

Stefan Immerfall
Göran Therborn
Editors

Handbook of European Societies

Social Transformations in the 21st Century

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Stefan Immerfall
Pädagogische Hochschule Schwäbisch Gmünd
University of Education
Institut für Humanwissenschaften - Soziologie
Oberbettringerstr. 200
73525 Schwäbisch Gmünd
Germany
stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

Göran Therborn
Department of Sociology
University of Cambridge
Free School Lane
Cambridge
United Kingdom CB2 3RQ
gt274@cam.ac.uk

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Country Codes

A	Albania
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
BG	Bulgaria
C	Croatia
CZ	Czech Republic
CY	Cyprus
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
FI	Finland
FR	France
G	Gibraltar
DE	Germany
EL	Greece
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
MC	Macedonia
MT	Malta
M	Moldova
NL	Netherlands
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
R	Russia
S	Serbia
SK	Slovakia
SI	Slovenia
ES	Spain
SE	Sweden
SW	Switzerland
TR	Turkey
U	Ukraine
UK	United Kingdom

Editors

Stefan Immerfall is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany. He graduated from Ruhr University in Germany and received his doctorate and his second doctorate from the University of Passau, Germany. Among his publications are *Safeguarding German-American Relations in the New Century: Understanding and Accepting Mutual Differences* (with Hermann Kurthen and Antonio Menendez), *Europa – politisches Einigungswerk und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung* (2006), *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies* (with Hans-Georg Betz, 1988), *Territoriality in the Globalizing Society* (1998), and *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich* (with Stefan Hradil, 1997). Besides European integration, his research topics include political economy and political sociology.

Göran Therborn is the Director of Research and Professor and Chair Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Cambridge. Prior to that, he was the co-Director of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences for 10 years, Professor of Sociology at Göteborg University in Sweden, and Professor of Political Science at the Catholic University in The Netherlands. His writings include the following books: *Science Class and Society* (1976), *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* (1978), *The Ideology of Power of and the Power of Ideology* (1980), *Why Some Peoples Are More Unemployed than Others* (1986), *European Modernity and Beyond* (1995), *Between Sex and Power. Family in the World, 1900–2000* (2004), *Inequalities of the World* (2006), and *From Marxism to Postmarxism?* (2009). His works have been translated into more than 20 languages. Currently, he is pursuing comparative global studies, and in particular, a project on the capital cities of the world.

Contributors

Thomas Bahle Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Germany, thomas.bahle@mzes.uni-mannheim.de

Dirk Baier Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Hannover, Germany, baier@kfn.uni-hannover.de

Rosemary Barberet John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA, rbarberet@jjay.cuny.edu

Sten Berglund Department of Social and Political Sciences, Örebro University, Sweden, sten.berglund@oru.se

Klaus Boehnke Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), Jacobs University Bremen, Germany, k.boehnke@jacobs-university.de

Petra Böhnke Inequality and Social Integration, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Germany, boehnke@wzb.eu

Sebastian Büttner Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, Germany, buettner@bigsss.uni-bremen.de

Roberto Cipriani Department of Sciences of Education, University of Roma Tre, Roma, Italy, rciprian@uniroma3.it

Jan Delhey School of Humanities and Social Science, Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany, j.delhey@jacobs-university.de

Joakim Ekman Department of Political Sciences, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden, joakim.ekman@shse

Tony Fahey Professor of Social Policy, University College Dublin, Ireland, tony.fahey@ucd.ie

Jürgen Gerhards Department of Sociology, Free University Berlin, Germany, j.gerhards@fu-berlin.de

Jukka Gronow Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, jukka.gronow@soc.uu.se

Elina Haavio-Mannila Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki, Finland, elina.haavio-mannila@helsinki.fi

Michael Hartmann Institute of Sociology, Technical University Darmstadt, Germany, hartmann@ifs.tu-darmstadt.de

Heather Hofmeister Institute of Sociology with the specialty Gender Studies, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany, heather.hofmeister@rwth-aachen.de

Stefan Immerfall Humanities Department, University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany, stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

Matti Joutsen Director of International Affairs, Ministry of Justice of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, matti.joutsen@om.fi

Irena Kogan Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, ikogan@mail.uni-mannheim.de

Jürgen Kohl Institute of Sociology, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany, juergen.kohl@soziologie.uni-heidelberg.de

Ulrich Kohler Inequality and Social Integration, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Germany, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany, kohler@wzb.eu

Patrick Le Galès Centre d'Etudes Européennes, Sciences Po and King's College London, UK, patrick.legales@sciences-po.fr

Steffen Mau Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, Germany, smau@bigsss.uni-bremen.de

Walter Müller Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Germany, wmueller@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

B. Guy Peters Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, bgpeters@pitt.edu

Eckhard Priller WZB, Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany, priller@wzb.eu

Péter Róbert Marie Curie Excellence Senior Research Fellow, UCD Geary Institute, Associate Professor, Social Science Faculty of the Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE), Hungary and Senior Researcher, TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Hungary, peter.robert@ucd.ie; robert@tarki.hu

Anna Rotkirch The Population Research Institute, The Family Federation of Finland, anna.rotkirch@vaestoliitto.fi

Dieter Rucht WZB, Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany, rucht@wzb.eu

Dale Southerton Sociology, Manchester University, UK, dale.southerton@man.ac.uk

Goran Therborn Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, UK, gt274@cam.ac.uk

Claus Wendt Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Germany, claus.wendt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de (currently: CES, Harvard University at wendt@fas.harvard.edu)

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Social Transformations in the 21st Century

Stefan Immerfall and Göran Therborn

It is always tempting for contemporaries to consider their times as exceptional. Still, today's Europe does look very different from the one only one generation ago. This is not because social change was stalled or absent in the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary! It was, quite rightfully, regarded as the time of turbulence which saw, just to mention a few social incidences, the expansion of education, the turn downwards of marriage and fertility rates, the shift towards the service sector, the finalization of the European welfare states, the return of women into the labour market, increasing affluence and the thawing of social and political cleavages. These changes took different forms in different countries, to be sure, and Western and Eastern Europe did display comparable but not converging patterns (Therborn 2000). Nevertheless, all of Europe was affected by similar and rapid changes.

A quarter century later, some people in the fortunate Western part of Europe, and even some in the more Eastern parts, look back with a certain feeling of nostalgia. As the social trends alluded to in the preceding paragraph testify, an increase in the velocity of social change cannot be the reason for this perception. This is no news to sociologists. As a matter of fact, social change and its perception were always in the centre of sociological attention. Both modernizations theory and Marxism with its many different variants saw relentless social change as key features of the modern condition (Zapf 2004). So it was not the slowing of social change that, looking back, gives the European 1960s, 1970s, and even the early 1980s a sense of intelligibility although the stagflation of the second half of the 1970s broke the assumptions of Keynesian economics. There the paradigms of social modernization or emancipation – from traditional religious patriarchy and hierarchy –, of capitalism and class struggle, whether seen from the Marxist left or from the neoliberal, “Thatcherite” right, and in the world at large there were, to some the free world vs. communism, and to others US imperialism and its allies vs. the peoples of the Third World. In neither of these rival frames of understanding the world had Europe or the EEC, as the EU was then called, any significant role.

Now those modes of seeing and understanding the world have largely eroded. Emancipation is no longer a clear horizon. Modernization has perhaps even become more popular among groups of German sociologists, but elsewhere in social theory and socio-cultural history it is well overshadowed by conceptual tools like multiple, alternative modernities or different roads to modernity. Capitalism, classes and, again increasingly,

S. Immerfall (✉)
Humanities Department, University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Schwäbisch Gmünd,
Germany
e-mail: stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

class conflict are still with us, but neoliberalism has lost its edge and Marxism its compass. Communism has imploded, and with it the free world banner has lost its meaning, since in spite of the intention of many its “freedom” was de facto little more than anti-communism. The peoples of the Third World are still suffering and struggling, but they have lost or shredded their heroic status. The American empire also remains in force, but without enemies whom Northern radicals could identify with, anti-imperialism has yielded to (pragmatic) pacifism, as in the huge European mobilizations against the US war on Iraq.

It is in this suddenly post-paradigmatic world that Europe, through the EU, has emerged as a phenomenon of global and of continental significance. The EU has become inevitable for any discussion about societies and states. The 1992 “Single Market” and the Eastern enlargement have demonstrably made the EU the most important institution on the western tip of the Eurasian continent. For about half a millennium Western Europe has been the world’s foremost trader, and as an economic union the EU has become the top economic player on the planet, on par with USA, the latter less of a trader but with more clout of political economy. European institutions have become inspirers of the world, the EU for the South American Mercosur and the North American NAFTA, for the upgrading of the Southeast Asian ASEAN and the revamping of the African Union. The transnational law of the Council of Europe has inspired a human rights jurisdiction of the Organization of American States.

With the end of the Cold War, neutral countries like Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the union. In the early post-Communist days of ruthless capitalism, drastic impoverishment among rapid enrichment and of seething chauvinism, the Western European Union held out the prospect of entering a prosperous regional configuration of democratic, social market capitalism, upon fulfilling conditions of democracy, social market institutions and ethnic equality (cf. Berend 2009). This prospect was probably crucial in saving the East–Central strip of Europe from the sad fate which befell all its liberal democracies in the interwar period.

However, these undeniable global and continental successes have not generated a European society sure and confident of itself. The Treaties of Rome of 1957 drive of “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”¹ is still being evoked in the, as of yet, still pending Treaty of Lisbon (amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community), but it seems to have run out of steam. The very institutional success has meant that the project of European integration, basically an elite technocratic project under the patronage of a few powerful politicians, Christian Democrats and French-Low Countries socialists, has been politicized, bringing deep socio-political cleavages to the fore whenever the people was allowed a voice, most importantly in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 (cf. Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). The very success of European institutions has laid bare a fracture of European society, a stark contrast between elite commitment and widespread scepticism and questioning (Haller 2008).

The prosperity of Europe has made it a natural in-migration area, after about 450 years of continental out-migration. Europe has again become part-Muslim, as it was

¹The phrase itself, long a red rag to Eurosceptics, has been dropped from the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Yet it has been replaced with the even stronger: “CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.” After the Constitutional Treaty run ashore, the subsequent 2007 Reform Treaty of Lisbon returned again to a wording more akin to that of the EEC treaty of Rome 1957: “RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Preamble, Treaty of Lisbon, consolidated version).

for about 800 years before 1492, friction of which has been exacerbated in the context of American–British and European wars and policies in the Middle East. Among some loud-mouthed European and US writers it has even led to strident calls for a Reconquista of “Eurabia” or “Islamicized Europe”. While the Western European mobility integration had little impact, the Eastern enlargement pulled large numbers of Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians and others to the West. On the whole these issues of immigration – and also that of the new Latin American wave into Spain – have been managed rather well, precisely, perhaps, because, even including the 2003 Accession country numbers, the European Commission has failed to unleash the desired “genuine mobility culture” for workers in the EU. But they add to the questions and the uncertainty about Europe.

Several external political challenges have put the European Union to tests, which it has largely not passed. One was the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 where the, then, EC was called upon and failed to devise and implement collective security measures. Another one was the American war on Iraq, which divided the political elites more than the populations, and to which no common European response was ever found. An enfolding crisis is the 2008 financial disaster, which revealed that the world’s prime trader was not equipped to deal with an economic crisis in any concerted way. In short, Europe has emerged as a continental social configuration, as a global pole of attraction and as a world player in markets and international law, but neither socially nor politically is it sure of its way ahead.

If Europe and the European Union figure prominently as centrepieces of hope and fear, it has not fared prominently as a main topic of sociological inquiry. After having a promising start with investigators like Karl Deutsch or Stein Rokkan, interest fizzled and did not revive until the last years. Analysis of the integrating of Europe was more or less left to economics and political science. There are many reasons for this lack of attention, absence of appropriate data being among them, but most importantly political integration seemed to be disconnected with the lives of ordinary people. This is the stuff sociologists are interested in. Thus, the sociology of European integration has two main foci, the social consequences of the integration process on the one hand and, vice versa, the social basis of political integration on the other. This is why a *Handbook of European Societies* is pertinent.

Such a handbook is not only timely, but also possible. As overviews like Kaelbe (1987), Hradil and Immerfall (1997), Crouch (1999), Therborn (2000), Hradil (2004), Immerfall (2006) and Alber et al. (2008) testify, a solid, though by no means perfect, empirical basis is starting to build up. More recently there has also been a proliferation of more specific sociological studies of the European Union (see the overviews by Guiraudon 2006 and Diez Mendrano 2008). While these studies successfully complemented the “top-down”, institution-focused approach that has dominated the field of EU studies, with the “people’s perspective”, they have been less successful in grasping the social bases of European integration (cf. Guiraudon and Favell 2007; Saurugger 2008; Trenz 2008). Therefore, we side with Guiraudon and Favell’s plea (2007: 3) to redress the balance between grand debates in social theory and normative approaches on the one hand and empirical groundwork aiding the development of an empirical sociology of European integration on the other hand in favour of the latter.

The *Handbook of European Societies* sets to rectify this neglect of societal developments in Europe, broadening the groundwork for the sociology of European integration. It wants to study the European Union as a social field, to analyse if and how the European project is or has been socially anchored, to explore how Europe is made through transnational interchanges and to find out how social change impinges upon political integration. We also hope our handbook will serve as a springboard for many research questions

because Europe has become a social scientist's laboratory begging topical questions in both politics and science.

When the editors, more than 5 years ago, jointly began pondering the idea of bringing into life such a handbook, they knew decisions had to be made. A first question concerned the societal trends and social patterns to be included. What would be a representative selection of major topics of social concern and of sociological relevance? We pragmatically determined "sociological and social relevance" simply by their being prominently present in most sociological introductory textbooks. Moreover, the topics also had to lend themselves to empirical and comparative scrutiny which did cut out concepts like "alienation" or "differentiation". Thus we arrived at a, what we thought, representative compilation of around 30 keywords. We then draw up a shortlist of leading researchers to synthesize existing knowledge and to make use of many different data sources in a straightforward style. We wanted them to stay away from jargon, simple labelling and sweeping assertions. Instead, they should provide solid and accessible information on a wide variety of social trends and processes within and across European societies.

As a chapter count reveals, we failed to cover all the topics we had in mind. In some cases it is the editors' fault, in other cases our enlisted authors backed out at such short notice we found it impossible to get adequate replacement. Still in other cases there was as of yet not enough cross-European expertise or data available. At any rate, we deeply regret to see topics like ethnicity, migration or labour missing even though they are at least referred to in several contexts.

A second question concerns the extension of Europe. What kind of Europe should be covered in this handbook? Again, we opted for a pragmatic solution and asked the authors to include as many countries and regions as data availability would permit. For each chapter we insisted to cover Europe methodologically as a unit of analysis. That is, we did neither presuppose nor rule out a European society as a reality or as a potential. This has to be determined empirically, topic by topic. Second, while in many cases and for pragmatic reasons, data will be at the nation-state level, the proper unit of analysis will depend on the subject in question, be it the individual, the household or the regional level.

A final, and perhaps the most important, question concerns the structuring of the chapters and, with it, of the whole handbook. In other words, What is the difference of this *Handbook of European Societies* to, say, a *Handbook of Social Trends*? Besides linking the question of social divergence and convergence to the political and economic integration of Europe, three more queries were insisted to be touched upon in each contribution:

- (1) "Europeanization from below":
How important is social integration for political integration? What are the social underpinnings to foster or to impede political integration? What is the impact of transnational and societal processes on EU and European integration? What is the interrelationship between Europe's internal diversity and political integration? How does the European Union reframe social processes at the member state and regional level?
- (2) "Europeanization from above":
What is the impact of EU on social change? How much do EU policies influence social patterns? What is the implication of the evolution of European institutions and politics for societal developments?
- (3) "Europe" at large:
What is "European" about European societies? Are there European idiosyncrasies in comparison to developments in America, Japan or Russia? What are main

developments and typical configurations? Is Europe a society in the making? What kind of a regime is the European system to bring about?

It is our hope to account for some of these conflicting trends. In other words, this handbook is concerned with issues of a Europeanization of the societies of Europe and with the distinctiveness of Europe in the world, as well as with providing solid and accessible information on a wide range of social processes and tendencies within and across the countries of Europe.

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Chapter 2

Association and Community

Stefan Immerfall, Eckhard Priller, and Jan Delhey

2.1 Introduction

Citizen's willingness to invest time and resources in causes other than their own is arguably a central requisite of liberal democracies (Lipset 1996). Even non-political associations seem to have unintended but important consequences for citizens' partaking in public affairs (Kwak et al. 2004). Volunteering is good for others and is good for you (Frey 2008: 79–86). This is not to say that all associational activity enhances the common good (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005) or that there is a one-way causality between high levels of associational activity and effective political and economic institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Yet, there is enough evidence about benevolent effects of associational involvement to warrant further investigation into the scope and the structure of civic engagement.

The question of civic engagement is of particular importance in – and for – Europe. Civic engagement is not only significant within the context of the nation state but even more crucial as a prerequisite to Europe's societal integration. Divergence in the practices of civic engagement in different member states may preclude the emergence of a European public sphere. Exceedingly different degrees of citizen involvement between the nation-states and a poorly developed cross-national exchange will distort the aggregation of citizens' preferences in European politics. In contrast vibrant civil societies operate as a potential antidote to the democratic deficit of the EU.

This chapter will analyse, describe and compare a wide range of social and citizen participation. We will study membership and engagement in voluntary associations (citizen participation) and also less formal involvement in the neighbourhood and in the community (social participation). We will also look at patterns of inter-personal trust in people from one's own and from other countries as a certain level of transnational trust would seem to represent a prerequisite for the development of a vibrant European civil society.

After an initial characterisation of civic engagement we will start out with informal dimensions of social cohesion (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). We then describe types, scope and patterns of voluntarism in comparative perspective. Similarities and differences between the member states will be elaborated at the empirical level of observation. The question is whether it is possible to draw up separate profiles of civic engagement for different groups of countries and, if so, how each individual group should be characterised (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 probes explanations for the country variations at work. Section 2.6 looks

S. Immerfall (✉)
Humanities Department, University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany
e-mail: stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

at the relationship between social bonding and trust and then moves on to providing a transnational perspectives: Do Europeans trust each other?

2.2 The (Re-)discovery of Civic Engagement

Civic engagement has only recently received renewed attention. This is evidenced, for example, by the United Nations' declaration of the year 2001 as the International Year of Volunteers. Scientific analyses carried out in the past few years have mainly sought to ascertain the level of engagement of citizens, the extent to which the latter is influenced by the underlying social structure and by both the individual motives behind and the many impediments to civic engagement. From the political perspective, interest in various European countries has focused on changes to national legislation which has furthered the design of social parameters that foster engagement.

From the point of view of different topical concepts of society and of blueprints for its future, then civic involvement is mainly given importance in three respects:

1. Civic engagement is seen to have a particular role in democratic theory in that it can be used to pool, articulate and push through interests. Engagement is even increasingly believed to be an indispensable aspect of a functioning democracy.
2. Civic engagement is seen as an important producer of welfare in that it plays a substantial role in the creation and allocation of so-called collective goods. This includes creating services in the areas of children and youth projects, environmental protection, charity and emergency services. Other collective goods that are also based to a large extent on the involvement of private citizens include sporting activities, the organisation of cultural events and the provision of opportunities for education and further education.
3. Finally, civic engagement is considered particularly important for the maintenance and cultivation of social cohesion in a society. Because the influence of institutions like the family that traditionally foster social integration and create social bonds has diminished in modern societies, the value of citizen involvement is growing.

Just as civic engagement proves to have many layers when it comes to situating it in different scientific contexts, its very definition is already complex in itself. Civic engagement appears to be a collective category that encompasses various types of voluntary activity geared towards the common good. The term "civic engagement" can equally be used to describe political efforts to defend human and civil rights and in relation to activities carried out in the social, cultural and leisure spheres. Although civic engagement usually refers to voluntary work carried out on a regular basis, the range of possible activities is often conceived as being more wide-reaching. For example, civil courage, participation in various types of protest, sporadic participation in the activities of clubs, associations and other organisations and making donations in support of particular activities carried out by such organisations can all be considered forms of civic engagement (cf. Enquete-Kommission 2002: 16).

Civic engagement is usually more institutionalised than what we have called collective action (see Chapter 6). What the former different definitions have in common is that they concern activities that are usually linked to some form of organisation, ranging from citizens' projects and self-help groups to clubs, associations and foundations as well as

political parties and trade unions. These organisational structures are seen as the underlying infrastructure for civic engagement. Although formal membership in an organisation says very little about what people actually do, it is often considered evidence of civic engagement. Beyond organised engagement, citizen involvement is also found in the form of activities carried out informally at neighbourhood, local or family level.

A decisive criterion for the characterisation of activities within or without an organisational context as civic engagement is its public aspect. Any behaviour that only or primarily serves private purposes thus cannot be defined as civic engagement. It must be emphasised that the activities in question here are not necessarily those that are acceptable according to the prevailing norms, that are categorised as morally “good” and considered in some way altruistic.¹ On the contrary, civic engagement is usually in some way concerned with the articulation of interests, and the actual activity must therefore not by any means necessarily comply with the prevailing norms (Rucht 2003: 22). And in contrast to collective action again, it is not necessarily meant to influence society and politics.

For a long time, civic engagement was not believed to have a very promising future – especially when seen in the context of the further development of the welfare state. Until well into the 1990s, volunteer workers were considered relics of the past in many countries. They were seen as well-meaning amateurs who helped out in the provision of professionally planned services and were often actually considered an obstacle to the implementation of such services. Proponents of the latter view believed volunteer workers might have been better replaced by paid professional staff. Although civic engagement was officially appreciated and applauded by policy-makers and large organisations on appropriate occasions, it also tended to be derided as a playground for people who were obsessed with joining clubs (cf. Anheier and Toepler 2003: 15; Kistler et al. 1999, 2002).

This attitude has changed recently in the sense that under the current economic pressure and in the context of the symptoms of three modern crises – the crisis of the welfare state, the crisis of the social security systems and the crisis of (i.e. growing dissatisfaction with) democracy – civic engagement has become an essential component of a new model of order and organisation. According to this new perspective, the state, the economy and civil society should collaborate more closely in the future. Increasingly, a closer link between civic engagement, participation in public life, social cohesion and democratic development is now being advocated – the kind of link already seen by Tocqueville as an antidote to escalating individualisation and destructive materialism.

2.3 Social Participation, Individual Characteristics and Social Ties

In view of this renewed discussion there is perhaps the danger of overestimating the beneficial effects of civic engagement. Sweeping expectations that civic engagement can help to resolve the state’s and society’s urgent problems both today and tomorrow could ultimately lead to an overload on its capacities (Priller 2007). Any discussion of civic participation has to begin with recognising the fact that politics usually is not an important issue for

¹Therefore, the United Nations’ definition of civic engagement, describing it as non-profit, non-wage contributions made by individuals in the interests of the well-being of their neighbours and of society as a whole and with a view to tackling particularly significant problems in the social, economic, cultural, humanitarian and peace-keeping spheres (United Nations 1999: 2), has to be taken with quite a pinch of salt.




Fig. 2.1 Important things in life. How important is each of these things in your life? (From 0 to 10)
Source: *ESS 2002/2003*,² country weighting was applied

most people. On a scale of 10 and compared to five other areas of possible relevance, politics ranks last (Fig. 2.1). In this respect there is not much difference between countries. There is also a broad agreement on the ranking across and within countries of the choices offered to the respondents, with one exception. This exception is religion. While there is a sizable minority in all countries to which religion is very important, there are countries such as Poland to which religion is, on the average, much more important than in most other European countries (see Chapter 15).

This peripheral status of politics does not mean, however, that political issues cannot grab the attention of citizens and that, occasionally, ordinary citizens may become politically very active. Even though around 40 per cent of the ESS population can “definitely” not think of taking an active role in a group involved with political issues, the figure being somewhat smaller in the Scandinavian and German speaking countries and higher in Hungary, France, Spain and Portugal (see Fig. 2.2), 8, respectively, 15 percent claim on

²The European Social Survey (ESS) is a representative population survey initiated by the European Science Foundation (ESF). A total of 22 countries participated in the first wave (2002/2003): Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Data on civic engagement are available for 19 European countries and Israel, the exceptions being the Czech Republic and Switzerland. The project is funded by the European Commission, the EFS and national organisations. The ESS has the long-term aim of examining interactions between the changing political and economic institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns of the populations in countries studied. The representative population surveys carried out in the participating countries are based on a standard questionnaire eliciting information about different aspects of political and social life, which is complemented by additional questions specific to each country and to rotating priority topics. For more information see <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>




Fig. 2.2 Could take an active role in a group involved with political issues Source: ESS 2002/2003

the other hand they “definitely” or “probably” do so. This declaration has to be taken with a pinch of salt since, when asked if they had voted in the last election, there is an over-reporting of 5–10 per cent. Nevertheless, as the huge demonstrations in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and elsewhere at the advent of the breakdown of communism have testified, people can be mobilized given the right circumstances and incentives (see Chapter 5).

This is also true for membership in associations. We will look at the composition and membership of voluntary organisations in more detail below. At this point we want to illustrate some of the social patterns leading to membership keeping in mind that research on these issues is only in the preliminary stages. Both social networks and personal resources have been established as driving forces. Resources – income, education, status – mean that a person usually wields more power in an organisation. Such a person has also more to win or lose than a person with few resources. Networks – links that you have to different kinds of people – work in different directions. The simplest case would be that having friends in organisations increases chances to becoming a member. And vice versa: being a member increases the likelihood of gaining and making friends in organisations and associations.

We will start to probe this relation by looking at the political participation as a target variable. In our survey different ways of trying to improve things or helping to prevent things from going wrong have been presented to the respondent. They range from “contacting a politician, government or local government official” to “donating money to a political organisation or group”. There were altogether nine possibilities.³ About half of the respondents reported to have done at least one of the political actions during the last 12 months; the other half reported not having done any.

³We did exclude illegal political action from the analysis.

Table 2.1 Social ties and inclination to political action: model summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.510(a)	.260	.260	1.44622

a Predictors: (Constant), Household's total net income, all sources, wTies, sTies, Number of friends in organisations, Years of full-time education completed

	Coefficients (a)				
	Unstandardised coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	b	Std. Error	beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	-.900	.040		-22.255	.000
Weak Ties	.077	.004	.094	17.589	.000
Strong Ties	.048	.015	.017	3.136	.002
Number of friends in organisations	.470	.007	.353	64.369	.000
Years of full-time education completed	.083	.002	.199	35.301	.000
Household's total net income, all sources	.057	.004	.082	14.167	.000

Source: ESS 2002/2003.

a Dependent variable: number of ways of trying to improve things.

Weak Ties: Indicator from 0 to 10 based on answers how often respondent meets with friends in different social occasions.

Strong ties: Indicator from 0 to 2; 2 means respondent lives with a partner and has somebody to talk about personal matters (other than partner).

Number of friends in organisations: ranging from 0 to 8.

Household's income: based on 11-point scale for all countries.

We see that the model explains a little more than a quarter of the variance of the dependent participation variable (R^2). Resource variables (income and education) have the expected positive sign, i.e. they contribute to resorting to political activities. Yet, in the case of income, this is of a modest influence. We can speculate that high-income people have other venues of exercising political clout than through associational participation.⁴ The number of friends indeed is the most important predictor. We do not know from our cross-sectional analysis what tends to come first, friends who are in organisation or political participation to make friends. Research seems to indicate both self-selection (trusting and sociable persons are more likely to join) and socialising effects (membership makes people more trusting and provides opportunities to make friends) (Immerfall 2001; Wollebaek and Selle 2003; Kwak et al. 2004). According to Table 2.1, the influence of strong ties indeed is negligible and the impact of weak ties, while perceptible, is much weaker than having membership friends. It helps to be sociable but having a social network that reaches into organisations is more important.

Returning to the question of the social composition, it is well known that higher socio-economic status, middle age and, particularly, higher education influence an individual's propensity to join voluntary organisations and to engage in volunteer work (Immerfall 1997; Bühlmann and Freitag 2007; Hoskins et al. 2008). While most Europeans (64 per cent) do not actively participate or do voluntary work in organisations, for instance, nearly

⁴The income factor is partly captured by the number of friends. According to our analyses of ISSP 1986 data, in all participating countries persons with higher social status report more "good friends" than lower status persons (between 25 and 40% more).

half of the respondents classified as managers do so compared to 20 percent of unemployed people.⁵ This socially skewed pattern has led to questioning the “Tocquevillean argument” about the benevolent impact of associations. Nevertheless, the argument still holds on two grounds: First, persons with greater levels of involvement in voluntary organisations also engage in more political acts and are generally more trusting of others than those who do not, even when controlling for a host of important demographic factors (Howard and Gilbert 2008). Second, and in accordance with the foregoing analysis, effects of associational activity have positive external effects to community or country at large, including those citizens who do not participate (Newton 2008: 253–256).

In sum, taking part in political issues is not very important for most people most of the time, but that having friends connected to organisations makes a perceptible difference. This pattern basically holds for all tested countries thus begging the question why levels of voluntary association membership are so different between countries. Before examining potential determinants explaining country profiles, we have to describe and classify country-specific patterns.

2.4 Patterns, Types and Scope of European Volunteerism

2.4.1 Methodological Basis

Civic engagement is generally seen to be culturally shaped and subject to the influence of national policies and it is therefore usually examined with respect to its particular profile and characteristics at national level. At the same time, it has long been recognised that the characteristics and scope of civic engagement also vary from region to region and in relation to the structure of the society in which it is embedded. An examination of similarities and differences can, to a certain extent, allow conclusions about the current and future functioning of different societies. If, in the process of internationalisation and in a globalised world, there are notable differences in levels of engagement at national levels, then in those countries with weak civic engagement, other institutions must carry out the functions of democratic participation, production of welfare and social integration that are normally assigned to involved citizens, or these countries will suffer political, economic and social deficits, all of which harbour risks of social distortion.

The following empirical analysis draws in particular on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002/2003. This database allows us to examine civil society involvement in detail and at many different levels. It is characterised by a proven theoretical concept and by high standards of methodology. The civic engagement of the citizens surveyed is ascertained on the basis of the incidence or absence during the preceding 12 months of the following forms of involvement:

1. formal membership in an organisation in one of 12 different areas (sports, culture, trade unions, trade, professional or farmers’ associations, consumer protection or automobile clubs, humanitarian aid or human rights, environmental protection or animal welfare, religion or organised churches, political parties, educational or parents’ associations, hobbies or leisure time, other);
2. participation in the activities of the above organisations (i.e. the respondent joins in the activities of an organisation);

⁵According to Special Eurobarometer 273/Wave 66.3: European Social Reality (Fieldwork November–December 2006). [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_273_en.pdf; 10.03.2009].

3. financial donations to organisations;
4. volunteering and other unpaid activity and work carried out in or through an organisation which involves donating time that goes beyond simple participation and joining in.

Because the details of engagement are restricted to activities in civil society organisations, other forms of involvement, such as direct aid to neighbours or participation in specific statutory bodies of democratic representation (e.g. membership in the municipal council, or activity as a lay judge), are not taken into consideration. The ESS also fails to provide data on civic engagement in all European countries. Thus, for example, details of civil society involvement are missing for Switzerland, although the survey was also carried out on the Swiss population. As regards the post-socialist countries, data on this topic are available only for Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.

The following national rates were calculated in relation to the four types of civic engagement studied (membership, participation, donations and active involvement): membership rates (share of respondents who were members of at least one organisation), participation rates (share of respondents who took part in the activities of at least one organisation), donation rates (share of respondents who donated money to at least one organisation) and activity rates (share of respondents who carried out voluntary work in at least one organisation). The reference population consisted of all citizens aged 15 and above.

In relation to the four factors of membership, participation, donations and active involvement, it emerges that while there are very substantial differences between the averages for the 19 countries, repeating patterns can still be identified with respect to the individual factors.

2.4.2 Membership as Civic Engagement

Membership in clubs, associations and other organisations is probably one of the simplest forms of civic engagement. Although membership often has no more than formal character and says little about the degree of an individual's involvement in an organisation, as a voluntary activity on the part of citizens, it is still an expression of participation and social integration (cf. Gabriel et al. 2002: 39). Unlike informal and short-term relationships, membership in an organisation acts as a basis for contact that persists over a prolonged period of time, and often permanently. Voluntary membership or, as alluded to in Section 2.3, membership of one's friends is often a precursor for additional forms of civic engagement. Thus, many citizens are drawn into active involvement in an organisation through their membership. They are encouraged to participate in the organisation's activities and support these by donating their time or their money. For this reason simple formal membership must be considered an important form of civic engagement.

The citizens of the various European countries examined here differ with respect to their membership in civil society organisations. While the European average, at 54 percent, indicates that more than every second citizen in Europe is a member of at least one organisation (membership rate), the differences from one country to another are actually very substantial. Large differentials are evident between the northern and the southern European countries and also between the western and the eastern European countries (see Fig. 2.3).

While the Danes, at 93 percent, the Swedes, at 91 percent, the Luxembourgers, at 86 percent, and the Norwegians and Dutch, at 84 percent each, all have extremely high rates for membership in organisations, the Portuguese, at 29 percent, the Hungarians, at




Fig. 2.3 Membership rates in European comparison

27 percent, the Greeks, at 25 percent, and the Poles, of whom at 21 percent only every fifth citizen is a member of an organisation, are at the bottom of the rankings.

2.4.3 Participation in the Activities of Civil Society Organisations

Levels of participation in the activities of civil society organisations also vary substantially across the countries of Europe. What is being measured here are those types of engagement that can be described as participating or simply “joining in”. Irrespective of membership, more than every third citizen (34 percent) in the 19 European countries examined participates in the activities of organisations (see Fig. 2.4).

The Danes, the Britons and the Belgians, at 49 percent each, take joint first place for participation rates in the countries studied, followed closely behind by the Swedes, at 48




Fig. 2.4 Participation rates in civil society organisations

percent, and the Norwegians, at 46 percent. The lower ranks are occupied by the Italians, at 22 percent, the Hungarians, at 20 percent, the Portuguese, at 18 percent, the Greeks, at 13 percent, and the Poles, at 11 percent. A comparison of the countries that show high rates for both membership and participation shows substantial correspondence. And this is even more true for the countries that have the lowest rates in both cases. But if, on the one hand, membership plays an important role as a prerequisite for participation in the activities of organisations, then, on the other, it is also true that clearly only around half of all members of organisations actually participate in the activities of the organisations of which they are members. Countries such as France, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal are exceptions in this regard. Here, the ratio between membership and participation rates is more favourable, that is, the share of organisation members who also participate in the activities of organisations is higher. The ratio is less favourable in Luxembourg, by contrast, which suggests that this country has a high incidence of merely formal memberships.

2.4.4 Donations to Civil Society Organisations

Donations to civil society organisations represent an entirely different form of civic engagement. Donation of money and goods has a long history in Europe. At the same time, the aims, motives and parameters of donating vary across different countries. The term donation is taken to mean, in very general terms, the transfer of money, goods or services for the common good (specifically, for social, church-related, cultural, non-profit or charitable purposes) on a voluntary basis and not in exchange for an equivalent material service.

The particular characteristics of donations (i.e. their nature as a voluntary contribution that does not entail any direct service in return is given in accordance with a specific sense of responsibility and is intended for the public good) by their very definition distinguish this type of involvement from other forms of civic engagement. Nowadays donations are rarely made directly to the needy, rather they are first collected and then redistributed by non-profit, charitable or church organisations. The average that emerges for the countries studied is that more than every fourth citizen makes donations to organisations (see Fig. 2.5).

The countries with the highest donation rates are Sweden and the Netherlands, at 44 percent each, followed by Norway, at 41 percent, Great Britain, at 40 percent, and Austria, at 38 percent, while Spain, at 15 percent, Poland and Italy, at 12 percent each, Greece, at 9 percent, and Hungary, at 6 percent, bring up the rear. The same order of countries emerges when considering only the subset of donations to organisations working for humanitarian aid, migrant and minority organisations and other organisations active in international relief. If this proportion is taken as an indicator for transnational solidarity, it seems that it is growing somewhat faster than voluntary giving overall. This is at least true for Germany and the United States for which we have comparable data since the 1980s (Radtke 2007; Fig. 2.6). The increase is quite uneven, however, partly reflecting media coverage of selective disasters.

In sum, the positions of the individual countries do not change substantially with respect to different types of civic engagement. Countries, in which many citizens are member of civil society organisations and also participate in their activities, also have very large shares of citizens who make donations to organisations. There is no crowding-out between welfare-state expenditures and voluntary donations.




Fig. 2.5 Donation rates in European comparison




Fig. 2.6 Donations overall and donation to International Affairs (United States 1987 to 2003)

2.4.5 Volunteering and Other Activities in and for Civil Society Organisations

The presence of civil society organisations and citizens’ “passive” participation in them appears to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a dynamic civil society. What is ultimately decisive for the functioning and the vitality of a civil society is the extent to which its citizens actively participate in organisations and cultivate activities within this context. This form of engagement is characterised in particular by the assumption of responsibility, and it generally involves greater effort than the other forms in terms of




Fig. 2.7 Activity rates in European comparison

time invested. Actively involving oneself in collective and social processes of discussion, decision-making and implementation can be seen as an individual effort to contribute to the shaping of society at both the micro and the macro level. In addition to numerous voluntary functions (usually elected positions in organisations), this form of civic engagement also includes those activities that go beyond direct participation and simply joining in and is therefore characterised by the active assumption of responsibility for specific tasks oriented towards the public good. At 17 percent, almost every fifth citizen in the countries studied holds a voluntary position or carries out other unpaid work in civil society organisations (see Fig. 2.7).

The countries that have the highest rates for the forms of engagement examined up to now also have comparatively high rates for voluntary work and other unpaid activities in organisations. Norway, at 37 percent, followed by Sweden, at 35 percent, leads the rankings here. In both of these countries, more than a third of the population aged over 15 is actively involved in civil society organisations. By contrast, the rates for active involvement are particularly low in Italy and Portugal, at 5 percent each, and in Spain, Greece and Poland, where they amount in each case to 6 percent.

2.4.6 Reciprocal Links Between Forms of Engagements

When we look at the reciprocal links between the four types of engagement studied, we can confirm what other research has already found. While there is no one-to-one link between the degree of organisation of a society and the amount of civic engagement in that society (Weßels 2004: 196), at the same time, those countries in which a large share of citizens are members of at least one organisation also have very high rates compared to other countries for the other three forms of civil society involvement.

We can classify the countries studied in four separate groups based on our data on the different forms of civic engagement (see Table 2.2). Sweden and Norway belong to the top-ranking countries for all four types of civic engagement. The same applies to the

Table 2.2 Country groups by level and type of civic engagement

	Membership	Participation	Donations	Active involvement
High level	>75%	>40%	>40%	>30%
	Denmark	Denmark	Sweden	Norway
	Sweden	Great Britain	Netherlands	Sweden
	Luxembourg	Belgium	Norway	
	Norway	Sweden		
	The Netherlands	Norway		
	Finland	Germany		
		France		
		The Netherlands		
Medium level	51–75%	31–40%	31–40%	21–30%
	Austria	Finland	Great Britain	The Netherlands
	Belgium	Ireland	Austria	Denmark
	Germany	Austria	Germany	Germany
	Great Britain		Denmark	Great Britain
	Ireland		Ireland	Belgium
	Slovenia		Slovenia	
	France			
Low level	26–50%	21–30%	21–30%	11–20%
	Spain	Luxembourg	Belgium	Slovenia
	Italy	Slovenia	France	France
	Portugal	Spain		Ireland
	Hungary	Italy		Luxembourg
				Austria
				Finland
Minimum level	<26%	<21%	<21%	<11%
	Greece	Hungary	Luxembourg Finland	Hungary
	Poland	Portugal	Portugal	Spain
		Greece	Spain	Portugal
		Poland	Poland	Greece
			Italy	Poland
			Greece	Italy
			Hungary	

Database: ESS 2002/2003.

Netherlands for three types of engagement (membership, participation, donations) and to Denmark for two types. Finland, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Germany and France feature in the high-level group only once and otherwise are found in the medium-level group.

Two other findings may actually seem surprising, by contrast. Slovenia, one of the eastern European countries that only recently joined the European Union, has two medium-level and two low-level rankings, which puts it ahead of Italy, Spain and Portugal and almost on par with France. Moreover, the post-socialist countries covered by the survey, whose weak civic engagement is often seen as a legacy of their socialist past, are not the only countries found in the group with minimum participation rates. In addition to Poland (four times) and Hungary (three times), the group with the lowest level of involvement also contains Greece (four times), Portugal (three times) and Spain and Italy (twice each). Thus, simple explanatory models that attribute low levels of civic engagement only to the new EU members from eastern and central Europe are evidently inaccurate. In addition to, and even more important than the East–West gradient there is a North–South differential for civic engagement.

Table 2.3 Group profiles for civic engagement

Designation	Description	Countries
Profile 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> –High rates of all types of engagement (especially membership, participation, active involvement) in different areas. –Substantial gaps between different areas (top rates for trade unions, sport, consumer protection/automobile clubs) –Different patterns of membership, participation, donations and active involvement in different areas –Large gaps between membership rates and rates for other types of engagement 	Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
Profile 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> –High rates of engagement only in the areas of sport and consumer protection/automobile clubs –Less substantial gaps between levels of engagement in different areas –The gaps between different rates for membership, participation, donations and active involvement are smaller in most areas –The gaps between membership and the other forms of engagement are smaller 	Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria
Profile 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> –Rates for the different types of engagement are low in most areas; medium levels are reached only in the areas of culture, sport and trade unions –The differences in levels of engagement are minor across the different areas –The gaps between membership and the other forms of engagement are smaller 	France, Slovenia, Spain
Profile 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> –Rates of engagement are weak in all areas –There are only small differences between the rates of engagement in the different areas –The rates for membership, participation, donations and active involvement almost coincide in the individual areas 	Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Hungary

Source: ESS 2002/2003.

Another way to examine the country-specific differences more closely is to also look at citizens' involvement in individual areas of activity or individual types of organisations. It then emerges that there are not only substantial differences as regards the extent of civic engagement in different countries, but that differences can also be found across countries as regards involvement in different areas of organisational activity (cf. Table 2.3). Again, this typology closely follows the clustering of the European countries into a Nordic, Western, Southern and Eastern region.

A final way to ascertain European cross-country differences in the extent and the structure of civic engagement is to set it against an international perspectives. The three indicators of civic involvement – participation in voluntary organisations, a new “civic involvement index” and political action – displayed in Table 2.4 shows the United States – since Alexis de Tocqueville praised for their high levels of civic engagement – usually falling between the West and the Nordic European country cluster. The reason for the United States being less exceptional with regard to civic engagement is that association activity in the United States has decreased since the mid-1960s, and especially after 1975, whereas in Western and Scandinavian countries there was no quantitative shift away from involvement in voluntary associations (Dekker and van den Broek 2005; Andersen et al. 2006).

Table 2.4 Civic engagement in Europe, Israel and the United States

	Participation in voluntary organisations (a)	Civic involvement index (b)	Political action (c)	Religious belonging (d)	Religiosity (e)	Generalized trust (f)	Institutional trust (g)	Trust in politicians (h)
Nordic countries								
Denmark	0.89	39.13	1.57	58.11	4.36	6.82	7.07	5.47
Finland	0.55	50.28	1.76	75.94	5.55	6.34	6.84	4.78
Norway	0.89	52.39	2.00	50.59	4.11	6.53	6.34	4.58
Sweden	0.90	52.33	1.99	29.72	3.72	6.25	6.25	4.72
Nordic mean	0.81	48.53	1.83	53.59	4.44	6.48	6.62	4.89
Western Europe								
Austria	0.77	31.32	1.53	71.38	5.20	5.31	5.88	3.52
Belgium	0.97	39.15	1.46	49.00	4.96	4.95	5.01	6.08
France	0.75	45.09	1.63	48.66	3.78	4.82	5.06	3.63
Germany	0.80	52.30	1.57	60.89	4.23	5.09	5.66	3.50
Ireland	0.73	47.03	1.32	82.65	5.77	5.81	5.38	3.75
Luxembourg	0.45	42.75	1.53	73.97	4.05	5.08	6.11	4.75
Netherlands	0.75	51.58	1.14	43.73	5.07	5.72	5.47	4.87
Switzerland	–	–	1.94	62.51	5.20	5.72	6.25	4.93
United Kingdom	0.91	52.61	1.52	48.72	4.30	5.34	5.25	3.79
WE mean	0.77	45.23	1.52	60.17	4.73	5.32	5.56	4.31
Southern Europe								
Greece	0.19	13.81	0.55	97.11	7.67	3.44	5.86	3.46
Italy	0.37	25.15	0.76	77.28	6.14	4.39	5.67	3.54
Portugal	0.31	18.63	0.53	85.82	5.70	4.45	4.61	2.82
Spain	0.46	26.57	1.05	78.21	4.40	4.84	4.86	3.37
SE mean	0.33	21.04	0.72	84.60	5.98	4.28	5.25	3.29
Eastern Europe								
Czech Republic	–	–	1.11	30.08	3.06	4.44	4.15	3.22
Hungary	0.35	21.60	0.49	63.07	4.39	4.29	5.01	3.88
Poland	0.16	12.63	0.51	93.33	6.61	3.78	4.04	2.72
Slovenia	0.37	32.39	0.56	50.63	4.86	4.29	4.41	3.07

Table 2.4 (continued)

	Participation in voluntary organisations (a)	Civic involvement index (b)	Political action (c)	Religious belonging (d)	Religiosity (e)	Generalized trust (f)	Institutional trust (g)	Trust in politicians (h)
EE mean	0.29	22.21	0.67	59.28	4.73	4.2	4.40	3.22
Nordic mean	0.81	48.53	1.83	53.59	4.44	6.48	6.62	4.89
WE mean	0.77	45.23	1.52	60.17	4.73	5.32	5.56	4.31
SE mean	0.33	21.04	0.72	84.60	5.98	4.28	5.25	3.29
EE mean	0.29	22.21	0.67	59.28	4.73	4.2	4.40	3.22
Israel	0.49	30.15	1.10	74.31	4.72	4.92	5.84	3.25
United States	0.71	36.13	1.57	70.57	6.16	5.31	5.42	4.11

Source: CID 2007 [fieldwork between mid-May and mid-July of 2005], Georgetown University⁶

(a) Respondents were asked whether, over the previous 12 months, they had been involved in any organisation (a list of 12 organisations was presented), average number of organisations in which respondents participated is displayed.

(b) The "Civic Involvement Index" allows for the following combinations: Inactive (no involvement of any kind), Passive (member only, donor only or member and donor only), Active (volunteer only, participant only, any combination, of either volunteer or participant with member or donor), Super-active (volunteer and participant only or three or more of the above), displayed is the percentage of respondents who are classified as either "active" or "super-active".

(c) Same as in Table 2.1.

(d) Percentage of people for each country who consider themselves as belonging to any particular religion or denomination.

(e) Respondents' inner religiosity based on asking how religious people say they are regardless whether belonging to a particular religion; average on a 0–10 scale, with 0 indicating "not at all religious" and 10 representing "very religious".

(f) Respondents' predispositions towards strangers, or other people in general, based on the following three questions: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?" "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?" Each question had a 0–10 scale, with 0 representing the lowest possible trust and 10 the highest. Average of these three scores is displayed.

(g) Average trust Parliament, Legal System, Police on a scale of 0–10 each.

(h) Trust in politicians on a scale of 0–10.

⁶The US "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" (CID) survey is a major study of American civic engagement in a comparative perspective. It integrates data from the ESS that stems from the ESS 2002/2003. For more information consult <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdaacs/cid/>.

Table 2.5 Civic engagement correlation matrix

	Participation in Voluntary Organisations	Civic Involvement Index	Political Action	Generalized Trust	Institutional Trust	Trust in Politicians
Participation in Voluntary Organisation	1	.816	.840	.765	.422	.645
Civic Involvement Index	.816	1	.841	.782	.478	.551
Political Action	.840	.841	1	.820	.640	.627
Generalized Trust	.765	.782	.820	1	.723	.663
Institutional Trust	.422	.478	.640	.723	1	.611
Trust in Politicians	.645	.551	.627	.663	.611	1

The United States is still “exceptional” in terms of religion, however. They are more religious than every West European country other than actively Catholic Ireland. The Nordic countries are equally on the high end of participation, volunteering and involvement, followed relatively closely by the West European countries, and then there is a much bigger drop to the South European countries, which are just above the East European countries. To a lesser extent, the same country pattern holds for trust. As the correlation coefficients in Table 2.5 show, the relationship between civic engagement and trust is particularly strong for generalized trust, i.e. trust that goes beyond known family and close friends. The correlation is weaker for trust in the political institutions and in the politicians. Before exploring the relationship between trust and civic engagement in more detail, we will probe the causes of cross-country differences.

2.5 Explanation of Country-Specific Similarities and Differences

Voluntary association membership and other forms of civic participation continue to vary dramatically among nations. The joiners of the 1970s were also the joiners of the 1990s (Immerfall 1997; Priller and Zimmer 2005), while the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries present oddly new challenges. Many studies carried out to date have failed to provide convincing explanations for the differences across countries (cf. van Deth 2004: 306). Country differences cannot be explained by variations in population composition or attributes, such as the age structure or differences in socioeconomic status (Immerfall 1997; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Attempts have often been made to relate country differences to the traditional religion of each population. The suggestion is that the north of Europe, with its Protestant and, if at all, denominationally mixed communities, is characterised by a high level of engagement, while there is little civic involvement in the more Catholic south of Europe. But this argument has weak explanatory power in Western Europe, for a start, for in the Catholic countries of Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium and Ireland, rates of engagement in some cases far exceed the European average. The argument also fails to explain the situation in the eastern European countries studied, which are also predominantly Catholic, but of which Slovenia nonetheless comes very close to the European average for civic engagement. In general, Protestants do exhibit a higher level of civil societal engagement while the spillover effect, implying that religious citizens also volunteer more for secular organisations, is stronger for Catholics than for Protestants (see Ruiter and de Graaf 2006).

Which other economic, political and social factors could lead to the different structural patterns? One explanation focuses on different structural contexts a country might provide. For instance, one could hypothesize that in countries with a high level of direct democracy there is little associational participation since citizens find official venues of participation more responsive. Yet, different kinds of participation usually vary together; if participation is comparatively high on one measure of participation it is most generally high on others as well. There should also be an event factor. In countries where important decisions are imminent there should be more mobilisation. Hotly contested debates about, for instance, joining the EU should increase associational participation. But at least for the CEE this expectation has not been borne out (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004).

Prolonged and continuous experience with democratic institutions and high levels of economic development are clearly important predictors of cross-national variations in voluntary associations (Curtis et al. 2001). A social and political framework set by the rule of law, low levels of corruption and the predominance of universal non-discriminating welfare programmes are also conducive to social and political participation (Newton and Giebler 2008). These co-variations obviously beg the question of cause and effect. It remains difficult to say what comes first: a “good society” or a thriving civil society (Wallace and Pichler 2009).

One of the main reasons for the dearth of well-founded attempts to explain national differences in civic engagement is the fact that civic engagement has primarily been observed in isolation to date, with little consideration being given to the complex setting in which it is embedded. Thus, in the past, civic engagement has often been analysed only at the individual level, detached from its social and cultural environment. What is needed, instead, is to tie civic engagement into its social context and to also include the analysis of the organisations in which the engagement takes place. Civic engagement would thus no longer be understood simply as the fruit of a one-sided decision by individuals, but as a social, cultural and economic phenomenon. In addition to micro-level analyses, then, the influences of the meso and macro levels must also be taken into account if a step forward is to be made in identifying the essential determinants of civic engagement.

An analysis from this perspective leads to the finding that national engagement rates depend to a significant extent on the ways in which societies are organised and the ways in which they distribute social responsibility (cf. Anheier and Toepler 2003: 13). The international comparative perspective reveals further that the basic structures of civil society vary from country to country and are shaped differently by the influence of each country’s specific historical and cultural contexts. Whereas in western European countries we find highly institutionalised forms of civil society with a broad range of formal organisations, the southern and eastern European countries are still highly characterised by traditional, informal parameters such as the extended clan, the village community or other types of less formalised networks in which there are high degrees of community-oriented engagement. These components of civil society are rarely considered in empirical data (Maloney and Rossteutscher 2007).

Notwithstanding the many differences regarding civic engagement across the countries of Europe, the protracted, collective history of the European continent – during which the engagement of numerous people for the common good was highly valued – has still produced similarities. The differences (which also existed in the past) are generally attributed to the effects of cultural, religious, political and economic factors at national level (Gaskin et al. 1996: 25). At the same time, the vast social processes of change that have taken place in recent decades must also be given special consideration because they have done more than simply influence civic engagement – they have actually transformed its very foundations. For example, developments in the countries of southern Europe have not

only led to growing industrialisation, but at the same time to substantial mobility for the population and thus to migratory movements. Both internal migration and emigration can induce shifts in established social structures. Ultimately, this is likely to have had unfavourable consequences for civic engagement.

In addition, issues such as current economic policy, the resolution of the financing problems of the public budgets, the challenge of increasing demand for social services and the associated need to overhaul the welfare state are responded to in different ways by the individual European countries, which of course do not implement identical solutions to these problems. In the same way, different policies to promote civic engagement can also be observed in the different countries. The different approaches can still lead to similar outcomes, however (cf. Riedel 2003). While, for example, a high level of engagement was achieved in the Netherlands by expanding the potential areas for involvement, Denmark's policies to promote civic engagement have been concentrated on areas to which the state has only difficult access, or where its institutions have not been sufficiently successful (e.g. assistance for the elderly, integration of marginal groups). In contrast to the Netherlands, in Denmark the highly professionalised core areas of the welfare state are not considered suitable for citizen involvement. This is also a major difference between civic engagement in Denmark and that in Great Britain, where civil society involvement is actually traditionally carried out in many public institutions and where its service aspect is currently emphasised by means of contractual relations between the state and the civil society organisations.

It has been argued that the former "nations of joiners" face decreasing levels of associational activities and declining levels of civic engagement (Putnam 2001). While we probably have not seen so much as a decline per se, we have seen a decline in different types of associations accompanied by an increase in other kinds of associations as well (see Chapter 6). Long-term commitment gives way both to participatory demands and also to an outsourcing of personal commitments through sponsoring professional new politics organisation like Greenpeace. In this sense we are experiencing a limited convergence across countries (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). This could also mean that the new member states will never reach the membership density rates common in north-western European countries.

All in all, therefore, the manner in which civic engagement is embedded in each society is a decisive determinant behind country-specific differences. The reasons for the specific way in which civic engagement is incorporated in a society can be sought both in national traditions and the dominance of specific values and in the prevailing economic, legal and general social situation. In this respect, the characteristics of civic engagement can most definitely be influenced and shaped by environmental factors. Going beyond the construction of appropriate legal parameters, the development of particular values and the cultivation of traditions are therefore particularly important for establishing civic engagement in a society.

2.6 Trust – Bonding Europeans Together

So far, the chapter has focussed on social capital and civil society in a classical comparative perspective, treating each European society as a single, closed entity. This reflects the very fact that the modern nation-state is both the central unit and the key agent of social and political integration. Nation states have been extremely successful in establishing strong bonds among the members of the "imagined community" (Anderson 1983), and civil society institutions have emerged that closely correspond to the national political

institutions and its characteristics. However, from a European perspective, it is useful to go beyond the comparative approach of “container sociology” (Beck 2002, see Chapter 18). With accelerating speed, relationships between European countries have become so dense – politically, economically and culturally – that it is perfectly legitimate to investigate to what extent a European-level civil society is emerging. This certainly comprises both an organisational and an attitudinal dimension. In its organisational dimension the question is to what extent the joined political system of EU institutions has led the way for pan-European associations and organisations, and to what extent ordinary citizens take part in them. In its attitudinal dimension, an important aspect is the extent to which Europeans trust each other. The remainder of this chapter deals with this latter issue, taking up the issue of European-wide social capital, measured as inter-personal trust among the various European populations.

Trusting others means viewing them in a positive way and expecting them to behave in a predictable and friendly manner (Inglehart 1991). Trust is the belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do us harm and, at best, they will act in our interest (Delhey and Newton 2003; Gambetta 1988; Inglehart 1999; Warren 1999). What we are here concerned with is inter-personal (or social) trust – the kind of trust that flows horizontally between persons and groups, in stark contrast to political trust that flows vertically, linking ordinary citizens on the one hand and political elites or political institutions on the other. Moreover, we are concerned with generalized social trust, a “thin” form of trust, which is usually differentiated from the “thick”, particularistic trust prevailing within small communities or kinships. Unlike the latter, generalised social trust does not rest on acquaintance. This feature makes it a valuable synthetic force for modern, large-scale societies (Simmel 1950) and probably even more valuable for the pan-European space with its 450 million inhabitants. We define trust as the level of generalised trust citizens of a given nationality vest in people from other EU member countries (“co-Europeans”). The radius of this sort of trust is certainly larger than for trust in co-nationals, but narrower than “trust in most people”. The idea is that from the perspective of the European project exactly those peoples are relevant targets of trust which are assembled together in the supranational polity “EU”.

Eric Uslaner (2001) has written about generalised trust as “the chicken soup of social life”. Social scientists have again and again suggested that good things tend to happen in settings where people trust each other. Trust seems to serve two main functions (Philips 2006). As a lubricant, it ensures that people and groups interact smoothly – “metaphorically oiling the wheels of society” (133). As social glue, trust holds together social groups by means of its moral qualities and implications. It is precisely these qualities which are of interest from a mass support perspective. Trusting strangers means accepting them into our “moral community” (Uslaner 2002), based on the belief that fundamental values are shared. This inclusive view, it is argued, is capable of building bridges across groups, since people who trust are more tolerant, more cosmopolitan-minded and more inclined to welcome those who are different from them. Part and parcel of this are sentiments of mutual obligation and solidarity. In a nutshell, trust is a “thin” form of sense of community, based on reputation and sympathy and implying feelings of loyalty, concern and solidarity. Distrust, in contrast, signals a considerable social distance, which can take the mild form of indifference or even the severe form of hostility.

For Europe and its integration project, transnational trust is also politically relevant. True, one can trust others without an urgent longing for political unification. Yet it is very unlikely that people who dislike their partner nationalities welcome a unified Europe with open arms. Arguably, mutual trust is part of the affiliational integration story which is regarded by some as equally important for making Europe work than measures of

functional and territorial integration (Wallace 1999). It is plausible on general grounds that the very idea of a supra-national community demands that citizens feel positively about each other. Moreover, there is a string of more specific arguments for why trust might turn politically relevant for the European project: First, the EU is a deliverer of collective goods from which all member states' populations benefit. Second, membership implies solidarity, one concrete manifestation of which is the redistribution of financial resources from richer to poorer areas. Third, EU citizenship opens up the legal boundaries of what were once relatively closed national political and welfare communities to mobile people from other member states, who are provided with a status of quasi-nationals (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005). Finally, the European project involves handing over a good deal of national sovereignty to European bodies, which brings with it the risk of decisions being taken that are perceived to be against national interest. Equipped with this, it is safe to say that it shall be much easier to favour or at least accept these by-products of the European project if citizens' regard their co-Europeans as trustworthy.

2.6.1 National and Transnational Trust Levels

In this section we show some results to what extent Europeans are ready to include other nationalities in their sense of trust. We obtained them from Eurobarometer surveys (EB) and the European Election Study (EES), which are the richest data sources on how Europeans see each other. Both survey programmes contain information on how much trust individuals vest in their fellow citizens and in people from a number of (European) countries. Trust is measured in a format where the extent of trust in each of the EU nationalities is surveyed separately, e.g. in the EES, *Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust?*

According to the most recent data from the EES 2004, most Europeans, West and East, have considerable trust in their compatriots (see Fig. 2.8, upper left). Using a barometer ranging from -100 (no trust at all) to +100 (a lot of trust), the populace of all countries (those born in the country) show much more trust than distrust in their fellow countrymen. In a number of countries led by Austria, Luxembourg, Finland and Denmark there is overwhelming trust in co-nationals. Elsewhere less impressive levels of trust in fellow countrymen can be found, notably in Poland and Italy. This is in line with accounts of the Polish culture of distrust (Sztompka 1999) and Banfield's (1958) seminal study of Italy's "immoral familism". However, Italy has seen increasing levels of trust in co-nationals over the past 30 years, bringing the country from the zone characterised by prevailing non-trust to the "normal" zone of prevailing trust. A similar growing climate of trust can be measured for Poland since the end of communist rule. In the other countries for which longer time-series are at hand, trust in fellow citizens has either increased somewhat or remained at high levels (Delhey 2004). Thus European societies are characterised by strong national cohesion, with recent waves of modernisation contributing rather than destroying social capital among fellow citizens.

The positive feelings towards fellow countrymen, however, do not extend in the same way to other Europeans. Figure 2.8 (upper right) displays the level of trust various populations have in people from 28 European countries, the current EU member states plus Turkey, on average. In a cross-national perspective, these averaged assessments of co-Europeans vary much more than that of co-nationals. The difference in trust between




Fig. 2.8 National and transnational trust of Europeans

Slovakia (high) and Poland (low) is considerably bigger than the difference between Austria and Italy in national trust. Among the old member states, the Luxembourgers, Finns, Germans, Danes and Spaniards report a considerable amount of trust in people from various European countries, whereas Italians and Greeks are neutral about them and Portuguese even negative. From previous studies based on Eurobarometer surveys it is known that the Swedes judge other Europeans very favourable (Delhey, 2004), but Sweden did not field the trust question in the EES 2004 we use here. From the new member states, some join the camp of low trust (Poland, Cyprus, Latvia), some others the opposite camp of high trust. Czechs and Slovaks in particular report high levels of trust in co-Europeans, much higher than 15 years ago. With the exception of Czechs and Slovaks, the results obtained echo nicely trust rankings based on cross-national differences in generalized inter-personal trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; van Oorschot et al. 2006).

Figure 2.8 (lower left) puts the two information, trust in fellow citizens and in co-Europeans, together. The ratio between the two can be interpreted as a measure of national ethnocentrism (or ingroup favouritism). On average, Europeans put 1.5 times more trust in co-nationals than in fellow Europeans. The very fact that compatriots are regarded as more reliable than the co-Europeans matches perfectly the social-psychological observation that judgements about the ingroup are almost always more favourable than about outgroups (Peabody 1985). For Europeans, the national society still represents the “homeland space” (Billig 1995). The persistent significance of the nation-state as a site of belonging and identity and the limited appeal of cosmopolitan orientations also show up when clustering subnational regions according to their averaged attitudes to the nation-states and patriotism (Haller 2008: 244–248). These subnational regions almost always form into county-clusters, meaning that the value orientation between the different regions of one country is much less pronounced than those between those countries. The value orientations within countries are still remarkably similar. When, in a second step, country clusters according to the similarities between the different countries are formed, European countries combine with European and non-European countries alike. Country cluster of similar cultural heritage emerge, but no specific European cluster.

Thus, nationality has not lost its social significance. Yet the degree of ethnocentrism is stronger in some places than others: it is weakest in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany and strongest in Poland, Portugal and Cyprus. The latter in particular stands out in limiting trust to their fellow countrymen. The position of Slovakia is somewhat surprising, since the Slovak showed strong ethnocentrism in 1990. Also Poland has changed its position considerably: in 1990 it was an exceptional case, since other Europeans were, on average, trusted more than the Poles trusted themselves. This “externalisation of trust” (Sztompka 1999) has been reversed since then, so that Poland exhibits a “normal” pattern now.

We now turn to the nationalities as receivers of trust. Figure 2.8 (lower right) shows how trustworthy European nationalities are believed to be, judged by 20 European people on average (by 13 old member states plus 7 new member states). The various nationalities inspire vastly different feelings of trust. Highly trusted, across Europe, are people from Scandinavia, the Benelux countries and Ireland. The remaining western and the southern nationalities are also judged positively, followed by Slovaks, Slovenes, Cypriots, Poles and people from the Baltic countries, which inspire neutral feelings among their co-Europeans. Least trusted are people from Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, with ratings in the negative (indicating prevailing non-trust). Other surveys show that the Swiss and Norwegians are highly trusted as well (Delhey 2004), which are not included here. This suggests that EU membership does not matter, since both are unification-hostile, but that other qualities drive

ratings of trustworthiness. Moving towards the lower end of the ranking, previous research revealed that also people from Russia inspire little trust among Europeans. In a nutshell, assessments of other nationalities follow a geographic pattern, since trust is, basically, graded against the clock: North (highest), West, South, East (lowest). Least trusted are Russians and South-East Europeans.

This pattern, however, cannot easily be interpreted as “West European racism”, as others did (Beck and Grande 2004), since both Westerners and Easterners essentially share the same mental map of trustworthiness. Europeans in East and West alike share the opinion that the Swedes, Danes, Finns and Dutch are among the most trustworthy. And both are united in their sceptical view of Turks (and Russians). Most important in this context, people from post-socialist countries, and particularly from Romania and Bulgaria, are seen as not too trustworthy not only by West Europeans but also by many East-Central Europeans. Thus, while the former perceive each other by and large positively, constituting a true “security community” (Deutsch et al. 1966), the latter express more caution. True, the neighbouring countries are not seen as potential enemies any more (Haerpfer 2002), but they are not regarded as close friends either. Chauvinism is usually muted, but stereotyping with neighbours is often pronounced (Boster and Maltseva 2006). The good news, however, is the progress during the past decade indicated, among other things, by growing sympathy of Poles for their post-communist neighbours (CBOS 2005).

That a nationality is trusted (or not) on average does not preclude that it is not trusted (or trusted) by some particular country. This is shown in Fig. 2.8 (lower right) by the markers identifying the most negative (“min”) and positive (“max”) judgements a nationality receives. Exceptions of this rule are the Swedes, Danes and Finns which inspire negative ratings nowhere; and the Romanians and Turks, which are rated as rather untrustworthy everywhere. All other nationalities have particular friends and foes. Take Germany as an example: The Germans are strongly trusted by the French, Luxembourgers and Danes, but much less trusted by the Czechs, Poles, British and Cypriots.

Some research has been done to uncover the rationale why nations trust each other, employing a country-to-country design (Delhey 2007a; Inglehart 1991). Among the many factors that might influence trust between nations, the modernisation level seems to be of paramount importance. There is a strong tendency that rich, highly developed and long-standing democracies inspire the highest levels of trust. Although theoretically one can distinguish among wealth, political freedom and well-functioning bureaucracies, empirically they form a tight-knit syndrome, for which modernisation seems to be the appropriate term. The modernisation level plays also a strong role on the other side of the dyad: the more developed (modern) a society is, the more its citizenry trusts other nationalities. The most trusted nationalities share other features in being small – too small to threaten other countries –, “quiet” and relatively peaceful. In contrast, the big European nations Germany, France and the United Kingdom, whose leaders strove to rule Europe by force of arms for centuries, are regarded as somewhat lesser trustworthy. Also Turkey and Russia seem to be “punished” for their populace and military weight. It has further been found that cultural similarity in terms of language and religion breeds trust. In this respect, the readiness of Europeans to include others into their sense of community has a cultural component as well. However, this component seems not to be of paramount importance compared to the other characteristics. It is the modernisation level that has the largest impact on trust between nations. This interpretation is also supported by the decent level of trustworthiness which Europeans attribute to US Americans (with the exceptions of French and Greeks) and Japanese, the latter being culturally very distinct, but nevertheless trusted.

It is equally instructive which properties do not qualify in rigorous statistic analysis as drivers (or blockers) of trust, among them enmity in WW2. Obviously, the European project was successful in overcoming many destructive rivalries of the past, although WW2 still casts a cloud over some specific bilateral relations, like the Polish-German or Czech-German relations. Moreover, EU membership seems to do little for trust, which is indicated by the high trust the Norwegians and Swiss receive, despite their hostility to join the European project. But certainly more research on this issue is needed.


Another factor of weak explanatory power is transactions. A whole school of thought in integration theory has adhered to the idea that sense of community between peoples is largely a function of the density of their exchange of goods, persons and information, as Karl Deutsch has suggested (Deutsch et al. 1966). However, recent research suggests that transactions do much less for sense of community than classical transactionalist theories assume (Delhey 2007b). True, there is a weak but statistically significant association between the amount of trust between two populations and the transactions flowing between them. This holds for transactions as diverse as phone contacts, country visits and trade, in particular exports (cf. also Inglehart 1991). However, once one controls for other country characteristics as the ones listed above, transaction rates no longer contribute to trust in other nationalities. A viable explanation is that the bulk of cross-border transactions are of a systemic nature, largely unnoticed by ordinary citizens, and hence do not have the potential to shape the judgements of trustworthiness accordingly. However, the field of transactions deserves more research as well, since longitudinal studies on the accumulative effects of (growing) exchange over time are largely missing (see Chapter 18).

2.6.2 Sympathy for Other Nationalities – The Case of Poland

A similar but yet not identical aspect of how Europeans perceive each other is feelings of sympathy and antipathy. The country for which this is surveyed best is Poland, thanks to the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS). In repeated surveys since 1993, the Poles are asked for their attitudes towards a number of nationalities, European and non-European (CBOS 2005). Figure 2.9 shows a summary indicator by subtracting the share of respondents who express antipathy for a respective nationality from those expressing sympathy. In 2004, from a list of 28 nationalities, the Poles have strongest feelings of sympathy towards the Italians, Spaniards, Czechs and Greeks; and the strongest feelings of antipathy towards the Romanians, Russians, Serbs and Vietnamese. With respect to Germans, positive and negative attitudes are exactly balanced.

Polish attitudes have become more positive over the last decade, in particular towards the three neighbouring countries Ukraine, Czech Republic, and Lithuania. For each post-socialist country on the list, sympathy has grown. Obviously, the post-socialist region of today is experienced by the Polish population as a much friendlier environment than shortly after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In 1992, the second biggest military threat after Russia was seen from the neighbouring countries (Haerpfer 2002). Back then, half of the region's citizens (and 6 out of 10 Poles) were of the opinion that the neighbouring countries pose a threat to peace and security of the own country. Already in 1998, feelings of having threatening neighbours have decreased to roughly one-third of the previous level, and it is very likely that this trend has continued. This is mirrored in a rising barometer of sympathy. Polish sympathy has also grown for the British, one of the countries which immediately after the Polish EU accession opened their labour market for Polish workers. Against the general upward trend sympathy for the US Americans and the French has

Fig. 2.9 Sympathy of Poles towards various nationalities



somewhat decreased, presumably due to disputes over the Iraq war. But both still rank among the most liked nationalities (although the Americans lost the pole position).

2.6.3 Trust and European Identity

Our final concerns are the consequences of (weak or strong) bonds of trust, which can be behavioural or attitudinal. We focus here on attitudinal consequences. It is an established claim of both the political culture school and the social capital school that, generally, high levels of horizontal trust go together with supportive attitudes for political regimes (Inglehart 1990, 1997). There is indeed evidence that trust is related to political attitudes beyond national matters. Surveying foreign policy preferences of US students, Rosenberg found a linkage between the student's preferred solution to international problems and their view of humanity (Rosenberg 1957). Distrusters voted for coercion and force as methods of settling international disputes, whereas trusters (i.e. those with strong faith in other people) were more likely to place their reliance upon co-operation and mutual understanding. He concluded that "people appear more likely to be 'peacelike' if they love and trust their

fellow men” (345). Brewer et al. studied international trust, measured as the belief that the United States can trust “most countries”. They found that “international trust helps dictate whether citizens approach international politics with fear of a bad world or faith in working together for a better one” (Brewer et al. 2004: 106). Support among EU citizens for political integration has been found to be driven, among other things, by the level of trust in the other member states (Genna 2003) and trust in co-Europeans (Delhey 2008). This suggests that supranational communities benefit from transnational trust – and suffer from its erosion.

One causal mechanism why trust is conducive to pro-integration attitudes is the link between trust in fellow Europeans and European identity, which is demonstrated in this last section of this chapter. As many noticed before us, identity is a fuzzy term, and European identity is conceptualized and measured very differently in the literature (cf. also Chapter 11). We rely here, again, on the EES 2004, which asks respondents for their level of self-identification as EU citizen: *Do you ever think of yourself not only as a [Nationality] citizen, but also as a citizen of the European Union? [Often; sometimes; never]*. Trust and identity are conceptually related as parts of what Karl Deutsch has termed “sense of community” (Deutsch et al. 1966), but they are not the same. One key difference is that whereas inter-personal trust clearly flows “horizontally” among and between the various populations, self-identification as EU citizen is more ambiguous in that it relates people both to a political group and a political system. In other words, there is a horizontal (cultural) and vertical (civic) dimension involved (Bruter 2005). We cannot disentangle fully the complexity of European identity here, but at least we can reveal the association between trust in other EU nationalities and Europeans’ self-identification as EU citizens. For that purpose, the citizenry of each country is divided into three segments with low, medium and high trust in co-Europeans, and the average level of European identity (on a scale of 1 = often, 0.5 = sometimes and 0 = never) is broken down by country and trust segment.

To some extent, trust and self-identification indeed go together (see Fig. 2.10). Take Austria as an example. Of those Austrians who vest little trust in co-Europeans (that is, trust no more than one-third of the EU-25 nationalities), average identification as EU citizen is 0.4 on the scale from 0 to 1. This proportion rises to 0.7 in the group of high trusters, which vests trust in at least two-thirds of the EU-25 nationalities. This stairway pattern holds true for all countries. On average, the identification gap between high trusters and low trusters is around 20 percentage points. Particularly steep increases in the attachment to EU citizenship can be found in Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia. The pattern is somewhat flatter in Hungary or Spain. But even there, trust in co-Europeans and self-perception as EU citizen are associated at the individual level in a statistically significant way. The lowest association is for Hungary (0.15), the strongest for Austria (0.31).

It is not relevant here which of the two, trust and identity, is cause and which is effect. Trust may breed European identity as well as identity might breed trust. The key message is that the two components are related, hence for any attempts of political unification it is not unimportant how Europeans see each other.

2.7 Conclusion

For a long time, concepts of society that focused one-sidedly on the powers of the market or the state attributed only marginal significance or indeed no significance at all to civic




Fig. 2.10 Trust in co-Europeans and self-identification as EU citizen

engagement. But recent years have seen a fundamental change in this point of view. The willingness of citizens to invest time and energy in various activities for collective and social purposes today is seen as one of the essential foundations of functioning modern societies. Many hopes and expectations have been linked to an active citizenship and the existence of a dense web of social organisations. They include the fostering of social solidarity and civic virtues, the promotion and the stabilisation of democracy, the production of social welfare and the providing of employment beyond the confines of the market and the state. Patterns of social and citizen participations have also been linked to decreasing or increasing social inequality.

Surprisingly little is known as yet either about the prevalence of civil society involvement in the different countries of the European Union or about the factors that determine these levels of prevalence. What we do know is that civic engagement follows a regional pattern that is surprisingly stable over time. Country families with common borders, strong historical and cultural connections and similar traditions in public policy often have similar levels of participation (Newton and Giebler 2008). It seems safe to argue that measures implemented by the European Union to the end of creating a European civil society had little impact (cf. Knodt and Finke 2005). On the contrary, the most recent enlargement with

Rumania and Bulgaria, no to speak of a possible accession of Turkey, has greatly increased the variation in civil societal engagement (see Chapter 8).

Something similar can be said about trusting each other. EU membership seems to do surprisingly little for transnational trust. As there are discrete regions of Europe sharing similar levels of civic participations, there are mental maps coinciding more strongly with historical likes and dislikes rather than with the expanding territory of the European Union. The flow of transnational sympathy does not follow the increasing circulation of goods, people, services and capital which, after all, is the cornerstone of the European integration. While there are increasing levels of trust in co-nationals in low-trust countries like Poland and Italy due to modernisation processes, the assessments of co-Europeans still vary much more, and are much lower, than that of co-nationals. The European project was successful in the sense that neighbouring countries are not seen as potential enemies any more. But regarding them as close friends is an altogether different matter.

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Chapter 3

Bureaucracy and the State

B. Guy Peters

The public bureaucracy has been a central element of governing in all industrialized societies, representing an attempt to institutionalize structures that can implement public programs in a reliable and effective manner, and do so in spite of the political party or faction controlling government at any one time. Public bureaucracies in their current forms did not come about through conscious design, but rather represent the long-term accretion of the characteristics that comprise that form of administration. Decisions to alter forms of governing often were made in response to specific problems in governing – war, economic crisis, and the need to manage the Welfare State as the most significant examples – or as a result of more limited state reforms, rather than in response to pre-determined ideas about how to govern. There has been a good deal of diffusion of ideas about governing, but there was not an intention to create a bureaucracy as we have come to know that form of organization.

The central argument of this chapter is that the development of the public bureaucracy has been closely linked with the development of the state. This linkage has been to a great extent true since the initial development of the modern state, but the underlying linkage has been even more significant in the movement away from the traditional night-watchman state toward the contemporary Welfare/Warfare State. Further, within the European Union the need for relatively common implementation processes has placed some pressure for uniformity, even in the persistence of fundamental differences among “administrative traditions.” Those pressures have been strongest in the newer members of the EU, but are present in the others as well.

Finally, the public bureaucracy has been a major target of the reforms of the state in the late 20th and into the 21st centuries, and those reforms have significantly altered not only the role of the public bureaucracy but also the nature of the state and governance more generally. Again, there have been relatively common ideas motivating these changes, but there have been differential reactions to those pressures. The latter point having been made, debureaucratization has created alternative conceptions of governance that are potentially inconsistent, making governance more difficult in these societies.

B.G. Peters (✉)

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
e-mail: bgpeters@pitt.edu

3.1 The Logic of Bureaucracy

The public bureaucracy has now become such a common component of the public sector, as well as such a common object of scorn, that it is very easy to forget that this institution was crucial for the development of the modern state. While Weber's concept of bureaucracy has been debated endlessly (Derlien, 1999; Mommsen, 1989), the empirical reality of systems of governing that it came to constitute was more readily apparent to observers. Although lacking many of the formal characteristics in the model of bureaucracy, the formal systems of government developed in European states did in some ways approximate the ideal system (see Page, 1984) so that these governments became bureaucratized, if not really bureaucracies, in the formal, conceptual sense. Further, we need to remember that the formalized nature of public organizations was not achieved in many states until well into the 20th century, so that developing the capacity of the public sector has been a continuing phenomenon.

The creation of formal bureaucracies performed at least three crucial functions for the states that they were developed to serve. The first thing that formalized public bureaucracies did was to enhance the governance capacity of those states substantially (see Pierre and Peters, 2000; Painter and Pierre, 2004), and particularly did so if the tasks of governing were considered as being conducted over time. Rather than depending on the personal household of a monarch or on part-time officials performing other tasks, the development of a formalized bureaucracy with its files and its organizational memory enabled government not only to implement decisions at any one time but also to ensure some temporal consistency. Governing after the formalization of bureaucracy did not depend upon individual whims or on personal loyalty but rather more closely on law and the rules of the administrative systems that were institutionalized.

A second crucial aspect of governance in European states that was enhanced by the formation of bureaucracy was that this institution could be used to create a greater sense of equality for citizens and also a greater capacity actually to deliver on any commitments to equality. In developmental terms the formation of bureaucracy moved governing from employing primarily particularistic criteria for making decisions toward using universalistic criteria. This change, in turn, meant that citizens began to enjoy genuine rights in the face of what had been an arbitrary system of making and implementing decisions. The formal, legal nature of governing through bureaucracy meant that rules were to be applied *sine irae ac studio* to all citizens. Decisions were to be made on the basis of the facts in the file rather than on the social or political attributes of the citizen or personal relationships between the civil servant and the citizen in question. Thus, institutionalizing the bureaucracy moved government toward a position of ensuring the civil rights of citizens, and perhaps therefore paving the way toward the eventual creation of political and social rights (Marshall, 1968).

The final thing that the creation of a formal bureaucracy did for the European state was to institutionalize the state itself. Although nation states had existed for some years before the creation of their bureaucracies (see Flora, 1999), the development of these formal administrative structures helped to transform the personalistic structures of most previous monarchical or proto-democratic regimes into at least the rudiments of modern states. For most of the emerging states of Continental Europe the bureaucracy was a means of building structures and procedures that would endure longer than the tenure of any individual leader and hence could continue to ensure that decisions and the means of implementing them would have continuity. These institutions in many ways became the state and were the most obvious manifestation of the authority held by states, and retained much

of that authority as the states themselves were transformed by democratization and other modernizing changes.

Thus, although not necessarily designed as a rational response to the needs of governing or of institutionalizing the modern state (Armstrong, 1973) the bureaucracies of European states have, in fact, performed those functions and performed the functions rather well. The creation of bureaucracies enhanced substantially the capacity of states to govern, when compared to the previous forms of government, and it further ensured that the capacity would be maintained even in the face of any political and social changes that would ensue. Further, the governing capacity of the modern state depended crucially on the development of the bureaucracy as a means of implementing its law on all parts of their territory, not only to implement but to do so in a fair and responsible manner. Again, our contemporary pejorative sense of the bureaucracy contrasts with the original utility, and even morality, of the original developments of this institution (Du Gay, 2000).

Given this developmental perspective on the nature and role of the public bureaucracy in European states, it appears sensible to consider these systems in terms of path dependency arguments now familiar in the social sciences (Mahoney, 2000; Peters, 2006). The fundamental assumption of this approach to institutions, public and private, is that after a “formative moment” the institution will persist along the path established at that time. That path will dominate until either that path becomes so dysfunctional that change is obviously necessary or until there is a superior alternative to the status quo that becomes readily apparent to the actors involved. For the administrative systems discussed in this chapter there has been a pronounced tendency toward persistence, reinforced by the very nature of formal organizations to reproduce themselves and the behavior of their members.¹

3.2 Explaining Bureaucratic Patterns

Although there are a number of common aspects of public bureaucracies in all European states, there are also a number of crucial differences. Those differences are reflected in the structure of the bureaucracies, in the behavior of the members of those bureaucracies, and the relationship between political actors and the formal bureaucracy. Most analysts and citizens talk about their bureaucracies but they are in reality talking about significantly different institutions. Bureaucracies may be the most similar institutions among the 25+ countries considered in this handbook, but they are still different.² The tasks these organizations perform are all quite similar, but the manner in which the bureaucracies perform those tasks are often quite different, to the point of not being recognizable as the same organizations or the same positions in society.

The patterns that we observe in contemporary public bureaucracies represent the confluence of three influences. One of these influences is state traditions, with the public bureaucracy being significantly influenced by the nature of the state systems within which they function. These state traditions, as developed below, represent fundamental beliefs

¹For administrative systems the paths tend to be extremely persistent. For example, many aspects of public administration law and practice in Germany survived extreme regime change from the Wilhelmine Empire to Weimar to the Third Reich to contemporary democracy (see Jacob, 1963).

²Arguably, legislatures and political executives are more significantly different across the European countries than are bureaucracies. For example, the differences between parliamentary and semi-presidential systems and the marked differences in the structure and behavior of legislatures.

about, and patterns of, governing. A second influence on the patterns of public bureaucracy is the ideas about management, whether that management is within the public or the private sectors. There is a growing body of evidence that different societies have different ideas about how organizations function and how management within organizations should function (Hofstede, 1984, 1991; Tayeb, 1988). Finally, there are a number of very specific attributes of public administrative systems that have been developed over time and which are perhaps the most proximate influence on the nature of contemporary administrative systems.

3.3 State Traditions and Bureaucracy

To this point I have been discussing European states and their bureaucracies as if they were all the same, and to some extent they are. European states have all developed administrative systems that are at the most fundamental level somewhat similar.³ All these systems of public administration have formal hierarchical structures based on authority and compliance. All also have some form of career structure based on merit, even if some degree of political consideration is permitted for appointment, especially for the very top positions.⁴ All these systems also depend to some extent upon law as a guide for action, although some emphasize management and public policy qualifications more than do others when considering how to be involved in the policy process. In short, there is a good deal of similarity among public bureaucracies at a very fundamental level.

The above having been said, however, the bureaucracies that were developed depended upon the nature of the states in which they were created, as well as on particular reactions of political and administrative actors to the needs to institutionalize the bureaucracy. Although the administrative traditions are related to the underlying state traditions, they also reflect some specific administrative patterns that may or may not be contingent upon the state tradition within which public administration is being developed. The resulting configurations of bureaucracies therefore reflect state traditions, administrative traditions, and specific national reactions to the formal requirements of public administration.

3.3.1 *State Traditions*

The underlying state traditions that have affected the development of public bureaucracies are comprised of several crucial factors. Were I interested in state traditions per se (see Dyson, 1981) I could add a number of additional dimensions, but for these purposes the need to differentiate among state traditions can be limited to several crucial factors. These factors all relate closely to the linkages between the state and the society with which it associated, and these linkages in turn define the capacity of the state to act

³Many of the characteristics are being eroded by the “reforms” of the state discussed toward the end of the chapter. This debureaucratization of government has been one of the central goals of reform, albeit justified in a number of different manners in different political settings.

⁴Even before the current spate of concern about the politicization of the civil service (Peters and Pierre, 2002), there was substantial concern about the extent to which appointment did, and should, depend upon the political persuasion of the civil servant.

autonomously. While the concept of state autonomy has had a somewhat checkered history (see Nordlinger, 1981; Migdal, 1987) there are still empirically marked differences in the constraints under which states are able to exercise their powers. Those constraints in turn influence the capacity of those states to exert control over their population and their territory. Although some of the most powerful state actors may somewhat paradoxically be among the least autonomous, the extent of linkage between society and state institutions remains a crucial dimension of state capacity.

The first dimension of state traditions to be considered is the difference between contractarian and organic conceptions of the state and its linkage to civil society. In the Anglo-American state tradition the state is a result of a contract, implicit or explicit, between the members of the society in order to create a means for collective decision-making, a view expressed by political theorists such as Locke and in political documents such as the American Declaration of Independence. The state that emerges from that contract has a number of characteristics that may restrict its capacity to act autonomously. In particular, the assumption that lies behind such a conception of the state is that society is the more important of the macro-structures existing within the territorial space, and therefore the state is dependent upon continued acceptance of its role in governance.

In contrast to that contractarian conception of the state an organic conception assumes that state and society are inextricably connected and have developed together. In such a conception the state is an enduring entity, just as is society, and therefore has greater autonomy to act to preserve its own interests. Indeed, in this conception it is important that the state is conceptualized as having its own interests, as opposed to merely being an arena in which social actors exercise rather temporary authority. Further, in the organic conception of the state there is some sense that the state is a crucial actor for maintaining the unity of societies that may otherwise be divided and fractious and that this integrating role for society provides it with both powers and responsibilities.

A second important dimension of state traditions that has significance for the public bureaucracy also involves the relationship between state and society, but at a meso or micro level. The second aspect of the state–society relationship is the linkage between social actors and state actors, especially elements of the public bureaucracy. One alternative for governing is to link those social actors directly with government and to permit representation of those interests directly into the public sector, rather than through legislatures. These corporate or corporate pluralist (Rokkan, 1967) structures are mechanisms for mutual cooptation between the social actors and the public sector, with each gaining benefits, but also paying some price, for this involvement. This pattern of linkage between state and society makes the bureaucracy the principal locus of decision-making for many aspects of governance and also enhances bureaucratic accountability.

Not surprisingly, the more organic conception of the state mentioned as the first attribute tends to be associated with the use of corporatist forms of interest intermediation (Molina and Rhodes, 2002). As implied, this style of interest intermediation tends to place the public bureaucracy in a more central position in governance than do other forms of representation, given that the principal point of contact between state and society is around departments and bureaucratic agencies.⁵ Rather than the indirect influence over policy

⁵Arguably this is true in general, given that the principal sources of contact between citizens and their governments are through bureaucrats such as social and health workers, teachers, policemen, tax collectors, and even postal clerks. We rarely see elected politicians but we see bureaucrats every day.

characteristic of representative democracy and pluralist forms of governance, the more direct form of interest representation involves a direct impact by social interests on policy.

A third significant dimension of state traditions that impacts the role of the public bureaucracy is the developmental role of the state. This style of state has been very visible in Asia in the 20th and 21st centuries (Evans, 1999; Migdal, 2001) but was present in Europe from the early 19th century. The clearest example of this style of state was Napoleonic France in which through the development of specialized educational and administrative structures (the *Grands Ecoles* and the technical *grands corps* such as *Ponts et Chausses*) the state undertook the economic development of the country, particularly the infrastructure necessary for economic growth. Other styles of state also engaged in developmental activities, but in less direct methods, often creating the conditions for individual entrepreneurs to invest rather than providing the infrastructure themselves.⁶

Clearly a public bureaucracy that is responsible for significant economic and infrastructural projects will be a different type of institution than one which has fewer responsibilities of that type and is responsible primarily for the “defining functions” of the state and later for regulatory and social policy programs (Rose, 1974). Not only are the skill sets necessary different but the centrality of the bureaucracy in all aspects of economic and social life is likely to be increased. Further, the path dependence created by such a developmental role tends to produce a continuing role for the bureaucracy in economic projects even when more formal involvement has been terminated. For example, although the French bureaucracy is no longer as central to the economy as it once was, much of the leadership of the private sector is still drawn from former bureaucrats (Eymeri, 2006).⁷

These broad patterns in the states of Europe represent fundamental ways of organizing political life that necessarily also influence the bureaucracies that serve those systems. These state traditions to some extent determine the tasks that the bureaucracies must perform, as well as the degree of latitude that they may have in performing them. Taken together, these factors help to establish some of the boundaries for action by bureaucracies and to locate those bureaucracies in the broad political context necessary to understand much of their behavior. In addition, however, the nature of bureaucracy and the role that this institution has played in governance has helped to define state traditions.⁸

3.3.2 *Management Ideas*

The second major influence on the manner in which public bureaucracies perform their tasks is the conception of management that is held in the society, and even more fundamentally the logic for the structure of organizations. These patterns may be linked to very

⁶Even the quintessential liberal states such as the United States and the United Kingdom were engaged in developmental projects (see Hughes, 1991) but generally through less direct mechanisms. Nationalization in the United Kingdom (and even in many cases in Scandinavia) came after the developmental period, as a means of producing greater equality rather than development.

⁷In particular many members of the *Grands Corps* engage in *pantouflage*, and slip out of their positions in the public sector to leadership positions in the private sector. Thus, a state-educated elite becomes an all-purpose elite for the society, public and private, and may continue to carry with it some commitment to public sector values. This movement to the private sector occurs earlier in their careers than in other systems having a similar movement, e.g., the *amakadura* system in Japan.

⁸To some extent this is a question of the role that the bureaucracy has had to play in governing when the political institutions of a State were weak or were blocked by excessive division among the political actors.

broad cultural patterns, such as those proposed by Mary Douglas (for the relevance to public bureaucracy see Hood, 1998). For example, societies that stress egalitarian values are much less likely to find the formality of a Weberian bureaucracy an acceptable mechanism for organization, whether in the public or the private sector. Likewise, a more hierarchical society may find adjusting to many of the changes in contemporary management that stress participation and involvement of lower echelon workers as well as clients to be inconsistent with their ideas of good management.

One of the most important discussion of cross-cultural variations in management has been provided by Geert Hofstede (1984, 1991) and his empirical analysis of management ideas in a wide variety of cultures. Hofstede surveyed a range of organizations in a wide variety of cultures and extracted four factors from these data that he argued captured the essential differences in work-related values, whether in the public or the private sectors. One of these factors was the “Relative Power Difference” that individuals were willing to accept in a managerial situation, or in other words a sense of hierarchy. In addition, some societies appeared more capable of accepting uncertainty and ambiguity in social relations than did others, with countries scoring high on this dimension requiring formalized relationships. Individualism was the third dimension identified, representing the capacity of the individual to resist pressures from the collectivities to which s/he belong. Finally, Hofstede labels the fourth factor “masculinity,” meaning both the distribution of gender roles within organizations and fundamental orientations toward aggressive behavior in management (and society).

Each of these criteria might be used to characterize an administrative system, but when combined they provide rather powerful means of identifying differences in organizational systems. For example, combining the first two factors – power distance and uncertainty avoidance – demonstrates clear differences between the rather democratic organizations of Scandinavia and the more fully developed formal bureaucracies in other areas of Europe such as Germany and parts of Eastern Europe, but particularly in Asian countries such as Japan. Other combinations of factors can also differentiate more finely among different bureaucratic systems and provide more insight into the observed differences in behavior.

In addition to the Hofstede research on cross-national ideas about management, there has been a large volume of work on organizational cultures that is also relevant for this analysis (House, 2004). Much of this research has focused on differences among organizations within a single country, or even within a single industry in a single country, but some of the ideas are still relevant for understanding the role of public bureaucracy in a more international sense. One of the issues that arises in the study of organizational cultures is the degree of internal consistency of the cultures. Further, this literature has also attempted to identify how that consistency contributes to the effectiveness, or lack of it, in organizations. In a complex environment, for example, more diverse internal cultures may permit the organization to work more effectively with the environment than would a more homogenous and rigid internal culture.

At a more political level, the literature based on Aberbach et al.’s study (1981) of classical and political bureaucrats considers the ways in which politicians and bureaucrats think about their own roles, and each others’ roles, in the political process. Their distinction between classical and political bureaucrats, and the possible existence of hybrid forms, points to the manner in which ideas about bureaucracies and bureaucrats influence the nature of bureaucracies. The idea of traditional bureaucrats captures well the sense of a formal bureaucracy with hierarchical management of public organizations. The political bureaucrat, on the other hand, will not adapt his or her behavior to the conditions

being imposed by their political masters so much as to pursue their own agendas largely determined by their organizations within government.⁹

While we might consider this body of literature on the attitudes of bureaucrats to be an aspect of the administrative traditions literature to be considered below, some aspects of this literature will indeed be referenced again there. I will, however, also consider it as a part of the cultural literature because of the emphasis on the political aspects of management in the public sector. The crucial question is how do bureaucrats think about their relationship with politicians. The tendency to think of this as a simple principal–agent relationship seriously underestimates the complexity of the interactions among these players in the game of governance.

3.3.3 Administrative Traditions

The third element used to understand the nature of public bureaucracy in European states is specific administrative traditions. These are to some extent derived from the state traditions already discussed, but they focus more specifically on the nature of the public bureaucracy and of the role of that institution in the process of governance. State traditions may influence these approaches to public bureaucracy, but administrative structure and behavior tend to be to some extent determined by factors peculiar to the bureaucracies themselves. In most instances the patterns that develop are compatible with the state traditions and the two sets of traditions tend to reinforce each other, but in some cases the two are incompatible. The administrative patterns that emerge in the settings of incompatibility may be unstable or at least subject to swings between one pole and another.

3.3.4 Law and Management

One of the most fundamental differences defining administrative traditions in European countries is whether they emphasize law or management as the foundation for administrative action. On the one side of this dichotomy are the *Rechtstaat* systems typified by the Germanic tradition. In this approach to public administration the nature of the bureaucracy is defined by law, and the task of the bureaucrat is perceived to be very much that of the lawyer or even a judge. The public servant must apply the law to individual cases in as fair and impartial manner as possible, and in so doing the state will perform its tasks as it is expected to do.

The contrast is with the Anglo-American conception of the civil servant as a manager, with the primary responsibility being to make programs perform as well as possible. Certainly the law will be the basis for much of this action, but there are independent decisions to be made that reflect the more autonomous choices of the managers, and perhaps also their political “masters.” The primary responsibility of the civil servant, therefore, is to make programs happen, and the law may often be conceptualized as a barrier to effective management rather than as a source of that action. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the home of much of the New Public Management has been in these systems, notably

⁹The politics in this sense of political bureaucrat is less partisan politics than it is politics in pursuit of policy goals, with again those goals being a function of the organizations within which the public employee functions.

the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.¹⁰ This approach to the public sector is not, however, a recent innovation but rather does represent a tradition of focusing on management issues in the public sector (Arnold, 2000).

The other two administrative traditions among the European countries lie to some extent between these two extremes. The Napoleonic tradition in France and many countries in Southern Europe also has a strong legal foundation, but individual managers may also have more latitude for action than in the Germanic case. Law is in many ways used as much or more as a system of control, e.g., through the *Conseil d'Etat* rather than as a direct guide for programmatic decisions for line bureaucrats (Massot and Giradot, 1999). The Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, may have as *Rechtstaat* heritage (see Torstendahl, 1991) but they now also have an emphasis on management. Law is important in these cases but so also is the capacity to manage programs effectively and to make programs work. These countries have been moving more toward the managerialist style over the past several decades, reflected in part in the shift away from recruiting civil servants with a legal background in favor of more recruits with public management, economics, or other types of training.

This dimension of administrative traditions helps to define the linkage between the state and administrative traditions, but perhaps in somewhat unexpected ways. We might, for example, think that the contractarian approach to the state would attempt to limit the actions of civil servants through law and other forms of control more than the organic conceptions that appear in the Germanic and Napoleonic cases. In reality, however, the Anglo-American and Scandinavian cases tend to allow greater latitude for bureaucratic action and assume that these officials are more central component parts of the policy process. To some extent this apparent contradiction can be resolved in part by understanding the strong *political* controls, as opposed to legal controls, that are imposed over the bureaucracy.

3.3.5 Accountability and Openness

The final dimension of administrative systems to be considered is the nature of the accountability regimen that is applied to the bureaucracy. This is in many ways the crucial dimension in these democratic systems, given that holding the permanent, career public service accountable for its actions is essential for maintaining popular control over government. Otherwise, the sheer number of public employees, never mind their expertise and their legal authority, would mean that governance would essentially be dominated by the bureaucracy. Many politicians believe that to be the case anyway, given that they perceive their opportunities for affecting policy once in office are very limited. Their expectations for control may be unrealistic, but this perceived lack of control has been voiced in any number of democratic political systems (see Savoie, 2003).

In all these cases the question is not so much whether there is a conception of accountability but rather how strong it is, and what are the operative elements of accountability. Assessing the strength of the concepts of accountability is difficult, given that all governments will place some pronounced emphasis on the need to maintain a responsible and accountable government. Despite that, some administrative traditions have been willing to give their bureaucracies greater autonomy than have others (see Carpenter, 2001). One

¹⁰Interestingly, public administration in the United States and Canada has not been as much influenced by these ideas and have pursued a more political and responsive direction for reforms.

important element in understanding the ways in which bureaucracies function is understanding their latitude for action and the levels of scrutiny that they may expect from outside.¹¹

As already implied the concept of accountability operative within any administrative system and its tradition is related to several of the other dimensions of state traditions and administrative traditions. First, the importance of law in the administrative system will influence the extent to which administrative systems will utilize that variety of instrument for accountability. For example, both the Napoleonic and Germanic systems emphasize legal instruments, especially *ex ante* legal controls, in contrast with political instruments that are dominant in the other settings. Even within the other cases, however, there are marked variations in the extent to which legal instruments are utilized. For example (although outside the European cases), administrative law is better developed and codified in the United States than in the other Anglo-American systems, and substantive and procedural controls are exercised over the bureaucracy.¹²

In addition to the importance of law, the contractarian nature of the state may influence the strength of accountability instruments. The states operating within these traditions are likely to assume that there are greater needs to control the state, given that it is the imperfect product of the compact that formed it. Therefore, they tend to focus more instruments of accountability on public organizations, and exercise perhaps more stringent controls. In practice these states tend to be less interested in legal controls than in finding direct political mechanisms for control and using those controls for the advantage of the political leaders imposing them.

Finally, the participatory nature of state traditions and their involvement of societal actors also affect the manner in which accountability will be implemented. This dimension of state traditions has become especially relevant in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the logic of enhanced participation in governing becomes more widespread, and governments even go about the business of creating groups that may become their own opposition. The openness of the accountability process in many regimes is central legitimation of the public sector and constitutes an alternative democratic track.¹³

3.4 A European Bureaucracy?

The development of the European Union and its own bureaucracy in the commission presents an interesting challenge to the concept of administrative traditions and its capacity to explain the nature and behavior of bureaucracies (Peters, 2000b). The Union itself is, depending upon one's point of view, an international organization, a proto-state, an emerging federal state, or simply *sui generis*. From whatever perspective one views this new structure, however, it is clear that the governance system emerging will require bringing together a number of different state traditions and administrative traditions, and therefore

¹¹Thus, one model of administrative accountability focuses on mutualism and controls with the administrative system itself, rather than focusing on the role of external, independent actors enforcing accountability. See Hood et al. (2004).

¹²The Administrative Procedures Act, and its amendments such as the Sunshine Act and the Freedom of Information Act, prescribe methods for making and adjudicating administrative regulations (Kerwin, 2003).

¹³Arguably, as citizens continue *not* to turn out at the polls, and membership in political parties continues to decline these forms of popular involvement with the public sector will become increasingly important for democracy.

will mean in all likelihood some blending of those national patterns if there is not to be excessively stark contrasts with national governments that do not function in the dominant style.

For public administration within the EU the questions of creating a new style or tradition are much the same. There is little doubt that the commission is a bureaucracy in any meaningful sense of the term (see Nugent, 2000; Hooghe, 2003). Further, it represents an attempt to build an institution that can be effective in working across a variety of European states and their administrative traditions. By giving the commission such a central role in governance within the EU (Peters, 1992; Rhinard, 2004) this style of governing has placed the bureaucracy in a more central governing position than in most other political systems, especially those with democratic backgrounds.¹⁴

The bureaucracy within the European Commission represents several overlays of administrative traditions. The original formation of the commission represented a core of Continental states, with the bureaucratic structures developed then being very much in the Napoleonic and Germanic traditions. The addition first of the United Kingdom and Denmark, then later two other Nordic systems, and then the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has made the ideas and logics of the constituent units more diverse, but in general the style within the commission has retained much of its Continental character. In particular, the use of numerous *ex ante* controls in the expenditure of money and the use of law as a principal instrument for control are characteristic of those Continental systems..

To some extent the nature of the bureaucracy in the European Union is conditioned by the types of instruments at its disposal for intervention into the social and economic systems of the member states. Most of the interventions of the EU into European economy and society are through indirect and/or regulatory means. That is, the European Union implements few of its policies directly but rather depends upon the bureaucracies in the member countries for that type of work (Peters, 2000b). Therefore, the principal means of intervention through directives involves primarily legal orders that then must be introduced into national law and implemented. This type of work is highly legalistic and hence well-suited to the traditional bureaucratic forms of the Germanic and Napoleonic states.

The implications of the development of the European Union and its bureaucracy within the commission do not stop with the EU itself and the implementation of EU policy. The existence of these institutions and the increasingly pervasive role of the EU's policy place some pressures on the bureaucracies of national governments for convergence. This pressure is the strongest in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have had to meet administrative criteria in addition to economic and political criteria for accession.¹⁵

The process of Europeanization of policy appears clearer than is the process of Europeanization of administration (but see Knill, 2001). As already argued, the administrative patterns developed across time are closely related to the nature of the state in these

¹⁴Of course, democracy within the EU is very much a contested issue. The deficit that is said to exist in democracy within the EU is a central concern in governing the European Union, and the role of the Commission, and the significantly smaller role of the European Parliament is a crucial component of that deficit.

¹⁵There were a set of administrative criteria developed by the EU in conjunction with SIGMA in OECD to ensure that the new members could administer the *acquis* effectively. The present author played some role in the development of those criteria. Similar administrative criteria are being applied to current applicant countries such as Romania and Bulgaria. Even in the other European States, however, there are marked pressures toward isomorphism with European structures and with the administrative structures and practices of other states.

systems, and hence change may be more difficult than simply changing the characteristics of a policy.¹⁶ Beyond the demands to be able to administer the *acquis*, which might constitute coercive pressures toward isomorphism, most of the pressures involve either mimesis or normative (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991).

The less coercive pressures can be as significant as the coercive. Although there is some tendency to think of Europeanization as a relatively coercive process, most of the evidence points to the importance of softer forms of influence over policy and public sector organizations. For example, one of the most important pressures for change in European administrative systems has been the process of cooperation and coordination initiated after Lisbon (Borras and Jacobsen, 2004) as a means of building more effective employment opportunities within European economies. These informal processes of integration, and the dialogue that has resulted from them, have tended to produce some policy learning across the range of political and administrative systems and some evidence of convergence in these policies and in the organizations that deliver them (O'Hagan, 2004).

3.5 Administrative Reform and Convergence

The heyday of the public bureaucracy, at least for Western Europe, was in many ways the post-war period until approximately the 1970s. During that period the European governments all had embarked on the project of building a mixed-economy Welfare State (see Rose and Peters, 1976). After the destruction of the two World Wars the dominant political project became to create mass affluence and economy security. Further, the public sector appeared to have the intellectual tools necessary to accomplish that task. With Keynesian management of the economy (Hall, 1989) and the various conceptions of the Welfare State political leaders embarked on building a new Europe.

Bureaucracies became a major target for reform after the economic slowdown of the 1970s, and the bureaucracy was a target for reformers coming both from the political right and from the political left. From the right the bureaucracy was portrayed as bumbling, bloated, inefficient, and as a barrier to successful economic performance. From the left the bureaucracy was insensitive, lacked an orientation for serving the citizens, and was especially poor at assisting the least fortunate in society in coping with the problems created by the market economy. What was clear from both ideological camps, however, was that the bureaucracy and much of the rest of the state apparatus was in dire need of reform.

Governments have been in the business of reforming themselves almost from their formation, but the reforms of the bureaucracy initiated during the past several decades have been unusual in having rather clear intellectual principles that were to guide them (see Peters, 2000a; Christensen and Laegreid, 2000). In addition, the same ideas have been advanced as solutions to the problems of bureaucracy in almost all European countries, including the new members of the EU during and after the accession process. Thus, the ideas of marketization, participation, and deregulation of the bureaucracy can be identified as generalized "ideas in good currency" for change in the public sector and hence as forces for convergence across the European countries.

Although the same ideas have been advanced as sources of change in the bureaucracies of Europe, they have been accepted at differential rates and in some cases adopted hardly

¹⁶That having been said, the Welfare State has been constitutive for a number of contemporary states, and to understand the governments in Northern Europe one must understand the Welfare State and its connections to society.

at all. The several versions of administrative traditions developed above are differentially conducive to these reforms, and there are also national, political, and administrative circumstances that have affected the extent of adoption. Further, the newer members of the EU have been under pressure both from the EU and more importantly from other organizations such as the World Bank to adopt the reform agenda. The traditions and national patterns have affected both the extent to which the reforms have been attempted and the extent to which those reforms have been successful if they are adopted.

3.6 Market Reforms

There is not time here to describe all the various reforms that have been instituted. As noted, however, these can be captured under some general rubrics. The most common idea has been the use of more market-type devices within the public sector, a style of reform often called the “New Public Management.” That term is itself rather vague (see Hood, 1991) but especially in the United Kingdom and the Antipodes, and to some extent in Finland and the other Scandinavian countries governments have implemented a large scale reform that privatizes¹⁷ administrative leaders, disaggregates large cabinet departments into numerous smaller agencies, institutes private sector personnel and financial management techniques, and institutes market devices such as vouchers and internal markets to attempt to make service provision more efficient.

Although these ideas have been successful in a limited set of European states, they have not been compatible with the other administrative traditions. In particular, although there have been some notable changes in administration at the *Land* and local levels in German and Austria, the federal governments in those systems are relatively unchanged from the legalistic model that has dominated administration (see Reichard, 1994; Goetz, 2005). Likewise, most of the countries in the Napoleonic tradition have made little if any real change in their administration based upon the ideas of NPM. In both of these traditions the dominance of legalism, and the consequently small role for managerial thinking at the top of organizations, has tended to devalue the managerialist ethos of NPM.

Many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been heavily influenced by the ideas of New Public Management, to some extent of their own accord and to some extent because of the influence of the European Union and international donor organizations. The adoption of these ideas has helped in part to overcome the legacy from the past Communist administration and also produce some convergence of administrative styles with other European states, albeit less so with the Germanic models that have been the underlying models in some of the cases, e.g., Hungary and the Czech Republic. That having been said, however, the modernization that was produced through these reforms is being paid for by other problems created by these changes. In particular, adopting the more *laissez faire* “Let the Managers Manage” style of NPM was not suitable for systems that had not fully institutionalized the values that have undergirded administration in most Western European countries (see Chapman, 2000). Thus, these reforms have been associated with opportunities for corruption in some cases and have not yielded as much efficiency gains as might have been expected, especially from the hymns of praise offered by the advocates.

¹⁷Privatization can well be considered independent from New Public Management but the ideas have tended to travel together and to be advocated by similar sets of political and

3.7 Reform as Participation

A second approach to reforming the bureaucracy has been to enhance the levels of participation available to both clients and members of the organizations themselves. Whereas the market reforms depended upon competitive pressures to improve the performance of the public sector this style of reform depended more on the abilities of the individuals within government, especially in the lower ranks of public organizations (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2004). Likewise, it was assumed that permitting the people most affected by a program to have some influence over the program was not only democratic, it might also enhance the quality of the program itself.

Within Europe the natural home of reforms of this type was Scandinavia, where these ideas actually had been in place as a fundamental component of that tradition of administration. Even with that strong foundation, the tendency has been to enhance the range of participation in terms of both programs affected and range of individuals involved. In particular, programs are increasingly influenced by networks of social actors designed to represent a range of interests in the policy area (Sorenson and Torfing, 2002). Likewise, individual facilities increasingly are influenced, or governed directly, by the stakeholders so that parents, or residents, or whoever can determine action.

While the Scandinavian countries did not have to make many significant changes to conform to a participatory style of governing, the heartland of change in this direction has been North America. Although one might have expected American government to accept the market model with substantial fervor, in reality there has been little change in that direction, and the dominant reforms of the 1990s and even to some extent in the second Bush administration have been more participatory.¹⁸ In particular, the National Performance Review stressed building mechanisms for involving lower echelon public employees and clients in the processes of governing. Likewise, Canadian government has engaged in several exercises in empowerment and citizen engagement to increase the openness of that government to social actors and individual citizens (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005).

Much as in the case of market reforms the participatory reforms have not been widely accepted in the Germanic or Napoleonic traditions. The corporatist nature of governing in the Germanic countries does provide substantial opportunities for involvement of social interests, perhaps especially in Austria. Also, some sub-national governments in Germany and the other countries have developed methods for including social actors in their decision-making processes. That having been said, although these opportunities for participation are well institutionalized, they tend to be more closely regulated and constrained than those foreseen in most versions of participatory reforms of the bureaucracy. In particular, the Scandinavian version of participatory governance has allowed, or even mandated, a wide range of involvement of organizations.

The extent of corporatism in the Napoleonic tradition has been debated (see for example, Royo, 2002; Baccaro, 2002) but in general this model has focused on a more autonomous role for the state and its bureaucracy and therefore has not provided as many opportunities for direct participation by social actors. With the modernization of administration now under way in most societies, however, there are some increases in participation options. In part decentralization and deconcentration of administration, and the consequent loss of

¹⁸To some extent much of the managerialist agenda had been adopted earlier, even as early as in the reports of the Brownlow and Hoover Commissions in the 1930s and the 1950s (Arnold, 2000).

uniformity in administration, have increased opportunities at lower levels of government for the public and for social actors to exert some influence over administration.¹⁹

For the countries in the Central and Eastern European countries the opportunities for enhanced participation are reduced by the lower levels of development of civil society and fewer actors available for participation in the policy process. Decades of suppression of independent social action in these systems have not been as yet overcome, despite numerous efforts (Glenn, 2001). Further, as countries have had to make choices about how to deal with the bureaucratic elites inherited from the old regimes, the use of available expertise has meant reinstitutionalizing some aspects of the rigid bureaucracy of the old system. That having been said, however, some policy areas such as the environment and gender have become the locus of substantial political mobilization so that in some policy areas at least there are real opportunities for building a more participatory style of governing.

3.8 Convergence Through Reform?

The assumption of many reformers, whether politician or public administrator, is that NPM and/or participatory reforms will necessarily improve the quality of government performance. The further assumption is that given the presumed superiority of these styles of governing there will be a convergence of public bureaucracies around these styles of governing. Even if the former assumption is correct, the latter has not been, and if anything there has been a divergence in the style of governing and in the structures of the public sector. All bureaucracies have changed, and these structures are not more open and transparent than in the past, and all are more concerned with “serving the customer.” But beyond those common changes there is almost certainly some divergence in these systems.

On the one hand the public sectors in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, and to a lesser extent the other Scandinavian countries have been engaged in a massive effort at reform and have produced significant changes. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have also made changes in their administrative systems although they generally have not been as sweeping as in the above cases, in part because of the need to institutionalize many of the fundamental aspects of administration. On the other hand, many of the countries in Southern Europe and countries following a more Germanic style of administration have made minimal changes, and administration continues much as before.

Although we observe this divergence at present, has the ground been laid for a later convergence of administrative systems? I would argue that this is unlikely, except for some of the most basic elements, again revolving around service delivery and transparency. Although the ideas of participation and especially the ideas of the New Public Management have been important catalysts for change in some settings, their power is now waning. This is true in part because they are now seen as old ideas that are somewhat passé, even if there is not any set of ideas that have replaced them as sources for change. Further, some of the dysfunctions that arise from the New Public Management have become very apparent to many governments, including some of the most enthusiastic adopters, and there have been some significant reversions to older forms of governing.

¹⁹French scholars have argued that there has been a good deal more involvement of sub-national officials in the administration of policy, and that these officials are able to exert much greater influence than might be expected from the formal positions of those officials Thoenig (1976), Gremion (1976).

3.9 The End of Bureaucracy?

The pressures for reform that I have discussed above, whether implemented completely or not, point to the pressures in many if not all governments in Europe that tend to drive their public sectors away from the bureaucratic form that has been so central to governance for these states. Those pressures are quite understandable, given the numerous and very real dysfunctions of bureaucracy, but they may also tend to undervalue some aspects of traditional bureaucracy. Indeed, despite those well-known dysfunctions and the importance of the ideas of reform, there are some movements to return governing to more bureaucratic formats.

Some of the initial justifications for bureaucracy have been undermined by reforms, and some of the resultant patterns of governing have produced some of the same problems that required the formality of bureaucracy or some other formalized means of administration. Much of the logic of bureaucracy was to minimize discretion and therefore to maximize predictability for citizens. In contrast, the logic of many reforms has been to permit greater latitude for individual civil servants to make decisions, whether the civil servant is at the bottom of the hierarchy or managers shaping policy through their organizations (see Page, 2005). In addition, the enhanced role of members of social networks in shaping decisions may divert decisions from their initial intent to match the preferences of the members of the networks.²⁰

Another important reason for returning somewhat to more bureaucratic forms of organizations within executives of government is to reassert the “primacy of politics” in public life. As already noted denigrating the role and capabilities of political leaders in reform has left those politicians with the sense that although they may be held responsible for the actions of many public organizations, they actually have little control over those organizations. While this sense of relative impotence on the part of politicians has a long history (Rose, 1974) it has increased in recent years, and politicians have begun to fight back. In particular, they have attempted to politicize the bureaucracy and to use political appointments and the creation of political watchdogs over administration to ensure that the directives of political leaders are being followed in the bureaucracy (see Peters and Pierre, 2002).

Following from the above point about political control, perhaps the most important reason for returning to more bureaucratic forms of administering public policy is to ensure, and perhaps to restore, accountability for those organizations. In traditional forms of democratic accountability (Day and Klein, 1987; Thomas, 2004) the bureaucracy was accountable to their minister, who was in turn responsible to parliament, who were in turn responsible to voters. In some administrative traditions (especially the Anglo-American) this format for accountability has been the central locus for coping with bureaucratic power, while in others legal instruments tend to dominate in the control of bureaucracy. The difficulty for maintaining democratic control that has arisen in the process of administrative reform has been that NPM in particular has tended to devalue the role of political leaders and to emphasize the autonomy of organizations within the bureaucracy (see Verhoest et al., 2004).

²⁰Conversely, networks may have sufficient difficulty in making decisions among the competing interests that are involved that they are incapable of imposing any consistent preferences on the bureaucracies with whom they interact.

In the end many of the virtues of formal bureaucracy that were identified by Weber and then by early reformers have been demonstrated in practice. Although there are without a doubt also significant dysfunctions of this form of administration and governance, those dysfunctions are in part compensated by the predictability and accountability that is programmed into the bureaucratic form. The reversion to the bureaucratic form to some extent reinforces Simon's famous argument about the proverbs of administration, albeit at a macro level. That is, most of the ideas we have about administration tend to come in pairs that are opposites, so that if we maximize one value we soon find that there are significant dysfunctions from that choice. The pendulum must then swing back toward the middle, often overshooting that middle and then creating a new set of dysfunctions.

3.10 Conclusion

The public bureaucracy is a central institution in all political systems and arguably is the most crucial institution in contemporary governments. The bureaucracy is also a central social institution, reflecting social and cultural values as well as the political necessities associated with governing. In part the values that are associated with bureaucracy are the links with the society, both at the macro level and on a more micro level of connection to social actors. The bureaucracy is increasingly important as a means of involving the public in making and implementing public policy and also an important locus for effective democracy in changing political circumstances.

Those bureaucracies are based on authority and cross-national differences among European countries in the role of formal authority, and its basis is a beginning in understanding the role of bureaucracy in society. This role has had a number of important similarities in all European societies, but there are also crucial differences, especially in terms of the role of law as the guidance for administrators and the autonomy of the bureaucracy from political control. Some of those differences are idiosyncratic, but many are related more systematically to underlying patterns that I have referred to as administrative traditions. Those traditions have persisted over decades if not centuries and are persisting even in the face of substantial pressures for modernization, Europeanization, and reform.

Europeanization does appear to be producing some convergence in administrative systems, although the ability of countries to use their own administrative apparatus to implement European regulations may make that convergence more superficial than is true for substantive policy areas. There are also marked pressures toward reform in the public sector, and these reforms might have been expected to produce some convergence. Instead of that convergence, however, the differential acceptance of the ideas guiding reform within different administrative traditions may in fact be producing greater divergence of public administration.

Although bureaucracy persists, and to some extent has been reinforced, some aspects of the formal system of governing have indeed decayed or been largely eliminated. The emphasis on greater transparency in government that has been at the heart of many less dramatic reforms in the public sector than those sparked off by NPM has produced important improvements in accountability and has made effective participation more feasible. Likewise, an emphasis on simply delivering better services has been possible without all the trappings of NPM and has been achieved in a number of settings. Thus, at the same time that there has been some reaction to the excesses of reform by reinstating some aspects of the bureaucratic system there also has been substantial debureaucratization. The changes

that are occurring in the public sectors in Europe, and elsewhere, are too complex to be captured by simple slogans such as NPM. To understand these changes requires a more nuanced approach, and often a case by case understanding of how state and bureaucracy have been altered.

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Chapter 4

Cities

Patrick Le Galès and Göran Therborn

4.1 The City Continent

More than anywhere else on the planet, civilization in Europe in the past 2500 years has been shaped by cities. Historical Europe is an urban civilization even if cities are by no means a European invention. They were pioneered in West Asia, in Mesopotamia, and had an early bloom in a Western region reaching into today's Syria, Palestine, Anatolia, and in the East in China. But the links from Sumerian Mesopotamia were broken long ago, and Asia developed in a land-centred direction of empires, intermittently punctuated by nomadic power of horse-borne warriors, such as the Mongols and Turkic peoples, with the Ottomans as the most enduringly successful.

Europe, on the other hand, was created by cities, or city-states. From Athens and the other Greek city-states we derive our conceptions of polity and politics, from the *polis*, the city. European political theory, based on Plato and Aristotle, started out as a theory of city governance. The city-state tradition was continued by the Romans. Rome and its ultimately vast and powerful empire developed as a city-state, always beginning its official history *ab urbe condita*, i.e. from the (mythical) founding of Rome. The Roman empire expanded as a “federation of cities”, linking regional and provincial centres with that of the empire (Lafon et al. 2003:140).

The European conception of citizenship derives from the Roman concept of *civis*, originally denoting a burgher of the city of Rome, in 212 AD extended to the whole empire. After the fall of Rome, the city-centred conception of the world was continued by the mainstream of the Christian Church, as Augustine's central 5th century opus *The City of God*, and in the sixth–seventh work of Isidore of Sevilla, against the tide of “barbarian” ruralization. Church organization had an urban orientation and an urban effect. *Civitates* came to mean cities of episcopal sites.

The rise of autonomous cities, successfully asserting their autonomy vis-à-vis territorial lords, became a major phenomenon of Italy of the 12th century, the centre of Europe at that time. It spawned the first revival of urban republican political thought in Europe (Skinner 2002). The landlords returned in most cases, but early second millennium Italian urbanism

P. Le Galès (✉)

Centre d'Etudes Européennes, Sciences Po and King's College London, UK
e-mail: patrick.legales@sciences-po.fr

While the authors share a joint responsibility for this article, in our division of labour Therborn has concentrated on historical and symbolic developments and Le Galés on contemporary politics and economics.

left the enduring cultural legacies of Florence, Siena and others, and the long-lived political economy clout of Genoa and Venice. And when the Italian cities started to decline, the relay was passed to cities of Flanders and Holland, Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam (Braudel 1982).

City law was an important part of the city-state formation of Europe. Even when dependent on, tributary to, territorial lords, European cities usually had their own laws. They could also be exported to other cities. Nuremberg law was exported westwards in Bavaria, Lübeck law north into the Baltics, and Magdeburg law, most successfully, eastwards, in Eastern Germany and into contemporary Poland and Ukraine, including Kyiv (Hamm 1993:6–7), where it is still commemorated on the Dniepr embankment by a pre-revolutionary white column with a golden apple.

Collective urban autonomy within larger polities was uniquely European in recorded history, but Max Weber (1922) may have over-emphasized the importance of the medieval *coniuratio* (urban conspiracy). The European urban panorama also included heteronomous cities of various kinds, *untertänige Städte* (subject cities in Habsburg German; Cerman and Knittler 2001:183). A remarkable break in urban conception took place in West-Central Europe in the 11th and 12th centuries, whereby classical *civitas*, a concentrated community of citizens, gradually began to be abandoned for *stad* (*Stadt* in Germany and the Netherlands – soon inspiring West Slavic *miasto/mesto*, and for *ville* in France, i.e. for purely territorial concepts). The Germanic and West Slavic words just meant “place”, whereas the French adopted a Latin word for a major country-house, in Carolingian times a major rural residence (Van Loon 2000:186ff).

In their protracted struggle against landed power and territorial lords, all European cities finally lost out to dynastic empires and to nation-states, as superior war-makers in the war-driven competition among European polities (Tilly 1990). The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and their outcome sealed the fate of Venice and of the (city-ruled) Dutch United Provinces, presaging the imminent end of the Swiss urban oligarchies of Basle, Berne, Geneva, Lucerne, Zürich.

By early 19th century, the Europe of city-states had definitely been overcome by a rapidly urbanizing Europe of states. What Europe then came to export to the world was not the city-state but the nation-state and the dual colonial city. However, Athens, Rome, and, to a much lesser extent, Florence and Venice have remained proud parts of the European cultural, legal, and political canon. The European classics are Greco-Roman, of philosophy, drama, poetry, law, political theory, architecture, and urban planning. The basics of European construction, of proportions, arches, and colonnades, etc., of public monuments, statues, columns, triumphal arches, as well as of modes of governance, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, republic or tyranny, and citizenship all derive from city-states.

What was the basis of this powerful European urbanism? Classically, it was the force – naval in Athens, terrestrial in Sparta and Rome – of a concentration of free men. Later on it was long-distance trade, banking, and capital accumulation, protected by mercenaries.

The classical city was governed by a sharp distinction between a citizenry of free men – of proprietors free from work – and, on the other hand, the slaves and the foreigners. The medieval city thrived on another distinction, between town and country, between the burghers on one side and the peasants – servile or not – and the landowners on the other.

4.2 The Pattern of European Urbanization

Urbanization has had different meanings in European history, from the establishment, diffusion, growth, or shrinkage of special legal–political entities with their own jurisdiction and spatially clearly demarcated by walls, entered into only through guarded gates, closed at night, to that of settlements of a certain size and density, whose roadside boundary signposts are often deliberately ignored in current studies of urbanization. But however defined, European urbanization has its shifting spatial patterning and its variable rhythm over time.

Despite the common European canon of Classicism from Athens and Rome, modern Europe has a spatially very differentiated urban history. There was a City Belt running from Italy to the Low Countries, through largely rural Switzerland, with a set of powerful, autonomous cities, and through the urbanized Germanic Rhineland. Spain and Portugal also had a significant, somewhat lower, urban presence – most notable if the bottom line is set at 5,000 rather than 10,000 population (Epstein 2001:10; de Vries 1984:39), but for the rest of it, Europe in 1500 was overwhelmingly rural. This pattern began to change in the 17th century through accelerated urbanization in the Netherlands and, particularly, in England. But France, the main early modern political power, remained predominantly rural, as did the Germanic lands, not to speak of Northern and Eastern Europe (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 The urban percentage of the population, 1500–1800

	1500	1700	1800
Low countries	19	29	23
Italy	12	13	15
Spain	6	9	11
England and Wales	1	13	20
France	4	9	9
Germany	4	5	6
Scandinavia	1	4	5
Poland	0	1	3

Source: J. de Vries, *European Urbanization 1500–1800*, London, Methuen, 1984, p. 39.

Note: Urban population denotes populations in cities with 10,000 inhabitants or more.

By the same criterion, of 10,000, Europe did not get an urban majority until after 1950. The main growth took place between 1850 and 1950, when the urban population, defined as inhabitants of cities with at least 5,000 inhabitants, increased from 16 to 59% of the population (Pinol and Walther 2003:26; cf. also Lees and Hollen Lees 2007). By then North America and Oceania (Australia) had become more urbanized than Europe. Pre-modern cities thrived on political power, trade, and religious significance, but modern European urbanization was mainly driven by industrialization and industrial empire, a process very different from the growth of Southern mega cities in the last decades, generated much more by rural push and consumer dreams than by industrial pull of employment and mobility.

In the late 19th century, the capital cities – which had a first spurt of growth with the Renaissance monarchies and the rise of Absolutism in the 16th and 17th centuries –, in particular, benefited from the consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level, and the strengthening of the states’ – and therefore the bureaucracies’, including the army – capacity for control, as well as from industrial development and colonization.

They absorbed a large part of the flow of migration, thus providing sizeable reserves of labour. They were the first beneficiaries of the transport revolution, from tramways to road and rail networks. Open to the world in an era that saw increasing numbers of different kinds of exchanges, discoveries, and technical innovations, they established their role by organizing universal exhibitions and great fairs. Concerned with public health and safety, governments organized major improvement works, created wide avenues, and constructed new public buildings: stations, squares, and monuments that symbolized their dynamism and technical progress. These cities were also places of speculation, of public and private investment in housing, and of financial capital. Their cultural influence changed scale because of more rapid diffusion, transports, and colonial empires. London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, especially, were theatres of extraordinary physical and cultural transformations. As university cities and cultural centres they were the focus of unrest and the sites of the political and social revolts that punctuated the 19th century. The great metropolis became the site of consumption, of department stores and wide avenues, of art and entertainment which changed the urban cultural experience. This led also to physical transformation with the ever-increasing diffusion of urbanization around those large metropolis, hence the rise of suburbs, either working class ones as the red belt in Paris or bourgeois suburbs where, as in industrial England, middle classes abandoned the centre.

Seen from the sky, the European pattern of urbanization is very peculiar with the mix of land and sea. Dematteis (2000:50) reminds us that “in 1822, the geographer Karl Ritter wrote that Africa appears as a limbless trunk, Asia has ramifications on three sides, while Europe seems divided in all directions, with the limbs prevailing over the body”. An X image was developed in the 1980s to illustrate the metropolitan concentration, in the central part of the European urban X going, on the one hand, from the South of Spain to Scandinavia, and, on the other hand, from Dublin and Glasgow to Southern Italy and Greece, thus identifying an urban core of Europe made of the corridor linking London to Northern Italy going through Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, once imaginatively named “blue banana” by the French geographer R. Brunet, a clear inheritance of the long-term relatively stable pattern of European urbanization. Within the nation-state information, Walther Christaller (1950) famously identified territorial hierarchies in Europe within which cities were functional to organization of the economic and political control of the political state in formation. As mentioned before, this central periphery model helped understanding at different scales the difference between the European core regions and the rest, urban regions and their periphery, cities, and the countryside even if this model was already modified by the influence of the industrial revolution (Dematteis 2000).

After 1950 the direction of European urban development began to diverge. While there was accelerated city growth in the south and, above all, in the east, British cities started to decline. The urban share of the population of England and Wales, by national criteria, peaked in the census of 1951, at 80.8%, coming back to its 1931 level of 80.0% in 1961, and then receding to 6.9% by 1981, still staying there in 1991 (although a new definition raised the percentage to 89.7). The proportion of the population living in the six major conurbations peaked already in 1931, at 41%. By 2001 it was down to 35% (Wood and Carter 2000:416ff). On the other hand, the decades after World War II were the decades of massive urbanization in France and in Southern and Eastern Europe. Indexing regional urban population in 1950 at 100, the UN (1997) found for 1990 a value of 245 in Eastern Europe, of 187 in Southern Europe, and 148 in Western Europe. By 1989 USSR was 66% urban, from 18% in 1926 (when the deurbanizing ravages of the wars and the civil war had been recovered), and its number of million-plus cities had grown from 3 in 1959 to 22 in 1986 (Medvedikov 1990:18).

The European context is now made up of a few declining cities, many dynamic medium size and large cities, and two dynamic large “global” cities. In the mid-2000s, the European rate of urbanization, according to variable national definitions, range from about 45% in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina to 97% in Belgium. According to current criteria, the urbanization rate is 76 in France, 88 in Germany, 67 in Italy, 73 in Russia, and 89 in the UK. UN estimates three-fourths of the European population to be urban. As a reference it may be added that the rate is 80 in USA, 65 in Japan, 39 in China, and 28 in India (UNDP 2005: Table 15).

The UN Population Division is currently working with a habitat conception of “urban agglomeration”, which refers to population concentration rather than to urbanity. It is interesting in its findings of the limitations of European urbanization. The main “agglomerations” are now all outside Europe, headed by Tokyo (35 million in 2005), Mexico and New York-Newark (19 each), São Paulo and Mumbai (18 each). Among the world’s 25 largest conurbations, 4 are European, on rungs 20 (Moscow, 11 million), 21–22 (Paris and Istanbul), and 25 (London) (www.infoplease.com/ipa). The post-World War II growth of these mega cities has been much faster than that of European big cities at their period of rapid expansion. Between 1850 and 1910 Berlin, for example, grew by about 2.6% annually, while Dhaka and Lagos have had an annual growth of around 6.8% between 1950 and 2000 (Berlin growth calculated from Le Galès 2002:59).

But it still makes some sense to compare administratively defined cities, especially since the agglomeration criteria are rather fleeting. This list of the world’s formally largest cities is topped by Seoul at 10.2 million inhabitants, followed by São Paulo at 10. Among the 25 largest, 3 are European, Moscow (rank 6, 8.3 million), Istanbul (8.3 million, rank 7), and London (7.1 million, rank 11). Fifteen are Asian, five are Latin American, one is North American, one is African, and Lagos is missing. (Paris, by this way of counting, is a rather modest big city, with 2.2 million, in Europe behind also St. Petersburg (4.7), Berlin (3.4), Madrid (2.8), Rome (2.6), Kyiv (2.6); www.citymayors.com/features/largest_cities.)

Europe has a distinctive urban pattern in terms of size, with a large proportion of its urban population in medium-sized and small cities as comes out of Table 4.2. Western Europe has three and a half times more urban areas with at least 10,000 inhabitants than the USA (Cattan et al. 1999:23).

Table 4.2 Percentage of total population in cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, 2000

Africa	23
Asia	19
Europe	47
Latin America and Caribbean	36
North America	30
Oceania	34

Source. UN (2003).

As a proportion of the urban population of Europe, cities larger than half a million as well as smaller than 100,000 lost to the medium cities in between, which increased their share from 21 to 24% during 1950–1990 (Moriconi-Ebrard 1994, Pinol and Walther 2003:623). Small-and medium-sized cities are particularly important in the Nordic countries in Italy, Spain, Netherlands and France, whereas the German and the British pattern is less significant, and similar to that of Japan, but more than in the USA (Kaelble 1987:63).

In Western Europe, since the mid-1980s, cities (which are not old industrial cities), and above all the largest cities, have felt the benefits of growth. There followed a recovery and a renewed urban growth in the 1990s and the 2000s in most of Western Europe, including a new period of growth for most of the largest cities. All the ten largest cities of France, defined in narrow administrative terms or in terms of urban areas, increased their population in 1999–2005 (INSEE). The German pattern was uneven in 1990s, even among the big cities, where Berlin lost population, together with Munich, Frankfurt a.M., and, of course, the Ruhr cities, while Hamburg and Cologne were gaining. By the mid-2000s Berlin seemed to have regained a growth track, while city shrinking still continued (Spiegel 2004). After a substantial decline in the 1970s and stagnation for most of the 1980s, the population of London is rising again, surpassing its 1971 level in 2006 (Population Trends 2006). Eastern European development went in the opposite direction, post-Communist economic depression, de-industrialization, and, in some cases, belated suburbanization led to a general decline of the major cities. The main exception was Tirana, which had an explosive influx of people from a crumbling countryside, a development more similar to, say, Dhaka or Kinshasa than to Western Europe (Tosics 2005:67f).

In centralized countries, it seems to be mainly the region around the capital city that absorbs the strongest forces and the economic dynamism: this is true not only of London, Paris, Rome, but also of Madrid, Dublin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Lisbon. In the lower echelons of the hierarchy of cities, some regional capitals and other medium-sized European cities have also experienced strong growth: Bologna, Strasbourg, Lyon, Grenoble, Nice, Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Geneva, Valencia, Seville, Saragossa, Norwich, Bristol, Swindon, Leicester, Turku. In some cases, however, economic dynamism has actually combined with population losses to release the grip previously exerted by certain metropolises, a development that has been particularly spectacular in Northern Italy, where medium-sized cities between Milan and Venice have seen very strong growth. A new feature has been that a number of cities have undergone economic development disconnected from the regions surrounding them. The movement of concentration/dispersal of activities favours smaller cities and rural spaces around cities. By contrast, others – especially smaller cities (which, from a French point of view, might be described as medium-sized cities) – are experiencing changes that tend more towards decline, as if regional metropolises in their turn are largely absorbing the economic dynamism of their region, as in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna.

There is currently a lively debate about European spatial urbanization pattern. Beyond the representation of cities, many geographers argue that flows and networks are far more important to understand those patterns, hence a process of mapping all sorts of flows or making innovative representation of networks. Cities are of course at the same time territorial places and part of global or regional networks. Taking into account this dimension does make the old Christaller (1950) order obsolete (with its limits) but all the new visual representation of flows and networks remain in part shaped by the deep and old territoriality of the European urbanization.

4.3 Economic Development

One motor of urbanization is economic development and over the long term, now that the growth of the state seems to be over for a while, this motor is again quite central. The revival of a more “urban” economy partly remains a puzzle. It remains that cities have

become again the key engine of economic development as they were during most of the middle age years (Hohenberg and Lees 1985). Two main factors have been put forward: the pressure of globalization processes and the need for agglomeration raised by new forms of economic development. Many observers have therefore taken globalization trends and increasing networks and exchanges as the main factor behind the coming back of cities.

Paris metropolitan area absorbed half the French population growth in the 1980s; London enjoyed accelerated growth. The growth of those large cities was put in parallel with the rise of economic exchanges at the global level. Processes of globalization, including transnational migration, architectural development, financial transactions, transport flux, or dissemination of technological innovations contribute to the rise of mega cities in different parts of the globe. In a different way, the metropolitan revival or growth is explained by the demands of the “new economy”. Manville and Storper (2006) suggest that the New Economy’s demands for proximity are stimulated by information. Therefore people have to work in close vicinity in big cities with diverse economic sectors to sustain the production of knowledge and the circulation of talents among sectors.

The development of large cities is related first to the pressure and incentives of globalization trends. They are seen as the new motors of the global economy: issues of competitiveness are central to this notion. They result from the amalgamation of existing localities, to construct inter-territorial organization for collective action which are more or less functionally dependent. Some can be organized around a major urban centre as in the classic model of the metropolis, some may be the network of urban centres (Delta metropolis in Holland, Milan), some may go over national boundaries such as the Sound region, “Örestad”. The basic argument behind this version of the mega city is from economic geography: those global city-regions are the centre of dense networks of transnational firms, they “thrive on the productivity and innovation enhancing effects of dense and multifaceted urban milieux that are simultaneously embedded in worldwide distribution networks” (Scott 2001:4).

However, there is little evidence to suggest that, in the European context, global or world cities are a particular category of cities beyond the concentration of networks, headquarters, more diverse interests. In economic terms therefore, the rise of the so-called global cities is rather to be related to the more general renewal and acceleration of metropolization trends which are also valid for medium-sized cities in the USA and Europe alike. There is indeed more to economic development than just the leading services, for instance the financial services. Following Veltz (1996, 2000) we would argue that dynamics of metropolization can be used to account for both the growth of a good number of European cities, notably regional capitals, and the effects of acceleration and accentuation of these dynamics in the largest of them. Differences are of degree, not of nature, reflecting hierarchies of cities.

What remains unclear is the extent to which there is a direct link between the concentration of headquarters, networks of various sorts, advanced services, diverse skilled professionals, knowledge complex, on the one hand, and, on the other, economic development. In other words, is there a clear size effect which has some impact on the rate of economic development? It may be the case that global city-regions are the genuine motor of economic growth and that they have a major comparative advantage. It may also be the case that different patterns of metropolization may lead to the same result because the combination of network, mobility, diffusion of innovation can take different forms. The density of medium-sized cities in Europe may be a functional equivalent for those factors identified in the global city-regions to the concentration within a large metropolis.

4.4 Urban Form

Cities are built environments in natural settings, and these nature-located built environments constitute something of a core connotation of what a city is.

After the urban destruction in World War II, a crucial question of European urbanism was reconstruction or modern construction? On the whole the answer was reconstruction, most emphatically in the Communist East, which had suffered most destruction. The restoration of Warsaw, including its noble palaces and royal castle, set a major example, followed in less damaged Budapest and Prague. In Sofia, the bomb damage to the city core provided the launching pad for building a new political centre of socialist-historicist convenience. Coventry and Rotterdam, the most damaged cities of Europe west of Germany, chose a modernist course, focused on central pedestrian shopping districts, of which the Rotterdam *Lijnbaan* was both the first and the most noticed (Ward 2002:169, 197).

Cold War-divided Berlin had a divided post-war development, but on both sides reconstruction rather than modernist novel construction carried the day. Post-World War II Communism broke the previous links between aesthetic modernism and political radicalism. The showpiece of East Berlin, the *Stalin-Allee* was not a restoration, but it linked up with a historical past (see further Aman 1992). In the Cold War competition, West Berlin was happy to house some icons of International Style modernism, like the *Hansaviertel* and the *Philharmonie*, but it too settled for reconstruction – like Munich, Hamburg, and the rest of West Germany, with the exception of Frankfurt am Main, where the old city wall was replaced by American-style business towers (cf. Dolff-Bonekämper and Kier 1996; Rodenstein 2004).

Re-unified Berlin emits different architectural messages, even inside the new Potsdamer Platz project, with an European part directed by the Italian architect Renzo Piano and a part of extra-European modernism around the Sony centre designed by the German-American Helmut Jahn; with a sleek modernist Chancellor's Office, a post-modern refurbished Reichstag, and a commitment to rebuild the pre-war imperial city palace.

For all North Atlantic Cold War commitment, American urbanism and architecture made little headway in post-war Western Europe, in spite of several study tours to the USA by, for example, French planners and architects, focusing mainly on American construction methods. American interwar Art Deco high rises were quite influential in the Soviet Union, as in the post-war iconic skyscrapers of Moscow or in the Culture Palace given by the Soviets to Warsaw (cf. Cohen 1995: Ch. 7).

With the outcome of the war, the centre of European urban planning shifted from Germany and Austria to Britain, with significant Scandinavian, above all Swedish and Finnish, and Dutch inputs (Ward 2002). British planning was governed by the notion of containing metropolitan London, de facto enormously dominant and never well seated in the ruralistic high culture of Britain (Williams 2004), of “the fundamental need for putting a limit to London's growth by accretion” (Abercombie 1945:24), and by the “garden city” idea developed half a century before (Howard 1902). A set of New Towns were launched, around London and some other big British cities, the most successful probably being the latest, Milton Keynes, a sort of Los Angeles in miniature, spread out, green, with little centrality. In its objective the Abercombie plan was successful. Inner London declined in population till 1980, and by 2001 Inner and Outer London together had 7.2 million population, to be compared with 8.7 in 1939 and 8.3 in 1950 (Hartog 2005: 93f).

In Scandinavia, post-war suburban development took another course, urban-type density, low-rise apartment blocks, important and multifunctional local pedestrian centres, well

equipped with public transport. The original intention that they would also be employment centres was never really realized. Vällingby in Stockholm and Tapiola in Helsinki became sites of 1950s architectural pilgrimage (Hall 1998:861ff).

In Eastern Europe a political brake on metropolitan development was also applied, with limited success in spite of the use of administrative residence permits. There was furthermore the project of new “socialist cities”, industrial, working class, well endowed with institutions of culture, Nowa Huta in Poland, Stalinstadt/Eisenhüttenstadt in the GDR, Stalinvaros/Dunajvaros in Hungary (see further Enyedi 1996).

All European post-war cities had to face the problem of mass housing, generated by industrialization and urbanizations (Burgel 2003:761ff). Everywhere, the outcome of the considerable efforts turned out problematic, involving new social problems among the new tenants, be they of inner city low-rise council estates in the UK, of suburban medium-rise *grands-ensembles* of Parisian suburbs, or medium-to-high-rise suburban apartment blocks of the “million program” – of a million new housing units within 10 years of a population of 8 million – housing of suburban Sweden, or the Khrushchev or Brezhnev pre-fabricated apartment complexes of the USSR.

While the housing quality in Scandinavia or France may have been superior, similar problems of concentrated post-industrial unemployment and/or multicultural migration out of poverty governed urban post-1970s problems East and West.

Europe pioneered the department stores, and the big cities have so far more or less successfully resisted or delimited the suburban mall of American shopping, ironically pioneered by an architect from Red Vienna, having fled the Nazis in 1938, Victor Gruen, né Grünbaum (cf. Wall 2005). They still have their fashionable shopping streets in their centres. Post-war Rotterdam pioneered the pedestrian central shopping precinct (Ward 2002:199), a concept taken up early in Coventry and which has spread on the continent, first northwards, later and much more modestly southwards. What has spread northwards from the Mediterranean south has been sidewalk cafés and restaurants, now a prominent feature also of Nordic cities.

Urban regeneration policies driven by cultural investments and by new iconic buildings of culture became in the 1980s one of the major city responses to urban crisis and decline, to a significant extent inspired by American examples. The most spectacular case is the ex-industrial city of Bilbao, which in 1989 adopted a culturally oriented Plan of Urban Renewal, that in the 1990s was crowned by a deal with the New York Guggenheim Museum and by a post-modern trailblazer building by Frank Gehry (1997). Barcelona made very good use of a sports event, the 1992 Olympics, for a large-scale renaissance, supported by European and national funds. Increased urban autonomy in Italy spawned ambitious cultural policies in many cities, including Rome.

Northern and Midlands English ex-industrial cities, like Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, and Scottish, such as Glasgow, have made heroic efforts at recycling themselves as vibrant cultural centres (cf. Bianchini and Parkinson 1993). The EU institution of European Cities of Culture, inaugurated in 1985 out of an initiative by Melina Mercouri as Greek Minister of Culture, and since 1999 renamed “Cultural of Capital of Europe”, has given a big boost to urban cultural policy. In terms of architecture and arts they have, on the whole, been successful, but their overall effect on city development and prospects have so far been more limited.

Waterfront developments, on rivers as well as on seas, have been a major feature of many European cities since the 1980s, converting old docks and port areas – rendered obsolete by new container ports – and de-industrialized railway yards into post-industrial areas of finance (London) offices and leisure and entertainment areas. Vienna, which always had

turned its back to the river and its recurrent floods, has developed an ostentatious Donau city (cf. Rebak et al. 2003). The Liverpool docks and the inner port areas of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have been opened up to urbanization. Barcelona used its Olympic occasion, and Sevilla and Lisbon (cf. Cabral and Rato 2003) their World Expo opportunity to develop their sea and their river fronts, respectively. Oslo has turned its former major engineering plant by the *fjord* into an area of posh consumption and gastronomy (see further Tölle 2004).

European cities have in the last decades tended, unevenly, to depollution. The coal-fired London smog disappeared in the 1950s. In the 1990s it became again possible to swim bacteriologically safe and to catch fish in the waters of central Stockholm. The move towards sustainable development is only recent and often supported by the presence of elected green politicians in city councils. Slowly, bicycle lanes imported for Northern Europe, public transport, waste recycling scheme, energy saving *dispositifs*, electric buses and depollution schemes are developing in particular in Northern cities but increasingly in Southern Europe as well.

4.4.1 *Symbolic Forms*

In Western Europe, low-keyed sobriety characterized the post-war period in terms of urban symbolism. The heroes and the martyrs of the war were commemorated, but in modest forms, often tacked onto World War I memorials. Germany and Austria gradually came to initiate a novel form of public political iconography, representing guilt and shame, with respect to the Nazi crimes, to the Holocaust in particular. This was all very different from Eastern Europe, where Soviet victory – won at horrendous cost of lives – generated large-scale monumental ensembles, of triumph as well as of mourning of the dead. Gigantic statues of Stalin were erected in Budapest and Prague and planned for all capitals. A mausoleum monumentality was developed for local Communist leaders, in Prague and in Sofia in particular. Iconic buildings of the new political power were put up, the Culture Palace in Warsaw, the Central Committee building in Sofia, the *Scinteia* print concern in Bucharest, and later Ceausescu's gargantuan Palace of the People, but not that many (See further Therborn 2006).

In the West, grand-scale symbolic building only took off from the 1980s. As in the 19th century, Paris led the way, actually starting earlier. The high-rise area *La Défense*, to the west of the city centre, developed from the 1960s was at first perhaps only an outsourced business district, its towers not allowed *intra muros*. But later the old plan of linking it with the Triumphal Way from the Louvre westwards was realized, with the Arch of La Défense. The new airport at Roissy, soon named Charles de Gaulle, is still, after four decades, the most spectacular in Europe, arguably in the world, designed by Paul Andreu. The 1970s Centre of Modern Art at Beaubourg, now bearing the name of de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, by Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers, became a trendsetter of contemporary cultural buildings in Europe and many parts of the world.

On this already vibrant legacy, Francois Mitterand launched his *grands travaux* of urban monumentality in Paris, including an extension of the Louvre, with the pyramid by I.M. Pei, a new National Library, a new opera, the Parc de la Villette of design, etc. Parisian monumentality continued under the Chirac Presidency, for instance with new grand museal constructions, of which the post-colonial of Quai Branly, designed by Jean Nouvel, is the most memorable.

No European city has matched this recent Parisian investment in monumentality, concentrated on a raft of cultural buildings although the Ministry of Finance has got an impressive location. But there are two other cities comparable to Paris in symbolic ambition, Berlin and London.

Berlin has been driven by its aim at becoming the political capital and the centre of unified Germany. Its effort has had two main foci and a general idea. The latter has been gentle reconstruction of the eastern centre, with strict rules of size and style. Lately this has taken an explicitly anti-modernist direction, in deciding to rebuild the imperial city castle, but before it invited many modern architects to work under the constraints, and many did. The modernist foci have been, on the one hand the Potsdamer Platz area, before the war the hub of Berlin, in the years of the Wall a border wasteland, to be developed as an east–west centre of urban life of leisure and entertainment. On the other hand, the *Spreebogen* (the inner city bend of the river Spree) aimed at manifesting the new political centre of reunified democratic Germany, with a seemingly transparent, distinctively non-pompous but soberly solemn Chancellor’s Office – proudly overtaking the modest Chancellor’s bungalow in Bonn –, a restored old *Reichstag* with a new glass cupola, up to which people and tourists can walk, on top of the MPs, and with an open green field in between.

Political symbolism in Germany has come to mean, first of all, commemoration of Nazi crimes, crimes against Jews above all. The two most symbolically laden constructions in contemporary Berlin, both by American Jews and of striking originality, are the Jewish Museum by Daniel Liebeskind and the Holocaust memorial by Peter Eisenmann, at the very centre of the city, by the Brandenburger Tor and the new American Embassy.

London, due to taxpayer influence (the City in particular), always less monumental than the big continental capitals, got a shot in the arm from the “Big Bang” of financial capitalism in the mid-1980s. A new business district with architectural ambitions was developed by North American capital, and in part by US architects, in Canary Wharf, a former docks area in the east. Currently, the most iconic building of London is the “Gherkin”, a gherkin-shaped office tower in the original City designed by Sir Norman Foster, originally for the insurance company Swiss Re, which has now sold off. Public building in London came after the end of Thatcherism. Sponsored by the New Labour government, a monumental building of spectacular economic failure was built in Greenwich, also in the east, the Millennium Dome by the other top star architect of current Britain, Richard Rogers, a remarkable post-modern construction for entertainment and/or exhibitions, which so far has not found its *raison d’être*. More solid, but less spectacular have been the developments on the South Bank of the Thames, of cultural institutions as well as commercial buildings, and a new, modernist City Hall. Business, rather than public culture as in Paris, has driven recent London architecture.

It has been argued (Jencks 2005, 2006) that iconic buildings are replacing monuments as symbolic landmarks. In Western Europe the golden age of urban monumentalism was the century from the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars – with the Parisian *Arc de Triomphe* and the London Trafalgar Square until that of World War I and the completion of the Roman *Vittorino*. Eastern Europe is still, after Communism, pursuing another track, with a marked re-sacralization of urban public space, most ostentatiously in the rebuilt Cathedrals of Christ the Redeemer in Moscow and of St. Michael in Kyiv, and with a very varied post-Communist monumentality. Nationally martyrological in Warsaw, militantly anti-Communist in Budapest, of diverse discretion in Prague, including both a return of a Habsburg statue and a modernist commemoration of people lost by Communist repression. The announced international competition for a new headquarters of Gazprom in St. Petersburg may signal a coming turn to iconic construction, of which post-Communist

Europe has so far not seen much more than a twisted Frank Gehry office for a Dutch insurance company in Prague. New architectural ambitions are proclaimed and planned in Prague, Riga, Vilnius, and many other cities. Minsk is already very proud of its new (2006), locally designed library, a big hexagon diamond on top of a low circular structure.

4.5 The Current “State of European Cities”

The 2007 “State of European cities report” by the Urban Audit of the EU provides evidence of the more recent socio-economic urban trends within the Europe of 27 (and of increased diversity from the enlargement). First, the population of European urban areas is still expanding more quickly than the growth of the overall population. In most countries, the pattern is mixed: some dynamic urban growth in a majority of cities and some cases of decline (or of shrinking cities). The largest cities in the North of Europe in particular (Netherlands, UK) and in Spain and Greece have expanded more quickly than smaller urban areas.

In the 1990s, the pattern of growth of Western European cities has been quite striking (not everywhere, not in the old harbours or industrial cities) by contrast to Eastern Europe where the overall decline of the population also translated to cities in the Baltic states, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. However, within those countries some capital cities have been doing much better than the rest of the cities. The overall pattern remains a pattern of urban decline and loss of population.

Following from its historical tradition of urban autonomy, European cities have always had strong centres, very much in contrast to the new US cities of the 19th and 20th centuries. On the continent, even in the industrial era, the upper classes have maintained a strong presence in the centres of big cities, dominating them in large parts. This pattern of the rich in the middle and the popular classes in the periphery has been pronounced in typical Mediterranean cities (Magnier 1996:66) but is by and large also a Germanic pattern, from Vienna to Stockholm. London and even more the industrial cities of Northern England, while having proud national and municipal centres (cf. impressive city halls), have had more of a bourgeois flight to the suburbs. Nevertheless, currently Inner London has the highest average disposable income in the European Union, including higher than the surrounding counties and Outer London (Eurostat 2007). There seems to be least sprawl in Switzerland, with prosperous compact cities (Bailly 2004).

Authors of the report are able to distinguish between different pattern of urbanization. (State of European cities report: 14, 15). Crucially, there is no unique pattern of decline of cities and massive sprawls. There is a dynamic pattern of urban growth, more growth in the suburbs than in core cities, but the old European city centres are not disappearing and in a number of cases, they are still growing.

- patterns of urbanization (growth of the entire metropolitan area, both the core cities and the outer urban area): large cities in Spain, Greece, Benelux, Germany (overall that pattern applies to a third of European cities within the Urban Audit)
- patterns of urban decline (decline of both): some Italian cities and some in the Ruhr but mostly cities in East Germany, Central and Eastern Europe (but not Bulgaria)
- patterns of suburbanization (decline of the centre, growth of the urban periphery): in Spain, Poland, the UK, Austria, Italy

- re-urbanization (core city is expanding faster than its periphery but both are growing): London, Copenhagen, and a few cities in Spain, Greece, Finland

The report provides a set of figures (from GDP per capita within cities, to economic growth, employment growth, and contribution to the national growth) which clearly demonstrate some level of economic concentration to the largest cities London and Paris and to major cities of the Northwest, Nordic and Dutch cities, or German cities such as Hamburg. However, a whole set of more peripheral and medium size cities are also enjoying very consistent economic growth: capitals of Eastern and Central European countries (Budapest, Prague), Madrid, Barcelona or Athens and Thessaloniki, regional cities in the main countries (Munich, Lyon) and in the periphery (in Ireland). The picture also reveals the remaining transformation, slow growth or difficulties of old industrial areas, port cities, or Eastern European cities which do not benefit from the service growth. Services are centrally important, within the five largest urban areas in Europe (i.e. London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, and Rome), “the service sector employment accounts for between 80 and 90% of all jobs”. Most accounts of the productivity of the larger cities conclude that it is superior by about a third to that of the rest of the country (Davezies 2007). Some regional capitals still have an industrial base. Among them, it is, however, crucial to make a distinction between rapidly declining industrial cities in Eastern and Central Europe and dynamic cities with mixed economies including a dynamic industrial part in Western Europe (such as Göteborg, Grenoble, Cork, Tampere, Linz).

In the reading of the coming back of cities and metropolises, the level of education and available diverse skills has been seen as crucial. Cities are seen as giant matrices for recombining resources in order to generate innovations (Veltz 1999).

4.6 The Urban and the Rural

The city is also a geographical category of space. However, as the world is becoming increasingly urban, does it make sense to identify particular urban characteristics? With three-fourths of the population urban and the rest very much connected to the urban world – by mobility, travel, media, and by the transfers of the nation-state –, the urban–rural divide had lost most of its socio-demographic as well as its juridico-administrative salience in Europe. Europe is more or less urban. However, new cleavages are emerging, reinforcing the salience of European cities.

A city is usually distinguished by a certain size and density of population, which statisticians have tried to standardize internationally, with very limited success. New spatial forms of built environment have become salient, to the old suburbs have been added edge cities, urban sprawl, conurbations, urban agglomerations, urban regions, networked urban space (Cheshire and Hay 1989; Martinotti 1993; Kesteloot 2005). In various countries, statisticians try to develop accurate figures to measure those changes. In Britain, the whole debate on the making of city-regions echo old discussion around travel to work areas. The French statistical nomenclature has been ambitious in trying to systematize complex urban developments from the city centre, to the urban units (defined by density and population), and the *pôles urbains* providing at least 5000 jobs and urban fringe having at least 40% of its working population commuting to the city (Huriot 2004:184).

A distinction between cities and the countryside is no longer part of the routine of the major statistical bureau, be they global, like the WHO, European as Eurostat, or national ones. Urbanity/rurality had been superseded by regionality.

Grosso modo, the long post-war disinterest of official statistics for cities, corresponded to a major historical change of marginalization of what was one of Europe's most distinctive divides. The fertility rate, historically and globally, still lower in cities of London is now (in 2005) almost exactly the same as the UK rate, 1.77 and 1.79, respectively. Life expectancy, in early modernity considerably lower in European cities than in the countryside, can now be at its peak nationally in the capital, as in Paris, Dague (2006) or the national average can be forked between the length in the capital (below) and in the second largest city (above), as is the case with Berlin and Hamburg in Germany.

National media, secularization, and de-industrialization have tended to make politics more national and more volatile, although every election still shows considerable spatial variation, including, usually, among different urban areas.

In contemporary Europe, the historically crucial juridico-political meanings of a city have lost most of their relevance in post-war Europe. In Sweden, the city (*stad*) was officially abolished as an administrative category in 1971, submerged under the concept of municipality (*kommun*), which are relatively few (290) and more resourceful than most. Swedish cities are allowed, though, still to call themselves cities, which a few of the largest ones do. "Local government" has emerged as a generic term in studies of territorial administration and self-government. In the UK, the administrative distinction between urban and rural areas disappeared with the local government reform of 1974.

After World War II, Konrad Adenauer took the initiative of re-establishing the German Cities Congress (*Städtetag*), which the Nazis had merged with that of other municipalities. In 1951 it comprised 151 West German cities, and in 1990, 133 cities of former GDR entered. However, post-war West German law did not distinguish between cities and other municipalities. The Cities Congress now claims to represent 5500 "cities and municipalities" with 51 (out of 80) million inhabitants. The distinctive urban units in current German administrative law are the larger "county-free" (*kreisfreie*) cities, of which West German had 87, apart from its city-states of Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg (Hesse 1991a:364ff).

France and Italy basically have only *communes/comuni*, 37,000 in France, which often makes an informal divide at 30,000 inhabitants, and 8,000 in Italy. Spain has a conception similar to that of England and Germany, with a basic trans-urban/rural category of municipality, but with a formal upper tier. In the Spanish case it includes cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants, or which are provincial or autonomous capitals. On the other hand, the actual city of Brussels, at the western end of the medieval-cum modern city belt of Europe, is divided into 19 communes (Hesse 1991b; John 2001).

The socialist doctrine of the Communist countries included, as an important part of its egalitarian programme, the overcoming of the different conditions of urban and rural life. De facto, Communist development came to reproduce, by new means, the inherited huge gaps between cities and countryside in Eastern and East-Central Europe, through its linking large-scale industrialization with city creation or expansion, by administrative rules of territorial mobility and by different policies of housing and of social security for urban occupations and for agriculture. Cities were ordered in hierarchies of industrial and/or administrative importance. In the post-Communist era there has been a stark differentiation between winners and losers. Purely industrial cities and the rural areas are usually among the latter, capital cities among the former.

The specific European town has largely disappeared, with its special rights, its internal jurisdiction, its local burgher identity. Everything local has become municipal. Strong city government is not necessarily dependent upon a directly elected mayor as the Scandinavian and Dutch experiences show – Scandinavia with collective party governments, the Netherlands with appointed mayors – but to politically fragmented conurbations, like the English, and to cities within countries characterized by strong state traditions, as in post-Napoleonic Western Europe and in post-Communist Eastern Europe, having directly elected mayors tends to strengthen and vitalize urban governance (cf. World Bank 2004). The Dutch political *habitus* of consensual politics has implied governmental political sensitivity in appointing mayors of major cities, so Amsterdam, for instance, has a long 20th century history of powerful Social Democratic mayors.

However, in the past 15 years, the reorganization of urban governments has given salience to the particular status of (big) cities, now comprised in terms of metropolitan areas (Brenner 2004). First, in comparison with a century or 50 years ago, the larger European cities have more autonomy and much more vigorous local leadership. The major capital cities of Europe have only in the last years (London since 2001) or decades had an elected unified government and mayor. Despite some resistance, a metropolitan government is being recreated in Britain, following the London example. The coming of age of city-regions is now on the cards with special status, rights, and powers. In Italy, the first law on metropolitan governments in 1992 was not successfully implemented. However, the local government laws organizing the direct election of city mayors were a major driving force to reorganize local governments. City mayors in Milan, Naples, Venice, Torino, Florence, Bologna, and most importantly Rome reorganized urban services, developed new strategies for their cities. The new Italian law on metropolitan government establishes a special legal status for 10–12 large Italian cities.

In France too, the restructuring of local government based on a mix of direct constraints and strong financial incentives is creating an original and powerful structure of inter-municipal urban government benefiting from strategic and public policy delivery powers together with important financial and human resources. Metropolitan government emerged in the Stockholm area in the 1970s and has developed in the other Nordic capital regions too (Haila and Le Galès 2005).

In Eastern Europe, reforms of local government in the 1990s led to differentiated set of legal status, in particular for the capital. During the negotiation to join the EU, a particular emphasis was put on decentralization reforms supposed to undermine existing bureaucracies and to reinforce the democratization of the political regimes. Within that decentralization trend, cities did particularly well in terms of new powers. In the Hungarian two-tier system, the capital has been granted a special legal status with specific powers given to the district government of Budapest and the urban mayors are directly elected. The same applies to the Czech Republic where the 2002 restructuring of local government applies a special status to Prague and to 19 statutory cities. In Poland too, 65 cities were given county status. Relatively high level of devolution was also granted to Baltic state cities.

National and international statistical organizations are redesigning their spatial statistics, into focusing on urban variation rather than on urban–rural differences. The major EU statistical bureau has initiated a long-term effort to provide a new kind of urban statistics. The “Urban Audit Pilot project” was started in 1998 based on data collected in 1981, 1991, and 1996 for 58 cities. It was completed in 2000 and was followed by large-scale Urban Audit, collecting data on 258 cities and urban areas in Europe, with

an improved methodology designed by Eurostat and covering 27 countries and 333 variables (see <http://www.urbanaudit.org>). Its latest report, “The State of European cities”, was published in 2007.

4.7 Four Dimensions of a New Urban Salience

There is therefore a new debate in Europe on the urban–rural divide, whether or not it is still a major distinguishing variable of social science, demography, or medicine. In the past decade, many social issues from the integration of ethnic minorities, and mobility to economic development have re-emerged with a significant urban dimension in the USA and in Europe (Storper 1997; Butler and Robson 2003; Favell 2008; Kazepov 2005).

In socio-economic respects, four dimensions contribute, in diverse ways, to the distinction of cities: migration/ethnicity, education, the labour market for women, and inequality.

4.7.1 *Ethnification of European Urbanity*

Multi-ethnicity is not a new phenomenon in European cities. In Eastern Europe it was a rule and a characteristic feature, until the ethnic cleansings of World Wars I and II. In Western Europe Brussels, London, and Paris, and some other cities have a long historical experience with it. But after mid-20th century national homogenizations, multi-ethnic migration has returned, and in Europe on a scale unprecedented in modern times.

European cities have become gradually more ethnically mixed, a rather recent phenomenon outside large capitals and industrial cities, which date back to the 1980’s. Ethnic diversity, so obvious in larger cities all over the world and in the USA in particular, is becoming the norm, London being the leading example of a global metropolis (Hamnett 2003; Massey 2007), with about a third of its population foreign born. The high density and wide variety of immigrant populations is more a distinctive characteristic of the largest European cities, notably London, Paris, but also Amsterdam (28% foreign born in 2005; <http://gstudynet.org/gum/Netherlands/Amsterdam2005.htm>), Frankfurt (25%), Rotterdam (20%), Brussels (just under 30% of the city centre population), and Stockholm. In recent years, London, Madrid, Paris, Berlin, but also cities like Galway, Lyon, Munich Vienna, Copenhagen, and Budapest have attracted the largest influx of migrants, a trend not unrelated to the dynamic economic growth of those cities. Around 10% of the European Urban Audit cities residents are non-nationals, mostly (two-thirds) from outside the EU. By contrast, most cities in the Eastern and Central part of Europe are sending migrants and comprised very low proportions of non-nationals.

Inter-ethnic relations – of cultural integration and autonomy, of violence and coexistence –, the proper place of religion, raised by the growth of Islam in particular, have become central issues of urban discussion, politics, and policy (Garbaye 2005). Ethnicity also gives a new edge to classical urban problems, of segregation, poverty among opulence – a phenomenon much increased in the 1980s, and staying since then – youth unruliness, crime, and unsafety. Integration, inclusion, and social cohesion discourses have become increasingly widespread in urban public discourse, without being able, yet, to get very far in practice (Castel 1995; Mingione 1996; Paugam 1996; Harloe 1999; Lagrange and Oberti 2006).

There is less segregation in European cities than in American ones, but most of the difference hinges on the segregation of African-Americans. There are few mono-ethnic neighbourhoods, even areas where there is a high concentration of immigrants are ethnically diverse.

German cities have low levels of ethnic segregation, followed by Oslo, Vienna, French, Dutch, and English cities (as far as Black people are concerned). The most segregated cities are Brussels, Antwerp, and Rotterdam (concerning Turks and North Africans in all three cases) and some British cities, like Bradford, with respect to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

4.7.2 Educated Cities Women's Chances

A second major trend in European cities, and in particular in the largest cities, is the concentration of highly educated populations, of which the American author R. Florida (2002) has called "the creative class". The largest cities in centralized countries in particular such as Helsinki, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Athens, Paris, and London operate like "escalator regions" (A. Cochrane, in Allen et al. 1998). Due to their central position they have a more qualified labour market, they attract the highly qualified youth of their country, often educated in those cities, and increasingly highly qualified young foreigners "Eurostars in Eurocities" as Favell (2008) put it. Some of them will progressively leave either around age 30 or when they have a family, or later on during their career, or when they retire. However, those who stay in those labour markets have a better career, better earnings (30% on average in Paris in relation to France), and often double careers. These cities function as an escalator in terms of social mobility and income generation.

Big cities are also characterized by the large and diversified job structure which is particularly crucial for women. European rural to urban migration has historically been spearheaded by women, less bound to rural property and to rural outdoor pursuits. Qualified women are massively employed in services which are concentrated in cities. The level of women's employment is far higher in cities and large cities in particular. The "State of the European city report" is particularly relevant to make this point. The authors have used as a proxy the proportion of those who have attained the ISCED 5–6 level (i.e. 4 years of university education or 3 years for a job-specific tertiary course). City inhabitants are on average much better educated than other European citizens. Almost all urban audit cities score higher with regard to completed tertiary education than their respective national averages, and many of them have a significantly better score, with more than 30% of the population having more or less a master's degree. Again, capitals such as Paris, Tallinn, Sofia, Helsinki, London, Amsterdam, and Warsaw stand out, together with medium-sized university cities.

4.7.3 Inequalities and Social Segregation

Dynamics of inequalities formation or reduction have to be analysed from different angles and by looking at different groups. The most educated and wealthiest individuals have great resources to oppose redistribution, to organize politically to limit tax, inheritance, or to move to exclusive areas, gated communities. The middle classes are the motor of spatial segregation.

Cities are classically characterized by inequalities, where the richest social groups coexist with the poorest. However, within continental Europe, the high level of welfare expenditure played a major role for a long time to limit urban poverty and to limit urban inequalities. As is well known (Atkinson and Piketty 2007), national inequalities are rising due to the increased revenue of upper classes and the decrease of the income tax. Average income is usually highest in the capital cities or regions, although it is rarely weighed by cost differentials in housing and other respects (Eurostat 2007). The World Bank (2006) study of poverty in post-Communist Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia found a thoroughgoing urban–rural difference, with less incidence of poverty in the cities, except in the Caucasus and in Moldova.

European cities differ significantly from US ones on this point. Historically – and this is linked to the role of the city centre in European cities – the most privileged social strata (the cultural, political, and economic elites) have remained in the cities and in their centres, except in the UK. They have maintained and reproduced their presence, and they have accumulated economic, social, cultural, and political capital. New groups of managers and professionals have followed the same logic but they have settled less systematically in the centre, they also moved to residential suburbs. European cities are rarely distinguished by urban crisis in the city centre, except in 19th-century industrial cities, ports, and some special cases such as Brussels or Frankfurt. On the contrary, their bourgeoisies have often been sufficiently active to push the building of factories and social housing out towards the periphery – more so in France and Southern Europe, and less so in Scandinavia. Areas of suburban houses or peri-urban developments and small, ethnically and socially homogeneous residential towns, largely of owner-occupiers have developed on the periphery of cities, and these benefit from the two movements of urban growth and dispersal. Horizontal dispersal has gradually affected European cities but has not led to the decline of city centres, except in the cases mentioned above.

Socio-economic segregation is smaller in Europe than in the USA. Even highly segregated areas such as Antwerp or British cities are far behind American urban areas. The poor are not detached from the middle classes in Europe, there is much social mix (cf. Wacquant and Howe 2007). Of course there are differences between states (Denmark is less segregated than Belgium), cities (unemployed people are more segregated spatially in Leeds than in Manchester), and groups (higher social class positions lead to a higher level of segregation).

In the European context, we now see at the same time the dynamics of gentrification in the classic sense of city centres, continuous embourgeoisement of historical bourgeois neighbourhood, the political construction of middle class brand new neighbourhoods close to city centres, corporation headquarters and financial districts, and also some trend toward suburbanization and the making of more or less gated communities. In France, Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot (1989, 2000) working on the upper class (in other words, a narrower and more elitist group than the one we identify) have identified the “spatial stamp” of the bourgeoisie – a way of building and organizing “good districts” in cities, especially the largest ones. This has not disappeared. This geographical mutual reinforcement enables them to deploy inheritance and reproduction strategies: “this spatial segregation, pushed to the extreme, is in fact an aggregation, the choice of a social group, of a class, through which it is expressing its awareness of the group’s deep community of interests” (2000:54). The same thing was shown by Butler and Savage’s research on the UK middle classes (1995), particularly in relation to educational strategies, and Savage (2000) has hypothesized a “spatialization of class”. Trends making sense of those different dynamics, identifying

what Lockwood (1995) used to call “the urban seeking”, versus the “urban fleeing” middle classes seems to us a fruitful way to understand inequalities.

The link between globalization trends and inequalities within cities rose in the 1990s and was structured by the seminal work of Saskia Sassen on global cities (1991) which made a link between rising inequalities and globalization. She argued that “. . . these cities now function [as centres] in four new ways: first, as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and for specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of production, including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced” (1991:3–4). Sassen provides a new definition of “global cities” describing them in terms of their central role in exchange flows – flows of travellers and of merchandise, and as headquarters of the largest firms and of cultural and political institutions, banks, and insurance companies: in other words, on the basis of their functions and their power to exert economic and political influence. Thus, growth in exchanges of goods and persons, which has accelerated since the 1970s, gives cities at the heart of these exchanges a special position. The development of multinational and then global firms means the concentration of economic power within these firms, which establish their headquarters – and therefore the power of highly aggregated economic command – in a small number of very large metropolises. These metropolises are thus integrated into the most globalized part of the economy, which gives them a special role.

Sassen (1991) goes further, by stressing that the dynamic of economic globalization requires capacities for control and co-ordination, which are changing scale. Global cities are cities within which these modes of control and co-ordination are organized, giving such cities increasingly extensive influence. Above all, global cities have an original dynamic of producing innovations for the leading services of capitalism – financial and legal services, consultancy, and communication. The global city is a particular environment, producing specialized, innovative services that enable co-ordination and control of the globalized economy, thanks to the concentration of global firms’ headquarters and of these services. For Sassen, the dispersal of activities increases the need in the global city for a social and economic environment that can produce its own codes and its own culture, thus contributing to co-ordination. She deduces from this that there is a new social structure, distinguished by the concentration of social groups involved in the global city dynamic, who need a whole set of professional and domestic services: hence the proliferation of low-paid, insecure workers cleaning offices, providing various domestic services, and staffing restaurants and cafés. This dual structure is characteristic of advanced capitalism and the global cities that are its command centres: New York, London, Tokyo, and, to a lesser extent, Los Angeles, Paris, and Frankfurt.

Her thesis of a dualization of global cities has however been contested by Hamnett (2003) on London and Prêteceille (2000, 2006) for Paris, who confirmed a dynamic growth and segregation of the most privileged groups, but who did find an accentuation of polarization, not a decline of the middle strata. This is due in particular to the role of the welfare state. In his analysis of changes in post-industrial social structures, Esping-Andersen (1993) very clearly reveals the role of the welfare state and of education in structuring Western societies, in combination with the structure of production and the industrial relations system. The figures for Scandinavian states are obviously more spectacular than those for the UK or, to a lesser extent, Germany. Up to now, public employment, as a relatively stable form of employment, has been maintained, providing a solid pillar of stability for national and local societies and benefiting women especially.

These observations take on their full meaning when applied to cities. In the European context, cities are most often either the capitals of small nation-states, regional capitals, or centres of economic regions. In all these cases, the cities have played a particularly important role as local or regional bases for a welfare state organized at the national level. This general trend and structural component masks great diversity among European cities, and particularly between cities in Northern as against Southern Europe. Statistics on employment in cities, although difficult to compare from one country to another, express this reality. In the French regional capital over 50% of jobs are in the public sector. At the level of the urban area, figures are close to 30%, similar to Scandinavia. Thanks to public services and the welfare state, European cities have a stable employment base. Broadly, a third of city employment is rooted in the public or quasi-public sector, sometimes beyond 40% which means that, in the short and medium term, a large section of the workforce is escaping the logic of the market, globalized as these now are. In addition, these jobs offer social services to the population, provide a substantial proportion of female employment, make life easier for households, and partly protect populations from the effects of economic risks (even though this last has proved less effective since the 1980s). The situation in the UK is somewhat different. State public expenditure there is traditionally lower than in continental Europe (but not in comparison with Ireland or the South of Europe). This trend became more pronounced after Mrs Thatcher came to power in 1979, with the introduction of market mechanisms, privatization (of housing, transport, and energy), and tax reductions.

Up to the present day, European cities have been able to count on an element of stability: local government, state agencies and services, hospitals, schools, universities, social and cultural centres, research centres, and the forces of law and order have together contributed a great deal to the organization and stability of cities. In more sociological terms, based on the Italian case, Bagnasco and Negri (1994) have attributed a dual role to the middle classes and lower-middle classes (*classi medie e ceti medi*) in stabilizing local urban societies and in social innovation. This means that, in some cities, from the point of view of the production of goods and services, public or quasi-public sector employees—or some of them—may organize as a social group. Looking at these individuals from the point of view of consumption of collective welfare state services, the “Thirty Glorious Years” from 1947 to 1976 allowed the middle strata to gain in strength; the stratum that includes both blue-collar and white-collar workers (who have become more similar by virtue of their increased purchasing power) is relatively more uniform and stable, with lifestyles and consumption patterns that are now closer, centred on leisure and working hours. The middle strata have always been the main beneficiaries of public services. By contrast, those who did not get in at the right time (by the 1970s — those who came too late have been identified as “a sacrificed generation”) or who have remained outside this system (some women, young people, those who have left the labour market early, immigrants, lone-parent families, unskilled people) may find themselves on exclusion trajectories, from which they run the risk of forming social groups of “the excluded” in various European cities. Without stretching things too far, this second line of social demarcation could be described as status stratification, a term that traditionally relates to particular ways of life and to consumption possibilities recognized socially or through political guarantees. Setting aside the most industrial cities, medium-sized European cities have been and largely remain cities where these status groups have played a central role. From the 1970s onwards, evidence of this has appeared through urban social movements linked to public amenities, schools, and housing, complemented by research on issues of urban poverty and the process of exclusion.

These public sector middle classes and lower-middle classes have gradually gained influence in many European cities. A whole literature in political science has studied the decline of the working class as the main supporters of social democratic parties in the 1970s. The rise of the middle strata has translated into social movements, associations, and new political élites in social democratic and Green parties, particularly in cities (Sellers 2002), as well as into public policies.

4.8 Cities as Actors

The old European conception of self-governing urbanity implies that cities may be taken as collective actors. Max Weber famously emphasized what he saw as distinctive characteristics of European societies, i.e. the medieval occidental city defined in terms of “sworn confraternization” based upon a fortress, a market, bourgeois associations, specific rules in terms of land ownership and tax sometimes courts and armies. Cities became institutionalized associations, autonomous and autocephalous, active territorial corporation characterized by autonomy and capacity for action towards the outside (the lord, the prince, the state, the emperor, rival cities) and led by urban officials.

Later, in industrial cities, for instance in the UK but also in Germany, France, and Scandinavia, the scope of social problems became such that elites in urban government pioneered policy programmes in housing, planning, basic elements of welfare, education (de Swaan 1988) and hygienist and circulation concerns led to the “haussmanization” movement of city rebuilding. Urban governments played a key role in providing basic utilities and services such as water, sewage, street lighting, later gas and electricity, firemen, and transport not to mention slaughterhouse. This development was diverse, fragmented, contested between a conservative petty bourgeoisie and the municipal socialism movement and more consistent in the North of Europe than in the South. The rise of urban government was not just a local or national phenomenon. Exchanges of experiences of ideas for instance in planning and social housing were crucial.

In their classic comparative research, Goldsmith and Page (1987) have suggested that local government autonomy in Europe should be analysed in terms of autonomy through two major criteria which encompass or are closely related to other dimensions: legal status and political status. That analysis clearly stressed the differences between the welfarist Northern European urban governments and the more political (sometimes clientelistic) Southern European urban governments.

Urban governments were contested in the 1970s and 1980s by urban social movements. The bureaucratization, hierarchies, urban regeneration projects, the complex and fragmented decision-making process of urban government were attacked in cities all over Europe. Conflicts entered the realm of urban politics in relation to housing, planning, large infrastructure projects, economic crisis, and cultural issues. New groups, beyond class basis, organized to raise new issues (quality of life, democracy and participation, economic development and culture) to promote urban change against elected urban leaders. New middle classes were gradually incorporated within political parties (social democratic and green) and played an important role in many European cities to promote a new set of urban policies to deal with those issues. In the most radical cases, squatters in Amsterdam, Berlin, or Copenhagen for instance, urban government politicians and officials learnt to cooperate or accommodate, to provide sources of funding, and to try to incorporate those groups in more loosely defined structure of governance (Mayer 2000). Preventing large social conflicts and including various groups has become the norm for urban governments,

although the long-lived squatters community of Christiania in Copenhagen remains a sore in the eyes of the national government.

Those movements and changing patterns of governing elites led both to structural changes and experiments in new forms of urban governments all over Europe. Most urban governments have initiated management reforms including neighbourhood councils and the decentralization of services management as new mechanisms for citizen participation in decisions despite the twofold difficulty of giving up power and budgets (uneasy for councillors) and of sustaining citizen interests in running day-to-day business. Beyond the UK, market-friendly ideas associated with “new public management” are having an impact in urban government, in particular in the North of Europe, marketizing but not necessarily reducing the Northern welfare states. Issues of citizen participation in urban governments and governance are associated with growing issues of management efficiency in the delivery of services to customers (Kübler and Heinelt 2005). The restructuring of the public sector leads to increased confusion in public policies and the fragmentation of urban governments, hence the growing interests for issues of leadership, management, co-ordination, and governance (Borraz and John 2004).

One can first notice the blurring of national frontiers and identify common modes of governance in groups of cities, usually articulated in part by national patterns. What is interesting in the European case is the attempt made by urban government elites to deal with increased fragmentation, to balance the politics of growth with social issues, and to strengthen governments and processes of governance. Urban governments in most European countries have become more complex organizations, more fragmented, and to some extent, more responsive to the demands of local groups and neighbourhood but also more dependent on firms and utility firms in particular. In other words, the issue of articulating urban government and urban governance in different ways is central. That attempt to bridge the gap between politics and policies and to define some collective urban interest is at the heart a political process.

The ending 20th century saw a series of legislations strengthening the competence as well as the popular legitimacy, if less frequently the resources, of local government, and above all big city government, first in Western and then, after 1989–91, in Eastern Europe. This was a challenging time for local urban leadership, with pan-European de-industrialization and new still unsettled economic sectors rising fast, finance, tourism, information, entertainment. An impressive set of urban initiatives did ensue, which dramatically changed the townscape of many cities. How far they are socially sustainable and encompassing may be too early to assess properly.

Most crucially, various local actors, voluntary sectors, organizations, firms have engaged in various strategic planning exercises to enhance the collective capacity of the city. The increased legitimacy of political urban elites sustains and re-invents this presentation. European cities are still strongly regulated by public authorities and complex arrangement of public and private actors. European cities appear to be relatively robust, despite pressures from economic actors, individuals, and states (including welfare states) being reshaped within the European Union.

Beyond the relevance of the category “European cities” (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000; Le Galès 2002), the updated Weberian perspective on studying cities has proved fruitful to understand medium-sized cities. It suggests going beyond the fluidity of day-to-day interactions and encounters on the one hand and determinist globalization trends on the other (Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000). Cities may be more or less structured in their economic and cultural exchanges and the different actors may be related to each other in the same local context with long-term strategies, investing their resources in a co-ordinated

way and adding to the wealth of social capital. In this case the urban society appears as well structured and visible, and one can detect forms of (relative) integration. If not, the city reveals itself as less structured and as such no longer a significant subject: somewhere where decisions are made externally by separate actors.

This analysis suggests looking at the interplay and conflicts of social groups, interests, and institutions, and the way in which regulations have been put in place through conflicts and the logics of integration. Cities do not develop solely according to interactions and contingencies: groups, actors and organizations oppose one another, enter into conflict, co-ordinate, produce representations in order to institutionalize collective forms of action, implement policies, structure inequalities, and defend their interests. That perspective on cities highlights the informal economy, the dynamism of localized family relations, the interplay of associations, reciprocity, culture and ways of life, the density of localized horizontal relations, and local social formations (Saraceno 2002; Kazepov 2004).

European cities are collective actors in the making (not to be reified), composed of a diversity of actors, groups, and institutions. The myth of the European city feeds the imaginary picture – and frequently the strategies – of European actors, but these cities are also diverse and riddled with conflicts. Anthropologists highlight multiple identities, the urban mosaic, the diversity of experiences. The city does not have a single will to act, and conflicts lie at the heart of the social and political dynamic.

The term “actor city” may lead to privileging instrumental rationality and a desocialized, depoliticized view of the world in terms of consensus and decision-making. Just like the common good of the state, the common good of a city is a fiction created and sustained by the actors at a given moment and expressed through strategic document, planning in particular (Pinson 2009; Healey 2007). Although the development of a common good for a city may enable collective strategies to be put into effect, it is also intended to reduce conflicts between the different social groups and organizations, even to impose an hegemonic plan – in the Gramscian sense – in the aim of legitimizing the domination of certain social groups, which develop an instrumental vision of unity in order play to the game of competition between cities (Préteceille 2000).

Cities are also social structures and institutions that guide actors’ anticipations, structure their interests, and influence their view of the world. Following the Italian sociologist of organizations, Pichierri (1997), five elements seem to be important in identifying a collective actor: a collective decision-making system, common interests (or those perceived as such), integration mechanisms, internal and external representation of the collective actor, and a capacity for innovation. Moreover, Pichierri stresses that this type of collective actor is all the more relevant when applied to particular types of organization with “*legame debole*” and “weak ties” - situations where there are weak hierarchies, strong interdependence, or strong autonomy, for instance a European governance in the making. Some of the problems of defining a collective actor are problems of a political order, of defining common interests and collective choices, of integration of local society, and of the selection and exclusion of actors and groups which are central within contemporary European cities (Kazepov 2005; Perulli 2007).

Coalitions are mobilized within European cities and pursue public policies. Several issues are central in the mobilization of leading groups within different modes of urban governance in the making: competition between cities organized by the state or the EU (Brenner 2004), attraction of capital, visitors, public investments; social policies, the making of a common good, of getting various groups to live together; security, police, control, surveillance; urban renovation, development, and infrastructure; sustainable development.

4.9 The Impact of the EU

At a superficial level, the category “European cities” makes sense because those cities are part of a political union, the European Union, which has developed over time a set of powers, norms, representations, law, political elites, institutions, statistical categories which are progressively, unevenly, creating a multilevel polity within which cities have the opportunity to mobilize resources, to play with constraints, to develop their own strategies. The making of Europe goes together with a vast movement of reallocation of authority. The changing scale does not suppress the narrow legal and financial relations between urban government and nation-states but includes them within a wider set of intergovernmental relations, networks, interdependent bodies. Urban governments have to deal with an increasing amount of actors and policy tools (contracts and partnership for instance) together with more diverse networks and actors. The making of a European polity implies not just a more complex structure of vertical intergovernmental relations but also horizontal ones.

Networks of cities are flourishing in Europe, including policy best practice exchanges financed by the Commission or old twinning arrangements modified in multi-dimensional cooperation between cities in Europe. In this multilevel governance in the making, the constraints imposed by the state are often lessened, urban governments tend to get more discretion (not always) but also a different set of constraints: “Multilevel governance processes are illustrated inter alia by: an increase in the density of interdependence; a redistribution of political resources; an acceleration of policy transfers; a diffusion of policy “ideas” between different level of authority: the emergence of new public policy instruments; challenges to transnational policy styles” (Carter and Pasquier forthcoming). The EU therefore sets new parameters, within which urban governance modes may be organized and are encouraged. The Europeanization literature emphasizes the transformative process through which “EU styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms” (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004) are becoming part of the logic of urban governance.

Looking at the meaning of the EU to cities in Europe one first has to deal with the general impact of EU integration and top-down urban policies. A second perspective concentrates on the vertical and horizontal mobilization of cities within Europe.

In the first decades of the EU, the urban policy was a marginal issue. However, the making of the common market and then the industrial restructuring of the 1970s put pressure on the EU to deal with some impact for cities in industrial crisis, for instance through competition law (see Grazi 2006). Regional imbalance was more central and the urban question emerged in the EU within the framing of regional policies and regional inequality, a perspective which fully came of age in the 1980s with the enlargement to the south and the inclusion of Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Since the late 1980s, the urban question has found a place within a formerly reticent DG XVI (in charge of regional policy – now DG Regio). Studies were commissioned to provide some intellectual background, early experimental schemes were designed (Urban Pilot Projects, *quartiers en crise*) which progressively led to the URBAN programme, targeting cities in restructuring and promoting a transversal, partnership approach to urban renovation.

An urban coalition has gradually been organized, finding intermediaries among Commissioners, Member State representatives to the Commission, and in the Parliament. Despite DG XVI’s reservations, German hostility, and early expressions of reservations by Southern Member States, the URBAN Programme for the renewal of urban neighbourhoods started in 1994. The Commission then put out a paper entitled “Towards a European urban agenda” (1997) and later issued the “Agenda 2000” document, which proposed the

reorganization of the Structural Funds. In this, the Commission reaffirmed the importance of cities, including in terms of legitimacy (cities as close to citizens and as actors in the success of European policies), as well as the principles for action enshrined in the Treaties or promoted through policies: subsidiarity, partnership, social cohesion, and economic efficiency; sustainable development; and strengthening the local capacity to act. The most important point to be established was the promotion of the transverse urban dimension within all European policies, including economic and social cohesion policy.

The Commission also produced a document entitled "Europe's cities, community measures in urban areas" (1997), which has strengthened this dynamic. URBAN (1994–1999) is a Community Initiatives programme. The first phase included a budget of 880 million ECUs for 110 cities, including depressed neighbourhoods (Halpern 2005). The URBAN programme has as its objectives: promoting local employment, revitalizing depressed neighbourhoods both socially and economically, providing social and other services, improving living conditions and the urban environment and public spaces, and improving local strategies and decision-making processes so as to involve local communities. A second phase (URBAN II) included 70 projects between 2001 and 2006 with a budget of 748 million Euros.

However, the enlargement of the EU was made with no increase of the EU budget and no substantial increase of the regional policy budgets when the need to deal with territorial imbalance became even more striking. The whole urban policy is being sidelined and it is losing its momentum, resources, and political support. The solution was to strengthen the urban dimension in a transversal way within regional and the rest of EU policy. According to the EU, the new regional policy for 2007–2013 (now dealing with 27 countries) has recognized the role of European cities as engines of growth and employment, but also as places of social inequalities and key sites for sustainable development strategies. The EU is thus developing or reinforcing networks and organization to produce some intellectual framework for EU cities in Europe (ESPON project but also the Urban Audit); it will provide about 20 million Euros for urban development over the period.

It is argued that the aim is to spend a third of cohesion policy money in EU cities, in particular in Eastern Europe. An urban dimension is put forward in all kinds of EU policy areas from competition law to transport, from the environment to employment. This new urban mobilization of the EU was symbolically marked by the signing of the Leipzig charter on sustainable European Cities and the making of the new "Territorial Agenda of the EU", both in spring 2007. The Leipzig charter signed by 27 urban policy ministers designs a sort of ideal European city where cities are mobilized to deal with climate change, quality of life, youth unemployment, neighbourhoods in crisis and to become more attractive and competitive, with some emphasis put on the importance of city centres.

Cities are therefore mobilized by a weak EU policy to implement various policies and in particular the Lisbon agenda. In the process, many networks are organized, norms and categories are diffused (e.g., partnership in urban renovation), ways of doing things disseminate, and competition between cities become more codified. Politically, cities are organized in different ways: they are parts of hundreds of European networks, most importantly Eurocities, to develop cooperation, exchanges of experience, and to lobby the EU. Although regions and cities are now sidelined in the governance of the EU, their representation is institutionalized within the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). A House of Cities was even opened in June 2007 (housing CEMR, Eurocities) to reinforce the visibility of cities' interests within the EU. They tend to operate through the lobbying of MEP and the commission. All in all, however, in contrast to the expectation

of the 1990s during the heyday of the Delors dynamics, the EU urban policy is not very significant.

However, indirect the effects of the EU, local mobilization, and the diffusion of norms within EU networks are slowly having an impact on the ways cities are organized. The whole business of competition, benchmark, and performance evaluation may not make much sense but it feeds the making of documents, of statistics, of categories which progressively unify, give some coherence to the EU political space. Magnier reports for instance that the strategic organization of large cities is more and more influenced by EU norms deriving from interactions between urban elites. Some policies issues (like agenda 21) are also diffused through horizontal networks. A slow integration process is in the making.

A difficult question that remains, how to assess the degree of Europeanization from below that is achieved by all these city networks and cross-border organizations beyond the diffusion of norms, the making of European categories or the circulation of elites. As shown by Fligstein (2008 and Chapter 11), Europeanization is first and foremost supported by the 15% who are the richest and the most qualified, able to take full advantage of the European construction. Providing robust evidence to support the view that all those city networks have had an impact has so far eluded social scientists and the EU commission alike. However, trans-border cooperation or cities networks allow for the mobility of not just the elite but middle-range local officials, representatives of the voluntary sector or cultural groups. In most European cities, the European circulation of groups and individuals is probably slowly giving roots to the bottom-up Europeanization. New bus routes and cheap flights connect Eastern European cities, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with Western European ones, from Manchester to Malaga. In the first years of the eastern enlargement this new connectivity became a mass phenomenon.

However, this is only one part of a larger process including the circulation of students, tourists, immigrants and that may not lead to further support for the EU as a political construction. In other words and in line with most of the work on Europeanization, cities and city networks do contribute to a significant Europeanization of elites and may pave the way for further developments, but one cannot, so far, identify a clear and enduring impact for the rest of the population, the less educated and the social excluded in particular.

4.10 Conclusion: The European City and Its Sustainability in a Globalized World

Is there still something which may be called the European (type of) city? If so, what would be its current characteristics? And is it sustainable?

Our answer is rather positive: there still seems to be something specific to European cities. And it looks sustainable for the foreseeable future. European cities make a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original forms of compromise, aggregation of interest and culture which brings together local social groups, associations, organized interests, private firms, and urban governments. The pressures created by property developers, major groups in the urban services sector, and cultural and economic globalization processes provoke reactions and adaptation processes of actors, including active public policies, within European cities, defending the idea of a fairly particular type of city that is not yet in terminal decline. The modernized myth of the European city remains

a very strongly mobilized resource and is strengthened by growing political autonomy and transverse mobilizations

The robust characteristics of European cities include the long-term meta-stability of the urban system and the role of public policies (including land ownership and planning). Inheritance is central to European cities (Häussermann 2005; Häussermann and Haila 2005). On the less glamorous side, the relatively slow growth of Europe and its ageing societies are factors which contribute to the reproduction of this model of cities.

While individual rankings can differ from one evaluator to another, there is a widespread expert opinion that together with cities of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (i.e. part of the developed world) Western European cities provide the best urban environments, the highest quality of urban life in the world. USA, other American, Asian, and African cities are far behind in such rankings, as shown by Table 4.3. According to the same source, the best US cities, Honolulu and San Francisco, ranked 27 and 28, the best Asian cities, Singapore and Tokyo, 34 and 35. Paris was put on place 33, London on 39, and New York on 48.

Table 4.3 The 10 cities in the world with the best quality of life in 2007

Zürich
Geneva
Vienna
Vancouver
Auckland
Düsseldorf
Frankfurt
Munich
Berne
Sydney

Source: Mercer Consulting (www.citymayors.com/features/quality_survey).

Such rankings had better not to be taken too seriously, as they usually express some contingent selectivity. The style magazine *Monocle* (no. 15, July 2008), for instance, ranks the 25 “top livable cities” of the world differently, including three Japanese cities (with Tokyo as no. 3), Singapore, and three US cities (Honolulu, Minneapolis, and Portland, on rungs 12, 19, and 25, respectively). But from different angles, the two lists converge on Western Europe. Thirteen of the top 25 on the *Monocle* list, and like the Mercer ranking 7 of the top 10, are Western European, including the 2 “most livable cities” of the world, Copenhagen and Munich. In a new sense, Europe is still the city continent.

However, as emphasized above, pressures, tensions, and conflicts are central to the urban dynamics of Europe: in many cities the integration of immigrants still raises opposition and political conflicts. Urban riots, conflicts about Roma or gypsies, intolerance about foreign influence have not disappeared. Inequalities flourish and social housing is crucially lacking. The privatization of once public utilities is threatening one of the invisible mechanism of cohesion within urban areas. Gated communities appear, in Southern and Eastern Europe in particular, raising questions about the durability of the urban fabric, and the generalized surveillance within British cities reveals a lack of urbanity. European cities are not immune from pollution threats, virus dissemination, or financial crisis. Central state restructuring may put increasing pressure on their political capacity.

European cities are not obsolete or decaying. They are robust, legitimate, and politically strongly organized, with great capacities from a massive accumulation of social, economic, and cultural resources. The uncertainty around the future of European societies and the

European Union, increasing pressure of competition, and market rules in particular are bound to have some impact on European cities. But European cities are also world models. The current mayor of Seoul (Oh Se-hoon), for example, with an ambition to make his city into “one of the top four cities in the world”, formulated it thus in 2006: “The Seoul that I dream of is a city with economic strength like New York, culture and art like Paris, majestic beauty like London, fashion and style like Milan, and powerful landmarks like Sydney” (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2006:5). European cities are not only subject to globalization processes, they are also significant parts of them.

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Chapter 5

Cleavages and Political Transformations

Sten Berglund and Joakim Ekman

5.1 Introduction

What is a political cleavage, and what cleavage structures are relevant to European societies today? Drawing on empirical evidence from the political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, this chapter seeks to enhance the academic discussion on cleavages in contemporary Europe. In a manner of speaking, the post-communist countries are used as a laboratory in order to understand the way cleavages emerge, develop and overlap.

The chapter breaks down into three parts: an introductory section on the cleavage concept and its connotations; a section on manifest, latent and potential cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe; and finally, a section with an all-European perspective. The kind of data – and analyses – that we have in mind may be used for different purposes, e.g. a discussion about the development of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe or a discussion about practical integration problems, as the new member states send their delegates to the European Parliament where they have to find a suitable faction. Here, focus is on the debate about the importance of political cleavages for the consolidation of democracy, but the point is also to use the evidence from Central and Eastern Europe to discuss political cleavages in contemporary Europe as a whole.

5.2 Political Cleavages and Divides: Conceptual Points of Departure

What do we, as political scientists, mean by a ‘cleavage’? A wide array of definitions is characteristic of the literature; in fact, there are perhaps too many definitions available. In a standard handbook – *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (Calhoun 2002) – the following entry appears:

[Cleavage] Deep and persistent differences of political opinion and behavior within a polity, most commonly along lines of class, religion, language, nationality, ethnicity, and/or gender. Many political scientists, such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, argue that the stability of democratic regimes often depends on salient, crosscutting cleavages – where individuals’ various memberships and identifications with groups create cross-allegiances to different political positions or support for catchall, large political parties. When cleavages are reinforcing rather than crosscutting, the probability of mass conflict and political instability increases. Arend Lijphart, drawing on

S. Berglund (✉)
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Örebro University, Sweden
e-mail: sten.berglund@oru.se

Table 5.1 *Cleavages in Western Europe according to Lipset and Rokkan*

Critical phases	Cleavages	Central conflicts
Reformation/counter-reformation	Centre – Periphery	National versus supra-national religious authority
National revolution	Church – State	Secular versus Christian mass education
Industrial revolution	Labour – Capital (Urban – Rural)	Free trade versus protectionism
International revolution	Social Democracy – Communism	Integration in the nation-state versus international workers' movement

Sources: Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 47); Flora (1992, 123).

observations of cooperation and accommodation between elites in Europe, argued for consociationalism as a means of overcoming the politically disintegrative tendencies of reinforcing cleavages (Calhoun 2002, 72).

The implicit reference to Lipset and Rokkan's *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967) is telling, indeed almost obligatory in research on political cleavages and voting behaviour. However, Lipset and Rokkan's work avoided both explicit definitions and offered only a relatively cursory treatment of European political development after the 1920s. The basic idea was that the social cleavages in (Western) Europe were the result of certain historical or critical phases, basically the birth of the nation-states and the industrial revolution (Table 5.1). The modern European party systems reflected these historical social cleavages – in this sense, the party systems in Western Europe were 'frozen'.

However, if we are interested in an application of the cleavage concept to more contemporary developments – and if we want to draw on quantitative data from surveys or elections – we need a more explicit definition. Rae and Taylor (1970) have provided us with a more sophisticated definition by identifying three fundamental types of cleavages: (1) ascriptive or 'trait' cleavages such as race or caste; (2) attitudinal or 'opinion' cleavages based on ideology or political preferences; and (3) behavioural cleavages manifested through voting and organisational membership (Rae and Taylor 1970, 1; cf. Zuckerman 1975). Bartolini and Mair (1990) have employed a similar set of relationships and at the same time suggested a high degree of interconnection:

[T]he concept of cleavage can be seen to incorporate three levels: an *empirical* element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a *normative* element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an *organizational/behavioural* element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 215).

In contrast to Rae and Taylor, Bartolini and Mair thus explicitly define cleavages as consisting of all three aspects together, at the same time. This definition emphasises that 'cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become cleavages when they are organized as such [. . .] A cleavage has therefore to be considered primarily as *a form of closure of social relationships*' (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216). As noted by Deegan-Krause (2004), this definition possesses a certain intuitive advantage. The kind of cleavages Rae and Taylor identify may be found just about everywhere. The kind of cleavages Bartolini and Mair talk about are far less common, as they depend on the overlapping of a variety of particular differences (Deegan-Krause




Fig. 5.1 Three-level model of cleavages and partial cleavages
Source: Deegan-Krause (2004).

2004, 256). The more perfectly these differences overlap, the more complete is the closure of social relationships. In other words, a 'cleavage' as defined by Bartolini and Mair has more significant political consequences than the 'differences' identified by Rae and Taylor.

Of course, between such 'differences' and actual 'cleavages' lies an intermediate realm. Even a partial overlap between particular differences may constitute a significant political force. Deegan-Krause (2004) has developed a model in order to illustrate the relation between full cleavages and partial cleavages as well as the relationship between the concepts of 'difference' and 'cleavage' and the intermediate level (Fig. 5.1). A 'difference' can emerge in any of the three categories – hence a demographic difference, an attitudinal difference and a behavioural difference – whereas a 'full cleavage' requires all three differences to overlap. When only two differences overlap, Deegan-Krause talks about 'partial cleavages' (cf. Knutsen and Scarborough 1995; Knutsen 1988). Partial cleavages take three distinct forms, based on the three possible combinations of two differences (Fig. 5.1). Each of these partial cleavages – or 'divides' as Deegan-Krause also calls them – displays distinct characteristics and has its own distinct effects:

1. A *structural divide* consists of an overlap between demographic and attitudinal elements. A structural divide involves a relationship between particular material conditions or identities and specific sets of beliefs such as, for example, pro-redistribution sentiments of working classes or attitudes favouring majority elections in a dominant ethnic group that may create a wide and enduring split in society. Yet without a behavioural component that produces, say, labour unions or labour parties, the split may yield little conflict and even less change. This corresponds quite closely to Mainwaring's

description of ‘salient social cleavages without clear party expressions’ (Mainwaring 1999, 46).

2. An *issue divide* consists of overlapping attitudinal and behavioural elements. As such, it involves a relationship between particular beliefs and particular party choices. These divides may have an immediate political impact, but they may not endure from one election to the next because they lack roots in society. In fact, observers often refer to such cleavages as ‘political cleavages’ to distinguish them from ‘social cleavages’ that involve ties to particular social groups. These cleavages also correspond closely to the ‘issue dimensions’ of party competition discussed by Lijphart (1984).
3. A *caste divide*, finally, consists of a direct overlap between ascriptive or demographic elements, on the one hand, and behavioural elements, on the other. Lacking an attitudinal component, this is the least familiar of the three divides, but it may come into being when social groups have not consciously articulated the nature of an underlying group identity. If the members of a group can agree on questions of identity and formulate corresponding demands, this divide can develop into a full cleavage. If they cannot, caste divides are vulnerable to political entrepreneurs, who may try to seek support by emphasising attitudinal factors that cut across group and party lines (Deegan-Krause 2004, 257–258).

In the next section, we will turn to an empirical analysis of cleavages, in order to illustrate how different political cleavages may emerge, develop and overlap. Here, the study of political cleavage formation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe offers a rare opportunity to investigate the dynamics of how support for political parties is shaped by varying circumstances (Kitschelt 1992; Evans and Whitefield 2000; Whitefield 2002; Innes 2002). In a global perspective, these states are all complex, modern societies. Moreover, a number of these countries emerged as independent states with relatively democratic constitutions at the time when mass politics was consolidated throughout the industrialised world, in the wake of the First World War. Finally, all the states experienced profound regime changes prior to and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, as well as in the early 1990s. Thus, Central and Eastern Europe does provide students of political conflict with a fascinating laboratory for comparing the impact of very different historical and structural contexts on the patterns of political cleavages, e.g. by utilising election data to investigate ‘issue divides’ or by using public opinion surveys to investigate attitudinal differences or the ‘normative element’ of cleavages.

5.3 Lessons from Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe

In the late 1990s, in an analysis of political cleavages in Bulgaria, Karasimeonov (1998) presented a classification of post-communist regimes based on their degree of democratic consolidation (cf. Linz and Stepan 1996). His typology testifies to the relatively high degree of variation among the post-communist countries at that point in time. None of the countries analysed by Karasimeonov could unequivocally be classified as consolidated democracies, but most of them were seen as being on the road towards democratic consolidation. Only Romania and Bulgaria were what Karasimeonov defined as ‘transitional democracies’; and Slovakia at that point in time stood out as something of a borderline case, at best a transitional democracy, but perhaps an authoritarian electoral democracy like Serbia in the 1990s (Karasimeonov 1998). There were thus intimations of

a North/South divide with South Eastern Europe lagging behind the Northern Tier in terms of democratic consolidation. A few years later, 10 post-communist countries had been invited to join the European Union in two waves of accession – the three Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia in May 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The historical decision by the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 testifies not only to the successful consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe but also to the resilience of the North/South divide astutely identified by Karasimeonov in 1998.

As for cleavages and democratic development, scholars have also identified a distinct post-communist pattern. Analysing the cleavage structures in 13 countries in Central and Eastern Europe – drawing on data from the entire post-communist period – Berglund et al. (2004) have demonstrated that democratic consolidation has been possible *without* cleavage crystallisation and a freezing of the party systems. The East European party systems remain weakly anchored in the fluid and imperceptibly differentiated post-communist social structure. The fact that democratic consolidation may occur in a setting of weak cleavage crystallisation goes against the grain of established theory (Moreno 1999; Whitefield 2002). How can this paradoxical fact be accounted for?

There is of course the historical explanation. The current, post-communist try at democracy has had better prospects than the inter-war and immediate post-war experiments in democratic rule; the international climate is significantly more conducive to democracy today than it was back then. East European political leaders and voters alike have vigorously pursued integration into Western political, economic and military structures. This has given Western governments and institutions strong leverage to enforce adherence to the principles of participatory democracy, the rule of law, the free market and minority protection. In short, democratic consolidation is a prerequisite for, as well as a by-product of, integration with the West, i.e. EU and NATO.

The swift and relatively smooth integration of ex-communists into the democratic framework is but one aspect of the broad commitment to democratic principles. There has been a climate favouring co-optation of organisations and individuals tainted by communism. Moreover, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have successfully applied creative electoral engineering in order to avoid political fragmentation. All the countries in the region have introduced electoral thresholds and several of them have electoral systems combining majority and proportional representation; designs set to produce strong and stable government and to counter the kind of immobilism that once thrust the Weimar Republic and the French third and fourth republics into a state of political paralysis.

The impact of more than 40 years of communism has also, somewhat counter-intuitively, improved the prospects for democracy. The comprehensive modernisation of Central and Eastern Europe during communism has provided a social setting more conducive to democracy than ever before. By way of example, the high level of education (Berglund and Aarebrot 1997, 93; Lewis 1994, 132) makes it inconceivable for the countries of contemporary Central and Eastern Europe to restrict balloting in a way similar to Hungary in the inter-war era, when rural voters had to state their voting preferences openly or were not allowed to vote at all (Rothschild 1974, 160). Another aspect of communist modernisation conducive to democracy was the emergence of social groups with interests – at least potential – that political parties could set out to represent. The immediate post-communist societies have sometimes been referred to as ‘flattened societies’ (Wessels and Klingemann 1994); they were certainly marked by class differences, but did not have an independent middle class in the Western sense. Nevertheless, these flattened societies contained embryos of a modern class structure. Of particular importance are the

well-educated middle strata, which have the potential of developing into a Western-style propertied middle class.

Civil society alone did not bring down Soviet-style communism, but the increasing strength of dissident organisations in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s is easy to document and was certainly an unintended by-product of communist-initiated modernisation. It is no coincidence that the transition was violent and/or an elite-level affair in the least modern societies, where civil society was not developed enough to challenge clientelistic structures. While the peoples of the Baltic republics organised a ‘singing revolution’, and the Czechs and Slovaks embarked on their Velvet Revolution, the transfer of power was a backroom affair in Bulgaria and Romania, in the latter eventually spilling over into a regular shoot-out between competing factions of the beleaguered regime. In Croatia, Moldova and Serbia the transition from communism was elite-driven and accompanied by the revival of deeply seated ethnic and religious tensions.

In sum, there are a number of arguments that support the notion that democracy has come to stay in Central and Eastern Europe. Again, this has happened in a setting of weak cleavage crystallisation. What does this signify? In the next paragraphs, we will elaborate on different approaches to the study of political cleavages in post-communist Europe.

5.3.1 Cleavage Typologies: Three Different Approaches

The seminal Lipset–Rokkan classification scheme (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970, 1975) draws on a wide range of historical data from Western Europe; it identifies manifest cleavages rooted in the long-running processes of the national and industrial revolution, such as urban/rural, centre/periphery, church/state, labour/capital and social democracy versus communism (Table 5.1).

As noted in the introduction, cleavages are operative on three levels of analysis – the demographic level, the attitudinal level and the behavioural level (Fig. 5.1). Some scholars, like Deegan-Krause (2004) and Zakošek and Čular (2004), make a strong case for reserving the term ‘cleavage’ for cases where all three levels overlap. For example, as a socio-demographic category, ‘workers’ will have to display attitudinal and behavioural characteristics that set them apart from other social groups in order to qualify for cleavage politics along a left/right continuum. A partial overlap does not constitute a cleavage but a *divide*, and Deegan-Krause draws our attention to three such divides or partial cleavages – structural divides, issue divides and caste divides. Other scholars, operating within a framework inspired by Lipset and Rokkan are inclined to be somewhat less demanding and extend the term ‘cleavage’ also to what Deegan-Krause (2004) would refer to as divides (cf. Karasimeonov 1998).

Berglund et al. (2004) take an intermediate position on, e.g. the relevance of historical cleavages in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. These cleavages were repressed during several decades of dictatorship before, as well as after, the Second World War; they may re-emerge, but not necessarily in the same form. By way of example, the rural/urban dimension has been thoroughly transformed by communist-style modernisation. Collectivisation of agriculture reduced the farmers to workers, and to all intents and purposes wiped out the constituencies of the inter-war agrarian parties, with the exception of the peasant parties of Poland and Slovenia. Advocating privatisation of agricultural land was not a successful strategy for the re-born agrarian parties of the early 1990s; agricultural workers adjusted well to being workers rather than farmers, and they are now

<i>Origins</i>	<i>Lipset and Rokkan (1967)</i>	<i>Karasimeonov (1998)</i>	<i>Berglund et al. (2004)</i>	<i>Cleavages discussed in the country-specific chapters in Berglund et al. (2004)</i>
<i>Pre-war social structure</i>	MANIFEST <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • urban–rural • centre–periphery • Church–State • labour–capital • social democracy–communism 	Residual (historical) cleavages	<i>Historical</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • core populations versus minorities • religious–secular • urban–rural • workers–owners • social democracy–communism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ethnic/linguistic • religious • urban–rural • regional • left–right
<i>Contemporary social structures</i>		Actual cleavages	<i>Contemporary</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • national versus cosmopolitan • protectionist versus free-market • generational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mode of distribution • rent-seekers versus wage-earners • education • generation
<i>Regime transition from authoritarian to democratic rule</i>		Transitional cleavages	<i>Transitional</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • apparatus versus forums/fronts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • communist regime versus civic forums/fronts • apparatus versus civil society • professionals versus dissidents ('amateurs')
<i>Long-term developmental trends</i>	LATENT	Potential cleavages		

Fig. 5.2 Cleavage typologies and their origins

rallying to parties associated with the defunct communist regimes, which serve as parties of rural defence.

Fig. 5.2 provides an overview of the scope of conceptual variations in the usage of terms related to the cleavage concept, drawing mainly on the second edition of the *Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Berglund et al. 2004). First, Lipset and Rokkan's distinction between manifest and latent cleavages is taken as a point of departure. The table deals primarily with cleavages manifested through the *representation of* and *the electoral support for* political parties.

In the figure, we have classified the categories proposed by Karasimeonov and others in terms of their respective origins. We would argue that some of the manifestations of political parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe originate from social conflicts present already in the inter-war period. As mentioned above, these ‘historical’ or ‘residual’ cleavages are not necessarily represented by the same parties or even by the same ideologies today as after the First World War. In fact, in most cases it is new parties, which today capitalise on old societal cleavages.

Fig. 5.2 indicates that *latent* cleavages – or, in Karasimeonov’s typology, ‘potential cleavages’ – are not subject to investigation by the contributing authors in Berglund et al. (2004). Another set of *manifest* cleavages is derived from contemporary social conflicts. Such cleavages are referred to by Berglund et al. (2004) as ‘contemporary’ cleavages; by Karasimeonov (1998) as ‘actual’ cleavages. Lack of precedence from the inter-war period is the common denominator behind this class of conflicts. Furthermore, both Berglund et al. and Karasimeonov have defined a class of manifest ‘transitional’ cleavages. These are conflicts related to the dramatic days and months following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order for a cleavage to be classified as transitional, parties which still identify themselves with the early popular fronts or, conversely, with the besieged pro-Soviet communists, must be present on the parliamentary level throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

In the right-hand column of Fig. 5.2, we have listed terms for classification of cleavages employed in the various country-specific chapters in the *Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Berglund et al. 2004) covering 13 post-communist countries. Despite some terminological ambiguities, a conceptual consistency clearly exists here.

The relevance of the left–right dimension is an important finding in the post-communist setting. The party systems in most countries, with the exception of Estonia, Moldova, Serbia and, possibly, Latvia and Croatia (cf. Table 5.2) are structured along a left–right dimension, either explicitly or implicitly. As convincingly demonstrated by Mansfeldová (2004), Czech voters place the parties and the parties place themselves explicitly along a left–right continuum defined in socio-economic terms. In the remaining countries, the political parties somehow end up on a left–right scale anyway. Lithuania and Hungary are cases in point, but they also serve as a reminder that the Central and East European party systems have not frozen yet. The legacy of communism has added one important component to the left–right cleavage: the conflict of interest between winners and losers of the transition process, between what may be classified as wage earners and rent-seekers. This component has some features in common with the Lipset–Rokkan labour/capital cleavage, which also revolves around questions of distribution and redistribution. Yet it is important not to overstate the particularity of the East European case. The left/right or labour/capital cleavage in Western Europe has undergone profound change since Lipset and Rokkan developed their classification scheme in the 1960s. The welfare state has contributed to a weakening of class linkages and created a growing constituency of subsidy-seekers who use political parties to extract resources from the state. With the public sector accounting for more than half of GDP in many West European countries, the state has seen fit to take over many of the distributive functions formerly attributed to private capital.

Several parties compete for the different segments of the rent-seeking electorate in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. The rent-seeking electorate has occasionally found representation through the ex-communist parties, but some of the former ruling parties have developed into paragons of pro-market virtue – the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) is a case in point; and as evidenced by Crowther (2004), legislators affiliated with the three main communist party-derived formations in Romania are more pro-market

than the population average. Indeed, all Central and East European parties, including the ex-communists, are constrained by voters conditioned to seeing the state as a source of subsidies, and by external economic constraints, as well as by the need to make a clean break with communism and the planned economy.

In the late 1990s, Berglund et al. (1998) concluded that many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe had gone through a metamorphosis and acquired genuine democratic credentials. This tendency was particularly strong in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Lithuania and particularly weak in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Since then, the three latter have edged much closer to the Central and East European mainstream. Slovakia is no longer a deviant case in the Central European context; and though marked by clientelism as well as occasional political turmoil, Bulgaria and Romania are now well beyond the transitional stage – indeed, since January 2007, they are members of the European Union. Moldova and Serbia have not come as far. Crowther and Josanu (2004) bluntly refer to Moldova as a case of ‘failed democratisation’; and in a similar vein, Todosijević (2004) refers to the level of violence in Serbian politics in recent years. Croatia is obviously in a more favourable position, but it has nevertheless been grappling until quite recently with the transition from authoritarianism under Franjo Tuđman (Zakošek and Čular 2004).

With the exception of the Balkans, the issues of nationalism and ethnicity have been of less importance than might be expected, given Eastern Europe’s legacy of ethnic politics. Even so, it is legitimate to ask whether this will be a permanent state of affairs. The countries in South Eastern Europe remain ethnically heterogeneous in spite of the ethnic cleansings of the early 1990s within the former Yugoslav federation; the Baltic states are more ethnically heterogeneous than they were before they were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940; Polish ‘anti-Semitism without Jews’ (Lendvai 1971) and anti-German resentments in the Czech polity are manifestations of ethnic cleavages, which lost most of their underlying substance during the ethnic cleansings of the 1940s. External constraints, operative on the elite level, may go a long way towards accounting for the limited degree of exploitation of ethno-linguistic cleavages. For example, EU and NATO intervention has certainly played a major role in defusing, or at least suspending, the Trianon issue between Hungary and her neighbours. (In the Peace Treaty of Trianon, at the end of the First World War, Hungary was deprived of its crownlands from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was perceived as an injustice by a majority of Hungarians, who endorsed the revisionist foreign policy pursued by Hungary in the 1930s and 1940s.)

Identity politics is an important feature of state- and nation-building, and it still plays a role in Central and Eastern Europe today. State- and nation-building was not completed by the end of the inter-war era, and communism slowed down the process. In this respect, the Baltic states and Moldova had the dual disadvantage of being not only communist but also under direct Soviet rule and subject to intense attempts at Russification. It should therefore come as no surprise that identity politics plays such a prominent role in these four countries, in Estonia, Latvia and Moldova to the extent of overshadowing other cleavages.

5.3.2 Contemporary Cleavage Structures in Central and Eastern Europe

Capitalising on the conceptually consistent pattern defined in Fig. 5.2, we will seek to define and compare the cleavage patterns for 13 post-communist countries. In order to do so, it is necessary to define a set of historical, contemporary and transitional cleavages at a rather high level of abstraction. We do this in order to be able to compare variations

Table 5.2 Patterns of cleavage types in Central and Eastern Europe based on parties represented in national parliaments after 1989

	Est	Lat	Lith	Pol	Cze	Slvk	Hun	Slvn	Rom	Bul	Cro	Ser	Mol
Historical													
Core population versus ethno-linguistic minorities	+	+				+			+	+	+	+	+
Religious versus secular	+		+	+	(+)	+	+	+			+		
Urban versus rural	+	+		+			+	+	+	(+)	+	(+)	
Workers versus owners		(+)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	(+)	(+)		
Social democrats versus communists		+	+	(+)	+		+	+	+	+			
Contemporary													
National versus cosmopolitan		+			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	(+)
Protectionist versus freemarket		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	(+)
Generational							+	+					
Socio-economically disadvantaged versus occupational and managing elites	+	+											
Transitional													
Apparatus versus forums/fronts	+		+	+	+			+	+	+			(+)

Source: Berglund et al. (2004).

in cleavage patterns across the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The results are reported in Table 5.2.

The first five cleavages are historical, closely related to Lipset and Rokkan's classification of 1967:

- *Core populations versus ethno-linguistic minorities*: Here we refer to political parties which are clear-cut representatives of a linguistic or ethnic minority or to any party appealing to the core population by negative references to national minorities.
- *Religious versus secular*: This dimension is captured by parties seeking to gain votes by defending religious values or by parties attacking religious values and arguing for a secular society.
- *Urban versus rural*: This cleavage is manifested by parties that represent cities or rural areas and have some roots in the politics of the inter-war era.
- *Workers versus owners*: This cleavage, also known as labour/capital or left/right, manifests itself through parties which derive their support primarily from within organised labour or from within employers' organisations such as federations of industry. Traditional social democratic parties would be typical examples.
- *Social democrats versus communists*: This cleavage is tapped by parties derived from the traditional conflict between internationalist and nationally oriented socialism.

The next four cleavages are contemporary:

- *National versus cosmopolitan*: At the poles of this cleavage we find parties with the nation-state as the focal point and parties strongly oriented towards international co-operation as a way of solving political problems (i.e. European integration). To be listed

as an exponent of this cleavage, nationalist or cosmopolitan rhetoric must be a dominant feature of the party's appeal.

- *Protective versus free market*: At one end of this spectrum are parties which try to preserve subsidies for unprofitable industries; at the other are parties which launch themselves by arguing that the free market will benefit the country, irrespective of negative short-term consequences such as unemployment and social tension.
- *Generational*: This cleavage is manifested by parties, which derive their support from people with a common generational experience, such as pensioners and youth (cf. Inglehart 1977).
- *Socio-economically disadvantaged versus occupational and managing elites*: This cleavage is manifested by parties drawing support from, on the one side of the spectrum, the 'ordinary people' who feel that they have become 'losers' in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe and, on the other end of the spectrum, from the 'winners' of the transformation, the emerging middle- and upper-middle classes. This cleavage may cut across traditional cleavages based on issues such as left/right, urban/rural, gender, generation and ethnicity (cf. Kriesi 1998; Brooks et al. 2005).

Finally, we have listed one transitional cleavage:

- *Apparatus versus popular forums/fronts*: In order for this cleavage to be manifest, the party system must include parties which are derived from the old communist ruling apparatus or parties which represent a direct continuation of the early anti-communist popular forums and fronts.

For a cleavage to be listed as relevant in Table 5.2, a party representing it must have returned at least 5 per cent of the vote in recent general elections (see the appendices to the country-specific chapters in Berglund et al. 2004). The same party may be salient as a mobilising agent on more than one cleavage. For a party to be considered 'mobilising' on the basis of a historical cleavage, it is not necessary for it to have had organisational continuity since the inter-war and immediate post-war eras. Cleavages do not have to be bipolar in order to be registered as salient for any specific country: it is sufficient for the party system to include a party, or a group of parties, seeking to capitalise on one end of a given dimension. For example, a country is considered to have a religious/secular cleavage if it has a religious party polling more than 5 per cent of the vote; a secular counterpart is not necessary.

If each significant party in a country attempts to mobilise voters on the basis of the same position on a given cleavage, we do not classify that cleavage as salient. For example, in countries where all relevant parties are in favour of NATO and EU membership, the national versus cosmopolitan cleavage is not considered salient. Following these rules of classification we arrive at the pattern of salient cleavages presented in Table 5.2. A '+' marks a salient cleavage, whereas a '+' within brackets indicates marginal salience relevant to one of our criteria.

Much has happened in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989–1990. Political life no longer revolves around the pros and cons of Soviet-style communism. Cleavages long suppressed and manipulated by the communist and pre-war authoritarian rulers have re-emerged, and new cleavages specific to post-communist societies have appeared. The countries of contemporary Central and Eastern Europe all have a multi-dimensional cleavage space.

Table 5.2 makes it possible to make a rough distinction between countries with simple versus complex cleavage structures. Countries like Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Croatia with only one salient contemporary cleavage clearly qualify for the first category. And with three salient contemporary cleavages, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia obviously qualify for the latter category. With two salient contemporary cleavages, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia land in between these two groups. Moldova, finally, ends up all by itself with no salient contemporary cleavages at all. Moldova is grappling with historical cleavages that revolve around ethnicity and state- and nation-building, to the extent that the contours of the contemporary cleavages are barely visible.

As already noted, in the late 1990s there was ample evidence of a North–South divide in post-communist Europe, with the Northern Tier – encompassing Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – having the most simple cleavage structure. Table 5.2 does not lend itself to such straightforward conclusions. Croatia, Serbia and Moldova are all located in South Eastern Europe, and they all seem to have rather simple cleavage structures. This is not what we would have hypothesised, given the empirical data at hand in the late 1990s (cf. Berglund et al. 1998). For example, we would have expected Latvia to stay put among the Northern Tier countries with a simple contemporary cleavage structure. And Latvia has obviously moved towards greater complexity.

A word of caution might be appropriate at this stage. Table 5.2 tells us which cleavages have been represented by relevant parties in each of the 13 Central and East European countries throughout the post-communist period; it does not convey any information about cleavages represented by non-relevant parties, i.e. parties that have polled less than 5 per cent of the valid votes cast in the post-communist elections. More important still, the table does not say anything about the relative importance of the various cleavages that we have identified. And not all cleavages are of equal importance.

We know from Lagerspetz and Vogt's analysis (2004) that contemporary Estonia is uni-dimensional, for all intents and purposes. Identity politics is pervasive to the extent that Estonia might even be classified as a case of non-party politics, though with a left/right cleavage lurking in the background. This of course does not preclude the existence of enough actors in the market to fill a few more cells in the matrix (Table 5.2) than just one. Similarly, Smith-Sivertsen (2004) convincingly demonstrates the increasing salience of the left/right cleavage in contemporary Latvian politics. Duvold and Jurkynas (2004) document the resilience of the left/right cleavage in Lithuania also in times of political turmoil. There is in fact an almost overwhelming agreement among many scholars that Central and East European parties may be classified in terms of left, right or centre. These terms often carry more than socio-economic connotations, however. Rightwing parties may, for instance, be seen to campaign on a platform of traditional conservative and religious values, while leftwing parties adopt a secular and cosmopolitan platform. This is the case in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, and to some extent even in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

We are basically saying that a complex cleavage structure may turn into something rather simple and straightforward, if the cleavages are correlated as tends to be the case in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. In the extreme scenario, the cleavages are literally superimposed on one another. This would seem to be at least part of the secret behind the relative simple cleavage structure in Croatia, Moldova and Serbia. The transition to pluralism and democracy in these countries has been dominated by historical cleavages to the extent that other cleavages or divides have been subordinated to the dominant cleavage. This is most strongly pronounced in Serbia, where all latent cleavages were subsumed by the historical national cleavage (Todosijević 2004). But Croatia and Moldova have also

had more than their fair share of polarisation and are not that far removed from the Serbian model.

5.3.3 Linking Cleavages to Survey Data

Whether broadly or narrowly defined, the cleavage concept remains an analytical concept. Voters do not necessarily relate to political parties in terms of cleavages, even though they might seem to do so when we analyse their attitudes and political behaviour. This does not mean that politics does not make sense to the voters. On the contrary, voters are also capable of identifying stable patterns and underlying structures as brought out by numerous election studies.

In the *New Europe Barometer* (2001), respondents were explicitly asked about their understanding of existing cleavages in society that parties can draw on. The question reads: 'Here are some reasons that people give about the differences between political parties in this country. Which of the following best explains these differences: (1) Some parties believe the Communist regime did much more harm than good, while others want to preserve many of its achievements; (2) Some parties represent big cities, while others defend rural and peripheral regions; (3) Some parties want government to manage the economy, while others prefer the market; (4) Some parties represent ethnic minorities, while others oppose special policies for minorities; (5) Big personalities are the chief appeal of some parties, while others ask voters to support their political ideas; (6) Some parties promote national traditions, while others emphasise integration in Europe.'

The respondents were explicitly instructed to select the two alternatives that explain the most. Table 5.3 provides information on both, on the first and second most important cleavages as perceived by the respondents. Unfortunately, the *New Europe Barometer* does not cover all the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are included in Table 5.2. Serbia, Croatia and Moldova are excluded, and we are thus left with a sample of 10 countries instead of 13. Nevertheless, Table 5.3 provides us with some interesting insights into the way ordinary citizens perceive the relevant cleavages in contemporary post-communist Europe.

Table 5.3 Perceptions of cleavages (%)

Country	Communist past	Market versus state	Urban versus rural	Ethnic minority rights	Nation versus Europe	Ideas versus persons	No opinion
<i>Bulgaria</i>	45	29	17	16	24	23	21
<i>Czech Republic</i>	45	44	14	6	32	41	3
<i>Estonia</i>	24	29	35	17	35	33	12
<i>Hungary</i>	29	24	20	9	31	24	28
<i>Latvia</i>	13	27	12	12	31	33	31
<i>Lithuania</i>	29	50	24	10	33	40	6
<i>Poland</i>	42	20	18	5	31	39	18
<i>Romania</i>	30	26	16	17	34	33	19
<i>Slovakia</i>	22	30	14	25	31	36	16
<i>Slovenia</i>	25	25	19	6	40	25	24
<i>Average</i>	30	30	19	12	32	33	18

Source: New Europe Barometer (2001).

Looking at the average scores, we find that four types of cleavages stand out as particularly important: *ideas versus persons* (or populism versus ideology); *nation versus Europe*; *market versus state*; and *communism versus anti-communism*.

We have encountered the populism/ideology cleavage in Karasimeonov (2004), on the vicissitudes of Bulgarian politics, and charismatic personalities is a common feature of a number of other countries in post-communist Europe (Berglund et al. 2004). The salience of the populism/ideology cleavage in the minds of East European voters is hardly surprising. The importance attributed to nation versus Europe and market versus state also goes towards confirming previous expectations. In fact, the history of Central and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1990 and onwards might very well be summarised in terms of these very cleavages. Communism versus anti-communism is of course also a familiar cleavage, but the importance of this cleavage in the minds of the voters (polled in 2001) nevertheless comes as somewhat of a surprise, particularly in consolidated democracies like Poland and the Czech Republic. The present writers would be inclined to see this as a lingering impact of what was a salient transitional cleavage in the early part of the 1990s rather than an indication that the cleavage is about to become a permanent fixture. The communist past remains relevant, but it is by no means decisive any more.

5.4 Political Cleavages in Contemporary Europe

It is standard operating procedure to conclude a section like the one above with an evaluation of the prospects for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. This is easily done. The vast majority of our indicators pull in favour of democracy. Nine out of the 13 countries in our sample qualify as being well on the road towards democratic consolidation, if not already consolidated democracies. Only Croatia, Romania and particularly Serbia lag behind. Yet even the laggards in our sample have made considerable progress on the bubbly road towards democracy in recent years (cf. Berglund et al. 2004).

It would nevertheless be foolhardy to exclude the possibility of setbacks. Democracy is not a one-way street, as illustrated by the failed democratisation process in, e.g. Moldova (Crowther and Josanu 2004). The countries of Central and Eastern Europe do still have features which may turn out to be problematic for democratic consolidation in the long run. Cleavage crystallisation remains far from complete and the linkages between parties and voters are weak. The net result is party system fluidity and a high degree of electoral volatility. These are weaknesses which can be offset by what is occasionally referred to as ‘creative electoral engineering’ – but only to a degree, as shown throughout the 1990s as well as in recent years by the surprising success of outsiders like presidential contenders Stanisław Tymiński in Poland, Valdas Adamkus in Lithuania or the ex-king Simeon II in Bulgaria; or, for that matter, of parties such as the Czech Republican Party, the People’s Movement for Latvia (Siegerist Party) and Estonia’s Res Publica. As if this were not enough, there is still the potential explosiveness of ethnic and national grievances, currently checked by pressure from the international community.

The problems of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have been closely monitored by Western political science since 1989. Not seldom have scholars discussed the development of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe on the implicit assumption that West European democracy may be taken for granted and serve as a model. This is in no way unproblematic. Contemporary Western Europe is in fact beset by many of the problems encountered in the Central and East European context, albeit in different forms and to

a different order of magnitude. Most of Western Europe is in the middle of a transition process of sorts. Harsh economic realities undermine the welfare states which were built from the 1950s onwards, on the dual assumptions of continuous growth and the primacy of politics. The increasing inability of the welfare state to deliver on its outstanding promises erodes the legitimacy of the political system as well as attachments to political parties. There is in fact ample evidence of decreasing levels of party attachment in Western Europe (cf. Norris 1999; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Biorcio and Mannheimer 1995; Chapter 2 and 6). There is even a case to be made for the notion that Western Europe is currently undergoing a process of party system ‘unfreezing’. As a rule, established parties all over Europe have found it increasingly difficult to defend their position against new political entrepreneurs such as the Greens in Finland, Sweden and Germany. Noteworthy is also the dramatically increasing levels of electoral support for right-wing populist and Eurosceptic parties in many West European countries; *Vlaams Belang* (previously *Vlaams Blok*) in Belgium, *le Front National* in France and the FPÖ in Austria being perhaps the primary examples. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, migration will not become a significant social and political problem in the foreseeable future, and the emergence of parties founded on anti-immigration seems unlikely. Estonia and Latvia are special cases here: they have a significant non-national population composed mainly of the Russians that moved or were moved to these countries during communism.

Last but not least, the breakdown of Soviet-style communism has had an impact on Western Europe well beyond the obvious economic and strategic implications. With the spectre of communism removed from the political agenda, the conceptual and ideological space in Western Europe was substantially reduced. It is probably premature to proclaim the demise of ideology in Western Europe, but like their Central and East European counterparts, West European parties face the necessity of reformulating and rethinking their ideological positions.

In this chapter, we have discussed the importance of political cleavages for the consolidation of democracy in post-communist Europe, but the idea has also been to use the empirical evidence from Central and Eastern Europe to discuss political cleavages in contemporary Europe. Here, the most obvious point of reference would be the European Union – and its now 27 members – and the European Parliament (EP). The EU and the EP open up interesting perspectives for parties and voters in Europe.

Obviously, the European Parliament might theoretically initiate the formation of a European party system structured along the cleavages or divisions behind current coalition patterns within the EP. The idea is by no means far-fetched. Many liberal and conservative parties in Western Europe emerged first in the form of loosely knit parliamentary parties; the transformation into catch-all parties backed by a party organisation based on dues-paying members came much later. The problems may be the same, but when they appear on the federal level – of a federation contested from within and at the most only in the making – the problems are clearly of a different order of magnitude than they were in the latter part of the 19th century.

Arguably, the European Commission can promote this process by encouraging the current parliamentary factions to campaign as parties and not as loose coalitions of parties from all over the European continent (cf. Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 2002). This might very well work, but, if so, it is likely to be a drawn-out affair. Some questions are well worth raising any way, even if we think we have good reasons not to expect them to materialise in the near future, and this is clearly one of them. Had it not been for eastward enlargement, a reference to current factions in the European Parliament would perhaps have been sufficient. With the complex and fluid cleavage structure in many of the new members of the

European Union (Table 5.2), it is not that easy. We would expect most of the EP factions already in place prior to enlargement to survive; the new arrivals have to adapt to them and are already in the process of doing so. This will stretch the meaning of labels like ‘conservative’, ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’ even further, but that is only a matter of degrees. Of the many cleavages and divisions present in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, two would seem to have all-European potential (cf. Marks and Steenbergen 2002). We are referring to the ‘national versus cosmopolitan’ and ‘protectionist versus free market’ cleavages (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). The national position on the first dimension is reminiscent of arguments raised by Eurosceptics also in the West European context, and if we modify the wording of the second dimension slightly into ‘welfare state versus free market’ we have yet another dimension of conflict with all-European implications.

The *left–right dimension* and the *European integration–national sovereignty dimension* have both been emphasised in the literature, e.g. in relation to voting patterns in the European Parliament. Some have argued that politics in the EP is primarily about left and right divisions. Despite MEPs from many different countries, different cultures, different national parties and national interests, European-level politics is not altogether unpredictable. On the contrary, some would say. As Hix et al. (2007) have demonstrated, analysing more than 15,000 recorded votes in the EP elections between 1979 and 2004, the voting behaviour among representatives of the trans-national European parties is basically dominated by a traditional left–right cleavage (Hix et al. 2007; cf. Heidar 2003, 16–18). Still, others have suggested that nationality is a more powerful predictor of voting behaviour in the EP elections – positions are related to expected economic gains (cf. Brinegar et al. 2004).

When pondering prospective all-European cleavages, the question is also in what way the two cleavages identified here as potentially relevant European cleavages – the left–right cleavage and the European integration–national sovereignty cleavage – may interact. These two can be seen as fundamentally irreconcilable dimensions (cf. Hix and Lord 1997), but on the other hand, also as partly overlapping (cf. Marks and Steenbergen 2002). Thus, scholars have pointed to not just two but three possible main blocs of a future European party system: a left bloc, a centre–right bloc, and a pro-European-integration bloc that in some ways cuts through the other two blocs (Heidar 2003, 19). In addition, smaller blocs based on traditional party families may of course survive, e.g. Greens, Conservatives or extreme left- and rightwing parties.

Speculating about the development of all-European cleavages, there is yet another question that needs to be addressed: What would it take for a European cleavage-based party system to emerge? Most scholars seem to agree that it has ultimately to do with how the European and national levels interact. Stefano Bartolini (2002) – cited in Heidar (2003) – has suggested four scenarios for how the European and national levels could create a European party system:

1. Europeanisation of the nation state: National parties regroup into Europarties that will align along a *left–right axis*. Euro-sceptical groups could remain marginal, and territorial–cultural cleavages would persist as internal divisions inside the Europarty families.
2. Internalisation of ‘European integration’: Opposition/support for integration will be kept at the national level. The European ‘electoral-parliamentary processes and arenas will remain “second-order” structures, loosely bounded and poorly co-ordinated’ although there will be party contacts among like-minded parties across national boundaries on *the integration dimension*.

3. Europeanisation of ‘European integration’: *The integration issue* will emerge only at EU-level elections and institutions, generating a ‘split’ or two-level party system within the EU [. . .] Specific Euro-election parties would debate integration issues. This outcome would require a more clear-cut, constitutional division of competence between the two levels to be sustainable.
4. Externalisation of the ‘European integration’ cleavage: *The integration issue* will restructure national party systems and form new aligned Europarties. This would make Europe enter a new phase of ‘mass politics’ [. . .] (Heidar 2003, 15–16).

Three out of the four scenarios thus suggest that the European integration process, in itself, will eventually lead to the creation of EU-level cleavages. Which of these scenarios that is most likely to develop is of course a matter of educated guesses.

5.5 Concluding Remarks

Returning to the question posed at the opening of this chapter, what cleavage structures are relevant to European societies today? Historically, cleavages have emerged as a result of state-building, the rise of capitalism, nation formation, democratisation and the formation of the welfare state in Europe. Today, the European integration process may be added to this list, as a new critical phase that creates cleavages.

Here, we have for the most part focused on manifest, latent and potential cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis indicates that the left–right cleavage and the European integration–national sovereignty cleavage have potential to emerge as all-European cleavages. Particularly the pro/contra EU integration dimension is interesting and often highlighted in the literature on possible cleavages on the European level. At the same time, the actual content of such a division – in terms of party competition – is an open question: What will the struggle be all about? Will the pro/contra European integration cleavage align with territorial cleavages, e.g. small nations versus large nations, or regions versus national elites? It is also possible that economic and cultural differences may mobilise voters for or against European integration (cf. Heidar 2003, 24).

We noted that the development of truly European cleavage-based party system is likely to be a drawn-out affair. More power to the European Parliament and more visibility for the European Parliament and its MEPs in their respective national constituencies would ultimately be helpful. But the former is contested by Eurosceptics, not only in Northern and Western Europe but also in the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe; the latter is feasible, but not likely to draw much of an audience as long as the European Parliament is perceived as a political institution of limited importance for living and working conditions in Europe and as long as the notion of a European society remains a theoretical concept on the drawing board of political scientists or yet another buzzword in lofty political statements.

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Chapter 6

Collective Action

Dieter Rucht

6.1 Collective Action as an Analytical Concept

Collective action is a fuzzy term, encompassing extremely variegated activities ranging from a young couple taking a honeymoon trip to armies engaging in warfare. Contrary to collective behaviour (e.g. panic) which is often taken synonymous to collective action, the latter term should be reserved for an intentional activity to reach a certain goal. And contrary to many forms of individual action, such as participating in a ballot, collective action requires a certain degree of coordination among the activists. While collective action, taken literally, would also include activities of highly institutionalised groups such as governments or executive boards of corporations, the term usually refers to activities of groups that are less institutionalised and less formalised. Following this semantics, collective action hereafter means coordinated actions of groups or organisations of committed citizens who collectively pursue their interest or, in an advocate's role, the interest of another group or society as a whole (see also Chong 1996; Rucht and Neidhardt 2001). While this definition emphasises the instrumental aspect of collective action, it is worth noting that collective action may also have a more expressive character that, in turn, can serve to reach certain goals or fulfil latent functions (e.g. strengthening group cohesion through the performance of rituals).

Informal citizen initiatives, social movements, interest groups and political parties are among the most important carriers of collective action. Accordingly, collective action may include a few individuals or millions of people. It may be locally bound or transnational, peaceful or radical, spontaneous or planned, occurring in a private setting or on public stage, focus on a group-specific or a universal good. Moreover, it can be routinised and therefore largely predictable. An example for this would be a mainstream political party engaging in a voting campaign or an annual commemoration of a historical event. In other cases, however, for example, a terrorist attack or a full-blown revolution, collective action is highly contingent and disruptive. Considering these variations, it is obvious that the universe of collective action is extremely vast, particularly if we were to include many small and informal activities below the threshold of broad public attention, e.g. a street football match, petty crime of small gangs, birthday parties, religious ceremonies or a joint letter of a tenants' group to its landlord.

D. Rucht (✉)
WZB, Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany
e-mail: rucht@wzb.eu

In the context of this *Handbook of European Societies*, the focus is mainly on collective actions that occur in the public sphere and are meant to influence (some parts of) society and politics.¹ Typically but not exclusively, these are activities by intermediary groups that link the citizenry to the state authorities. However, some kinds of groups also interact directly with other groups or institutions, e.g. trade unions with employers, right-wing movements with their left-wing opponents, lobbying groups with governmental agencies. Collective actions of groups that lobby decision-makers as well as activities of groups or movements with a strong emphasis on identity (e.g. youth subcultures, movements focussing on personal change as opposed to political and social change) will be largely neglected in this chapter.

Most of the collective actions considered in this chapter are carried out by members or adherents of pre-existing groups rather than by prior disconnected individuals. Sometimes, collective action is also based on broad alliances of different kinds of collective actors. At least large collective actions require some sort of a core group, organisation or network that mobilises a wider circle of sympathisers for a specific activity. Yet not every protest activity implies the physical gathering of all participants, as the case of a collection of signatures shows. In many other cases, however, the physical presence of masses of protesters is part of the message. This applies, for example, to the demonstrations against the imminent war in Iraq on 15 February 2003. It probably was the largest coordinated collective event in human history with a turnout of 10 to 15 million participants, spanning from Australia to Europe to the west coast of North America (Walgrave and Rucht forthcoming). The initial impulse to this protest was a call for action issued at the European Social Forum taking place in Florence in the Autumn of 2002. Considering the stunning reaction, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) declared that the February 15 demonstrations would “go into history books as a signal for the birth of a European Public”.

The study of collective action is mostly undertaken by sociologists, political scientists, social psychologists and historians. Theorists in the tradition of the methodological individualism insist that only individuals can be conceptualised as a meaningful unit of action and therefore groups are nothing more than the aggregate of individual behaviours (e.g. Opp 1989). Yet most other social scientists tend to perceive collectivities as a unit in its own right that, under certain conditions and in specific moments, qualify as entities being able to take decisions and act strategically. In this view, groups, and thus collection actions, are more than just the aggregate of individual behaviours. Whatever stance one takes in this debate, it is important to note that collective action may rest on strikingly different structural bases. While in many cases collective action is grounded on social bonds and a sense of collective identity, it can also be a mere tactical instrument jointly used by actors with different goals. Sometimes “strange bed-fellows” temporarily unite in negative coalitions, for example, to topple a government, but having strikingly divergent political ideologies and contradictory or even mutually exclusive ultimate goals.

6.2 Determinants of Collective Action

It is obvious that collective action depends on certain characteristics of their carriers, e.g. the participants’ motives, interests, level of education, sex, etc. as well as group structures

¹For overviews on collective action and/or political participation in Europe, see Roller and Wessels (1996); Greenwood and Aspinwall (1998); Imig and Tarrow (2001); Balme et al. (2002); and Rucht (2006).

and resources. For example, vital interests concerning the physical survival or the deeply anchored identity of a collective actor tend to have a greater capacity to mobilise than concerns that the participants themselves consider to be less crucial. It is also clear that a united and coherent collective actor can easier choose and implement a demanding joint activity than a group that is internally divided and socially incoherent. Sometimes, the existence of charismatic leaders can also be conducive to stimulate and energise collective action. Furthermore, collective actors disposing on sizeable material resources are more likely to carry out large-scale and sustained activities than groups that are ad hoc formed and poorly financed.

In addition to such internal factors, also the external structural context widens or restricts the range, scope and kinds of collective actions (Dalton and van Sickle 2005). Historical evidence shows that the patterns of collective action differ widely across time and place. Collective action accumulates and intensifies in some periods and some places while being rare or insignificant in others. In central Europe, for example, the periods of 1848/1849, 1918/1919 and around 1968 are marked by widespread political unrest and rebellion, culminating in some places in rebellious or even revolutionary activities. Equally, strikes do not tend to spread evenly over place and time but cluster (Flora et al. 1987; Mitchell 1997; Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). Such waves of large-scale collective political action can hardly be explained by endogenous factors such as certain properties of the respective collective actors. Rather, waves of mobilisation to a large extent are fostered by exogenous factors that provide both motives and favourable opportunities for joint action, e.g. deteriorating conditions of life, weak or divided elites and chances to forge new alliances. In social science literature, these factors are discussed under labels such as objective or relative deprivation on the one hand (e.g. Gurr 1970) and political (and other) opportunity structures on the other (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998; Schulz 1998; Marks and McAdam 1996, 1999). Let us look at some of these contextual factors in a more detailed way. After all, one might expect that the themes and forms of collective action become more similar and more intertwined across nation-states due to several developments: the transnationalisation of many problems (e.g. environmental degradation and immigration), a corresponding sense of cross-border deprivation but also the perception of cross-border opportunities for joint action; and eventually the internationalisation of both non-established and established politics together with the creation of transnational networks or organisations to carry out collective action (see Smith 2004).

One important contextual factor for collective action is the nature and geographical locus of the target group. Charles Tilly (1984, 1995), for example, has argued that in the period before the formation of full-blown nation-states contentious collective action was primarily locally bound, parochial, bifurcated and particular, but subsequently became more national and strategically oriented.² To the extent that decision-making competencies regarding societal and political conditions shifted to national bodies (in particular, national governments and parliaments), also collective action widened its geographical focus. As a consequence, in addition to local and regional groups, larger and ultimately nation-wide mobilisation structures, political parties and formal associations, were put in place. Today, with the growing shift of competencies to international and supranational bodies, we witness a further scale-shift in some fields of collective action that easily transcends national

²Tilly distinguishes, and probably overemphasises, a historical watershed around the turn from the 18th to the 19th century when new forms of collective action, in his words a new action repertoire, took shape. It is likely that these changes occurred at a slower pace than Tilly has assumed (see, for example, Tarrow 1998, Chapter 6).

and continental borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta et al. 1999; Banaszak et al. 2003; Tarrow 2006).

Second, and related to the first aspect, the presence or absence of certain institutional channels of interest mediation strongly influence the patterns of collective action. When access to decision-making processes is notoriously blocked, challenger groups may give up or, to the contrary, intensify their efforts, probably resorting to disruptive ways of expressing dissent, as it can be seen in some authoritarian states but also in a democracy like the USA during the period of ghetto riots. By contrast, the availability of institutional means to pursue collective interests tends to channel and shape a great deal of collective action. For example, the rights to associate and assemble, to vote, to initiate a referendum or to litigate have a profound impact on the repertoire, arenas and specific forms in which collective actions take place.

Third, the cleavage structure in a given society (Rokkan 1981), as manifested in enduring conflicts (religious vs. secular, left vs. right, cultural rigidity vs. liberty) and related social milieus and organisational structures, influences the extent, content and forms of collective action. This, in part, can explain why some societies are notoriously conflict-ridden and exhibit higher levels of political violence than others. Also the presence of a strong or a weak state, a more or a less vibrant associational life and the prevailing cultural values favouring a more consociational or a more conflictive style of politics have a profound impact on the occurrence and patterns of collective action. This is why, for example, the regionalist movement in the Basque country not only could survive but also displays a high level of disruption. As far as attitudes to European integration are concerned, Tesebelis and Garret (2000) have assumed that the Left/Right dimension continues to be a relevant factor, whereas Hooghe and Marks (2001; see also Marks and Steenbergen 2002) stress the role of a cleavage between regulated capitalism and neoliberalism. Related to the cleavage structure is also the potential to forge political alliances. This opportunity, however, is also influenced by more contingent factors that are not considered here.

Fourth, the general economic context comes into play. While the attempts of some scholars to link waves of collective action to the long economic waves, e.g. the Kondratieff cycles, ended inclusive mainly because of the lack of longitudinal data on collective action, it remains plausible that a given economic situation has an impact on the dominant themes of collective action. For example, Kerbo (1982) has distinguished between “movements of crisis” and “movements of affluence” – an approach that has been applied to the situation in East and West Germany in the early 1990s (Burchardt 2001) to explain differences in the organisation and repertoires of collective protest.

Fifth, collective action is influenced by a range of technical factors, especially means to travel, communicate and coordinate. To the extent that such means facilitate the mobilisation of large groups in large areas, collective action can reach transcend national and even continental boundaries. Whereas transnational meetings of groups in the 19th and much parts of the 20th centuries were relatively small and mostly included only delegates or leaders of formal associations (Rucht 2001; specifically for the women’s movement, see Rupp 1997), today’s transnational collective actions may attract several 10,000s or 100,000s of participants, including many members of the rank-and-file or people not affiliated to any organisations, as is the case with the World Social Forums taking place since 2001 (Sen et al. 2004; Juris 2008; Smith et al. 2008). In addition to relatively cheap and fast means of travelling, communication technologies, e.g. telephone, fax machines and especially the Internet, help to broaden and fasten mobilisation for collective actions across national borders. Accordingly, the number and size of genuine transnational non-governmental organisations have strongly increased in the last few decades (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Beyond the quantitative aspect, modern means of communication also facilitate qualitative developments. For example, television and video streams available at the World Wide Web help to diffuse innovative and successful protest tactics used by one group to other groups.

Considering these factors, one might assume that collective action in Europe underwent some profound changes particularly since some of the traditional societal cleavages (e.g. religious vs. secular, rural vs. urban and, to a lower extent, left vs. right) were mitigated; the technical means of communication and coordination improved considerably; and the EU became an increasingly important reference point for many political and societal actors. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the patterns and dynamics of collective action in Europe, both in a comparative perspective across European nations and regarding transnational collective actions.

6.3 Collective Action in Europe

When considering collective action in Europe, the dominant geographical perspective is usually a comparison of nation-states. This is particularly so when statistical data are used that, for the most part, are collected and computed as if states were the only, or at least the most relevant, units of analysis. Accordingly, it is difficult to quantitatively study certain social phenomena beyond and across political and legal entities which were of theoretical interest but rest on factors such as modes of agricultural production, cultural heritages and religious bonds. However, states do matter, particularly with regard to many policy-relevant activities whose context is shaped by legal and administrative rules. For better or worse, most of the data presented hereafter are based on nation-states as the central units of analysis and comparison. Hence Europe, even when subdivided into large geographic areas, is treated as an aggregate of nations and nation-specific patterns but not as a social and cultural entity in its own right or a conglomerate of specific entities based on non-legal commonalities.

6.3.1 *Some Notes on Long-Term Developments of Collective Action in Europe*

During the centuries since the late Middle Ages, collective action in Europe underwent enormous changes regarding its social carriers, claims, mobilisation structures and forms of action (see Louise Tilly 2001). Only some brief remarks can be made to illustrate several major changes.

European societies in the 16th and 17th centuries were basically agrarian societies in which, in terms of quantity, the rural population dominated by far. Accordingly, peasants and landless rural groups were the central carriers of collective action. For the most part, their actions aimed at securing economic survival (as expressed, for example, in food riots and tax revolts) but also elementary traditional rights once these were threatened or violated by secular and/or clerical powers. In addition, religious matters and corresponding forces played a central role as indicated, for example, by struggles and even civil wars between catholic and protestant groups and by the communal experiments of religious dissenters like the Anabaptists. Further, one has to mention the struggles of cities and city-states to gain or keep their autonomy vis-à-vis higher powers such as Kings or Bishops and

the defence of economic and other interests of the rising class of burghers located in the cities.³

In many respects, the French Revolution which, at a closer look, has to be understood as a series of events lasting over several years, represented a watershed in the history of collective action in Europe. It inspired similar, though for the most part less successful, activities in other countries up to the early 20th century. On both the factual and symbolic level, it marked the steep decline of the aristocracy and the rapid rise of the burghers as the economically and partly also politically dominant new force. But still, European societies, and especially East/Central European societies, were predominantly rural societies during the 18th and most of the 19th centuries. No wonder that rural and peasant collective actions continued in many parts of Europe – again, as earlier centuries, usually concentrating sharply in time and place (Rudé 1964). Besides rural collective action, the townsmen and burghers began to occupy a central place (Harrison 1988). The burghers and intellectuals were the major force for establishing modern representative democracies and gradually institutionalising human and civic rights. One important step in this context, for example, was the anti-Slavery mobilisation which soon was transformed into a transnational matter already around the mid-19th century.

Besides the progressive part of the bourgeoisie, the artisans, journeymen and, above all, the rapidly growing class of workers concentrated in the factories became the dominant carrier of collective action in Europe. In some occasions, the workers defended their genuine economic survival and interest in face of brutal capitalist exploitation, as exemplified by the struggle of Luddites and the machine-breakers. On other occasions, the workers also allied with the radical democrats of the bourgeois class to fight for political rights. Waves of strikes, revolts or revolutions marked only the tip of the iceberg consisting of many more but less spectacular collective actions of “the crowd” throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. This period, however, was also marked by other kinds of struggles, especially nationalist and secessionist mobilisation, anti-Semitism and other forms of racism. On the other hand, it was also a period of the emancipatory struggles of women’s movements claiming a broad range of rights from entering universities to universal suffrage, of a surge of the peace movement before and after World War Two and of the youth movement and a set of so-called life-reform movements proclaiming a “natural” and healthy life style.

Most notably in the first half of the 20th century, however, were the fascist movements that entered the historical stage in Europe (but also Japan). They were extremely successful in a number of countries (especially Germany, Italy and Spain) where they could seize power for quite some years. Unintentionally, the rise of fascism also contributed to strengthening left-wing mobilisation as long that the latter could not be fully repressed, as it was the case in Nazi-Germany.

Besides the student movements in the 1960s and the new social movements in the Western part of Europe from the 1970s to 1990s, it is also important the citizen movements in Central/Eastern countries in a surprisingly peaceful revolution were able to bring about the fall of communist regimes. This is another indicator of the historical power that social movements can assume in extraordinary moments of history, particularly in a period when the economy is weakening and the elites are divided or have lost their credibility.

Along with the changes of issues and social carriers of collective action also the very forms of action underwent significant changes (Tilly 1986). In cases of minor violations of their rights and demands, peasants and rural people staged symbolic acts of protest such as

³These struggles go back much earlier. See, for example, Cohn (2006).

rough music. In other cases, they submitted petitions to authorities and formal complaints to courts. In cases of severe violations or when moderate protest was ignored, rural people tended to resort to property destruction, violence and outright rebellion. With the rise of other social carriers and the shift of protest from the countryside to the cities, other forms of dissent were added to the protest repertoire, including barricades, demonstrations, boycotts and strikes.

In the 20th century, variations of existing or new forms were added: tactics of civil disobedience, vigils, tabling, guerrilla theatre, human chains, consumer boycotts, occupation of construction sites and hunger strikes, to mention just a few examples. As mentioned earlier, also a scale-shift of much collective action could be observed towards nation-wide and even transnational protests. This went hand in hand with the creation of informal and, more importantly, formal mobilisation structures including organisations that specialised on protest activity.

All in all, it appears that over the last few centuries the social carries, themes, organisational structures and forms of collective action became more diversified and richer. The relatively homogeneous social milieus that breded distinct conflicts and forms of protest gradually lost their profile. With the growing expansion and institutionalisation of rights in most European states, collective action became less oriented towards changing society as a whole but rather focussing on changes within a given society and polity (with the obvious exception of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe – Spain, Portugal, Greece – and in East/Central Europe). It also seems that advocacy protest by which relatively privileged groups defend the interest and rights of deprived other groups (e.g. homeless people, asylum seekers, poor people, indigenous people, children) are on the rise.

6.3.2 Recent Patterns of Collective Action and Political Participation in European Countries

In order to identify patterns and changes of collective action in European countries beyond mere impressions and case studies, we can basically rely on three kinds of sources: first, representative surveys in which the respondents provide information on their involvement in certain kinds of groups and/or activities; second, data on protest events, usually based on newspaper or newswire, occasionally also on police reports; third, data on associations and organisations which, however, are rarely available for cross-national comparison.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, representative surveys were the major source of studying levels and forms of political participation. These data suggest that, at least as far as Western European countries are concerned, there was a significant increase of political participation in Western most liberal democracies (Jennings and van Deth 1990; Dalton 2004, Norris 1999, 2002). Based on early indications, it was already in the first half of the 1980s when Kaase (1984) was observing a “participatory revolution” – a statement which is probably exaggerated. For the most recent years, it is interesting to investigate whether or not that increase in participation is slowing down or may even come to a halt. Also, it remains to see whether the early finding of Barnes et al. (1979) that conventional and unconventional political activities often go hand in hand is still valid today.

As mentioned in the introductory section, collective action may occur in strikingly different group contexts, ranging from very formal to very informal associations. In this regard, one can observe a remarkable change over the last few decades. It is widely noted in the literature and by political activists that formal, well-structured, and more or less

hierarchical organisations such as political parties and trade unions generally experience a decline in membership and recognition (Dalton et al. 1984; Norris 1997; Clark and Stewart 1998; Dalton 2006). This also becomes obvious in representative surveys, for example, the World Values Survey.

When considering changes in party membership from 1990 to 2000, this trend of declining membership is particularly salient in countries that were belonging to the former Soviet bloc (Bulgaria, East Germany, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia). In these cases, however, one has to take into account that party membership was de facto obligatory for people in certain professions or functions. Yet, a decline is also visible in a number of western European countries such as Finland, West Germany, Britain and Portugal (see Fig. 6.1).

A decline also can be observed for union membership which, in Central/Eastern Europe, has much to do with the fact that union membership was more or less obligatory for most workers and employees. The weighted average of trade union density, measured as the percentage of union members among the employed work force, was 34 percent in 1970, 32 percent in 1980, 27 percent in 1990 and 21 percent in 2000 in the aggregate of the OECD countries (OECD 2004: 145). Table 6.1 shows the trade union density in those European countries for which the OECD data are available.

The decreasing membership in trade unions and political parties is accompanied by a decline of voter turnout in many national elections but also elections of the European Parliament. In social science literature, this trend is widely recognised and documented (e.g., Norris 1997; Gray and Caul 2000). Largely, it is attributed to the dissolution of homogenous social milieus, to growing individualisation (and, according to some authors, growing egoism) and to structural changes in political and social organisations. These observations led in an earlier phase to the thesis of a decreasing “social capital” (Putnam 1995, 2000) with negative consequences for democracy as a whole. What has been overlooked, however, is the fact that a considerable proportion of the populace in Europe




Fig. 6.1 Party membership 1990 and 2000 in selected European countries (percentages)
Source: World Values Survey 1990 and European Values Survey 2000 (Weßels 2003).

Table 6.1 Trade union density in European countries, 1970–2000 (percentages)

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000	Change 1990–2000
<i>Country</i>					
Austria	63	57	47	37	–10
Belgium	41	54	54	56	2
Czech Republic	–	–	46	27	–19
Denmark	60	79	75	74	–1
Finland	51	69	72	76	4
France	22	18	10	10	0
Germany	32	35	31	25	–6
Greece	–	39	32	27	–5
Hungary	–	–	63	20	–43
Iceland	–	75	88	84	–4
Ireland	53	57	51	38	–13
Italy	37	50	39	35	–4
Luxembourg	47	52	50	34	–16
Netherlands	37	35	25	23	–2
Norway	57	58	59	54	–5
Poland	–	–	33	15	–18
Portugal	–	61	32	24	–8
Slovak Republic	–	–	57	36	–21
Spain	–	7	11	15	4
Sweden	68	80	80	79	–1
Switzerland	29	31	24	18	–6
Turkey	–	–	27	33	6
United Kingdom	45	51	39	31	–8
Unweighted average	46	50	45	38	–7

Source: OECD (2004).

and elsewhere is (increasingly) engaged in other kinds of groups, such as social movement organisations, protest networks and informal citizen initiatives. Partly because these engagements are more difficult to grasp and to measure (de Ulzurrun 2002), they have been neglected in the early writings on the decline of social capital and only taken into consideration more recently (Barry 1999; Norris 2002; Stolle and Hooghe 2004).

Table 6.2 provides figures on the proportion of people who are involved⁴ in trade unions, political parties and groups dealing with ecology, women's rights and peace. Still, involvement in trade unions is most frequent when compared to other groups. Yet there is also considerable engagement in groups focusing on ecology, women's rights and peace in quite a number of countries. As can be seen, women's groups attract fewer people than those engaged for ecology and peace. In interpreting these findings, it is important to note that many more groups than those listed in Table 6.2 would have to be taken into account when assessing the relative weight of political parties and trade unions on the one hand and other associations on the other hand.

When looking at people's involvement in the same kinds of groups over time, the above noted decline regarding trade unions and political parties becomes apparent, whereas the opposite holds for groups dealing with ecology, women's rights and peace (Fig. 6.2). Most striking, however, are the dramatic changes in most central/eastern European countries. By

⁴“Involvement” has been operationalised by the items “Belong to group” and/or “do unpaid work” for such a group.

Table 6.2 Involvement in political groups and social movement organisations in selected European countries

Country/region	Labour unions	Political parties	Conservation, environment, ecology, animal rights	Women's group	Peace movement
Austria	19.1	11.9	9.5	4.7	1.0
Belgium	15.0	5.5	7.7	9.2	2.1
Bulgaria	13.3	8.1	1.5	1.3	0.9
Belarus	39.0	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.1
Czech Republic	17.5	4.6	6.6	3.3	1.3
Denmark	48.1	6.6	9.0	1.9	1.5
Estonia	31.9	4.8	1.7	2.1	0.7
Finland	34.4	8.9	4.8	3.5	1.4
France	6.0	2.3	1.8	0.7	0.4
Germany	22.3	6.6	2.2	5.3	1.3
Greece	8.3	7.9	11.0	4.2	4.1
Hungary	19.4	2.1	1.9	0.7	0.4
Ireland	10.9	4.1	2.8	4.7	1.0
Italy	6.5	5.0	3.0	0.4	1.3
Latvia	30.5	9.7	0.7	0.6	0.7
Lithuania	22.2	4.7	0.8	1.5	0.4
Luxembourg	11.6	5.1	9.7	5.8	2.2
Malta	9.0	7.3	2.0	1.4	0.3
Netherlands	18.7	8.7	26.4	5.7	2.8
Norway	38.6	14.1	4.4	2.9	1.5
Poland	15.7	1.3	1.4	3.0	0.3
Portugal	3.5	2.9	0.9	0.1	0.6
Russian Fed.	40.1	5.4	0.7	1.3	0.5
Slovakia	19.0	5.0	2.6	5.8	0.9
Slovenia	18.1	3.1	3.3	1.1	0.4
Spain	4.1	2.0	1.7	1.2	0.9
Sweden	55.2	11.3	7.7	3.2	2.3
Switzerland	6.4	9.0	—	—	—
Turkey	1.7	3.5	0.2	0.2	0.1
Great Britain	14.2	4.2	3.4	3.5	0.9
Germany West	15.8	8.1	3.3	—	—
Northern Ireland	8.8	2.3	1.8	4.5	1.6

Source: Four waves of World Values Survey (1981–2004).

and large, membership in parties and trade unions has greatly declined, whereas involvement in peace groups and ecology groups has increased significantly. In most Western European countries, the changes are moderate. Sizeable increases of involvement are visible, for example, for peace groups in Germany and peace and ecology groups in the Netherlands.

While the data presented thus far inform about citizens' involvement in certain groups, they do not cover the kind of activities in which people take part. In this regard, we can again draw on the World Values Survey. In addition, we can use the European Social Survey which offers more reliable data (Newton and Giebler 2008: 3) but, until present, is only available for the years 2002 and 2004.

According to the most recent wave of the European Value Survey (conducted, depending on the country, between 1999 and 2004), we can first analyse how many people per




Fig. 6.2 Changes of involvement in political groups and social movement organisations in selected European countries (percentages)
 Source: World Values Survey, second (1989/1990) and fourth wave (1999–2004).

country participated in different kinds of “unconventional” political behaviours (Fig. 6.3). Across the board, signing a petition, i.e. the least demanding of the four kinds of action considered here,⁵ is fairly common in most of the countries under study, with particular high proportions in Sweden (87 percent), Great Britain (79), Belgium (69) and France

⁵The survey includes “Joining in boycotts” as another kind of action which, however, is neglected here for two reasons: First, to reduce the amount of information packed in one table and, second, because the meaning of joining a boycott is relatively vague. It may include not buying a certain product, hence a non-disruptive act, but also an illegal act, e.g. to refuse to pay taxes for political reasons.




Fig. 6.3 Participation in four kinds of “unconventional” action in selected European countries, 1999–2004
Source: World/European Social Survey, fourth wave (1999–2004).

(68), but relatively low shares in most Eastern European countries and especially in the Russian Federation (12).

Attending lawful demonstrations is less frequent, and again less frequent is participation in an unofficial strike (Fig. 6.3). Least comes occupying buildings or factories. Considering individual countries, Greeks lead in attending lawful demonstrations (48 percent), followed by the French (40). With respect to participation in unofficial strikes, Denmark (22 percent) and Finland (13) range on top. Finally, in terms of occupying buildings or factories, the Greeks stand out with a high percentage (27). Italians, though with a considerably lower percentage (8), come next. The mean for participation in unofficial strikes is 6.9 percent in

Western Europe and 3.4 percent in East/Central Europe. Regarding occupations, the mean is 4.5 percent in Western Europe and 1.1 percent in East/Central Europe.

In their detailed analysis of patterns of political and social participation in 22 nations, Newton and Giebler (2008) have demonstrated on the basis of the first wave of the European Social Survey that the level of participation is generally high, medium or low in given country, regardless which specific forms of participation are considered. In other words, there is generally a high correlation between these forms of participation on the aggregate level of countries (but not necessarily on the level of individuals). The authors also found that basically three groups of countries can be identified: the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Germany exhibiting high levels of participation; Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, Ireland and France ranging in the middle ground; and Southern and Eastern European countries exhibiting relatively low levels (*ibid.*). It is worth noting that this distribution in terms of levels of participation roughly corresponds to the distribution of postmaterialist values identified by Inglehart (1990). Moreover, as demonstrated in many other studies (e.g. Dalton 2004, 2006), this grouping of countries also suggests a positive correlation between levels of participation and levels of education.

In a further step, drawing again on the World Values Survey, we can look at changes of political engagement over time. Because in the four waves of the survey that have been conducted since 1981, different sets of countries were involved and, moreover, the number of countries for which data on forms of action are available was still low in the first wave ($N = 10$), the second and fourth wave offer the broadest comparative perspective. Since the percentages of participation in four forms of action were already displayed in Fig. 6.3, it suffices to document the increases or decreases per country (see Fig. 6.4). Similar to the involvement in groups (see Fig. 6.2), the biggest changes in “unconventional” political behaviour occurred in Central/Eastern European countries, generally exhibiting a decrease in participation regarding all or most forms of collective action. This trend is most pronounced in the Baltic states. However, because the reference period for the comparison was 1988/89, hence an extraordinary period of regime changes which were accompanied by a wave of collective action, we should be careful in interpreting the findings presented in Fig. 6.4 as a general trend. In most western European states an increase in involvement in these forms of collective action can be discerned. This is most salient in Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, France and Belgium.

Data displayed in Fig. 6.3 (based on the World Values Survey) cannot directly be compared to corresponding data from the European Social Survey for two reasons: First, respondents in the latter survey were asked about participation in different kinds of action *during the last 12 months* only. Second, partly different items were asked in the two surveys. For the European Social Survey, we used data from 2002 and 2004. Table 6.4 shows the percentages of those respondents who have participated in one or several kinds of “unconventional” actions. Because the questions regarding these activities referred only to the last 12 months, the percentages of those having signed a petition or attended a lawful demonstrations are significantly lower than in the data based on the World Values Survey. With respect to petitions, the European Social Survey reports high proportions for Sweden (48.7 percent), Norway and Switzerland, but very low percentages for Portugal and even lower ones for Greece (3 percent). Regarding participation in lawful demonstrations, Spaniards take by far the lead (34 percent), followed by Luxembourgers and French. On the bottom are Portugal (3.5 percent) and Finland (2 percent).

Because the time span between the two waves of the European Social Survey is only 2 years, it comes as no surprise that on the average changes over time remain small for both Western and Central/Eastern European countries (Table 6.3). Remarkable changes in an




Fig. 6.4 Changes in participation in four forms of “unconventional” actions, 1988/1989 and around 2002 (percentages)

Source: World Values Survey, second (1989/1990) and fourth wave (1999–2004).

Table 6.3 Participation in four forms of “unconventional” action in selected European countries, 2004 and difference to 2002 (percentages)

	Signed petition last 12 months		Boycotted certain products last 12 months		Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months		Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months	
	2004	Change to 2002	2004	Change to 2002	2004	Change to 2002	2004	Change to 2002
Western Europe								
Austria	24.7	-2.6	19.6	-1.9	8.8	0.9	6.6	-3
Belgium	22.0	-11.9	9.9	-2.9	5.2	-2.2	6.5	-1.9
Denmark	29.0	0.8	28.3	5.4	8.0	2.9	5.4	-2.9
Finland	25.6	1.6	29.3	2.5	14.2	-1.5	2.0	0
France	32.0	-	30.0	-	12.9	-	12.8	-
Germany	32.4	1.9	21.9	-4.2	4.4	-1.4	8.5	-2.1
Great Britain	35.5	-4.5	20.6	-5.5	7.5	-2.3	3.7	-0.7
Greece	3.0	1.8	5.1	-3.4	2.6	-0.1	5.0	0.5
Ireland	22.9	4.7	10.9	2.7	7.7	-1.7	5.9	-1.2
Luxembourg	20.8	-8.1	14.2	-1.7	5.6	0.4	14.8	6.1
Netherlands	23.5	1.1	8.3	-2.1	5.4	1.6	4.4	1.5
Norway	38.7	2.7	23.5	4.7	23.2	1	10.6	2.1
Portugal	4.6	-2.7	2.1	-1.3	2.5	-4	3.5	-0.8
Spain	24.7	0.5	14.0	6	11.6	1.8	34.0	16.5
Sweden	48.7	7.9	34.8	2.3	12.8	2.1	7.5	1.1
Switzerland	38.2	-1.2	24.9	-6.5	8.5	-0.9	8.8	-0.9
Mean	26.4	-1.2	16.2	-2.4	8.9	0.1	8.8	0.4
Central/Eastern Europe								
Czech Republic	13.6	-2.5	6.9	-3.5	4.6	-0.4	3.4	-1.2
Estonia	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.2	2.7	2.7	2.0	2
Hungary	6.3	2.1	5.2	0.4	1.4	-1.8	1.6	-2.1
Poland	9.3	2.4	5.0	1.4	3.8	0.9	1.6	0.3
Slovakia	25.4	-	11.5	-	5.2	-	3.7	3.7
Slovenia	5.7	-6.1	2.2	-2.9	1.9	-0.2	1.6	-1.1
Ukraine	9.5	-	1.8	-	13.4	-	21.7	-
Mean	9.7	0.9	5.2	-0.9	4.7	1.4	5.1	2

individual country, e.g. the decline in signing petitions in Belgium, may occur when there was a major campaign in the period prior to one but not the other survey.⁶ The direction of the changes does not exhibit a conclusive pattern in Western and Central/Eastern European countries. Thus we can conclude that in the aggregate there was no significant change in participation in the four activities considered here in the early 2000s.

Looking at the kind of people who participate in the above-specified groups and activities, a clear and consistent pattern emerges regarding the level of education. The more educated the people, the more they are involved in these activities. An analysis based on the fourth wave of the World Values Survey shows for all activities, and for both the average of Western and Central/Eastern European respondents, a strong correlation between engagement in unconventional action and educational level (Table 6.4). Regarding age, the data do not exhibit a consistent pattern. Yet when only regarding the most disruptive

⁶This was indeed the case in Belgium when the by far largest protest ever in this country took place because of the bad handling of spectacular criminal case by state authorities including the judiciary (Walgrave and Manssens 2000).

Table 6.4 Participation in four forms of “unconventional” action. West and East/Central Europe, 1999–2004

	Signing a petition		Attending lawful demonstrations		Joining unofficial strikes		Occupying buildings or factories	
	Have done		Have done		Have done		Have done	
	West Eu	East CEU	West Eu	East CEU	West Eu	East CEU	West Eu	East CEU
Educational level								
Low	41.7	14.9	17.1	8.8	5.8	2.1	2.5	1.4
Medium	56.8	25.2	26.0	13.2	7.2	2.3	3.9	1.0
High	73.5	39.4	43.7	19.8	8.9	3.8	6.6	2.2
Age group								
25 years	55.1	25.2	30.0	10.4	5.9	2.6	6.0	0.9
26-50 years	61.2	31.9	30.1	15.8	7.8	3.9	4.7	1.3
51+ years	49.4	27.3	22.5	15.9	6.2	3.5	3.0	1.6
Gender: female	55.0	28.4	24.0	12.7	5.0	2.8	3.8	0.9

Source: World Values Survey 1999–2004.

West Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.

East/Central Europe: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russian Federation, Ukraine.

among the range of five activities, namely “occupying buildings or factories”, a tendency of a greater participation of the youngest cohorts in Western Europe can be found. (For Central/Eastern Europe, the figures are too small to indicate a pattern.) This finding is in line with other analyses showing that predominantly young people are involved in disruptive and even more so in violent political actions. Finally, considering the sex of those participating in unconventional activities, a striking pattern can be observed. The more disruptive the activities, the lower the proportion of women who participate (Table 6.4). Women are overrepresented in signing a petition, but very rare among those joining unofficial strikes, and almost absent when buildings and factories are occupied. This gendered pattern holds not only for European countries but also for economically advanced countries outside of Europe (Canada, Israel, Japan, USA) and less developed countries ranging from Argentina to Uganda (data for these two groups of countries are not displayed here).

Another source for investigating the scope and patterns of collective action is protest event analysis based on newspaper or newswire reports (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Obviously, these data only reflect what is covered in these sources, hence what journalists consider to be newsworthy. Nevertheless, these data are useful because they reflect what the general public and the political decision-makers are confronted with. The many small and mostly local protests that are not reported remain unknown to the general public and therefore have no or little impact on the political agenda, let alone political decision-making. While protest event analysis, and its extension in the form of claims analysis including all kinds of public statements of both non-established and established political actors (Koopmans and Statham 1999), is an excellent tool for research, it is hardly available for cross-national analysis – with a few remarkable exceptions, however: first, the study of Kriesi et al. (1995) covering unconventional protest events in France, West Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland from 1975 to 1989; second, a study conducted in seven western

European countries⁷ focussing exclusively on environmental protest from 1988 to 1997 (Rootes 2003); third, a claims analysis focussing on the issue of immigration and xenophobia in five western European countries⁸ (Koopmans et al. 2005). In addition, there are two studies dealing with EU-related protest events based on Reuters newswire reports. The first analyses such events in France, Belgium and Germany from 1980 to 1995 (Reising 1999). The second study provides aggregate data on EU-related protests from 1984 to February 1998 (Imig and Tarrow 1999, 2000). Some results of these two studies will be presented in Section 6.3.3.

One interesting finding of the study on unconventional protest events in four western European countries is the different volume of protest activity by social movement and by country. In the period investigated, the so-called new social movements⁹ – here only presented as an aggregate of a set of more specific movements – made up the largest proportion (73.2) out of all protests in West Germany, followed by the Netherlands (65.4), Switzerland (61.0) and France (36.1). Among the remaining movements, regionalist movements were important in France (16.6 percent) and Switzerland (10.6 percent), whereas the labour movement was significant in France (10.1) and the Netherlands (9.2), but not so in Germany (4.3) and Switzerland (3.7) (Kriesi et al. 1995: 20). When controlling for population size, the capacity of social movements to mobilise varies considerably across countries. In the aggregate including strikes, France has the greatest mobilisation density. Next come Germany, then the Netherlands and Switzerland. When strikes are excluded, Germany ranges on top, whereas France falls back on the third position. Germany also leads regarding the mobilisation density of new social movements, whereas density is weakest in France.

The levels of environmental protests in seven European countries are difficult to compare because there is a suspicion that the underlying newspapers have different selection criteria resulting in biases. When looking at numbers of environmental protests over time, no overriding trend across countries can be identified. Regarding the forms of environmental protest in the aggregate of all seven countries, most protests are attributed to the categories of “conventional” and “demonstrative”. Confrontational protests are overrepresented in Britain and Germany, violent protests are overrepresented in Italy, followed by Britain (Rootes 2003: 242).

For Germany, detailed protest event data are available for the long period from 1950 to 1997 and, though based on a different source and for a reduced set of variables only, for 1993 to 2004. Figure 6.5 shows the yearly number of protests and protest participants by year until 1997. By and large, there is an increase of protest events over time, with peaks in the period of 1968–1969 at the height of the student movement, and in the 1990s when different kinds of movements including those of the extreme right flourished. It is important to take into account that these data include East Germany from 1989 onwards. So one should not overestimate the high level of protest from 1990 to 1997. In terms of participants, there exists considerable fluctuation due to the weight of some large-scale protests such as collection of signatures. Interestingly, the peak in numbers of protest in 1968–1969 is accompanied by an ebb in the number of participants in these

⁷Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden.

⁸Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland.

⁹To this category, one usually attributes movements concerned with peace, human, civil, women’s and gay rights, environmental protection, urban issues and Third World problems in the period since the 1960s/1970s. For an analysis of support to these movements in several European countries, see Fuchs and Rucht 1994.




Fig. 6.5 Number of protest events and protest participants in Germany*, 1950–1997
*including East Germany since 1999.

Source: Prodat/Rucht.

years. In other words, this period is marked by many but, on the average, rather small protests.

There are other noteworthy details on collective protest in Germany. For example, the proportion of violent protests is increasing over time, with its highest value in the period from 1990 to 1997 mainly because of right-wing and xenophobic activities. Another broader trend is the increasing role of informal groups and networks, and the decreasing proportion of formal organisations in protest participation. Political parties contribute with a share of around 10 percent in the aggregate of all protest events. In most cases, these are parties from the far right or far left. Another finding is that protest activity which tended to concentrate in the 19th century on particular social strata and milieus is gradually spreading to almost all social groups, including state employees (and even police) and groups that are economically privileged (e.g. medical doctors and aircraft pilots). Whether similar trends can also be observed in other countries remains an open question as long as comparable longitudinal data do not exist. However, I would speculate that Germany is not an outlier as far as the above-mentioned patterns are concerned.

Closer investigations of particular protest campaigns show an increasing sophistication and professionalisation of protest tactics. This is a trend that has been observed for the USA since a long time (McCarthy and Zald 1973). It also appears that the lobbying activities and the public relations work in which some social movement groups engage becomes increasingly professional. Finally, there are many signs that the forms of protest, with the obvious exception some forms bound to certain occupational groups (e.g. strikes) and probably violent actions, diffuse across different social groups – a process that Sidney Tarrow (1998: 29 ff.) has called the modularising of collective action. Acts of civil disobedience, once reserved for liberal and leftist groups, can also be found among right-wing activists. In some cases, leading state representatives spearheaded street demonstrations. And even protest symbols formerly reserved to the radical left, e.g. T-shirts with the portray of Che Guevara or the so-called Palestine scarves, can be found among right-wing extremists.

6.3.3 *Europeanisation from Below?*

The European Union and its precursors were largely an enterprise initiated and driven by political and partly economic elites. This process “from above” was relatively successful in building EU institutions as well as establishing and implementing EU policies in some areas. More recently, also the enlargement of the EU through the accession of Central/Eastern European countries was basically initiated and driven by the elites in these countries, though in most cases with the consent of, or at least the toleration by, the majority of the population.

Yet, this process of Europeanisation from above can neither be interpreted as an expression of collective action (as defined in the introductory section) nor seems to have a considerable impact on pro-European collective action from below. Regardless whether pro- or anti-European, only to the extent that civil society groups increasingly engage in European-wide activities and/or activities addressing matters of Europe, we could call this Europeanisation from below. This process, however, should not be equated with a general rise in collective action that may be unrelated to matters of Europe or the EU in particular. For example, when leaving aside the extraordinary mobilisations that led the revolutionary regime changes in Central/Eastern Europe in the 1980s, it seems that collective action in most Central/Eastern European countries is on the rise but, thus far, largely unrelated to EU or other transnational matters. While there are some collective actions that are clearly influenced by transnational contacts such as the gay parades taking place in Poland since 2004, most other protest events in Poland focus on domestic issues. This is all the more true for a country such as Russia where a considerable part of collective mobilisation is devoted to acquire or to safeguard the rights of oppositional politics, and where links to protest groups in other countries are rare.

Although there was, and still is, a number of pro-European associations of citizens, these, apart from some symbolic actions, have been marginal when compared to the rise of eurosceptic groups (see, e.g. Taggart 1998 and www.eurosceptic.com). The latter successfully mobilised in a few countries and were able to slow down or curb the process of European integration, as it could be observed in the wake of various referenda. No wonder that EU institutions are increasingly worried about an actual or potential lack of legitimacy and therefore made some efforts to (re-)gain the support of the citizenry.¹⁰ Thus far, however, the call for the activation and inclusion of “civil society” in the process of European integration (see European Commission 2001) resulted in symbolic rather than substantial activities, as illustrated by the debates around European constitution as well as a call by José Manuel Barroso urging for “Eurooptimism” in a speech held in France (Cordis Newsletter Focus, September 2006, no. 270).

Nevertheless, EU institutions are a significant reference point for or a direct target of collective action in member states, though with great variation from country to country and across policy domains. Some of this EU-related activity crystallises in lobby activities in both the nation-states and in Brussels (Pedler 2002; van Schendelen 2006). This aspect is neglected here. Other activities, ranging from the local to the EU level, publicly address institutions and policies of the EU.

Protest event analysis allows to investigate to which extent collective action is geared towards the EU and whether this changes over time. The evidence presented so far does, if at all, only indicate a weak trend towards the Europeanisation of collective action in terms

¹⁰Schmitter and Trechsel (2004).

of (a) the EU as the final addressee; (b) problems related to the EU; and (c) cross-border mobilisation in the EU.

Imig and Tarrow (1999, 2000), based on newswire reports, identify a modest trend towards Europeanisation by using a vague criterion (protests “surrounding the EU”). The results of their two studies (having a non-identical time frame and a non-identical unit of analysis) differ in details but show that the proportion of EU-related protests is small (within the range of 4 percent or less). Reising (1999), also using Reuters newswire reports for identifying EU-related protests in three countries, did not find a consistent trend towards the Europeanisation of protest. While in France and Germany numbers were increasing, rather the opposite was found in Belgium. Rucht (2002), based on protest data for Germany covering the period from 1950 to 1994 (and later to 1997), was unable to find indications for the Europeanisation of protest in terms of the addressee, the geographical scope of the problem or cross-national mobilisation (Fig. 6.6).

These data indicate that the extent and pace of Europeanisation from below tend to be overestimated by most observers. A closer investigation, however, might show that such a trend is observable in some countries and regarding some policy domains, e.g. environmental policies. Yet even in traditional policy domains such as labour, Europeanisation from below is marginal though genuine EU-wide associations, for example, the European Trade Union Federation, are in place since decades. In this case, common action is restricted because of different ideological lines and hardly compatible organisational structures and cultures of nation-wide trade unions which, in addition, provide few resources for their European umbrella organisation (Abbott 1997; Taylor and Mathers 2004).

Europeanisation from below is probably most developed in EU-lobbying structures. At least in Brussels, associations that are usually prone to collective action in their domestic context devote more energy to lobbying than public protest (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1997; Rucht 2002). Regarding the Global Justice Movements in Europe, international institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank, G8, etc.) seem to be a more important reference point than European institutions. However, in several instances EU summits became a target of large-scale protest, as it could be seen especially in the meetings in Nice (2000), Gothenburg (2001) and Barcelona (2002). Yet in general, mobilisation from below hardly




Fig. 6.6 Geographical scope of protest mobilisation in Germany, 1950–1997 (percentages)
Source: Prodat/Rucht.

did have an effect on EU institution-building but strikingly differential effects on various policy domains. Eurosceptic and anti-European mobilisation thus far did delay but not stop the process of European integration. But to the extent that this potential for Eurosceptic mobilisation is growing, it may have negative effects on further steps of European integration. It is unlikely, however, that these forces will be powerful enough to cause a rollback of European integration. They might experience a temporal surge but, for the most part, they lack the support of political and economic elites on both the domestic and the European level. Moreover, as long as euroscepticism remains within the confines of single nation-states, it has little chances to influence the process of Europeanisation as whole. And if euroscepticism mobilises across borders, it might contribute unwillingly and paradoxically to a growing Europeanisation in the way how ordinary people perceive their problems, who they should target and how they might exert political pressure. After all, eurosceptic groups try to “keeping alive the debate on European integration, its benefits and drawbacks” and “connecting the various groups and web sites that are part of the resistance to European federalisation” (<http://www.euro-sceptic.org/about.asp>).

6.3.4 Is There a European Pattern of Collective Action?

This question is difficult to answer because reliable data are lacking. Thus far, it seems that there is large variation across and within the EU countries and probably more so in Europe at large. This applies, for instance, to the relative weight of issues, levels of mobilisation, distribution of forms of action and timing and geographical scope of collective action in general and protest more specifically. Just consider a few examples. Regionalist issues play a role in certain areas (e.g. Northern Ireland, Basque country) but not in others. In the aggregate, the levels of collective mobilisation are generally high in countries like Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands but significantly lower in Greece, Portugal, and the Irish Republic. New social movements are strong in Germany but weak in France, while strike activity is relatively high in France but low in Germany. Violent protest activity by right-extremists is frequent in Germany but relatively rare in a number of other European countries, among these countries in which right-wing parties had considerable electoral success. Disruptive protest activity by farmers is more frequent in France and Spain than say, in Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries.

Given the strong impact of cultural traditions as well as nation-specific political opportunities, it is likely that many of these differences will remain in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, one should not overemphasise such differences. While cross-national variations tend to be highly obtrusive from a close and/or internal perspective, they are likely to become smaller when the angle is widened and more and strikingly different cases are included in the comparison. Imagine a traveller from central Africa or China visiting several European countries. He or she is usually much more aware of differences between his/her home country and these countries as a whole group than differences between European countries. Compared to Latin America and Africa, collective action in Europe appears to be more regulated, institutionally channelled, stronger based on middle classes and less disruptive. Compared to Asia, it is difficult to make general assumptions because there are huge differences in the levels and forms of participation across countries. Some countries come closer to Western patterns (e.g. Japan); others exhibit considerable levels of disruptive and violent actions (including ongoing civil wars; e.g. the Philippines); still others relatively successfully suppress oppositional activities (North Korea). But note

that even a country like China with an authoritarian government acts of collective dissidence have considerably increased in the last two decades. Finally, when compared to the USA, European collective action seems to be more ideology-driven, more bound to the left/right-cleavage, and more oriented towards, and carried out by, political parties. These, however, are broad impressions that would require further analysis. It is also an open question of whether these broad cross-continental differences are predominantly the result of deeply anchored cultural traditions or of different political opportunity structures.

6.4 Summary and Conclusion

Collective action in Europe has a long history in which different forms and different social carriers prevailed in different periods. When considering social movements only, workers movements were especially prominent in the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries; fascist movements in the 1930s and 1940s, though only in some countries; student movements in the second half of the 1960s; new social movements from the 1970s to the 1990s, and citizen's movement in Eastern/Central Europe in the late 1980s. In general, however, it seems that the social movement sector in Europe become more and more variegated and diversified so that it is hard to identify a dominant movement in the last few years. With the erosion of distinct and durable social milieus and of traditional cleavages engagement in collective action becomes more contingent and more flexible, depending on an individual's current biographical, occupational and other status, but also on particular constellations of societal problems, powers and political opportunities.

Collective action in Europe is widespread and still seems to increase, though probably at a slower pace in recent years than several decades ago. Relative to earlier forms of collective action based on broad and encompassing identities (peasants, workers, etc.), recent and contemporary collective action in Europe has partly shifted from the sphere of production to that of reproduction. Particularly when compared to largely institutionalised action within the framework of more formal organisations such as trade unions and political parties, informal citizen initiatives, networks and social movements seem to be on the rise.

Also the forms of collective action have changed over time. They became more campaign-oriented, differentiated, specialised and professionalised. Moreover, specific forms of protest that once were bound to particular social groups have become increasingly "modular" and de-contextualised so that they can be used by different groups with different claims in different places. Also, "conventional" and "unconventional" forms of collective action are likely to be combined by the same individuals or groups.

Activities of social movements and protest groups attract significant proportions of the populace (Rucht 2007). They gradually diffuse to almost all social strata, including even medical doctors or state employees who were hardly involved in such groups and activities several decades ago. Unlike in earlier centuries, these kinds of activities are widely considered to be a "normal" and "rational" way of putting particular themes and claims on the public agenda (Lipsky 1968; Etzioni 1970; Fuchs 1991; van Aelst and Walgrave 2001) and, as the collective actors hope, ultimately on the agenda of political decision-makers.

Considering the density of associational life, the overall extent of collective action and, more specifically, protest activity, large differences between European countries do exist and are likely to persist in the foreseeable future. By and large, publicly visible collective action appears to be more frequent in Western (including Southern and Northern) Europe

than in Central/Eastern Europe. This probably reflects the relatively weak infrastructure of civil society in the latter countries. Also, it seems to be related to postmaterialist values and concerns that are less important in Eastern and Central Europe. Within Western Europe, collective action tends to be more moderate and institutionally mediated in Scandinavian countries than in other West European countries. Yet even within a given country, significant regional differences can be observed in the amount, content and forms of collective action, as the example of the Basque country demonstrates when compared to the rest of Spain (Casquete 2003).

Contrary to the fancy talk about globalisation and Europeanisation, collective action still remains largely within the boundaries of the nation-state (Tarrow 1995: 231; Kriesi 1999: 422 f.). EU institutions, despite their increasing competencies, are still a relatively marginal reference point for collective action, though significant differences across policy domains do exist. For example, it appears that farmer associations target EU institutions, relative to national institutions, more intensively and frequently than groups fighting for women's rights and immigrant rights. On the other hand, cross-national networking is probably more common among the latter groups (Mazey 1998; Geddes 2000; Guiraudon 2001) than among farmer associations, especially because it is difficult to represent diffuse interests in the EU policy process (Pollack 1997; Lahusen 2004). These differences might be explained by the partially competitive nature of agricultural production and distribution of subsidies as opposed to the universalist values and approaches of groups supporting immigrants or defending diffuse interests. However, even in the domain of environmental protection where the competencies of the EU are significant and competition between non-governmental groups is low, the differences in mobilisation structures and collective actions across nations tend to persist (Rootes 2003). Very likely the patterns of contemporary collective action in Europe continue to be shaped predominantly by nation-specific and even sub-national structures (Tarrow 2006). A large part of collective action in Europe remains on the sub-national level with regard to both the issues that are addressed and the territorial scope of mobilisation.

Thus far, there are few signs of a growing convergence in the amount and forms of collective action in Europe in the past two or three decades. In addition, differences in the properties of the collective actors are likely to remain with regard to ideological tendencies, organisational structures and cultures, resources, etc. In some areas, however, transnational collective action is gaining ground (mainly in "soft policies" such as human rights, immigration, women's rights). Especially in these domains, the European Union tends to encourage and sometimes even fund non-state collective actors, thus providing a new or an additional opportunity structure. In general, however, the actual role of the EU in shaping European societies is not yet adequately reflected in a corresponding structure of collective action. This, however, might change in the future for various reasons. First, the actual impact of EU policy-making on European societies will gradually become recognised by the wider populace because EU policies will more and more impact on their daily lives. Second, with the gradual extension of the competencies of the European Parliament, the practise of the majority rule in the European Commission and the growing visibility of conflicts of interest between EU member states, the EU will be perceived as a set of political bodies rather than a bureaucratic apparatus. In a similar way as the building of nation-states fuelled the "nationalisation" of conflicts, Europeanisation at the institutional level is likely to foster the Europeanisation of collective action. This process may imply both a growing convergence and synchronisation of the issues that are domestically discussed and an increase in transnational mobilisation of interest groups and social movements. Third, collective mobilisation across borders, even when directed against further

Table 6.5 Volume of participation in unconventional events by movements (1975–1989), in 1,000s per million inhabitants

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
New social movements*	43	168	143	101
Student movement	23	4	7	0
Foreigners	1	2	3	8
Regionalist movement	4	0	0	11
Education	62	2	2	0
Labour movement	33	19	19	15
Other mobilisation	12	16	24	21
Total not new social movements	135	43	55	55
All mobilisations	178	211	198	156
N (events)	(2.076)	(2.229)	(1.264)	(1.027)
Strikes	225	37	23	2
Total	403	248	221	158

Source: Kriesi et al. (1995: 22).

* comprised of the items nuclear weapons, other peace movement, nuclear energy, ecology movement, antiracism, other solidarity movement, squatter's movement, other countercultural, homosexual movement, women's movement.

European integration, will become facilitated by the growing availability and use of modern means of transport and communication and, last but not least, by the growing command of the English language by citizens all over Europe. Taken together, these developments will contribute to the formation of a European public which, thus far, is almost absent. And to the extent that a European public is emerging, it will, in turn, facilitate cross-national action within Europe.

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Chapter 7

Crime and Justice

Rosemary Barberet and Matti Joutsen

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines trends in crime and criminal justice in Europe, the nature of European criminology and the research topics of interest to criminologists who study European societies. It is highly ironic that although criminology as a discipline clearly stems from the European intellectual tradition, present-day European criminology struggles for its own identity and recognition. This chapter therefore examines current issues in European criminology as framed by the history of the discipline in Europe and its subsequent development across the Atlantic. We will also contextualize this chapter by discussing crime and criminal justice in Europe as influenced by trends and pressures towards convergence or divergence.

7.2 Historical Antecedents of European Criminology

Criminologists have long recognized that the ideas of three great European social theorists, Durkheim, Marx and Weber, lay the foundations for criminology and criminal justice. Although none of these scholars called himself a criminologist, each one's concepts and theories would prove integral to a sociological criminology. Durkheim's seminal ideas on social change and crime, on the collective conscience and the function of deviance in society, on the search for patterns and correlates of crime and on the value of comparative research helped to wrestle criminology from biology and psychiatry and create a multidisciplinary social science. Marx's writings on oppression, exploitation, alienation and false consciousness would provide the intellectual stimulus for radical criminology in the 1960s. And Weber's theoretical work on the formal rationalization of law and within that, bureaucracies, would provide the framework for much modern research on the organization of the police and other socio-legal institutions.

Along with the aforementioned European scholars, also others deserve our attention. No introductory criminology text or course anywhere in the world can forego mentioning Beccaria, Bentham, Lombroso, Tarde, Guerry and Quetelet, who were among those who shaped the contours of the discipline through their contributions to the classical and positivist schools of criminology. Modern criminology still draws deeply from these eminent

R. Barberet (✉)
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA
e-mail: rbarberet@jjay.cuny.edu

European theorists. The work of the classical theorists is considered fundamental to the establishment of just and humane criminal justice systems, as well as to modern rational choice theories of crime which conceive offender decision-making as a cost–benefit analysis. Lombroso’s voluminous positivist work, later pursued in various forms by his students Enrico Ferri and Raffaele Garofalo, is credited with establishing criminology as a science and still provokes reinterpretation among criminologists today (Lombroso et al., 2004; Rafter, 2005). Adolphe Quetelet, a Belgian mathematician, and André-Michel Guerry, a French jurist, began the “cartographic school of criminology” that used data and statistics to examine correlates of crime – what they called moral statistics. Their methods were the basis for those used by the Chicago School of Criminology in the early 20th century and by current crime mapping analysts. Gabriel Tarde, a French sociologist, criminologist and social psychologist, was the forerunner of modern learning theory in criminology, through his work that was critical of Lombroso’s biological positivism and stressed the social nature of crime.

However, although the contributions of these 18th and 19th century European scholars are not disputed, few criminologists have investigated the extent to which these contributions can really be considered *European Criminology*. There is little if any mention in any of these seminal works of a European consciousness or a European identity as a framework for analysis. During this period, Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Toqueville’s comparative work, *On the Penitentiary System in the United States and its Application in France* (1833), is probably the most notable work in criminal justice that shows the most European consciousness.

The criminological contributions from Europe have been less defined from the post-World War II era until the present day and not as voluminous as those from the United States, where sociology and criminology blossomed after World War II. This has much to do with the devastating impact of the two world wars upon European academia, namely, the persecution and exile of critical scholars under authoritarian regimes, the weakening of the social sciences, the use of criminological positivism to frame Nazi ideology (van Stokkom, 2001), and the huge popularity and growth of sociology and criminology in their developments largely across the Atlantic and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom. Schneider (2001, p. 331) argues that early 20th century European criminology, as reflected in the founding of the International Society of Criminology in 1934 by the Italian clinical criminologist Benigno Di Tullio, concentrated too much on Europe and on the perspectives of criminal law and psychiatry. He concludes that “American criminology is at present the market leader in the world” (p. 332). Thus, a main feature of 20th century European criminology has been the dominance of theories, methods and findings from the United States and the Anglo-American world, transposed uncritically onto the European crime and justice landscape (Tham, 2001; Killias, 2001).

7.3 Current Developments in European Criminology

Early efforts to foster a truly interdisciplinary, empirical but policy-oriented criminology in Europe in the 20th century were undertaken by the Council of Europe’s Criminological Scientific Council. The Criminological Scientific Council was set up by a decision of the Committee of Ministers adopted at the 106th meeting of its deputies in 1961. It was made up of seven members elected by the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) for a term of 4 years. It acted as an advisory body to the CDPC with a view to preparing

and implementing the Council of Europe program in the field of crime problems. The CSC was involved in the organization of the Criminological Research Conferences and criminological colloquia, as well as in studies and research in the field of crime problems and criminology. Budget limitations made the council inactive as of 2005, and it held its last meeting in 2004.

In conjunction with the encouragement of criminology by the Council of Europe, spurred by the politics of the European Union, including funding for comparative European research, and the advent of newly gathered comparative crime data sources, a renewed interest in European criminology surfaced in the 1990s, culminating in the founding of the European Society of Criminology in 2000, which attracts annually over 500 scholars to its annual conference, sponsors a new journal, the *European Journal of Criminology*, and advocates in general for the recognition of the discipline in Europe. Accompanying this interest for scholarly promotion and exchange is a new area of research for criminologists on European criminal justice, i.e. supranational attempts by the European Union to harmonize legislation, advance cross-border policing and judicial cooperation and coordinate responses to cross-border crime and terrorism.

In 2001, one of the more longstanding journals of criminology in Europe, the *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, devoted an entire issue to reflections on the nature of European criminology. The editors commissioned a large number of essays and articles on this topic to discern the identity of such a criminology and its aims and objectives for the future. A number of themes emerged. The first theme is a realization that European criminology has been under the dominance of criminology from the United States for too long and that unfortunately, most European criminologists know more about crime and criminology in the United States than in their neighbouring European countries (Killias, 2001; Tham, 2001). Walgrave cites the new European awareness in criminology as part of a “global emancipation movement away from the American dominance” (2001, p. 349). Besides this realization of American dominance, there is the realization that crime phenomena and criminal justice in the United States are no longer representative of the world, but rather of a nation that is becoming an outlier: American exceptionalism in a truly negative sense. As evidence, Walgrave (2001, p. 350) cites the death penalty, repressive penal policies, lax gun control, gangs, private prisons, strained racial and ethnic relations, materialism and a weaker social welfare system. Newburn (2002) referring to the United Kingdom and Wacquant (cited in Newburn, 2002), referring to France, are more cynical: what may seem now like a distant dystopia (criminal justice practices in the United States) may be what the future holds for some European countries.

The second theme is the heterogeneous nature of current European criminology, which is more like a sum of national criminologies, due to differing legal traditions, culture, historical antecedents, ideologies and language divisions (Killias, 2001, p. 327), and the subsequent need for comparative data and comparative research (Junger-Tas, 2001). Given this heretogeneity, it is no surprise that much of the foundational work of European criminologists has been to develop comparative data sources.

7.4 Development of European Data Sources

Although international crime data sources such as Interpol and the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems date back to 1950 and 1977, respectively, the push to develop comparative crime data sources in Europe

specifically started in the 1980s and was largely managed by criminologists, supported by a variety of national or intergovernmental bodies. In 1987, criminologists from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland met to plan the first International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), which sampled from many European countries. The ICVS has been repeated five times and respondents have been sampled from 78 countries in the world. Most recently, a special European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS) has been conducted by an European consortium comprising Gallup, UNICRI, the Max Planck Institute, CEPS/INSTEAD, and GeoX Ltd. and co-funded by the European Commission. The survey was carried out in the 15 “old” member states of the European Union (essentially Western Europe) plus Poland, Hungary and Estonia.

The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, originally a compendium elaborated by a Criminological Scientific Council established by the Council of Europe, commenced in 1996 and produces official crime data which has been checked by national experts for its comparative validity and reliability. Thirty-nine countries participate in this effort (see Aebi et al., 2006). A fourth edition of the sourcebook will be published in 2009. European Sourcebook methodology and selected aggregate figures are summarized in recent publications by Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union (Tavares and Thomas, 2008).

SPACE, the prison data set sponsored by the Council of Europe, was developed by Pierre Tournier from France in 1983 and as of 2002 has been maintained by Marcelo Aebi at the University of Lausanne. A similar effort to gather comparative prison data has been undertaken by the International Centre for Prison Studies at Kings College London via the World Prison Brief, since 2000 (see Walmsley, 2007).

Despite increased interest in the gathering and analysis of European crime data, there is no European crime observatory similar to the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), in Lisbon, Portugal. The closest thing to a European crime observatory is HEUNI, the United Nations-affiliated European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, located in Helsinki, Finland, since its creation in 1981. HEUNI has conducted comparative research in Europe not only on specific issues ranging from victimization to prison use, but regularly produces reports providing basic data on crime trends and the operation of criminal justice systems in almost all European countries (Aromaa and Heiskanen, 2008).

7.5 Current Crime Situation in Europe

From 1995 to 2006, general trends in recorded crime in European countries with available data reflect that robbery, violent crime and drug trafficking have featured increasingly in the police records, whereas domestic burglary and motor vehicle thefts less frequently. Homicide rates in selected European countries averaged 1.5 per 100,000 in population for the 2004–2006 period, with the highest rates in Estonia and Lithuania and the lowest in Austria, Malta and Germany. Prison populations in Europe have generally risen since 1995 and now average 124 prisoners per 100,000 in population in the 2004–2006 period (Tavares and Thomas, 2008).

Somewhat in contrast, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), including recent European data from the European Survey of Crime and Safety (EU ICS), show victimization rates in Europe peaking in the 1990s and falling since then. This finding can be applied to burglary, theft, robbery and assault in the 15 “old” EU countries plus Hungary,

Estonia and Poland, except Ireland and possibly Belgium. This fall in crime parallels trends in Canada, Australia and the United States. Overall victimization rates for 10 common offences were highest in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Estonia, the Netherlands and Denmark. They were lowest in Spain, Hungary, Portugal, France and Austria. On average, 15% of the European sample, aged 18 or more, was victimized once or more in the year preceding the survey (Dijk et al., 2007) (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Victimization in the year preceding the survey (percentage victimized once or more)

Country	Year of the Survey	Ten Crimes
Austria	1996	13.9
	2005	12.2
Belgium	1989	13.4
	1992	15.2
	2000	17.5
	2005	17.8
Denmark	2000	20.6
	2005	19.3
Estonia	1993	27.6
	1995	28.3
	1999	26.0
	2004	20.2
Finland	1989	13.0
	1992	17.2
	1996	16.2
	2000	16.6
	2005	12.7
France	1989	16.4
	1996	20.8
	2000	17.2
	2005	12.0
Germany (b)	1989	16.6
	2005	13.1
Greece	2005	12.3
Hungary	2005	10.0
Ireland	2005	22.1
Italy	1992	20.3
	2005	12.6
Luxembourg	2005	12.7
Netherlands	1989	21.9
	1992	25.7
	1996	26.0
	2000	20.2
	2005	19.8
Poland	1992	24.6
	1996	20.5
	2000	19.1
	2004	15.0
Portugal	2000	11.3
	2005	10.4
Spain	1989	21.8
	2005	9.0
Sweden	1992	18.7
	1996	22.0
	2000	22.6
	2005	16.2

Table 7.1 (continued)

Country	Year of the Survey	Ten Crimes
United Kingdom ^b	1989	15.0
	1992	23.9
	1996	24.7
	2000	21.6
	2005	21.0
Average (*)	1989	16.9
	1992	21.6
	1996	21.6
	2000	19.3
	2005	14.9

^bWest Germany in 1989.

^cEngland and Wales in 1992.

*Averages are computed on all countries taking part in each sweep. As countries included vary across sweeps, comparisons should be made cautiously.

Source: EU ICS (Dijk et al.)

Public insecurity about crime, particularly street crime, has not lessened and levels of crime prevention self-help, such as the installation of locks and burglar alarms, has increased. Public anxiety about crime was measured through two survey questions, one on the risk of being a burglary victim in the year following the survey and one about feelings of safety on the street in the local area of the respondent. For the first question, southern Europeans were the most pessimistic and Scandinavians the least pessimistic. On average, 30% of those surveyed saw the probability of experiencing a burglary as likely or very likely. For the second question, on average 30% of those surveyed feel unsafe or very unsafe on the streets after dark in their local area. As concerns crime prevention, the prevalence of burglar alarms is much higher in Ireland and the United Kingdom (50–60% of households) than elsewhere. Specifically, only around 10% of households have burglar alarms in Spain, Denmark, Finland, Estonia and Poland (Dijk et al., 2007).

Punitive attitudes towards offenders in Europe appear to have declined but remain strong in the United Kingdom. The ICVS and the EU-ICS measure public punitiveness by asking respondents to choose a sentence for a burglary of a colour television set by a 21-year-old with one prior conviction for burglary. Nearly half the respondents of the EU-ICS preferred a community service sentence and 25% a prison sentence. Respondents in Estonia, Hungary, the United Kingdom and Ireland were most likely to favour imprisonment. Specifically, more than half of UK respondents preferred a prison sentence. Imprisonment was least favoured among respondents from Portugal, France, Austria and Finland (Dijk et al., 2007). Table 7.2 lists incarceration rates for European countries, and the data somewhat agree with the EU-ICS data on public punitiveness. Incarceration rates are generally higher in Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom and lower in Scandinavia.

EU ICS respondents were asked about their experiences with hate crimes – those crimes motivated by hatred against minorities. Levels were highest in France, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. The lowest levels were noted for Italy, Portugal, Greece and Austria. On average, 10 % of immigrants and 15% of those immigrants who consider themselves to be religious in the European Union reported having been victimized once or more by a “hate crime” in 2004.

The EU ICS asked respondents whether they had been requested to pay bribes to public officials over the course of the past year. Bribe-seeking was most prevalent among respondents of Greece, Poland, Hungary and Estonia and least common in Finland, the United

Table 7.2 Situation of penal institutions on 1 September 2006 by decreasing prison population rates (adjusted figures)

Country	Total number of prisoners (including pre-trial detainees)	Prison population rate per 100,000 inhabitants	Change 2000–2006 evolution (in percentage) of prison population rates between 2000 and 2006
Russian Federation	853857	595.5	
Ukraine	162825	349.7	
Estonia	4207	314.0	–1.9
Georgia	13236	298.6	
Latvia	6397	279.5	–19.2
Poland	88647	232.4	37.5
Lithuania	7895	231.7	–1.2
Moldova	8605	224.5	
Azerbaijan	17698	210.5	
Armenia	5649	187.7	
Czech Republic	17074	167.6	–15.2
Luxembourg	755	163.6	81.0
Bulgaria	12130	157.7	38.1
Slovakia	8312	154.3	
Romania	32994	153.2	–24.5
Hungary	15096	150.1	–1.9
UK: England and Wales	77982	145.1	17.0
UK: Scotland	7192	140.6	
Spain	58922	134.3	28.2
Monaco	37	113.5	
Albania	3540	111.6	181.5
Portugal	11602	109.7	
Serbia	7878	105.1	
Austria	8285	99.5	26.9
The FYRO Macedonia	2003	98.4	45.0
Belgium	9400	90.1	12.9
France	56615	89.6	14.3
Germany	71469	86.5	
UK: Northern Ireland	1470	84.4	
Greece	9328	83.9	19.3
Croatia	3752	82.4	89.5
Netherlands	12774	78.0	38.6
Sweden	7005	77.2	23.3
Turkey	56810	76.9	–16.6
Switzerland	5525	74.1	–11.5
Malta	292	72.1	
Ireland	3032	71.8	–2.8
Finland	3714	70.6	35.0
Denmark	3759	69.2	12.6
Norway	3164	67.8	14.9
Slovenia	1271	63.5	13.5
BH: Republica Srpska	936	63.4	
Italy	36943	62.9	–29.7
Cyprus	436	(51.6)	
Andorra	30	40.4	
Iceland	119	39.9	37.5
Liechtenstein	9	(25.8)	
San Marino	1	(3.3)	
BH: BIH (state level)	18	...	

Reference: Council of Europe, SPACE 2006,1.3A

Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands and Ireland. These results are roughly in line with the rankings on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (Transparency International, 2004). In that ranking, all European countries are in the top half of the listing (i.e. least corrupt). The highest ranked are Finland, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The lowest ranked are the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland.

According to victimized respondents, about 60% of serious crimes were reported to the police. Victims were also queried as to their opinion of treatment by the police. The judgements of crime victims showed considerable variation, with opinions being least favourable in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Portugal and most favourable in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden and Germany.

All respondents were asked to judge the performance of their local police in controlling crime. In most countries ratings of police performance showed slight improvements compared to the findings of previous polls. Opinions were most negative of the police in Poland and Estonia and most positive in Finland, Denmark, Austria and Ireland.

As concerns domestic violence, an International Violence Against Women Survey (Johnson et al., 2007) was conducted in countries including such European ones as the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland and Switzerland. Rates of intimate partner violence varied widely and for the aforementioned countries were highest in the Czech Republic (37% of women reported any violence, with 35% reporting physical violence and 11% reporting sexual violence) and lowest in Switzerland (10% reporting any violence, 9% reporting physical violence and 3% reporting sexual violence). Rates for reporting violence to the police varied as well: while 31% of victims reported the violence to the police in Poland, many fewer did so in Denmark (12%) and the Czech Republic (8%).

7.6 Explanations


There has been relatively little work done on explaining crime trends in Europe. There are essentially two tasks at hand: (1) explaining the variation among European countries and (2) explaining the trend over time of a drop-off in crime.

The EU ICS discusses both of these issues. First, in explaining the variation among European countries, it discredits economic wealth or economic inequality as a correlate of crime since the data show great variation on these lines among both high-crime and low-crime countries (Dijk et al., 2007, p. 21). The report gives some credibility to urbanization. More urbanized European countries have higher crime rates. The report also considers the proportion of young people in a country's population, which it found to be statistically insignificant in relation to crime.

Second, in explaining the drop off in crime from the mid-1990s to the present, the EU ICS report examines demographics, better crime prevention methods used by citizens and stronger deterrence as evidenced by hard line policing methods and punitive sentencing patterns. Indeed, from that time period to the present, the proportion of adolescents in the population in Europe has decreased. And crime prevention methods – the universal growth in the possession of private security measures by households and companies – offer another plausible explanation. According to the EU ICS authors, there is little evidence that punitive sentencing policies are responsible for the drop in crime. They have not been uniformly adopted across Europe and thus do not explain the drop in crime (Dijk et al., 2007, p. 24). Killias et al. (2000) examined several American theories to see if they applied to European data as well, without much success, but decided that routine

activities theory and situational crime prevention – theoretical perspectives that examine context and opportunities – were the most plausible in explaining European crime rates.

There are many challenges to preventing, reducing and controlling crime in Europe. On the research agenda of many criminologists who are interested in Europe are such issues as immigration, organized crime, particularly since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, white collar crime and fraud. Indeed, increased European integration has made criminologists realize how little transnational crime research has been done in Europe – or indeed, around the globe. Von Lampe (2005) stresses that the very concept of “organized crime” is one that originated in the American context that has relatively little power in explaining organized crime in Europe, where much of organized crime is still domestic (and not the result of ethnicities) and where networks are loosely organized as opposed to hierarchically rigid structures. Nevertheless, the postcommunist transition has indeed been marked by an asymmetry in social equality, the weakening of traditional values and of formal and informal social control. In this context it has been particularly easy for criminal organizations, who come from the ranks of the old communist elites and black marketeers, to manipulate the business and governmental system to their advantage (Von Lampe, 2005, p. 410).



Source: Aebi & Delgrande, 2008, p. 31. Reprinted with permission.

7.7 Criminal Justice in the European Union

7.7.1 Criminal Justice: From National to Transnational

Around the world, criminal justice has traditionally been regarded as a sovereign matter. Each country has decided very much on its own what conduct it regards as criminal and

how to respond to such criminal acts. As a result, criminal law and criminal procedure vary considerably, even within the major legal traditions in Europe – common law and the French and Germanic versions of civil (Continental) law.

The differences are apparent in matters both big and small. Even such universally criminalized acts such as homicide, burglary or assault are defined differently by neighbouring countries.¹ Since criminalization is intended to safeguard core values of society, and different societies have different values, the result can be that acts regarded as criminal in one country (abortion, homosexuality, passive euthanasia) can be legal in another. Similarly, the level of punishment varies considerably. While the courts in some European countries routinely impose imprisonment sentences of 5 years or more for offences such as burglary or aggravated assault, in other European countries sentences of over 2 years are highly unusual. As we saw in the previous section, the nature of public punitiveness also varies among European countries.

Other examples can be taken from how the functions of policing, prosecution, adjudication and the enforcement of sentences have been set up. What the powers of the police are in investigating offences and dealing with suspects, who prosecutes and under what conditions, how is the victim of a crime involved in a criminal trial, who decides on the sentence – the variety within Europe is immense.

For a long time, these differences among countries (to the extent that people were even aware of them) mattered little. At a time when few people travelled beyond even the next village, and few crimes affected anyone but those who were directly involved, those responsible for public order and the meting out of justice were not concerned with what happened elsewhere. As a result, criminal justice was almost entirely territorial, in that it was concerned only with acts or omissions on the territory of the “forum state”, and with offenders apprehended in the country in question. Cooperation between countries in investigating offences and bringing offenders to justice was almost unheard of.

The limitations of this simple territorial approach to law enforcement and adjudication began to become more and more apparent during the 1800s, since offenders could and would take deliberate advantage of national borders in order to avoid apprehension. Transnational crime became a practical problem.² On a global perspective, most of the early developments in this respect occurred in Europe. Countries with closer contacts with one another began to consider bilateral agreements and other arrangements for cooperation in criminal justice. The first arrangements to emerge were informal, bilateral arrangements on the sharing of information between law enforcement forces (at first on an ad hoc, i.e. case-by-case basis, and later on also on a regular basis) and other forms of law enforcement assistance. The first formal arrangements for *cross-border authority* between law enforcement agencies were those between Belgium and France in 1919. Multilateral law

¹For example, homicide may or may not include “vehicular homicide”, infanticide and assaults resulting in death; burglary may or may not include cases where the offender entered through an open door or window, and assault may or may not require a certain degree of injury.

²The term “transnational crime” is coming into general usage to refer to an offence with a point of contact in two or more countries. For example, an offender may cross a border in order to commit a crime (as with drug trafficking, smuggling or trafficking in persons) or to flee justice. Another example is where an offender commits an offence in one country that has an effect in another country (cybercrime, international fraud and money laundering). The term has been developed primarily to maintain a distinction with international crimes, which are widely understood to be offences that are so serious that most if not all countries agree internationally on measures for their prevention and for bringing the offenders to justice. Prime examples of international crimes are war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

enforcement co-operation emerged, again in Europe, with the establishment of Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) in 1923.

Attempts at judicial co-operation emerged more slowly, in the form of various bilateral agreements on extradition, the service of summons, the hearing of witnesses, other collection of evidence (such as official records), the transfer of proceedings, co-operation in enforcement, the recognition of foreign judgements and the transfer of convicted persons. The first significant multilateral conventions on co-operation in criminal matters emerged in Europe, within the framework of the newly established Council of Europe.³ These conventions are the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1959. Also the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the proceeds of Crime of 1990 (the “Convention on Money Laundering”) has been influential, both within and outside of Europe.

The Council of Europe also served as the framework for a highly successful attempt, not to harmonize criminal justice in Europe, but to establish minimum safeguards. In 1950, soon after its establishment, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the “European Convention on Human Rights”). As a result of the vigorous action of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting in particular articles 5 (on liberty and security) and 6 (on fair trial) of the Convention, the different member countries of the Council of Europe have had to make modifications to their criminal justice systems.

Given that the Council of Europe already provided a framework for discussions of human rights issues, and keeping in mind not only the reluctance of countries to look beyond their borders for inspiration in criminal justice but also the low level of cooperation in criminal justice, it is perhaps inevitable that when the predecessor to the European Union – the Common Market⁴ – was set up in the immediate aftermath of World War II, almost no thought was given to having it deal with policing or criminal justice matters in any way. However, reconsideration was soon called for. The Common Market was based on the principle that persons, products, services and capital should be allowed to move freely from one country to the next. Such freedom of movement obviously benefits the economy, but it also opens up new opportunities for crime and new possibilities for offenders to slip from one country to another, trying to evade justice. Considering also the huge amounts of money that began to be disbursed within the Common Market to support economic activity in different areas, it was quite understandable that concern gradually arose over possible fraud in obtaining such funds.

A further source for reconsideration was the emergence especially during the 1970s of political violence, most clearly identified with the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany and the Red Brigade in Italy. The terrorist attack against the Israeli team at the Munich Olympics in 1972 provided a graphic demonstration of the ability of offenders to move internationally within Europe.

During the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, two developments took place that began to lay the foundation for formal European Union cooperation in criminal justice.

³A possible source of confusion: the Council of Europe and the European Union are different inter-governmental organizations. The European Union currently consists of 27 Member States and covers most of Western and Central Europe. Its top decision-making body is called the European Council of Ministers, or the European Council for short. The Council of Europe, in turn, today has 44 Member States and covers almost all of Europe, East and West, North and South.

⁴More formally known as the European Communities.

Both were related to the growing ease with which persons could cross borders. One development was that the top police and immigration officials of the Member States began to meet on an informal basis (“Trevi” cooperation). The second was that five core members of the Common Market (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) signed an agreement in 1985 on the eventual elimination of border controls and on what measures this would require (“Schengen” cooperation). Given the purpose of the agreement, it was understandable that the Schengen Agreement contained provisions on police cooperation.

The countries forming the Common Market was thus slowly coming to the realization that the criminal law treaties of the Council of Europe were not enough and that they themselves should deal with policing and justice issues. The result was that when the basic EC treaties were overhauled at the beginning of the 1990s (resulting in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, also known as the “Maastricht Treaty”), the European Union was mandated to deal also with these topics. However, because of the traditional reluctance of countries to yield their sovereignty over policing and criminal justice matters, it was agreed that decisions on these would be made differently. For example, while decisions on such matters as trade, fishing and agriculture could be made by qualified majority, and required constant negotiation with the European Parliament, decisions on policing and criminal justice were to require full unanimity of every Member State, and the European Parliament has only a right to be consulted. A further safeguard was that the European Union could not take a decision relating to the maintenance of law and order, or to the safeguarding of internal security, in any of the Member States.⁵

The Maastricht Treaty marked such a radical change in how decisions were made in and among the European Union Member States that it is perhaps not surprising that the structures that were set up soon proved to be flawed. The EU institutions (the European Commission and most notably the European Parliament) were not happy with their low-profile role when deciding on policing and justice matters. Furthermore, even among the 15 Member States at the time, it was difficult to reach unanimity on these matters issues. A third problem arose outside of the EU structures: more and more countries joined the Schengen cooperation designed at eliminating border controls (of the Member States, only Ireland and the United Kingdom remained outside; in addition, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995 and were seeking to join Schengen), and the various legal provisions on Schengen were becoming more complex. Given the fact that the EU itself was dealing with immigration, asylum and border control, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Schengen provisions had to be incorporated into the EU itself.

The result was a new treaty, the “Amsterdam Treaty”, which entered into force in 1999. This treaty somewhat amended the decision-making procedure on policing and justice matters. Under the Maastricht Treaty, only Member States could propose new instruments. The Amsterdam Treaty also brought the Schengen provisions into the EU and contained provisions on the establishment of a new body for the coordination of policing, Europol.

In 1997, the European Union decided on a set of measures (an “action plan”) that needed to be taken in response to organized crime. These measures included the adoption of decisions related to the criminalization of participation in a criminal organization and money laundering, more effective measures for the tracing of assets, the identification of best practice in mutual assistance and close cooperation with the countries that had recently applied

⁵As can be assumed, Member States have different views on where, exactly, the border lies between the maintenance of law and order on one hand and cooperation in policing and in criminal matters on the other.

for membership in the European Union. A system for mutual evaluation was set up, by which teams of experts from different countries would assess how efficiently each Member State was dealing with a certain issue, such as extradition or mutual legal assistance. The action plan also created what is known as the European Judicial Network, which allows the practitioners responsible for extradition and mutual legal assistance to be in direct contact with their counterparts in other countries (instead of, as is the usual case elsewhere in the world, going through diplomatic channels). Because of the strong support given on the highest political level to the action plan, many of the measures called for in the action plan were adopted in less than 3 years — an impressive achievement in international cooperation.

Two years later, in October 1999, a special European Council organized in Tampere, Finland, laid out a program for the EU to follow in dealing with questions such as migration, asylum, criminal and civil justice and responding to organized crime. This legislative program covered a number of police and criminal justice issues, ranging from the establishment of an EU body (Eurojust) to coordinate prosecution in different countries, the strengthening of Europol, the use of “joint investigative teams” in investigating cross-border crimes, to closer cooperation in preventing and responding to economic crime and money laundering. Perhaps the most important conclusion of the Tampere Council was that the cornerstone for cooperation in criminal justice should be the principle of mutual recognition, in that court decisions taken in one country should be recognized elsewhere in the EU (see the next section).

Two years after the Tampere Council, the work on legal integration was hastened by the impact of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001. The attacks led to the adoption of an EU decision that harmonized domestic legislation defining terrorist crimes. Furthermore, only 3 months after the attacks, the European Union adopted its first decision on mutual recognition, the so-called European arrest warrant. This framework decision replaced extradition proceedings entirely with a much more rapid procedure for the surrender of fugitives. Soon after, a decision was adopted on the mutual recognition of orders on the freezing of property and evidence. As a result of these two decisions, once a court in any Member State orders the arrest of a certain suspect or convicted offender, and the freezing of his or her property, the courts in any and all other Member States can and should enforce these immediately.

Towards the end of 2004, the European Union reviewed the progress it had made since 1999 and decided on a new legislative program, the so-called Hague Program. Between 2005 and 2010, decisions were to be made that would help to overcome cross-border problems connected with, for example, minimum standards for dealing with suspects and defendants, the use of pre-trial detention, the collection of evidence, the checking of criminal records and the transfer of sentenced offenders to their state of nationality or state of residence. Attention was also to be paid to encouraging good practice, not only in extradition and mutual legal assistance, but also, for example, in crime prevention.

7.7.2 Is the European Union Leading to Harmonized Criminal Justice?

The criminalization of participation in a criminal organization and of money laundering referred to above were early examples of the attempt to harmonize criminal law within the European Union. There were recognized precedents for this. Already during the early 1900s, international conventions were being drafted on such issues as drug trafficking,

piracy and white slavery, which called upon the signatories to take action against these crimes, including of course their criminalization.

The question of how far the criminal law and procedural law of the Member States of the European Union should be harmonized has long been a subject of considerable controversy. Everyone appears to agree that some degree of harmonization is necessary in order to ensure smooth international cooperation, as long as by “harmonization” one means the *approximation* or co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major differences and creating minimum requirements or standards.

Everyone also appears to agree that, at least at the present, we are not talking about the *unification* of criminal and procedural law within the European Union, in the sense that the 27 distinct legal systems would be replaced by one system.

A number of arguments can be presented in support of the harmonization or approximation of European criminal and procedural law. All of Europe can be said to share cultural values to the extent that the different countries can and should share the same laws. The approximation of laws would simplify the application of law, since more or less the same laws would apply throughout the European Union. This would reduce the number of cases (usually admittedly marginal, but at times serious) where one Member State refuses to extradite or provide mutual legal assistance to another Member State, on the grounds of the absence of double criminality.⁶ The approximation of laws would also encourage all the Member States of the EU to assign more or less the same priority to the detection and prosecution of different offences, thus decreasing the risk of a situation where one country does not take sufficiently vigorous steps to detect and prosecute (for example) fraud against the European Union.

Furthermore, if all countries would apply more or less the same criminal and procedural laws, this would help in fostering mutual trust and cooperation among courts and other judicial authorities, thus strengthening the basis for the mutual recognition of judgements and other judicial decisions.

At the very least, according to this line of argument, the Member States should be able to agree on the criminalization at least of the most serious offences (even if the precise definitions vary from one country to the next). And surely with the European Human Rights Convention in force throughout Europe, the Member States should be able to agree on the core of protections under procedural law: the inviolability of the person, the protection against self-incrimination, the right to be informed of the charges against oneself, the right to a proper defence and so on (even if the way in which these rights are ensured varies from one country to the next).

Those who criticize efforts at approximation within the European Union are often answered that they are fighting a paper tiger. According to this line of response, no one is seeking full harmonization of criminal and procedural law. Instead, only a basic level of harmonization is sought for two main purposes: in order to ensure that all Member States criminalize the more serious offences (in particular, serious cross-border offences) and in order to support mutual recognition of judgements. Here, an analogy can be made with the United States, where there is both federal and state legislation. Criminal law on the federal level focuses on activity that has cross-border implications. Each state can and does legislate on other criminal acts.

⁶The requirement of double criminality is strongly entrenched in international cooperation in criminal matters. In essence, it means that country A will not provide assistance or extradite a suspect to country B for an offence, unless this is an offence also in country A.

The Tampere program adopted in 1999 was relatively clear in stating that mutual recognition is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation (in both criminal and civil matters). However, the Tampere program also refers to “the necessary approximation of legislation”.⁷ What is “necessary” appears to be a matter of dispute. Furthermore, the Tampere Council, while recognizing mutual recognition as the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation, also stated that work on agreeing on common definitions should be focussed “in the first instance on a limited number of sectors of particular relevance”, such as financial crime (money laundering, corruption, Euro counterfeiting), drugs trafficking, trafficking in human beings, particularly exploitation of women, sexual exploitation of children, high-tech crime and environmental crime – a long list indeed.

Even though mutual recognition has been accepted as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation, this does not mean that all Member States are as enthusiastic about expanding the scope of mutual recognition. It took the horror of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to get the EU to agree on the very first decision on mutual recognition, the EU arrest warrant. That decision was ultimately pushed through in 3 months, a remarkably short period – especially given the fact that the decision marked a shift in paradigm in international cooperation in criminal justice. As noted, the next decision, on the freezing of property and evidence, came soon afterwards.

Since then, however, the pace of negotiation appears to have slowed down considerably, even though several mutual recognition topics remain to be dealt with, among them community-based sanctions, pre-trial release and the supervision of suspects, disqualifications and loss of rights, and the principle of *ne bis in idem* (double jeopardy).

Three factors in particular appear to have contributed to this appreciable slowing in the pace of development: enlargement, the difficulties encountered by some Member States in the implementation of decisions and lack of trust in the operation of other criminal justice systems.

In 2005, the European Union expanded by taking in 10 new Member States, and somewhat over a year later, 2 more, for a total of 27. From the simple logistical point of view, presenting and considering 27 national positions on any one issue takes more time than presenting and considering 15 positions. Even more importantly, all the 27 continue to have their own domestic legal and administrative systems, laws, practice and interests, and this will be reflected in their approach to the negotiations.

The second factor is difficulties in implementation. There has been increased external and internal criticism of the way Member States have implemented EU decisions. For example, the Commission has faulted the way in which several Member States have implemented the 2002 framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, by not bringing the decision into force on time, by inappropriately adding grounds for refusal, by turning facultative grounds of refusal into absolute grounds for refusal and so on. Domestically, the Constitutional Court of Germany has struck down the German law by which the European Arrest Warrant was brought into force within Germany, on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional by requiring the surrender of German nationals to other EU Member States unless certain conditions (allowed for by the framework decision but not implemented by

⁷Along much the same lines, the Hague program (which followed the Tampere program) states that the approximation of substantive criminal law facilitates mutual recognition of judgements and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension (Section 3.3.2).

Germany) were fulfilled. Germany has since then amended its law. (Corresponding difficulties were encountered in Poland and Cyprus, which have had to amend their constitutions to allow for adoption of the framework decision.)

A third and perhaps more nebulous factor slowing down progress in negotiations may be a lack of trust in the operation of other criminal justice systems. The difficulties in national implementation identified by the Commission may be the result of the attitude of national legislators that their country needs safeguards in order to allow their judges to “second guess” a decision taken in another country. This could explain, for example, the adoption of additional grounds for refusal. The recent strong criticism that the Commission and many other Member States have directed at the lack of progress in the newest Member States of Bulgaria and Romania in coming to grips with corruption and organized crime has presumably eroded the trust further.

As a result of these and similar difficulties, the negotiators of several Member States may well have become more critical regarding how instruments are formulated and more apt to try to add language that protects their country’s status quo in criminal law. At times, it almost seems as if negotiators have implicit instructions not to accept any EU instruments that would require extensive changes in law and practice in one’s own country or that would expand the scope of mutual recognition.

Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal to solve these difficulties is to change the way decisions are made on police and criminal justice cooperation. The proposed “Lisbon Treaty” would bring this decision-making much closer to decision-making on other EU matters. For example, most decisions could be made by a qualified majority, and the European Parliament would have considerably more influence in the negotiations.⁸ According to the theory, Member States will realize that they cannot continue to hold on to all the peculiarities of their national law and will be forced to seek compromises.

The Commission and several Member States have also argued that, since a lack of trust and confidence in the operation of the criminal justice system of other Member States has made it difficult to negotiate new decisions on mutual recognition, what are needed are EU-wide rules on procedural guarantees and further approximation of legislation criminalizing the key types of offences.

Beyond attempts to approximate criminal and procedural law in the European Union countries, the Commission has at times sought to align also criminal justice policy more closely. This has arguably already been done by the adoption of a long line of decisions dealing with various priority offences, ranging from trafficking in persons, child paedophilia and corruption, to terrorism. These decisions have nudged the different Member States to taking these offences more seriously. Attempts by the Commission to bring sentencing policies into closer alignment – in practice, by setting a minimum sentence – have been less successful, as illustrated best by the refusal so far of the Netherlands to criminalize also in practice the use of soft drugs.

At present, there is a tension between countries wanting more mutual recognition and countries wanting more approximation. There are also a number of Member States in the European Union that are inherently sceptical of the added value of further decisions on

⁸At the time of this writing, the results of the referendum in Ireland in June 2008 mean that the European Union will once again have to enter into a “period of reflection”. Several outcomes are possible, ranging from totally abandoning the Lisbon Treaty, to making some slight adjustments, and holding a new referendum in Ireland. Even if the Lisbon Treaty is abandoned, however, the problems will remain in EU decision-making, and undoubtedly the search for a solution in respect of cooperation in policing and criminal justice would follow the same general lines.

criminal and procedural law. It is nonetheless likely that the scope of approximation will gradually expand, but its scope will tend to be largely limited to those offences which often have cross-border effects (for example, terrorism, various forms of organized crime, crimes over the Internet) or are directed against core EU interests (in particular, offences directed against the financial interests of the EU).

However, since the vast majority of offences that are processed through the criminal justice system (such as property offences and violent offences) usually do not have such cross-border effects, the national criminal and procedural law of each Member State will retain its own distinct elements. The European Union may make international cooperation somewhat easier, and there may be continued attempts to harmonize criminal and procedural law, but for many years to come, Europe will remain a patchwork of different systems.

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Chapter 8

Culture

Jürgen Gerhards

European integration is characterized by increasing institutionalization and a gradual enlargement of member states of the European Union.¹ In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was established by six members. Within a few years, these members decided to integrate other sectors of their economies. In 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community with the goals of removing trade barriers and forming a common market. Additional sectors were gradually included, such as a customs union, a monetary union, and a common currency for a subset of EU countries. With the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the EU extended its sphere of influence to the fields of foreign and domestic policy and to the security sector. This broadening of European cooperation in multiple sectors corresponds to the expansion of European institutions, which are increasingly assuming more responsibilities and gaining greater independence. In fact, EU member states have ceded part of their national sovereignty to the EU (Wessels 1997). In that EU law supersedes national law, member states and their citizens are directly subject to the decisions made by the EU. The European Commission oversees the implementation of its decisions, and the European Court of Justice has the ability to sanction member states who do not fully comply (Lepsius 1990).

Alongside this deepening institutional process, the development of the European Union is also characterized by the continuous expansion in the number of member states. Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined the European Community (EC) in 1973; Greece became a member in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995. The EU's expansion to the East adds another dimension, both qualitatively and quantitatively.² On May 1, 2004, ten countries joined the EU (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007. Turkey has been knocking on the EU's door since 1963 and is now an accession candidate. Croatia and Macedonia have also become accession candidates. Entering into accession negotiations has typically meant that the country in question will ultimately accede into the union. Within the next few years, the "EU-15" will have absorbed 12 and more new member states.

J. Gerhards (✉)
Department of Sociology, Free University Berlin, Germany
e-mail: j.gerhards@fu-berlin.de

¹In this chapter I will heavily rely on a book, I have published (Gerhards and Hölscher 2005; English edition Gerhards 2007).

²The term "eastward enlargement" is not completely accurate, as two of the accession countries, Malta and Cyprus, are in Southern Europe.

The level of similarities and differences between old and new member states seems to be a crucial factor for the success of building up an enlarged Europe. Until now scholarly discussion has mainly focused on the institutional and economic differences between the different European countries, thereby neglecting the cultural dimension. There are at least three arguments why cultural similarities are an important precondition for the European integration process.

1. There is a negative relationship between common values and the probability of conflicts. The more people share basic values, the higher is the probability that there will be no conflict between them. Take the example of the family. The more parents, for example, agree on how to socialize their children, the higher is the probability that no conflict will arise about the question how to treat the children. The same hypothesis holds true for countries and states too. The more they agree for example, what kind of economy or welfare state they prefer, the lesser is the probability of conflicts between them.
2. In addition, social psychologists have shown that there is a positive relationship between sharing certain values, identity building, and solidarity (Turner 1987). People who share basic values are more attached to each other and accordingly more solidly. Deepening the EU and enlargement of the EU is combined with a tremendous transfer of money from the old member states to the new member states. The readiness of people to accept these transfers will be higher the more they share the same values (Vobruba 1999).
3. A third hypothesis about the importance of shared values comes from political scientists. Democracy means that the elected majority is allowed to rule over the minority for a certain time period. One of the preconditions for the stability of democracy is that the minority accepts to be ruled by the majority. Minorities are more likely to accept the decisions of the majority, when both interpret each other as being part of one community, of one value community (Kielmannsegg 1996). Insofar a common culture is also an important factor for the stability of democracies in general and the democratic elements of the political system of the EU specifically.

The main goal of this chapter is to describe and to explain cultural similarities and differences between the member states of the European Union by analyzing comparative survey data on the value orientations of the citizens of Europe. In the first section of this chapter we will start with some terminological clarifications and the description of our research questions. As we distinguish between different cultural spheres, the following sections will discuss each value sphere separately. We will start with religion (Section 8.2) and go on to the analysis of the family culture (Section 8.3). In the focus of Section 8.4 stands the analysis of the political culture of the member states of the European Union, and in Section 8.5 we will analyze attitudes toward the welfare state.³ The results will be summed up in Section 8.6.

³Using a similar approach Michael Hölscher (2006) has analyzed the culture of the economy in 27 European countries.

8.1 Terminological Clarifications and Research Questions

8.1.1 *What Do We Mean by Europe?*

As implicitly already assumed in the introduction, in the context of this chapter we will focus on European societies which are or will become members of the European Union; countries, which are part of Europe, but not members of the European Union – e.g., Norway, Switzerland, and Serbia – are excluded from the analysis, for two reasons. First, as argued above cultural differences are especially important, when different societies are integrated into a supranational unit, and by that the need for cooperation between societies increases. The European Union is such a supranational unit. The EU has become much more than a purely economic union. Step by step the EU has attempted to create a European society; factors above and beyond the economic sphere will consequently determine the success of integrating accession countries into a unified Europe (Bach 2000). The second and main reason for the restriction of our analysis on countries which are members of the EU is due to data problems. To compare the culture of different societies we are dependent on data sets, which were collected in different countries with the same questionnaire. For our analysis, the most important data set is the “European Values Study” of 1999–2000, which covers most of the old and new member states of the European Union.⁴ The national samples of at least 1,000 randomly chosen interviewees are representative for each society. People at least 18 years of age were questioned in face-to-face interviews.⁵

8.1.2 *What Do We Mean by Culture?*

There are only few social scientific concepts as vague as culture. In 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of “culture.” We understand terms to be nominal definitions which specify what conceptual substance should be covered by a certain word. We define culture as a system of values, divided jointly among actors, and used to interpret the world. Such a definition contains three elements: (a) values as a specific interpretation of the world, (b) objects which are interpreted by values, and (c) subjects or bearers of culture.

- a) We consider culture to be composed of a system of relatively stable and abstract values.⁶ Values can be distinguished from interests and needs, in that values can be justified (Thome 2003). This notion is bound to Kluckhohn’s classic definition, in which values are defined as a “conception of the desirable.” “A value is not just a preference, but is a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified” (Kluckhohn 1951: 396).⁷

⁴Information regarding the European Values Study and the World Values Survey is available at the following URLs: <http://www.europeanvalues.nl> and <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu>.

⁵The data set is accessible at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research in Cologne under the number 3811.

⁶The list of literature concerning the theme of “values” is long. We base ourselves on the very thorough reconstruction from Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (1995).

⁷Values are abstract orientations. In this regard, they vary from norms and from concrete, normative preferences, yet simultaneously influence such norms and concrete beliefs. A value, such as equal gender rights, can have substantial influence on a particular political position like preferring a liberal pro-choice law.

- b) Values might refer to different *objects*. As social scientists we are interested in the values that refer to the social world. Following the classical description of modern society, we assume that society is made up of different spheres or subsystems like religion, family, economy, and politics. Values that are important in one field might prove irrelevant in another. For example, religious orientation may not have a substantial relevance in one's professional life, and an economic merit system will probably not play an important role in the family sphere. Hence, one can differentiate between different cultural spheres of a society and speak of a family culture, culture of religion, culture of the economy, political culture, and so on. In order to analyze cultural similarities and differences in various societies, these cultural subfields must be distinguished.
- c) Sociologists are not primarily interested in values only important to one particular person. Rather, we take interest in values shared among several actors, in "shared or collective evaluations" (Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 34) or socially generalized values (Gerhards 2000). The subject of culture can be citizens or a subgroup or class of citizens in any given society. In our analysis the subjects of culture are the citizens of a country, which is a member state of the EU. Depending on the value sphere, citizens from Poland, for example, may differ from citizens from Sweden in their understanding of social responsibilities of the state, the organization of the economy (market economy or state economy), the role religion should play in society, or the degree to which the employment of women is desirable.⁸

Determining a country's culture by means of measuring its citizens' value orientations requires justification, due to the fact that multiple attempts to determine a country's culture have been undertaken. Culture is commonly described by reference to a country's particular history or history of ideas. Seen from a systematic, cultural comparative perspective this approach is plagued by three problems. (a) A comparison among multiple entities is possible only if the point of comparison is kept constant, for example, the same instruments are used in all of the investigated countries. This is generally not the case in many philological and historical studies because most case studies deal with only one or two countries. Consequently, no reliable comparison is possible, especially between 27 different countries. (b) Moreover, in philological—historical culture studies, it is often unclear what the analyzed material actually represents. Sociologists focus on cultural elements that influence society. A study concerning let us say the similarities and differences between Western and Eastern European philosophical thought might be of interest for philosophers, but may only mirror an elite discourse that has little bearing on society at large. (c) Finally, some cultural analyses are historically oriented; the question is, whether a historical perspective furthers our understanding of Europe in the present. If we define the culture of a country by the citizens' current value orientations, then we are more likely dealing with a contemporary rather than a historical measurement of culture. The fact that the citizens' value orientations in all of the countries are measured by the same standardized survey satisfies the demand that the study be truly comparative. Furthermore, because the survey was carried out in a representative manner, we are able to draw conclusions for a country's entire population (rather than just for academic or political elite).

⁸Here, our concept of culture is identical to the concept of political culture developed and applied by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba: "When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. (...) The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution pattern of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation" (Almond and Verba 1963: 13, Kaase 1983).

To summarize, our definition of culture: Culture is a relatively stable and abstract concept of a desirable society which refers to different social spheres and is shared among the citizens of a nation state society. Citizens' beliefs concerning the ideal form of society is referred to as societal culture.

8.1.3 Research Questions

In the following sections, we will investigate the citizens' attitudes regarding the ideal form a society should have in both the EU-15 and in the accession countries. As we differentiate between different spheres of societal culture, we will analyze these value spheres separately. Each section has a similar internal structure.

The question of how well the different countries of the EU fit to each other requires a reference point. From a sociological perspective, the entire process of European unification can be understood as an attempt to establish a coherent European value system. The various institutions of the European Union can be interpreted as value manufacturers that have developed a definitive set of beliefs as to what constitutes European society. The EU maintains a blueprint of an ideal society, which it attempts to realize through its policies. This blueprint manifests itself in primary and secondary European legislation, in the drafted EU constitution, and in the Treaty of Lisbon.⁹ This societal ideal serves as a reference point in our analysis. In each section we will first reconstruct this value system that the EU promotes, differentiating between different spheres of values – religion, family, economy, politics, etc.

Several other attempts have been made to define Europe's cultural identity. Some scholars believe that Europe's identity and uniqueness results from its history, including Jewish-Greek-Roman antiquity, the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and, finally, a modern understanding of the social sciences (Wehler 2002). Other scholars define Europe's cultural identity by its Christian tradition: "The European identity relates to its specific character directly and indirectly derived from the religion that formed Europe as a cultural unit, namely Christianity" (Brague 1996: 45). Religion also plays a central role in Samuel Huntington's attempt to define the boundaries between civilizations and the cultural identity of Europe (Huntington 1996: 158). These authors' definition of Europe's cultural identity contains both empirical and normative dimensions. There is no question that the old members have a Christian tradition. Declaring, however, that countries with a different religious heritage cannot be EU members is a normative claim that cannot be empirically legitimated. The position taken here is that the normative question of defining a cultural identity of Europe is translated into an empirical one; values that the EU itself defines as meaningful are decisive for determining Europe's identity. Ascertaining a European identity in reference to European law is justifiable for the following reason. The primary law, constituted from the Treaties, is legitimized by the member state governments' espousal of it. The adoption of these EU treaties by national governments is further legitimated in that these countries are democratic and their governments are elected by the people.

⁹The fact that the constitutional draft was not ratified does not exclude the possibility of using it to reconstruct the European value system. The sections of the constitutional draft we interpret largely summarizing *existing* treaties and legal systems into one unified text. The second part of the constitutional draft contains, for example, the basic EU laws which are already in force.

In the second part of each section we will analyze whether citizens of the member and accession countries support the EU's blueprint of religion, family, etc. We will describe the cultural differences and similarities between the different countries of the EU. The empirical bases for this part of the study are secondary analyses of representative surveys. We do not only aim to describe cultural similarities between EU member states and accession countries but also to explain possible differences. For sociologists, countries in and of themselves do not constitute relevant analytical categories; rather, one must break countries down into social variables by investigating what lies below the surface of these countries (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Three important societal factors significantly influence citizens' value orientations:

- a) The countries analyzed differ in terms of economic modernization and wealth. Economic modernization and wealth influence citizens' value orientations, according to social scientists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell and Ronald Inglehart. In the following sections, we comment more closely on how the degree of modernization in a society influences value orientations in certain ways.
- b) Max Weber was among the first to show that religious beliefs influence citizens' value orientations. For example, the basis of capitalism is formed by a system of merit, asceticism, and a rational lifestyle. These characteristics have a religious origin in that they are concepts of ascetic Protestantism. Several of Weber's successors adopted and elaborated the idea that a country's cultural—religious tradition influences the beliefs of its citizens. We assume that the different religions in the EU-15 and accession countries have developed a variety of ideas as to what constitutes an ideal society. These beliefs, in turn, influence those who are members of the religious communities. For each value sphere, we categorize the beliefs that exist in the respective religion and then empirically test whether these beliefs have an impact on the citizens' value orientations.
- c) Lastly, we assume that a country's political—institutional system influences citizens' values. For example, the countries' concepts regarding family models are different. This, in turn, is propagated by particular policies and encouraged by political measures. In the former socialist states, for example, married women with children were strongly encouraged both by ideological and social—political measures to seek employment. On the other hand, some of the old member states, like Western Germany, fostered the concept of a housewife. We assume that particular political systems play a significant role in determining citizens' attitudes. We empirically test these different hypotheses using regression analysis to help determine the explanatory power of different groups of variables for specific value orientations.

8.2 Religion in a Wider Europe

Religion strongly influences peoples' behavior and is a central element in societal culture. The influence of religion is evident through directly related actions such as praying, attending church, eating particular foods, or the way the calendar year is arranged (see Chapter 15). Religious orientations also influence non-religious activities, such as voting behavior, economic behavior, and moral attitudes toward questions, i.e., abortion and homosexuality (Pickel 2001). They can provoke conflicts and even civil wars, such as those between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and the continuing tensions in the Balkans.

First, we will reconstruct the EU's blueprint of religion. What kind of role should religion play in the European community? Second, we investigate whether and to what degree

citizens' religious cultures deviate from this blueprint and vary from one another. In a third step we will try to explain the differences in religious attitudes.

Our basis for reconstructing the blueprint of religion of the EU comes from interpreting the laws, directives, regulations, and recommendations released by EU institutions. Gerhard Robbers (2003a, b) has collected and summarized all EU legally binding rules concerning religious issues. We will rely on his work. The EU regards itself as a value community that does not prefer a specific religious orientation and consequently leaves religious aspects undefined. There are no statements in the primary or secondary legislation that bind the EU to a particular religion. Although all of the EU member states have a Christian tradition, the Treaties or other European laws do not contain any references to Christianity or to the Christian God. Hence, the EU is a secular value community.

Another aspect of the EU religious blueprint is individual and collective religious freedom and tolerance vis-à-vis religious plurality: In Part I of the constitutional draft, the EU defines its central values as pluralism, tolerance, and non-discrimination. In Part II, which includes the Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, it specifies general principles regarding religious orientation. In addition to freedom of speech and opinion, Article II-70 also guarantees freedom of religion. "This includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance" (European Convention 2003: Article II-70). The guarantee of freedom for individual and collective religious practices indicates the expectation that every religion adhere to the concept of tolerance. Correspondingly, the EU declares all religions to be of equal value, respects religious diversity (Article II-82), and prohibits any discrimination based on religion (Article II-81). In summary, the EU views itself as a federation of secular societies that maintains an institutionalized separation of politics, society, and religion.

8.2.1 The Religious Orientations of Citizens

First, we present some basic information on religious similarities and differences not connected with the EU blueprint. In the second step, we use the EU's blueprint of religion as a benchmark to analyze whether and to what extent citizens in different countries support the EU concept of religion.

8.2.1.1 Basic Information on Citizens' Religious Orientations

Religiosity can be distinguished using various dimensions, such as integration into church and individual religiosity (see Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1993, 1995). Integration into church and other religious institutions refers to membership and participation in church activities, whereas individual religiosity describes the subjective feeling of religiosity independent of church organizations.

Table 8.1 depicts the rate of citizen membership in different religious denominations using data from the European Values Study. The EVS data for some countries deviates from the results of other surveys and data found in the Encyclopedia Britannica. But the Encyclopedia Britannica information is not particularly reliable. For example, the values given for Germany clearly diverge from the data available at the Federal Office of Statistics.

With the exception of Greece, citizens of the old EU-15 countries and of the Enlargement I countries are primarily Catholic or Protestant. A substantial proportion of

Table 8.1 Membership in religious denominations (in %)

	Roman Catholic	Protestant	Christian Orthodox	Muslim	Not belonging to a religious denomination	Other
EU-15	42.1	24.2	6.2	0.6	23.6	3.3
Ireland	89.0	2.0	0.2		6.9	1.9
Portugal	85.9	0.3			11.4	2.4
Italy	81.5	0.3	0.1		17.9	0.3
Spain	80.8	0.9		0.3	18.0	0.0
Austria	80.6	5.2	0.7	0.2	12.5	0.9
Luxembourg	65.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	30.4	3.3
Belgium	55.3	1.2	0.4	3.1	35.7	4.4
France	52.7	1.3	1.2	0.1	42.6	2.1
Denmark	0.8	87.1		0.5	10.1	1.6
Finland	0.1	84.2	1.1		11.7	2.9
Sweden	1.6	68.9	0.5	0.4	25.3	3.3
Great Britain	13.8	57.4	0.2	0.9	15.0	12.7
Western Germany	39.3	41.3	0.5	2.1	14.2	2.7
Eastern Germany	3.4	28.0	0.3	0.2	66.0	2.1
Netherlands	22.1	10.1		1.1	55.0	11.8
Greece	1.5		93.8		4.0	0.7
Enlargement I	54.1	7.1	3.6	0.2	33.5	1.5
Malta	97.7	0.9			1.3	0.1
Poland	94.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	4.6	0.7
Lithuania	75.1	1.3	3.0		19.5	1.2
Slovenia	66.4	0.3	1.6	1.1	30.0	0.6
Slovakia	64.2	11.2	0.8		23.1	0.8
Estonia	0.4	13.1	9.8	0.1	75.8	0.8
Czech Republic	29.8	3.8	0.1		64.9 ^a	1.4
Hungary	39.2	16.2	0.2		42.3 ^a	2.0
Latvia	19.6	17.0	16.8	0.1	40.8	5.8
Enlargement II	3.9	1.4	73.0	4.2	16.2	4.2
Bulgaria	7.5	2.0	85.6	8.3	2.5 ^a	2.5
Romania	0.3	0.7	60.5	—	29.9	0.2
Turkey	—	—	0.1	97.5	2.3	0.1

* Significant differences exist for Czech Republic and Hungary depending on which data set is used (ISSP 1998, WVS 1995–1997). The ISSP data shows that only 43.5% in Czech Republic and 27.2% in Hungary do not belong to a religious denomination at all. In turn, the number of Roman Catholics in both countries rises by approx. the same amount. Additionally, in Bulgaria the number of respondents without religious affiliation according to the ISSP and the WVS is higher than the number given in the EVS (ISSP: 12.8%, WVS even 33.2%). We decided to use the EVS data because we have no additional information to assume which of the data sets is most accurate.

these two groups lack any religious affiliation at all. Citizens of the Enlargement II countries (Bulgaria and Romania) are primarily Orthodox Christians, and Bulgaria also has a Muslim minority. Turkey deviates from this pattern in that it is a primarily Muslim country and therefore does not belong to the Christian religious community.¹⁰

¹⁰As Olaf Müller et al. (2003) have shown, state socialism has led to a reduction of membership in churches throughout Central European countries. At the same time, the authors show that large differences exist between the religious affiliations. The Catholic Church has proven to stabilize their membership rate much more successfully than the Protestant Church.

Table 8.2 Attendance at religious services (in %)

	At least once a month	Less than once a month	Never
EU-15	30.6	36.2	33.2
Ireland	74.6	17.6	7.7
Italy	53.6	32.5	13.9
Portugal	53.2	31.0	15.8
Austria	42.9	40.6	16.5
Spain	36.0	32.5	31.5
Greece	33.6	61.7	4.6
Finland	12.5	59.4	28.2
Denmark	11.9	45.4	42.7
Western Germany	34.7	41.5	23.7
Luxembourg	30.4	36.3	33.3
France	12.3	27.2	60.4
Eastern Germany	13.4	29.4	57.2
Great Britain	18.7	26.2	55.1
Netherlands	25.1	26.9	48.1
Belgium	27.8	25.9	46.3
Sweden	9.1	45.2	45.7
Enlargement I	37.0	34.9	28.1
Malta	87.2	8.9	3.9
Poland	78.1	16.0	5.9
Slovakia	49.8	27.1	23.1
Lithuania	28.9	53.5	17.5
Estonia	10.8	50.9	38.3
Latvia	15.1	50.4	34.6
Slovenia	30.7	39.2	30.1
Czech Republic	12.7	31.1	56.1
Hungary	17.9	38.1	44.0
Enlargement II	34.2	49.2	16.7
Romania	46.4	46.1	7.5
Bulgaria	21.9	52.3	25.8
Turkey	41.2	26.5	32.3

Membership in religious denominations does not, however, indicate participation in church activities or integration in church institutions. A well-proven indicator for measuring citizens' integration into "their" church is attendance at religious services.¹¹ Table 8.2 shows that attendance at religious services varies significantly in different countries.¹²

A look at the aggregate categories shows that the attendance rate in the old EU countries is lowest. Rates in the Enlargement I and II countries are somewhat higher, while Turkey has the highest rate of attendance. A look at the country differences shows that the level

¹¹The question of how often one attends church contains eight categories in all, ranging from "never, practically never" (1) to "more than once a week" (8).

¹²The regularity of attending church in previous socialist societies was exposed to large variations in the past 15 years (Pollack 2003). Shortly before and after the transformation of these societies from socialistic to democratic regimes, the church experienced approval and recognition from the citizens. This is particularly related to the political opposition role adopted by the church in a few socialist countries during the socialist period. Afterward citizens' support for the church declined so that one can speak of normalization for the time period that the Value Study's data was collected (1999/2000).

of church integration does not depend on membership levels, but rather on the dominance of different religious denominations.¹³ Countries with a very high proportion of Catholics have higher rates of church attendance, with the exceptions of France and Luxembourg. Orthodox Christian and Muslim countries have the next highest attendance rates, while Protestant countries or countries with a high level of non-affiliated citizens have the lowest level of attendance. The different compositions of religious denominations in the four groups of countries lead to these described differences in the aggregate.

People can still be religious even if they are not members of a religious denomination and do not attend religious services. We can measure “individual religiosity” using the question if one would characterize himself as a religious person (possible answers being “a religious person,” “not a religious person,” and “a convinced atheist”) (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3 Percentage of people describing themselves as religious

	Religious person	Not a religious person	Convinced atheist
EU-15	63.7	29.9	6.5
Portugal	87.6	9.3	3.1
Italy	85.8	11.5	2.7
Austria	80.9	17.4	1.8
Greece	79.7	15.7	4.6
Denmark	76.5	18.1	5.4
Ireland	76.4	22.3	1.2
Belgium	65.0	26.6	8.4
Finland	64.1	32.7	3.2
Western Germany	62.1	33.5	4.4
Luxembourg	62.1	30.2	7.7
Netherlands	61.4	32.2	6.5
Spain	58.9	34.6	6.5
France	46.3	39.1	14.6
Great Britain	41.5	53.2	5.4
Sweden	38.8	54.6	6.6
Eastern Germany	29.4	48.9	21.7
Enlargement I	69.8	25.8	4.5
Poland	93.9	4.5	1.6
Lithuania	84.2	13.9	1.9
Slovakia	81.7	13.9	4.4
Latvia	76.8	20.3	2.8
Malta	75.3	24.5	0.2
Slovenia	70.1	21.3	8.6
Hungary	57.5	36.9	5.6
Czech Republic	44.6	46.6	8.8
Estonia	41.2	52.0	6.8
Enlargement II	68.8	27.6	3.6
Romania	84.8	14.4	0.8
Bulgaria	52.0	41.5	6.6
Turkey	79.7	18.8	1.5

¹³In their analysis of Christian countries, Pollack and Pickel (2003) show that the regularity of church attendance depends on the proportion of Catholics. Catholics are traditionally more strongly connected to their church in comparison to Protestants and the Orthodox Christians.

The degree of religiosity is approximately the same between the old EU member states and Enlargement I countries. Enlargement II countries, and particularly Turkey, show the highest rate of religiosity. The differences correspond to the dominance of various religious denominations in these countries. Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Catholic countries demonstrate very high levels of religiosity. Protestant countries and countries with above average levels of citizens lacking religious affiliation have a lower level of individual religiosity. The results are similar to those regarding the rate of church attendance, which we confirmed with a correlation analysis. The statistical relationship between the regularity of attending church and believing in God as well as between attending church and judging oneself to be religious amounts to 0.51 (Pearson's correlation, p-value: 0.01). This evidence refutes the thesis that decreased institutionalized religiosity is replaced by individual religiosity. Pollack and Pickel (2003) arrive at similar results. Additionally, it is important to note that secularization (see Hervieu-Lèger 1999), commonly described as European phenomenon, does not appear to be especially significant either in the sense of declining institutionalized or individual religiosity. In almost every country (the most significant exception being East Germany), the majority of people belong to a religious denomination, believe in God, and do not describe themselves as atheists.

In summary, the citizens of EU member states are mostly Catholic or Protestant, and the religious structure of the EU will shift with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (predominantly Orthodox Christian countries) and, in the future, Turkey (a completely Muslim country). Comparing levels of individual religiosity, Catholics, Muslims, and Orthodox Christians attend church most often and demonstrate the strongest degree of individual religiosity.

8.2.1.2 EU Blueprint of Religion and the Religious Beliefs of Citizens

In this section, we investigate whether people support a separation of religious and secular spheres and whether they prove to be tolerant toward other religions.

The European Values Study poses three yes or no questions concerning the relevance of religion for resolving societal problems: Does the church give adequate answers to (a) individual moral problems, (b) domestic and familial issues, and (c) to social problems facing the country?¹⁴ We interpret the answers to these three questions as indicators with which to measure the degree of separation between religion and society. If the respondent believes that religion provides adequate answers to and solutions for societal issues, then his subjective separation of the religious and societal sphere is less substantial (Table 8.4).

The majority of citizens in old member states do not expect the church to solve societal problems. This is noticeably different for citizens in accession countries.¹⁵ The further away a country is from the EU core, the more popular the notion that religion can solve societal problems. Turkey shows the lowest degree of separation between religion and society. There are, however, substantial differences between countries within the aggregate categories. Countries with a large population of Muslims have the lowest degree of separation of society and religion, followed by those countries with a large number of Orthodox Christians, then by countries with a large Catholic population. Protestant countries and

¹⁴The correlations between the three question range between 0.52 and 0.69 (Eta).

¹⁵In regard to the question of social issues, the difference in responses between Enlargement I and Enlargement II countries and between Enlargement I and old EU members is not statistically significant.

Table 8.4 Separation of religion and society (in %)

“Church gives adequate answers tomoral problems”	. . .problems of family life”	. . .social problems”
EU-15	39.0	31.5	27.8
France	35.3	27.3	20.9
Great Britain	32.5	30.2	26.5
Western Germany	53.6	41.6	35.8
Eastern Germany	34.6	26.7	15.3
Austria	37.8	28.5	30.7
Italy	61.8	47.7	43.5
Spain	39.9	35.1	28.9
Portugal	56.0	45.0	36.8
Netherlands	35.2	29.6	37.0
Belgium	36.2	32.6	27.1
Denmark	20.0	15.0	11.5
Sweden	25.6	18.3	16.9
Finland	42.0	39.9	29.9
Ireland	31.8	29.0	28.4
Greece	43.1	30.6	31.0
Luxembourg	33.0	24.2	23.4
Enlargement I	56.5	53.0	32.8
Estonia	44.7	30.1	14.1
Latvia	58.2	47.9	26.3
Lithuania	81.3	78.8	54.2
Poland	65.6	64.4	40.5
Czech Republic	36.8	32.1	16.7
Slovakia	68.2	63.8	29.7
Hungary	44.8	38.9	23.3
Malta	66.6	75.0	57.0
Slovenia	44.9	42.8	33.8
Enlargement II	63.6	54.8	32.8
Romania	80.7	78.5	52.2
Bulgaria	44.5	28.8	13.9
Turkey	76.2	67.2	43.7

countries with a significant amount of non-religious citizens show the highest degree of separation of church and society.

Results from the European Values Study also allowed us to test the extent to which citizens believe the spheres of religion and politics should be separated. First, people were asked whether they think politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office. They were then asked whether they believe it would be better for their country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.¹⁶ Interviewees could choose from five answers (“disagree strongly,” “disagree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “agree,” “agree strongly”). We combined the “agree” and “agree strongly” responses in Table 8.5, which shows mean values and percentages.¹⁷

¹⁶The European Values Study asks two additional questions that measure the separation of religion and politics, which we did not use in our analysis. In these two questions, citizens were asked whether religious leaders should influence government decisions and how people vote in elections. Both a correlation analysis and a factor analysis show that these questions clearly measure other dimensions than the two questions we chose.

¹⁷The correlation between both questions accounts for 0.62 (Pearson’s correlation, p-value: 0.01).

Table 8.5 Separation of religion and politics

	“Politicians should believe in god”		“It would be better for the country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office”	
	(mean)	(% of approval)	(mean)	(% of approval)
EU-15	2.08	12.2	2.41	18.8
France	1.70	9.2	1.98	12.7
Great Britain	2.10	9.7	2.46	16.7
Western Germany	2.24	17.6	2.74	29.7
Eastern Germany	1.96	7.7	2.26	15.9
Austria	2.14	15.1	2.64	26.6
Italy	2.40	15.0	2.68	22.2
Spain	2.21	9.5	2.54	16.4
Portugal	2.26	14.5	2.69	25.4
Netherlands	1.56	1.7	2.17	11.8
Belgium	1.70	9.1	2.15	17.8
Denmark	1.53	3.7	1.66	5.6
Sweden	1.72	4.0	2.09	8.8
Finland	2.25	11.9	2.41	15.4
Ireland	2.40	16.2	2.65	24.1
Greece	3.07	37.3	3.04	32.0
Luxembourg	2.11	13.1	2.45	20.0
Enlargement I	2.43	18.4	2.82	31.3
Estonia	2.41	13.9	2.77	25.0
Latvia	2.64	22.2	3.19	43.8
Lithuania	2.62	20.4	3.10	36.8
Poland	2.35	15.9	2.79	29.3
Czech Republic	2.06	6.3	2.23	9.5
Slovakia	2.51	22.0	3.01	37.0
Hungary	2.11	12.4	2.52	23.1
Malta	3.06	41.7	3.59	64.5
Slovenia	2.10	10.7	2.16	12.3
Enlargement II	3.06	38.7	3.31	47.2
Romania	3.46	52.0	3.76	64.7
Bulgaria	2.67	24.9	2.86	28.9
Turkey	3.52	62.3	3.42	57.1

The results for both questions show the expected results, with the EU-15 member states manifestly expressing a preference for the separation between religion and politics. There is less support for such separation in the Enlargement I and II countries, particularly in Romania. This concept is most clearly rejected by Turkish citizens, who believe that religion should guide political actions and assume that religion provides the correct solution for many everyday political problems. In this regard, Turkey and Romania fit the EU’s blueprint of religion the least.

In addition, the EU expects its members, regardless of their religious denomination, to tolerate other religions. The European Values Study poses only one question that can be used to operationalize tolerance toward other religious communities. In almost all countries, respondents were asked whether they would be opposed to having a Muslim as a neighbor. A fitting equivalent was, unfortunately, not asked in Turkey. Respondents in all




Fig. 8.1 Intolerance against other religious denominations (in %)

countries were asked whether they would oppose having Jewish neighbors. We therefore use this question as a measurement of citizens' religious tolerance.¹⁸

Figure 8.1 shows that there is widely accepted tolerance toward Jews in the old EU member states. The Enlargement I and II countries also show high levels of tolerance toward Jews, although a fifth of the population expresses non-tolerance. The situation is noticeably different in Turkey, where 60 percent of the interviewees are opposed to having Jewish neighbors. These results must be carefully interpreted, in that the question regarding tolerance toward Jews may also measure anti-Israel sentiments regarding Israel's policies toward Palestinians.¹⁹

We now turn to a summary of the descriptive evidence. The EU considers itself a secular value community, favoring the separation of societal and religious spheres and expecting reciprocal tolerance among religious groups. The old EU citizens strongly support these

¹⁸Due to the fact that the question was asked in a different manner in Hungary, the results for Hungary are probably overrated.

¹⁹Yet the following empirical evidence also supports our thesis that the indicator measures general tolerance toward other religious denominations. Pearson's correlation coefficient of attitudes toward Jews and Muslims as neighbors, a question not posed in all countries, amounts to 0.47 (p-value: 0.01). We can also show through secondary analysis of the World Values Survey from 1990 and 1995–1997 that the level of religious tolerance in Turkey is very low. In both of these surveys, respondents were asked whether they had anything against a Muslim living in their neighborhood. This same question was asked in Turkey, and the word "Muslim" was replaced by "Christian." Both surveys show that Turkey has the lowest level of religious tolerance for all countries under analysis. The percentages of respondents in Turkey who did not want a Christian living in their neighborhood were 54.7 and 49.1 percent in the 1990 and 1995–1997 surveys, respectively.

beliefs, whereas citizens of the 2004 accession countries accept these concepts to a lesser degree. Romania visibly deviates from these beliefs. Moreover, a significant proportion of Turkish citizens expresses a desire for a closer relationship between religion, society, and politics.²⁰ The admission of new countries will change the overall religious culture in the EU, and the proportion of those who do not share the EU's concept of a clear separation between the sacred and the secular spheres will increase.

In addition to the differences on the aggregate level, there are significant variations within individual country groups. Countries with large Protestant populations most strongly support the EU blueprint of religion, countries with substantial Catholic and Orthodox populations adopt a middle ground, and Muslim Turkey shows less support.

8.2.2 *Explaining Differences in Religious Orientations*

We differentiate between three dependent variables: two dimensions regarding the separation of religious and secular spheres and one dimension regarding the citizens' tolerance toward other religious denominations.²¹

- a) To measure attitudes regarding the separation of religion and society, we used three questions that highlight the relevance of religion in solving societal problems (family, social, and moral problems). We combined these questions to create an additive scale (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.82).
- b) We also formed an additive scale from the survey questions that measure the separation of religion and politics. This scale is also sufficiently reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.77).
- c) We measure tolerance toward other religions using the question on whether one would accept a Jew in one's neighborhood.

In addition to these three dependent variables, we differentiate between three groups of independent variables:

- a) Religious denominations and integration into the church: As noted above attitudes concerning the separation of religion and the secular sphere and tolerance toward other religions vary depending on (1) the degree of integration into a church or a religious institution and (2) the particular religious denomination.
 1. We assume that *all* religious communities are predisposed to spreading their convictions beyond the field of religion. We presume, then, that people with no religious affiliation support separation between religious and secular spheres and are tolerant toward other religions to a higher degree than members of religious communities. We also assume that the degree of integration into a particular church, measured

²⁰A good overview of the surveys that investigate religious attitudes in Turkey is available in an article by M. Emin Köktas (2002). The evidence differs from our results in some respects, which has to do with the different manner in which the questions were formulated. Kayhan Mutlu (1996) investigated the religious attitudes of students from a university in Ankara and demonstrated that religiosity has risen from 1978 to 1991. He argues that these religious attitudes are completely compatible with democratic beliefs.

²¹We recoded all dependent variables so that high values signify a strong separation between religion and the secular world as well as a high tolerance rate toward other religions.

- by attendance, influences beliefs on the separation of religious and the secular spheres.²² The less people are involved in the daily practices of their church, the more likely they are to support a separation between religion and the secular world.
2. It is very controversial as to whether different religions as entire entities can be characterized by a particular belief concerning the relationship of religion and the wider world and, more importantly, by a particular belief on the desired position between religion and the state. Theologians and scholars debate as to whether beliefs concerning the relationship of religion and the secular sphere can be textually derived from the Bible or the Koran. This debate is not particularly surprising, in that the Bible and the Koran are both extremely ambiguous texts whose longevity can be attributed to this very fact; and ambiguity allows for different interpretations of the text. It is not our task to judge the accuracy of different interpretations of the Bible or the Koran, but rather to formulate a hypothesis and test whether it can be empirically confirmed. We start from the *hypothesis* that Islam is a religion in which the separation between the religious and secular spheres is less apparent than in the other faiths under analysis.²³ Unity of religion and politics has existed since Muhammad became the simultaneous religious and political leader of the first Muslim community in the 7th century AD. The Koran is both a secular and religious book of laws. The sharia sets guidelines for social–political life. And although the Koran does not demand a particular form of government, religion and politics appear to be more closely interwoven in Islam than is the case in Christianity.²⁴ Separation between church and state appears to be more anchored in the Christian tradition, though to varying degrees depending on the particular denomination. The Orthodox Christian faith maintains a greater association between church and state than the other Christian denominations. Starting with Constantine the Great, the Emperor had a strong influence on the relationship between the church and state, which were considered as two sides of Christianity. The Emperor accorded the force of law to church ordinance. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, followed Augustine’s model for a separation between the earthly and divine orders. The church claimed “*potestas directiva*” instead of “*potestas directa*” for worldly matters. The church declared precepts concerning the secular world, but never made particular decisions. Following Samuel Huntington, it can be expected that the support for separation between religious and secular spheres increases in the following manner: Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, then Protestants (Huntington 1996).

As Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics are more integrated into their religious institutions than are Protestants and people with no religious affiliation, we cannot use the contingency tables to discern whether the degree of church integration forms the basis for rejecting separation between the religious and secular

²²High values represent a greater degree of church attendance.

²³See the articles “politics and religion” and “church and state” published in the encyclopedia “Religion in Gegenwart und Geschichte” edited by Hans Dieter Betz et al. (2003). See also the articles “church and state” and “politics and Christianity” in “Theologische Realenzyklopädie” edited by Gerhard Müller et al. (1976).

²⁴The assumption that Christianity is in favor of a separation of religion and state, whereas Islam is not, is extremely contentious. Dietrich Jung attempts to prove the assertion that political and religious spheres in Islam form an inherent unit as historically false (Jung 2002).

spheres or whether this is related to the content of the different religions. We can, however, test this in a multivariate regression analysis.

- b) The second group of independent variables focus on the degree of modernization: Several scholars claim that societal modernization has an impact on the separation of religion from society and politics. The more modernized a society, the greater the support for separation of religion and society. The degree of societal modernization is expressed by multiple factors, such as economic welfare and educational levels. Émile Durkheim formulated the thesis that educational levels influence the separation between religion and society (Durkheim 1983: 177). Education increases the potential for self-reflection and the likelihood of a scholarly and secular outlook on the world. As levels of education rise, so does the likelihood that traditions will be questioned rather than automatically accepted. We assume that more educated interviewees are more likely to support a separation of religion and society, whereas people with lower levels of education will not support such a separation. We operationalize the interviewees' education by using their highest completed level of education. Because national educational certificates are difficult to compare, the EVS created an approximate comparative classification ranging from 0 "inadequately completed elementary education" to 8 "highest education – upper-level tertiary certificate."

A second assumption of modernization theory is that economic conditions as a determinant of quality of life influence a person's religious interpretation of the world. This theory stems from the religious sociology of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who incorporated Friedrich Feuerbach's theory of religion. The growth and persistence of religion is explained in terms of worldly factors: "All religion is nothing more than the phantasmagoric reflection in people's minds of those external powers that rule their daily existence, a reflection in which the earthly powers assume the form of heavenly ones" (Engels 1973: 294). Marx and Engels perceive "phantasmagoric products" such as religion as compensation for trials and tribulations people experience in their daily lives. These trials are of a double nature: they consist not only of natural threats like plague or flood but also of societal impediments like economic conditions for survival.²⁵ In order to endure the burdens imposed by nature and society, humans invented religion. Religion gives a supernatural interpretation to this earthly veil of tears (Marx 1972: 378). As earthly happiness waxes, the need for religion wanes. Earthly happiness consists mainly of securing living conditions and economic welfare. From this presumed link, we derive the following hypothesis: With less existential and material needs – i.e., greater prosperity – the need for religiosity decreases. We assume that greater societal economic well-being increases the likelihood that material needs are met, which in turn leads to a greater separation of religion and society. We measure the degree of a country's economic modernization by the level of its Human Development Index. Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure the relative economic well-being of all the interviewees from all countries at the individual level.

- c) The third set of independent variables concerns the institutional separation of religion and politics: Different countries vary in the degree to which the church and state are institutionally separated. The scale ranges from countries that maintain a strict separation (France and Turkey) to states that have or had until recently an institutionalized

²⁵These economic conditions are of course determined by the ownership of the means of production and the class structure, which will be left aside here.

state church (England, Sweden, Denmark). We assume that the institutional separation of church and state also influences citizens' attitudes toward the separation of religion and the secular world (see Chaves and Cann 1992, Pollack and Pickel 2000, Pollack 2003). In order to test this hypothesis, we must first classify the countries in regard to the institutionalized degree of separation between church and state. This task is neither theoretically nor empirically simple. Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel's study is the only one that also includes East European countries (see Pollack and Pickel 2000, Pollack 2003).²⁶ We assume that the degree of institutional separation of church and state influences the extent to which the citizens support the separation of these spheres. We measure the degree of institutional separation with Pollack and Pickel's scale. In a multivariate regression analysis we analyze the influence of the different independent variables on the four dependent variables. This analysis is performed in two steps. Because we only have information regarding the degree of institutional separation of church and state for 15 of the 27 countries, we first conduct the analysis for these 15 countries. The institutional separation of church and state has no significant effect on attitudes toward the separation of religion and society. The effect on attitudes toward the separation of religion and politics (Beta = 0.06) has the expected effect. Consequently, our hypotheses are neither clearly supported nor refuted. This result could be expected on the basis of our descriptive analysis. The citizens of Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) with a strong church—state connection support a separation between religion and the secular world. On the other hand, Turkey belongs to those countries where the separation of church and state is significantly institutionalized (Jung 2003), but the citizens' acceptance of this separation is slight.²⁷

In the second step of our analysis, we excluded the variable, "institutional separation of church and state." By doing so, we were able to consider all 28 countries. Table 8.6 shows the results of three multivariate regression models.

A look at the explained variance for all dependent variables shows that the chosen independent variables are able to explain quite well the attitudes regarding the separation of religion and society as well as religion and politics. This is less the case when explaining tolerance toward other religious denominations.

Educational levels and economic development, variables derived from modernization theory, both influence the separation of religion from the secular world as well as tolerance toward other religions. This confirms our theoretical assumptions. The more educated an interviewee and the more modernized his country, the more likely he is to support a separation of religious and secular spheres and advocate tolerance toward other religions.

All religious affiliations, with the exception of Protestants, exhibit less tolerance toward other religions than people having no religious affiliation. This is particularly the case for Muslims. Likewise, all of those affiliated with a religion accept a separation of

²⁶These authors construct an 8-point scale using five dimensions (existence of a state church, existence of theological faculties at state universities, religious instruction in public schools, existence of military and penitentiary spiritual guidance, and fiscal preferential treatment of churches). A value of 7 indicates a very slight separation of church and state, whereas a value of 0 signifies a complete separation. The authors classify those countries that are part of our analysis in the following way: Austria (5), the Czech Republic (6), Denmark (7), France (2), Germany (7), Great Britain (6), Hungary (5), Ireland (5), Italy (6), the Netherlands (4), Poland (4), Portugal (6), Spain (5) and Sweden (7). Additionally, we classify Turkey as (1), because we know that the separation of religion and the state is strictly implemented.

²⁷Our result corresponds with other studies that analyze the influence of institutional separation between religion and the state either on citizens' religiosity (Pollack 2003) and on support for democracy or for certain policies (Minkenberg 2003).

Table 8.6 Explaining attitudes toward separation of religion and personal conduct of life, religion and society, religion and politics, and tolerance toward other religious denominations: linear regressions

	Separation of religion and personal conduct of life	Separation of religion and society	Separation of religion and politics	Tolerance toward other religious denominations
Religion ^a				
Protestants	-0.153	-0.105	-0.070	0.023
Roman Catholics	-0.339	-0.161	-0.093	-0.020*
Orthodox	-0.222	-0.056	-0.174	-0.022
Muslims	-0.284	-0.080	-0.108	-0.183
Integration into church	-0.496	-0.367	-0.360	-0.047
Level of modernization				
HDI	0.049	0.164	0.218	0.143
Education of respondent	0.079	0.084	0.134	0.121
R ²	0.57	0.26	0.32	0.10

The models represent standardized beta-coefficients from the OLS regression analysis.

If not indicated differently, coefficients are significant at the 1% level.

*= significant at 5% level.

^aCategory of reference: people who do not have a religious affiliation.

religion and the world to a lesser degree. One *may not* assert that Orthodox Christians and Muslims differ from Catholics and Protestants; the results are too inconsistent to reach this conclusion. Less important is the religious denomination to which a respondent belongs than is the degree to which he is integrated into his religious community.²⁸ The degree of integration in a specific church or religious institution has a much greater degree of influence on the separation between the religious and secular spheres than does the religious denomination to which the interviewee belongs. This is an extremely interesting discovery. Regarding Turkey's accession into the EU, some authors like Samuel Huntington (1996) and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (2002) assume that a separation of church and state is *inherent* to the Christian tradition and that this is not the case for the Muslim faith. "The co-existence of church and state or, more generally, the state and religious communities is so self-evident for modern people that they are unconscious of the fact that this is a particular characteristic of Christianity. Even today, Muslim and East Asian countries still do not recognize this fact" (Campenhausen 2002: 98). Our analysis does not support this statement. The fact that Turkey and the Enlargement II Orthodox Christian countries support the EU religious concepts to a lesser degree has little to do with the inherent substance of their dominant religious systems. Rather, this orientation is influenced by the degree of modernization and the strength of integration into the church. Because the degree of modernization is slight in these countries and the degree of integration into religious institutions, particularly in Turkey, is very high, the citizens of these countries show less support for the EU's blueprint.

Let us summarize the results of this section: We have seen that the EU favors a separation of religious and secular spheres and expects its citizens to tolerate other religious communities. If one distinguishes among the old and new EU member states, the

²⁸Zulehner and Denz (1994) come to a similar conclusion.

Enlargement II countries and Turkey, it then seems that the old member states support the EU position the most and country groups support it to an ever decreasing degree in chronological order of accession. Within country groups, differences between individual nations are to some extent substantial. This is particularly true for the Protestant countries as well as for the Czech Republic and France, where the interviewees strongly support the EU's blueprint. In the other Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and, above all, Muslim countries, the separation of religion and the secular world is supported to a significantly lesser degree.

We have shown that support for the EU position has less to do with belonging to a specific religion and depends more on the degree of integration into a religious institution. Furthermore, the degree of societal modernization significantly influences the level of support for the EU's blueprint of religion. The more modernized a society, the more likely its citizens are to support a separation of religious and secular spheres as well as advocate religious tolerance. Thus, in countries that are less modernized and where the level of integration into the church is high, the support for the separation between religious and secular spheres and for religious tolerance is substantially lower. Turkey is the most fitting example of this configuration.

8.3 Family Values and Gender Roles

Family is an important societal sphere in people's lives in almost all societies; for many, it is the most important. The European Values Study asked citizens from different countries how important different aspects of their life (work, politics, religion, family, leisure time, friends, and acquaintances) were to them. Respondents could choose between the following alternatives: "very important," "quite important," "not important," or "not at all important." About 85.5 percent consider family "very important"; for comparison, only 7.8 percent give the same worth to politics. Country values for the family sphere vary between 66.8 percent in Lithuania to 97.2 percent in Turkey.

The structure of this section is similar to that of Section 8.2: First, we reconstruct the EU blueprint of family and gender roles. Then, with the help of secondary survey data analysis, we investigate the extent to which citizens of member states and accession countries support this EU family model. Finally, we pursue the causal question of how one can explain the country differences in terms of family structure.

The principle of gender equality in the work place has a long tradition in the EU. Article 119 in the Treaties of Rome (1957) established the principle of equal pay for men and women in the EC realm. The Treaty of Amsterdam adopted and expanded this concept in Article 141. Numerous regulations and community directives have further supplemented this article, and decisions substantiated by the European Court of Justice have made it legally binding (Bergmann 1999: 45ff., Wobbe 2001). The principle of equality includes equal treatment of men and women regarding access to employment, job counseling, and education. This principle also guarantees equality in regard to work conditions as well as membership in employee and employer organizations. Member states have, for the most part, adopted these EU directives into their national legislation.²⁹

²⁹This is a necessity, however, and is not a sufficient provision for real gender equality in the work place. Kristin Bergmann (1999) provides evidence of enormous differences between EU member states despite the legal adaptation to this provision.

Some scholars have criticized the fact that EU equality policies refer only to the work place. Many women perform household chores, an activity that does not count as employment. The chances to access employment therefore remain unequal (Ostner 1993). The EU reacted to this criticism. Article II-93 of the Basic Rights Charter broaches the compatibility of work and family. As a fundamental right, pregnant women are protected against being fired and receive paid maternity and parental leave. Additionally, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty extended the equality principle to several other political spheres. Article 3 obliged the EC to facilitate equality of men and women in all policy spheres (Läufer 1999). At the March 2000 meeting in Lisbon, European heads of state further substantiated this for political employment measures. In order to achieve an equal level of employed women in member states, the EU aims to create equal chances for both genders in all political spheres. Moreover, it declares the compatibility of family and work as a political goal (European Council 2000). The principle of equality is most comprehensively extended in the EC's recommendations on various societal spheres, but these recommendations are not legally binding. In order to facilitate the compatibility of work with family and household chores, the EC's 1994 "White Papers on European Social Policy" called for an improvement in the availability of child-care. Furthermore, the EC demanded a more equitable division of household chores between men and women (European Commission 1994: 47). Six years later, the recommendations of the 1994 White Papers were adopted into the "European Social Agenda" (Council of the European Union 2000), in which political goals and concepts until 2010 were laid out. Equality in businesses was one such central goal. The issue of restrictions hindering women from employment was also broached, and necessary changes were defined.

Summarized, one can say that EU family policy deems equality between men and women in the work place as the most important issue. The EU believes this goal will only become reality if an infrastructure for raising children outside the family is developed and if traditional household gender roles are removed. With this political orientation, the EU supports an egalitarian relationship between men and women, in which women are employed and the socialization of children takes place in part outside of the familial environment. In this regard, EU policies show a preferred familial model that differs from the traditional, bourgeois family model.³⁰

8.3.1 Citizens' Conceptions of Family and Gender Roles

Equal opportunity of employment for men and women is the most central part of the EU's family and gender policy. By utilizing the following questions, we are able to operationalize and empirically determine the degree to which citizens from EU member and accession states support this model quite well. Citizens were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than

³⁰The equality and family concepts of the EU were part of the negotiations with the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bretherton 2001) and were carried out with a 31-chapter checklist. The content of each chapter emphasized various points concerning the legal and structural assimilation of the accession countries to the EU (agriculture, environment, statistics, etc.). The equal treatment of men and women is negotiated in Chapter 13 (Employment and Social Policy) and, consequently, forms one required criterion necessary to accede into the EU. This holds true even if some authors do not interpret the implementation of "gender mainstreaming" principles as sufficient (Bretherton 2001).

women.” Possible answers are “agree,” “neither,” and “disagree.” The question measures attitudes toward gender equality in the work place fairly well. The question insinuates a shortage of jobs, which forces interviewees to express their actual attitude by making them answer whether their convictions toward equality would also hold under restrictive conditions.

First, we look at differences at the aggregate level. As Table 8.7 shows, there are clear and significant differences among country groups regarding their attitudes toward the employment of women. Whereas the old member states and Enlargement I countries express a clear support for gender equality in the workplace, slightly less than 50 percent of citizens in Enlargement II countries and only a third of the Turkish population expresses support for this concept. Of all EU countries, Turkish citizens show the lowest level of support for the EU’s blueprint concerning gender equality. The results also reveal high internal variance within particular aggregate country groups. Scandinavian countries show the clearest support for gender equality. In the accession countries, a significantly higher percentage of Polish and Maltese citizens reject the EU equality model. We return

Table 8.7 Attitudes toward equality of men and women in the labor market (%): “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.”

	Approval	Disapproval	Neither . . . nor
EU-15	19.7	69.8	10.5
Sweden	2.3	93.4	4.4
Denmark	6.2	89.4	4.4
Finland	9.0	84.7	6.3
Netherlands	12.5	83.4	4.1
Ireland	16.4	75.6	8.0
Greece	19.9	72.6	7.5
Great Britain	21.0	66.9	12.1
Belgium	25.0	70.1	4.9
France	21.7	68.3	10.0
Spain	21.7	62.5	15.8
Luxembourg	23.7	66.0	10.2
Portugal	27.2	61.4	11.3
Italy	27.0	56.8	16.2
Austria	28.6	52.9	18.5
Western Germany	28.4	52.8	18.8
Eastern Germany	24.8	59.0	16.2
Enlargement I	25.3	61.4	13.4
Estonia	13.6	75.5	11.0
Hungary	22.7	67.9	9.3
Slovenia	17.8	67.8	14.4
Latvia	19.8	69.5	10.7
Czech Republic	19.2	65.3	15.6
Lithuania	22.7	65.1	12.1
Slovakia	24.1	54.2	21.7
Malta	48.8	42.7	8.4
Poland	37.9	45.1	17.0
Enlargement II	37.3	47.4	15.3
Bulgaria	36.7	47.5	15.8
Romania	37.9	47.4	14.7
Turkey	61.9	34.4	3.8

to these country differences when explaining our findings. A second question for measuring attitudes toward gender equality indirectly measures convictions toward equal access to employment of men and women without suggesting the restriction of job shortages on the market. Unfortunately, this question was not asked in Turkey. Citizens were asked whether and to what degree they agreed with the following statement: “A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.” The possible answers range from “strongly agree” and “agree” to “disagree” and “strongly disagree.”³¹ We summarized the percentages of both concurrence alternatives in Fig. 8.2.

The results on the aggregate level are similar to those found in Table 8.7: The support of the EU model for gainfully employed women shrinks with each subsequent EU accession group. Slightly less than half of the old EU citizens maintain that women would rather not be employed. This percentage rises to 70 percent in Enlargement I countries and to 80 percent in Enlargement II countries. Country differences within the aggregate categories, particularly between EU-15 countries, are significant.




Fig. 8.2 Attitude toward being a housewife: “A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children” (%)

*The question was not asked in Turkey.

³¹The neutral choice of “neither agree nor disagree” existed only for Austria and Ireland. The aggregate calculations for “EU countries” consequently do not include these countries.

8.3.2 Explaining Differences in the Conception of Family and Gender Roles

We understand the different EU member states and accession countries as representations of different social constellations. In order to determine these factors, we rely on earlier studies. Numerous empirical studies attempt to explain differences in the concepts of family and gender roles through country comparisons (Gomilshak et al. 2000, Haller and Hoellinger 1994, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Knudsen and Waerness 1999, Künzler et al. 1999, Gerhards and Rössel 2000). We differentiate between two dependent variables: The question “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women” and the question “A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children,” a question not posed in Turkey.

In determining the independent variables, we distinguish between three different groups of variables and an additional single variable:

- a) Social scientists assume that a relationship exists between the support for gender equality and the degree of modernization. The more modernized a society, the more gender equality is supported. The degree of a society’s modernization is expressed by multiple factors, like the degree of economic modernization or educational levels. According to Ronald Inglehart, economic modernization and welfare influence peoples’ generalized value orientations. Economic modernization affects attitudes toward family and gender roles in the following manner: Greater economic wealth raises the likelihood that material needs are met. This, in turn, increases the population’s preference for post-materialistic values (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Norris 2003). Post-materialistic values include self-determination and gender equality. One can then expect that people living in countries with a high level of modernization will support a family model with equality of employment for women to a greater degree.³² We measure the degree of a country’s economic modernization using the Human Development Index (HDI). As mentioned above, numerous measures for determining the level of modernization are included in the HDI: per-capita GDP, level of education, and average life expectancy. We unfortunately do not have the ability to measure the relative economic welfare of interviewees in all the countries at an individual level.³³

Education is another aspect of societal modernization. Education increases the possibility of self-reflection and the likelihood of gaining a scholarly worldview. Inglehart describes the effect associated with higher levels of education as cognitive mobilization in which more education increases the likelihood that traditional concepts are not automatically accepted, but rather questioned and possibly rejected. Questioning tradition also relates to traditional gender roles. We assume that more educated interviewees are more likely to support gender equality and operationalize education by means of the highest level of completed education by the interviewee. This is measured with the help of an 8-point scale ranging from “inadequately completed elementary education” up to “university with degree/higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate.”

³²Christian Welzel (2000) offers a good overview of literature regarding this theoretical argument of modernization.

³³Another commonly used measurement for the level of modernization is per-capita GDP. We also carried out a regression analysis with this variable instead of the HDI. The results remained constant.

b) Our second independent variable which might have an impact on the support for gender equality is the cultural–religious orientation of the respondent: Societies are influenced by different cultural lines of tradition that shape conceptions toward family and gender (Haller and Hoellinger 1994, Inglehart and Norris 2003). Cultural traditions are substantially influenced by religion and by the ideas embodied in the belief systems of different religions. As seen in Section 8.2, current and future EU citizens either have no religious affiliation, are Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, or Orthodox Christians. We assume that membership in one of these religions will influence attitudes toward gender equality in the following manner:

All of the religions in our analysis have at some point in time legitimized the dominance of men over women to varying degrees and continue to do so to some extent.³⁴ In the Christian denominations, the book of Genesis legitimizes a male-dominated world. The originally equal relation between man and woman disappeared after the fall of mankind and was transferred into a relationship in which the woman is subject to the man. The Koran states that men have superiority over women, and it also provides the right to polygamy. Men, as witnesses, carry twice the weight as women. We therefore assume that the degree of integration into a particular church/religious institution (measured by attendance) – regardless of which one – impacts attitudes toward gender equality. The less a person is integrated into the daily practices of his or her religious institution, the more likely he or she is to support gender equality.

We assume also that differences exist among the various religious denominations regarding their interpretation of gender roles, which affects their followers' beliefs. It is highly controversial whether and to what degree different interpretations of gender roles can be traced back to particular religious texts like the Bible or the Koran. We do not judge the correctness of different interpretations. Rather, we theoretically formulate one position as a hypothesis and empirically test whether it can be confirmed by our data. Islam advocates strongly a traditional gender hierarchy, in which the wife is responsible for the children and the household, while the husband is responsible for earning money and maintaining a position of power in the family. Being a wife and mother is the most important societal function for women; education and employment are subordinate (El-Saadawi 1991: 51). The public sphere is reserved for men, and women who participate in the public sphere are forced to conceal this fact. To look at Turkey for example, Swiss civil law was introduced in 1926, shortly after the establishment of the republic. This legislation placed family and marriage questions under the secularized control of the state and strengthened the role of women. Despite this strong legal protection, traditional family law, derived in part from the Islamic faith, remains central in contemporary Turkey (Nauck and Klaus 2005). Traditional Islamic law is structured in a patriarchal manner and secures the dominance of men in many spheres.

Compared to the importance of family and gender roles in the Islamic faith, Christianity has relatively little to say about gender roles (Mitterauer 1999: 325). We expect, therefore, that the preparedness of Muslims to support the EU gender equality model will be lower than that of the other religions. Of the three Christian denominations, Protestantism appears to deviate most from the patriarchal gender order. Since

³⁴The definitions are derived from the entries of the key words “family,” “woman,” and “man” in the excellent encyclopedia “Religion in the Present and Past” edited by Hans Dieter Betz et al. (2003) and from the entries in the encyclopedia “Theologische Realenzyklopädie” edited by Gerhard Müller et al. (1976).

the Reformation, representatives of the Catholic and Protestant Church have developed differing beliefs on the family. Protestants defined this sphere of life as a mainly secular sphere and have therefore governed it less normatively (Dülmen 1990: 157–164). As compared to the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church has been oriented more toward the bourgeois model of a family in which the man is the provider and the woman is responsible for the children, household, and family. This belief is still relevant for the Catholic Church today. In the published “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World” (Ratzinger and Amato 2004), the Vatican recognizes the role of women in the work place, but sees motherhood as woman’s most important role. We expect, therefore, that readiness to support the EU equality model by religious orientation is as follows: Muslims will show the least support, followed by Orthodox Christians, and Catholics. Protestants appear to support the EU model the most.

- c) The third set of independent variables we use to explain conceptions of family and gender roles relate to welfare state models and institutionalized equality. For example, socio-political measures in former East Germany supported the employment of women with small children, but women with children in former West Germany were ideologically and structurally supported to stay at home (Wendt 1997, Wingen 1997).³⁵ The countries under analysis differ in the degree to which national policies contain a specific family model and the degree to which political measures support this model (Kaufmann et al. 1997). A country’s family policies are embedded in the type of welfare state, different types of which do exist³⁶ (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001, Korpi 2001, Künzler et al. 1999, Lessenich and Ostner 1998, O’Connor 1993, Orloff 1993, Pascall and Manning 2000, Pfau-Effinger 2000, Roller 2000). Almost all of these typologies relate to Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s 1990 classification of “liberal,” “conservative,” and “social democratic” welfare states.

We assume that political support for the employment of women affects citizens’ attitudes toward equality. Unfortunately, there is no classification available to satisfactorily describe the equality policies of the 28 countries. We have discussed the different approaches that exist elsewhere (Gerhards 2007). We thereafter substitute this variable with the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).³⁷ Similar to the Human Development Index, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) sponsored GEM project conducted surveys in several countries in the world to create indicators (Human Development Report Office 2000). This index measures the degree of institutionalized gender equality with three variables: the proportion of women and men in parliament, the proportion of women and men in top business and government positions, and the difference between the income for men and women. Complete gender equality results in a value of 1, and total inequality results in a value of 0. Values for France, Luxembourg, Malta, and Bulgaria are missing. The GEM is certainly not an optimal operationalization with which to measure

³⁵Franz-Xaver Kaufmann et al.’s excellent volume provides a good overview of ten country reports.

³⁶Several authors note an additional relationship between religion and a particular welfare state model (Kaufmann 1988, Martin 1978). Countries with a Catholic tradition have developed the most advanced welfare state, which corresponds closely to the “family support model.” On the other hand, Protestant countries have developed welfare states supporting the other two family models. This relationship is not valid for Central and East European countries.

³⁷The Beta-values in the regression model are quite similar independent whether one uses the “Gender Empowerment Measure” or Korpi’s classification as an independent variable.

Table 8.8 Explaining attitudes toward gender equality: linear regressions

	“Women have an equal right to a job”	“Women want more than just home and children”
Level of modernization		
HDI	0.080	0.092
Education	0.254	0.170
Religion ^a		
Protestants	0.038	−0.002+
Roman Catholics	−0.081	−0.043
Orthodox	−0.055	−0.020*
Muslims	−0.140	−0.047
Integration into church	−0.081	−0.083
GEM	−0.004+	0.213
Gender ^b	0.082	0.064
R ²	0.140	0.147

The models represent standardized beta-coefficients from the OLS regression analysis.

If not indicated differently, coefficients are significant at the 1% level. (* = significant at 5% level, + = not significant).

^a Category of reference: people who do not have a religious affiliation.

^b Category of reference for the gender variable: men.

institutionalized support for gender equality, in that GEM measures “output,” or the results concerning equality. The degree of equality can be, but is not necessarily traced back to national policies. As no better measurement exists, however, we use this indicator in our analysis.

d) Our fourth independent variable is gender, because we assume that questions regarding gender equality affect men and women differently. We hypothesize that women support the concept of gender equality more than men do. Table 8.8 contains the results of the regression analysis, and comments on the results follow.

The explained variance of both dependent variables shows that we can satisfactorily explain attitudes toward the employment and equality of women with the chosen independent variables. Both of the modernization variables (educational levels and economic development) have the strongest influences on citizens’ conceptions of equality and goes in the direction we expected. The higher the respondent’s level of education and the more modernized his or her country, the more likely he or she is to support gender equality.³⁸

The degree of institutionalized equality clearly increases the likelihood that one supports gender equality, for at least one of the dependent variables. Religious membership also impacts citizens’ conceptions of gender equality. Affiliation with Islam increases the probability that one rejects the EU concept of gender equality.³⁹ Orthodox Christians and Catholics also show a rejection of gender equality, although to a somewhat lesser degree. Protestants are more likely to support this concept. This result corresponds to our expectations. It is also evident that the degree of integration in a religious institution has a negative

³⁸The influence of education is substantially larger in comparison to the HDI. This could be due to the fact that education is measured at the individual level, whereas the HDI is measured at the country level.

³⁹The substantially smaller influence on the second dependent variable traces back to the fact that Turkey could not be considered in this regression due to missing data.

influence on support for gender equality, which also corresponds with our assumptions. Finally, our analysis shows that the gender of the interviewee influences his or her attitudes toward gender equality. As expected, women support their right to equality more clearly.

Summary: EU family policy primarily concerns gender equality in the work place. The EU believes this can only be achieved when a childcare infrastructure exists outside of the household and when traditional household chores are split between men and women. We analyzed the extent to which citizens from EU member states and accession countries accept the EU's conception of an ideal family. When one distinguishes between old and new EU member states as well as Turkey, it becomes clear that the old members support the EU position most strongly. This support weakens with subsequent accession groups. Turkish citizens reject the EU family blueprint most strongly and express the clearest preference for a traditional, male-dominant gender order. With the help of a multiple regression analysis, we tried to account for the differences in support of gender equality. We could show that the support for the EU's family blueprint is influenced by the degree of modernization and institutionalization of equality through domestic policies. Additionally, citizens' religious affiliation, integration into a religious community, and their own gender influence their attitudes toward gender equality.

8.4 Political Culture in a Wider Europe

Although today's European Union began as an economic community, it has increasingly evolved into a political union. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht were particularly important for this development. The EU sees itself as a union of democratic states, characterizes its own institutional order as democratic, and also endorses elements of a participatory democracy in which the inclusion of civil society is emphasized. In the first section, we reconstruct the EU's understanding of democracy and civil society in greater detail. We then analyze the extent to which current and future EU citizens hold democratic values and participate in the civil society organizations. Finally, we attempt to explain the differences in democratic beliefs and engagement.

In an etymological sense, democracy means popular government. Robert Dahl, among others, emphasizes that democracy in the sense of popular rule is impossible and therefore remains an ideal. A government of the many is, however, feasible. Dahl characterizes this as a polyarchy, the model for a representative democracy. Using Dahl's (1989: 10ff.) criteria the EU has elements of a representative democracy implemented, and more important, it expects its member states to share the principles of a representative democracy: (1) Elected representatives make EU decisions. This includes officials of both the European Parliament and members of the European Council and Council of Ministries. The latter groups are made up of nationally elected government representatives. (2) The European Parliament and national governments are chosen in free elections every 4 or 5 years. (3) At the European level, the active and passive right to vote is granted to all citizens. Likewise, national constitutions afford the active and passive right to vote to their citizens. (4) The freedom of expression and information and the freedom to assemble and associate are guaranteed.

The EU blueprint of representative democracy has been supplemented with elements of participatory democracy over the last couple of years. There are at least three EU documents that define the role of civil society. These include the 2001 "European Governance"

White Book, the “Report from the Commission on European Governance,” as well as the 2002 “General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission” (EU Commission 2002a, b). All three documents highlight the importance of integrating civil societal actors. The EU hopes to improve support for its institutions by strengthening these actors.

8.4.1 Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Democracy and Civil Society

Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure all dimensions of the EU’s blueprint on democracy with the available data. Therefore, we focus on measuring the support of democracy at a more abstract level. In doing so, we utilize Dieter Fuchs’s proposal (1997, 1999a, b, 2000), which distinguishes three hierarchical levels of support for democracy: basic values, structure, and performance (Fuchs 1997: 83ff.). Support for basic democratic values constitutes the topmost level, political culture. Citizens must perceive democracy as the best option among different political systems and reject alternative autocratic systems.

Four items measure basic attitudes toward democracy and democratic culture. Two of these items measure direct support for democracy. The first question reads as follows: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. Please tell me whether you find the following forms of government are very good, pretty good, good, rather bad or very bad.” One of the political systems for which respondents had to give an opinion was democracy (“one should have a democratic political system”). The second item that measures direct support for democracy reads: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree, disagree or completely disagree.” One of these things was “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” The affirmative opinions for this question are also summarized in the table below. The results from Table 8.9 show almost universal support for the idea of democracy among all citizens. This is also true in the four aggregate groups. This finding confirms Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1999), who showed abstract democratic values to be universal values, seeing as they enjoy support in almost every society.

The results of the second dimension for measuring democratic culture – support or rejection of autocratic regimes – are somewhat different. Two questions are available for measuring this dimension. Interviewees were asked to respond to the following statements: “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” and “Having army rule.” The percentage of respondents who considered these statements to be “very good” or “fairly good” are reported in Table 8.10.

The first question appears to measure attitudes toward democracy particularly well, in that a government control by the parliament and citizens is a central characteristic and a good measure of one of Dahl’s criteria. At the aggregate level, it is apparent that few old and Enlargement I state citizens show acceptance of totalitarian rule. This does not hold true for Bulgaria and Romania, and especially not for Turkey. More than half of Enlargement II citizens and two-thirds of the Turkish population are receptive to the idea of a strong leader (see Pickel and Jacobs 2001: 6). Answers to the second question yield similar results, albeit to a much lesser degree. With the integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU, support for one of the EU’s central pillars, the idea of democracy, will dissipate. If Turkey accedes, this support will dissipate further.

Table 8.9 Support of democratic values (%)

	“The country should have a democratic political system”	“Democracy is better than any other form of government”
EU-15	93.6	93.5
Denmark	98.0	98.6
Greece	97.9	96.6
Sweden	97.4	94.3
Netherlands	96.7	96.4
Italy	96.6	94.3
Austria	96.3	96.9
Western Germany	95.4	97.3
Spain	94.3	93.8
Eastern Germany	92.1	92.8
Luxembourg	92.1	95.0
Portugal	91.9	92.6
Ireland	91.6	93.2
Belgium	90.6	92.0
France	89.2	93.3
Finland	88.3	90.5
Great Britain	86.8	77.7
Enlargement I	88.1	89.3
Malta	93.6	93.9
Czech Rep.	92.9	92.6
Slovenia	89.5	90.1
Latvia	88.2	88.9
Hungary	87.4	83.0
Estonia	86.8	90.3
Lithuania	85.8	90.7
Slovakia	84.1	84.5
Poland	83.6	89.3
Enlargement II	87.9	81.2
Romania	88.7	78.2
Bulgaria	87.0	84.3
Turkey	91.7	87.9

The second dimension of the EU blueprint of a democratic culture is the strength of civil society. The EU propagates greater involvement of civil societal actors in the decision making process. The European Values Study allows us to determine three key figures for measuring the strength of civil society.

- a) The European Values Study posed the following question: “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say, which, if any, you belong to? Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; Religious or church organizations; Education, arts, music, or cultural activities; Labor unions; Political parties or groups; Local community action; Third world development or human rights; Conservation, environmental, animal rights groups; Professional associations; Youth work; Sports or recreation; Women’s groups; Peace movement; Voluntary organizations concerned with health; Other groups; Belong to none.” The spectrum of groups is very comprehensive, in that it includes traditional interest organizations like labor unions, new social movements, and different welfare-oriented groups.

Table 8.10 Support of authoritarian values (%)

	“The country should have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”	“Having the army rule the country”
EU-15	24.0	4.8
Greece	8.7	9.7
Denmark	13.9	0.8
Italy	15.6	4.4
Western Germany	15.6	1.9
Austria	16.3	1.8
Sweden	21.1	6.6
Spain	23.1	7.8
Eastern Germany	23.3	1.9
Finland	25.2	5.7
Great Britain	25.8	6.8
Ireland	26.8	4.2
Netherlands	27.2	1.1
Belgium	31.6	4.5
France	34.5	4.0
Portugal	36.5	9.0
Luxembourg	44.8	7.6
Enlargement I	27.5	5.8
Czech Rep.	16.8	2.1
Estonia	18.6	3.3
Malta	18.9	4.1
Slovakia	19.8	7.4
Hungary	20.4	3.0
Poland	22.2	17.8
Slovenia	23.9	4.6
Lithuania	53.7	4.7
Latvia	57.8	5.4
Enlargement II	56.5	19.8
Bulgaria	45.0	11.3
Romania	66.7	27.9
Turkey	66.1	24.7

By naming the additional category of “other groups,” the question remains open. However, the question does not determine whether interviewees are members of several organizations within any given category. We formed two variables for the analysis of this question. The first measures the number of categories of groups to which an interviewee belongs. The second variable measures whether an interviewee is a member of at least one organization (Table 8.11).

Membership in civil society groups is highest in the EU-15 countries. The Enlargement I countries exhibit lower levels in comparison. The civil society sector is even less developed in Bulgaria and Romania, while civil society in Turkey is the least developed. There is significant variation within the first two country groups at the national level. The Scandinavian countries Finland, Sweden, and Denmark along with the Netherlands demonstrate the greatest citizen participation in civil society groups, whereas the Southern countries Spain and Portugal show the least activity. Enlargement

Table 8.11 Membership in civil society organizations

	Membership in at least one organization (%)	Mean of memberships in organizations
EU-15	57.7	1.34
Sweden	95.7	3.22
Netherlands	92.4	3.09
Denmark	84.4	1.91
Finland	80.1	1.86
Austria	66.8	1.50
Belgium	65.2	1.57
Luxembourg	58.2	1.39
Ireland	57.1	1.20
Greece	56.4	1.25
Western Germany	50.9	0.86
Italy	42.1	0.78
Eastern Germany	42.0	0.62
France	39.4	0.63
Great Britain	33.6	0.60
Spain	30.9	0.53
Portugal	27.6	0.40
Enlargement I	39.8	0.64
Slovakia	65.0	1.13
Czech Rep.	60.2	1.04
Slovenia	51.7	0.98
Malta	42.2	0.63
Estonia	33.5	0.51
Latvia	31.4	0.41
Hungary	30.8	0.45
Poland	25.0	0.40
Lithuania	18.6	0.26
Enlargement II	22.0	0.34
Bulgaria	22.9	0.36
Romania	21.1	0.31
Turkey	7.8	0.12

I countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia significantly exceed the group average.⁴⁰

- b) Membership in an organization or group says little about the interviewee's participation in the group's activities. One can argue that the effect the EU desires for civil societies will only materialize when people actively participate in the groups. Fortunately, the European Values Study poses the question whether the interviewee is *active* in the group in which he or she is a member. We have constructed two variables from this question. One variable adds up the number of groups in which an interviewee is active. The second variable measures whether an interviewee is an active member of at least one organization. We discuss the empirical results after briefly presenting a third measure of civil societal engagement.

⁴⁰This result coincides with Bernhard Weßels' (2003: 178) empirical findings for 12 post-communist societies.

c) We constructed an index of social capital, following Pippa Norris' suggestions (2002: 149). Social capital is composed of two dimensions. The first is structural, consisting of membership and activities in civil societal organizations. The second is cultural, consisting of trust in other citizens. According to Putnam's (2000) concept, the structural element of membership in voluntary associations generates the cultural element. We use the question regarding active membership in a voluntary organization to measure the first dimension. We use the following question to measure the second dimension: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" (Answer alternatives being "most people can be trusted" and "can't be too careful"). We combine these two variables to an additive index with values ranging from 1 (little social capital) to 3 (high degree of social capital).

On the aggregate level, the pattern from Table 8.11 is repeated in Table 8.12. Citizens in the EU-15 member states are distinctly more active in civil society groups and

Table 8.12 Doing voluntary work in civil society organizations and social capital

	Voluntary work in at least one organization (in %)	Mean of voluntary work in organizations	Social capital
EU-15	32.3	0.56	1.70
Sweden	56.1	1.15	2.22
Netherlands	49.2	0.93	2.09
Denmark	37.2	0.57	2.03
Finland	38.0	0.64	1.96
Great Britain*	42.3	0.83	1.71
Ireland	32.6	0.61	1.69
Belgium	35.4	0.69	1.65
Greece	39.8	0.96	1.64
Austria	30.4	0.48	1.63
Eastern Germany	16.4	0.19	1.60
Italy	26.1	0.46	1.58
Spain	17.6	0.27	1.57
Luxembourg	30.2	0.63	1.55
Western Germany	22.0	0.28	1.54
France	27.1	0.38	1.48
Portugal	16.4	0.23	1.29
Enlargement I	25.3	0.40	1.46
Slovakia	51.4	0.81	1.68
Czech Rep.	33.2	0.50	1.58
Slovenia	28.5	0.54	1.50
Malta	28.6	0.52	1.49
Estonia	18.0	0.29	1.41
Lithuania	15.8	0.20	1.41
Latvia	22.4	0.29	1.40
Hungary	15.4	0.26	1.38
Poland	13.9	0.21	1.32
Enlargement II	17.3	0.24	1.36
Bulgaria	18.8	0.27	1.46
Romania	15.7	0.21	1.26
Turkey	6.4	0.10	1.13

* There is no information for "activities in other voluntary organizations" available for Great Britain. Therefore, the values for Great Britain are probably slightly underestimated.

possess a higher level of social capital than citizens from the other three groups. Once more, Turkey reported the lowest values for both dimensions. Significant variations also exist in the first two country groups at the national level. Sweden is the model country for a highly developed civil society, while Spain and Portugal maintain much lower levels in these dimensions. In Enlargement I countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia exhibit above average values, which reach the average values of old EU countries. Overall, it is evident that the EU's blueprint for civil society receives the highest support from the old EU countries. Every EU expansion will dilute support for the EU civil society, as civil societal engagement in subsequent accession countries is lower on average.

8.4.2 Explaining Democratic Values and Civil Society Engagement

The emergence and stability of democracies has been a major field of research in comparative political science. With the so-called third wave of democratic transformation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this field has once more experienced a revival (Berglund et al. 1998, Huntington 1991). Some of the explanations offered in this field can be used to explain democratic values.

- a) In his 1959 essay "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," Seymour M. Lipset asserts that a relationship between socio-economic modernization and democratization exists. This relationship has been empirically verified in several studies (Vanhanen 1997, Lipset 2000). Four causal relations lie behind this correlation (Rössel 2000). First, economic growth leads to the emergence of a middle class, which prevents social polarization. Second, economic growth leads to more consumption among all classes, which has a tempering effect on labor unions. Third, this leads to the assumption that the elite becomes less skeptical toward democracy. Finally, modernization goes hand-in-hand with an improved educational system. A higher level of education leads to more tolerance and to the rejection of ideologies that attempt to reduce freedom. In regard to this last factor, Lipset explicitly refers to democratic values and claims that a causal relation between modernization and democratic values exists. Other authors (Dalton 1988, Inglehart 1997, Welzel 2000 and 2002) have further expanded upon this thesis, saying that modernization leads to increased economic and cognitive resources, which, in turn, results in an increase of citizens' participatory abilities and claims. This civic participation increases pressure to build democratic institutions. Thus, modernization is not a sufficient condition for democratization, but it does bring societies into what Samuel Huntington calls a "transition zone," where democratization is first made possible.
- b) From a historical perspective, democracies first developed in Protestant countries, and then later in Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim countries. Two hypotheses can explain this historical difference. First, in comparison to other religions, Protestantism emphasizes the concept of individualism, an element conducive to forming democratic attitudes. Second, the link between church and state, which would complicate the development of democratic institutions, is not as strong in the Protestant faith (Lipset 2000: 399). The negative relationship between Catholicism and democracy, however, becomes invalid for the period following World War II. The number of democracies in Orthodox Christian and in Muslim countries is substantially below average (Lipset 2000). Only one-quarter of the 47 countries with a Muslim majority are democracies today (Norris and Inglehart 2002: 238). Samuel Huntington (1996) assumes that the Muslim faith

contains elements that are incompatible with democratic ideals. Empirically, this thesis is extremely controversial. By using data from the World Values Survey, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2002) as well as Yilmaz Esmer (2002) tested whether Muslim citizens' views on democratic values differ from their Christian counterparts. Both studies show that citizens' democratic value orientations in Muslim countries do not significantly differ from those of citizens in Christian countries (see also Tessler 2002). Using our data, we will test Huntington's thesis of whether Muslims and Orthodox Christians support democratic ideals less than Catholics and Protestants.

- c) Finally, we assume that a population's experience with their democratic institutions will affect attitudes toward democracy. The longer people live in a democracy, the more they come to trust the democratic institutional system and the more they support the ideas implemented by the system. "The chance of acquiring the typical value orientation toward democracy may vary with time and depend on the consistency of the democratic structures" (Gabriel 1994: 103). This socialization hypothesis of democratic attitudes has been empirically tested several times (Muller and Seligson 1994). In another example, Dieter Fuchs (1999a) explains differences in democratic attitudes between East and West Germany by referring to this socialization hypothesis. Consequently, in our analysis, we utilize a variable measuring the number of continuous years as a democracy since 1920 (Inglehart 1997: 357f.).

Table 8.13 includes the results from our multiple regression models. The dependent variables are the two aforementioned attitudes toward an authoritarian regime.⁴¹ We also formed an additive index from the two variables measuring support of an authoritarian regime.⁴² In addition, we have calculated regression models to explain the two aforementioned democratic values. Due to the fact that the variance between countries and individuals is very small, these regression models do not provide a suitable explanation

Table 8.13 Explaining support of authoritarian values

	"Having a strong leader"	"Having the army rule the country"	"Additive index support of authoritarian regime"
Modernization level			
HDI	0.427	0.267	0.435
Education	0.150	0.115	0.160
Religion ^a			
Protestants	0.006+	-0.010+	-0.001+
Roman Catholics	-0.030	-0.059	-0.048
Orthodox	0.005+	-0.069	-0.022
Muslims	-0.027	-0.071	-0.058
Years under democratic rule	-0.242	-0.101	-0.225
R ²	0.101	0.075	0.126

The models represent standardized beta-coefficients from the OLS regression analysis.

If not indicated differently, coefficients are significant at the 1% level, * = significant at 5% level, + = not significant.

^a Category of reference: people who do not have a religious affiliation.

⁴¹ All variables were recoded so that high values signify a high level of support of democracy.

⁴² Cronbach's Alpha yields 0.68.

of the differences in democratic values. The explanation of attitudes toward authoritarian regimes is somewhat better. Both modernization factors confirm our expectations, in that the degree of modernization and the interviewee's level of education have a clear positive effect on rejection of an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, experience with democracy, measured by the number of continuous years under democratic rule, does not play the positive role we hypothesized. This corresponds to other findings, which state "Assumption that the acceptance of democratic principles is strongest in countries with a long democratic tradition is not confirmed" (Gabriel 1994: 104). We can conclude that less support for democracy is found in traditional democratic countries. Moreover, these countries more strongly advocate authoritarian regimes. The influence of religion and religious affiliation goes in the direction we have expected, but is not very strong, and not always significant. Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics support authoritarian regimes more strongly, with Protestants being the only exception to this finding. Before summarizing our analysis, we will explain membership and engagement in civil societal groups.

This is not the first attempt to explain membership and engagement in civil societal groups (see Chapter 2). Rather, we follow other authors' hypotheses and operationalizations. The works of Pippa Norris (2002) and James E. Curtis et al. (1992, 2001) are particularly helpful, due to the fact that they work with similar data sets (i.e., World Values Survey) and investigate country differences (most recently Paxton 2002). While Norris focuses primarily on the consequences of a strong civil society, Curtis et al. attempt to provide an explanation for its causes. First, the authors reconstruct hypotheses already existing on this topic, some of which are similar to variables explaining democratic values.

- a) Some authors assume that a relationship exists between the level of modernization and the strength of civil society (Smith and Shen 2002). There are two reasons for this expected relationship. First, modernization leads to greater professional specialization and to differentiation among status positions. Interest organizations often emerge as trade or other associations in which people maintain similar social positions. These groups then try to implement their members' interests into the political process (Smith 1972). Seymour M. Lipset (1994: 2) assumes that this chain of causality, in which a middle class with several interest groups emerges due to economic development, explains the processes of democratization. Second, modernization is connected to a rise in welfare and free time. Along with higher education, these resources make people more flexible, thus making membership in associations easier. "Higher average levels of formal education in a nation tend to make people of that nation more ready and able to participate in associations as individuals on average (. . .), leading to greater associational prevalence in the aggregate" (Smith and Shen 2002: 101). In his research, David H. Smith (1972, Smith and Shen 2002) shows that a strong relationship does in fact exist between economic modernization and the development of civil society. We expect a positive relationship between the degree of modernization and the development of the civil society sector. Additionally, we incorporate the interviewees' level of education into our analysis.
- b) The USA represents the classical model of a developed civil society, which Alexis de Tocqueville attributed to their religious structure. The first groups of settlers were the Puritans, a Protestant sect that fled from religious persecution by the Anglican Church. These Puritan settlements consisted of decentralized, small units with an anti-hierarchical structure, emphasizing individual responsibility and self-organization (de Tocqueville 2000, Lipset 1996). Unlike the denominations of Catholicism,

Orthodox Christianity, or Islam, the Protestant Church seems to be more egalitarian, participatory, and anti-hierarchical. This gives their members a good opportunity to participate in church activities and to practice cooperation with others. These effects may transfer to the way these members engage in other civil societal groups.

Several authors have tried to test the thesis that Protestantism supports civil society engagement, unlike Orthodox Christianity, Islam, or Catholicism (Lipset 1994, Verba et al. 1995, Inglehart and Baker 2000, Curtis et al. 2001). We adopt the ideas of these studies and test whether Protestants engage in civil society more than members of other religious denominations.

c) Finally, some scholars assert that the political–institutional environment influences the strength of civil society. The incentive for engaging in voluntary organization is greater in democratic systems because restrictions for such engagement are lower than in dictatorships or totalitarian systems. Democracies link political decisions to citizens’ preference, which motivates citizens to join organizations and associations so that their interests and preferences are better heard. As compared to dictatorships and totalitarian systems, democracies have distinctly fewer restrictions to founding or to participating in voluntary organizations. Freedom of expression, assembly, and demonstration are ensured rights in democracies. Membership in associations is also often fiscally supported. Consequently, we assume that the civil societal sector is more developed in societies that have a long history of democracy than in countries who have only had a short period of time as a democracy (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Baker 2000, Lipset 1994, Curtis et al. 2001). We measure this variable with the number of years a country has maintained democratic rule without disruption. Marc M. Howard (2002) introduces another difference. He also shows that the civil societal sector in democracies is distinctly more developed than in authoritarian regimes. But in a comparative study between post-authoritarian (i.e., South Africa, South Korea, Chile, and Argentina) and post-communist regimes, he illustrates that civil societal engagement in post-communist societies is clearly less developed than in post-authoritarian regimes. Howard offers three explanations for this difference: (1) Although communist regimes attempted to suppress the autonomous civil societal sector, this does not distinguish them from authoritarian governments. Communist regimes also constructed a state-controlled sector for association, in which citizen membership was partly obligatory.⁴³ This negative experience with a state-ordered civil society seems to have had a particular effect on citizens, reducing their readiness to organize in an association. (2) Communist regimes’ massive control over public life led to the formation of a societal sphere, namely private networks of friends, in which one could express oneself freely. These networks have survived the transformation to democracy and a market economy and continue to play a very important function. As a result, the need to integrate in civil societal organization is rather small. (3) Lastly, many citizens in former communist societies are very disappointed with the results of the transformation process. They are neither satisfied with the economic nor political developments. The consequence is a blocking of civil society engagement. Bernhard Weßels (2003) demonstrates that membership in civil societal organizations in post-communist countries has drastically

⁴³A 90 percent organizational participatory rate for trade unions was not uncommon.

Table 8.14 Explaining membership and activity in civil society organizations: linear regressions

	Membership in organizations	Activity in organizations	Social capital
Modernization level			
HDI	0.110	0.040	0.118
Education	0.197	0.150	0.215
Religion ^a			
Protestants	0.116	0.054	0.117
Roman Catholics	-0.007+	0.028	-0.011+
Orthodox	0.018	0.042	-0.015*
Muslims	0.021	-0.007+	-0.028
Political—institutional environment			
Years under democratic rule	0.252	0.095	0.100
Years under socialist rule	0.055	-0.002+	0.012+
R ²	0.159	0.045	0.118

The models represent standardized beta-coefficients from the OLS regression analysis.

If not indicated differently, coefficients are significant at the 1% level, * = significant at 5% level, + = not significant.

^a Category of reference: people who do not have a religious affiliation.

declined between 1990 and 2000. A large portion of this change is due to a downturn in the number of trade unions. In order to test Howard's thesis, we include the variable "years a country was under communist control" in the regression analysis (Inglehart 1997). Table 8.14 reflects the results of our causal analysis.⁴⁴ Some authors consider excluding union membership from the analysis because membership in unions is sometimes involuntary (Smith 1975: 239, Curtis et al. 2001: 789). We therefore conducted a separate analysis for which we excluded union membership, but this does not change the structure of the results.

As the R²-values show, membership in civil society organizations and social capital can be explained very well, while the active engagement in these groups cannot. This might be due to the fact that the variation of this variable is rather small. Which factors explain membership in civil societal organizations? All models confirm the expected relationship between the degree of modernization and the level of civil societal involvement. The more modernized a society, the more people take part in voluntary organizations and the higher the levels of social capital. This is true for both modernization indicators, in which education has a rather strong influence. It is also apparent that democracies provide a propitious environment for the development of civil society. The longer a country is under democratic control, the more developed its civil society becomes (for similar results, see Paxton 2002). The thesis that Protestants exhibit a higher level of civil societal engagement is also confirmed. The impact of other religions on civil society involvement is ambivalent and often not significant. Our analysis does not confirm Howard's findings (2002) that a

⁴⁴For the sake of space, we do not give the results for the two variables "membership in at least one organization" and "participation in at least one organization." The results of logit regression models resemble the other findings presented here.

socialist experience reduces engagement in voluntary organizations, regardless of the length of democratic control.⁴⁵

Summary: The EU feels an obligation to provide the basic principles of a representative democracy and also expects this from their member states. More than 80 percent of European citizens support democracy and consider it the best form of government; however, an affinity to authoritarian regimes is apparent in a couple of countries. This is particularly the case in Turkey and Romania, and also with the majority in Latvia and Lithuania, who feel more assured with a strong leader able to govern without a parliament and elections. We have seen that civil society is strongest in the old EU member states, while this support decreases with every accession round.

We have seen that the degree of a society's modernization has a clear and positive influence on both dimensions, democratic values and engagement in civil society. In this regard, the modernization process might lead to an alignment with and to a stronger support of democracy in accession countries. The EU wants to encourage this sort of modernization (Delhey 2003). Cultural factors also influence democracy and civil society. With the exception of Protestants, all other denominations support authoritarian regimes to a greater degree. Moreover, the Orthodox Christian and especially Islamic tradition have a negative influence on the development of social capital.

8.5 Concepts of the Welfare State in the European Union

Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) developed the most well-known typology of welfare states, which distinguishes between three welfare state models: the social democratic system (i.e., Sweden), the conservative (i.e., Germany and Italy) and the liberal (i.e., USA).⁴⁶ Edeltraud Roller (2000) used Esping-Andersen as a starting point and developed her own typology, which describes four welfare state models differentiated by the number of state-regulated spheres.⁴⁷ The number of regulated spheres increases from model to model. In the *liberal* model, the state only assumes responsibility in extreme cases like sickness, age, or inability to work. In the *Christian democratic* model, the state also takes measures to create equal opportunities. In the *social democratic* model, the state becomes responsible for equality of outcomes and full employment. The *socialist* welfare state additionally controls wages and salaries (Roller 2000). We use Roller's typology in our analysis. First, we reconstruct the EU welfare state blueprint by interpreting central legal texts of the EU (see also Immerfall

⁴⁵In a second regression model, we replaced the variables "years of continuous democracy" and "years under socialist rule" with two dummy variables, which measure socialist and authoritarian legacies (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). Both variables have a negative influence on civil society. Indeed, the effect caused by the authoritarian regime is greater than that of ex-socialist countries. This partially supports Howard's thesis that both authoritarian and socialist pasts have a negative influence on civil society. Nevertheless, this finding also contradicts his assumption that the effect is greater for former socialist countries.

⁴⁶A number of publications concerning this typology exist (Leibfried and Pierson (1995), Lessenich and Ostner (1998), Manow (2002), Obinger and Wagschal (2001), Schmidt (1998), Schmid (1996), Vobruba (2001), Vogel (1999)).

⁴⁷Esping-Andersen distinguishes between three analytical dimensions that help to determine the three welfare state systems: de-commodification, stratification, and the relationship of the market to the state. Roller's typology mainly deals with the first dimension and describes the degree to which security of a citizen's existence is independent from income.

2006, Chap. 6). Then, we test the extent to which the member states and accession candidate countries' citizens support this blueprint. Third, we attempt to explain the similarities and differences. The section concludes with a summary of our findings.

Part I of the constitutional draft discusses the EU's goals and values.⁴⁸ Solidarity is defined as a central value in Article I-2 (Conference 2004). "Social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress" is considered a fundamental EU goal (Article I-3). It is not possible, however, to conclude that the EU advocates a social democratic welfare state model simply because it adopts the goal of full employment. The question of whether full employment is established through state-regulated measures or through a subordinated state role remains unanswered. Part I of the constitutional draft also promotes social protection and intergenerational solidarity. Unlike the goal of full employment, these general goals are more clearly expressed in later articles. Article 94 from Part II of the constitutional draft is titled "social security and social assistance." We cite this article in its entirety because it includes the most important elements of the EU's welfare state blueprint. "(1) The Union recognizes and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices. (2) Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices. (3) In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices" (Conference 2004).

The EU clearly and concretely supports a welfare state protecting its citizens from basic risks associated with unemployment: sickness (including invalids and people in need of long-term care), maternity leave, age.⁴⁹ This welfare state model almost perfectly matches Roller's liberal or basic model. More detailed versions of a European welfare state do not exist in a legally binding form, because there is no consensus between the member states that a more developed European welfare is desirable.⁵⁰ Even the basic welfare state model is formulated in a qualified way in that securing definitive achievements in this field remains a right of individual member states. This means that "a European social state" will consequently not emerge (Leibfried and Pierson 2000: 352). Using game theory, Fritz Scharpf (1996) attempts to explain why European welfare state did not emerge and probably never will. In his view, poorer EU countries are not interested in European-wide social standards. Labor productivity and capital is clearly less substantial in these countries than in the more economically developed EU countries. If poorer countries want to be competitive, factor costs, above all, wages, ancillary wage costs, and environmental costs,

⁴⁸Part III, Article II of the constitutional draft contains an abundance of socio-political related regulations. These relate to the 1961 European social charter and the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. These aforementioned charters are not considered in the following analysis.

⁴⁹Article 95, Part II specifies health protection more clearly: "Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities."

⁵⁰An abundance of social policy programs and initiatives exists for fighting poverty, indirect ramifications of the currency union and the common market. "Indirect" European social policies and EU "soft law" (Leibfried and Pierson 2000, Schulte 2001) are not considered here.

must be very low. An equalization of wages and social standards would probably lead to higher unemployment rates in these countries. Poorer EU countries are therefore strong advocates for the preservation of country-specific standards and exercise their veto against standardized regulations. It is therefore unlikely that a developed European welfare state will develop in the near future (Vobruba 2001: 102ff.).

8.5.1 The Citizens' Attitudes Toward the Welfare State

When we analyze citizen's attitudes toward the welfare state, we will not be able to determine whether citizens think their nation state or the European Union should be responsible for providing a certain social standard. Instead, we will focus on the level of welfare state people want to be institutionalized independent from the question who provides social welfare. The European Values Study contains three questions that measure the support of the EU model of a welfare state. The first item is as follows: "I will now read to you different groups of people. Tell me on the basis of this list how much value you place on the living requirements for . . . (1) older people in our country, (2) the unemployed in our country and (3) sick and handicapped people in our country." Possible answers ranged from "not at all," "not so much," "to a certain extent," "a lot," to "very much." One could argue that the question is not a good indicator of attitudes toward the welfare state because it does not refer to the state itself and does not measure the extent to which interviewees assign responsibility to the state for the three groups. The question does, however, give information as to whether one is, in principle, prepared to support the elderly, the unemployed, and the sick and handicapped. We assume that general support for these groups represents a positive disposition of support for a state social policy, an assumption for which we found empirical support. An additional question asked interviewees was whether they believe the state or the individual should assume responsibility for providing for these groups. In a correlation analysis, a positive correlation emerges between attitudes toward state responsibility and the three questions concerning the care of the sick, handicapped, elderly, and unemployed.⁵¹

Table 8.15 shows the results for the three approval categories ("very much," "a lot," and "to a certain degree") as well as the countries' means (in parentheses) for the particular questions. A high percentage value and high country mean signify high level of support for a particular group.

First, we look at the approval for supporting the elderly. The approval rating in all four aggregate groups is around 90 percent, and there is hardly a difference between the old EU member states and the accession countries.⁵² Turkey shows an even higher approval rate. There is also general approval at the country level. The old member states of Ireland, Portugal, and East Germany show above average support for the elderly. In the accession countries, Malta, then Slovakia, express support for the elderly to the highest degree. A comparatively smaller degree of solidarity is evident in Luxembourg and Latvia. But the approval rate is overall very high. A similar picture emerges for attitudes toward the sick

⁵¹The correlation coefficients are not particularly high (although all are significant (p-value: 0.01)): The relationship between state responsibility and care for the elderly amounts to 0.045, for sick and handicapped people 0.055, and for the unemployed 0.129. The lower values from the first two correlations are partially due to the extremely lopsided distribution of support for the elderly, sick, and handicapped.

⁵²Nevertheless, the mean differences are in almost all cases (the exceptions are the EU members and Enlargement II countries) at a 5 percent level of significance.

Table 8.15 Support of the EU welfare state blueprint (percentage and mean of support of different groups in need)

	Elderly people	Sick and disabled people	Unemployed people
EU-15	91.9 (3.82)	90.8 (3.69)	81.4 (3.31)
Ireland	96.2 (4.33)	97.5 (4.30)	87.5 (3.58)
Portugal	97.7 (4.28)	96.0 (4.05)	86.4 (3.57)
Italy	96.3 (3.97)	96.1 (3.94)	90.6 (3.66)
Greece	96.1 (3.94)	94.9(3.96)	89.8 (3.59)
Eastern Germany	98.6 (4.03)	94.8 (3.70)	91.9 (3.55)
France	90.9 (3.85)	90.0 (3.71)	85.6 (3.53)
Great Britain	93.1 (3.98)	92.3 (3.83)	77.3 (3.18)
Sweden	94.8 (3.92)	94.1 (3.78)	78.8 (3.23)
Spain	95.3 (3.77)	90.1 (3.52)	91.5 (3.55)
Finland	89.4 (3.68)	88.0 (3.56)	85.9 (3.42)
Belgium	90.7 (3.69)	89.1 (3.55)	76.4 (3.14)
Western Germany	95.1 (3.75)	90.1 (3.47)	83.0 (3.16)
Austria	88.7 (3.53)	87.8 (3.49)	75.2 (3.13)
Netherlands	89.2 (3.58)	90.5 (3.48)	72.9 (2.95)
Denmark	79.1 (3.51)	82.8 (3.53)	62.3 (2.82)
Luxembourg	78.2 (3.26)	77.8 (3.19)	66.3 (2.85)
Enlargement I	90.2 (3.72)	89.3 (3.63)	81.3 (3.35)
Malta	93.7 (4.14)	94.1 (4.06)	81.4 (3.38)
Slovakia	94.8 (4.02)	93.8 (3.82)	88.5 (3.57)
Lithuania	94.3 (3.94)	94.0 (3.75)	92.5 (3.71)
Poland	95.2 (3.97)	89.0 (3.73)	87.3 (3.54)
Czech Rep.	85.0 (3.45)	93.2 (3.77)	85.5 (3.40)
Slovenia	91.6 (3.48)	92.5 (3.60)	90.7 (3.53)
Hungary	89.2 (3.74)	83.2 (3.43)	69.0 (3.02)
Estonia	89.6 (3.52)	86.5 (3.38)	80.2 (3.27)
Latvia	77.9 (3.23)	76.6 (3.13)	55.7 (2.69)
Enlargement II	89.6 (3.86)	87.2 (3.71)	83.8 (3.59)
Bulgaria	96.6 (4.04)	93.0 (3.78)	90.9 (3.73)
Romania	82.5 (3.68)	81.1 (3.63)	76.7 (3.44)
Turkey	94.5 (4.21)	97.3 (4.38)	94.9 (4.27)

and handicapped in that the significant majority in all four country groups supports the sick and handicapped. The country level differences are similar to our findings of the first question. Ireland, Portugal, and Malta make up the leading countries, and Luxembourg and Latvia have lowest levels of support in their respective groups. The results are somewhat different for attitudes toward the unemployed. The average level of support is around 80 percent, which is indeed very high, but less than for the other groups. Additionally, the differences between the countries are somewhat more pronounced. Turkey shows the least support of the unemployed. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Hungary also maintain the lowest approval ratings in their respective groups.

We assume that the unemployed receive less support from their fellow citizens than the sick and elderly because they are seen as being at least partially responsible for their current status. Elderly, sick, and handicapped people are not faulted for being in their situation.⁵³ This is not necessarily the case for the unemployed; either the system is at fault in that

⁵³Even if certain sicknesses are caused, to a certain extent, by a particular life style, it can still be assumed that every person tries to remain healthy.




Fig. 8.3 Support for the elderly, sick, handicapped, and unemployed (mean index)

there are not enough jobs are provided for those citizens willing to work or the individual is seen as having a bad work ethic.

The countries follow a similar pattern for all three questions in Fig. 8.3. We formed an index by adding up the three indicators. The index values range from 0 “absolutely no support” to 12 “very strong support.”⁵⁴

The majority of citizens in all countries adopt the EU position by demonstrating their support for the elderly, sick, and unemployed.⁵⁵ On the aggregate level, EU member states and Enlargement I countries yield very similar results. Citizens in Enlargement II countries show higher levels of support for the elderly, sick, and unemployed, and Turkey supports this EU concept the most. Latvia and Luxembourg are the countries with the lowest levels of support, followed by Denmark and the Netherlands. The next section attempts to explain these differences.

⁵⁴We recoded the scale so that it begins at 0, with high values indicating a high level of support. The mean value amounts to 7.9 and the standard deviation is 2.5. The scale exhibits a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.82.

⁵⁵Another question from the European Values Study provides further support for this result. Interviewees were asked whether satisfying the basic need of all people is a prerequisite of a just society. This question also exhibits an average approval of over 90 percent in almost all countries. Since a state reference is lacking, we do not analyze this variable further.

As mentioned above, the three indicators are not ideal for measuring the citizens' attitudes toward the welfare state because the questions do not directly refer to the state. The data from the 1996 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) "Role of Government III" includes such a reference and is therefore a better operationalization of the EU's welfare state blueprint. Apart from the state's responsibility for the sick, elderly, and unemployed, this survey also asks about provision of housing, another integral part of the EU blueprint. The disadvantage to using this data set is that the ISSP survey was not carried out in all member and accession countries. The following question from the ISSP is well suited for measuring the EU blueprint. "Please indicate the extent to which the state should be responsible for the following items: (1) Providing health care for the sick, (2) Securing a fair standard of living for the elderly, (3) Providing for those not able to support themselves financially with adequate accommodations, (4) Ensuring an adequate standard of living for the unemployed." The interviewee could choose from the following answers: "The state should . . .": "definitely be responsible," "be responsible," "not be responsible," and "by no means be responsible." Table 8.16 provides the percentage values for both the two positive approval alternatives.⁵⁶

The results support the findings from the European Values Study. The approval of the EU welfare state blueprint is extraordinarily high in all countries. This is particularly true for the elderly and sick. Support for providing accommodation to the unemployed is somewhat lower. Holding the state responsible for supporting the unemployed is particularly low in Hungary and in the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, the survey was not carried out in Turkey.

Table 8.16 "The state should take responsibility for. . ." (%)

	Provide health care for the sick	Provide a decent standard of living for the old	Provide a decent housing for those who cannot afford it	Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed
EU-15	97.1	97.3	88.3	85.8
Spain	99.2	98.9	98.0	93.9
Ireland	99.1	99.1	93.9	91.5
Eastern Germany	99.1	98.4	91.1	91.6
Sweden	96.2	97.7	81.8	90.3
Great Britain	98.6	98.1	88.6	78.7
Italy	98.6	98.0	88.1	75.1
Western				
Germany	96.6	96.0	77.9	80.4
France	88.7	92.4	86.8	80.9
Enlargement I	98.1	98.0	84.0	71.8
Slovenia	97.2	96.4	90.8	86.4
Poland	97.9	98.5	90.5	81.2
Latvia	98.7	99.5	85.7	82.6
Hungary	99.3	98.2	76.1	62.8
Czech Rep.	96.8	96.6	79.7	44.7
Enlargement II				
Bulgaria	97.2	97.8	79.9	87.6

⁵⁶The sequential order of the countries arises from their average approval rating of all four categories.

Our analysis shows that a majority of citizens in all countries support at least the minimal welfare state model, which the EU favors. We used ISSP data to measure whether citizens desire a welfare state model beyond the type spelled out by the EU. We again use Roller's typology, but as the data does not allow a differentiation between the liberal and the Christian democratic model, we differentiated between three variants: a basic model (Roller's "liberal model"), a social democratic model, and a socialist model.⁵⁷ Based on this distinction we can group interviewees into three categories: (a) interviewees who want the state to be responsible for at least two of the three groups (the sick, elderly, or unemployed) while rejecting a further state role are classified as advocates of the basic liberal model; (b) interviewees are classified as advocates of the social democratic model if they also define one of the two following tasks as state responsibilities: "reduction of income inequality" or "provision of jobs"; (c) interviewees are classified as advocates of the socialist model if they also advocate legal controls on wages and stipends (Table 8.17).

The results show a clear pattern. Citizens' beliefs clearly go beyond the EU blueprint in all countries. In their view the minimal welfare state does not go far enough. The socialist model has the highest approval rate in all three aggregate categories. This holds true for almost all countries except Sweden and West Germany, where the social democratic model is preferred. Only a minority supports the minimal welfare state model. As mentioned above, we are not able to determine whether people think that either their state or the European Union should provide such an extended welfare state.

One must consider, however, that the data was collected in 1996. Roller (2000: 98) shows in her time comparison between 1985 and 1996 that support for a reduced role of the state increases over time. One can assume that this trend has continued up until today.

Table 8.17 Support of different welfare state models (%)

	No welfare state	Basic model	Social demo-critic model	Socialist model	Not classified
EU-15	0.5	8.9	29.8	56.5	4.4
Sweden	0.7	20.2	40.9	34.5	3.7
Great Britain	0.2	15.1	32.5	46.7	5.6
Western Germany	0.8	13.7	46.8	34.0	4.7
Ireland	0.1	9.7	43.1	43.6	3.6
France	1.9	8.5	23.9	56.0	9.7
Italy	0	6.7	18.0	69.3	6.0
Eastern Germany	0	2.8	13.9	80.7	2.6
Spain	0	1.3	19.6	77.6	1.6
Enlargement I	0.5	4.7	21.8	69.1	3.9
Czech Rep.	2.2	12.1	24.2	54.8	6.8
Hungary	0.1	5.1	30.8	61.0	2.9
Poland	0.4	3.1	17.2	76.7	2.6
Latvia	0	3.0	21.9	71.8	3.3
Slovenia	0.2	1.2	11.6	82.5	4.5
Enlargement II					
Bulgaria	0	6.7	12.1	76.7	4.6

⁵⁷The concept "socialist model" is not very accurate because socialist concepts go far beyond controls over wages and stipends. Most importantly, this does not include the collectivization of means of production.

Earlier, an intense debate raged over whether the social security system was feasible. State services were reduced in all countries, even under social democratic governments. We assume that this development has had consequences on citizens' attitudes. The number of claims for state-welfare services has probably also decreased. Even if this portends the development of such a trend, a discrepancy between the EU welfare state blueprint and the citizens' attitudes will continue to exist. While the EU advocates a minimal welfare state model on the European stage, the citizens desire a greater degree of state welfare and intervention in the economy. This disparity between the EU and its citizens has increased and may increase further with EU expansion.

8.5.2 Explaining Differences in Attitudes Toward the Welfare State

We have seen that support for the elderly, sick, handicapped, and unemployed is very similar in the different European countries. Nevertheless, certain differences do exist, which we will attempt to explain in this section. Our analysis primarily uses the European Values Study, because it is the only survey to include all relevant countries. The three questions from Table 8.15 – attitudes toward the elderly, sick/handicapped, and unemployed – form the dependent variables. As independent variables, we use both (a) individual variables and (b) macro contexts.

- a) There are a number of studies that investigate the factors influencing attitudes toward the welfare state, some of which are comparative empirical studies (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, Delhey 2001, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Künzler et al. 1999, Mau 2002, 2003, Roller 2000, Svallfors 1997). Most of these studies focus on individual characteristics in order to explain attitudes toward the welfare state, and the individual's constellation of interests plays a significant role. The studies show that those people or groups who profit or who could profit from welfare state measures are more likely to support a welfare state. Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Jane A. Rafferty (1989) demonstrate that such relationship exists, and Stefan Svallfors (1997: 293) shows that underprivileged classes are more likely to support a redistributive, interventionist state. Roller also arrives at similar results (2000: 106). If one adheres to the argument that interviewees' interests influence their beliefs toward the welfare state, then the following hypothesis can be deduced. First, we assume that older people are more concerned for the elderly (their own age group) than are younger people. The elderly are also more likely to support aid for the sick and unemployed, because they are more likely to become ill as they age. Additionally, the unemployment rate for the job-seeking elderly is higher than that of younger citizens. We also assume that jobless people are more likely to support social protection for the unemployed. In regard to support for the unemployed, we take into consideration whether an interviewee is employed.
- b) Apart from individual interests, the cultural and structural societal contexts of individuals may also influence their attitudes toward a welfare state. Similar to earlier sections, we distinguish between the three factors of modernization, religion, and the role of the state.

In his seminal 1958 study, "The Passing of Traditional Society," Daniel Lerner argues that the process of modernization is accompanied by the development of empathy. "High levels of empathy, which only occur in modern societies, form part of the prevailing personal life style, this is one of the most important hypotheses of our study. Modern society

entails industrialization and urbanization as well as a participatory society” (Lerner 1958: 49). Empathy includes the ability to place oneself in another’s shoes and to take on the role of the others, even if they are not family members or close friends. This is different than in traditional societies where empathy is limited to close friends and family members.⁵⁸ This hypothesis can be used for the question at hand. Solidarity with the sick, elderly, handicapped, and unemployed is an expression of empathy in that it is not limited to relatives and close friends, but refers to *abstract* groups of people requiring help. One can expect from Lerner’s hypothesis that the level of support for a greater welfare state increases with the degree of modernization. Again we determine a country’s modernization by using the Human Development Index.

We expect that a country’s religious traditions influence citizens’ attitudes toward the welfare state.

All religious denominations support the concept of helping weaker members, albeit to different degrees (Schwinger 2003: 159). We therefore assume that members of religious communities support the sick, handicapped, elderly, and unemployed more than people lacking a religious affiliation. Furthermore, we assume that the degree of church integration has an influence on how one views the welfare state. We assume that the more people are integrated into the daily practices of their church, the more strongly they advocate a welfare state. We measure the degree of integration through church attendance.

In addition, we assume that different denominations have developed varying attitudes toward the proper form of the welfare state. We assume that these attitudes influence their members accordingly. Referring to Christianity, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann expresses his view “that there is no uniform Christian influence on the development of the welfare state. Rather, depending on the religious denomination and the relation of church and state, this influence differs” (Kaufmann 1988: 68). Esping-Andersen suggests a relationship between Catholicism and an enlarged, conservative welfare state model (Esping-Andersen 1990: 53, 122f.). Catholicism certainly focuses more on corporative structures than on a strong central state (Esping-Andersen 1990: 61). In Protestant denominations, a greater emphasis on self-responsibility is evident. The Protestant ethic is characterized by “personal responsibility for the improvement of one’s own fate” and merges “public welfare with individual initiative” (Manow 2002: 208).⁵⁹ Therefore, in comparison to Catholic countries, Philip Manow speaks of a “Protestant restrained welfare state” (Manow 2002: 210). This is particularly the case for Calvinism. Alfred Müller-Armack notes “how little their dogma encourages social sympathy. The Old Testament notion of a wrathful God visibly hardens the mind toward poverty and suffering” (Müller-Armack 1959: 234). Michael Opielka attests to the overall Christian, particularly Catholic, social ethic “a meaningful and often unperceived development of the West European welfare state” (Opielka 2003: 180, Kaufmann, 1988, 1989). Consequently, we expect the support of the elderly, sick, and unemployed to be associated with membership in the Catholic or, to a smaller extent, Protestant Church.

⁵⁸On the one hand, empathy is a consequence of the modernization process. Increased economic growth, division of labor, economic interdependence, and urbanization increase contact with strangers and create the structural requisites that are necessary for empathy to develop (Simmel 1992). On the other hand, empathy is a necessary requirement in order to interact with strangers at all.

⁵⁹Philip Manow also indicates that one must distinguish between Lutherans and reformed Protestant faiths. The latter distinguishes itself by “under-emphasizing communal self help, strictly separating church and state, advocating spiritual asceticism and opposing strong state programs” (Manow 2002: 208).

Islamic and Orthodox welfare state beliefs are more difficult to reconstruct, but it does seem that these religions emphasize the principle of personal responsibility to a much lesser degree. Additionally, the connection between church and state is much stronger. Regarding the Orthodox Church, Müller-Armack argues that “the lack of individual entrepreneurship is compensated by the activities of the almighty state” (Müller-Armack 1959: 93). We assume that this deficit of self-initiative and the role of the state in the Orthodox Church lead to substantial support for the welfare state. In Islam the state is interpreted as an instrument for implementing an Islamic societal order and that the demand for socio-political engagement of the state is therefore substantial. With the poor tax (“zakat”), the Islamic faith possesses a tool that several Islamic economists have interpreted as a basis for a well-constructed welfare state (Hildebrandt 1996: 10f). Overall, we assume that Protestants and, to a lesser degree, Catholics support the welfare state less strongly than Orthodox Christians and Muslims.

We assume that there is a causal relationship between a country’s institutions and its citizens’ attitudes. The direction of the causality between the two factors is nevertheless a controversial subject. While the welfare state regime and its activities may influence the convictions of its citizens (Edlund 1999, Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003), it may also work the other way around. We know that politicians in a democratic society must adhere to the values and preferences of their citizens. It may therefore be the case that citizens’ values influence political decisions and, consequently, the institutional structure of the welfare state. Empirical evidence regarding this relationship is ambivalent. In his eight-country study, Stefan Svallfors (1997) determined a relationship between regime type and citizens’ convictions toward state redistribution. This relationship, however, is not valid for Sweden. In his 14-country study, John Gelissen (2000) comes to a different conclusion: “The findings give no support to the claim of a systematic variation between levels of popular support for the welfare state and its institutional set-up” (Gelissen 2000: 285).

In international comparative studies on welfare states, the extent of a country’s welfare provisions is often measured by a small number of key indicators, like public social expenditure. Authors who distinguish between welfare state regimes have criticized this approach. Nevertheless, we use the degree of public social expenditure as a variable for measuring a welfare state for three reasons. First, we have concentrated solely on protection against risks in our definition of the European welfare state. We have not considered the complicated aspects of equality. Second, key figures, such as public social expenditure, are still the best predictors for the degree of redistribution effects in the welfare sector (Busch 1998: 276ff.). Third, the numbers are available for the majority of countries in a readily comparable form, which allows us to carry out a comparative analysis. We use the public expenditures for social needs (“public social expenditure”) in proportion to the GDP as our indicator (OECD 2002). High values represent a significant state influence.⁶⁰

The results of our regression models are illustrated in Table 8.18. The results of the aforementioned additive support index are located in the last column.

Ten percent of the variance in attitudes toward the elderly and for the additive index are explained through our analysis. The aforementioned factors explain attitudes toward the

⁶⁰The OECD data on social public expenditure is not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia. In order to control our analyses, we used a second measurement, namely the degree of state influence on the economy as measured by the “Index Economic Freedom of the World: Size of Government” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003). The data for this index is available for all countries and correlates with the public social expenditures indicator. The results do not change substantially. The influence of modernization is somewhat reduced.

Table 8.18 Explanation of support of the elderly, sick, handicapped, and unemployed people: linear regressions

	Elderly people	Sick and handicapped people	Unemployed people	Additive index
Level of modernization				
HDI	.187	.224	.082	.189
Religion ^a				
Protestants	0.050	0.049	-0.022	0.030
Roman Catholics	0.026	0.003+	-0.009+	0.008+
Orthodox	0.095	0.104	0.069	0.104
Muslims	0.092	0.111	0.126	0.128
Integration into church	0.098	0.088	0.075	0.101
State Intervention				
Public social expenditure	-0.221	-0.281	-0.164	-0.258
Individual markers				
Age	0.207	0.104	0.112	0.164
Unemployment			0.085	0.030
R ²	0.089	0.07	0.068	0.092

The models represent standardized beta-coefficients from the OLS regression analysis.

If not indicated differently, coefficients are significant at the 1% level. * = significant at 5% level. + = not significant.

^a Category of reference: people who do not have a religious affiliation.

sick, handicapped, and unemployed somewhat less. As expected, a higher degree of modernization leads to greater solidarity with the elderly, sick, and unemployed. The Human Development Index is the strongest explanatory factor. The postulated influence of religion is also confirmed by our data. Higher levels of integration into religious communities positively and significantly affect support for the elderly, unemployed, and the sick and handicapped. The effect produced by the affiliation with different religious denominations is also, by and large, validated. Catholics differ only slightly from people with no religious affiliation, whereas Orthodox Christianity and Islam have a positive influence on attitudes toward the welfare state. The Protestant faith is the only denomination that deviates from the hypothesis. Protestants show higher levels of support than Catholics for the elderly and the sick, but demonstrate even less empathy for the unemployed than people without a religious affiliation. In contrast to our assumption, the existence of a strong welfare state does not lead to greater support of the elderly, sick, handicapped, and unemployed. Rather, support declines as the strength of the welfare state increases. Using an explanation offered by Ronald Inglehart (1997: 256ff.), one may assume that this is due to the effect of diminishing marginal utility. Because the welfare state is successful, the necessity of solidarity is not considered as important and consequently gains less support. This is only a speculation, however, and requires further research to be substantiated.

In regard to the socio-demographic variables, all of our hypotheses were confirmed. Age has a strong influence on citizens' attitudes toward all three groups. This is particularly the case for support of the elderly. Our hypothesis concerning the unemployed is also well proven. If the respondent is unemployed, this clearly increases solidarity with other unemployed people.

Summary: A highly developed welfare state is a common structural element in all Western European countries (Alber 1989: 34). The central goal of the welfare state is

to protect “against the standard risks of old age, invalidity, sickness, unemployment and, only recently, maternity leave” (Schmid and Niketta 1998: 14). European countries achieve these ends in very different manners. Consequently, different welfare regimes are identifiable.

In this section, we first reconstructed the EU welfare state blueprint. There are a number of regulations and initiatives along with a significant amount of rhetoric surrounding the “European social model.” The EU actually advocates a very basic model of a welfare state that protects its citizens against basic factors rendering them unemployable: sickness, handicapped, maternity leave, age, and unemployment. No additional concepts of a European welfare state exist in a legally binding form. In the second part of this section, we analyzed citizens’ attitudes toward the welfare state. The vast majority of citizens in all countries display solidarity with the elderly, sick, and unemployed. This corresponds to the EU welfare state blueprint. Our analysis also revealed that the citizens’ welfare state concepts exceed those of the EU. Most citizens desire a more active social state that intervenes in economic affairs. This is particularly valid for the new member states and accession candidates.

Finally, we attempted to explain the differences in citizens’ attitudes. It is evident that those who stand to profit most from a welfare state also support it the strongest. Nevertheless, the most influential factors are the degree of modernization and the level of a country’s public social expenditure. High levels of modernization have a positive influence on the solidarity of its citizens, whereas high levels of public social expenditure have a negative effect, contrary to conclusions of several earlier studies.

European citizens demand a strong welfare state, and several scholars have also advocated that the European welfare state takes on a stronger form (Busch 1998: 292). Past experience has shown, however, that there is no consensus between member states to strengthen the EU’s socio-political activities. This disinclination toward strengthening the EU’s welfare state activities is likely to increase with eastward expansion. Governments of poorer EU countries, however, have no interest in expanding welfare state standards, even if their citizens express high levels of support. The old EU countries face a similar constellation. The elite in almost every country pushes for a reduction of welfare state activities due to the difficulty of financing these programs, which is contradictory to most of the citizens’ wishes.

8.6 Summary

In the context of this chapter we have focused on European societies which are or will become members of the European Union. The number of member states in the European Union is growing substantially in a short amount of time. Ten new countries acceded into the “Club of 15” on 1 May 2004, with Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007. Furthermore, the European Council decided to enter into accession talks with Turkey following a contentious recommendation from the Commission in December 2004. Croatia and Macedonia have also become accession candidates. The economic performance of most new EU member states pales in comparison to old member states and has sparked an academic debate regarding the EU’s ability to economically and politically integrate these countries.

Economic differences are not the only issues pertinent to the integration of new members; cultural differences also have a significant impact. The stability of the EU’s institutional structure is dependent on citizens’ beliefs of an ideal society (Gerhards 2007:

14). The degree to which citizens accept the EU blueprint of an ideal European society is significant in terms of the legitimacy of European policies (Scharpf 2005), in that democracies are structurally dependent on the support of their citizens. A mismatch between an elite project and public opinion can lead to legitimacy problems for EU institutions, as demonstrated by the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution referendum. The expanded EU will prove unstable in the long run if its institutions are not compatible with the value orientations of its citizens.

A definition of the cultural identity of the EU is necessary to determine whether EU accession countries culturally fit to each other and into the EU. We reconstructed the EU's value order and blueprint of an ideal society using EU legislation. When reconstructing the EU's value order, we distinguished between four different spheres of values – religion, family, politics, and the welfare state. We have then analyzed the citizens' attitudes regarding the ideal form a society should have. As we differentiate between different spheres of societal culture, we have analyzed these value spheres separately. Finally we have tried to explain the differences in the value orientations of the citizens. We summarize our findings according to the different value spheres.

Religion: We have seen that the EU favors a separation of religious and secular spheres and expects its citizens to tolerate other religious communities. If one distinguishes among the old and new EU member states, the Enlargement II countries and Turkey, it then seems that the old member states support the EU position the most and country groups support it to an ever decreasing degree in chronological order of accession. Within country groups, differences between individual nations are to some extent substantial. This is particularly true for the Protestant countries as well as for the Czech Republic and France, where the interviewees strongly support the EU's blueprint. In the other Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and, above all, Muslim countries, the separation of religion and the secular world is supported to a significantly lesser degree.

We have shown that support for the EU position has less to do with belonging to a specific religion and depends more on the degree of integration into a religious institution. Furthermore, the degree of societal modernization plays a significant role. The more modernized a society, the more likely its citizens are to support a separation of religious and secular spheres as well as advocate religious tolerance. Thus, in countries that are less modernized and where the level of integration into the church is high, the support for the separation between religious and secular spheres and for religious tolerance is substantially lower.

Family and Gender Roles: EU family policy primarily concerns gender equality in the work place. The EU believes this can only be achieved when a childcare infrastructure exists outside of the household and when traditional household chores are split between men and women. When one distinguishes between old and new EU member states as well as Turkey, it becomes clear that the old members support the EU position most strongly. This support weakens with subsequent accession groups. Turkish citizens reject the EU family blueprint most strongly and express the clearest preference for a traditional, male-dominant gender order. With the help of a multiple regression analysis, we tried to account for the differences in support of gender equality. We could show that the support for the EU's family blueprint is influenced by the degree of modernization and institutionalization of equality through domestic policies. Additionally, citizens' religious affiliation, integration into a religious community, and their own gender influence their attitudes toward gender equality.

Political Culture: The EU feels an obligation to provide the basic principles of a representative democracy and also expect this from their member states. More than 80 percent of European citizens support democracy and consider it the best form of government;

however, an affinity to authoritarian regimes is apparent in a couple of countries. This is particularly the case in Turkey and Romania, and also with the majority in Latvia and Lithuania, who feel more assured with a strong leader able to govern without a parliament and elections. We have seen that civil society is strongest in the old EU member states, while this support decreases with every accession round.

We have seen that the degree of a society's modernization has a clear and positive influence on both dimensions, democratic values and engagement in civil society. Cultural factors also influence democracy and civil society. With the exception of Protestants, all other denominations support authoritarian regimes to a greater degree. Moreover, the Orthodox Christian and especially Islamic tradition have a negative influence on the development of social capital.

Welfare State: The EU actually advocates a very basic model of a welfare state that protects its citizens against basic factors rendering them unemployable: sickness, handicaps, maternity leave, age, and unemployment. The vast majority of citizens in all countries display solidarity with the elderly, sick, and unemployed. This corresponds to the EU welfare state blueprint. Our analysis also revealed that the citizens' welfare state concepts exceed those of the EU. Most citizens desire a more active social state that intervenes in economic affairs. This is particularly valid for the new member states and accession candidates. The most influential factors explaining attitudes toward the welfare state are the degree of modernization and the level of a country's public social expenditure. High levels of modernization have a positive influence on the solidarity of its citizens, whereas high levels of public social expenditure have a negative effect, contrary to conclusions of several earlier studies.

Overall our analysis shows that a high level of modernization, as measured by the HDI and the interviewee's level of education, increases support for the EU blueprint in almost every sphere. Our findings strengthen the heavily criticized and "obsolete" modernization theory (Knöbl 2001). This critique is unfounded if the criticized theory continues to have explanatory power and cannot be replaced by other better theories. Our results suggest that this is the case. In classifying the countries with the three macro context variables we have not done justice to the particular historical developments of individual countries. Comparative social scientists stress the importance of historical, path-dependent developments of individual countries (Therborn 1995). These scholars criticize approaches that treat countries as a complex of variables. We agree with this critique, but believe that both methodologies are compatible. Systematic analyses such as ours can develop a rough sketch of the differences between countries and cultures but cannot replace a historical approach complete with microanalyses of particular conditions. This study did not take developmental, historical paths of individual societies into account. Consequently, the explanatory power of our findings is limited. Despite this shortcoming, we are able to explain the value orientations of citizens relatively well.

What lessons can be taken from our analysis and applied to the cultural development of the EU in the future? One may conclude that present value differences especially between "new" and "old" EU countries might not matter in the future if new member states go through a period of modernization similar to that of the old members and if the time period for the modernization process is not too short. If the new countries continue to modernize, their agricultural sector becomes decreasingly important, the middle class continues to grow, and education levels and the standard of living continue to rise, then cultural differences between new and old member states will presumably fade away. And membership in the EU may accelerate modernization, as was the case for Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland (Bornschiefer et al. 2004, Delhey 2003). These countries were

significantly less modernized at the time of EU accession, but membership has been conducive to modernization.

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Chapter 9

Education

Walter Müller and Irena Kogan

9.1 Introduction

In most of present-day Europe, people spend about a quarter of their life in education and training. About a quarter of the present population of Europe are currently pupils or students, and the various groups of education and teaching professionals are the single largest professional group in the European labour force. The time spent and the attainment achieved in education and training is among the most influential determinants of the opportunities and living conditions later in life. Indeed, the more time is spent in education and training, the longer and more prosperous and advantageous life tends to be. Education plays a crucial role in shaping labour market outcomes, social stratification and mobility, the social disparities in life chances and the reproduction of such inequalities from generation to generation. Formation of human capital is not only individually a profitable investment but also considered essential in the international competition of economies. Education also affects many social, cultural and political domains such as value and attitude formation, political interest and political and social participation.

In the past, the development of a system of basic compulsory education has been one of the main elements in the formation of national identities and in the cultural integration and homogenization of the nation-state societies in Europe. Also today, education and its macro- and micro-level social and economic consequences may play a crucial role in the making of a future European society. What is learnt in schools is likely to influence whether and how the old national or regional identities will be complemented by European elements. Another factor for the formation of a European society is migration of people across the old national borders. Here again, education is pertinent. Mobility across borders is strongly tied to portability of qualifications, and especially the second generation's integration into the host society very much depends on language learning and achievement in schools.

The powerful role education plays for the life of individuals and the development of societies is largely common to all modern societies. At the same time, when looking more closely, considerable differences appear between countries. Life in schools and the experiences pupils and students make while in education can differ a lot from country to country. The timing in the age at which infants, children, adolescents and adults spend different amounts of their daily life in educational institutions varies as do the level and kind of

W. Müller (✉)

Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Germany
e-mail: wmueller@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

competences different groups of the population acquire in schools. Countries also differ in the kind and distribution of certificates and credentials at different levels and types, and they differ in what acquired competences and qualifications imply for later life outcomes. How then can we explain what is similar in different countries and what is not?

What is similar in different countries usually is due to the operation of mechanisms and developments that are so forceful that they apply practically everywhere. In the case of education these are the benefits individuals, the economy and society expect and draw from education in the modern world. In all countries educational institutions have been installed to teach individuals the knowledge and skills they are thought to need as workers and citizens in adult life. Everywhere qualifications obtained through formal education and training have become an essential criterion employers use to recruit workers to work positions with different job tasks and rewards. Individuals acquire these qualifications in view of the benefits they expect from them for their future life and depending on how difficult and costly the acquisition of qualifications is for them. Much of the similarities and regularities observed in different countries are due to the fact that education everywhere has received this instrumental role of providing individuals with crucial resources in which families and individuals invest early in life and receive benefits later in life. This is the basic idea of the human capital theory of education (Becker 1964; Mincer 1994).

But what then accounts for differences? The two most powerful factors include, first, differences in the general economic and socio-structural development of countries, and second, differences in the institutional arrangements that are set up for education in different countries. Countries with lower levels of economic development and wealth and with still large shares of technologically little advanced production of agricultural or other goods spend less for education. Fewer individuals than in more advanced countries acquire high levels of education. Apart from this, a lot of variation between countries derives from the different ways the supply of education is institutionalized in the educational system of different countries and in the rules that govern the provision of and access to education as well as in the costs that are imposed to those who participate in education. The specific conditions given both by the level of development as well as the arrangement of educational institutions constitute the set-up within which the more general mechanisms of investing in and collecting returns from education come to play and then can lead – because conditions vary – to different outcomes. One important mechanism here is the signalling capacity attached with education (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973; see also Section 9.5.4 below). Concerning outcomes of education such as in the labour market or in the political system evidently also institutional or other conditions in these outcome spheres can vary between countries and then lead to different consequences of similar education.

In Section 9.2 we therefore first describe essential characteristics of educational systems and the institutional variations therein in different countries of Europe. In Section 9.3, we then examine the expansion of educational opportunities and educational participation as well as the varying levels of education in the different age groups of the European populations. In Section 9.4 we focus on the role played by education for the social stratification of European societies: the social inequalities in educational attainment and in the level of competences gained while at school. In further sections we then look at various outcomes of initial education; among them language competence, participation in lifelong learning, the role education plays for labour market outcomes, in particular in early working life, when school leavers and graduates make the transition from education to work. Finally we address implications for policies, especially political participation of citizens and their political orientations.

9.2 Educational Systems and Institutional Variation

Educational systems are among those institutional infrastructures of European societies that due to their historical legacy strongly vary between countries. These systems did not emerge along some rational plan. They rather are the result of historically specific cultural orientations, socio-economic conditions and power relations among interest groups and political parties in the long periods in which the educational systems were gradually built up and further developed. It began with the process of alphabetization from the 18th century onwards; in the second part of the 19th century compulsory elementary education for the general populations was first introduced; in the early part of the 20th century especially following WWI various forms of vocational and general secondary education slowly expanded; in the second part of the 20th century secondary education became more or less universal and also tertiary education strongly expanded and changed from elite to mass institutions. In the early periods in which the states gradually displaced the churches as main suppliers of education especially value conflicts in different varieties of *Kulturkampf* influenced the ways in which the states took over responsibility for and control over education. Later, the conviction that education influences the economic and social opportunities of various population groups led to heavy political dispute and class conflict about educational reforms and the further development of the systems. As these battles differed in different countries they contributed to the emergence of different institutional forms to assure the general education of the population and their vocational preparation for working life. Early developments have influenced later adaptations and through path dependencies the pluriform landscape of present-day educational systems in Europe has emerged.

We cannot review these national developments in any detail here.¹ Boli et al. (1985) describe one historical source that was highly consequential for later educational development in Europe: The expansion of mass education served as a new integrative link between the individual and the society at large in the development of modern societies and the nation building process. They distinguish two patterns in which this integration has been pursued. In the first, the individual is predominantly conceived as a *member of the moral order of civil society*. In the second, the individual is integrated predominantly as a *member of the nation state*. Which model predominates depends on the strength of the state as a formal central authority structure. In the societal member model, the central authority structure is weak; and individual citizens are integrated into a network of more or less autonomous institutions and associations that together constitute the society. In the nation-state model, the role of individuals as members of a common nation state is stressed. The state is an active force incorporating its citizens through its institutions and imposing strong obligations on them to participate in state-directed national development (Boli et al. 1985: 159; but see also Marshall 1964, Bendix 1964). Education is typically institutionalized in different ways in these two models. In the societal member model, education is decentralized, organized on a communal or even private basis, and it develops naturally through initiatives at the base of society with different branches not really connected to each other. In the nation-state model, the state promotes a mass educational system with a high degree of uniformity in order to transform all individuals into members of the national polity. From the systematic structure it develops, one would expect that its credentials would also be

¹For general background of education development see Ringer (1979); Archer (1979); Fägerlind and Lawrence (1989); Müller (1994); for France, Prost (1981); for Germany, Lundgreen (1980, 1981); for Britain, Shipman (1971).

more systematically linked to positions in the labour market than the hardly comparable certificates provided by the less orderly institutions in the societal member model. The divergent developments of the educational systems in the various countries show that in many ways the United Kingdom and countries that developed under its influence as the United States or Australia are cases of the association/societal member model, whereas France and Germany and most of the continental countries are more aptly described by the nation-state model.

Several characteristics of educational systems today can still be traced back to these early beginnings. Other important influences derive from differences in the development of different welfare-state models. The political forces which were able to put their mark into the formation of different welfare-state institutions usually also had different conceptions about the role of education for the welfare of citizens. They had different views which arrangements in education and training would serve their aims, e.g. the conservation of the status order and the protection of status groups vs. policies of equal educational opportunity or gender equality (by building educational services in ways allowing women to better reconcile family duties and work career pressures).

Important dimensions along which the educational systems in various countries of Europe distinguish themselves include the following:

- The degree of centralization in the administration and control of the educational system by the central state, by federal state *Bildungshoheit* or even communal responsibility in (some) educational matters;
- The division between different forms of public and private supply, financing and control of education;
- The degree and the forms of differentiation in the educational pathways and the degree of segmentation among them;
- The degree of variation between different education institutes in a given educational sector (schools, colleges, universities) concerning educational content, curricula and examinations and quality (e.g. distinction between elite and mass sector).

Different parts of a country's educational system often differ in these characteristics. Parts of the system may be centrally controlled while others are controlled at the regional level. Some sectors of education may be rather homogeneous throughout all regions of a country, while for others there is more variation between different parts of a country. In some countries private institutions mainly exist in pre-school or tertiary education, and in other countries private segments exist besides public ones in most sectors of education. Elite institutions may exist only or mainly at the tertiary level, such as the *Grandes ecoles* in France. It is thus hardly useful to try to characterize entire educational systems in some ideal-typical way. In the following we therefore briefly describe the variety of the educational landscape in Europe separately for the major usually distinguished segments of educational systems: pre-school education, primary education, general and vocational secondary education, and tertiary education.

9.2.1 Institutional Child Care and Pre-school Education

We have deliberately chosen this section title because, depending on the age of a child and pedagogical philosophies, the relative role attached to the family and to extra familial

institutions for caring and early “education” in the sense of some structured teaching and learning strongly varies. How long children should be cared in the parental home before they are entrusted to extra familial public or private institutions is still – in some countries at least – a matter of considerable controversy, and hence, large differences exist between countries in the services offered to this purpose and in their use by parents. But for two main reasons, in most countries, increasingly larger proportions of children at ever younger ages make extra familial experiences together with other children in crèches, kindergartens or other pre-school institutions. Families increasingly demand such services for children to facilitate combining family and working life, especially for women. And, secondly, it is increasingly assumed that children profit from “enriched learning environments in which they can explore, play and enjoy positive social interaction, both with caregivers and other children” (OECD 2002:14), especially when the services become more professional and their quality improves. Also, with declining family size early contacts with other children outside the family are assumed to become more important to develop social skills. As to the dimensions that are especially important for the child’s development and later success in school, the US National Education Goals Panel (1997) lists the following: health and physical development; emotional well-being and social competence; positive approaches to learning; communication skills; and cognition and general knowledge. The relevant pedagogical literature discusses the question of the most favourable balance between fostering the emotional, social and cognitive development of children, and how best this can be achieved at different ages through institutional care (Roßbach 2003: 252). According to Leseman’s (2002) review of recent neuroscience research both cognitive and socio-emotional outcomes should be pursued simultaneously. “Children’s self-esteem, self-confidence, work attitudes and social skills support cognitive development, while, in turn, cognitive achievement reinforces the well-being and self-image of children” (OECD 2002:14). It seems evident that very young children especially need attention to their socio-emotional needs. But research has also shown the huge impact on cognitive and especially language development of exposure of children in the early childhood to a rich environment of cognitive stimulation (Leseman et al. 2001; Blok et al. 2005; OECD 2006). Thus, in particular, children who grow up in families that cannot provide a stimulating environment should profit from high-quality extra-family institutions, notably children in the lower classes or in migrant families with poor receiving country language competence.

In most countries, services offered differ by age of children. For children below 3 years of age, in various countries beside institutions such as crèches, more private day-care services in other families are also offered. Such arrangements are not well covered in statistical sources and reliable comparable information is lacking. However, extra-family care of infants and very young children is most frequent in the Scandinavian countries, in France, and was also widely available and used in the Eastern European countries during the socialist period, but after the fall of socialism it declined in many countries because it became more costly for families and because, due to rising unemployment, employment of women declined.

From age 3 onwards, children in most countries visit kindergartens and similar pre-school institutions, with emphasis of structured learning increasing with the age of children. In most countries, participation recently has increased. In 2005, on average, close to three-quarters of all 3-year-old children are enrolled in the EU-27 countries (see Table 9.1). Participation is above average – and in some countries almost universal – in Scandinavia (except Finland) and in Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Malta and Estonia. In practically all countries of Eastern

AQ2 **Table 9.1** Participation of children in pre-school education, % of population in 2005

	EU member states	Other countries
At age 3:		CH (8%)
Below 25%	IE (2%) NL (0.1%)	
25–49%	AT (48%) CY (32%) PL (28%) FI (38%)	HR (42%) AU (30%) US (35%)
50–69%	LU PT BU CZ LV LT HU RO SI SK	JP
70–89%	DE EE MT SE UK	NO
90–100%	BE DK ES FR IT	
No information	GR	
72.3%	EU 27 average	
At age 4:		
Below 50%	IE (1%) PL (38%) FI (47%)	HR (45%) CH (38%)
50–69%	GR CY LT	
70% or above	All other countries	

Source: Own calculations. Based on data from Eurostat Homepage/ Population and Social Conditions/ Participation / Enrolment in education (ISCED 0–4) Indic_ed_p01_1; date of extraction 30 August 2007.

Country abbreviations: AT – Austria; BE – Belgium; BG – Bulgaria; CH – Switzerland; CY – Cyprus; CZ – Czech Republic; DE – Germany; DK – Denmark; EE – Estonia; ES – Spain; EU27 – European Union (27 countries); FI – Finland; FR – France; GR – Greece; HR – Croatia; HU – Hungary; IE – Ireland; IS – Iceland; IT – Italy; JP – Japan; LT – Lithuania; LU – Luxembourg (Grand-Duche); LV – Latvia; MT – Malta; NL – Netherlands; NO – Norway; PL – Poland; PT – Portugal; RO – Romania; SE – Sweden; SI – Slovenia; SK – Slovakia; UK – United Kingdom.

Europe and in Portugal it is below average. Less than half of all children participate in Austria, Finland, Poland and Cyprus, and it hardly exists at age 3 in the Netherlands, Ireland, Turkey and Switzerland. In the Netherlands and Ireland the very low participation rates in pre-school institutions is partly compensated by a very early start of schooling (see section 9.2.2 below). On average, participation is larger in the EU than in countries like the United States, Japan or Australia. At age 4, participation is clearly higher in most countries that have below average participation at age 3, but it remains especially low in Ireland, Poland, Finland, Switzerland and Croatia. The main factors which explain the cross-country differences in participation rates include the publicly supported supply and the relative cost burdens for the families. Participation, however, also varies between different population groups within countries. It is often lowest in families of lower social classes and of migration background, in which participation probably would be most profitable for children. What makes them participate less most likely is the relative cost burden. In these families, mothers (and partly fathers as well) encounter often particular difficulties to find employment and their gains from working – compared to the costs of childcare and pre-school participation – are lowest. In migrant families, another likely barrier is the cultural distance and mistrust against host country care institutions.

Countries not only differ in participation rates. They also differ in many ways in the public or private organization of the services, staff professionalization, financing and cost sharing between the state and family budgets and – most difficult to assess – the service quality and the more socio-emotional vs. cognitive-educational orientation of the activities agenda of the institutions. A recent OECD assessment (OECD 2002:15) observes that in the Nordic countries emphasis is on the child's own interests, on play and interactive group work and on child initiated activities to develop children's self-esteem, social responsibility and inter-personal skills. In the English and French-speaking

countries, in contrast, programmes tend to focus more on cognitive development and on early literacy and numeracy. It is suggested that measures to support cognitive development are stressed because of the greater heterogeneity of populations in the latter countries and the higher proportions of bilingual children, and of children at risk of school failure.

All in all, we see that the organization of all-day life in families with small children and their early experience with non-family institutions is still rather different among countries in Europe, both in view of the age and the length of time in which they make these experiences as well as in view of the characteristics of the experiences they make.

9.2.2 Primary Education and the Transition to Secondary Education

The institutional set-up and the teaching content of primary education is probably the part of education with the largest degree of similarity in various countries of Europe, especially in the first years of primary education. Everywhere, there is little differentiation, neither in the institutions which provide primary education nor in curricula for different groups of pupils. Almost all children in most of the countries are enrolled in a primary education school, which is common for all children, mostly with no or at most little ability tracking. The curricula are also rather similar across countries. They focus everywhere on the basics in native language, reading and writing, numeracy, nature and the environment, some sports and arts/crafts activities, e.g. in drawing and music. The most pronounced difference between countries concerns the teaching of foreign language which in some countries already starts in the early years of primary education while in other countries, notably in the Anglo-American world, foreign language learning starts later and with less emphasis.

In most countries compulsory primary education begins at age 6. It starts at age 4 in the Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and at age 5 in the other parts of the United Kingdom, Latvia and Malta. It starts only at age 7 in the Nordic Countries (except Norway) and in a few countries of Eastern Europe (Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria). In countries in which primary education begins early the very first years partly resemble to what is pre-school education in other countries. Still, the earlier or later inclusion of children into the formal programmes of primary education is indicative of the earlier or later beginning of more purposive teaching and structured learning. It also has the consequence that education tends to be concluded at younger ages and entry into the labour market takes place earlier in countries with an early start of schooling. The Scandinavian countries with their late school entry have the oldest students in Europe (Eurostat 2005:155).

While the early years of primary education are quite similar across countries, with increasing time in schools the educational realities become increasingly different across countries. In some countries, notably in the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, and also in Portugal and Slovenia, there is no clear transition between primary and lower secondary education. There is only one school type continuing more or less until the end of compulsory schooling. In other countries (mostly after 6 years) pupils transfer into a school of lower secondary education, which however has no separate tracks and teaches all students practically the same curriculum, such as in the *Collège* in France, the schools of secondary education in Spain, the *scola media* in Italy or the *Gymnasion* in Poland. In other countries, like Austria, Germany, the Netherlands or Switzerland, and also the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary since the system change, the transition from primary and secondary education is also the point at which the pupils are sorted into different types

of secondary schools which clearly differ in their curriculum and ability requirements. Still another model exist in the United Kingdom, where pupils after 6 years of primary education transfer in comprehensive secondary schools, which however have a lot of differentiation in the subjects pupils focus on and in the competence level at which these subjects are studied.

9.2.3 Secondary Education

At the secondary level, education serves rather diverse aims: It selects and prepares students for higher education at the same time as it prepares other students for many different jobs in the labour market that usually do not require higher education. In different countries different solutions and institutional arrangements were found for these diverse chores. We cannot describe here the full plurality of different regulations and diversity of institutional forms in any detail. We rather focus on a few select aspects which have important consequences for the kind of qualifications people obtain and the more or less equal distribution of education among the population:

- Length of compulsory education
- School track differentiation
- General or vocational education
- Tertiary education eligibility

9.2.3.1 Length of Compulsory Education

While making education compulsory, states attempt to define a kind of minimum of education that is felt indispensable and hence imposed on all citizens. Historically it often took a long time to establish the rule that all children indeed regularly participate in education, initially though only for a few years. Even at the turn to the 20th century participation rates were still very low and only tiny minorities had some secondary education. Among children aged 5–14, only about 40% were enrolled in schools in Finland and Italy, between 60 and 70% in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, between 70 and 85% in France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. In most of Eastern Europe and Russia participation rates were below 40%. Beyond age 14 participation rates in most countries were very poor. In the course of the 20th century, the length of compulsory education has been increased steadily, and now in all Europe, children have to stay in school at least until age 15. Increasing the length of compulsory education has not only been a means of increasing the minimum level of education, but has also resulted in a less skewed and more equal distribution of education. In terms of educational equality it matters a lot whether most people have only four or five years of education while a few receive four times as much, or whether all spend at least 10 years in schools and those with most educated about twice as much. In most countries of Europe compulsory education presently lasts 9 years (see column 2 in Table 9.2). Only in Romania it remains at 8 years, while 10 years or more are required in several countries. Compulsory education is especially long in some of the new member states in Eastern Europe, and in Spain, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland and in the United Kingdom. Further upward shifts can be expected for the future.

Table 9.2 Characteristics of secondary education

	Length of compulsory education in years	Age at first track – differentiation	% of upper secondary students in general track
EU 25			37.3
Austria	9	10	27.7
Belgium	9	12	30.3
Bulgaria	10	14	44.5
Cyprus	9	15	86.2
Czech Republic	11	11	19.8
Denmark	9	16	47.0
Estonia	9	16	68.5
Finland	9	16	42.8
France	10	14	43.7
Germany	9	10	37.0
Greece	9	16	60.0
Hungary	13	10	87.2 ^a
Ireland	10	15	100
Italy	9	14	73.2
Latvia	11	15	60.9
Lithuania	10	14	71.8
Luxemburg	11	12	36.0
Malta	11	16	67.2
The Netherlands	12	12	30.8
Norway	10	16	42.0
Poland	9	16	39.1
Portugal	9	15	71.2
Romania	8	15	26.0
Spain	10	16	62.0
Sweden	9	16	50.4
Slovakia	10	10	23.6
Slovenia	9	16	29.7
United Kingdom	11 (12 in NIR)	16	27.9

Source: Columns 2 and 3: Eurostat (2005: 56–63); Column 4: Eurostat (2005: 140).

^aThis figure is questionable, as according to other sources (UNESCO 2007) it should be lower.

9.2.3.2 School Track Differentiation

Sooner or later all educational systems split up the student population in segments which follow different tracks or courses of study. This is indispensable because not everybody can study everything and also because students have different abilities and preferences. But various questions arise: Which knowledge and general competences should be shared by everybody, either because they are an essential prerequisite for further more specialized learning or because it is considered a basic resource for full participation as citizen in social life? Which degree of specialized tracking is hence useful at which point in the educational career? Are tracks mainly distinguished by subject areas or by school performance or ability level of students? Which criteria are used to assign students to different tracks and who decides? How strongly segmented are tracks from each other and how open are they for between track mobility in the course of the educational career?

The earlier students are assigned to different tracks, the more likely they will end up with different kinds and levels of knowledge, competences and qualifications. Inequality between students will tend to be larger (Wößmann 2007). The more tracks are segmented by ability level of students, the more likely these tracks will also be academically more

or less demanding and represent learning and development environments with different degrees of stimulation for the students. Students in more demanding and stimulating environments will make more progress than students in less demanding and stimulating environments, even when controlling for level of ability and competence of students before track entry (results from BIJU project; Baumert et al. 2006). However, the mediating processes and mechanisms are highly complex and not yet fully understood (Baumert et al. 2006). General competences and skills (like reading, writing, reasoning, numeracy, computing) tend to be more flexibly applicable in different life and work domains than specific knowledge, competences and skills that more narrowly relate to a particular subject area or occupation. Track systems which differentiate students according to their school performance tend to segregate students more by social class, whereas tracking systems which specialize more along subject areas or occupational specialties likely segregate more by gender. When track allocation is decided by competence or ability tests the result is less class biased than allocation by school marks or teacher's recommendation. Class bias increases with increasing leeway left to parental preferences and decisions. Secondary educational systems in Europe strongly vary along most of these aspects, but there is no sufficient research yet that would allow drawing a detailed map for all countries.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9.2 provide information on three rather crude characteristics of secondary education in Europe, which, however, have quite substantial consequences especially as regards inequalities of educational opportunities and labour market outcomes of education.

Column 3 shows that the age at which pupils are first sorted into different tracks varies a lot in different countries of Europe – from 10 to 16 years. Three groups of countries can be distinguished: The first group already sorts at age 10–12, usually when students transfer from primary to lower secondary school. In the intermediate group of countries transition into different tracks takes place at age 13 or 14, either at the end of a much longer stage of primary education or during lower secondary education. In the third group tracking only occurs at entering or during a relatively short stage of upper secondary education at age 15 or 16. Late tracking was first introduced in the Scandinavian countries, somewhat later the United Kingdom and Ireland joined, and in more recent reforms it was also introduced in Southern Europe (except Italy). Also, some countries in Eastern Europe (Estonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) introduced late tracking early, and still keep late tracking. Meanwhile most countries have late tracking, usually only in the post-compulsory stages of education. Thus compulsory education is spent in school classes which are common for largely all pupils of a given age (except for late entrants, repeaters or pupils with handicaps who need special service). The intermediate group of countries includes France (and likely under its influence) Belgium and Italy, but also Bulgaria and Lithuania in Eastern Europe. Reserves of very early tracking remain in Central and Central Eastern Europe: in Germany and its neighbours the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Austria and the offspring countries of the Austrian–Hungarian Monarchy, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. It is interesting to note that the latter countries, as well as Russia, Belarus and Croatia, recently re-introduced early tracking as a post-socialist reform. In these countries, following competitive examinations, pupils can enter selective elite-type gymnasia with a strong academic orientation (Cerych 1997; Kotásek 1996). It should be mentioned, however, that pupils in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia who do not enter selective gymnasia can continue in a single-structure school, which formally offers similar prospects for tertiary education as gymnasia do. The reality is, however, that graduates of selective gymnasia have higher transition rates to tertiary education and are, on average, better equipped with the skills and knowledge to succeed there (Kogan 2008).

Defenders of early sorting usually assume that segmenting pupils into groups of homogeneous ability and school performance makes teaching and learning more efficient because it can be better adapted to the pace of students. However, effects in this direction are at most weak and its advantages can be counterbalanced by negative consequences of stigmatization of students in low achievement tracks and by weakening social integration and cohesion. As research discussed further below shows, it can be widely taken for granted that early tracking is furthermore associated with the generation of more educational inequality with particular disadvantage for lower class and migrant families.² Considering the status-conserving consequences of early sorting, it is perhaps not surprising that the list of early-sorting countries in Central Europe heavily overlaps with those countries that also share various other institutions of conservative welfare states. On the other side, all countries with a social democratic welfare-state model postpone tracking. However, also liberal welfare states such as the United Kingdom or Ireland have late tracking. In these countries, acceptance of late tracking could be related to ideas in the liberal political philosophy which stress the importance of empowering individuals with the resources they need to make it themselves in markets³ while in social democratic policies late tracking may be seen more as an element of policies which foster social equality. Timing of educational tracking is thus plausibly associated with other welfare state characteristics, even though the association is not perfect. The association is especially less clear for Southern Europe and for Eastern Europe where the new democracies have yet to establish and stabilize their welfare institutions.

9.2.3.3 General or Vocational Education

The timing of tracking is partly also related to the predominance of general or vocational orientation in upper secondary education. Most educational systems provide a mix of tracks; but some systems provide more places in tracks that have a general orientation; other systems provide more places in vocationally oriented tracks. In most systems vocational tracks become available at the earliest only towards the end of compulsory education, in many countries (especially those with late differentiation) only at the level of so-called upper secondary education. The general tracks are often academically more demanding and their main mission is to prepare students for later entry into higher tertiary education. The vocational tracks usually prepare for entry into the labour market; they specialize in various occupational areas and are often intended to cater for students who are stronger or feel more comfortable in doing things practically rather than study them theoretically. Many systems have inbuilt selectivity in the sense that only students with good school performance are given access to the higher levels of general education. The vocational tracks then often include more students with weaker cognitive abilities, school motivation and

²For instance, in practically all countries with early segmentation disparities between students of different social class background in school performance towards the end of compulsory education are larger than in the international average of countries (see Figure 9.4 below).

³This does parallel as it appears other 'liberal' elements in the UK educational system, such as the high degree of free choice among curriculum subjects left to individual students early in the educational career, the relatively high degree of autonomy of schools or aspects mentioned above in connection with the discussion of Boli et al. (1985) on the civil society characteristics in the early history of educational development. A further related characteristic of the UK system is the considerable role of private schools in secondary education which evidently represents an alternative form of tracking which allows well-to-do families providing privileged educational opportunities to their children.

school performance, and a more or less pronounced hierarchy evolves between the tracks. In most countries, vocational tracks are overwhelmingly oriented towards manual and technical occupations whereas general tracks have a closer affinity towards office and service work. This probably partly explains why girls usually are more often found in general tracks and boys more often in vocational tracks (OECD 2007:46-47).

In the process of educational expansion – whenever larger proportions of a cohort entered upper secondary education – the institutions of both general and vocational education have been transformed. In fact, often reforms have been pursued to motivate higher numbers of participation. The general track has traditionally offered a quite uniform curriculum to prepare for university matriculation. In the course of expansion and reforms it often diversified into various streams of specialization. Different types of final qualifications were introduced, such as different types of *baccalauréat* in France, *Abitur* and maturity types in Germany and Austria and corresponding differentiations in other countries. While in earlier decades, upper secondary education was mostly dominated by the general track, in many countries vocational tracks have particularly expanded. On the average of the EU27 countries in upper secondary education, students on a vocational track outnumber those in general tracks. The fostered expansion of vocational education was partly motivated to reduce the number of early school leavers who otherwise would have entered the labour market without qualifications. In some countries it was partly also politically stimulated by its priority in the EU educational policy agenda. Another motivation derived from the observation of its successful history and the rather good labour market prospects of its graduates in countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark who have a long tradition of vocational education. The increase in the proportion of students in vocational education can at least partially be attributed to the EU expansion to the East, where vocational and technical education has traditionally been strongly represented.⁴ Even though all CEE countries (apart from the Baltic States) have systems that predominantly favour vocational or technical education, the majority of their pupils leave education with a matriculation certificate. That is, despite its strong vocational orientation, the systems of vocational and technical education in CEE countries provide definitely more open access to tertiary education, than similarly organized secondary education systems in German-speaking countries.

However, aside these general characteristics and developments in general and vocational education, a world of difference exists in the more specific forms of their institutionalization in various countries of Europe. What is counted as vocational education in different countries is quite diverse. Sometimes it is hard to see what the “vocational” element is. For example, what Italy counts as vocational education has much less of practical, workplace based training than Germany’s vocational education. There is probably more diversity between countries in the character of vocational education than in any other kind of secondary education. One might even say that the extent and character of vocational education is the main source of variation between countries in their secondary education. First of all, the number of places available in the two segments varies a lot (Column 4 in Table 9.2). We can distinguish three groups of countries: countries with an above average number of students in vocationally oriented courses (63% or more in vocational and 37% or less in general); at the other extreme countries with a clear majority of general

⁴It should be noted, however, that an increase in the enrolment of pupils in general tracks is rather apparent for CEE countries, with Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia having more pronounced growth rates (Kogan 2008).

education (60% or more), and the countries in between with similar share of students in either general or vocational education. Vocational courses of study clearly dominate in Central and Central Eastern Europe, in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and also in Belgium, the United Kingdom and in Romania. The intermediate group of countries includes the Scandinavian countries, France, Poland and Bulgaria, while particularly little vocational training and a clear dominance of general education is found in Southern Europe, in the Baltic States and in Ireland. With a few exceptions and outliers we thus find clear regional clusters. This is especially interesting in the first group of countries, which heavily overlap with the early tracking countries. Aiming at building up a practically oriented workforce, these countries foster vocational training and at the same time separate early and provide different kinds of education and training to the students in vocational education and those in general education.

Further crucial differences relate to the form and context in which education and training is provided. While general education is usually provided in schools and classroom contexts, vocational education is much more varied, often combining learning in schools and practical work in workplaces. In the most explicit way these two learning environments are combined in the dual system model: While enrolled in a vocational school the learner at the same time has a paid learning/employment contract as an apprentice. The employer commits himself to teach the practical side of an occupation or profession either in regular workplaces or in special training shops within the firm. These arrangements predominate in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and are partly also found in the Netherlands. Also, in the United Kingdom, there was a tradition of apprenticeship training, but it eroded.⁵ While during the socialist period most of the countries in Eastern Europe had strong elements of enterprise-based apprentice training, dual system training has survived the market transformation as the dominant training arrangement only in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary (Austria neighbours) and Romania. In parts it also exists in Slovakia and Poland, whereas in the rest of countries it is mostly under the auspice of schools. While apart from dual system arrangements vocational education usually also includes elements of learning practical work tasks, learning is mostly school-based and workplace experiences are much less pronounced. In contrast to apprenticeship system (the roots of which reach back to the guilds in the Middle Age) in which specialized training is often offered for a large variety of specific occupations, school-based vocational training arrangements tend to be less occupation specific. Training relates rather to broader areas of work: not bicycle mechanics, car mechanics or aircraft mechanics as separate occupations, but mechanics in general.

9.2.3.4 Tertiary Education Eligibility

The different arrangements and curricula in general and vocational education are often connected with different degrees of permeability and mobility between the various tracks and courses of study, especially in terms of later access to tertiary education. Unfortunately, no well-harmonized data on tertiary education eligibility are available for the whole of Europe, even though such data are crucial to assess opportunities and barriers of access to the most profitable sector of education.

⁵The new apprenticeships that have been introduced recently are more an opportunity to make first work experiences rather than anything of a systematic professional training.

Successfully passing the concluding exams in the general upper secondary tracks usually provides access to a wide variety of study programmes at institutions of tertiary education. This is less the case for the vocational tracks, even though in many countries new routes through vocationally oriented education to tertiary education eligibility have been implemented (such as the ‘baccalauréat professionnel’ in France, vocational gymnasias in several federal states in Germany or the vocational *Matura* in Switzerland. Notably, also in Eastern Europe, parts of vocationally oriented education has been upgraded towards more demanding courses in technical, commercial or other areas. Its the successful completion usually gives access to tertiary level studies, however sometimes limited to specific subject areas. But, especially in countries with strongly established vocational traditions, especially those with dual system arrangements, the vocational tracks often still have a somewhat dead-end character. Substantial amounts of additional bridging courses can be required to be eligible for tertiary studies. And even if – in other countries such as Italy – vocational degrees formally allow access, participation and success rates of vocational graduates in tertiary studies are usually clearly lower than among graduates from general education. Vocational graduates who continue education more often opt for post-secondary non-tertiary training rather than tertiary studies. Given the barriers vocational graduates encounter for entering tertiary education, participation rates in tertiary education tend to be lower in countries with extended vocational training than in countries with a prevalence of general tracks. In Western Europe this is especially true for Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Also in Eastern Europe an countries with a strong emphasis on vocational or technical education at the secondary level such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland had low level tertiary participation. However, in most recent years Hungary and Poland experienced strong growth in tertiary education participation. Low tertiary education participation among vocational graduates is probably also due to the fact that direct access to jobs is usually easier than for graduates of general tracks.

In sum, secondary education is organized in highly diverse ways in Europe. It has experienced a lot of reforms and changes in the course of its expansion in the decades following World War II. Reforms have been unequal, but one general tendency in most of the countries has been to postpone selection of students into different tracks to higher ages. An exception to this general trend are the German-speaking and some of their neighbour countries which also in other respects show a high degree of continuation of their historical traditions. They conserved the strong emphasis of vocationally oriented and occupation-specific training organized in the dual system pattern, and – connected to it – the early segmentation of students in different schooling tracks. The early channelling into tracks with highly different opportunities for further educational progression is linked to other characteristics of a status-conserving welfare state. Interestingly, some of these characteristics are also found today in those Eastern European countries that historically were most subject to German and Austrian influence and powers. While after the separation from the Soviet Union the Baltic States – possibly taking Scandinavian developments as a model – moved to a strong emphasis on general education, especially the regions of the once Austrian–Hungarian monarchy retained, or reintroduced early selection and a strong emphasis on vocational training and a dual system type organization.

9.2.4 Tertiary Education

Over and above the universalization of secondary education, in almost all countries educational participation at the tertiary level has also strongly grown. In some countries already clearly more than half of a cohort obtain a tertiary degree. The process of expansion and its

reasons are described in more detail in Section 9.3 below. In terms of its institutional implications it is important to note that practically everywhere expansion has been connected with increasing differentiation of tertiary level education. Still in the first decades after World War II, it was more or less exclusively only universities that offered academically oriented studies. And while the organization of the universities and of the study programmes and teaching staff differed to some extent, this academic world was rather similar in different countries. But over the post-war decades two main factors have contributed to increasing differentiation of higher education within countries and increasing divergence between countries.

First, tertiary education is closely related to the development of science and the production of scientific knowledge. With its unprecedented growth, scientific knowledge has become more diversified. To successfully compete in the production of new knowledge, research institutions and researchers must increasingly specialize in their fields of expertise. The proliferation and specialization of knowledge also inevitably requires tailoring of knowledge in more specialized study programmes. The progressive growth and differentiation of scientific knowledge entails similar trends in higher education.

The second major force of diversification and differentiation derives from the expansion of the system which requires institutional reforms for the selection, management and canalization of the growing masses of students. General reasons for educational expansion are discussed below. Here we only note some specific aspects for *tertiary* education expansion in order to understand why this led to different forms of tertiary education differentiation in different countries. In many knowledge-intensive work areas for which a classical university education is considered indispensable, such as in the professions, in higher level teaching, in the higher ranks of private and public administrations or in research, labour market demand has grown. This trend is probably largely common in different countries and mainly depends on the general economic development of the countries. But the number of the students has also increased because in most countries tertiary education is considered appropriate for increasingly more work areas. Since higher education is usually connected with higher status and better remuneration, many occupational groups urge for academic or semi-academic credentials. In different countries, different groups pressure for and succeed to conquer such professionalization. Societal needs, pressures and success tend to be higher when traditions of vocational education on the secondary level are only weakly developed.⁶ In Sweden, France and Spain, e.g. education and training for nurses and for several other medical auxiliary occupations are clearly part of tertiary level education. In contrast they are clearly part of the secondary level education in those countries which at that level have a strong vocationally oriented sector such as Germany, Austria or Switzerland. The same is true for many technical and other occupational fields.

Both expansion and need – driven by the development of science, labour market demand and interest group pressures – to invent ever new study programmes and competence profiles are strong forces of diversification of the system of tertiary education within single countries, but also of its growing divergence between countries. Differences between countries in established traditions of vocational and general education and different political compromises between the various actors involved in the described processes have led to varying policies of opening up and putting resources into tertiary education. In different countries all this has “caused” varying rates of expansion, different forms of differentiation and varying spectra of qualifications for which the tertiary education sector prepares.

⁶For a case study of new fields of work for tertiary education graduates in the United Kingdom see Elias and Purcell (2004). For a discussion on the relationship between secondary-level vocational education and tertiary education expansion see Müller and Wolbers (2003).

Also, the student populations became more heterogeneous over time within the individual countries as well as between the countries.

The differentiation of tertiary education observed in tandem with its expansion can be interpreted in the light of general organization theory, according to which growth of organizations usually tends to be accompanied by differentiation (Blau 1970). To become more efficient, the growing heterogeneity is handled by creating a larger number of homogeneous units. But as Arum, et al. (2007: 4) observe, the differentiation may not only follow expansion, but may also further expansion because in new segments of the educational system more potential students may find study opportunities attractive to them. Besides such functional interpretations of differentiation, Arum, et al. (2007) also point to interest-and conflict-based theories of the expansion–differentiation link: Differentiation can serve to secure the survival of privileged elite sectors of education in spite of expansion (Brint and Karabel 1989). A large body of literature has emerged on the diverse developments of the systems of higher education in different countries. The long-lasting work of Ulrich Teichler about the various institutional configurations of vertical and horizontal differentiation that emerged and changed over time in different countries is especially informative (see e.g. Teichler 1988, 2007a).

9.2.4.1 Forms of Differentiation of Tertiary Education

In most countries, differentiation of tertiary education went beyond merely increasing the number of study programmes. Differentiation usually also occurred via the introduction or strengthening of elements of stratification in tertiary education. Stratification here means the creation of courses of study with different duration, termination levels, cognitive demands, study efforts and labour market value. Often the traditional university studies – oriented towards science, research and academic professions and representing the top of the educational hierarchy – have been complemented by other programmes. These tend to be shorter, oriented towards practical application rather than research or have a less-demanding learning profile. Countries introduced such more diversified structures at different historical times. France massively expanded short programmes in the 1970s; Austria or Italy did so only in the new millennium. Countries also differ in the institutional integration of the various types of programmes. Two main types can be distinguished according to whether the programmes with the different orientation, requirements or termination levels are organized in *parallel* or in *sequence*. Systems with a parallel segmentation are often called *binary* systems. Systems with a sequential structure are also labelled as *diversified*. Some systems clearly correspond to one of these types, while other systems include elements of both types. Until recently, a few countries (such as Italy or the Czech Republic) still had *unitary* systems. This means that at the tertiary level they just offered one form of traditional long academically oriented university studies.

Binary system with a predominantly parallel segmentation has mainly developed in the European countries which have a strong tradition of vocational education and training, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and more recently also in Austria, Switzerland and CEE countries. (In Norway a binary system developed without the vocational background in secondary education.) Besides the classical universities – oriented towards basic research – a second (lower) tier of tertiary education institutions with a profile oriented towards application and work praxis has been established in these countries.⁷

⁷Binary systems to some extent thus replicate with their parallel structure of different kinds of tertiary institutions the pattern of parallel general vs. vocational tracks at the secondary level.

They often developed out of attempts to provide opportunities of higher education to graduates from secondary vocational training who had no direct access to university studies. With the aim to provide their graduates career opportunities similar to those of university graduates, these institutions successively raised standards. This process was driven as well by the aspirations of the teaching staff to obtain status and remuneration equivalent to those of their colleagues at the universities. Thus, the 'second tier' institutions were gradually upgraded up to point where they call themselves 'universities of applied sciences'. Well-known cases of such a development are the *Fachhochschulen* in Germany, Austria and Switzerland or the *Hogscholen* in the Netherlands. Remnants of their historical provenance include special entry requirements, most clearly perhaps in the Netherlands, where a separate track of secondary education is designed to prepare access to the *Hogscholen*. In binary systems, a crucial line of differentiation exists between the tiers who offer clearly different study programmes and diplomas, while within a given tier there is no marked difference in requirements, quality or reputation of its institutions and study programmes. Another important characteristic of binary systems is that the two sectors really exist in parallel, side by side. The students enrol in either of these sectors with very little mobility between them. Also, only a very small minority of students strive for a university degree once they have concluded their studies at an institution of the lower tier.

The second type of structure of tertiary education is sequentially organized. These systems are dominantly structured by successive cycles of two or three study years. Access into the following cycle is dependent on the successful completion of the preceding cycle. But the study programmes of each cycle are organized in ways that the conclusion of each cycle is also an institutionally established entry point into the labour market. The labour market value of the qualification and the career prospects tied to it evidently vary with the level of the cycle concluded. Western Europe, France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal have most closely adopted elements of this model.

However, as the case of France illustrates, elements of binary and sequential structures are sometimes mixed. In France, the universities – the part of the system that serves most of the students – are structured in three cycles with usually 2–3 years duration. After each cycle a certificate can be obtained which provides access to the next cycles and also qualifies for gainful employment. While the organization in cycles clearly points to the sequential character of the French system, it also has elements of binary segmentation. Besides the universities which teach a broad variety of all traditional academic subjects, other institutions of tertiary education exist, which mainly specialize in technical areas. Most students in these institutions enter the labour market after the first cycle, but some institutions also provide programmes at the second cycle; and there are various options to transfer to second cycle studies at universities. Furthermore, the *Grandes Écoles* represent another, even more segregated domain. Access to them is highly selective and requires special preparation courses and examinations beyond secondary level graduation. There is extremely little student mobility between these and other tertiary education institutions. With their high intake selectivity and with the best labour market returns they clearly represent a separate elite sector of French tertiary education. A particular mark of these elite institutions is their high specialization for particular areas of the labour market, such as for public administration (ENA – *École nationale d'administration*). Pursuing a strategy to keep elitism side by side with professing democratization, tertiary education has altogether enormously expanded with this organizational structure in France: The system allows open access to tertiary education. However, a large proportion of students are sent into working life after a study period of 1 to 2 years, and the majority of tertiary level graduates only qualify at the short first level. The number of those who are admitted to the higher cycles

is carefully selected according to achievements in the system and has grown only slowly. Likewise, the *Grandes Écoles* have survived the education expansion relatively unchanged. Access to them continues to be highly selective and the number of graduates remain low. This solution mirrors the French educational traditions since the French revolution and particularly since Napoleon, in which the idea of elite formation and elite selection coexists with the idea of just and democratic selection. According to French educational thinking, these two guiding ideas are thought to be reconciled if the selection takes place according to criteria of performance shown (see e.g. Prost 1992; Brauns 1998). This is an interesting contrast to the public discourse in other countries, e.g. Germany, in which elite institutions are often seen as incompatible with values of equality.

The third relatively distinct model of tertiary education differentiation has developed in the United Kingdom in a tradition in which the educational system is not primarily the product of central state regulation, but has developed from initiatives undertaken by civil society with a considerable degree of institutional autonomy and regional variation between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Raffe et al. 1999). In this tradition a tertiary education system has developed that is characterized (similar as in secondary education) by much heterogeneity between institutions and a considerable role of private institutions. The latter not only include the elite universities of Cambridge and Oxford, but also many less distinguished training sites. The heterogeneity partly also derives from the fact that the boundary between the secondary and the tertiary level is not clearly defined and that tertiary level degrees are often obtained through part-time further education while already employed. The criteria and requirements of access into institutions of tertiary education as well as teaching levels and the requested performances of students vary to a large extent.⁸ Also, the special set-up and the development of vocationally oriented training and the strong emphasis on further education has contributed to today's extraordinarily large heterogeneity of the tertiary education system in the United Kingdom. In earlier decades, higher level vocationally oriented training and further education was offered in institutions clearly separated from universities and was often not considered as part of tertiary education. In the 1980s and 1990s, large parts of these training sites became integrated into the UK university system. In particular, with the integration of the earlier Polytechnics into the university system, the variety in the profiles of universities has strongly increased. Many institutions of the university system deliver courses and degrees in a large bandwidth of qualifications ranging from higher level vocational training or further education to traditional academic degrees while others have retained a more academic character. The mixture of students with various educational backgrounds and careers and of students who study full time and those who combine work and study to upgrade their qualifications is more varied than in other countries. After 3 years of study, a very large majority of students enter the labour market with the First Degree. After the First Degree, studies can be continued for master and doctoral degrees, and in this sense the UK system has a cyclic structure. But as the main differentiation consists in the large differences between institutions in the highly heterogeneous tertiary education sector, the UK, system might best be labelled as diversified. Of all the European countries, it probably resembles the US system most. The Irish

⁸English secondary education pupils take exams in selected subjects at Ordinary or Advanced level. The number of O- and A-level credits obtained determines their chances of admittance to more, or less demanding tertiary studies. The reforms in the 1994 Education Act also make it possible to combine general and vocational secondary qualifications to qualify for tertiary education (see Raffe et al. (1999) on the problems of unifying academic and vocational learning).

system has many similarities to that of the United Kingdom, but it offers less opportunity for vocationally oriented studies and lacks the broad supply of Further Education.

Germany, France and the United Kingdom represent three different forms of an interesting systemic relationship between the hierarchical differentiation within tertiary education and the regulation of access of students into the various institutions and programmes. Germany (and similarly Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands) represent entitlement systems.⁹ In the tradition of these systems, the right of access to different institutions of tertiary education are essentially acquired at the secondary level of education. All those who have successfully completed a given level of secondary education with the matriculation examination are in principle entitled to admission at a tertiary level education institution of their choice in the tier corresponding to the type of their matriculation exam. Such a system presupposes that the institutions at the releasing secondary level and the receiving tertiary level have largely the same quality standards and reputation. Similar standards at the secondary level are required because the tertiary institutions that have no choice in selecting students must be able to rely on a minimum standard of ability and knowledge of the students they have to admit. The standards are expected to be secured by the institutions which provide the matriculation certificate. Institutions at the tertiary level must be of similar quality and reputation because otherwise the best would be overrun by students. United Kingdom, with no standard secondary education certification (in the sense of a standard set of subjects and requirements in the level of competence, see footnote 8) and its marked diversity in quality and reputation of universities, finds the equilibrium of the system via student selection through the universities. France has found a mixed solution: From different kinds of more or less demanding *Baccalauréats* (the French matriculation exam) there is open initial access to the mass universities, but students sooner or later are selected in the course of the sequence of study cycles. At the same time, access to the elite institutions and some technical courses of study is highly selective. With educational expansion, the entitlement system has increasingly come under pressure. The population of secondary education graduates eligible for tertiary education became more heterogeneous. Attractive study programmes did introduce selective *numerus clausus* regulations to counteract the growing demand for study places. With attempts to build an elite sector of higher education, Germany is slowly seeing the end of the entitlement system, as increasingly larger proportions of students are admitted on the base of selective recruitment procedures.

Germany, France and the United Kingdom have been described here more extensively as distinct types exemplifying the broad variety of organization of tertiary education in the countries of Western Europe. As indicated, variants of tertiary education institutions with more or less clear similarities to the described types exist in other countries. Over time, they have partly changed their character through reforms. The Scandinavian countries, for instance, had much of a German type Humboldtian university system and moved toward the English and American tertiary education model.

In Eastern Europe the system of higher education was strongly influenced by the manpower planning priorities of the command economy and by the separation of research from universities and its localization in the so-called academies and other large-scale research units. Tertiary studies were very limited in numbers and technological (e.g. engineering) education was over-emphasized, while fewer educational opportunities were offered in the humanities and social sciences (Matějů and Simonová 2003). After the break down of socialism, lack of resources in the public institutions, the spread of the market philosophy

⁹For an interesting discussion see Pechar and Pellert (2004).

and the quickly rising demand from the mid-1990s onwards let many private higher education institutions of unequal quality emerge. They particularly feature short and practically oriented programmes (see e.g. Roberts 1998; Matějů and Simonová 2003; Mickelwright 1999). On the one hand, this contributed to a growing heterogeneity of the tertiary education sector. On the other hand, the orientation of the builders of new institutions towards the Western World and the coincidence of the expansion with the Bologna process were good grounds to at least formally accept the structures that were proposed in the Bologna agreements.

This large diversity in tertiary education has not only been described for its own sake. The different systems have varying consequences, e.g. for social inequalities in tertiary education opportunities or in different patterns of labour market returns for tertiary education graduates, that we discuss further below. Furthermore, an awareness of the varied tertiary education landscape with different principles of organization, training programmes, exams and certificates is also important as a background for better understanding the currently ongoing reforms in most of the European countries through the so-called Bologna process. It attempts to counteract these diverging trends in European higher education, and we now turn to it to see how and to what extent this may in fact become true.

9.2.4.2 The Bologna Process: Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Europeanization or Globalization?

The most discussed part of this process consists in implementing a structure of successive cycles in tertiary education in all countries of the European Educational area. This process has many facets. In view of overarching issues pursued in this handbook two aspects are of particular interest: First, the Bologna reforms concern an area, which according to the principle of independent science and university autonomy is often accepted – with variation between countries – to be autonomously ruled by the respective educational institutions themselves. And along the principles of subsidiarity and of respecting cultural identities educational matters are often a responsibility assigned to lower level societal or state administrative units. It is therefore of particular interest to examine the role of supra-national, national, sub-national or institutional actors in the Bologna Process. Second, are the Bologna reforms indeed reverting the trend of divergence and promoting convergence in European tertiary education?

In the European Union, education is clearly a matter of competence reserved to the member states. In the funding treaties there is no role at all for the EU in education matters. Also in the 1991 Maastricht treaty, education is reserved as a primary responsibility of the member states. Formally, the EU may encourage cooperation between member states and support and complement policy action at the national level, but must respect the member state's responsibility for the content of education, for the structure of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity (Huisman and van der Wende 2004). Until the Bologna declaration the member states did use all occasions to emphasize that the diversity of their educational worlds are an expression of their historical traditions and an indispensable vehicle to conserve the richness of the European cultural heritage. The Bologna Declaration in 1999 brings a revolutionary turn in this discourse: The responsible national education ministers now plea for compatibility and comparability in the set-up of a "European area of higher education". Reflecting the nation states' concern to keep their competence in educational matters untouched by supra-national authority, EU bodies did not take part in the Bologna Declaration or were not invited to take part. Also, the preceding step from which Bologna emerged – the Sorbonne declaration of 1998 by the

education ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which formed the blueprint of the Bologna declaration – was clearly nation-based. Bologna is explicitly a non-EU intergovernmental initiative and process with wide participation of meanwhile 19 European states besides the EU members.¹⁰

How then the turn of mind in practically all European education ministries from Iceland to Azerbaijan from praising “the blessings of diversity” (Wächter 2004: 268) to a cooperation and convergence discourse be explained? The literature mentions various reasons, some of which stress (common) needs felt at the national level and among the HEIs themselves, while others also refer to the “Invisible Hand of the EC and other Supranational Agencies” (Huisman and van der Wende 2004: 351). At the national level, the perception of an emerging international higher education market was increasing towards the turn of the century, and – anticipating a knowledge society – concerns were growing in many countries of Europe that they could lose in the competition with America’s higher education and the brain drain resulting from its attraction to many talented young people. The Bologna declaration explicitly notes the objective of “increasing the international competitiveness of the European system of higher education”, which needs to acquire “a worldwide degree of attraction” that is hindered by its diversity and the peculiarities in various countries. Perhaps more importantly, in many countries, various problems in the existing systems of higher education – notably the inability to cope with the massive student expansion – had led to pressures and initiatives for structural reforms along the lines formulated at Sorbonne and in Bologna.¹¹ Higher education reform was on the agenda in many countries, and in many countries an international agreement was a welcome legitimation to back reformers and to be used against within country opposition. The acceptance of the Bologna ideas in ever more countries in Europe is thus at least partly due to its promise to help push through intended national reforms and partly also to the dynamism engendered by taking part in a winning race.¹²

While thus Bologna is formally an intergovernmental process and a considerable part of its momentum is due to the promise to solve domestic problems, the hands of the EU and other international organizations cannot be overseen. Still, notwithstanding all efforts to enlarge EU competences, its main mission remains in the economic realm of creating a common market and enhancing the free flow of productive resources among the member states. As in other areas with no legal mandate, this is a door for the EU to enter into education-related policies. Under the open market flag, the EU pushes for reforms in education and educational structures which enhance the mobility of academic staff, students

¹⁰Initially the Bologna declaration was signed by the then EU-member states, the then EU-accession countries and Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. While the declaration notes the important contributions to the process by the educational institutions with their autonomy and of non-governmental European organizations with competence on higher education, there is no mention of any EU institution nor has any such institution signed the declaration. The EU, Commission later joined, however side by side with other international institutions and associations such as UNESCO, the European Council, the European University Association and the European Student Union.

¹¹In Germany, e.g. a law enabling reforms along a bachelor/master structure was prepared to counteract very long study times and high dropout rates from university studies. Similar pressures and initiatives existed in other countries, e.g. in Austria (Pechar and Pellert 2004), the Netherlands and Flanders (Dittrich et al. 2004) or in Italy. In Eastern Europe most countries were to modernize their higher education systems after the fall of communism and welcomed the opportunity to join into a wider European process.

¹²Often within-country opposition to the reforms has been given up not by the conviction that something better is coming, but rather by resignation that one’s own country’s idiosyncrasy cannot survive when most others follow a common new track.

and later workers and which augment the research capacity through improved cooperation and increased exchange among researchers and research institutions of different countries. Various EU-funded teacher and student mobility programmes (Erasmus and others) and research framework programmes essentially pursue this line. The mobility programmes were initiated in the mid-1980s, indeed long before the days of Bologna. As a probably not anticipated consequence, the resulting “mass mobility laid bare a very shocking diversity” (Neave 2003). In the confrontation with a plethora of issues of equivalence and recognition of studies abroad, national governments and educational institutions became aware of the real barriers for mobility. In the declaration, they explicitly recognize the impediments of, the idiosyncratic national systems and of the high diversity in Europe on the way ahead. Furthermore, since the 1980s, the OECD pushed its efforts of (comparative) reviews of educational systems, publication of international educational statistics and its various programmes for international assessment of students’ and adults’ competences. In the context of a public discourse increasingly emphasising the role of education and knowledge for international competitiveness, the naming and shaming policies of international agencies such as the OECD and the envious comparisons with other countries did likely also help to understand the needs for reform and fostered the nations’ readiness for building a European Education Area. Once Bologna was declared on national initiatives, the EU Commission later was able to enter the game. It became a full member of the Bologna process and a facilitator and further motivator, not least through paying the bill for many coordination groups, conferences, experiments and evaluation studies. In terms of practical implications, likely the EU’s most significant contribution includes the development of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) in the context of the Erasmus programme that later became an important convertibility tool in the Bologna process. In many documents the EU institutions also publish a lot of poesy and visions about the current and future challenges for education. This likely has some influence on the general educational discourse in Europe; its implications for educational policies and resource allocation among the decision makers in HEI’s and the national or sub-national parliaments and governments, however, are difficult to assess. Due to less restrictive competences and due to the much larger EU budget available for supporting research, research cooperation and research infrastructure, the EU has probably a more significant role for the development of the European Research Area (ERA) than it has for the European Higher Education Area (EHEA).

Bologna is thus a child of many circumstances, forces and actors, but it is clearly more a (national) bottom-up rather than an (EU) top-down process. And because the process encompasses many countries outside the EU and is influenced by international developments and agencies beyond the EU, its international traces probably derive more from globalization rather than (EU) -Europeanization even though this is difficult to establish (Verdier and Breen 2001).

9.2.4.3 Bologna: A Process of European Convergence?

The rapid adaptation in many countries of the core Bologna vision – a two- or three-level sequential structure of tertiary education – points at least superficially to an amazing success story of a politically induced transformation of higher education along an international template. In view of the HEI’s steady claim of autonomy (Magna Charta Universitatum, Bologna 1988), this development is all the more surprising. As the reforms are still in the process of being implemented, one cannot yet foresee their precise implications for harmonization and convergence of the higher education landscape in Europe. The long-term outcomes are open because (a) there is ambivalence in the political aims, (b) there

are a variety of instruments envisaged in or later added to the initial declaration that may induce fuzziness to the enterprise and (c) there is considerable leeway for the national implementation of the reforms.

In the Sorbonne declaration the initiating ministers agreed to the aim of “progressive harmonization of the overall framework of our degrees and cycles”. In Bologna they moved a step back and – aspiring not any more for harmonization but just for “greater compatibility and comparability” – they required the “adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, . . . based on two main cycles, . . . establishment of a system of credits, . . . (and) promotion of mobility”. As Wächter (2004: 271), a long-time participant observer of the process describes it: “With the Union’s abstention from any major convergence push and the member states’ ambiguous attitude on this issue, it is unlikely that convergence policies will get a further boost.” A harmonized higher education landscape with a common currency is not likely to finally emerge, but rather the creation of instruments of convertibility and tools of transparency and equivalence. These include the consolidation of a Credit Transfer System such as ECTS (which allows easy recognition of Credits obtained in different institutions and countries), the delivery of diploma supplements (which rephrase the national diplomas in a common international language) or the creation of qualification frameworks (which are essentially detailed descriptions of the structure of qualifications in a given country). Wächter (2004) also notes a danger of dilution of the initial aims due to the fact that increasingly more autonomous national partners joined the club and that in Bologna follow-up meetings successively new items were discussed. This agenda includes the request for “transnational education”, the further development of the Bologna model in a life-long learning perspective; the development of accreditation and quality assurance mechanisms, the addition of a third doctoral cycle, the recognition of non-formal and informal learning in credits relevant for higher education, the inclusion of student associations as full partners. The latter stress social dimensions and extend those to anti-globalization and anti-competition orientation. With so many different (verbal) commitments the process is indeed in danger of losing focus. But most importantly it has to be recognized that all national partners are autonomous actors and no mechanisms exist to enforce implementation in a truly convergent manner. When in their most recent communiqué, the education ministers “reaffirm our commitment to increasing the compatibility and comparability of our higher education systems, whilst at the same time respecting their diversity” (London Communiqué 2007), they realistically acknowledge limits of convergence.

In the decade following the declaration, a wide majority of the participating countries have indeed started to reform the structure of higher education along the Bologna lines and is introducing the 2–3-cycle study programmes and qualifications, but the extent of realization varies a lot between countries, and so do many specifics of national regulations. This is not surprising, because in terms of the concrete set-up of study cycles or qualification requirements the official declarations and ministerial communiqués are extremely vague and no written formulations of concrete operationalizations¹³ exist. In her profound study comparing England, France, Germany and the Netherlands Witte (2006) concludes that

¹³The most concrete exercise in this direction are the so-called Dublin-descriptors, in which the competences to be required from a holder of a bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degree’s are described on a two-page leaflet with a number of general definitions. See <http://www.jointquality.nl/>. An effective observation of the nations’ eagerness for cooperation is that Germany and Austria cannot agree to an identical translation of the English language version of these descriptors into German.

the Bologna process has often been used to legitimize national arrangements that may differ substantially. Such differences usually mirror characteristics of pre-Bologna national education systems. Sometimes the old wine is merely coloured with new nomenclature. For instance, in these countries, the varying set-up of tertiary education institutions with their different study programmes has not been changed. Germany and the Netherlands keep their binary structure of universities for general studies and universities of applied sciences (*Fachhochschulen* and *Hogescholen*) for professionally oriented programmes. Also in France and the United Kingdom the organizational and institutional peculiarities described above remain in place practically unchanged. In some instances, transparency may even have become worse. While before the reforms, different things in different countries had different names, they may have the same name now. In the Netherlands, for instance, the delivery of master-level courses and degrees is practically reserved for universities, and courses are expected to have a research orientation.¹⁴ In Germany, in contrast, *Fachhochschulen* and universities now deliver at all levels grades with identical names without fully corresponding adaptations of the study programmes and requirements. Also in France the universities and the *Grandes Écoles* can now deliver an equally named “grade de master” while largely conserving the earlier differences in programmes and student selectivity. Countries vary in the extent to which the bachelor degree is considered to sufficiently qualify for the labour market and whether access to the master level is selective and dependent on performance on the bachelor level.¹⁵ Major differences between the countries also exist in the programme accreditation procedures and requirements and in many other respects, not the least in the conditions and selectivity of access to tertiary education and its different institutions.

With many countries meanwhile committed to introduce the two- or three-level sequential structure of tertiary education and related diplomas at each of these levels, a clear development towards more convergence of tertiary education in Europe can be expected, at least superficially in terms of study and diploma structures. However, it is much less clear whether and how much convergence will be reached in terms of the more substantive issues of study content, the competences acquired in study programmes, the value of qualifications on the labour market or the implications of the new sequential structures of tertiary education for inequalities of educational opportunities and social mobility. Much is changing within countries in the course of the ongoing reforms. This includes tendencies among many HEI's to specialize with particular profiles. Serving “the *Zeitgeist* of ‘competition and stratification’” (Teichler 2007a: 270) some countries also foster increasing differentiation in terms of quality and reputation among institutions of the same type. For instance, when in Germany the attempts to develop a number of elite universities are successful, the labour market value of diplomas will increasingly depend on the reputation of the issuing institution. In the future much research will be needed to find out what the precise consequences of all these developments are. It will cost not little efforts to obtain knowledge on the character and comparability of the post-reform systems which reaches the level of knowledge now available on the pre-reform systems. Only then will we be able to establish in a more comprehensive view whether the systems have indeed become more similar at the end and in which respect.

¹⁴Public funds for such courses are only available for universities and the required accreditation criteria make it hardly possible to establish master courses at the *Hoghscholen*.

¹⁵For detailed discussion see Witte (2006).

9.2.4.4 Student Mobility and Its Consequences

Mobility of people between countries of Europe and their integration into the host society is likely one of the strongest factors of European integration from below. Hardly anything else could be a stronger indicator of an emerging European society than growing interregional mobility and the raising, self-evident and accepted presence of persons from different regional origins in the local communities and workplaces of other regions of Europe. Both the Bologna and the Copenhagen process are understood as part of such an agenda. It is assumed that by providing similar qualifications and similar institutional forms to acquire qualifications and by making it easier to transfer study credits between countries, the barriers for students to study in other countries will decline. Increased student mobility is expected to promote the international orientation and competence of future workers and prepare the grounds for international careers and increasing cross-European (or wider international) worker mobility. Many programmes to foster pupil and student mobility exist for years now. What do we know about the present extent of student mobility and its potential significance as a mechanism to enhance cross-cultural contacts and future worker mobility across national borders? We focus on higher education students and do not consider here migration from less-developed into advanced economies which often involves individuals with little education.

As recent data from the REFLEX project for a selection of 13 European Countries indicate,¹⁶ about a quarter of students — thus quite a substantial number of them — currently have foreign experience during the time of studies. Twenty-one percent indicate to have spent a period of study abroad and seven percent a period of work abroad (Teichler 2007b:193). Participation in studies abroad has risen in recent years, but varies between countries; rates seem to be lower in Southern Europe (Italy and Spain) and in the United Kingdom, while they are larger in the countries of Central Europe. Usually, study periods abroad are short (7 months on average). Some young people also have an experience abroad before studies (about 5% according to Jahr and Teichler 2007b: 216) or spend time abroad for post-graduate studies (about 7%). In the first five years after graduation 16% of graduates have a work episode abroad, the majority of them, however, only for relatively short periods of less than 1 year and are often commissioned to work in an international workplace of a national employer. Only 3% work and live abroad five years after graduation. Work abroad of European graduates is concentrated in a few countries only and mostly in neighbouring countries.¹⁷ Young people who study and work abroad, of course, are a selective group. They more often have parents with higher education, higher income and status. They are often “depicted as highly motivated and energetic” (Teichler 2007b:199) and they rate their study success as higher than formerly non-mobile students. Observed correlates in later life of having studied abroad such as a smoother and quicker transition into working life, employment in somewhat higher positions and slightly higher income, are thus certainly not entirely due to the international experience of students. Considering this, direct consequences of studying abroad seem to be rather limited. Graduates with earlier international experiences somewhat more often than graduates without such experiences make international careers or work at home in international firms or organizations and

¹⁶About REFLEX see: <http://www.roa.unimaas.nl/projects/reflexabstract.htm>

¹⁷About two-thirds of the graduates work in either Germany (17%), UK (12%), Switzerland (11 %), USA (9%), the Netherlands (7%) or France (6%), and working abroad is concentrated in neighbouring countries. The Dutch, Swiss and Austrians often work in Germany. Graduates from a Scandinavian country most often work in another Scandinavian country.

have more often jobs which require foreign language proficiency. They may earn slightly more (in some countries), and they more often work in innovative firms and in jobs that are seen by the graduates as providing good career prospects and opportunities to learn.

Thus, depending on the country, already considerable numbers of students go abroad to study, and even though such periods tend to be short, they likely enrich students' knowledge and experience of other countries and provide opportunities to make friends in other places. Studies abroad also generate "horizontal" links between international learning and experiences and later international work, as well as "vertical" links between international experiences and career success, even though vertical consequences are less pronounced and less consistent (Teichler 2007b:211). Still, later life of the very large majority of graduates with international experience very much remains a national story. This is true, even though the EU commission and many national agencies invest much to provide students opportunities for international learning. For the later stages in life, the structure of opportunities and the prevailing incentives and constraints, benefits and costs seem to be such that for the acting individual a place at home will likely remain for long the most attractive option.

9.2.5 Public and Private Responsibilities for Education

Everywhere in modern societies states have assumed responsibility for education. Still, countries vary considerable in the relative weight put on public and private actors in various domains of education. Among the many aspects under which the role of public and private actors can be examined, two are of particular importance: Who pays for education and who is in charge for the direct delivery of educational services? These two aspects must not overlap. Often the state pays the costs of education, but contracts out its delivery to private organizations which run kindergartens, schools or universities. Conversely, a state-run university may deliver education, but students have to pay fees for receiving it. The extent of public or private financing affects the chances of especially less wealthy groups to participate in education. The extent of public or private delivery of education affects the homogeneity of educational services. While education offered under direct authority of the state can certainly differ in many respects among the delivering institutions, services in a system with diverse private organizations in charge of providing education are likely to vary even more. Private delivery is indeed often advocated by arguments to allow for religious, cultural or *Weltanschauungs*-diversity in education. It is also expected to improve quality or innovation by fostering competition between (public and private) educational providers who may pursue different teaching methods or other measures to better satisfy expectations of clients. Especially education providers who are both privately financed and privately run are likely to cater for particular (often well to do) clientele. In a system with private financing and/or private delivery, the state may nevertheless use its regulatory competence and impose, e.g. through accreditation and control procedures minimum quality standards, "equal opportunity" requirements or other demands.

In a rudimentary way, the extent to which education at the various levels is practised as a public or private enterprise can be grasped (1) by the shares of public or private funding and (2) by examining the proportions of public funds that are used for service provision by public institutions rather than being transferred to private organizations to this purpose. Table 9.3 shows respective figures for selected European and non-European countries for which data are available. Columns (2) – (5) indicate the shares contributed by public finances for the various levels of education. In European countries, at all levels the bulk of costs (84–93%, averaged over countries) is covered by public funds. In the non-European Countries the share of public funds is considerably lower. A much larger

Table 9.3 Proportions of public expenditures on educational institutions and proportions of total public expenditures used for public institutions in 2004

	Expenditures from public sources (in %)				of public expenditures used for public institutions (in %)	
	All levels	Elementary	Primary + secondary	Tertiary	Primary + secondary	Tertiary
Austria	93	70	95	94	98	75
Belgium	94	97	95	90	45	36
Czech Republic	87	87	89	85	92	93
Denmark	96	81	98	97	81	70
Finland	98	91	99	96	91	76
France	91	96	93	84	84	87
Germany	82	72	82	86	84	81
Greece	95	94	94	98	100	95
Hungary	91	65	95	79	84	79
Iceland	91		97	91	97	73
Ireland	93		96	83	91	85
Italy	90	91	96	69	97	81
Netherlands	90	96	94	78		
Norway	99	86			86	56
Poland	90	87	98	73		
Portugal	98		100	86	92	95
Slovak Republic	84	79	85	81	90	89
Slovenia	86	81	90	76	94	76
Spain	87	83	93	76	84	90
Sweden	97	100	100	88	87	67
Switzerland	90		86		91	80
Turkey	83		93	90	99	81
United Kingdom	84	95	87	70	79	0
Cyprus	83					
Latvia	85					
Lithuania	91					
Malta	92					
Bulgaria	86					
Romania	96					
Average Europe	89	86	93	84	87	74
Australia	73	69	83	47	76	67
Japan	74	50	91	41	96	70
Korea	61	38	80	21	92	70
Mexico	81	81	88	69	95	94
New Zealand	81	58	88	61	90	56
United States	68	75	91	35	100	71
Chile	52	66	69	16	60	35
Israel	76	77	92	50	74	5
Average non-Europe	71	64	85	42	85	59

Source: OECD (2007) Columns 2–5: p. 220–221; columns 6–7: p 231.

Data for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Bulgaria, Romania: Download (12 February 2008) from Eurostat: Populations and Social Conditions; Funding of education indic_ed fs03_1.

share of education costs is paid by private sources, especially for pre-primary child care and for tertiary studies. In both groups of countries the public contribution is highest at the primary and secondary level, and lowest at the tertiary level. Primary and secondary education is usually considered as providing the minimum competences all citizens should master, and thus it should be free of costs. Higher education, in contrast, is often seen

differently. As it usually provides especially profitable economic returns later in life, in many countries the conviction gains ground that those who profit from higher education should also pay for it. Still, in many parts of Europe, higher education remains a paradise with largely free or low-cost access.

As columns (6) and (7) indicate, in most of the European countries the public resources are also used to a larger extent for the direct delivery of educational services by public institutions than outside Europe. In Europe a smaller part of these resources is handed over to private actors for delivering education or buying educational services. A more prominent role of private institutions for tertiary education in countries outside Europe is fostered by both, a low share of public resources and the use of large parts of these resources to subsidize private education providers.

Still, the public/private mix varies to some extent between countries. For pre-school child care, more than 20% of the cost burden is covered by private sources in Austria, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia. At the primary and secondary level, more than 10% of costs are covered by non-public sources in Germany, Switzerland and the Czech Republic, mainly including cost of firms for apprenticeship training, while in the United Kingdom the relatively high private bill results from households paying for private education. At the tertiary level, private financing is more pronounced in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy and Spain, paralleling the generally weaker role of welfare state institutions in these countries. As a recent development, also in some countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), higher education relies more than elsewhere in Europe on private funds, most likely due to the lack of public resources in the transformation years giving room to private entrepreneurs to satisfy the quickly rising demand for education. Private delivery of state-paid education is especially high at all levels in Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and at the tertiary level also in Slovenia and in the Scandinavian countries. In the Netherlands, the strong role of private organizations in education delivery derives from the pressures for educational autonomy of religious communities in the Netherlands. In Belgium it is due to both religions (Catholicism vs. laicism) and language conflicts (French vs. Flemish). In the United Kingdom, where the tradition of private education reaches far back into history, the contrast between public financing and (formally) private delivery is possibly most pronounced. In the United Kingdom, tertiary education institutions are formally all private institutions (hence 0% of direct public expenditures are used for public institutions), but they depend highly on the state for their funding. As far as funding is concerned, this also applies to Oxford and Cambridge. Universities have no discretion to set their own fees for undergraduate teaching. Even spending on infrastructure such as buildings comes from the state. Their funding from the state depends on their meeting certain requirements laid down by the state, such as how and what they teach and how well they teach, what research they do, and so forth. This lack of discretion means that although they are formally private, they are *de facto* under the control of the state. The character of private institutions is thus quite different from the private US universities, for example, who have complete freedom to charge, teach or build what they want. Also in some countries of the New World with a strong role of private education, the character of the private–public interplay takes up various forms.¹⁸ But such variation

¹⁸However, it would be wrong to assume that everywhere in the non-European world private financing and private delivery play a similarly strong role as in the countries listed in Table 9.3. While several other populous countries such as Argentina, Indonesia or the Philippines have a similar public/private mix as the countries listed, in India, in contrast, almost all education is publicly financed and publicly provided (OECD 2003).

notwithstanding, and consistent with differences in general welfare state expansion, education is nevertheless clearly more in public hands in Europe than in various countries outside Europe.

9.2.6 Educational Systems in Europe: Concluding Remarks

Education is a cumulative process. The early stages are important because differences in achievements at these stages are often difficult to compensate at later stages. Secondary education is decisive because it tends to separate in all countries sooner or later the student population into different tracks, which to a large degree structure later educational and work career opportunities. Tertiary education is crucial because those who obtain it have by far the best labour market opportunities and other life outcomes. When children move through education and make their early non-family experiences they encounter highly diverse institutional set-ups brought about by the varying historical conditions under which the educational systems have been gradually built up and reformed in the different countries of Europe. Among other factors, the varying institutional conditions lead them to attain different kinds and different levels of education. As per the recent results of the various international programmes for student assessment document, there is also a lot of variation between countries in the competences children acquire to master tasks in various domains of education, such as reading, and the understanding of mathematics or natural science.

As there are many dimensions along which educational institutions and processes in the several stages of education can vary, it seems hardly possible to construct simplifying models through which the highly diverse educational landscape in Europe could be classified into a small number of characteristic types which summarize several interrelated dimensions. The most clearly distinguishable set of countries, which differ in characteristic ways from most other countries, are the German-speaking countries and some of their neighbours. Throughout secondary education they have an early and marked segmentation of school tracks as well as a strong emphasis on and particular organization of vocational training in common. This is replicated in the marked parallel segmentation in the binary tertiary system. During the Cold War, a characteristic structure with a lot of similarity between the different countries also existed in Eastern Europe. Since the break-down of socialism, the commonalities appear to diverge, interestingly though in ways, that the traces of the 'historical kinship' among the closest neighbours to Germany and Austria reappear. The Scandinavian countries have in common the historically early reforms towards comprehensive models of secondary education, featured by long-standing social democratic governments. In contrast to most of Scandinavia, Denmark – the closest neighbour to Germany in the North – kept a widely apprenticeship-based system of vocational training. France, with some influence in the south of Europe, strongly stresses general education with a strong examination-based system of selection and a distinct mark of hierarchical levels cumulating in the *Grandes Écoles*. Quite a proportion of students though follow vocational tracks, but in contrast to Germany, vocational education is not really valued but rather stigmatized as training for those who cannot do better and do not survive in general tracks. The UK system with its strong heterogeneity and the most pronounced role of private education in Europe may best be understood from its civil society traditions and less central state involvement in educational matters – at least in the early developments – leaving more autonomy to local and institutional actors as well as to educational market forces.

Can “harmonization” be expected in this European world of difference and who are likely the actors? Tertiary education has been chosen as an example to discuss these issues, because the Bologna process is the most far-reaching initiative to this end. However, under similar conditions, with similar aims, with similar instruments and with similar roles for the involved actors, similar initiatives are under way for secondary vocational education in the so-called Copenhagen progress. What is true for Bologna is therefore largely also true for Copenhagen, even though in vocational education there is less of an explicit vision about the format and shape an European vocational training system might take. The ambition there is to generally strengthen vocational training, to improve the connectivity and portability of general and vocational training modules and to make the training systems more transparent through qualification frameworks. Very little attempts exist for the harmonization of secondary general education. At the tertiary level of education, the introduction of a successive cycle organization of studies is likely to make the systems more similar, at least in the formal structure of the study programmes. This does not mean that the substance in the boxes will become the same thing even if they get the same name. The national reforms very much build on what is grown historically and many of the national idiosyncrasies are likely to remain. This is the more true as the competences for the structure of education and reforms explicitly remain the autonomous responsibility of national parliaments and governments and the role of supra-national bodies like the EU or OECD remains one of facilitating and sometimes coordinating cooperation. Already the fact that the Bologna structure essentially emulates the American system of higher education rather than something existing in one of the European countries before the Bologna agreement, might be seen as indicative of global adaptation rather than being based on strong European forces.

9.3 Educational Expansion and the Future Dynamics of Human Capital Growth

Educational expansion is one of the most significant social changes of the second half of the 20th century in most European countries, and the future is likely to bring further expansion in particular of tertiary education. Different theories attempt to explain educational expansion. According to *modernization theory* (Treiman 1970), education becomes an increasingly indispensable resource for access into advantageous and well-paying jobs when science and technology advances. Growing proportions of jobs require high qualifications while unskilled work is replaced by machines or exported into less-advanced cheap-labour countries. Also due to the expansion of bureaucratically structured work organizations, formal qualification criteria are used in recruitment procedures for increasingly more jobs (Weber 1964). In their own interest, individuals adapt to this growing demand and require more education. *Macro-level variants of human capital theory* (Hanushek and Welch 2006) refer to productivity gains, the enhancement of economic growth and the advantages in the international competition that countries can achieve by investing in education. In the view of economists, it is reasonable for the state to spend money on education as far as higher education has positive externalities, that is, when education adds more to total welfare than to individual welfare and people would take too little education for a societal optimum if there was no support from the state (Wolf 2002). Governments therefore pay for education from their budgets; over the last 200 years they have required increasingly more years of compulsory education; at all levels of education they have augmented the number of schools and subsidized in many different ways education, so that it becomes increasingly profitable for more people to stay longer in education and training. On occasions, the international competition arguments have high currency value

in the public discourse to mobilize more resources for education (e.g. in the Sputnik–Shock reaction during the Cold War or in the current globalization discourse).

According to the *micro-level variant of human capital theory* (Becker 1964; Schultz 1961) educational expansion is driven by individual productivity growth and profitability calculation. It is assumed that education enhances the productivity of individuals and in turn their incomes and other returns. As long as investments in education have more profitable returns than other investments individuals will go for education. The positive returns education had and continues to have in many dimensions provide strong incentives to require more education. They constitute the basis for the growing aggregate demand for education. According to *signalling theory* (Arrow 1973) and *the job competition model*, (Thurow 1975), what counts is to have more education than one's competitors, because employers recruit workers from a labour queue in which applicants are largely ranked according to their education. Those placed at the top of the queue will obtain the relatively best jobs. As Boudon (1974) has argued, this may lead to a perverse race for more education. Individuals need increasingly more education to reach the same job (returns) because competitors have more education. To a considerable extent, the expansion of tertiary education thus is an endogenous process, at least in countries with a deregulated labour market. Once tertiary education starts to expand, jobs that formerly required only secondary qualifications may be partly taken by tertiary graduates, and this increases the demand by parents for tertiary education for their children. This is then manifested through pressure on politicians to expand tertiary education and make access to it easier. Demand for education may not only rise because of its profitable economic returns. Individuals may also demand education for its own sake, i.e. for its *consumption* value because they enjoy it or they do it for a more enriching life style. In a kind of self-perpetuating dynamic such demand may especially come from families in which parents already have higher education or in social groups whose material needs are largely saturated. Finally, going back to Max Weber, *status group* or *conflict theories* emphasize that growing demand for education results from the interests of status groups to conserve their privileges. In modern societies education increasingly is a key for access to professions and other privileged positions. In order to restrain access to such positions and keep privileges intact, these groups raise the standards and educational entry criteria and contribute to inflationary demands for education (Weber 1964, 1971; Collins 1971, 1979; Abbott 1988).

As mentioned before in the context of tertiary education expansion, conditions and incentives for expansion differ between countries, and thus also the rates of expansion are likely to vary between countries. It is not possible here to establish the relative weight of the possible driving factors in the various countries, but the fact itself is unquestionable. In successive birth cohorts ever larger proportions of cohort members obtain higher levels of initial education. While it is true that increasing numbers of people return to school after a period of gainful work or combine work and further education, such successive accumulation of education only accounts for a small part of educational expansion. Educational expansion is thus an exemplary case of a cohort-driven process of social change, and it is also best represented in this way. With such a representation we grasp the unequal stocks of human capital available in the different countries of Europe. At the same time we can observe the gaps in the possession of the educational resources in the different generations of the European populations and foresee the future dynamics in human capital development in different countries of Europe.

In Figs. 9.1 and 9.2 we illustrate this cohort-driven process of educational expansion with two indicators which characterize the two extreme positions in the educational distribution. Figure 9.1 shows the proportions of cohort members with only lower secondary education or less. Everywhere this level of education involves a serious risk of




Fig. 9.1 Percent lower secondary education or less by cohort in 2004
 Source: EULFS (2004); calculations by authors.
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.




Fig. 9.2 Percent tertiary education by cohort in 2004
 Source: EULFS (2004); calculations by authors.
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

deprivation in further life including unstable employment, unemployment, low status, poverty, living without a partner, political alienation and little participation, bad health up to even poor life chances in the literal sense of a shorter life. Figure 9.2 in contrast

shows the proportions of cohort members with some kind of tertiary education, which is the best guarantee for an advantaged position in the very same dimensions. In these figures we show two old and two young cohorts (excluding the middle cohorts). The oldest cohort has been born just before the Second World War and was in compulsory education during World War II or in the economically difficult early post-war years. The second cohort was in compulsory education in the years of growing prosperity from the early 1950s until the mid-1960s. The two youngest cohorts entered schooling from the late 1970s onwards. Those with tertiary education among them have recently finished their studies; among the youngest some will still be studying.

For all countries we find a dramatic decline in the proportions of low education, but the decline took place in different periods of post-war history in different regions of Europe. In Scandinavia (except Finland) and in Central Europe (Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) the cohorts who were already in compulsory education up to the mid-1960s (the second cohort) had relatively low levels of low education. In most Scandinavian countries this is due to early comprehensive school reforms; in Germany and the surrounding countries (Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark) it results from the wide spread opportunities of apprenticeships and other forms of vocational training. In Eastern Europe as well, low education declined early. Here the educational policies of the communist regimes strongly fostered education beyond the elementary level. The effect of these policies is particularly evident for the cohort 1945–1949 for which the figure indicates a very substantial decline of low education. In Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, in contrast, even in the first post-war cohort about half left education with a low level, and significant reduction of low education occurred only later. The historical laggard in combating low education, however, is the south of Europe. In some of these countries, especially in Portugal, even among the youngest cohorts, large proportions continue to obtain only a little schooling. As indicated by the two youngest cohorts in the leading countries, it seems to be rather difficult to further reduce low education. In none of the countries of Scandinavia or Central Europe substantial gains have been made between the two youngest cohorts. Germany is the most telling case: From the first post-war cohort up to now, hardly any decline of low education occurred. However, as Germany has been surpassed by many other countries, one can conclude that more can be achieved at the lower end if adequate efforts are made.

In describing the development of tertiary education (see Fig. 9.2) we must be aware of the variation in age at which students in different countries finish their tertiary education. If the proportion of highly qualified persons in a country is lower among the 25–29-year-olds than among the 30–34-year-olds, this likely derives from the late conclusion of studies in a given country. This applies to some of the Scandinavian countries and especially to Germany. While in all countries tertiary education has expanded, the expansion occurred at different rates in different countries. Ireland, France, Belgium, Spain, and Cyprus experienced an enormous increase in tertiary education. Together with some of the Scandinavian countries, these formerly backward countries have reached a top position with almost half of the cohort members obtaining some tertiary degree. In other countries such as in Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Italy and Portugal, tertiary education did grow only moderately, and these countries have fallen or have remained far behind the former group of countries. In Eastern Europe (with the exception of Lithuania) the decline of low education did not result in a similar growth of tertiary education. The communist regimes pushed for often polytechnic qualifications at the upper secondary level, but did not invest in university or other tertiary education. Except for Lithuania and perhaps Poland, we also cannot see yet any significant growth in tertiary education after the system

change. This may have different reasons. The youngest cohort who reached the age to enter tertiary education in the first decade after the system change was either not prepared for academic studies, did not have the means for such education in the turbulent transformation years or the tertiary education system was not able to offer study places in these years.

In recent years, however, tertiary education participation has substantially increased in all CEE countries (see Fig. 9.3). A surge in tertiary educational enrolment is observable for Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland. Despite growth, tertiary education enrolment still lags behind in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Tertiary educational expansion occurred not least due to the emergence of private institutions of higher education and the expansion of short, practically oriented programmes at the tertiary level in ‘fashionable’ areas of specialization (Cerych 1997; Roberts 1998; Matějů and Simonová 2003; Mickelwright 1999; Kogan 2008).

In interpreting these figures we must be aware that tertiary education can mean different things in different countries and that in some countries the pressures towards tertiarization are less acute than in other countries.¹⁹ The countries with a quick expansion of tertiary education often include rather short training programmes, which in other countries (especially in Germany or Austria) are part of secondary vocational training. But the staggering




Fig. 9.3 Higher education enrolments (gross population ratios, percent of population aged 19–24)
 Source: UNICEF (2007). Note: For Czech Republic the data for 1989–1995 refer to those aged 18–22; 1996–2005 to those aged 19–23; for Hungary data refer to those aged 18–23; for Slovakia - data refer to those aged 18–22, 1989–1995 for full-time courses only; for Slovenia data refer to those aged 19–23; data includes all students enrolled at ISCED 5 level (also enrolled on post-graduate master’s programs); for Estonia data refer to those aged 19–22; for Latvia and Lithuania data refer to those aged 19–23. Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

¹⁹Comparing educational attainment in different countries suffers from various inconsistencies and lack of detail in delivering educational information by different countries to international statistical agencies such as Eurostat or OECD that cannot be discussed here; for a review and suggestions for improvement see Schneider (2008a, b).

educational growth in some countries is not to be denied; neither the slow rate of growth in other countries.

As to convergence or divergence in the profile of educational qualifications in different countries of Europe, the developments differ at the lower and at the upper end of the educational ladder. At the lower end we find a converging trend. While in the oldest cohort who entered the labour market in the 1950s, proportions of low education varied between more than 80% in the South of Europe and about 30% in Germany, the proportions in the youngest cohort vary between 5% and some 30% (with the only exception of Portugal). The trend to convergence is evidently supported by floor effects. Even in the most successful country, low education cannot fall to zero. All improvements in other countries then lead to convergence. At the upper end, in contrast, countries are far from reaching a ceiling, and there is much room for diverging developments. Indeed, in the last half century, the disparities in the amount of tertiary education have considerably grown. While in the oldest cohort countries varied between somewhat less than 5% and 20%, in the youngest cohort, they vary between about 15% and 45%. In sum, based on the most recent data we can confirm a conclusion drawn from data of the mid-1990s: "Educational expansion has not so far brought about a significantly more homogenous educational landscape in Europe. However, the geography of educational participation has changed considerably. In the early post-war decades, obtaining more, or less education was very much a matter of living in northern or central Europe rather than in the peripheral countries in Southern Europe or in Ireland. At the beginning of the new century, this contrast does not exist any more. Countries like Ireland, Spain, and Greece have narrowed the gap between themselves and the educationally most advanced countries" (Müller and Wolbers 2003).

Countries also differ largely in the generational disparities of education. In Germany or Austria the differences in the levels of education between the oldest and youngest cohort are small compared to the huge gaps between young and old found in other countries such as in Spain, Cyprus, Ireland, Belgium or France.²⁰ Countries with rapid cohort change in education also require rapid change in labour markets to provide adequate jobs to the young graduates who are looking for rather different jobs than those the retiring workers leave.

Countries in Europe not only vary in the level of education and the rate of its expansion. As described above, they also differ in the mix of provision of more general/academic vs. vocational education, in particular at the secondary level. Several general conclusions from research on the implications of the dominantly general or vocational orientation of secondary education can be drawn. First, countries that provide ample opportunities for vocationally oriented training have for long been most successful in reducing early dropout from education and training. Germany is an exemplary case. However, as the recent developments in Ireland or Belgium show, countries in which vocational education scarcely exists may find ways to reduce the incidence of low education down to quite low levels. Similarly, the incidence of low education is quite low in practically all CEE countries, regardless of the level of provision of vocational education. Romania and Bulgaria represent exceptions as in these countries vocational training provision is at the medium level, but early school-leaving rates are comparatively high (Kogan 2008).

Second, in countries with ample opportunities of vocational education at the secondary level and when vocational education secures relatively easy integration into the labour markets and provides access to decent skilled jobs (this is particularly true for well-established

²⁰The extreme case is probably Spain, where 90% of the oldest cohort have received but a few years of elementary schooling, while almost half of the youngest has gained tertiary degrees.

apprenticeship programs), the pressures towards expansion of the tertiary sector of education and the consecutive growth of tertiary education have been much smaller than in other countries. The strong apprenticeship tradition in Germany, Austria and Switzerland has likely been one of the main reasons of slow tertiary education expansion. Decent and promising vocational alternatives to general and academically oriented tracks of secondary education are likely to be especially attractive to children of working class background. The availability of such alternatives may draw children of such background away from more promising, but also more costly and risky tertiary study aims and contributes to enhanced class inequalities in educational participation (Murray 1988; Shavit and Müller 2000; Hillmert and Jacob 2003; Müller and Pollak 2004). Recent research for CEE countries, in which the system of vocational education appears to be more diverse and also formally more open than in the German-speaking neighbour countries, also proves that a smaller proportion of young people proceed to the tertiary level. Examples are the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria and Romania. Hungary and Slovenia, on the other hand, do not fit this pattern (Kogan 2008).

As especially the younger cohorts will be part of the active labour force for many years to come, data like those in Figs. 9.1 and 9.2 can also be used to anticipate the human capital potential existing in the different countries for the foreseeable future. Countries in which low education declined early and higher education expanded early have a higher level of human capital available for the future than countries which developed late. Unless the latter heavily invest into adult education, they will have to compete with a less well-educated population for possibly many years.

9.4 Social Inequalities in the Distribution of Education

9.4.1 Inequalities by Social Class

In all countries education is distributed highly unequally among different population groups. This fact contrasts sharply with the claims of equality of educational opportunity officially proclaimed by most political and social actors in modern societies. This discrepancy appears the more dramatic the more education is recognized as crucial resource for individual life chances and the welfare of societies. The social sources of educational inequality have been increasingly realized in the early decades after World War II and then became subject of continued research. In this research, the individual and social conditions and mechanisms which lead to unequal individual investment and success in education are discussed controversially. For the explanation of the individual-level processes, the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” disparities proposed in the pioneering work by Boudon (1974) has become widely shared. But this distinction also proves useful to understand the macro and institutional conditions of the generation of educational inequality, e.g. the hotly debated issues whether in the course of educational expansion educational inequality is likely to change or which reforms in educational institutions are likely to lead to less inequality (for recent reviews see Vallet 2004; Breen and Jonsson 2005).

Primary disparities of social origin result from differences in school performance of children from different class backgrounds, while secondary disparities are due to different propensities prevailing in different classes to progress to the next educational step – even at the same level of performance. Children raised in families of advantaged classes encounter better conditions in their home environments which help them to do better in school. From early childhood onwards, they get more intellectual stimulation, receive more parental motivation and support and have better physical conditions for learning. To some

extent, ability-relevant genetic differences between individuals from different class backgrounds may also affect school performance. As emphasized by Bourdieu (1977), school requirements may also be more difficult to be fulfilled by working-class than middle-class children, and there is indication that performances of children of different background are evaluated differently by teachers. However, there is also ample evidence that at the same level of shown performance, parents and children from different homes choose differently at the various branching points in the educational system to exit education or to continue in one of the different educational tracks towards a higher level of education. Rational Action theory is particularly useful to explain these secondary disparities. As discussed elsewhere, according to these models, “three components typically contribute to making middle class students more likely than working class students to continue to higher levels of education: They can more easily bear the *costs* of higher education; they expect *higher rates of success* in education; and they have more incentives to continue to higher education because by doing so they avoid the risk of downward mobility” (Breen et al. 2009a). The higher social classes favour the more demanding and prestigious qualifications as they have more to lose by not doing so. Therefore it is much more likely that middle-class families invest more in education and their children reach higher levels of education than working-class children (for imaginative studies of the interplay and accumulation of primary and secondary disparities see Gambetta 1987; Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Becker 2003; Erikson et al. 2005; Erikson 2007; Stocké 2007; Erikson and Rudolphi 2009)

These primary and secondary mechanisms seem to operate very much in the same way and in the same direction in different countries. Their strength, however, may vary, essentially depending on institutional factors of the school system and the macro-structural economic and social context conditions in a given country. They can make it more or less easy and attractive for families and children in different classes to invest in education and fulfil school requirements. Whether educational inequalities remain stable or change over time will also depend on stability or change of these institutional or structural conditions.

Empirically based insights on the operation and outcome of these interlinked mechanisms and processes in different countries result from two different major lines of research: first, from the international programmes of the assessment of student competences, and second, from studies of social class effects on educational attainment in the tradition of sociological stratification research.

The studies focusing on student competences mainly capture primary disparities as they refer to competences in various study subjects (such as reading, mathematics, natural sciences) achieved by students at relatively early ages (e.g. at age 11 in the PIRLS studies; at age 15 in the TIMSS or in the PISA studies). However, depending on the age at which children are sorted into different educational tracks, the results may be more or less confounded with secondary effects. For 29 countries participating in the PISA-studies 2000–2006, Fig. 9.4 cross-classifies the average level of the reading scores achieved in these countries with the variance of the individual students reading scores explained by parental ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index). The lower the variance explained the less individual reading scores of children depend on parental socioeconomic background. Thus according to PISA, Japan, Korea, the Scandinavian countries and also Canada, Spain and Italy are the countries in which achieved competences of children depend the least on parental socio-economic conditions. Particularly high inequality, in contrast, is found in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Austria and all Eastern European countries participating in the study. With the exception of the Netherlands all countries of the latter group also show only average or below average reading scores, while the countries with very good average reading scores (Korea, Finland, Canada) at the same time




Fig. 9.4 Variance of PISA-reading scores explained by highest parental ISEI and average reading scores in 29 countries*

Source: Baumert et al. (2001: 391), Prenzel et al. (2004: 99); Prenzel et al. (2007: 229, 323).

*Variances explained and average reading scores are shown as the arithmetic mean of the respective measures found in the PISA- studies of 2000, 2003 and 2006.

Country abbreviations: AT – Austria; AUS – Australia; BE – Belgium; CAN – Canada; CH – Switzerland; CO – Korea; CZ – Czech Republic; DE – Germany; DK – Denmark; ES – Spain; FI – Finland; FR – France; EL – Greece; HU – Hungary; IR – Ireland; IS – Iceland; IT – Italy; JA – Japan; LU – Luxembourg (Grand-Duchè); MEX – Mexico; NL – Netherlands; NZL – New Zealand; NO – Norway; PL – Poland; PT – Portugal; SE – Sweden; SK – Slovakia; TU – Turkey; UK – United Kingdom.

have very low inequality. Over all countries, we find a slight negative, statistically significant correlation between the extent of social class disparities in reading competences and the average reading score achieved by the students of a given country ($r=0.43$; $p=0.029$). Thus across countries there is a slight tendency to find low social inequality paired with high average reading competences in some countries, and high social inequality paired with low average reading competences in other countries. However, unless the factors, that lead to the results in each country are firmly established, one cannot claim a causal relationship between the social inequality in competences in a country and the level of competences achieved in it.

Recent research on these issues²¹ seems to show that the factors that affect social inequality differ from the factors that influence the level of competences; but they do not inhibit each other. For instance, the *level of average competences* achieved is higher in countries in which final exams are not taken by the school, but take place externally, that is, school external bodies provide examination tasks and assess students' achievement; competence levels are also higher in countries with more school autonomy and with higher proportions of non-state schools. However, positive effects of school autonomy and private school management are not unconditional. Positive effects of school autonomy depend on

²¹See Wößmann (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007), Schütz et al. (2005), Schütz et al. (2007); Hanushek and Wößmann (2006); and Wößmann and Peterson (2007).

external examination control, motivating schools to use autonomy in ways to raise school quality. Positive effects of private schools are conditional on public financing and fee-free and non-discriminatory access for students (e.g. state-paid schools run by religious organizations are not allowed to be selective in terms of confession, ability or social background of children). Private schools must be organized in a fair competition to public schools and in ways to attract children by school quality. Under such conditions they may not only improve their own quality but also be a means to induce quality improvements in public schools, which otherwise might lose pupils. *Social inequality*, in contrast, is lower in countries in which a higher proportion of children receive pre-school care and education (in crèches or kindergartens), in countries in which such care and education starts earlier and in countries in which tracking occurs later and the number of different tracks is smaller. Given similar provisions of public financing and open access as above, social inequality is also systematically lower in countries in which a higher proportion of students receive education in privately managed schools. These findings from country comparisons on the effects of the described institutional characteristics hold under control of various individual level social background factors. Results from different studies, however, are not always fully consistent and a lot of further research is certainly needed for consolidation and test of other factors that can explain the considerable difference between countries in the average level of competences achieved and in the extent of social disparities in acquired competences. But considering the institutional characteristics of educational systems discussed in Section 9.2 of this chapter, the results just described make understandable, that, compared, e.g. to the Scandinavian countries, in the German-speaking countries and in their neighbour countries in Eastern Europe average levels of competences are relatively low and social inequalities are high.

The student assessment programmes study competences mastered at a given, usually early point in the educational process. The social stratification research tradition, in contrast, focuses on the social disparities in the educational choices at the crucial branching points of the educational career and on the social inequality level of education finally achieved at the end of the educational process.²² Also, rather than concentrating on outcomes at a particular point in time, much attention has been devoted to the long-term developments of educational inequality in the course of societal modernization and educational expansion. In one of the seminal studies in this tradition – Shavit and Blossfeld's (1993) "Persistent Inequality" – a core aim was indeed to examine a central hypothesis of modernization theory: When societies modernize (and educational participation expands) socio-economic inequalities in educational attainment decline. Shavit and Blossfeld could not confirm this hypothesis. They essentially find that in spite of dramatic educational expansion during the twentieth century, all but two (Sweden and the Netherlands) of thirteen countries studied "exhibit stability of socio-economic inequalities of educational opportunities" (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993: 22). However, this conclusion must probably be revised. Evidence based on more powerful data than was available to the researchers in the Shavit and Blossfeld project clearly indicates that in the second half of the 20th century educational inequalities have declined in various European countries.²³ In their comparative assessment for Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and

²²Much research in this area has followed Mare's (1980) exemplary study for the USA on social disparities in the successive educational transitions individuals make when they move through the various stages in the educational system.

²³The databases used by Breen et al. (2009a, b) are considerably larger than those used by Shavit and Blossfeld (1993), and hence allow more stable and reliable estimates for change over time with less random noise. The former also use variable definitions more comparable across countries.

Sweden, Breen et al. (2009a, b) find that throughout the 20th century inequalities of educational attainment by parental class have declined in practically all of these countries, for both men and women. They also find some convergence in these countries in the extent of inequalities. While among cohorts at school in the first post World War II decade inequalities were clearly larger in Germany, Italy, France and Poland than in Great Britain, the Netherlands or Sweden, such differences between countries became smaller among more recent cohorts. Declining inequalities are also found in several single country studies.²⁴

As tertiary education expands and is increasingly indispensable for advantageous life chances research interest increasingly focuses on inequality in attainment of tertiary education. In their recent internationally comparative study Arum et al. (2007) analyse how the extent of such inequalities is influenced by various characteristics of systems of tertiary education such as their expansion, financing and the binary or diversified type of tertiary education systems. For the OECD countries studied, they essentially find that non-European systems, which usually are *diversified* and have a higher level of private financing, expanded at a higher rate than most of the European systems, most of which have a binary structure and are largely publicly financed.²⁵ As stated by the authors, privately financed systems tend to become institutionally more diversified and they tend to develop more lenient admission criteria, both in order to attract more clientele for their services. These systems thus expand more. According to further findings, expansion at the tertiary level is related to lower levels of inequality, and this inequality-reducing capacity of expansion compensates for the tendency of private financing to boost inequality. Private financing, in the end, thus does not lead to higher inequality, because the expansion generated by it counterbalances the growth of inequality inherent in private financing. Even if, as the authors add, systems with higher levels of participation and student output had the same level of inequality as systems with lower student numbers, expansion is beneficial because it enhances inclusion, i.e. it “extends a valued good to a broader spectrum of the population”(Arum et al. 2007: 29).

When there is thus evidence that educational disparities between children raised in different social classes have declined in a number of countries, and when in some countries disparities appear to be somewhat smaller than in other countries, one must nevertheless underline, that everywhere such disparities are still large. One should also note, that one is not likely to find quick decline. Rather, one needs to observe fairly long historical periods, such as in the Breen et al. (2009a,b) study who compare cohorts born at the beginning of the 20th century with cohorts born in the 1960s. Decline is thus at most slow. Unfortunately there are hardly any studies so far which were able to precisely identify the factors responsible for change in disparities (but see Erikson (1996), who shows that in Sweden essentially the following factors have contributed to the decline of educational inequality: the introduction of comprehensive education and postponement of educational tracking to higher student ages; increasing economic security; and the decline of income inequality between the parental families). As long as such factors are not precisely identified, it is impossible to foresee developments in the future. It cannot be excluded that inequalities will increase again. Breen et al. (2009a, b), e.g. find such a tendency for the youngest cohort in Poland,

²⁴For a review of respective findings see Breen and Jonsson (2005) and Breen et al. (2009a).

²⁵It should be mentioned that the understanding of binary versus diversified systems by Arum et al. (2007) differs somewhat from the characterization of systems given in Section 2.4. For instance, Arum et al. classify both France and the United Kingdom as binary systems of higher education while they include Sweden among the diversified systems.

and there is some evidence, that also elsewhere in Eastern Europe educational inequalities during the turbulent transformation years have become larger than they were under the socialist regime (Gerber (2000) for Russia; Iannelli (2003) for Hungary, Romania and Slovakia).

Summarizing then, it seems clear, that educational inequality varies in Europe, both between countries and in the course of time, where it has declined in several countries. It is less clear, however, exactly why educational inequalities are smaller in some countries than in other countries and which are the crucial factors that are responsible for declining inequalities. The results of the two approaches (study competences at a given point in the educational career vs. study the level of educational qualifications reached at the end of the educational career) are not in complete agreement for the European countries. While according to both approaches educational inequalities are relatively small in the Scandinavian countries and large in Germany, France and some countries of Eastern Europe, there is disagreement for Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In Italy, inequalities are low for measured competences, but high for final educational attainment. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom inequalities are high for measured competences, but low in educational attainment. Even though comparative research on educational inequality has made substantial progress in recent years, there are still many riddles to be solved.

9.4.2 Ethnic Inequalities in Education

European countries increasingly face problems connected with the integration of the so-called second generation of immigrants in the educational system and the labour market. The recent volume edited by Heath and Brinbaum (2007) with research covering Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the USA, documents large differences in educational attainment that exist between various ethnic groups in these countries. The most disadvantaged groups are young people of Turkish ancestry (in Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, also in Germany but to a somewhat lesser degree than in the rest of the countries), Moroccan ancestry in Belgium and the Netherlands, of North African ancestry in France, of Mexican ancestry in the United States, of Pakistani ancestry both in Norway and in England and Wales and of Caribbean ancestry in England and Wales and in the Netherlands. Lagging behind are also youth of Italian ancestry in Belgium and Germany, Portuguese ancestry in France and Germany, of former Yugoslav ancestry in Germany. Interestingly enough, there are also some groups with immigrant background that match (e.g. youth of Greek origin in Germany) or even outperform charter population (e.g. second generation of Indian ancestry in Norway, England and Wales).

According to the editors of the study (*ibid.*), the hierarchy of success in educational attainment for various migrant nationalities is parallel to the location in the occupational hierarchy reached in the parental generation (see Kogan 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007). The most consistent finding is that the educational disadvantage of European ancestry groups can be almost fully explained by their parents' socio-economic positions and hence is nothing else but a special case of social reproduction. This holds true for groups of Yugoslav, Spanish and Portuguese²⁶ ancestry in Germany (Kristen and Granato 2007),

²⁶Furthermore, after controlling for social origin the original disadvantage of Spanish and Portuguese youth in Germany turns into advantage – i.e. these groups appear to outperform native Germans.

Portuguese origin in France (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007), and Italian origin in Belgium (Phalet et al. 2007). Differences between youth with immigrant background and natives to a very large extent result from the former's lower socio-economic origin, going hand in hand with lower financial resources and poorer quality social networks. Apart from financial conditions and social capital, parental support may vary in various other respects with social origin. For example, children and youth of working-class background may have less information on the functioning of the educational system and experience with its challenges and opportunities (Erikson and Jonsson 1996). Another important argument linking social origin with educational attainment concerns class differences in educational aspirations (see above).

For visible minority groups from less-developed countries, educational disadvantage persists even after taking into account parental socioeconomic position. Examples are Mexican disadvantage in high-school graduation in the United States (Lutz 2007) or Turkish and Pakistani difficulties in secondary school completion for Norway (Fekjær 2007). These remaining ethnic penalties for the most disadvantaged groups could be related to several factors. One is the lack of country-specific cultural capital, which for immigrants largely means the lack of fluency in the host country language. For the children of migrants, host-country language usually is not their native tongue and consequently many of them encounter difficulties in their schoolwork or during the tests. Furthermore, migrant families can lack information about options available in the host country educational system and might discount high-cost alternatives despite their promising returns. Possible lack of contacts with the charter population hinders their access to such information. Further, residential and school segregation are seen as factors contributing to immigrant disadvantages in the school system (Kristen 2008). First of all, segregation hampers the establishment of everyday contacts with native speakers essential for acquiring language proficiency and developing skills necessary to succeed (Esser 2006). Furthermore, high concentrations of students from ethnic minority families or of any other disadvantaged students tend to have a negative impact on academic climate and achievement (Kristen 2008). Given that ethnic minorities are often concentrated in economically deprived neighbourhoods, these are often associated with poorer schooling, higher teacher turnover and other adverse effects of the school composition on student attainment (Heath and Brinbaum 2007).

The ongoing research in Germany (Relikowski et al. 2009), as well as in England and Wales (Jackson 2008), which seeks to disentangle primary and secondary effects of ethnic origin, has shown that immigrants' poorer school performance is primarily responsible for their lack of educational success, whereas much fewer or even no disadvantages stem from immigrant educational choices. Controlling for social background immigrants families aspire at more advantageous educational tracks for their offspring than this is the case among the charter population. Research indeed shows that due to operating selection mechanisms, some immigrant groups exhibit exceptional drive, motivation and high aspirations (e.g. Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Kao and Tienda 1995; 1998; Vallet 2005; Van de Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007). Despite the fact that immigrant parents themselves hold low positions in the country of destination and hence are unlikely to accomplish their goals throughout their own careers, they might perceive education of their children as a central path to improve the latter's material conditions and as the main or even only vehicle to upward mobility available to them (Kao and Tienda 1995; Vallet 2005). This might explain these groups' ambitions to progress to higher levels of education and the fact that in some cases immigrants achieve more than natives in comparable social conditions.

A tendency among minorities to acquire high levels of education might also be related to the expectation of discrimination on the labour market and the assumption that it can best

be counteracted through furthering education. If children of immigrants expect employer discrimination when searching for training positions or gainful employment upon the completion of, let us say, secondary education, their opportunity costs of continuing into tertiary education are lower than for the majority population – as long as the returns to education do not differ across groups (Heath and Brinbaum 2007) – and they are more likely to strive for further education.

All arguments presented above would be relevant for explaining differences between students with migrant background and the native born within any single country. How would one explain cross-national variation in ethnic minorities' educational achievement? One of the reasons is certainly the nature and the composition in the flow of direct immigrants. In countries which experienced guest worker recruitment, first-generation immigrants were often negatively selected for low-status jobs, and poor socio-economic origin is likely to have consequences for the educational success of their offspring. Countries with higher returns to education but also more pronounced inequalities are more likely to attract highly educated and motivated immigrants (Borjas 1990, 1994), so positive self-selection and hence higher educational achievement is also expected for their children. Differences between countries in ethnic inequalities are argued to be also related to the structure of the educational system. In particular, early selection and tracking at the secondary level of education or stratification at the tertiary level of education is assumed to aggravate the conditions for educational success for migrants (Heath and Brinbaum 2007). The empirical evidence concerning such institutional effects on the ethnic minorities' performance is, however, still inconclusive.

9.4.3 Educational Inequality Between Gender

One of the really significant changes in inequality in education is the rapid decline of the gender gap in educational attainment. If 30 years ago women were over-represented among those with low education and they were in the minority in tertiary education in all of Europe, somewhat more in Western than in Eastern Europe, the situation dramatically changed since then.

The continuous improvement in the relative position of women compared to men clearly is illustrated in Figs. 9.5 and 9.6 with the same indicators and data that are used in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. For different age groups, Fig. 9.5 shows how more often women have only lower secondary education than men; Fig. 9.6 shows these gender proportions for tertiary education. Values above 1 indicate that women are in the majority, while values below 1 indicate that men are in the majority. An equal gender proportion is indicated by 1. In the oldest age group clearly more women than men have low education in all countries (Fig. 9.5), while in most countries more men than women have tertiary education (Fig. 9.6). For most of the countries, the contrary is true in the youngest age group. There are only two countries in which even in the youngest cohorts more women than men have only low education: Austria and the Czech Republic, but in all countries more women have tertiary education than men (again with Austria and the Czech Republic on the margin). The figures also show how different in the various countries of Europe the gender disparities were when the oldest generation was in school age, how different the dynamics of change were across Europe and how different the gender disparities among the younger generations presently are, now mostly to the disadvantage of men. As to tertiary education, women's superiority is most pronounced in some of the Scandinavian countries, notably




Fig. 9.5 Gender inequality (odds ratios of women relative to men) in attainment of lower secondary education or less by cohort
 Source: EULFS (2004).
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.




Fig. 9.6 Gender inequality (odds ratios of women relative to men) in attainment of tertiary education by cohort
 Source: EULFS (2004).
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

Finland and Norway, in Southern Europe, notably Portugal and Italy, and in some of the Eastern European Countries, especially Slovenia, Estonia, Poland and Latvia.

As female disadvantage in the vertical level of education has largely disappeared, the issue of gender inequalities in education has shifted recently to the issue of horizontal gender disparities in the choice of field of study. In nearly all countries much fewer women

than men are enrolled in the fields of engineering and architecture, mathematics and computer sciences. Across the board, in contrast, women outnumber men in subjects such as humanities, social sciences, social work, nursing and the medical (semi-) professions. The puzzle is sometimes discussed why in the social democratic Scandinavia the concentration of women in 'female' fields of study is particularly high while it is especially low in the familistic countries in the South of Europe.

Other puzzles to explain are as given: Why have gender disparities in the levels of education so dramatically changed while those between field of study as well as class and ethnic inequalities decline at most rather slowly if at all? And why is ethnic inequality to a large extent related to the class position of ethnic groups, while inequality between men and women is very much the same in all classes? One answer to these puzzles is that the driving forces behind class inequalities and behind gender inequalities are clearly not the same. The driving forces behind class inequalities are the resources families possess and that they can use to pursue their aims. That is why class inequalities tend to persist as long as there is not a fundamental change in the distribution of resources between classes. And ethnic inequalities are related to class because the class position of ethnicities constrains the resources at their disposition. Educational inequalities between gender do not vary by class because within families, who share resources among their members, the class-specific resource constraints for brothers and sisters can be assumed to be largely the same.

Gender disparities arise for different reasons. The driving forces for gender inequalities (in education or otherwise) must first be sought in factors which affect gender in general, irrespective of class. Only if these are controlled, one then should consider whether gender matters differently in different classes (technically by studying gender–class interactions). What are then the general factors and what did change to revert gender inequalities in education? And what remains for class specific gender differences?

Becker (1964) suggests that parents would be rational to invest less in their daughters' schooling than in their sons', even if the change in earnings with an additional year of schooling were identical for both sexes, because their daughters could be expected to work full time for fewer years than do sons. Women's attachment to the family role and their low labour force participation in earlier times (combined with usually lower pay for female work) were indeed the most likely reasons for the lower investments in daughter's compared to son's education (in all classes). This has quickly changed when gainful employment among women increased and educational investments for good labour market preparation became at least as important for daughters than for sons. For the United States, Buchmann and DiPrete (2006) argue along these lines when they explain the turn in college completion from overrepresentation of men to overrepresentation of women by an increasing value of education for women in terms of labour market earnings. In addition, they show that returns to education for women have also grown through their consequences for marriage stability, household standard of living and prevention of income deprivation. For women all these benefits have risen faster and are now higher than for men. Similar developments are the likely driving forces for the reversal in Europe of gender inequalities in the level of education attained.²⁷ Horizontal disparities in fields of study, in contrast, must not be necessarily tied to changes in labour force participation. Charles and Bradley (2002) argue that horizontal disparities are likely to be more resistant than vertical inequalities to

²⁷ A more difficult task, however, would be to explain why countries differ in the extent of this development. For more extended discussion of the issue see Breen et al. (2009b) and the literature referred to there; also see Walters (1986) and Jonsson (1999).

gender-egalitarian cultural pressures. Sex segregation by field of study is generated and maintained by extremely resilient, taken-for-granted beliefs about gender differences that are not necessarily incompatible with mandates for gender equality.

Such gender differences operated in largely the same way and to the same extent in all classes. So, for instance, Breen et al. (2009b) find that in spite of all the changes in women's role during the 20th century, advantages and disadvantages of the parental social class on children's educational attainment mattered very much in the same way and to the same extent for sons and daughters in cohorts in education at different periods in the 20th century, and disadvantages of low class background declined in similar ways for boys and girls from the older to the younger cohorts.²⁸

All in all, then, the massive educational expansion, which during the second part of the 20th century has enormously increased the human capital resources in Europe, was fostered by women catching up with men in education and then letting them behind in most of the countries. The educational resources of women have improved and this will clearly also change their position compared to men in other spheres of social life in the time to come. How the educational advancement of women over men achieved in different countries will influence the position of men and women and gender relations in the various countries is certainly a highly interesting question to be observed and answered in the future.

9.5 Educational Outcomes

As illustrated in the beginning, education has numerous consequences for the further lives of people. We will concentrate on the following issues: foreign-language competences, life-long learning, labour market attainment and political participation.

9.5.1 Foreign Language Competences

Foreign language competences are an important resource for communication across the language communities of Europe. Speaking a foreign language certainly facilitates familiarization with this country's culture. Enhanced exchange across countries may eventually contribute to the formation of a 'European identity'. Schooling is certainly not the only way to teach and learn foreign languages, but language training in schools is often the beginning for later language acquisition through other means. How then education contributes to the development of language competences in different countries of Europe, and how countries differ in this regard?

Table 9.4 explores the variety of foreign languages spoken and studied in EU-15 countries based on the results of the Eurobarometer. Not surprisingly, English is the most often spoken language in all European countries with the exception of Luxembourg. Other

²⁸If anything, for two classes the class disadvantage for girls is somewhat smaller than it is for boys in the same classes: Compared to the education received by girls and boys in the upper classes the class disadvantage in families of farmers and self-employed is somewhat smaller for girls than for their brothers. Given the situation of these classes, girls receive relatively more education than their brothers, probably to recompensate that the brothers are more likely to inherit the parental business, a regularity that is confirmed for various countries in Europe. Also see Buchmann and DiPrete (2006) for an interesting study, how in the United States effects of low parental education, which earlier worked to the disadvantage of girls, have changed and now works to the disadvantage of boys.

Table 9.4 Foreign language competencies across Europe

Country	Official languages	Foreign languages most spoken	Percentage of no foreign language spoken	Foreign languages studied	Percentage of no foreign language studied
Austria	German. Locally also Hungarian, Slovenian and Croatian	English (51%) French (9%) Italian (7%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Belgium	Dutch, French, German	English (37%) French (34%) German (16%)	45	English (52%) French (47%) German (30%)	28
Denmark	Danish	English (73%) German (49%) Swedish (15%)	23	English (84%) German (77%) French (30%)	11
Finland	Finish, Swedish	English (52%) Swedish (35%) German (14%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
France	French	English (32%) Spanish (10%) German (8%)	52	English (60%) Spanish (24%) German (24%)	28
East Germany	German	English (22%) Russian (16%) French (3%)	73	Other (44%) ^b English (38%) French (5%)	39
West Germany	German	English (47%) French (12%) German (4%) ^a	46	English (62%) French (25%) German (5%)	32
Greece	Greek	English (32%) French (5%) German (5%)	66	English (37%) French (10%) German (7%)	52
Ireland	English, Gaelic	French (14%) English (6%) German (5%)	63	French (41%) Other (27%) ^b German (10%)	37
Italy	Italy	English (24%) French (18%) German (3%)	66	English (41%) French (37%) German (7%)	37
Luxembourg	French, German, Luxembourgish	German (81%) English (48%) Italian (12%)	4	French (94%) German (89%) English (64%)	4
Netherlands	Dutch	English (73%) German (60%) French (17%)	13	Italian (17%) English (83%) German (76%) French (52%)	9

Table 9.4 (continued)

Country	Official languages	Foreign languages most spoken	Percentage of no foreign language spoken	Foreign languages studied	Percentage of no foreign language studied
Norway	Norwegian	English (73%) German (27%)	12	English (84%) German (54%)	13
Portugal	Portuguese	Danish (27%) English (22%) French (20%) Spanish (6%)	66	Danish (30%) French (36%) English (32%) Spanish (8%)	57
Spain	Spanish. Regionally also Aranese, Basque, Catalan, Galician	English (16%) Spanish (12%) French (9%)	61	English (26%) French (19%) Spanish (15%)	46
Sweden	Swedish	English (74%) German (25%) Danish (12%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
UK	English	French (18%) German (7%) English (3%) ^a	72	French (48%) German (18%) Spanish (7%)	42

Source: Eurobarometer 34 (1990), 41 (1994), 44 (1995), 52 (1999); Language learned only EB 34, 41.

^aLanguages spoken by ethnic minorities.

^bOther than Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish.

frequently spoken languages are French and German. Some other languages are also frequently spoken, and they often pertain to languages spoken by ethnic minority or migrant groups. Quite significant proportions of the European population unfortunately do not speak any foreign language. Whereas about 73% of East Germans and 72% of the British report no foreign language spoken, much fewer people in Nordic and Benelux countries speak no foreign language. Overall, fewer people report studying no foreign languages than actually speaking it, but the order of countries with regard to the frequency of foreign language studied remains more or less the same. English is the most frequently studied language in the majority of countries, French is the second most frequently studied language in Europe and is most often studied in Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.

Figure 9.7 shows how the number of foreign languages spoken varies by age group and level of education in different countries of Europe. In all countries, the older cohort with less than tertiary education has clearly the lowest foreign language competences. In all countries, those of the older cohort with tertiary education speak substantially more foreign languages than the less-educated cohort members. Almost everywhere, the members of the younger cohort have clearly improved language skills compared to their older compatriots. Generally, the improvement is particularly pronounced among those with less than tertiary education. In several countries the young less educated now match the language skills of the older better educated, while the young with tertiary education have often made hardly any progress compared to their older countrymen or women. We thus have a general improvement in language skills with declining educational differences. The considerable improvement among the group with less than tertiary education is likely due to both (a) language training taking place mostly in secondary education and (b) a compositional change towards higher levels of secondary education among those with less than tertiary education.




Fig. 9.7 Number of foreign languages spoken well by level of education and cohort

Source: Eurobarometer (1990, 1994, 1995, 1999).

Note: Non-national population included Finland, Sweden, Austria only 1995+1999, Luxembourg not 1990, UK not 1999.

Country abbreviations: DE-West – Former West-Germany; DE-East – Former East-Germany; other country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

But there is also substantial variation between countries. Foreign language competences are highest in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries (all small language communities), they are lowest in the Latin countries and in the English-speaking countries. Another interesting observation is that in the English-speaking countries those with less than tertiary education have hardly made any progress from the older to the younger cohort.

9.5.2 Life-Long Learning

Without doubt the acquisition of qualifications is rather concentrated in initial education. Notwithstanding the persistent dominance of initial general education and, in some countries, vocational training, participation rates in continuing education and training have increased and the forms of such training over the life course have multiplied.

Three main forms of further education and training and life-long learning can be distinguished. First, in recent years, more people return to full-time education and training to obtain complementary or higher qualifications after a period of work, or they combine working and studying. Often such successive work/study careers, however, take place in very early stages of working life, and they usually serve to acquire qualifications corresponding to traditional courses of study offered before entering the labour market. Therefore, they can be understood as alternative forms of (extended) initial education and training. Second, for many workers the most important form of further skill formation throughout the life course is possibly informal learning at the workplace. In the human capital framework this aspect is conventionally included as “experience”, usually only crudely and indirectly measured by years of labour force participation. Third, the most tangible form of explicit and intended further skill formation over the life course is work-related further training following initial education. It includes all forms of training offered by firms or outside agencies, and includes short training episodes as well as extended studies or training for additional or new qualifications in the more advanced work career. If counted as single training episodes or as training participation rates over a year – as is usually done in statistical sources – incidence of further education and training can appear to be quite high. For instance in the countries of central and northern Europe, according to various sources (LFS, CVTS) each year, some 30%, up to over 50% of workers participate at least once in further education (Müller and Jacob 2008). It is such figures, and their growth over the years, which nurture the assumptions of a steadily increased significance of life-long learning compared to initial education and training. However, many of the counted training episodes are usually of very short duration and of limited training intensity, and therefore in most countries further formal training following initial education is still very limited, but its extent varies a lot between countries.

As discussed in detail by O’Connell and Jungblut (2008), there are huge differences between countries in further education and training participation. Participation in continuing vocational training is highest in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and Ireland, where up to 60% of all employees participate in such training in a given year. With participation rates of 10–20% on average, it is lowest in most countries in the South of Europe and in several of the new member or candidate countries in Eastern Europe (see also Fig. 9.8). According to Bassanini et al. (2005), differences in training intensity between countries are due to the composition of firms with varying training needs in a country’s economy. Innovative firms and firms with a technology- or knowledge-driven production profile train more than other firms. Large firms train more than small




Fig. 9.8 Proportion of individuals, aged 25–64, enrolled in any type of VET in the last 12 months
 Source: EULFS (2003) ad hoc module of lifelong learning (LLL), own calculations.
 Labour market integration and first job outcome by initial level of education in Europe.
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

firms. Country differences in a firm’s demand for continuing vocational training may also result from differences between countries in initial training. Training needs in the United Kingdom or Ireland may be particularly large because in these countries study programs are short and young people enter the labour market very early and often without specific vocational qualifications. In countries with extended initial vocational training, the need for further training may be smaller, because workers with high quality initial training may adapt more easily to new task requirements. Need for formal training should also be smaller when the organization of work and cooperation among workers allows for more informal learning on the job. Finally, differences between countries in training intensity can also result from varying provisions of publicly supported training opportunities.²⁹ The high public resources conferred to further education and training in Scandinavian countries may explain the generally high participation rates – independent of firm and sector characteristics – and minimize the underinvestment problem in these countries.

A consistent finding across various studies is that low-qualified individuals have the lowest training participation rates, whereas those who are already more educated participate in employment that requires high skills and therefore have higher chances to reinforce their training (OECD 1999, 2003; Booth 1991; Brunello 2001; Arulampalam et al. 2004). This picture is also evident in Fig. 9.8: tertiary-educated individuals are those who participate in VET in larger proportions, whereas least educated are less likely to be among those receiving training. Particularly low CVT participation rates are found among the least educated in Southern and Eastern European countries. In Nordic countries, on the other hand,

²⁹Interestingly, countries that rank high in continuing vocational training reach this position through a high level of training involvement in all sectors and kinds of firms. In countries with lower overall training, in contrast, differences between sectors, between large and small firms, and between innovative and non-innovative firms are much more pronounced.

even the least educated receive more training than the most educated in South and East of Europe. Continuous Vocational Training thus usually does not compensate for a lack of initial training. During the life course there is no equalization in educational and training differences between individuals; differences rather increase, and this is true for all countries.

9.5.3 Labour Market Outcomes

9.5.3.1 Institutional Embeddedness

Adherents of post-modernism or individualization theory sometimes claim that – due to increased global competition, mass unemployment, and rapid structural change – social class and other stable structuring forces such as education have lost significance in shaping the life course of individuals. At least for education (but also for class) findings of recent research clearly contradict such assertions. In all countries, education matters for various dimensions of labour market outcomes. In the following, we will especially focus on the transition from school to work, because at this stage of working life the qualifications acquired through education are most directly linked to the chances of graduates in the labour market. Labour market outcomes at later stages of the work career are affected by many other intervening factors and circumstances. The study of the transition from school to work is also crucial because the consecutive work career very much depends on the positions individuals obtain at the beginning of their working life.

While there are many common features in the way education affects the integration of school leavers into the labour market, this process also differs in different countries. The differences between countries mainly depend on institutional features both of the educational system and the labour market as well as of macro-structural conditions of labour supply and demand.³⁰ Concerning the educational system two characteristics of education and training systems turned out to have significant effects – their degree of stratification, and occupational specificity (Shavit and Müller 1998). The concept of *stratification* refers to the extent and form of tracking in the educational system. It measures whether there are clearly distinct tracks in the educational system with different levels and kinds of requirements and training. *Occupational specificity* relates to the extent training emphasizes specific occupational competences rather than more general knowledge or cognitive abilities. Both characteristics can be assumed to enhance the signalling capacity of qualifications, the educational system provides. The more training is organized in different institutions, or tracks with specific training curricula, the better recognizable are abilities and their signalling. The more occupationally specific (rather than general) training is, the

³⁰Theoretically, matching models (Kalleberg and Sørensen 1979; Logan 1996) are probably the most useful starting point to understand the allocation of individuals to jobs, the effect of institutions, and why similar skills acquired through education and training may have different labor market outcomes across educational systems and countries. Matching models explain the outcome of decisions of two contracting actors – in the classical paper these were men and women matching for a marital union (Gale and Shapley 1962). In our case, the matching partners are workers with their certified qualifications and employers with specific jobs. *Employers* try to recruit those applicants they perceive to be both most productive and least costly to train for the kind of work the job requires (Thurow 1976). They use qualifications as signals to assess actual and/or potential productivity and costs. *Workers* with given preferences strive to obtain the jobs that promise the best possible returns for their educational investments – monetary and non-pecuniary rewards, status, security or other aspects of job quality. For a further discussion how varying institutional arrangements affect the matching of individuals and jobs, see Müller and Jacob (2008).

more qualifications should be of direct use in specific jobs and require less training investments by employers.³¹ In addition to these distinctions, the distinction between different organizational forms of training has received a lot of attention – whether vocational training is mainly *school based* or consists in a systematic *combination of training and working, such as in apprenticeships* (Allmendinger 1989; Kerckhoff 1995; Shavit and Müller 1998, 2000; OECD 2000; Ryan 2001).

Countries also differ in labour market institutions that affect the integration of school leavers into the labour market. The most important probably are employment protection regulations; others include arrangements for the wage-setting process or prescriptions requiring particular diplomas for specific jobs. Economists argue, and they are most probably right, that employment protection makes employers think twice before they hire additional staff, since it implies costs to dismiss workers who do not perform according to expectations or when for some reason the firm wants to reduce personnel. Employment protection also enhances the disadvantages of outsiders as compared to insiders (Lindbeck and Snower 1988; Flanagan 1988). It tends to reduce the dynamics of the labour market and, in consequence, the chances of finding a job (Gregg and Manning 1997; Bertola and Rogerson 1997; Gangl 2004). Protection of employed workers may make it particularly difficult for school leavers to become integrated into stable employment because they are in a weak competitive position against experienced workers. However, it would be too short-sighted to see only the negative effects of employment protection. Evidently employment protection provides security and prevents easy hiring and firing at employers' will. Labour market regulation can also have positive effects at the stage of school-leavers' entry into the labour market. Apprenticeship-based training systems, for instance, show that cooperative relationships between corporate partners can generate economically viable institutional structures of youth integration into the labour market.

Besides the institutional settings, labour market outcomes of school leavers will also depend on the resources an individual commands in comparison to the level of resources acquired by his competitors. We must, thus, take into account *educational supply and demand*, which affect the conditions of competition among different groups of workers in a given country at a given point in time. There is the well-known problem of the potential devaluation of qualifications and of processes of displacement from the top in the course of educational expansion by virtue of the fact that many others have made the same educational choices. Finally, our accounts for the variation in the role of education for labour market integration and outcomes in different countries are incomplete as long as we do not take account of *aggregate structural conditions*, such as the ups and downs in economic cycles, the speed of educational expansion and the change in demand for qualifications resulting from changes in occupational structures (Gangl 2003c).

9.5.3.2 Common Patterns and Cross-national Differences

Summarizing recent research on the operation of these conditions in the transition from education to work and on the role educational qualifications play for the labour market

³¹Characteristics of educational systems have also to be seen as related to different arrangements of labour market segmentation. Educational systems with a high degree of occupational specificity support the prevalence of occupationally segmented labour markets while firm internal labour market structures prevail in countries with little occupation related training in the educational system (Maurice et al. 1982; Blossfeld and Mayer 1988; Marsden 1990).

integration of graduates, we first review findings that are widely common for all European countries and then describe a number of important cross-national differences.

One of the most stable findings in much research is that the higher the level of education achieved, the more favourable the prospects are in practically all dimensions researchers have analysed. There are clear positive effects of educational achievement on class position, status and prestige of job, income, autonomy, unemployment risk, stability of employment, job security, health, and even life expectancy. The educational gradients are often very substantial. Tertiary qualifications in general provide the strongest differential in advantage. Tertiary education very often is the crucial step to do really better.³²

We can illustrate this with a few summary data including most countries of Western Europe. To show the common (and widely shared) conditions data refer to the population weighted average in these countries. It describes the experience of young people who left education and training during the decade from 1990 to 2000.³³ Educational attainment in this data is coded according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Unless otherwise indicated we will use the following educational groupings:

ISCED 0–2 Lower secondary education or less

ISCED 3–4 Upper secondary education or post-secondary, non-tertiary

ISCED 5–6 First or second (doctoral) stage tertiary education.

Figure 9.9 shows how long school leavers had to wait until they found their first significant job and what kind of job this was. Even with the rather undifferentiated measures of education used, the transition from school to work substantially differs between the three ISCED groupings. Education leavers with tertiary education (ISCED 5–6) find employment clearly quicker than education leavers with only lower secondary education or less. Among tertiary education leavers a larger proportion than among leavers with lower qualifications needs less than six months to find employment, and among the former a clearly lower proportion needs more than two years. The jobs obtained by tertiary education leavers are also much more advantageous than those with less education. About 70% of the former obtain professional or managerial first job, whereas almost none of those with the lowest level of education do so. Similarly, large differences result in terms of social status of first job. Having tertiary education is decisive in view of the quality of the job.

Figure 9.10 shows, again for the school leavers of the 1990s in most of Europe, how their employment conditions evolved over time (measured in months) since they left education and training. The left part of the figure shows the evolution of the proportions of those who have a precarious job. In the right part, we see how the risk of unemployment evolves when young people enter the labour market with different levels of education and training. In both figures there are substantial differences between the three educational groups, and with more time in the labour market the relative disadvantage for the least qualified does not decline, it becomes even larger.

³²Respective findings are shown below, but see also Brauns et al. (2003); Müller et al. (2002); Kogan and Schubert (2003) and Smyth and McCoy (2000). One case that does not seem to fit into these patterns concern some of the countries of Southern Europe, where graduates with different levels of education differ less from each other in length of search for first job and unemployment in early careers than in other countries (Scherer 2004; Gangl 2003b; Iannelli 2003; Iannelli and Bonmati 2003).

³³The data derive from the European Union Labour Force surveys, either from the regular annual surveys or from the special ad hoc module on transitions from school to work (data collected in 2000).




Fig. 9.9 Labour market integration and first job outcome by initial level of education in Europe
 Source: EULFS (2000) ad hoc module on school-to-work transitions.
 Note: Includes Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.




Fig. 9.10 Precarious employment and unemployment rates by initial level of education and months since leaving continuous education for the first time in Europe
 Source: EULFS (2000) ad hoc module on school-to-work transitions.
 Note: Includes Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

The *level* of education in most dimensions is a more powerful predictor of outcomes than the distinction between *general-academic education and vocationally oriented education or training*. However, which kind of education provides better returns depends on the dimension considered and also on the more specific kind of vocational training

obtained. In terms of class position, status or income, returns to general/academic qualifications often tend to be more advantageous than those to vocational qualifications. While tertiary education again makes the crucial difference, we also see variation at the secondary level of education. School leavers with general upper secondary qualifications on average obtain jobs of slightly higher occupational status than school leavers with vocational qualifications or those who have served an apprenticeship (Gangl 2003b:177).

In contrast, in particular at the secondary level of education, vocational qualifications tend to facilitate access into jobs and are associated with lower risks of unemployment than general qualifications. This is the true; the more specific vocational qualifications are and the more employers are involved in providing training. Apprenticeship-type training provides the most clear-cut example. Chances of apprentices to face a relatively smooth transition into work are substantially better than for graduates with general qualifications.

These are general principles that practically hold in all countries of Europe. One finds these same general patterns when going through the data country by country. But, as the following analyses indicate, there are also significant *differences* across countries.

There is strong evidence that different institutional arrangements matter and produce systematic differences between countries. Perhaps most marked are the differences between European countries in the unemployment risks experienced by school leavers in the first years of their working life. As illustrative example Fig. 9.11 demonstrates this for the case of labour market entrants with upper secondary education (ISCED 3). We see huge differences between countries in the extent of unemployment and in the way in which unemployment risks evolve in the first 10 years after labour market entry. In Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, levels of unemployment tend to be relatively low and risks of unemployment do not differ much among labour market entrants and more senior workers (i.e. workers who already have 10 years work experience). In all other countries, unemployment risks are much higher at labour market entry and they only gradually converge towards the level of unemployment characteristic for more senior workers (that depending on the general level of unemployment evidently also varies between countries). In most countries in the south of Europe, young people face the highest difficulties to become integrated into the labour market.

A likely explanation for this specific pattern in the South are labour market regulations, and in particular *employment protection* legislation, that also affect the ease of young people's integration. Recent studies indicate that the level of employment protection indeed enhances the difficulties of youth integration. The countries in Southern Europe are among those with the highest degree of employment protection. However, the impact of employment protection seems to interact with characteristics of the educational system. Breen³⁴ (2005), for example, shows that those countries that have particularly high levels of youth unemployment mainly provide general education and have little vocational training, and which at the same time have high employment protection. Employment protection (which makes it difficult and costly to dismiss a non-fitting worker) impedes employment chances of new entrants mainly, or only, under conditions in which employers cannot easily and reliably guess from educational credentials what will be the training costs and the workers'

³⁴Breen (2005) has developed a formal model to explain and test the risks of unemployment of workers at school leaving age compared to the risks of the experienced workforce. The model shows how these risks should vary between countries with different signalling capacity of the education and training system and with a different extent of labour protection in the countries.




Fig. 9.11 Unemployment Rates by Country and Years of Labour Force Experience, ISCED 3 leavers
Source: Gangl (2003b).

potential productivity. In countries with well-signalled vocational and occupation specific training, high employment protection has hardly negative effects on youth integration because training costs are low as well as the risks that high costs from employment protection will ensue. Breen’s model quite convincingly accounts for the high variation in the unemployment rate among labour market entrants in the groups of countries in Fig. 9.11. Unemployment in the countries of Southern Europe is extremely high because these countries have high employment protection and at the same time lack ready-to-use and reliably signalled vocational qualifications. In Germany and other countries with similar training systems, unemployment is low in spite of a high level of employment protection. In several countries in the middle group of Fig. 9.11 there is less employment protection, in particular in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and therefore the signalling capacity of education is not important for employers’ decision to hire someone, because they can easily dissolve the contract.

Countries also differ – even though to a lesser extent – in the degree to which education shapes the status of jobs school leavers obtain in the early working life. In two groups of countries education plays a particularly strong role (Fig. 9.12) – in the Eastern European countries, and in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. Germany would also belong to this group of countries, but unfortunately data for Germany are not available in the database used. The Eastern European countries operated manpower planning and manpower allocation in highly credentialist ways during the state-socialist period. In the 1990s – the period to which our data refer – education still appears to affect very strongly the status of the jobs school leavers are able to obtain in the labour market. To understand differences between the other countries of Europe we can draw on the findings of the study *From School to Work* (Müller and Shavit 1998), which shows that the more stratified and the more occupationally specific education is organized, the stronger is the association between a particular kind and level of education and the social status or class position individuals obtain in the labour market. There is also less hopping around until a fitting match is reached. In Europe, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands are




Fig. 9.12 Occupational status (ISEI) of recent school leavers by country groups and level of education
 Source: EULFS (2000) ad hoc module on school-to-work transitions.
 Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

prime examples of high stratification and vocational specificity, while the United Kingdom probably is at the other extreme.

Differences between countries in returns to specific educational and vocational qualifications also result from varying macrostructural conditions existing in different countries, such as the ups and downs in business cycles, the speed of educational expansion, and the change in demand for qualifications resulting from changes in occupational structures. Gangl (2003b) showed that business cycles strongly influence *unemployment risks* for labour market entrants, but *not the quality of the job* attained (in terms of status or class). *Educational expansion* is associated with lower net returns to education in terms of occupational status and class. Within a given occupational level, better-qualified school leavers tend to substitute for less-qualified ones. However, such effects of educational expansion can be counterbalanced when *demand for qualified workers* on the labour market increases. That is, the effects of educational expansion depend on the structural balance of supply and demand, and this balance can develop differently among countries. Germany, for instance, had a rather balanced development of expansion of educational participation and upgrading of occupational demand. In the United Kingdom and Spain, expansion of tertiary qualifications has grown faster than the demand for such qualifications; thus displacement has been stronger. This is consistent with findings by Wolf (2002) and Wolff (2006) who notice for the United Kingdom clear signs of a “perverse race” leading to over-qualification³⁵ and displacement. Similar developments may take place in other countries in which educational expansion ‘overcompensates’ the demand for higher qualifications resulting from the growth of professional and semi-professional services or from processes of skill-based technological change (Autor et al. 2003; Mayer and Solga, 2008).³⁶

³⁵We cannot enter here a discussion of the ‘over-qualification issue’ appropriate to the complexity of the problem; for exemplary work see Halaby (1994) or Büchel et al. (2003).

³⁶We should also note here a core problem for the assessment in a European comparative perspective labour market outcomes of education and their change over time: In pertinent European Union databases such as

All three aggregate structural conditions — business cycles, educational expansion, and occupational upgrading — tend to have the most severe effects on school leavers with low qualifications, in particular those with neither general education nor vocational training beyond the lower secondary level. Economic downturns produce stronger growth of the unemployment risks among these least qualified, likely because employers have invested the least in their human capital. Also educational expansion and occupational upgrading tend both to increase the unemployment risks of the least qualified: educational expansion because the least qualified are at the lowest end of the displacement queue; occupational upgrading because jobs for unskilled workers disappear.³⁷

All in all, the cross-national differences in labour market outcomes are, to a large extent, *compositional*. This means that given levels or types of education and qualifications have broadly similar labour market consequences in the various countries of Europe. When structural conditions are controlled, then the effects of different levels and types of qualifications on labour market outcomes appear to be much more similar. Thus, the effects of different qualifications are similar, but the educational systems of different countries differ to a large extent in the composition by level and type of the qualifications they offer. An important part of cross-national differences in early labour market outcomes of education is thus institutionally based, in the sense that national systems of education provide different educational opportunities, which are then associated with systematically varying labour market prospects. These compositional differences account for a substantial part of variation in educational outcomes across Europe (Gangl et al. 2003).

9.5.4 Political Participation and Political Attitudes

Formal education does not only provide individuals with the specific competence necessary to perform duties within a given profession but also enhances more generalizable skills that help understanding the world around them and acting in competent ways. In democratic political systems which rely on the judgment and active participation of responsible citizens this is particularly relevant for the political world, e.g. the ability to integrate and organize information about government and politics (Inglehart 1989; Dalton 1984; Jennings 1996). Formal education is almost without exception the strongest factor explaining how citizens think about politics and what they do in politics. Nie et al. (1996) argue that educational attainment effects the development of verbal cognitive proficiency,³⁸ which is responsible for paving a cognitive pathway towards democratic enlightenment and influences the placement of individuals in social networks which serves as a positional mediator to political engagement.

The common explanation in the political science literature for why education is such a powerful predictor of political participation is resource and socialization arguments (Wolfinger and Rosestone 1980; see also Chapter 6). The mechanism can be exemplified with regard to individual voting behaviour. Education increases cognitive skills, which

the EU Labour Force Survey or the European Community Household Panel information on education is only available in rather broad educational categories. So, developments that might become evident when educational information were available in finer grids (as they often are at the national level) may not or less clearly appear in a comparative perspective.

³⁷For further discussion of specific problems for persons with low qualifications see Solga (2008).

³⁸A similar idea of cognitive mobilization could be found in Becker et al. (2006), who explore development of cognitive skills of German youth, as well as Hadjar and Becker (2006).

facilitates learning about politics, and thus is a resource that reduces the costs of voting by giving people the skills necessary for processing political information and for making political decisions. Besides, better-educated people are likely to get more gratification from political participation. Finally, schooling imparts experience with a variety of bureaucratic relationships, which helps one overcome the procedural hurdles required to register and then to vote. As for the costs of contributing to politics, it is argued that people with higher levels of education have better-paying jobs and more financial resources, and can therefore more easily absorb the financial costs. It is also said that people who have been in school for more years absorb civic values and develop interest in politics, which then facilitates increased participation. For political engagement education hence works as a sorting mechanism, assigning ranks on the basis of the citizen's relative educational attainment.

Education is shown to provide both the skills necessary to become politically engaged and the knowledge to understand and accept democratic principles. In the United States education has a strong and positive influence on political knowledge, political participation and voting, attentiveness to politics and tolerance (Nie et al. 1996). In their comparative study of the United States, Germany and the Netherlands, Jennings et al. (1990) have shown a strong relationship between formal education and the conventional and the unconventional modes of political participation among all party identifiers in all three countries. In Germany, both Western and Eastern, education is the most important predictor of voting participation, party involvement, thematic forms of political participation, but plays no role in explaining protest behaviour (Gabriel 2005). Hadjar and Becker (2006), who analyse trends in political interest in Germany since 1980s, point to its increase up to the early 1990s, followed by a decrease until the mid-1990s and a new increase later on. With regard to cohort differences in political interest the descriptive evidence suggests that the cohort of 1939–1948 is the most politically engaged one, whereas the younger cohort of those born in 1959–1968 is the least interested in politics. Once age effect is taken into account, the results point to a stronger political interest among the younger cohorts. With regard to the effect of education, Hadjar and Becker's (2006) analyses show that the differences in political interest decrease between the least and most educated in the younger cohorts.

Results from the recently introduced European Social Survey (ESS, years 2002, 2004) show that in all European countries who participate in the survey there is a linear relationship between the level of education and various forms of political behaviour. A number of items for political participation are shown in Fig. 9.13. Be it contacting a politician or a government official, working in a political party or action group, signing a petition or taking part in a lawful public demonstration in the last 12 months, the higher the level of education the higher the levels of political engagement. This holds true almost without exceptions for all countries in the ESS sample. This notwithstanding there is substantial variation with regard to political involvement dependent on the type of activity as well as cross-national variation. Signing petitions, for example, is much less wide-spread in Southern (except for Spain) and Eastern European countries. Eastern Europeans are also somewhat less involved in a political party or an action group or more rarely mention taking part in lawful public demonstrations. Contacting a politician or a government official is, on the other hand, more frequently mentioned by citizens of Nordic countries.

Education also appears to be a powerful predictor of the attitudes among European citizens towards the European Union and its institutions (see Chapter 11). In Fig. 9.14 we plot the proportion of individuals agreeing with the statement of the beneficial role of the European Union for their respective countries. Irish appear to be overall the most positive about the benefits of the European Union. They are followed by the majority of the citizens of the new member states. The most sceptical about EU benefits appear to




Fig. 9.13 Political participation and educational attainment in Europe (%)

Source: ESS (2002, 2004), own calculations.

Note: Unweighted data.

Country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

be Britons, Swedes, Hungarians and Italians with the rest of the continental Europeans settling in between. With regard to the main question of this chapter, the role of education in political and social attitudes, it could again be shown that the more educated individuals are more positive about the beneficial role of the European Union for their country, and this is true for all countries shown here. Moreover, as a rule, younger cohorts, regardless of education, appear to be more optimistic about the pluses of the EU.

In Fig. 9.15 we sort the European countries with regard to the degree their citizens assess the image of the EU and compare these countries' most and least educated populations. The overall picture is as expected: tertiary-educated individuals in all countries under discussion view EU more positively. The gaps between two educational groups are mostly noticeable in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Germany, France and Ireland. Ireland again appears to be the country whose population views the EU in a most positive way. As already shown above, the EU image is more favourable in Eastern European countries, whereas British again appear among the sceptics of the EU.




Fig. 9.14 Benefits of EU membership for one's own country by education and cohort (%)
 Source: Eurobarometer, 66.1 (September–October 2006).
 Country abbreviations: IE-N – Northern Ireland; DE-E – Former East-Germany; DE-W – Former West-Germany; other country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.




Fig. 9.15 Image of the EU (mean score), by education
 Source: Eurobarometer, 66.1 (September–October 2006).
 Note: The values range from 1 (very negative image) to 5 (very positive image).
 Country abbreviations: IE-N – Northern Ireland; DE-E – Former East-Germany; DE-W – Former West-Germany; other country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.




Fig. 9.16 Trust in the European Parliament (%), by education
 Source: Eurobarometer, 66.1 (September–October 2006).
 Country abbreviations: IE-N – Northern Ireland; DE-E – Former East-Germany; DE-W – Former West-Germany; other country abbreviations as in Table 9.1, page 222.

Unsurprisingly, British trust European institutions less than citizens of other countries, which is evident from Fig. 9.16, where the degree of trust in the European Parliament is plotted. Among the countries with a relatively low trust in European Union institutions are Turkey, Turkish Cyprus, Germany, Croatia, France and Austria. The population of new EU members, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Belgium are, on the other hand, more trustful.³⁹ Overall, the well-known pattern with regard to the differences in trust by education is also found here: tertiary-educated people trust in two most visible European Union institutions more than less educated. This holds true for all EU-27 and candidate countries with a single exception of Luxembourg, where the degree of trust of both highly and less educated is quite similar.

9.6 Conclusions

To conclude, we address three questions the editors of the volume ask to consider. First, what are the specifically *European* characteristics in the topical area reviewed? Second, are crucial institutions, structures or processes converging or diverging among the various countries of Europe, and third, do the developments in the area studied contribute to European integration? We will try to briefly approach these questions from what we have learned in the various sections of this chapter.

Throughout the preceding pages we have sought to identify in which aspects education is similar in the different countries of Europe and in which aspects it differs. Not

³⁹Similarly to the trust in the European Parliament, trust in the European Commission is questioned in the Eurobarometer, and the ranking of countries is quite similar to the one shown.

surprisingly we found a high level of heterogeneity deriving from the historical evolution of education and training systems in different national contexts. Now, is there still something “European” in all this diversity, or to put it in other words: Does education in all or most of Europe in some characteristic way differ from education in other parts of the world? Without similar detailed investigation for other parts of the world, answers must be tentative and should be considered as suggestions for further research rather than firm conclusions. Neo-institutionalists would tend to answer negatively, since they see diffuse educational institutions and practices in similar ways all over the world, partly based on activities of international organizations with their worldwide reach and global impact (Meyer and Schofer 2005). In educational matters, not little of this global diffusion is of European origin. Agreeing or disagreeing with such claims is a question of the lenses one uses. Viewed with more focused lenses, the very diversity in educational institutions and their consequences found within Europe does suggest disagreeing with an ‘all is similar’ claim. The huge institutional diversity on the European territory might itself be considered a first particular characteristic. In hardly any other region of the world are small populations confronted with as varied educational institutions as in Europe.

One might think of three further aspects along which education in Europe differs from other parts of the world. First, one is tempted to assume that especially at the secondary level, education in Europe tends to have stronger vocational components than in many non-European countries such as in Japan, Korea or India, in which secondary education tends to follow the American high school model with little serious vocational training. However, difference here is a matter of degrees rather than a sharp contrast. Also, in Europe, the character of vocational education and its prevalence against general education varies a lot. What’s more, some non-European countries, such as Australia, have large proportions of their secondary level students following tracks with a strong vocational orientation. Second, partly related to stronger vocational components at the secondary level, one can expect participation rates in tertiary education to be lower in most of the European countries than they are in the New World countries at a similar level of economic development. This is essentially true, at least for the past. All OECD countries outside Europe had and still have higher proportions of tertiary education graduates in their populations than the European OECD countries. However, with the recent rapid expansion of tertiary education in various European countries, this state of affairs is changing. Among the youngest cohorts (old enough to graduate from tertiary education), graduation rates in several European countries, notably in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and Ireland, are now higher than they are in the United States (OECD 2007: 67). Third, and here we touch upon probably the most distinguishing feature for education in Europe: The role of the state in providing, controlling and financing education is more pervasive in practically all of Europe than it is in most other parts of the world. Even in the European country with the highest level of private pay for the costs of education, the United Kingdom, the public share is higher than in any non-European OECD country, e.g. Australia, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand or the United States. With the exception of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, education is also clearly more often provided in institutions under direct public control in Europe than outside Europe, especially at the tertiary level. This ‘European’ pattern of more state involvement in education is embedded in a context of a generally more pronounced role of the state for welfare production in Europe, and interestingly even within Europe the state’s philosophy and engagement in welfare-state policies correlates with related philosophies and practises in educational matters.

As to the convergence–divergence issue we found that in the process of educational expansion and differentiation since World War II the educational systems and institutions in Europe tended to diverge rather than converge. With the Bologna process, attempts at reverting this trend are now made by many governments in Europe. By installing a similar study and degree structure for higher education, by installing other measures to increase transparency and readability of qualifications, and with the wide acceptance of the new template, the systems of higher education are on a converging path, at least at the surface of formal structures. At lower levels of education, no similar process can be observed so far of reducing the huge diversity in the structure of educational tracks, pathways, age of tracking or selection procedures. Thus, many national idiosyncrasies remain, and for higher education we must await the further developments and research to know how significant the convergence in the educational institutions really is. Apart of such institutional reforms, even among the youngest cohorts, the patterns of participation in different types of education and in the distribution of qualifications and degrees vary a lot between countries, as do the level of competences mastered as well as the extent of social disparities in educational attainment and competences. While early drop-out from education with low level qualifications is declining towards similar numbers in most countries – converging thus in this respect – countries diverge at higher levels of education, notably due to varying policies fostering expansion for different kinds of tertiary qualifications. If convergence occurs, it will remain limited. As no supra-national authority has a legal competence to pressure for convergence and educational reforms very much remain a battle-field of national interest groups, even similar pressures from global markets will be filtered by specific national conditions and must not lead to similar outcomes. And even if in the future some convergence in educational participation and qualification attainment occurs among the rising generations, the various populations of Europe will for long have a highly diverse educational face, because it takes many decades before the new generations will have replaced the generations educated up to now.

Do the developments in education contribute to European integration? As long as we do not have good knowledge about what children learn in school, especially about their own country and about Europe, we are not well equipped to answer this question. But already from what we have learned in this chapter, we have sufficient grounds to argue, that education will certainly not play a similarly important role for the development and consolidation of an European identity as it once did for national identity in the nation-building process in the 18th and 19th century. Education at that time was much more homogenous within nations than it is today within Europe. A crucial element for nation building was learning to read and write in a common national language and inculcating a common national history and culture. We have seen that learning foreign languages has made some progress, but no one dares to suggest a common European language for everyday use. Learning a common history is hardly better developed than learning a common language. Language borders remain a crucial barrier for cross-country communication and media consumption and thus constrain the cultural integration of the different populations of Europe. Both, different educational qualifications and language barriers inhibit worker mobility which could bolster structural integration. Developments in education which reduce such barriers and reduce the costs of mobility can contribute to European integration, but in relation to the existing obstacles progress is small and is likely to remain small for long. A somewhat friendlier climate for Europe may be backed by the general educational expansion and the continued compositional change in the population towards larger shares of highly educated people. The growth of this group with its generally more positive evaluations of Europe and

European matters may, in the long run, enhance the acceptance in the populations of policies that strengthen Europe. But again, it would be wise not to have too high expectations: Differences between education groups are not really large; they may be caused by correlates of education, and positive attitudes usually have little effects when it comes to costly decisions.

This chapter, as long as it is, could only tap upon selected aspects, and most of them would need more in-depth examination. We had to neglect many other aspects, for instance informal learning or the important role of education for social networks, social mobility, poverty, fertility, life styles, health, morbidity, criminality, value orientations or tolerance. Even a thick book cannot cover all this. For many of these aspects good and sufficiently comparable data for a wide range of countries are not yet available. A lot of resources and much scholarly work is needed to grasp the ongoing changes and to gradually cover the lacunae.

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Chapter 10

Elites and Power Structure

Michael Hartmann

10.1 Introduction

After the failure of the referenda on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, again and again one could read in the media about a serious estrangement of elites and population. National elites and high-ranking EU bureaucrats being far from reality was named as a decisive reason for the negative results of the referenda. Particularly the fast and comprehensive extension of the EU towards the East and the influence of EU regulations on national politics, which is increasingly seen critically by many common citizens (e.g. the effects of the Bolkestein directive on free travel in services for social standards) increased the impression that the EU is most of all a project of the elites. But who are these elites? Are they already European, maybe even globalized, or are they still nationally structured in their overwhelming majority? What is their social recruitment like? How strong is mobility between the various elite-sectors, to what degree does the integration of elites happen? These questions will determine the following explanations. They are crucial for a sociological analyses as they inform about the two most important aspects, i.e. the democratic authorization of elites and their interior coherence, that is also about the concentration of power within a given society and thus about the existence and the power of a ruling class (Aron 1950; Dahrendorf 1962; Giddens 1974; Hartmann 2006a). The concentration of power is strongest if exclusive social recruitment comes along with high mobility among the elite sectors.

In the following the focus will be on the elites in the fields of business, politics, and administration and on the elites in the countries of Germany, France, and Great Britain. This is due to two reasons, a topical one and a formal one. Topically, putting the main emphasis on these aspects is suggested on the one hand by the fact that these three countries – if Russia is left out of consideration – dominate Europe due to their economic, political, and finally also military strength and furthermore – as we will see – represent the three crucial types of elites. On the other hand, the importance of the economic, political, and administrative elites together with those from the field of justice clearly surpasses that of all other elites for they are able to influence the development of society more than others. This influence, however, is the criterion for speaking about an elite at all or not. Exactly because of this, top sportspersons and “stars” from the various fields of entertainment, who

M. Hartmann (✉)
Institute of Sociology, Technical University Darmstadt, Germany
e-mail: hartmann@ifs.tu-darmstadt.de

commonly are also called elites, do not count among real elites. They lack a relevant influence on society as a whole. Despite being famous, usually they are only an ornament of the real elites. As demonstrated by numerous cases (most recently the example of Tom Cruise, one of the most famous Hollywood actors), even the most famous stars depend on decisions by owners or top managers of the media branch or of sports clubs, after all. Media and military elites have significantly more influence, but they – like the media – must to a large extent be counted among business (private media groups like Bertelsmann, Lagardere, or Murdoch) or among politics (TV and radio stations under public law), or – like the armed forces – they have massively lost importance in most countries. The latter is true most of all for Europe, where more or less the importance of the armed forces has been declining drastically, not only due to the changes in global politics after the Second World War but also due to several other reasons (decline of the British and French colonial empires, end of military dictatorships in Greece and Portugal as well as of the Franco regime in Spain).

Formally, focusing on the above-mentioned countries and elites is suggested by the fact that only about them data and information are at hand to a larger extent. While elites from Germany, France, and Great Britain – though to different extent – have frequently been in the focus of sociologists' interest, among them prominent scientists like Bourdieu, Dahrendorf, or Giddens, and accordingly there is a number of more or less voluminous and fruitful analyses, this is not the case for Europe's other countries. At the most, there are single studies on the latter which often are not really satisfying regarding their data basis. Most publications, and this is true both for the aforementioned three countries and for all the others, refer to the elites from the three sectors of business, politics, and administration. Unfortunately, on the military elites and the elites of justice there are much less investigations. They allow only punctual consideration.

10.2 The Basic Types of Elite Formation in Europe

In Europe, three different basic types of elite formation can be identified. They differ from each other by two decisive aspects, by their specific ways of (both institutional and social) recruiting and by the extent of their inter-sectoral mobility. Elites are most homogeneous where their recruiting is not only socially standardized to a certain degree but also happens on the basis of standardized education at special elite-related educational institutions and if furthermore they regularly change between the different elite sectors. In this way, in Europe this is only the case with the French model, outside Europe also with the Japanese model. For Europe, Great Britain represents the second type. Although it is also characterized by relatively uniform social and institutional recruitment it is different from the first type due to the fact that there is only limited exchange between the sectors. Germany must finally be counted among the third type which includes most of the European countries. In the case of this type elite careers happen mostly within one field, but in contrast to Great Britain there is no common education of elites at special institutions. Thus, the integration of elites may be considered least in this case. Its concrete degree, however, is strongly dependent on the social recruitment of each single elite which in this respect is more or less different, according to country.

10.2.1 Common Education of Elites and Regular Change of Elites

In France there can be observed one of the most distinctive – if not the most distinctive worldwide – system of standardized elite formation. Who wants to make his way to the

top positions of the French society, most of all those of business, politics, and administration, must usually attend one of the famous *Grandes Écoles* at first, which (like the *École Polytechnique*) as special places of elite formation have in some cases been existing for more than 200 years, and if possible he/she should then pass through one of the elite institutions of public administration, one of the *Grands Corps*.

If at first we have a look at top managers, more than half of the managing directors (PDG) of the 200 biggest French companies in 1993 studied only at the three most renowned *Grandes Écoles*, ENA, the *École Polytechnique*, and HEC. Furthermore, the tendency is clearly rising, from 45% in 1985 and 53% 4 years later to 57% in 1993. Here, with 7–8% the economy-scientific orientated HEC, run by the Paris Chamber of Commerce, is considerably behind the other two elite institutions, being run by the state and enjoying high reputation in France, which reach about 25% respectively. With only ca. 500 graduates a year, which is 0.6 per mill, ENA and Polytechnique provide every second top manager. The extremely small recruitment basis for French top managers becomes even more clear if as an additional precondition of advancement membership in one of the five leading *Grands Corps* is taken into account, those elite institutions of public service which year after year accept the 80 best graduates from ENA and Polytechnique, i.e. 0.1 per mill of each age cohort. From the members of these five *Grands Corps*, who before have already attended one of the two most exclusive *Grandes Écoles*, more than one-third of the 200 PDG is recruited (Bauer and Bertin-Mouroit 1996: 48–50).

If the circle of top managers is defined even more closely and only the 100 biggest companies are taken into account, the pattern of recruitment becomes even clearer (Hartmann 2000: 246f). Among the PDG of the 100 biggest French companies of the year 1995, already more than two-thirds studied at the *École Polytechnique*, ENA, or HEC. With about 30 graduates, respectively, the classical state-run elite universities, Polytechnique and ENA, are again far in front of the privately run HEC with only 10. The percentage of graduates from Polytechnique, ENA, and HEC which then have been members of one of the famous *Grands Corps* is also higher than in Bauer's and Bertin-Mouroits investigation, making a total of about 40%.

The enormous importance of France's exclusive educational institutions for recruiting the national elites become even clearer if besides business we have a look at the other central social fields, like most of all politics and state administration. In France, graduates from the famous *Grandes Écoles*, most of all ENA, as well as the leading *Grands Corps* are extraordinarily strongly represented also in top positions in these fields. Of the three presidents of the post-Gaullist era after 1974 only one, Francois Mitterand, did not attend one of the leading *Grandes Écoles*. The other two, Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac, did not only attend ENA and before this even the same lycee in Paris, Louis le Grand, but they were also members of one of the *Grand Corps*. For the 12 prime ministers of this period there is a similar picture. Only Pierre Mauroy and Pierre Bérégovoy did not attend a *Grande École*. Raymond Barre attended the Sciences Po,¹ where in the following he worked as a professor, Pierre Raffarin attended the ESCP, and Edith Cresson attended HEC which (if compared to ENA and Polytechnique) is far more open towards women. All of the remaining seven graduated from ENA. In the following, five of them became members of one of the five decisive *Grands Corps*. If Lionel Jospin and Dominique de Villepin, due to their work for the diplomatic corps, are also considered, almost two-thirds have a *Grands*

¹The Sciences Po is almost as exclusive as the famous *Grandes Écoles* but does not officially enjoy the latter's status.

Corps past.² Also for the three Cabinets from Juppé to Raffarin (including deputy ministers 27–39 people) the share of graduates from the three leading *Grandes Écoles* makes a minimum of one-quarter and a maximum of almost one-half. If also those ministers are taken into consideration who attended “only” the almost as famous Sciences Po in Paris, percentage even rises to 36–60%. Even among the members of parliament of the last two legislative periods almost one out of seven passed through one of these four elite educational institutions (Joly 2005: 153–155).

At the level below that of ministers, the “Cabinets ministérielles”, i.e. the personal staffs of the ministers, there is a similar picture. Under the Prime Minister, Balladur (1993–1995) with 36% every third member of the “Cabinets” came from ENA alone. In the following years the percentage of the *enarques* increased to 38% under Juppé (Chevallier 1997: 92). Among the ministerial directors, leading the ministers’ personal staffs, the influence of ENA graduates is even considerably stronger. In the Barre and Chirac governments between 1978 and 1986, 37% of them had attended ENA, in the later Bérégovoy and Juppé governments they were even double as much, about 70% (Kesler 1997: 27). During the first half of the 1990s, every eighth to tenth head of a ministry department came from the *Grands Corps* alone (Rouban 1999: 70). Altogether, meanwhile every second director of the other ministries and every second ambassador as well as two out of three *prefects* come from the ranks of the *enarques*. Even severe political change has not changed much about the dominating function of ENA graduates, as illustrated by the Socialists seizing power in the 1980s.

Also in the administration as a whole ENA graduates are extraordinarily strongly represented. Of the members of the three non-technical *Grands Corps* (Conseil d’Etat, Cour de Comptes, and Inspection des Finances) between 66 and 80% graduated from this elite institution. Even in the diplomatic corps they make one-third. With the *Corps des Administrateurs Civils*, which does not count among the *Grands Corps*, their share is 69% and among all 545 *Inspecteurs Généraux* it is still 19% (Kesler 1997: 25–26). Also among the heads of departments of the ministries, who are less included into politics, i.e. they belong to the administrative elite in the stricter sense, more than 40% graduated from ENA (Derlien and Lang 2005: 128). Even among the higher ranks of justice *enarques* are found. They do not only provide four out of five members of the “Conseil d’Etat”, the Council of State, which besides its function of advising the government is at the same time supreme French administrative court (Bock 1999: 394), but also more of one-quarter of all members of the higher administrative jurisdiction (Kesler 1997: 25).

As illustrated by the high share of former members of the *Grands Corps* among top managers and presidents as well as prime ministers, in the international comparison the inter-sectoral mobility of the elites from administration, politics, and business is definitely high. However, this is most of a one-way street from the top institutions of administration, i.e. mostly the *Grands Corps*, to the top positions of politics and business. Thus, in the cabinets from Juppé to Raffarin former high ranking public officials make one-third of ministers and thus were represented five times as many than pure professional politicians (Joly 2005: 161). On average, the change from administration to politics or business happens after a bit more than 10 years of work in government service, i.e. at a relatively early

²Here, like in the following, all current statements on education, career, and social origin of elites as well as all statements for which no reference is given are based on the author’s own research. In the case of British, French, and US top managers, the data on course of education and career (not on social origin), however, were not investigated by the author alone but in the context of a research and teaching project at the Institute of Sociology of the TU Darmstadt, which was supervised by the author.

stage of the career. By “pantouflage” there even exists a special term for this process. In principle, for the members of the Grands Corps the way back is open. They need not at once decide about definitely leaving public service but at first may be granted a time or longer period of leave. There are even some prominent cases when earlier members of a Grand Corps came back after having failed in business. Changes from politics to business and the other way round are clearly more seldom but nevertheless happen regularly. Out of the last three economics ministers alone, two had been leading one of the biggest French companies.

The high inter-sectoral mobility of elites is based on common education at the Grandes Écoles and on activity with the Grands Corps. This is also the basis of the great homogeneity of French elites and the very close contact to each other. A typical example: during his time in the Corps Diplomatique the former Socialist prime minister and leader of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, shared an office for 3 years with Ernest-Antoine de Seillière, the heir and PDG of the Wendel group and for long years chairman of the biggest French employer’s association. Both had been at ENA before. This shows how close the links among the elites of the various social sectors may become in France by attending the elite educational institutions. The proverbial esprit de corps, which does not only result from shared experiences but also from consciously being supported by the institutions of elite education, forms a tie which closely links the graduates from the Grandes Écoles and the former members of the Grands Corps.

To this there adds also a great social homogeneity. The great majority of top ranking people from business, politics, and administration come from the ranks of 3.5% of the population, the upper middle or even the upper class. Thus, only 3 out of the last 12 prime ministers have come from mainstream population. Mauroy’s and Jospin’s fathers were teachers, Bérégoovoy’s father was a worker. All the others have come from the upper middle or the upper class. If the three last presidents, Giscard d’Estaing who comes from one of France’s most renowned families, Mitterand whose father worked for the railway before he took over a vinegar factory, and Chirac, son of a company director, are included, there results a clear picture. The political elite is definitely dominated by the “bourgeoisie”. The situation in administration is similar. Thus, also in the Inspection des Finances about three-quarters of Corps members come from the upper middle or the upper class (Rouban 2002: 16–19). Among top managers, with more than four-fifths percentage is even higher (Hartmann 2000: 247). This is particularly true for the upper class. Almost half of the PDG come from families of large-scale entrepreneurs, the PDG of large companies, the highest ranks of civil service, generals, and distinguished professions, in other words from the upper class.

The main reason for elitist social recruitment is the educational system which is marked by a particularly high level of social selection. This is particularly true for the most renowned institutions, the Grandes Écoles. At ENA, for example, only about 120 out of more than 2,000 applicants pass the entrance examination. The situation is similar at the other famous Grands Écoles which limit their incoming classes to between 100 and 400 students.

For the offspring of working class and middle class families the chances of gaining admission to the Grandes Écoles are extremely low. At the end of the 1960s, between 70 and 80% of students at the famous Grandes Écoles, such as the Polytechnique, ENA, HEC, or the Science Po, came from families of industrial and commercial employers, members of the free professions, higher ranking white collar employees, and the high ranks of civil service (Bourdieu 1989: 192; Suleiman 1974: 58–61, 87–88). In the decades since, social selection has become even more intense. Between 1966 and 1970, 21.2% of students

at the four most famous *Grandes Écoles*, the Polytechnique, ENA, ENS (*École Normale Supérieure*), and HEC, came from an “*origine populaire*” (farmers, the working class, average white collar employees and civil servants, artisans, retail, and small business). This figure fell to 8.6% for the years 1989 to 1993, compared to a share of 64.5% of children from the “*cadres supérieurs*” (executives) (Euriat and Thélot 1995: 434–436). At ENA, out of students accepted between 1987 and 1996 due to the external examination 84.6% came from families of the “*cadres supérieurs*”, self-employed academics or bigger entrepreneurs (Eymeri 2005: 109).

The *Grandes Écoles* have proven to be quite effective with undermining the opening up of the educational system and the universities, which was a legacy of the 1960s, to broader social groups. The mass of children from the middle and lower classes who made new headway to post-secondary institutions made it only to the universities. There, the number of students rose from 214,000 in 1960 to today’s figure of about 2.1 million, something which has completely overwhelmed the French university system. The *Grandes Écoles*, in contrast, and particularly the most famous of them, have been able to preserve their elite character up to the present day. Backed by the long established distance to the universities, children from the upper middle and upper class were able to maintain their clear hold over the offspring of the other social classes in terms of academic degrees.

Although most of the prestigious *Grandes Écoles* do not demand tuition and the qualifying examination with its standardized format seems to offer equal opportunity to all students, the French educational system nonetheless ensures an extremely effective social selection in favour of the offspring of the “*classe dominante*”. There is one essential cause of this effectiveness: families of the upper middle and the upper class have much better access to both the cultural and the economic requisites for passing the numerous examinations than families from the other social classes (Bourdieu 1989).

The role of the *Grandes Écoles* for the formation of elites has not changed over the decades. But indeed there are some minor changes. For example, during the past 10 years a certain decline of their significance for business can be stated. Of the PDG of the 100 biggest French companies of the year 2005 “only” slightly more than one-half studied at the Polytechnique, ENA, or HEC, compared to a bit more than two-thirds 10 years before. If one includes further famous *Grandes Écoles*, like *École centrale* or *Supélec*, the difference is reduced to about 10%, but it still exists. Responsible for the decline of significance of the leading *Grandes Écoles* is first of all the share of upper class children among PDG, which has risen by almost one-fifth to 56.5%. Due to their social origin, they find it easier than others to give up on attending the leading *Grandes Écoles*. Less than one-half of them graduated from Polytechnique, ENA, or HEC, the share of PDG coming from the upper middle class, whose share, however, has declined to be about 30%, being the same as in 1995. The percentage of PDG having been member of one of the *Grands Corps* has also declined, however less significantly, to be still a bit more than one-third. Thus, *pantouflage* stays to be the predominant type of career, with a share of more than 40%. In contrast to business, in politics there has been no change. In Prime Minister de Villepin’s current cabinet half of the ministers graduated from ENA or *Sciences Po*, just like in the past. Having a share of slightly more than two-thirds, their overwhelming majority still comes from the upper middle or the upper class. The social structure of French elites proves to be extraordinarily stable. For the time being, it is not possible to tell if the reduced weight of the leading *Grandes Écoles* will be a lasting or only a short-term phenomenon, the fact however, that of the younger cohort of PDG, born after 1950, again two-thirds graduated from such an institution suggests the second variant, just as the fact that more than four-fifths of the PDG of those 100 French companies which are the biggest ones according to

market capitalization graduated from one of these three *Grandes Écoles* or the Sciences Po (Opitz 2004: 64).

The French model of common education of the elite and of high mobility between the different elite sectors is unique in Europe. No other country knows such a homogeneity of its elites. Elements of the French model, however, are also found elsewhere. In respect of common education of the elite this is true for Great Britain and to a lesser extent also for Switzerland, as described in more detail in the next chapter. In respect of the role of the *Grands Corps* there are clear similarities to Spain.

Based on measures taken by Napoleon during the occupation of Spain at the beginning of the 19th century and following the French example, in the decades thereafter specialized corps were created for the most important fields of administration, whose members have traditionally occupied the highest positions within the administration. Despite numerous attempts of reform, their special role has not really changed until today. Accordingly, despite a clearly increased share of top positions which are occupied by followers of the respective ruling political parties and mostly according to political criteria, still between 50% (infrastructure) and 100% (foreign affairs) of the highest-ranking public officials, of assistant directors general, and directors general of the central ministries come from these elite corps (Alvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 47). In both big parties, the PP and the PSOE, in the parliament as well as most of all in governments the members of the corps are also largely represented. Every fourth minister of the governments between 1977 and 2002 and even a higher percentage of junior ministers had been a senior civil servant before, most of all in one of the elite corps, almost every fifth alone had been a director general (Linz et al. 2002: 97, 103).³ In the cabinet of Luis Zapatero even 5 out of 16 ministers are former directors general. If members of higher administration and the ministers are taken as one, three-quarters of those 76% of them who have been newly appointed at the beginning of the Socialist term of government are recruited from high positions of civil service. When the then following Conservative government seized power, they were slightly more than two-thirds of the 90% newly appointed. In both cases the members of the elite corps were clearly dominating (Parrado Diez 2001: 21). A number of corps members also occupy high business positions. Until the end of the 1980s this was true most of all for the top managers of state or state-influenced enterprises (apart from the Instituto Nacional de Industria – INI – a state holding, most of all the state monopolies of the sectors of telecommunication, oil, and tobacco), in total for ca. 20% of “big businessmen” (Alvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 44; Baena de Alcázar 2002: 331). Despite the extensive privatization of state companies, the percentage has not changed since. Of the Presidents of the 30 biggest Spanish groups of the year 2005, 6 had been working as a director general in the course of their careers. However, their fields of activity have changed. Today, two-thirds of them are at the top of private enterprises. Only two of them head former state companies. Also of the ministers of the four governments between 1976 and 1994 one-tenth (Gonzalez Cabinet) or one-third (Suarez and Calvo Sotelo Cabinets) changed to top positions in business (Botella: 188–190).

³ Alvarez de Cienfuegos and Botella state even a share of almost 50% of civil servants among ministers (Alvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 51; Botella 1997: 188). Even if they possibly defined the civil servants according to other criteria than Linz et al., as they included only the governments between 1976 and 1994, many facts suggest that during the past 10 years top officials were more seldomly appointed minister, which is also according to the data by Parrado Diez. This means that the mobility between the political and the administrative elites has definitely declined.

The recruitment of the majority of corps members “from wealthy families” (Alvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 43)⁴ and the fact that slightly more than four-fifths of the business elite and more than 70% of the Zapatero cabinet members come from upper middle class or upper class families reminds to the French elites that there are fundamental differences between the elites of the two countries. This is true most of all in three respects. At first, in Spain there are no special elite institutions in the educational sector, both at the levels of schools and universities. The resulting effect in respect of social selectivity and homogeneity of elites does not exist in Spain. Already due to this, the enormous social uniformity of the French elites is not achieved by the Spanish elites. Then, the Spanish corps are characterized by a high degree of specialization, while the French Grands Corps are clearly more generalistically orientated. This surely hinders mobility within higher-ranking administration, but most of all it reduces the probability of regular exchange between the different elite sectors.⁵ Also elite integration is clearly negatively influenced by this. Finally, and this may be the most important difference, the inter-sectoral mobility of the business elite is only small. For example, of those 130 ministers between 1977 and 2002 only 7 had already held high business positions, more than 50 having professional experience as lawyers or university professors respectively and further 33 had been working as civil servants (Linz et al. 2002: 97). One important reason for this is the historical predominance of Catalonia and Basque economy in Spain. Traditionally, their elites, a share of which was in opposition to the central government during the Franco regime, show only comparatively little inter-connection with top institutions of the state, which are concentrated in Madrid. Altogether, the Spanish elites thus do by far not achieve the homogeneity which is typical for France, despite some similarities.

10.2.2 Common Elite Education, Separate Elite Careers

Traditionally British elites, just as their French counterparts, are educated at special institutions of elite education. Although the well-known public schools⁶ and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge are not as dominating as the Grandes Ecoles, they doubtlessly play a major role. Among the top managers of the 200 biggest British companies, 36% graduated from one of the 20 most renowned public schools with only 2,500 successful graduates a year, and 32% graduated from Oxford or Cambridge, two-thirds of Oxbridge graduates having been at one of these public schools before (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1996: 101–104). Among the chairmen of the 100 biggest British companies of 1995, even more than three-quarters attended one of the 27 most renowned public schools, 11 alone the most famous of all public schools, Eton, and another 14 one of the (besides Eton) oldest

⁴At the end of the 1960s almost 90% of directors general came from the upper or upper middle class (Alba 1984: 235).

⁵The fact that almost two-thirds of the ministers after 1977 worked only for one ministry, that slightly another third changed ministry only once, and that only a total of 9.2% headed more than two ministries shows the small extent of mobility and suggests an extent of specialization which is similar to that of the Corps (Linz et al. 2002: 107).

⁶Public schools form the core of British private schools for boys, joined under the Headmasters Conference, ca. 200 altogether. The most famous of them is Eton, one of the nine oldest and most renowned public schools which are known as the Clarendon Nine. Together with another ca. 20 public schools these schools form the Eton and Rugby Groups, attended by about 5 per mill each year of students. Attending them costs up to 25,000 Pounds a year, i.e. more than the average income per year in Great Britain.

public schools, the so-called Clarendon Schools like Harrow, Westminster, or Winchester. Almost every second of them studied at Oxford or Cambridge. The stronghold both of former public school students and of graduates from Oxford and Cambridge is clearly the financial sector, where almost 90% of all chairmen attended a public school, almost one-third Eton alone, and almost two-thirds graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. Three more chairmen started an officer's career with one of the Royal elite-regiments of the Guards immediately after graduating from Eton (Hartmann 1999: 127).

For heads of government the situation is similar. Three-quarters of the 12 prime ministers after 1945 studied at Oxford or Cambridge. If we exclude Churchill, who graduated as an officer from Sandhurst, with Callaghan and Major there is one Conservative and one Labour prime minister each not having graduated from one of these two universities. Although Major himself is one of the exceptions, out of the 23 members of his cabinet at the end of 1995, 18 had such a certificate, out of the 18 permanent secretaries there were still 12 Oxbridge graduates (Adonis and Pollard 1997: 47–48, 59). For the Conservative cabinets after the war the percentage of Oxbridge graduates was always between 70 and 80%. For Labour governments, however, it reached or exceeded the 50% mark only as late as after 1970 (Mougel 1990: 86–87). Even among average MPs of the Conservative Party at the beginning of the 1990s still every fourth graduated from one of the two elite-universities (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 114). Among the permanent secretaries after 1945 they make between 56 and 88%, about 70% on average. Of the Heads of the Home Civil Service even only 1 in 11 was non "Oxbridge" (Barberis 1996: 99; Theakston 2005: 29–33). If the circle of top public officials of the senior civil service is extended, the picture stays mostly the same. In 1994, out of the 143 members of the two highest grades, 1 (permanent secretary) and 2 (deputy secretary), there was also a percentage of more than 60% with an Oxford or Cambridge certificate. Out of the 447 public officials of grade 3 (undersecretary) this is still true for 45% (Dargie and Locke 1999: 192).

If we look at attending school, the situation is hardly different. Surprisingly, with 91% the share of public school graduates was highest under Margaret Thatcher. More than every fourth of her ministers had been at Eton alone. In the previous Conservative cabinets after 1945 also usually more than 80% had attended a public school, under Major they still had a share of about 70%, in the Labour governments, however, there were only between one-fifth and one-third (Marsh 2002: 30; Mougel 1990: 86–87). Thus regarding public schools, the difference between Tories and Labour is much bigger than regarding Oxbridge, a clear indication of the stronger social selectivity of the renowned public schools. For the permanent secretaries on the other hand, the share of former students from such schools has constantly been more than 60% after 1945. Every fifth to seventh permanent secretary attended one of the "Clarendon Nine" alone. Under Major, even almost every fourth permanent secretary attended Eton. For the top 20 of public schools there are figures between 20 and 28% (Adonis and Pollard 1997: 48, 125; Barberis 1996: 105). Almost every second of the total of 590 top public officials attended a public school (Dargie and Locke 1999: 192). In 1992, of the Conservative MPs in the House of Commons even more than 60% had attended a public school, 10% Eton alone (Adonis and Pollard 1997: 125; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 100).

The situation is the same for the armed forces and High Justice. About 76% of the highest ranking judges of 1979 had attended a public school and almost 85% had graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. Out of the 214 generals and members of the Admiralty in 1987, 63% had graduated from public schools, every fourth army general from Eton (Mougel 1990: 159–161). Instead of studying at Oxbridge after this – only every sixth did so – their majority went directly to Sandhurst to be trained for being an officer there. That there

has been no change in the army since is shown by the fact that out of 180 new officers leaving Sandhurst in 1995, with 120 exactly two thirds had graduated from a public school, one-quarter from one of only 15 top schools (Adonis and Pollard 1996: 125).

Traditionally, the predominance of elite-schools and -universities came along with overwhelmingly recruiting the elites from the upper and upper middle class. After the end of Conservative predominance between 1951 and 1964, however, the absolute predominance of Prime Ministers from the traditional upper class, i.e. most of all from the nobility, having been educated at Eton was over. In the following, among the heads of government children from the upper middle class, the middle class, and the working class were balancing out each other. If, however, we look at entire cabinets, the differences are much smaller. Of the ministers of the Thatcher governments between 1979 and 1987 still almost two-thirds came from the upper class. Compared to the governments of the 1950s this was only a decline of slightly more than 10%. Drastically declined, however, had the importance of the nobility, who provided only hardly one-tenth of cabinet members, in contrast to one-third previously (Mougel 1990: 86–87). Of the Permanent Secretaries after 1945, a bit more than half of them came from the upper or the upper middle class (Barberis 1996: 115).

The economic elite, however, has stayed to be socially most exclusive. For the period from 1975 to 1985 Mougel names a share of about two-thirds for the upper class and another ca. 20% for the upper middle class, counting among the latter, however, also middle executives, teachers, and smaller entrepreneurs, besides academic self-employed, judges, professors, and higher ranking officers (Mougel 1990: 45, 339). In 1995, of the chairmen of the 100 biggest British companies still almost every second came from the upper class alone (Hartmann 1999: 132).

For this exclusive social recruitment the institutions of elite education play a decisive role. Although there are no exact figures on the social origin of “Clarendon Nine” or “Rugby Group” students, clear indication is provided by data on the students of the most important public schools, the about 200 HMC schools. In 1964 about 90% of them came from the service class, a share almost double as high than for university students, although no more than 4% of 1 year studied at a university. If one additionally takes into account that at the beginning of the 1960s 6 out of 10 Eton students were the sons of Etonians (Adonis and Pollard 1997: 25), one may have an idea of what the social recruitment of the 20 to 30 most renowned public schools looked like. As after having graduated a considerable share of these students went to Oxford or Cambridge – in 1955 from the 20 most renowned schools 23 to 57% matriculated there for their studies (Scott 1991: 116) – and more than half of the students at these two universities came from a public school, of course the composition of students there was accordingly influenced.

In principle, still today social selection by public schools and Oxbridge works as social selection by the *Grandes Écoles*. But at least in one respect the mechanisms of selection differ considerably from each other. In contrast to the *Grandes Écoles*, for attending renowned public schools like Eton, Harrow, or Winchester financial resources play a direct and decisive role. Independent of the strict entrance examinations, fees alone of up to slightly more than 20,000 pounds a year, i.e. up to one average yearly income, are enough for massive social exclusion.

If we compare the British elites to those in France, however, this difference is unimportant. The parallels, as far as the role of institutions of elite education and social recruitment are concerned, are by far predominant. But in other respect the elites of these two countries are fundamentally different from each other. In Great Britain there is only little mobility between the different elite sectors. Of the top managers of the 100 biggest companies,

only a handful shows experience outside business, frequently from state administration (Hartmann 1999: 129). Also among the permanent secretaries 82% spent their whole professional career in the civil service, as 10 out of 11 Heads of the Home Civil Service. This percentage has not at all changed for decades. Only full 7% of the permanent secretaries and one Head can be called real outsiders with extensive professional experience from other fields (Barberis 1996: 153; Theakston 2005: 29, 35–36). Nowhere at all is there something which at least slightly reminds of the pantouflage system. In most cases the elites remain loyal to their respective sectors. They are bound together only by common education at elite schools and universities, as well as by their overwhelming majority coming from the upper and upper middle class. Thus, they are still a good bit away from the homogeneity which is typical for the French elites.

This difference has even increased during the past years. Responsible for this is most of all the clear decline of public school and Oxbridge graduates in the field of business. Of the chairmen of the 100 biggest British companies, if they are of British origin, only slightly more than every second attended a public school. Most of all Eton and the Clarendon Nine have experienced a fall to only slightly more than 13%. Also the weight of Oxford and Cambridge has been reduced by one-third. In contrast to this, the four old Scottish universities of Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and St. Andrews have clearly gained importance, now holding a share of almost 11%. Also among the ranks of the political elite their weight has risen strongly. After all, every fifth member of the current Blair government studied at one of these universities. Still 40% of ministers graduated from Oxbridge, a figure which is comparable to previous Labour cabinets. For the higher ranks of justice even a slight increase of the significance of the traditional institutions of elite education can be observed. For those high judges as having been newly appointed by Blair, the figures are 79% for public schools (ca. one-fourth for Eton alone).

In respect of the social recruitment of British elites, the situation seems to be stable. Of the chairmen/CEOs⁷ of the 100 biggest companies still more than one-half comes from the upper class, almost one-third from the upper middle class, and less than one-sixth from the rest of the population. Somewhat more open is the political elite. After all, in Tony Blair's government almost 60% of ministers come from the upper class and the upper middle class. For the Conservatives, however, there are indications of a change. If one has a look at the Tories' new chairman, it seems that meanwhile the traditional upper class is advancing again even among party leaders. Whereas Margaret Thatcher and John Major were able to successfully push through against the upper class children, Whitelaw and Hurd, things have changed now. David Cameron, the son of a rich broker, Eton graduate, and married to a baroness, won the elections very clearly against Davis, the social climber who could be compared to Major. All in all, the British model may be supposed to show a relatively high extent of stability also in the future. However, there are many facts suggesting that the public schools will lastingly lose significance and that in the future the old Scottish universities and maybe also the renowned London universities, like the London School of Economics, will reach the same position as Oxford and Cambridge. The basic role of the institutions of elite education would not be questioned by this if one compares Great

⁷As currently the management model in Great Britain is changing, these data refer to those people actually occupying the leading position, i.e. usually either to executive chairmen or, if the chairmen are non-executive, to CEOs. In single cases the decision about who really has the power in the respective company was made according to media reports.

Britain to the rest of Europe, but their weight and most of all their concentration would definitely be reduced.⁸

As it is true for its French counterpart, there is no real imitator of the British model throughout Europe. The situation in Switzerland, however, is comparable in so far as also there a considerable share of elite members attended one of only two elite universities. Thus, of the Swiss board members of the 500 biggest companies more than half graduated either from the ETH Zürich or the University of St. Gallen. Almost 100% of the engineers among them were at the ETH, still 50% of economists at St. Gallen (N. N. 2005: 10). Of the Swiss CEO of the 25 biggest companies even three-thirds have studied at the ETH or St. Gallen. But these are the only parallels to Great Britain which can be found, as different from the situation there the social selectivity of attending institutions of elite education is limited. In contrast to the famous public schools and Oxbridge, the ETH and St. Gallen are missing the tradition and function of an exclusive educational institution for the upper class. Therefore, the Swiss business elite is clearly more open than its British counterpart. Thus, of the chief executives of the 25 most important Swiss companies “only” slightly more than one-half comes from the upper or upper middle class.⁹ In the political elite, even, only two-fifths have this background.

10.2.3 No Common Elite Education and Separated Elite Careers

It is not a coincidence that the two types of common elite education are found in France and Great Britain. In Europe, these two countries by far look back to the longest periods of being integrated national states. Only here national elites could develop over such a long period and special institutions of elite education with such a high social selectivity could be established. Furthermore, France and Great Britain in contrast to the other big European countries have capitals dominating the entire country and where the elites are regionally concentrated. In all other countries the constitution of an integrated state was considerably more complicated. This is particularly true for the two biggest European states besides France and Great Britain, Germany and Italy, who achieved national unity only several centuries later, in the second half of the 19th century.

If at first we look at Germany as the biggest and clearly the economically strongest country in Europe, the differences to the two previously introduced types of elite creation and elite formation become quickly clear. In Germany (like in the other countries of Europe) special institutions of elite education do not play any role for the time being,¹⁰ neither at the level of schools nor of universities. Accordingly, although about 80% of the German elites graduated from university (Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997: 187) they achieved their certifications at a number of universities. Thus, almost 90% of the Vorstandsvorsitzende

⁸This way, Great Britain would come closer to the USA, where institutions of elite education play a crucial role for the formation of elites but concentration is much weaker.

⁹In the middle of the 1990s the members of the uppermost management level of Swiss companies showed even broader social recruitment than members of parliament and professors. However, data are only based on a very small number of responding managers, only 207 of a total of 1,662 (Rothböck et al. 1999: 476, 480–482). According to experiences from the large German study on elites, carried out in Potsdam, it must be assumed that probably the social climbers most of all in state-run companies are by far over-represented, while the members of the classical business elite are clearly under-represented (Hartmann 2004: 146).

¹⁰Due to the Federal Government’s initiative for excellence, however, this may be supposed to change fundamentally in the oncoming years (Hartmann 2006b).

CEO of the 100 biggest German companies of 1995 successfully completed university studies and almost half of them also achieved a Ph.D. (Hartmann 2000: 248), they passed their examinations, however, at 21 out of only 25 universities existing during their times of studying. Although well-known universities like Cologne, Munich, or Berlin with slightly more than 5%, respectively, are more often represented than, e.g. Karlsruhe, Mainz, or Würzburg, their share is almost exactly according to their share of appropriate cohorts of students. Ten years later the image has not changed at all. Almost 90% of chief executives have graduated from a university, more than half have a PhD, and this in most cases of the same universities than their predecessors. However, 7.6% graduated from one of the new foundations of the 1960s or 1970s. There is no concentration at all on certain institutions.¹¹

Also the Ph.D. as the highest and most selective educational degree in Germany has by far not the same distinctive value as the final qualifications of institutions of elite education in France and Great Britain. What makes them fundamentally different from those is not only the lower general selective effect – for those subjects being decisive for elite recruitment, like technical sciences, law, and economics, with a share of 60% for the children of the upper middle and the upper class this effect was definitely high until the 1970s (Hartmann 2002: 55) – but most of all the lower social reputation of the degree and lacking sense of togetherness among Ph.D.s. Responsible for lower reputation is on the one hand the fact that a Ph.D., in contrast to graduating from a renowned *Grande École*, does not aim at leading to an elite status but most of all is scientifically orientated. On the other hand, the altogether, i.e. including all other disciplines, considerably higher number of Ph.D.s is responsible, which as early as in the 1950s and 1960s was between 5,000 and 10,000 a year and in the context of education expansion rose to more than 25,000. The lack of community spirit results from the fact that achieving a Ph.D. (in contrast to studying at ENA or Oxford) is a highly individualized process and that furthermore there exists no hierarchical structure of German universities, i.e. the place of achieving the Ph.D. does not matter.

But the homogeneity of German elites is not only severely affected by a lack of institutions of elite education, traditionally also the course of careers has a rather disintegrating than integrating effect. Usually, advancement to elite positions happened within one sector. Accordingly, inter-sectoral mobility was rather low. Of the chief executives of the 100 biggest companies, not even a handful had been working outside business before. Almost every second even made the entire career in one single company.

The situation is similar for top politicians and top public officials. As far as politics are concerned, during the past decades careers in the two big people's parties SPD and CDU happened according to the famous hard slog pattern. For this "continuous inner-party advancement, in most cases started from local board positions, is an almost indispensable precondition for reaching national leading positions" (Herzog 1990: 36). The most influential politicians are "as a rule experienced party members of many years' standing" who started their careers from local elected positions and then advanced step by step (Rebenstorf 1995: 161). The ministers of the last seven federal cabinets before Merkel were by average looking back to more than 17 years of holding elected political positions, a figure which even rises if those ministers coming from the former GDR are not taken into account. Thus, among the political elite people entering this sector from high positions of other sectors has traditionally been a rare exception. Completely different from the situation in France, this is also true for top public officials (Rebenstorf 2005: 145).

¹¹The same is true for Dutch top managers, as investigated by Beekenkamp in his study on *President-directeuren* of the 250 biggest Dutch companies (Beekenkamp 2002: 63).

Also the administrative elite, the secretaries of state, and heads of departments in the federal ministries in their majority are recruited from their own ranks, i.e. from experienced public officials of the administration with long years' standing. Half of them made their entire careers in public administration, another fifth most of it. Almost 30% count among mixed careers. However, there are hardly any people getting in through the back door without any experience of state administration, out of 222 secretaries of state between 1949 and 1999 there is exactly one. However, increasing politicization of high administrative positions has reduced the share of pure career officials from almost three-quarters to about 50% since the 1960s (Derlien and Lang 2005: 129–133). Thus, inter-sectoral mobility has increased, if starting from a comparably low level. But still in Germany it is considerably higher than in most other countries in Europe.

A lack of institutions of elite education and a (more or less) low degree of elite mobility across sector boundaries can be observed in almost all other European countries. Plans to change this have clearly failed, e.g. the attempt to establish special administration colleges following the ENA example, both in Germany with the "Verwaltungshochschule Speyer" and in Italy with the "Scuola Superiore dell' Amministrazione Pubblica" or in Greece with the National School of Public Administration. Although their graduates are accepted as being well-trained experts of higher administration service not a trace can be seen of forming of an elite reminding at least slightly to the enarques.

Also if Europe's actual administrative elites are compared to ENA graduates in respect of inter-sectoral mobility, they are worlds apart. While the enarques occupy top positions in all sectors, the other top officials spend the time of their professional career most of all in the administration. Although her administration was built up in the 19th century following the French example, this is even more distinctive for Italy than for Germany. More than four-fifths of the about 400 highest administrative positions are occupied from one's own ranks. Changing from one sector to another does practically not happen at all, not even between administration and politics. This is true for both directions. The administrative elite (just like high justice, by the way) does not only successfully resist direct influence of politics on occupying top positions, which most of all are occupied according to the principle of seniority, on the other hands they do not show any ambitions of becoming themselves active in politics. Of, e.g. members of parliament, generally only 3–6% came from public administration (Cassese 1999: 58). The situation was the same for the political elite. Of the ca. 250 ministers of the governments between 1945 and 1992 no more than 12 came from higher administration. Due to the dissolving of the traditional party system, however, their share has considerably increased since, to 9.3% of the cabinets between 1996 and 2001.

With the decline of those parties which had dominated Italian politics over the decades, most of all the Christian-Democrats and the Communists, the patterns of recruitment have changed. Until the beginning of the 1990s they were characterized by gradual rise (similar to Germany), starting with municipal and regional electoral positions and ending in the government. Almost 60% of ministers looked back to such a career. Since 1992 their share has been less than 40%. The change is even more drastic in respect of party-political positions. If until 1992 four-fifths of ministers had held an important party position before being appointed for the first time, it is only half of them since. This was particularly significant for the years until 1996, when many so-called technocrats presided over ministries and with Ciampi and Dini (the former governor and director general of the Bank of Italy, respectively) even had two prime ministers in their ranks. At that time the share of ministers who had held party positions before had declined to less than 40%. Since 1996 the weight of the parties has increased again, after all 60% of ministers look back to a party career

again (Cotta and Verzichelli 2002: 136–140). But still it must be stated that the collapse of the Italian party system at the beginning of the 1990s resulted in a gradual opening of the political elite towards other elites. However, this is particularly true for the administration. Despite Berlusconi, for business it is true to a significantly lesser extent. Despite the high number of state-run large enterprises, even before 1992 only very few top officials changed to business, and if, only after having retired and almost exclusively from the Ministries of Defence or Foreign Affairs. Thus, in 1992 hardly 3% of the heads of industrial enterprises were able to prove public administration experience (Mény and Knapp 1998: 290–297; Righettini 1997: 197). On the other hand, only 6 or 7% of ministers came from business. This percentage has declined even more clearly under the centre-left governments between 1996 and 2001 (Cotta and Verzichelli 2002: 136). Thus despite all the changes, still today Mény and Knapp's statement is essentially true: the "Italian system is characterized by a corporatist type of isolation" (Mény and Knapp 1998: 297).

Regarding their recruitment patterns, the administrative elites in most other countries of Europe, from Denmark via Belgium to Greece, are almost as closed off as in Italy. Everywhere the overwhelming majority of top officials come from one's own ranks. However, this does not mean that the administrative elite has no professional experience from other fields at all. For example, after all one-fifth each of the 47 Danish top officials spent at least part of their career also in business and/or the sciences. Only 55% made their whole career within administration (Christiansen et al. 2001: 91). However, for the high administration officials, 161 altogether, this is already true for 63%. The almost 200 members of the Norwegian administrative elite are somewhat more mobile. Slightly more than one-third each looks back to professional experience in business and/or scientific research, and almost every sixth has also held a political position (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 61).¹² On the other hand it is true that administration is the field which members of other elites are most likely to know during their careers. For example, not only 40% of the Danish government members of the year 1999, every third MP in the Norwegian and every second one in the Danish parliament, as well as every third of the members of the scientific elite in Denmark and Norway have also been working for public administration, but after all this is also true for every sixth Danish and Dutch as well as for slightly more than every fifth Norwegian top manager (Beekenkamp 2002: 76; Christiansen et al. 2001: 155, 266–267; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 61).¹³

But what traditionally happens very seldomly is direct transition from a top administrative position to a top position of another sector and vice versa. For example, less than 3% of Greek ministers after the end of the military dictatorship came from high administration (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2002: 179). To a degree worth mentioning, traditionally there is at the most the change of high ranking public officials with long years' standing into business. As far as political influence on the occupation of top positions is concerned, there are great differences, however. Only in Denmark it is low, in otherwise clearly different countries like Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, or Sweden it is clearly higher. Even if usually there is no considerable exchange between the elites from politics and administration which would be worth mentioning, the in many countries desired, if not necessary, party membership of top officials results in a closer connection between

¹²On the basis of available data it was not possible to find out in how far the two groups overlap.

¹³Being 64% for Norway and 100% for Denmark, the figures on the juristic elite are even considerably higher. However, they might be due to unclear definitions or required steps of administrative career and are thus not all too telling.

the elites from these two sectors than in countries where separation is stricter. This is true independently of political influence (like in Belgium and Austria) being exerted by way of a polished system of proportional representation or, like in the other countries, by way of other mechanisms (Brans and Hodeghem 1999: 126–132; Jensen and Knudsen 1999: 233–236; Liegl and Müller 1999: 97–98, 114–116; Meer and Raadschelders 1999: 211–219; Pierre and Ehn 1999: 253–256; Sotiropoulos 1999: 17–24).

But lacking sectoral mobility is not only typical for the administrative elites. Also the leaders of business and politics are relatively immobile in most countries, just as those of justice and sciences. A country like Portugal, where only about one-half of ministers held leading party positions or was a member of parliament before but many of them are recruited as experts from other sectors — every fourth has experience as a top manager and almost every seventh as a top official in administration — is a true exception (Almeida and Pinto 2002: 25,35). Much more typical are countries like Germany, Italy, or Greece, where traditionally the members of the political elite have experienced the hard slog. Regarding the relation of politics and business, this is also true in the opposite direction. Thus, of the President-directeuren (heads of company) of the 250 biggest Dutch companies only seven have also been in a political job throughout their lives (Beekenkamp 2002: 76). Also among the almost 200 chief executives of Danish big companies with more than 2,000 employees or a turnover of more than 2 billion Crowns their share, being 4%, is as low; among the 390 Norwegian managers of companies with more than 400 employees it is 9% (Christiansen et al. 2001: 267; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 61). Furthermore, due to extended privatization of formerly state-run enterprises the path which traditionally linked the political elite in many Southern and Central European countries,¹⁴ to parts of the business elite, has drastically become narrower.¹⁵ For, in these countries this link was mostly restricted to such enterprises. As a rule, private groups formed a world of their own, to a large extent closed off from the outside.

A typical example for this was Italy. Strictly speaking, the Italian economy was split in two. On the one hand there were the private companies, located in Northern Italy and being in private hands, lead by clans like the Agnellis, the Feruzzis, the Olivettis, the Pesentis, and the Pirellis, on the other hand the big state-run groups like most of all IRI and ENI. Of the 10 biggest listed companies of the country, the family groups had always a share of about one-half and the state-run companies one-fifth in the time from 1960 to 1990 (Aganin and Volpin 2005: 355–356). The differences and contradictions between these two parts of Italian economy were sometimes severe enough to result in a split of the entrepreneur's association. Although particularly the Fiat Group, controlled by the Agnellis, had enormous influence also on politics and for a long time was almost something like a state within a state, there was a clear separation between the elites of politics and administration and the "great families"¹⁶ dominating the business elite. This makes the decisive difference to France. There, the graduates from the *Grandes Écoles* and the *Grands Corps* were more often found leading the big state-run groups than private ones, but also for the leading private enterprises they provided a big share of top managers. There were no separate worlds like in Italy. Top officials changing to business was not only daily routine, also it was not restricted to enterprises connected to the state. Thus, privatization has not

¹⁴On the special situation in the states of the former Eastern Block see Chapter 5.

¹⁵For example, in Italy between 1992 and 2001 alone, there has been the denationalization of state shares to an extent which makes 11.9% of the whole gross domestic product. The denationalization of almost the entire IRI and Telecom Italia as well as of almost 70% of ENI counts among this.

¹⁶Very few members of the "great families", however, have always been found in high political positions, usually, such as Gianni Agnelli, as members of the Senate having been appointed for life by the President.

resulted in a change of recruitment practice and thus of elite mobility. In Italy and the similarly structured countries the situation is different.

Italy, however, shows a special feature which in this way is unique in Europe. For more than one decade, by the person of Silvio Berlusconi there has been such a close symbiosis between part of the business and political elites as having been unimaginable before. After the decline of the traditional Italian party system Berlusconi succeeded with using his rise to being one of the biggest private entrepreneurs of the country, which in the 1980s was only possible by close political connections, to found a political party being completely cut out for his own person and to himself reach the top of the state with its help. Being both the country's richest entrepreneur and prime minister represents a kind of elite integration which before hardly anyone was able to imagine.

Although Berlusconi is an exception and the conflicts between him and the Italian association of entrepreneurs, Confindustria, had become very sharp even before he was voted out of office, in one respect he is typical for a more recent development. In many countries where business and political elites were traditionally relatively clearly separated from each other and mobility between them was at a low level there has been a perceptible convergence. Typical is the situation in Germany. There, cases of top managers changing to politics become more frequent. Thus, the new head of the Office of the Federal President, Gert Haller, comes from the financial group Wüstenrot & Württembergische. For his time of working as a secretary of state of Federal President Köhler he has been released from his position as a chief executive (his wages even being paid on). Doing this, he follows the example of his colleague Peiner from the Gothaer Versicherung, who for many years has been economics senator in Hamburg. The new ministry of state in the Chancellery, Hildegard Müller, has even been released to a great extent for a political career (as far as to become a member of the CDU committee) by her company, the Dresdner Bank, where she was head of a department. Even after having changed to politics as her main profession, being a member of the Bundestag, she still was paid a reduced salary by the bank.¹⁷ The other way round, however, is much more frequent. During the past years no less than two economics ministers and one secretary of state have changed directly to chief executive or board positions of big groups, one more economics minister and one more secretary of state have changed to other leading positions, like the supervisory boards of big groups. The heavily debated fact that the former chancellor, Schröder, took over the position of head of the supervisory board (with €250,000 very well paid indeed) of the NEGP company, which was founded (by the Russian Gazprom and the German groups Eon and BASF) for the pipeline through the Baltic Sea, fits perfectly to this image, just as the recently announced change of the CDU's First Parliamentary Manager to the BDI (Federal Association of German Industry). Generally we may speak of a "rising permeability of sectoral boundaries" (Derlien and Lang 2005: 147). Since recently, representatives of the German business elite play an important role also with the sciences. For most of the university councils, which now are the supreme deciding authorities of universities, they provide a majority of external representatives. Also for other countries a comparable development can be observed. For example, in Denmark between 1963 and 1999 the share of high-ranking officials having made their entire career exclusively in public administration has declined from slightly more than three-quarters to less than two-thirds. Also

¹⁷ Recently, also at the level of ministry bureaucracy there are comparable developments. Two high-ranking staff members of the Federal Treasury are at the same time working for the German Stock Exchange and the HSH Nordbank, their previous employers, and still receive their previous salaries from them. A clash of interests can hardly be excluded in these cases, as they contribute to draft laws concerning their private employers.

among chief executives of big enterprises a similar decline of carriers in only the business, if slightly less, from more than three-quarters to only slightly more than two-thirds, must be stated (Christiansen et al. 2001: 262, 266–267).

At first sight, the fact that most of the countries in Europe have neither special institutions of elite education nor know any inter-sectoral mobility of their elites still suggests a rather low degree of elite integration, despite the above-mentioned tendencies and despite Silvio Berlusconi. If and in how far this impression is correct, however, is decisively dependent on the social origins of the different sectoral elites. The more integrated and the higher it is, the easier it is to balance lacking mobility and the lack of institutions of elite education; for coming from the upper or upper middle class does not only decisively reduce the number of people in question and simply due to this increase the probability of social relationships to each other, it also provides a common or at least similar class attitude as a basis of mutual understanding among elites and a way of acting being the same in respect of essential values and goals (Hartmann 2006a).

According to each country, social recruitment of elites is rather different. Generally speaking, Germany is probably characterized by the most exclusive recruitment of the elites of business and administration. Of the top managers of the 100 biggest enterprises four-fifths come from the “bourgeoisie”, about half even from the upper class. Only about 15% come from the middle or working classes which together make the 96.5% of population. This has not changed for decades. Only the share of upper class children has even been rising in the course of the past 10 years and currently is exactly 50% if one counts only German chief executives, and almost 52% if also the 9 foreigners in such a position are taken into consideration. Among the heads of supervisory boards (Aufsichtsratsvorsitzende) the offspring of upper middle and upper class, being almost 92%, is dominating even more clearly. Only the highest-ranking members of the German armed forces show a comparably exclusive recruitment, who, however, are a very small number of people. Of the 15 out of 19 four star generals and admirals since 1990 about who we know their fathers’ professions, four-fifths come from families of officers (usually holding a colonel’s or lieutenant colonel’s rank, in one-quarter of cases even a general’s rank), and the remaining fifth come from the families of a secretary of state, a professor, and an executive. Here, social homogeneity has been considerably rising in the course of time. Until the end of the 1980s, among the 24 top members of the armed forces who were then holding office there were at least three sons of farmers and one son of a teacher, one of a tailor, and one of a worker, apart from the children of academics and officers. The administrative elite shows more social openness, but in comparison with other countries without institutions of elite education it is also highly influenced by the “bourgeoisie”. Thus approximately 60% of top officials come from upper middle or upper class origins (Benzner 1989: 374; Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997: 82; Derlien 1997: 74–75; Derlien and Lang 2005: 121; Rouban 1996: 59). The situation is similar for the juristic elite, slightly more than 60% of which come from the upper middle or upper class. In contrast to that, “only” one-half of the scientific elite comes from this milieu.¹⁸

In respect of higher justice, Denmark and also the Netherlands look similar. Also there, ca. 60% come from the upper middle or the upper class. In Denmark alone, 54% of the fathers have academic education, and, being 22%, more than every fifth of them is listed

¹⁸However, for the most influential positions the situation is somewhat different also for the sciences. Thus, more than two-thirds of the previous chairmen of the most important organization, the “Wissenschaftsrat” (Council of Sciences), are of bourgeois origin.

in the Danish Who's Who (Kraks Bla Bog) with its only 8,000 names, which means that most probably they count among the Danish upper class (Christiansen et al. 2001: 109; de Groot-van Leeuwen 2004: 91).¹⁹ Also in Norway the juristic elite is the sector of socially most exclusive recruitment. Being 53%, also there more than one-half come from the upper 10% of the population (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 79). For the administrative elite the situation is different. For example, in Denmark "only" 38% of absolute top officials come from families of academics, and "only" slightly more than every seventh father is found in the Who's Who. For the entire top administration the figures, being 33 or 12%, respectively, look even worse (Christiansen et al. 2001: 86).²⁰ In Norway, even "only" 39% of higher-ranking administration officials come from the upper 10% of the population (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 79). Although in Sweden with a share of 49% more members of the administrative elite (however, including high justice) have this origin (SOU 1990: 332), in comparison to Germany also there the social recruitment of high-ranking officials is clearly less dependent on higher-class origin. Also in most other countries, from Greece via Italy and Belgium as far as to the Netherlands, young talents from the broad middle classes dominate the administrative elites (Brans and Hondeghem 1999: 135; Cassese 1999: 62; Meer and Raadschelders 1999: 219–220; Righettini 1997: 195; Sotiropoulos 1999: 26).²¹

The same is true for the political elites of these countries, who as a rule in their majority also come from lower middle class origins, a considerable share of them even from the working class. This is most of all true for the Scandinavian countries. For example, in Denmark in 1999 more than one-third of the Social democrat government of Prime Minister Rasmussen came from the working class, but only one-quarter from the families of academics, and only slightly more than every seventh father was listed in Who's Who (Christiansen et al. 2001: 52). At the end of the 1980s, 28% of the members of the Swedish political elite came from working class families, just as much as from the upper 10% of the population (SOU 1990: 322). In Finland in 1991, the share of working class children among top politician was only 18%, but if one adds the children of farmers, there is even a total of 42%. However, with 30% more members of the political elite than in Denmark came from the upper class (Rustetsaari 1993: 315). For Norway the image is even more clear. More than one-third of the members of parliament come from the working class, and not even one-quarter comes from the upper 10% of the population (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 79). Other than in administration, the majority of leading politicians of the two big German government parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, traditionally come from the middle classes and the working class. The social structure of the previous federal governments shows this clearly. Of all chancellors before Angela Merkel only one came from an upper middle class family. That was Helmut Schmidt. Due to this he held a special status for some decades. At the level of ministers the situation was similar. Also

¹⁹However, one must see that the share of academics among fathers, being 54% (1999), has been almost stable during the past few decades, but that the percentage of fathers being mentioned in Who's Who has almost halved in the same period. Given unchanged recruitment from the upper middle and the upper class in its entirety, there has obviously been a shift at the expense of the upper class.

²⁰Just as in justice, also for the administrative elite a clear decline in numbers of upper class children must be stated. In 1963 every third father, after all, was listed in Who's Who. The share of academics among fathers, however (also comparable to the juristic elite), showing a decline from 37 to 33%, has been relatively stable (Christiansen et al. 2001: 86).

²¹In this context, however, it must be taken into consideration that all these cases are assumptions by the authors, as for none of these countries there are really convincing data on social origin.

here, the influence of the lower middle class was clearly dominating. With Angela Merkel's assumption of office, however, this has changed severely. In respect of its social recruitment, the share of upper middle and upper class children within the political elite has risen considerably. If we compare Merkel's cabinet to the other coalition formed exclusively by the big people's parties, the one under Kiesinger in the 1960s, at once the difference becomes obvious. In those days, only 7 out of 20 ministers were children of the upper middle and the upper class. For the second Grand Coalition the situation is just the opposite. Only 6 out of 16 positions in the cabinet are occupied by people not coming from this background.

The far-reaching change of the social recruitment of the German political elite is decisively due to the erosion of the two big people's parties. During the past 20 years their membership has declined by slightly more than one-third and is highly inactive. Also among voters both parties record a decline of one-third on average. The clearly declining integrative power of the people's parties leads to an erosion of classical career paths. Interest in and contribution to sessions of the lower ranks of the party apparatus decline more and more. More and more the direct path replaces the hard slog. Increasingly, even a minister's office is achieved directly from top positions in other sectors, most of all administration. Minister of Justice Zypries, the daughter of an entrepreneur, is a typical example, who before being appointed a Minister after a long career in the administration had been a secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior (Hartmann 2005: 450–451).

In respect of recruitment, the business elites are generally less influenced by the lower middle class. On the one hand, this is guaranteed by the importance of family clans in business, which in all countries cannot be overlooked. This is not only true for the traditional strongholds of family enterprises, Germany with her Mohns, Ottos, or Quandts and Italy with her Agnellis, Benettonis, or Pirellis. It is also true for countries like the Netherlands with her van Vlissingens, and even in the Scandinavian countries with their comparably small social differences they play a considerable role, as shown not only by the Møllers in Denmark. Thus, there is probably no other developed country where one single family has such an influence as the Wallenberg family in Sweden, controlling every third of the 25 biggest enterprises of the country.

However, the second and more important reason, at least for Germany, must be looked for at the specific recruitment mechanisms of business. There, a very small number of people decide about filling top positions, following mostly informal criteria. Investigations on German business give clear evidence to this (Hartmann 1996, 2002). Decisive for the occupation of leading positions is at first the candidates' class-specific habit. Basically owners, board and supervisory board members look for somebody who is similar to them in respect of personality and career. From their point of view, this way of proceeding is suggested by an important reason. One may assume that somebody whose personality traits and career are similar to one's own will also act similarly. The pressure under which top managers take decisions and the often extremely insecure information which is the basis of these decisions make them look for people in whom they trust and whose personality they are at least able to judge on.

The decision is made according to a few personality traits which are supposed to be crucial by the members of the German business elite. They are detailed knowledge of dress codes and behaviour patterns, broad general education as being necessary for a member of the "Bildungsbürgertum" (educated classes), an entrepreneur's attitude including the optimistic basic attitude which is necessary for this, and most of all superior ease and self-confidence.

Finally decisive is the superior ease which one shows by his/her entire behaviour, to mark for "initiates" the decisive difference between those being members of the inner circle and those who only want to be members. Usually, this superior ease is shown only by somebody who is used to this milieu from childhood days, who feels home, not alien, on management floors. In this context, superior ease of behaviour occurs particularly also with the other important personality traits. Only who has actually internalized the codes of the upper classes is able to partly ignore them consciously and to use this to his/her advantage. Who, e.g. in respect of cultural aspects is not the slave of the laboriously learned educational canon of the educated classes but shows to be free to judge by himself, while at the same time having detailed knowledge of the official canon, will usually win this way. It is just the laboriousness of acquisition which discredits all those who have not learned this rather effortlessly during their childhood and youth. As Bourdieu stated in his analyses on the French elite, one must have the personality traits crucial for top positions without showing the process of acquisition.

How decisive the class-specific habit is for occupying top management positions is clearly shown if the influence of educational qualifications is excluded by only examining the careers of people with a doctor's grade as the highest educational grade. If also all other variables, like duration of studies, age, etc., are methodically excluded, the chance of becoming a member of the business elite is about 70% higher on average for upper middle class people with a doctor's grade, and for those from the upper class it is 150% higher than for those from the middle classes and the working class. According to year, the difference reaches as much as 400%. On average, the chances for children of board members are 17 times higher, for children of senior executives they are still 10 times higher than for the children of workers (Hartmann 2002: 81–83, 204–205).

This pattern, typical for Germany, may be supposed to be valid also for other countries. Thus, e.g. investigations on the role of coming from the nobility or the patricians for getting access to elite positions in the Netherlands produce basically comparable results (Dronkers 2003; Schijf et al. 2004). But this does not mean that social recruitment is as exclusively everywhere, as according to the traditional composition of the business elite and to social influence and values there is but still a rather differentiated picture. In the Netherlands, for example, the recruitment of the business elite is not just as exclusive as in Germany, but altogether it is still rather similar. About 44.5% of the President-directeuren of the 250 biggest companies of the country come from the country's business or cultural elite. The father of almost every third of them was himself the president or director of a big company. If we also include those top managers whose fathers owned a medium-sized company, were white-collar workers, or officials in leading positions, there is a share of more than two-thirds of children from the upper middle or upper class (Beekenkamp 2002: 40). Given the much more extended sample and at the same time the clearly smaller country, the difference to Germany is not really significant.

The situation in Scandinavia is different, which in this respect may be supposed to represent Germany's counterpart in Western Europe, although also there the business elite shows the most exclusive social recruitment (however, after high justice). For example, only every sixth head of a big enterprise in Denmark has a father who is an academic or is listed in *Who's Who*. It may be supposed that among those 47% of fathers having been self-employed there is a number of entrepreneurs but, although there are no detailed data, we may suppose that in their majority they do not come from the upper middle or the upper class. Anyway, they are clearly different from the origins of German top managers. This is even true if the considerably less exclusivity of the sample is taken into consideration, almost 200 Danish chief executives out of 5 million citizens compared to 100 German

ones out of more than 80 million citizens. For, if we only look at the 25 biggest Danish enterprises, the share of fathers being mentioned in Who's Who increases to 21%, but the share of academics, being 11%, is even smaller. Only the 30 heads of those big enterprises being controlled by single families show a social recruitment which might be compared to the German business elite. A total of 40% of them have a father being listed in Who's Who, and after all 29% of them come from families of academics (Christiansen et al. 2001: 150, 236, 265). In Finland in 1991, slightly more than one-third of the business elite came from the upper middle and the upper class, but also slightly more than one-quarter came from working class or farmers' families (however, the sample was much smaller, including only 108 people). Of those top managers born after 1940 the share of working class children may be supposed to be even higher; for among the members of the entire Finnish elite, one-half of which had been born before and after 1940, respectively, it had increased more than fivefold, from slightly more than 3% for the older generation to almost 17% for the younger generation (Rustetsaari 1993: 315–316). In Norway, the social recruitment of top managers may be said to be most open. Only 42% come from the upper 10% of the population, but every fifth comes from the working class. However, we must take into consideration that the sample, including 400 managers and every company with more than 400 employees, is clearly broader and accordingly the exclusivity of the included positions is lower than in the Finnish, the Danish (and definitely the German) case (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 79, 284).²² If compared to the Scandinavian situation, top managers in Sweden show the highest social origins. In 1988, after all one-half of top managers of all enterprises with more than 3,000 employees or at least a turnover of 3 bill., Crowns came from the upper 10% of the population, and only every ninth came from the working class (SOU 1990: 322). At the moment, about one-half of the CEOs of the 25 biggest enterprises come from the upper and upper middle class. If we take into consideration that also about one-half of these groups, among them several ones with a CEO from the middle or working class, is controlled by the Wallenberg family or three other families by way of supervisory board mandates, the influence of the upper class increases. But still, also in Sweden the social origin of top managers is clearly below the German level. Regarding the social composition of their business elites, the other Western European countries may be between Germany, France, Great Britain, and Spain on the one hand and Scandinavia on the other hand. For example, in Italy the share of top managers coming from the upper class is as high as in other big EU countries. Every second CEO (Amministratore Delegato) of the 50 biggest Italian enterprises comes from this class. In contrast to Germany, France, Great Britain, and Spain, however, also almost one-third comes from the lower middle and working class.

²²Mastekaase gives figures for Norwegian managers which indicate even greater social openness. According to him, in case of the same educational level children from the managerial class (managers and executives) do not have significantly better chances for top positions in big enterprises with more than 1,000 employees than working class children (Mastekaase 2004: 228–231). Gulbrandsen et al., on the other hand, state that even if the level of education is controlled the offspring from the upper 10% have a chance for reaching an elite position which is increased by the factor 4.7 (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002: 88). The reason for this considerable difference may be first of all the different sample, which in Mastekaase includes slightly more than 20 times as many people from business, including almost 10,000 managers. Even if we only count big enterprises with more than 1,000 employees, his figure is considerably bigger than in Gulbrandsen et al. because for his sample he includes the best-paid 3% of all employees, i.e. 3,000 people for the 24 enterprises with 4,000 employees or more alone. Thus, his figures may be supposed to be telling less on the business elite but much more on managers as a whole.

All in all, one may state that although in France with her extensive system of elite education the integration of elites is highest, a country like Germany without any institutions of elite education comes closer than initially thought. The basis for this is first of all the traditionally as exclusive social recruitment of business, administrative, and justice elites, which guarantees relatively uniform value and assessment patterns as the precondition of an elite consensus. This uniformity is most of all true for those economic and socio-political questions as being essential for the development of society and the distribution of wealth and power, that is, tax, job market, or pension policies. Here, the consensus of the elites is structurally rooted. However, regarding rather moral questions, like attitude towards homosexuality, differences among elites are much bigger. As also for Germany's political elite a important rise in the percentage of politicians coming from an upper middle and upper class background can be observed for the past years and as furthermore the mobility between the different elites has clearly increased, elite integration in Germany may be supposed to have meanwhile reached quite a high level (Hartmann 2006a: 95–98, 105–108). Although institutions of elite education support elite integration to a high degree, as shown by the examples of France and Great Britain, obviously they are not a compelling precondition.

10.3 The Special Development of the New EU Members in Eastern Europe

The situation in the new EU countries and the candidates in Central and Southeastern Europe is fundamentally different from that in the other European countries. The collapse of the Eastern Block in 1989 resulted in such far-reaching changes in the countries concerned as experienced by no country in Western Europe after 1945. Thus, the most interesting question is if or in how far new elites have developed as a result of the radical change or if the traditional elites have been able to keep their positions by adjusting to the new situation, and in what way the new elites are different from the traditional ones.

At first sight the answer seems to be clear. In Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the only countries on which there exist extensive research results,²³ only a quarter (Hungary) to one-third (Czech Republic) of the former economic, political, and cultural elite has been able to keep their position. With a share of almost 55%, the economic elite has been much more successful than their counterparts from the cultural sector with almost 30% and from politics with only slightly more than 22% (Eyal et al. 1998: 117–120). For the new elites, even a share as low as one-seventh (politics) to one-third (business) comes from the ranks of the former elites (*ibid.*: 131).

A closer look, however, reveals that the impression is correct only for politics but that it is wrong in respect of business. Among members of parliament there has been the greatest break with the past. In Poland and the Czech Republic less than 3%, in Hungary slightly more than 11% had been members of parliament before 1989. Now, with a share of more than 50% people who previously worked in academic professions dominate. Among top managers there was the smallest change. Every third Polish or Hungarian head of a company occupied the same position before 1989, in the Czech Republic it is still one-fifth. If we add those who had been deputy directors, we even reach a share of more than 75%. In

²³Almost all relevant publications refer to the results of this investigation carried out by an international team of sociologists under the title "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe".

this context there is no difference between companies run by the state and those already privatized. For newly founded private companies, however, the share of former heads of companies is lower, but still reaches figures like slightly more than 60% (Czech Republic) up to more than 70% (Poland). Quite obviously, in the business sector there has not been any far-reaching change of recruitment principles. The normal process of succession has only been clearly sped up, as the second level executives have replaced their predecessors faster than originally intended. The new heads of company show a clearly better training, which allows to deduce that even before 1989 there was a gradual change towards first of all technically qualified experts in the economic sector (Matějů and Hanley 1998: 156–158). In countries where party membership plays a bigger role for occupying a leading position in business and the role of formal education is smaller the situation is different. There, the change was of more political than technocratic nature. Typical is the situation in Croatia, where in 1996 every third of the directors general of big companies was a member of the governing party HDZ, while at the same time the share of university graduates among them declined from 77 to 52%. As a consequence, only 40% of the directors general had been in leading positions with state or business before 1989 (Sekulic and Sporer 2000: 151–157).

If the social recruitment of the new elites is concerned, it is surprisingly high. About 20 (Czech Republic) to 42% (Hungary) of top officials, slightly more than 30 (Poland and Czech Republic) to 60% (Hungary) of members of parliament and 11 (Poland)²⁴ to almost 30% (Hungary) of heads of company come from families of academics, in comparison to only 5–8% of the working population. Furthermore, every tenth (Hungary) to fourth (Czech Republic) member of the administrative elite and every sixth (Poland) to fourth top manager (Czech Republic and Hungary) has a father who already counted among the old political and economic elite. If we add former members of the elite and the other academics, about half of the members of parliament, top officials, and heads of company grew up in a higher social milieu. As the bigger share of their fathers had held such positions as early as before 1948, much suggests the thesis that the new elites show higher social origins than the old ones (Matějů and Hanley 1998: 161–169). This is also shown by data on the Hungarian business elite. For example, between 1990 and 1993 alone the share of managers coming from families of managers, professional, or entrepreneurs has risen from 34.4 to 50.3%. For bankers, the percentage has even risen from 51.7 to 66.7% (Lengyel and Bartha 2000: 169). “All in all” the basis for recruitment “has shifted upwards and has become more integrated” (Hatschikjan 1998: 262).

However, this statement is only true for those countries where there had been a bourgeois class of significant size already before 1945, that is, Poland, Czech, and Hungary. In the other Eastern European countries the recruitment of the new elites, most of all the business elite, is socially much more open. For example, in 1993, of the top managers and owners of big Serbian private companies only every fourth was the son/daughter of a politician, manager, or professional, but more than half was the son/daughter of a worker or a farmer. For the members of Serbia’s political elite the situation was similar. About 35% came from the families of politicians, managers, or professionals, 45% from those of workers or farmers (Lazic 2000: 133–134). Similar observations can be made for those members of parliament in Czech and Slovakia who were elected in 1992. The former have

²⁴For this figure it must be noticed that for Poland with 200 out of 600 biggest groups (Eyal et al. 1998: 206–207) the sample selection is more exclusive than for the other two countries, i.e. top managers represent a more exclusive circle.

rather more bourgeois origins, as they were more able to reach back to traditions from the time before 1948 (Brokl and Mansfeldova 1998: 137).

10.4 Trans-national Elites? European Integration Process, Economic Internationalization, and Their Effects

The strongly increasing internationalization of economy and the rapidly progressing process of European integration suggest that also with elites there will be a rejection of traditional, national recruitment, and mobility patterns. This is most of all true for the business elite. Already since the end of the 1980s authors like Kanter (1995), Marceau (1989), or Sklair (2001) have stated the development of a new world business class, world business elite, or trans-national capitalist class as a result of rapid globalization. Indeed, a tendency towards increasing internationalization of business elites can be stated, but this process happens much more slowly than predicted by the above-mentioned authors and many other observers.

What the state of the internationalization of European business elites really looks like can be clearly seen by the heads of the 100 biggest British, German, and French companies (see Table 10.1).

Already at first sight great differences between three countries can be recognized. Regarding business, France with her very closed-off elites shows the lowest degree of internationality, the level has even been further declining during the past 10 years.²⁵ With only two foreigners at the top of corporate groups, and longer foreign experience for only every 12th PDG, it is impossible to speak of internationality of the top management. This is already different for Germany and Great Britain. Not only does every tenth to fifth top manager come from a foreign country, also every seventh to fifth can look back to longer foreign experience.

However, this first impression is somewhat misleading. If we have a closer look, there are details urging to exercise caution with our estimation. Thus, with one exception (an Italian) the nine foreigners in the German groups come from neighbouring countries with equal or similar cultural traditions (most of all from Austria and Switzerland, but also from the Netherlands and Sweden) and in some cases spent their entire time of studying

Table 10.1 Internationality of top managers of the 100 biggest British, German, and French companies between 1995 and 2005 (share of foreigners and managers with foreign experience) (in per cent)

	D	D	F	F	GB	GB
	1995	2005	1995	2005	1995	2005
Foreigners	2.1	9.0	2.0	2.0	7.0	18.0
Short-term foreign experience (studies and jobs until a max. of 2 years)	9.5	16.5	8.7	10.2	9.7	5.5
Long-term foreign experience (studies and jobs 2 years or longer)	16.0	19.8	14.1	7.9	17.2	13.4

Source: Author's own research.

²⁵Also the USA and Japan present an image similar to France (see concluding section).

in Germany. Thus, it is not possible to speak of true internationalization, with British, French, Spaniards, or US-Americans leading German large enterprises. Also for Great Britain the situation looks much clearer than it really is. On the one hand, two-thirds of foreigners comes from the Anglo-Saxon area (Australia, Canada, South Africa, USA), so that due to the history of the British Commonwealth we may not always definitely assume foreign origins, except for US citizens. On the other hand also two-thirds head companies which are not entirely British but have been bi-national either for decades (like Shell and Unilever) or after a merger during the past 25 years (like BHP Billiton, Corus, or Reckitt Benckiser). Leadership of these companies has either regularly been changing between the contributing nations already in the past or was simply taken over from one of the concerned companies after the merger. The difference between 1995 and 2005 is mostly due to this, as shown by the clearly declining degree of internationalization among British top managers. If we add foreigners and British top managers with foreign experience, there is only an increase of 3% left. Also, for Germany long-term foreign experience in comparison to short-term experience has been rising only to a low degree must be taking into account. This is an indication for the assumption that although short foreign stays have meanwhile become an increasingly more important part of career planning it is impossible to speak of real internationalization in the sense of settling in with foreign cultures and making more intensive personal contacts. If we include Italy and Spain, being the biggest European countries apart from Germany, France, and Great Britain, the level of internationalization declines even further. Of the 50 biggest Italian enterprises, not one is headed by a foreigner, of the 30 biggest Spanish ones it is just one. Furthermore, Altadis is a Spanish-French group, originating from the merging of Spanish Tabacalera and French Seita and now being headed by Seita's former PDG.

Also the idea that business schools might be places of common elite education for the business elites of the different countries has proven to be little justified for the time being. In the most important European countries the MBA stays to be without any greater significance. Thus, as little as only 3 of the 100 most important German chairmen have this degree, 2 in addition to a German doctorate and only 1 more than 10 years ago. In France the situation is the same. Even among British top managers only slightly more than 10% have this kind of degree. Everywhere, national educational institutions and career paths stay to be predominant.²⁶ In those smaller European countries where the number of multinational groups is much higher than average the situation is different. There, due to the limited offer of native first-rate professionals, foreign top managers play a clearly bigger role. This is first of all true for Switzerland, which with 7 companies of the 100 biggest European groups is represented almost as strongly as Italy (5) and Spain (3) together, and for the Netherlands, which (including the British-Dutch groups of Shell and Unilever) has another 6 of these 100 companies. Thus, with the 100 biggest Swiss companies almost one-half (44%) of executives of the first level come from abroad, one-quarter of them from Germany alone, however (N. N. 2005: 6–7). In the Netherlands the situation is similar. Of the 256 board members of the biggest Dutch companies according to market capitalization only 57% come from the Netherlands, 43% come from abroad, one-quarter of latter is British, and another is US-American. However,

²⁶In Northwestern and particularly in Eastern Europe the situation is somewhat different. There, the MBA gains ground rather fast. As, however, in many cases it is achieved at national universities (most of all in Northwestern Europe) it has not automatically the nature of a transnational, integrating degree. Furthermore, it stays open in how far the graduates of the appropriate courses will really dominate top management positions.

there is an essential difference to Switzerland. With a share of 40%, almost every second of foreign top managers works for binational companies like Shell, Unilever, or Corus, that is, they are no true foreigners, as these companies are not purely Dutch. If we also take that quarter which has reached their positions only due to taking over foreign companies into consideration only slightly more than one-third of foreigners was really appointed a leading position from outside (Heemskerk 2004: 47–50). Altogether, we may thus speak of a tendency toward internationalizing the business elites, but still this tendency is not very distinctive and does not include every country, as clearly demonstrated by France.

For the political and administrative elites the situation is even more modest. Change across national borders does almost not happen at all. Typical for the administration are the following observations from Germany and France. A current survey among 400 young public officials of the higher German ministerial service showed that not even half of them had qualified knowledge of foreign languages and only every fifth had foreign experience (50% only 3 months). Furthermore, foreign stays did not prove to be helpful for a career but rather an obstacle, as often foreign assessments are not accepted as being of equal validity (Siedentopf and Speer 2004). Also the attempt to open up the administrative Grands Corps in France to foreigners for the first time was a failure. Although ENA made the necessary course formally accessible for foreign students in 2004 for the first time, the demands in form of a written but most of all an oral examination in French, for which particularly knowledge of the broad variety of the French language is a decisive criterion (Bourdieu 1989), resulted in only three applicants enrolling and in the end none of them appearing for the examination. Thus, the French will still keep by themselves.

If we have a direct look at EU institutions, it becomes clear that even there national recruitment patterns are clearly predominant. Thus, in the EU Commission as the highest and most powerful authority all commissioners from the big and important traditional EU countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, as well as Belgium and the Netherlands) show purely national careers, mostly in administrative and political positions. Furthermore, as a rule they are politicians (like the Blair-intimate Peter Mandelson, who after a scandal could not be held any longer in the British cabinet or the Socialist top candidate Joaquin Almunia, who resigned from all national positions after his clear defeat at the Spanish elections of 2000) who went to Brussels only because in their home countries they did not have any further chances for a career. Similar to the members of the EU Parliament they are rather second choice, as those who really want to get to the top still make their attempts in the national context. Nevertheless, the social origin of EU commissioners, however, is mostly an upper middle or upper class one, at least as far as the big and traditional EU countries are concerned. Günther Verheugen, the German commissioner, is the son of a bank director, his French colleague Jaques Barrot is the son of a pharmacist, and Joaquin Almunia the son of an engineer. Mandelson's grandfather was a minister already under Churchill and Attlee, Neelie Kroes's father from the Netherlands was an entrepreneur. Only the Belgian commissioner Louis Michel does not come from the upper middle or the upper class but from a working class family.²⁷ Definitely, this social homogeneity makes an Europeanization of elites (just as in business) easier. But altogether one must state that this tendency is still relatively weak.

²⁷There is no information of the social origins of the Italian commissioner Frattini.

10.5 Conclusion

Although in Europe there are three different basic types of elite formation and elite integration and the detailed designs of these types produce a relatively colourful image, this alone does not contradict a specifically European model, being different from the rest of the world by certain characteristics. However, a comparison with the two biggest non-European industrial states, Japan and the USA, shows that such a model does not exist. Regarding crucial aspects, in many respects the Japanese way of forming elites and their co-operation is similar to the French way, while the US-American way is similar to the British way (Hartmann 2006a: 70–78, 93–94, 99–100, 105).

In Japan, a nation state looking back to a history of 2000 years, elite formation is dominated by five elite universities, the oldest Japanese university, the Imperial University of Tokyo (Todai), being at the top, in just the same way as the *Grandes Écoles* in France. In the two most important ministries, the Ministry of Finance and the MITI, more than three-quarters of top officials come from the Todai, as a rule from just one faculty, the Faculty of Law. Of the 300 applicants, selected each year for the so-called short route which alone opens up access to the Japanese administrative elite, they still make two-thirds. Accordingly, also 80–90% of the secretaries of state come from the Todai. The same is true for more than one-third of Prime Ministers after the war and for more than one-quarter of cabinet members under Koizumi, one-quarter of current members of parliament from the ruling party LDP, and for one-fifth of all current MPs. The other four elite universities (Kyodo, Hitotsubashi, Waseda, and Keio) provide another almost one-third of Prime Ministers, 30% of members of parliament, and 20% of top officials (Cutts 1997: 4–5; Kerbo and McKinstry 1995: 140; Rothacher 1993: 71, 130). For the business elite the situation is similar. Of the current presidents of the 100 biggest Japanese companies, one-third attended the Todai and another slightly more than one-third the other four top universities.

All this reminds strongly to France indeed. Also the importance of high administration as a jumping board into top positions of business and politics is similar, if not that distinctive. Every 3rd cabinet member, almost every 6th member of parliament, and every 30th of the total of slightly more than 2,800 directors of the 100 biggest enterprises come directly from the top of a ministry, most of all the MOF (Ministry of Finance), the MOC (Ministry of Construction), and the MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) (Colognon and Usui 2003: 60–62, 150–152). As a rule, the person who has been at the top of the MITI will later change to the top management of a bigger company. Thus, it is not surprising that in the Japanese language there is a counterpart of the French word “*pantouflage*”, the word “*amakudari*”. Finally, also the low degree of internationality among Japanese top managers is according to the situation in France. With the exception of Nissan, run by the PDG of Renault, Carlos Ghosn, on the basis of a shareholding of 44%, all big companies are exclusively led by Japanese.

Elites in the USA are similar to those in Great Britain, most of all regarding one aspect, which is the role of private elite schools and most of all elite universities, like Harvard, Yale, or Princeton. Although they do not count just as much as in Great Britain, compared to other countries they make a considerable difference. After all, more than 50% of the CEO of the 100 biggest US companies and 6 out of 11 presidents studied at the 20 most renowned universities of the country. Among the CEO, every eighth alone was at Harvard, and among presidents every third was at Yale. However, what makes US elites different from British ones are the low degree of internationality and the frequent change between

sectors, most of all between business and politics. The fact that in the current Bush cabinet, three of the six most important cabinet members were at the head of one of the 100 biggest companies and made millions there is typical for the close connection of these two elites. If the internationality of the business elite is concerned, currently there are only five foreigners at the top of one of the 100 biggest companies, and among the US-American CEO not even 10% have foreign experience.

Altogether, it becomes clear that there is no specifically European model of elite formation and elite integration. The differences between the three basic types in Europe are sometimes bigger than the differences to non-European countries of comparable industrial and societal development. The increasing strengthening of central EU institutions and the increasing number of great mergers within European economy may be supposed, however, to result in gradual convergence, so that on the long run there will probably be a much more integrated European model. The increase in elite members from upper middle or upper class origins as being observed in the past years, which like leading politicians in Germany or business elites in the Central Eastern European countries before this have mostly come from the lower middle class or working class, is an important social–structural basis for such an approach.

However, two things must be taken into consideration in this context. First, generally the social exclusivity of elites increases according to the size of the respective country, just as it increases according to the size of an enterprise and the importance of a position (Hartmann 2002: 81–87; 2006a: 80–81), that is, in Germany, France, and Great Britain it is bigger than in Belgium, Austria, or Czech. Usually, the higher the share of its members coming from the upper middle and the upper class, the more power an elite has in comparison to the national as well as international standard.²⁸ Second, there are also specific national traditions and balances of power which influence the social recruitment of elites. In the Scandinavian countries with their comparably egalitarian basic attitude and their relatively open educational system the social composition of elites is on average less exclusive than in countries with explicit institutions of elite education, a classical upper class, or a tradition as a great power. Also in this respect there is still the need for a long process of becoming alike if these differences and specialities are supposed to decline decisively. Despite all structural similarities and forces within capitalist societies, the direction of this eventual becoming alike is not unimportant for the broad population. Usually, the more closed the social recruitment of elites is, the more strongly their actions will be orientated at their own advantage, the more they will ignore the interests of the average people, and the deeper is the gap between the rich and the poor (Hartmann 2006a: 107–109; 2006c; 2007: 225–235). Thus, more openness of elites following the Scandinavian example offers more pleasant prospects than higher exclusivity following the French, British, or German example.²⁹

²⁸Just like every rule, of course this rule has its exceptions, e.g. the special conditions (decline of the classical bourgeois parties in 1933, the development of the people's parties after 1945, the national elites being discredited by their support of National-Socialist rule, clash of systems within Germany, restricted sovereignty by the Statute of the Four Powers of the former occupying powers) of the recruitment of the political elite in Germany, which for decades has been based on the lower middle class.

²⁹For a more detailed analysis of the European elites and the relationship between the structure of national elites and the gap between the rich and the poor see Hartmann (2007).

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Chapter 11

Identity

Stefan Immerfall, Klaus Boehnke, and Dirk Baier

11.1 Introduction

Identity is a vague and contested concept. In simple terms, having an identity is to convey who one is. One's identity is meant to be recognizably stable and reflecting, so-to-speak, one's core. *Personal identity* is how one perceives and defines oneself as a human being.

Typically, people also have groups they feel attached to or think themselves as being part of, while looking at other groups as being different. Attachment to groups defines one's *social identity*. For people to have a social identity is advantageous both for the group they see themselves as belonging to, for example, a society, and for the individual himself or herself. This is the case, because members of a collective who identify with that collective will increase group cohesion, while individuals themselves can at the same time generate self-esteem from group belongingness.

Taking the distinction between personal and social identity¹ as a point of departure, the present chapter ventures into determinants of personal and social identity in Europe and elaborates on the concept of European identity.

People's identity typically has many different facets, most of which are in no way in conflict with each other. Yet there may be cases in which one has to choose which part of one's identity is given priority. At the same time, one's identity is not a fixed phenomenon. It develops and changes over time. Collective identities, in particular, are contested, contextual, and relational.

The concept of identity has gained much currency in recent times. One reason is that identity carries with it the promise of some stability in a fast-changing world (Howard 2000); another reason lies in fears of clashing ways of life in multi-cultural societies (Monroe et al. 2000). In the formation of the European Community and the European Union, identity has always been a key issue. When the aim is "to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe," as stated in the preamble to the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), "to continue the process" (Treaty of European Union, Maastricht 1992), and to even "forge a common destiny" (Treaty

S. Immerfall (✉)

Humanities Department, University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany
e-mail: stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

¹Here used synonymously with the terms collective or group identity although one could distinguish between the two whereby social identity still would be an individual property based on the ascriptions of significant others, and collective identity as a group property denoting symbolic borders on the basis of believed commonalities.

Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004), one has to ask how Europeans see themselves, as members of the “peoples of Europe” or eventually even the “People of Europe.” What social representations do they hold with regard to the process of European integration, as members of one or more social entities, and as individuals? Whom do they identify with? What is the connection between the different forms of identity and support for the European Union? How is the construction of a European identity related to self-categorization and to the identification with (other) groups in the private and in the social sphere?

The formal reference to the “peoples of Europe” in EU documents makes it obvious that the construction of Europe is, so-to-speak, born into an innate conflict with strong nation states and strong national identities. This is in clear contrast to the formation of other unions, where the same type of statement refers, for example, to “we, the people (!) of the United States” (Constitution of the United States of America 1787).

In this chapter we want to describe what Europeans think they are and how they feel about Europe and the European Union; we want to analyze their perceptions of each other and to explain how their individual identities inform their attitudes toward Europe and European integration. It is conceptually important to separate identity from attitudes, to like or dislike European integration that is. While it is certainly possible to appreciate the European Union without having a European identity, it is hard to imagine a popular drive for abandoning the EU when at the same time a European identity is widespread. Empirically, however, because of lack of proper data, we often will have to rely on attitudes to infer identity.

Our contribution cannot do justice to the full complexities of the concept of identity. We will neither venture into its intricate psychological meanings, e.g., the development and perpetuation of one’s self, nor into its grown historical meanings, e.g., the change and the persistence of cultural narratives through time. We will confine ourselves to analyzing and explaining definitions of self, of significant groups, and of collective categories such as the European Union only insofar as they are related to processes of European integration.

From this simple outline, we start out with the socio-psychological basis of identity: How much do self-concepts differ among Europeans and in comparison to non-Europeans. We then give an overview of public opinion in Europe concerning important EU issues. Next, we analyze different components of European identity. In the fifth section, we try to explain what drives individuals’ attitudes toward the European Union. Before the concluding section, we discuss conditions for constructing a European Union identity.

11.2 Self-Definition and Self-Concepts

When using self-definitions and the self-concept as a starting point of discourse about European identity, one cannot avoid one of the central questions of the social sciences, namely that of societal or individual determinism. Is it the sociocultural context of one’s upbringing that is formative for a person’s self-construals, or do (aggregated) individual self-construals determine the culture of a given geo- or sociopolitical entity? Or is the self after all just an outflow of a person’s genes?

In all likelihood, the or-question is falsely put, as societies cannot exist without individuals, and individuals hardly can without society; nor are there human beings without genetic predispositions. The or-question then obviously degenerates into a fruitless chicken-or-egg question, reserved for more abstract philosophy of science debates. What should, however, be kept in mind from the very beginning is that self-construals do not just evolve naturally

from “within” and do not have infinite degrees of freedom in their composition, but are restricted by the societal or cultural context in which a human being with a given set of biological dispositions grows up and lives.

In psychology the terms identity and self-concept are largely used synonymously. The phenomenon at stake is one of the—*if not the*—most important topic(s) of psychology. Psychology as an academic discipline is typically defined as the study of mind and behavior, embracing all aspects of human experience (American Psychological Association 2008). The self is often seen as the condensed result of one’s experience and at the same time the motor of behavior (Greve 2000).

Scientific psychological research on the self can be traced back to the work of William James who proposed the distinction between the “I” and the “Me”-component of being. The “I” is the agent of self-recognition, the “Me” is the object of the self-recognition process of the “I,” and thereby the sum of all knowledge a human being accumulates about him or herself during the life course (Asendorpf 1996). This means that whatever the agent “I” filters from the comprehensive body of knowledge about the “Me” is the Self.

By proposing this delineation of the “I,” the “Me,” and the Self, a basic paradox arises: On the one hand, the self is condensed knowledge of the “I” about the “Me” and thereby something stable that predisposes a person to engage in certain behavior. On the other hand, knowledge accumulation about the self never stops during the life course, thus the self is per definition dynamic.

The dynamic character of the self becomes particularly evident, when one acknowledges that it develops in a sociocultural context that itself constantly changes. Would human beings exist in complete isolation from one another, they would not need a self. It is their very inclusion into social groups, a larger social context, which calls for continuous adaptations. In these necessary steps of adaptation the relationship between what has been called the personal self and the social self has to be determined anew repeatedly. In order to build up a social self, people join groups of which they want be members, in order to develop a positive evaluation of themselves. Such groups become a part of a person’s social identity.

When looking more closely at components of the self-concept, psychology offers a helpful distinction, when it sets apart affective, cognitive, and conative (behavior-related) self-appraisals (Rosenberg 1979; Pinquart and Silbereisen 2000). The affective component of the self-concept encompasses self-evaluations like global and theme-specific self-esteem and self-respect in more holistic terms. The cognitive component encompasses the abstract body of knowledge about the self. The conative component pertains to beliefs about one’s own general abilities to engage in particular behaviors successfully; here self-efficacy as conceptualized by Albert Bandura (1977) is central.

As most psychologist would agree, all three components develop essentially in childhood and adolescence, without, however, coming to an end-state with the conclusion of that life-phase. Erikson (1959) saw adolescence as the decisive phase of gaining selfhood. In his view adolescents have to detach from the predeterminations of their parents and have to develop an identity of their own through autonomous participation in other socialization settings than the ones provided by the family.

For affective components of the self-concept, general, so-called global self-esteem is the most widely accepted indicator. Schmitt and Allik (2005) offer evidence on global self-esteem around the world as measured using the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale. This scale requests self-ratings on items like “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” Schmitt and Allik found very high self-esteem scores for Serbia, Chile, Israel, Peru, Estonia, and the USA. Main finding is, however, that there is no substantial intra-European variation in self-esteem: In Europe self-esteem is on average high but not very high compared to other

regions of the world, with East Asia at the lower end of self-esteem scores. It should be emphasized that Schmitt and Allik (2005) document self-reports of self-esteem. This is not the place to discuss the question of whether these self-ratings are in any way objectively justified. The self-concept can per definition not be objectively justified!

Cognitive aspects of identity denote the knowledge that we have about ourselves. These aspects would become overt through answers to the “Who am I?” question. Typical answers of Europeans to this question could be “I am a witty intellectual,” “I lack musical talent,” “I am slightly overweight,” or “I am a good cook.” Knowledge of Europeans about the self mostly pertains to ways in which they are different from other individuals from the same social entity. Only of secondary importance are aspects of social belonging. In that sphere, groups from the immediate social context of an individual tend to be more important (the family, the local soccer club, the neighborhood) than more distal social entities (social class, nation, Europe; see Boehnke and Fuss 2008 and Chapter 2).

Turning to the conative aspects of the self-concept, a look at self-efficacy across societies seems in place. Self-efficacy is measured by items like “When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.” A 22-country study is reported by Schwarzer and Scholz (2000). They once again corroborate the finding of little variation between European countries but substantially lower self-efficacy scores in East Asian countries.

How can the cross-European similarities of affective, cognitive, and conative dimensions of the self be explained? Reasons for similarities must be seen in more general cultural traditions. Visions of the ideal self differ substantially between cultures. Euro-American cultures typically favor the so-called independent self, while most non-Anglo-European cultures favor the interdependent self, a distinction introduced into the literature among others by Markus and Kitayama (1991). Numerous authors have associated the distinction between independent as opposed to interdependent self-construals with the predominance of individualistic self-direction values as opposed to collectivistic security values in a given society/culture (Hui and Triandis 1986; Hofstede 2002). Recently, Kusserow (1999) pointed to the fact, however, that the usefulness of the independent-interdependent differentiation should not a priori lead to a denial of intra-Western differences in the preference of certain self-construals.

The decisive difference between the two versions of construals of the self can be illustrated by way of example with regard to the cognitive self-dimension. Typical answers to the “Who am I?” question by a person favoring an *interdependent* self-construal would be “I am a brother,” “I work for an elite university,” “I am a typical North-German,” or “I am a dedicated father.” All of these self-construals encompass an explicit reference to others.

In all likelihood, self-construals of individuals will typically not encompass only independent or only interdependent self-descriptions, but the prevalence of either type of self-construal seems to differ between cultures. Oyserman et al. (2002) have recently published meta-analytic evidence that preference for a specific type of self-construal differs substantially between the major regions of the world. They analyzed 50 cross-cultural studies that assessed degree of individualism and collectivism among people from a particular culture as a proxy for a preference of independent as opposed to interdependent self-construals. All studies included the USA as the culture of comparison. The analysis showed that most major regions of the world show less preference for independent self-construals than the USA. Latin America is a surprising exception. In Europe, Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between the old and the new Europe gains empirical support in that Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Russia, and Greece come out as more like the USA in preferences of independent self-construals than do countries like Norway, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, or Portugal.

Even in light of the finding that countries of the “new Europe” have a somewhat above average preference for independent self-construals than countries of “old Europe,” on the whole one can say that self-construals of Europeans are more like those of fellow Europeans than like those of people from other parts of the world, namely more independent than interdependent. On the societal value dimension of embeddedness vs. autonomy, a distinction brought forward by Schwartz (1999), resembling the interdependent–independent as well as the collectivist–individualist distinction, differences between European countries do emerge as largely negligible (Bardi and Sagiv 2003).

Social belongingness is certainly a part of an independent self-construal, but group memberships are largely a matter of individual more or less rational choice. According to the Theory of Social Identity (Tajfel, and Turner, 1986), individuals include group memberships into their self-construal when they aid self-enhancement. This basic process renders the construction of a European identity a difficult process, because the question how it can assist individual self-enhancement is often utterly unclear, given that competing entities of group belongingness seemingly offer more self-enhancement options to many Europeans, namely one’s region of residence or one’s nation of citizenship.

The consequences of one’s social identity have been a frequent focus of social psychology and social science research. Human beings obviously organize their social environment by constructing differentiations; they “invent” social groups. Clearly, they cannot belong to all groups they have constructed. In case, however, they have developed an attachment to a certain social group, they are motivated to develop and retain a positive social identity through belongingness to that group (Tajfel 1982). Information about the status of one’s group and thereby about one’s own social identity is obtained through social comparison.

Social identities, however, do not always have normatively positive connotations. In case of a negative result of a comparison with an outgroup, there are different strategies to cope with the undesired: One can change group affiliation or one can attempt to favorably compare one’s own group to yet another group (Blanz et al. 1998). The latter strategy can encompass explicit derogation of that other group in order to alleviate one’s own inferiority.

The self-categorization as belonging to a certain group leads to the quasi-automatic development of positive stereotypes about one’s own group, as opposed to negative stereotypes about the reference group. Particularly when individuals identify strongly with their own group, the so-called ingroup, when they perceive a threat to their ingroup, or when there is a (latent) conflict with an outgroup, there is a high likelihood of a devaluation of that outgroup (Zick 1997).

In line with such findings, Rippl et al. (2007) report that individuals who see central economic or cultural resources of their nation under threat tend to side with their nation more intensely, i.e., show higher support for nationalistic and protectionist attitudes. At the same time they have a stronger tendency to devalue the groups identified as being the origin of a perceived threat: This means that people exhibit a differential risk of developing prejudice against outgroups. In modern European societies strong identification with symbolic medium-level social entities seems to encompass the most substantial danger to develop derogative outgroup stereotypes. In a six-country comparison Boehnke and Fuss (2008) found that in each of the six countries included in the study ethnocentrism correlated less strongly with identification with immediate geopolitical entities like one’s birthplace or one’s region of residence and with very inclusive geopolitical entities like Europe than with the identification with one’s country.

Before we take a closer look at the degree to which Europeans identify with their continent and its political institutions in Section 11.3, we need to attend to one final issue

just briefly, which is addressed in more detail in Chapter 2, namely that of interpersonal trust. When one identifies with a social group, one necessarily has to trust other members of that group. The same is true when looking at Europe as a social entity with which one can identify: One has to trust fellow Europeans both on the individual interpersonal and on the aggregate national level, i.e., one has to trust other nations. In addressing this aspect of identity formation, we no longer remain in the narrow confines of the individual self-concept, but transgress the construct into the direction of social interaction. Inglehart and Baker (2000) show that degrees of interpersonal trust vary substantially between cultures. Early work on interpersonal trust was presented by John Rotter (1967). He introduced a 25-item instrument meant to measure interpersonal trust with items like “Most elected public officials are really sincere in their campaign promises,” “Parents can usually be relied upon to keep their promises.” When inspecting such items, it becomes obvious that interpersonal trust cannot be seen as a component of the self-concept, but it is highly likely that only individuals with a positive self-concept can express interpersonal trust. The World Value Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) encompasses items on interpersonal trust. Figure 11.1, taken from Inglehart and Baker (2000), documents mean ratings of interpersonal trust in the 65 countries that have taken part in the World Value Survey, tabulated by GNP per capita.

The figure shows that interpersonal trust is quite high in the countries of “Old Europe,” in Anglo countries, and in East Asia, whereas the countries of “New Europe” rank considerably lower on trust. This finding suggests that there is no linear relationship between trust




Fig. 11.1 Distribution of interpersonal trust in relation to GNP

and self-esteem/self-efficacy. Otherwise East Asians could not be high on trust. A division line seemingly runs through Europe with regard to trust. For a more detailed interpretation of this finding the reader must, however, be referred to Chapter 2.

11.3 Support for European Integration

Particularly in its affective components, the acquisition of social identities does not develop independently from attitudes toward groups and geopolitical entities. Due to a close monitoring of the evolution of public opinion in the Member States by the European Commission,² attitudes toward the EU and European Integration are well-documented.³ We confine our analysis to answering the question if support for the European integration has increased over time, if public sentiment toward the European Union is converging between the Member States, and which domains of the integration process are supported most.

We may start by asking EU citizens to judge whether their country's membership is a good thing or not. The membership question disconfirms the idea of an upward trend of citizen support for the European integration. Generally speaking, we see a rise from the doldrums of the 1980s together with the new enthusiasm sparked by the Delors Commission and culminating in the optimism of the 1990s after the fall of the Iron Curtain (see Fig. 11.2). After that, membership support decreases to previous and even to lower than "normal" values. Support levels have been dropping exceedingly in Austria and Finland. The new member states of 2004 remain slightly more positive toward EU membership but with high levels of volatility and higher-than-average "neutral" or "don't know" replies and Latvia quickly joining the ranks of the particular EU-doubting countries. In contrast to support for the European Union, national pride appears to be quite stable over time (Arts and Halman 2006: 183).

Changes in citizen support seemingly have not been caused by the expansion of EU membership. A slight downward trend holds true for subsets of EU6, EU9, and EU15 as well. By the end of 2006 the proportion of respondents saying their country's EU membership is a good thing was almost identical in the old (EU15) and the new member states that joined the EU on May 1, 2004 (52 and 56%, respectively). The same is true when asked about attachment to national and European identities (see footnote 7). Moreover, a closer look at the different EU member states reveals that while public opinion on European integration waxes and wanes, differences between countries remain quite stable. That is to say that those countries with populations distinctively supporting or opposing European political integration do so for longer periods of time and irrespective of EU enlargements and extensions of competences (Fig. 11.3).

²This is done through different kinds of survey interviews (Eurobarometer) and selective qualitative studies (see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/communication/index_en.htm). It seems reasonable to note that by means of these instruments and through a selective presentation of results, the European Commission is not only measuring public opinion in the Member States but is also trying to influence it. The questions are set by the directorate-general, and it seems that question series which lend themselves to EU-unfriendly interpretations suffer a shorter life than questions which offer EU-friendly conclusions. Identity questions in particular have been changed suspiciously often.

³For recent summaries of European identity research, including its conceptual framework, see Arts and Halman (2006), Jamieson (2001), Nissen (2003, 2006), Kohli (2002), Sanchez-Mazas and Klein (2003).




Fig. 11.2 Membership in EU: A good thing?
 “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is ...? – a good thing – a bad thing – neither good nor bad good – bad?”; shown is percentage difference of respondents saying it is “a good thing” minus “a bad thing” across all EU member states at the particular time.
 Note: Membership changed from 6 to 25, see discussion in text.
 Source: Eurobarometer EB 1 to EB 66.




Fig. 11.3 EU enthusiasts and EU skeptics by country
 Note: The vertical lines indicate the extension of the surveys of the Eurobarometer to the then acceding new members. Greece was added in 1983. (Northern Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded).
 Source and Question as in Fig.11.2; given is the two highest and the two lowest country averages of people saying the membership of their country in the European Union is a good thing.

Figure 11.3 shows for each Eurobarometer survey the first and the second most committed country and, likewise, those two countries whose populations agree least with the statement that membership in the EU is a good thing. There is remarkably little change as to which countries are EU enthusiastic and EU averse. Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, are usually among the EU the two most skeptic countries, while Luxembourg,⁴ Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands generally display most enthusiasm. Thus, some of the most trusted countries in Europe are at the same time the countries with the least approval of the EU (see Chapter 2).

This result points once more to the distinction between the EU and Europe to which we will return. The result also shows the limited profoundness of even high levels of support for the EU. Ireland is a good example again. In Eurobarometer 69, the fieldwork of which was being done during the run up to the (first) referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (12 June 2008), the Irish continued to think their membership in the European Union is a good thing (73% compared to an EU average of 52%), that their country has benefited from being a member of the European Union (82% compare to 54% in the EU at large), and had an, at least, fairly positive image of the EU (65% versus 48%). Yet, they voted 'No' in the referendum. There is no contradiction in here, as the Irish still wanted to be part of the EU, but had reservations on this particular treaty. Even the most positive attitudes of the EU are not to be confused with steadfast commitment to this particular form of governance. Moreover, voting 'No' was easy with the Nizza-experience in mind. Already in 2001 the Irish nixed an attempt to adapt EU institutions, and not until being granted a number of key concessions they did let the Nizza treaty pass 16 months later. The same thing happened with the Lisbon treaty which was approved in a second referendum in October 2009. Widespread apprehension that Ireland would not be able to deal with the global economic recession on its own also helped to extracting the 'Yes' vote.

How can one account for the persistent country differences? One explanation would be to look for composition effects. As countries differ in their socio-demographic makeup, aggregate survey responses might vary accordingly. But this explanation accounts only for a smaller part of the country differences. Ireland is a good example again. It developed from being one of the poorest into one of the most prosperous countries in the EU while still retaining high support levels for the EU up to the Lisbon referenda. Another explanation links positive or negative judgment of membership with the respondents' appraisals of their countries' benefits arising from EU membership. Public perception of these benefits indeed parallels people's judgments about their countries' membership, albeit on a slightly lower level. In particular, people in countries which are net-receivers of EU funds, such as Spain or Greece, tend to approve their EU membership much stronger than net contributors like Germany, Austria, and Sweden.⁵ Yet, Denmark was a net beneficiary of the EU budget until 2000; nonetheless, its population is always on the low end of the approval rates. The opposite is true for the Netherlands. Moreover, the (weak) relationship between one's country's situation with regard to the EU household and one's perception of the EU does not carry over to identifying with either Europe or EU integration (Nissen 2006: 162–167). Country-wide support of EU integration is not only a matter of a cost–benefit analysis

⁴Not displayed in Fig. 11.3 (see footnote 6 for explanation).

⁵EU funds obviously comprise only part of the advantages of being member of the EU. Moreover, this explanation supposes that people have a fair idea of their country position with regard to the EU finance systems.

then. There must be non-utilitarian factors having a significant effect on attitudes toward European integration as well.

Positive attitudes are to be expected in relation to the degree respondents believe the attitude object possesses valued features (see Chapter 8). What, then, are the features respondents believe the EU to have? Differences to one's self-categorization and one's national group should provide clues which important features the respondents believe the EU to have or lack. Unfortunately, we have only the ranking of desirable political values and not of repulsive attributes like "inflated bureaucracy" which the EU also may conjure up. Absolute numbers may therefore be less telling than a comparison between the ranking of features attributed to one's country, the EU, and—in comparison—the USA. In addition to that we will distinguish between respondents in "old" member countries, new member countries, and accession countries (as of 2004): Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Only the first group comprises of "experienced" EU citizens.

When asked which 3 values out a list of 12 citizens from the EU15 think best to represent their own country on the one hand, the EU, and the USA on the other, the European Union does not elicit characteristics grossly different from people's own countries. The EU gets high marks for peace, but respondents typically think that their native country does represent this value even more, whereas the USA is seen as standing for the value of peace to a much smaller degree. Contrasts are noteworthy for "democracy," which is associated with one's country much more than with the EU (see Fig. 11.4).




Fig. 11.4 Which three values citizens think best represent their countries, the EU, and the USA?

Source: CCE 2003.5 and EB 60.1 – Fall 2003 [*=own country; •=USA; —=EU]

Question: Which three values [out of a list of 12] best represent our country/the EU/the USA? [EU15: EU member states before extension May 2004; 2004 Members: accession countries of May 2004; CC3: candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey]; other values offered in questionnaire are "Equality; Solidarity, Support for others; Tolerance; Self-Fulfillment; Respect of other cultures." (Not shown in the graph because not among the top three chosen).

Human rights is mentioned in second place as being characteristic for the EU. In contrast, both the new member states of 2004 and the acceding states believe the EU to represent human rights much better than their own country, and also the USA. In that sense, the EU epitomizes the "Scandinavia of the world" (Therborn 1997), but only for recent and potential members. These respondents regard the EU as a secular protector of human rights. All in all, the EU represents hope for new and acceding members for peace and stability, which respondents in the old member states already take for granted. The EU's famous "four freedoms," the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, do not carry over into identifying the EU with freedom in general. In all three groups of respondents the USA is thought to represent individual freedom better than the EU.

What about different policy areas respondents would like to see decided at a common European level? We may summarize Europeans' preferences as following a model

of “incremental cooperation” (Sobisch and Immerfall 1997). EU policies are favored in areas such as scientific research and foreign policy, where the pooling of resources would either make economic sense or allow Europe to speak with a louder voice. Where a common policy makes practical sense (immigration, the environment, defense, and even certain economic matters), the population is at least equally split on whether or not to proceed with national or common policies. Yet, limits of preferred cooperation are quickly reached. In areas like the social and cultural sphere most Europeans still look for national solutions. While very few Europeans believe that each European country should mainly keep to itself and “care only about its own affairs,” even fewer currently believe in the model of fully shared sovereignty in a “single common European state.” The vast majority prefers a solution somewhere in between those two extremes, about equally split between those who would like to see at least a “partial transfer of sovereignty,” and those who prefer cooperation without any loss of national autonomy. Overall, more people prefer for their nation to keep its full sovereignty than to relinquish all or parts of it.

So far, we have mostly looked at the aggregate level, i.e., at member countries. But what drives the individuals’ attitudes toward the European integration? Before trying to answer that question we have to clarify the issue of European Identity, particularly if it is meant to denote more than attitudes toward European integration.

11.4 European Identity and Its Components

There are several ways to probe identities relating to a political collectivity, depending on one’s conceptual approach and on the data at hand. As mentioned in the introduction, we take an agnostic approach saying that collective identities may be measured at the individual level while acknowledging that they are constructed in social interactions, sustained through group-related activities and represented in public narratives. As in the analysis of the self it may prove helpful to distinguish affective, cognitive, and conative components of one’s social identity in general and of European identity in particular (see Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 Three perspectives on European Identity

	Identity as . . .	Dimension	Definition with regard to Europe	Operationalizations
(a)	Identification “feeling”	Affective	Sensing closeness between the populations of Europe and the object of identification (EU and/or Europe)	Positive attitudes toward geopolitical unit
(b)	Representation “thinking”	Cognitive	Framing European Integration	Mental associations, images, and perceptions referring to Europe and the European Union
(c)	Behavior “doing”	Conative	Displaying loyalty to group, altering behavior in favor of group-related activities	Everyday behavior and activities related to EU

An abstractly categorized group becomes meaningful for its members when they recognize and regard themselves as part of an entity which they believe to have significant attributes and when their feelings of belonging have social consequences. Our case deals with a primary feeling of attachment to the abstract entity “Europe” before and above any other geopolitical entity (like birthplace, place or region of residence, country) or other

collective self-concepts (like class or ethnicity). We may call the affective component of a European collective identity “Feeling Europe.”

“Thinking Europe,” the cognitive component of a European identity, deals with the assessment of the object of orientation, in our case Europe and the European Union. What meaning is ascribed to European integration and its ensuing order? The main question is how are they framed and given meaning to?

Finally, “Doing Europe,” the conative component, refers to daily activities as a consequence of being part of an entity. It includes behavior like preferring to travel European countries and to shop European goods, reading newspapers covering European affairs, waving the European flag and cheering for EU teams, or inter-European marriage patterns.

11.4.1 Feeling Europe

Most analyses probe identity as “identification”: What are the attitudes toward Europe and European integration and what are their causes? “Europe” in general conveys a positive image. Based on the history of Europe, Europeans and non-Europeans alike talk of a European uniqueness built on a cultural and humanistic commitment to democracy, human rights, peace, and tolerance (Fells and Niznik 1992; Optem 2001).

Attachment to Europe, however, may not be the same as attachment to the European Union, even though the Commission deliberately helps to confuse the two. Where it is at least doubtful that the former kind of “Europeanness” carries any significance for day-to-day behavior, it is safe to say that it fails to inspire confidence in the European Union. Whereas positive connotations of “Europe” are almost universal, positive attitudes toward the European Union are not. Figure 11.5 gives a first indication of its limited affective dimension. Even though “Europe” in general, and not the “European Union,” is presented




Fig. 11.5 Feeling as European

“In the near future do you see yourself as . . . ?

1. (NATIONALITY) only, 2. [firstly] (NATIONALITY) and [then] European, 3. European and (NATIONALITY), 4. European only.

Note: Membership changed in 1992 from 12 to 15. On new member states see footnote **.

Source: Eurobarometer EB 37.0 to EB 61.

in those surveys as a possible object of identification, exclusive European identification is almost absent⁶ and predominant identification with Europe also is fairly rare.

The proportion of people seeing themselves exclusively as Dutch, British, German, and so on, is about same as the percentage of respondents who say they feel mainly as nationals but with a European component. Country first, but Europe too, is the dominant outlook in most countries.⁷ In the years leading up to the Maastricht treaty more people viewed the European Union as protecting as opposed to threatening their national culture (Westle 2003). This orientation seems to suggest that national and European attachments are quite compatible since a majority of citizens prefer a mixed type when asked about their future citizenship.

This result has led some scholars to envisage the imminent coming of a cosmopolitan identity (Beck and Grande 2005; Delanty and Rumford 2005) or at least an incipient European demos through a self-conscious appropriating of multilateral part of the European legacy.⁸ This idea is not borne out by our data on at least two grounds. First, what appears to be a mild form of patriotism and Europeanism can easily turn into negative attitudes toward non-nationals or non-Europeans (Arts and Halman 2006: 183–185). Giving priority to one's collectivity because of expedience (ethnocentrism) is a widespread phenomenon in Europe and goes well together with a civic national identity and a self-categorization as a European (Hjerm 2004; Licata and Klein 2002). As long as large numbers of European citizens continue to view other nations' citizens as outgroups, Europeanization may well trigger nationalism because the pooling of resources generates ingroup favoritism through resource conflicts.⁹

One could deny this risk by pointing to the recurrent observation of a positive correlation between identification with the nation-state and attachment to the European Union (Westle 2003; Deutsch 2006). But are national and European identification really on the same footing as presupposed in question formats such as the one used in Fig. 11.5? Research in the USA has shown national identity to be quite distinct from other forms of attachments on a host of measurements (Huddy and Khatib 2007). As a second argument against the idea of meshing national cultures into a post-national common European identity we emphasize that it is not reasonable to assume national and European identification being equally important for EU citizens. If citizens have to prioritize between conflicting attachments to country, region, or the European Union, the latter comes in clearly third (see Table 11.2), though with some national variation.

This is true for European young adults as well. They identify more strongly with immediate others and personal attributes than with any collective belonging. Within the latter identity building blocks, European citizenship usually comes last. Boehnke and Fuss (2008), who analyzed data of representative samples of 18- to 24-year-olds from 10 European cities, found that in a comparison of identification with one's birthplace, one's

⁶With the exemption of Luxembourg, where one-sixth of all respondents see themselves as first Europeans. Luxembourg has by far the largest proportion of employees working for a European institution.

⁷Again, there are no big differences between the old and the new EU countries of 2004. The New Member States were only asked without the possibility of being able to give the "European and (*nationality*)" response. In this question format, the number of citizens who consider themselves as nationals only was 48% compared to a 45% average for the EU 15 (EB61 and CCEB 2004.1, spring 2004).

⁸Habermas (1998), Habermas and Derrida (2003); Jürgen Habermas seems to become less optimistic, however; see his exchange of blows with European Commissioner Günter Verheugen in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* vom 24.6.2008.

⁹Experimental support for this proposition is provided by Sanchez-Mazas (1996).

Table 11.2 Feelings toward different kinds of citizenship

Feel as citizen of . . .	First choice	Second choice	Third choice
Europe	13	20	58
Nation	64	30	4
Region	22	43	29

Question: “In the near future, do you see yourself ABOVE ALL as a citizen of the European Union, a citizen of (YOUR COUNTRY) or a citizen of your region?” Respondents were probed for first, second, and third choices, as relevant; Percentages do not sum to 100 because there additionally was a “Don’t Know/No Answer” answering option.

Source: Eurobarometer 44.2 [=“Mega” survey of EB 45] (February/March 1996).

country, and Europe, few young people give Europe the edge. The seemingly much deeper rooted national mode of identification is borne out by a more detailed analysis of a smaller sample of the Saxonian border region in Germany (Boehnke et al. 2007). For our respondents, if not rejected altogether, European alignment is concordant with, but comes only second to, either feelings attached to Germany or to the region of Saxony.

A perhaps more fitting question format to probe the emotional attachment to the European Union than the one used in Fig. 11.5 is the Eurobarometer question used in Fig. 11.6. This question has not been asked as often as the identification question above but two conclusions seem to stand out. No more than 40% of the EU citizens expect to feel sorry about a possible breakup of the EU. What seems to have grown somewhat is the proportion of those with indifferent feelings toward the dissolution of the EU. The




Fig. 11.6 Emotional attachment to EU

Question: “If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent or relieved?”

In previous Eurobarometer, “Common Market” and “EEC” had been used as synonyms for EU. Remainder percentages are missing values or don’t knows.

Source: Selected Eurobarometer from EB 1 to EB 55.1.

good news for the EU and probably one reason for its stability is the still small number of staunch entrenched EU foes/opponents, on the other hand, who continue to remain a small minority hovering around 10%.

Summing up the affective dimension one may say that national identification continues to be a common phenomenon, whereas affective bonds to the European Union have not grown over time. Europe's generally positive image has not translated into an emotional alignment with Europe as a political system. One may see a certain analogy parallel to Eastern Europe's past here (Immerfall 2006a): Many were drawn to the idea of socialism but not many developed affection for the "real existing socialism."

11.4.2 Thinking Europe

As identities and identifications are context-dependent, surveys are perhaps not the best methods to gauge them. Better methods to capture nuanced meanings and to give depth to attitudes include semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Bruter 2005). One general finding is the low salience of Europe as a self-invoked category of identity. In contrast to other categories, European references usually appear only in response to direct questions by the interviewer (Armbruster et al. 2003). Europe's meaning for daily lives is also limited according to an in-depth study of European youth (Fuss and Grosser 2006). Europe and the European Union play an inferior role compared to more salient and more relevant objects of identification such as regions or the nation-state. If young people describe themselves as being European they do so as a matter of course. This does not mean, however, that young Europeans and European citizens in general do not share certain perceptions of the European Union. Spontaneous associations usually include "absence of borders" and "free movement of persons and goods" is usually the first spontaneous association.¹⁰ As these achievements are increasingly taken for granted they do not prevent the European Union from being perceived as a remote entity.

Experiments, too, shed light on the context-specific elucidation of perceptions of the European Union, while media analysis continues to reveal national differences in the presentation of European affairs. In an (experimentally faked) sports event, Europeans tend to systematically favor the victory of European teams over non-European teams of all sorts (Bruter 2003). Another experiment tried to assess whether identification with Europe is influenced by messages from the media and the use of symbols by European Union institutions. Shortly after having been presented with positive articles concerning the European integration, participants' perceptions of oneself as being a citizen of the European political system were stronger than among participants exposed to bad news about the EU. When exposed to symbols of European integration participants felt more as being part of a European community than participants shown placebo photographs like landscapes or people (Bruter 2005: 123–133). Such experiments point to a possible media influence, at least in the short run. We will discuss this possibility in Section 11.6.

Currency being an important symbol, the introduction of the Euro provided a valuable natural experiment. It was predicted that the Euro would have the potential of becoming a far more concrete symbol of identity than the flag, the anthem, or other European emblems. A successful Euro was expected to become a powerful manifestation of European identity

¹⁰See Flash Eurobarometer 202 in 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_202_en.pdf; 15/06/2007) and Optem (2006).

and to attract the participation of the United Kingdom in the currency union (Engelmann et al. 1997; Reinhardt 2004). While the common currency was a success in terms of low inflation, low interest rates, a more stable external value, and as a foreign reserve currency, the above predictions concerning European sentiments did not come true. The Euro was accepted but its introduction seems not to have strengthened European identity. Even in countries like Ireland that had warmly welcomed the new currency, attitudes focused more on the economic and practical aspects of currency change rather than on its symbolic meanings (Ranyard et al. 2005). This stands in stark contrast to the German monetary union of July 1990 when East Germans enthusiastically received their new currency as a symbol of national unity (Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder 2006).

11.4.3 Doing Europe

We should not forget, on the other hand, that the Euro was finally accepted even in countries like Germany that initially did not want to give up their national currency (Westle and Staeck 1998; Niedermayer 2003). Is this a case of “Doing Europe”? There is no high amount of engagement for Europe in a civil society context, as part of associations, union clubs, or political parties (Fuss and Grosser 2006). Yet Laura Cram (2001) has argued that loyalty to the European Union shows itself not in a “hot,” flag-waving fashion but in a day-to-day acceptance of the numerous European symbols like the billboard displaying the ominous “Financed with assistance of the European Union.” In the same vein we may include learning a foreign language and working or studying in a foreign country as an example of group-related activities.

Europeans have caught up on language learning. About 56% of the EU citizens claim to speak another language other than their mother tongue well enough to strike up a conversation.¹¹ This is a 9-point increase compared to the 2001 survey among the 15 Member States which is due to growing numbers of Europeans to learn languages at school. The level of motivation of EU citizens to learn languages remains moderate nonetheless. Moreover, language skills are still unevenly distributed, both over the geographical area of Europe and over sociodemographic characteristics. The situation is a far cry from EU’s official target of “mother tongue + two” meaning that everyone in the EU should be able to master two foreign languages. The EU is symbolically committed to preserving multilingualism but, due to the highly controversial nature of the language issue, it is unable to conduct an open debate of its internal language regime (Kraus 2008).

An impressive number of more than 1.2 million students have received ERASMUS—stipends to study abroad by the end of 2004. Such exchange programs are expected to foster a European sense of togetherness. Is this expectation borne out? In addition to having studied abroad, Fig. 11.7 includes the proportion of EU nationals having lived, worked, or shopped in another EU member state. Around one-sixth of all EU citizens have at least shopped in another member county. The three other types of experienced immersion in another European country are less numerous. The smaller and the more central a country is the higher the percentage of international experiences of its citizens.

Can we expect a growing sense of a shared community as Europeans increasingly interact on a day-to-day basis with their fellow Europeans from another member state? If the

¹¹ According to EB64.3 (“Europeans and their languages,” 11-12/2005), English is by far the most learned language in the EU with 38% of the respondents speaking it as a foreign language, followed by German and French with 14% each.




Fig. 11.7 Feeling as European and experiences abroad
 Question: “Have you ever... (1) Lived in another member state, (2) Worked and/or set up a business in another member state, (3) Studied in another member state, (4) Bought goods in a member state to bring them into another member state without border formalities.”
 Source: Eurobarometer 45.1 [= European Unions Rights, Sun Exposure, Work Safety, and Privacy Issues] (April/May 1996).
 Question for EU Citizenship same as above in Table 11.2; shown is proportion of respondents per country claiming European citizenship as first preference.

minority of citizens who feel primarily European in the near future is any indication, there is such a link on a country-wide base, at least among the “core” EU states and with the exception of Italy. A higher country-average of people having studied or lived in another member state is associated with a greater likelihood of respondents’ sense of a European citizenship. This pattern holds on the individual level as well: Citizens of one EU state studying or living in another country are more likely to see themselves above all as EU citizens (Fuss et al. 2004). What we do not know, however, is the causal direction of the observed correlation between the three variables (van der Veen 2002). It might be that people with a European identity in the first place are more likely to seek work in another European country (Verwiebe 2004). Another possibility is that there is an unknown third factor explaining both support for European integration and European-related activities.

In the next section we will present evidence that the causal link rather runs from feeling European to studying and living abroad than the other way around with personal resources as the most important predictor. Before concluding this section, we want to point to two “extreme” cases of “doing Europe.” Frédéric Mérand (2003) assessed the level of support for military integration among officers within the EU-Rapid Reaction Capability forces. These officers interacted with their fellow soldiers in a completely supra-national unit on a day-to-day basis. Yet their acceptance of the European project depended on their perceived opportunities for them as individuals. Nico Wilterdink (1992) looked into another truly European organization, the European University in Florence. Even in an environment completely composed of persons of different national origins in which certainly no European hostile attitude prevails, students continued to meet each other with their customary national stereotypes.

Overall, interaction between Europeans has substantially grown. But this is neither confined nor limited to Europe (see Chapter 18). For instance the proportion of non-EU nationals working in another member country is much larger than that of EU nationals. There is little evidence that this development has brought forward a growing sense of European citizenship beyond the elite section, not to speak of cosmopolitan citizenry at large. Such finding should not come as a surprise since we know that, depending on the context and the type of the relationship, growing interaction may also lead to a revival of nationalist sentiments including ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Arts and Halman 2006; Licata and Klein 2002). We may furthermore conclude that the majority of the European citizenry categorizes itself as Europeans but does so only on a high level of abstraction and generalization.

11.5 European Identity and Individual Support for the European Union

So far, we have mostly looked at the aggregate level, i.e., at member countries in general. But what drives the individual's attitudes toward the European integration? And how are these attitudes tied to one's identity? Since economic integration is at the heart of European integration, one may first look at possible utilitarian benefits. People who believe that the EU is advantageous for them and/or for their group (such as region, country, ethnicity, or social class) should have a better image of the European Union. The former would be an egocentric, the latter a sociotropic orientation. From utilitarian calculation it follows furthermore that education, occupation, mobility, and location should also impact respondents' preferences regarding European integration. The direction of the influence of these individual factors should be contingent on the factor endowment of respondents' country. In prosperous member countries less skilled workers will feel upset by increasing competition in the larger labor market. For highly skilled individuals the reverse should be true as should be for less skilled workers in low-wage countries. Both groups might welcome new job opportunities abroad.

But there are other factors than utilitarian and economic orientations as well. We already have seen that one's country's position with regard to EU funds explains only part of EU attachment. Competing group membership such as regional or national attachment may impede or strengthen identification with Europe. We also find that national histories are crucial in shaping patterns of discourse about EU integration. The identification with Europe has different meanings, depending on what is emphasized in which country. National history seems to condition the consequences of EU membership for support for European integration: English Euro-skepticism is rooted in Britain's history as an empire; West German's early support in its holocaust-related guilt and its related eagerness of being accepted again in the European family of nations; Spaniards tended to support European integration as a proxy for modernization and democratization (Diez Mendrano 2003). Social representations of the European Union's policies and actions are embedded in and linked to nation-specific discourses about sovereignty, society, and nation-state (Menéndez-Alarcón 2004). Thus debates about European integration follow national trajectories that do not travel easily.¹²

¹²The perceptions about a unified Europe even differ regionally within nation-states (Opp 2005).

Party identification may also be a factor (Harmsen and Spiering 2004). From its early beginnings, the European Community was much a project of Christian Democrats. One could expect followers of that party family to support European integration more than adherents of other party families. Elites in general tend to be more favorable of EU integration than the public at large (Hooghe 2003; Flockhart 2005; Haller 2009). In case the public is rather disinterested it will tend to follow its elite's preferences. An overt split over European integration within national elites, however, will have the effect of making European integration a contested topic. Finally, personal identity comes into play. A common we-feeling should bolster support for European integration even in the case of perceived personal disadvantages. All of these variables—economic position, partisanship, national and European identification, and attachment—have been shown to exert some effect. But how is one to compare their magnitude?

Figure 11.8 summarizes our research.¹³ Support for European integration is the dependent variable we wish to explain. Its measurement is based on an index combining the support of EU membership, wishing for a larger role of the EU and preferring a higher speed in the EU integration process. The thickness of the arrows in Fig. 11.8 represents the different impact of our independent variables. The more personal resources such as educational qualifications and higher income respondents have, the more they support European integration.¹⁴ We see that sociotropic benefits are more important than egocentric ones, i.e., respondents' expectations concerning the economic prospects of their countries are more important for predicting their support for European integration than their personal outlook. Figure 11.8 shows that there is indeed a linkage between identity and EU support. People who are likely to feel themselves as Europeans are more likely to support European integrating. But other factors, utilitarian factors in particular, are at least as important for EU support. The Irish for instance, continue to support the membership of their country in the EU in impressively high numbers, yet they occasionally vote down EU treaties when they expect to get a better deal.

Once checked for other variables, country contexts, such as the fiscal transfer position of a country or the type of welfare system, seem to be of lesser significance compared to personal identity as measured by one's degree of attachment to one's region, country, or Europe. People who feel attached to Europe tend to support European integration. But the impact of respondents' national attachment upon their support for European integration depends on the type of national attachment. Nationally attached respondents who think the enlargement of the European Union is culturally enriching Europe are particularly in favor of EU integration. National attachment combined with seeing oneself as a national only ("Closure") tends to produce disapproval of European Union. This is to say that not all kinds of national attachments are conducive to approving the integration process and the

¹³Our analysis is based on Eurobarometer 54.1 from Fall 2000 covering EU15. We used a slightly modified approach from the one suggested by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005). The idea was to combine economic, identity, and partisan factors into one model. The variation of the dependent variable (= support for European integration) is probed at the individual level, taking all independent variables into account and controlling for country differences. Detailed variable descriptions and statistics can be found on the first author's homepage at <http://www.ph-gmuend.de/deutsch/lehrende-a-z/i/immerfall-stefan.php?navanchor=>.

¹⁴Fuss and Grosser (2006) find this relationship to be true at a very young age which supports the idea that European personal experiences such as traveling and studying abroad are linked to positive identification with Europe via personal resources.




Fig. 11.8 A summary model explaining individual support for European integration
 Note: SES = socioeconomic status of the respondent; for other variables see text.

claim that national and European attachment are corresponding has to be qualified. A weak form of national attachment probably is most suitable.

Party vote is of marginal significance as is the placement of the respondent on the left–right dimension. Preferences for EU integration are per se no left–right issue. How support for European integration is related to a respondent’s political stance depends very much on where respondents come from. In social-democratic welfare states such as Sweden the left tends to oppose and the right supports (economic) integration. In Germany the left is more supportive of integration for the above-described historic reasons, while in the Czech Republic the left is in general opposed to EU integration (Rippl et al., 2007). Political elites do, however, have an impact. The more they are divided over EU integration, the more people come to think about costs and benefits and the less likely they are to support integration. This seems to be the case in Sweden and Denmark, whereas in Germany, for instance, the economic, political, and cultural elites almost unequivocally support EU membership.

Turning to personal characteristics we find, contrary to some expectations (Luedtke 2005), gender of marginal significance for EU support. The same is true for age. The post-materialistic expectation of finding more European attachment in the younger cohorts than in the older cohorts because only the latter has been raised during the height of nation-statehood is also not borne out by our data once controlling for other variables.

One could also expect more nationalism in Eastern Europe, as Central and Eastern Europeans have just returned to their nation-building processes which had been thwarted by Soviet dominance (Immerfall 2009). This proposition has not been tested in our above model. New member states have been excluded because of the high volatility of their party systems (the Chapter 4). Other research does provide evidence for a more privileged role of open nationalism in the new member countries (Bunce 2005; Janmaat 2006). One should not forget, however, that after a quarter century of the alleged decline of nationalism even in Western Europe, the nation continues to be by far the strongest commander of political loyalty. The weakening of nationalism certainly is no foreclosed fact.

The gap between political elites – who in most Central European countries were virtually unanimous in their support of rapid accession – and the population at large may be even larger in Eastern than in Western Europe. This gap may open up the possibility of the formation of solid anti-EU parties. “Winners” who have particularly benefited from the transition to capitalism are more likely to support EU membership because they regard the EU as a protector of domestic economic reforms (Caplanova et al. 2004, Christin 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006; Tucker et al. 2002).

Summing up, we may conclude that support for European integration is driven to a large extent by utilitarian perspectives which, in turn, are context-dependent and cushioned by national elites. The interaction between national and European attachment also seems to play a role. It is the question as to how to condition this interaction in order to promote European identity that we turn to next.

11.6 Constructing a European Union Identity?

From the very start—beginning with Jean Monnet—EU officials were consciously pondering ways on how to go beyond a political union (Shore 2002; Theiler 2005). The European Commission in particular sees it necessary to foster a European identity in order to endow the EU system of transnational governance with legitimacy: If only more awareness of commonalities in the European culture could be stimulated, then collective feelings of belonging would follow suit. An example of this approach is the 1972 Declaration on European Identity in which the Foreign Ministers of the then nine member states invoked common heritage, interests, and internal coherence with regard to the rest of the world.¹⁵ The solemn declaration was followed by the “People’s Europe,” not Peoples’ Europe (sic), campaign designed to bring the European Union closer to the citizens.

In the same vein, a substantive European heritage industry sponsored by European institutions tries to convey European awareness (Gostmann and Wagner 2005; Tsaliki 2007). These include the yearly designation of a European Capital of Culture, the organization for Cultural Routes around patently European themes, or the creation of a Musée de l’Europe that is to be opened in Brussel¹⁶ this year. All these initiatives are conceived as concrete demonstrations of European culture as means of bringing the citizens of Europe closer together. According to our analysis, however, the promotion of a European identity through targeting an allegedly common European culture is flawed empirically and conceptually. It is overlooking both Europe’s internal variation of self-definitions and self-concepts and the potentially highly divisive nature of national undertones when evoking cultural memories.

A more obvious idea, harking back to the history of the making of nation-states, is to “teach Europe” in school. Through the teaching of Europe, national memories can, perhaps, be re-created in order to align national and European history. Benedict Anderson (1991: 201) did point to the vast pedagogical industry necessary in the United States to establish the bloody secession war (1861–1865) as a war of “brother against brother.” In spite of the

¹⁵Declaration on European Identity, Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12, pp. 118–122.

¹⁶Cf. <http://www.expo-europe.be/>.

limited prerogatives of the EU in educational affairs,¹⁷ several attempts have been started along this road. In the early 1990s a common European history book came into being upon the initiative of a French banker, Frédéric Delouche. Twelve distinguished historians from different countries authorized the French text¹⁸ which then was translated into several languages. As far as we could find out there was little or no actual use of this book in schools.¹⁹ The German edition being out of print, its overall impact may have well been limited. After scathing criticism, the EU Commission distanced itself from the European history book (Theiler 2005: 122–124).

Other Euro-history initiatives continue. Starting in 2007 a common history book is going to be employed in selected French and German upper division schools. Each chapter is written by two historians, one French, one German.²⁰ The German Education Minister, Annette Schavan, put forward the idea of creating a similar European history book for use in schools across the EU on the margins of a meeting of EU education ministers in Heidelberg, Germany, in March 2007. At the same time history was emerging as a potential point of conflict on the declaration to mark the EU's 50th anniversary, which was signed by European leaders in Berlin on March 25, 2007. Not surprisingly, most countries were reported to remain doubtful about a uniform European history textbook.²¹

While it might be possible to patch over the Spanish-British debate as to whether Francis Drake was a noble hero or an ignoble buccaneer, mutual reservations immediately arise when central elements of national memory constructions are touched. Because of these national sensitiveness, the European dimension in school is highly contested (Walkenhorst 2006). When it does find its way into the class room it usually boils down to simply improving the knowledge about other Member States. Moreover, problems of intercultural education have come to the forefront in Europe's national educational systems (see Chapter 9). They badly need to accommodate their migrant student population, the majority of which do not originate from EU countries.

There might be other ways to Europeanize education than attempting to insert a European dimension into the school curricula. Perhaps what is taught about Europe is less important than how Europe is taught in schools. Yasemin Soysal (2002, 2005) argues that a "normalizing process" is happening through informal cross-Europeans networks like teachers' unions, academics and scientific experts, advocacy groups, and international organizations. The outcome would not be a uniform discourse but the reinterpretation of one's nation as being one among many, the removal of national heroes from mythical glorification, and the de-demonizing of the deeds of others. The sentimental detachment of national history is accompanied by an emphasis on regional and linguistic diversity. In similar vein Bernhard Giesen has argued that the defeat of Nazism and Fascism comes close to effecting a common collective memory of Europeans (Eisenstadt and Giesen 2005; Giesen

¹⁷Because education is politically highly sensitive, the EU has long promoted mobility-enhancing policies over curricular reforms (Theiler 2005). Nevertheless the Commission has gained ground in educational affairs by linking the Bologna process of educational reforms to the Lisbon strategy of upgrading Europe's competitiveness (Immerfall 2006b).

¹⁸Histoire de l'Europe. Une initiative européenne de Frédéric Delouche, Paris: Hachette Education, 2ème édition, 1997.

¹⁹As one German official pointed out, "this book did not fit German didactic standards" (Communication of Sep 25, 2007).

²⁰Histoire/Geschichte – L'Europe et le monde depuis 1945/Europa und die Welt seit 1945. Éditions Nathan, Paris/Leipzig: Ernst Klett Schulbuchverlag 2006.

²¹"EU ministers discuss joint history text," UPI of March 2.

and Schneider 2004). Atonement and repentance are no longer confined to the German case but have become a European tradition of commemoration. Such a collective European identity would be no longer constructed by referring positively to a unifying utopia, but by the memorization of victims and by a radical departure from the past.

This departing from traditional nation-centered historical narratives is very selective, however, stronger in some countries than in others. Moreover we do know little how textbook content has translated into classroom instruction which, again, might be quite different in different countries. Research on civic education's impact on support for democratic values and on civic interest and participation shows considerable differences between and within countries with respect to the teaching of skills and the emphasis on an open classroom climate (Torney-Purta 2002).

Communicating Europe would furthermore involve the constitution of a European public sphere. The Europeanization of public discourse may either be seen as a transnational deliberation or, at the least, as an increasing focus on European actors and affairs. Most researchers have settled with the latter, less demanding model of Europeanization of public discourse. Research evidence even on this limited form of European communication is quite sobering. A longitudinal quantitative study covering two decades in five EU Member States—Germany, United Kingdom, France, Austria, and Denmark between 1982 to 2002—provides little evidence of any Europeanization of public identities (Stift et al. 2007). The proportion of articles in which the EU policy-making is the major subject has steadily increased since the 1980s. Contrary to assertions by Trenz (2005) and others, however, this finding does not disconfirm the thesis of a persistent communication deficit of the EU because the EU is mostly invoked as an intervening, even as an obtrusive factor into national affairs. It is rarely debated as a policy-maker in its own right.

Interestingly enough, major parts of EU correspondents support and even promote European integration (AIM 2007). They see their responsibility to rectify stereotypes and prejudices against the EU rather than to report Brussels's wrongdoings. Nevertheless, the primary selection criterion for reporting EU news is whether it is important to their home country. Even if we may be optimistic about the willingness of the print media to function as agents of transnational political communication within the EU (Pfetsch et al. 2008), the fact remains that because of this inevitable home bias journalists from different countries need to be interested in different things.

With regard to Europe's discursive integration the results are even more sobering. Such integration exists only in selected papers of the economic elites; other attempts to turn European discussions into profitable business have failed.²² Only the internet, along with a series of publicly funded online magazines, provides overviews of the diversity of opinion within Europe.²³ Yet internet's transformative effects on European public space have also been relatively modest with regard to the mean of public mass communication (Kraus 2008: 161–167). The European quality press is open and permeable for opinions and ideas from the outside, but it is far more attentive to bigger than to smaller countries and to US actors much more than to any European country. Government, executive actors, and celebrities are the beneficiaries of this kind of Europeanization of public debates to the detriment of civil society actors (Koopmans 2007). This bias is even more pronounced in tabloids and in the regional press (Pfetsch et al. 2008). EU coverage in television news is anything but miniscule only in selected public programs (de Vreese 2004). All in all, the

²²Cf. Heribert Seifert, Unerfüllte Sehnsucht nach Europa, in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 7, 2007.

²³Examples of which are signandsight.com, eurozine.com, cafebabel.com, and eurotopics.net.

growth of transnational media has worked to Europeanize the elite public debate rather than to open up a European arena of communication to the mass public (Schlesinger 2007; Kaelble 2007).

11.7 A European Sense of Community?

Modern nationalism was born in Europe, and perhaps it is dying there also. At least some scholars and politicians “are mounting a death watch” (Citrin and Sides 2004: 41). In the face of growing transnational ties and mutual obligations, the argument goes, Europe has become an open network with fluid boundaries, in which the outside is always already the inside (Beck 2007). Sympathy with transnational causes become natural in these circumstances whereas belonging to the nation does become increasingly irrelevant.

This chapter has found few signs of shared beliefs, rights, and responsibilities among Europeans, however. While we did find multiple identifications, national identity still comes first for most Europeans. Their self-categorizations do for the most part not include co-Europeans as citizens on the same footing as they include their co-nationals. Affective affinity to an abstract idea of Europe is widespread, but does not guarantee support for the integration process. It is a moot question if matters would have been different had the Union adhered to its original smaller and more homogenous size.

We do not concur with the idea, widespread among politicians but also shared by political scientists (e.g., Blondel et. al. 1998), that mass public support for or opposition against the EU form of governance is mainly driven by apathy, ignorance and even irrationality. We have found the legitimacy of the European Union not as fragile, but as weak, and EU attitudes not as unsubstantial but as socially fragmented and context driven in explicable ways.

After 50 years of expanding political integration there is little EU-identity to speak of and, moreover, there is little indication it will develop in the foreseeable future either. This prediction is based on two reasons. First, Europeans still differ much more in their self-concepts across than within nations. While it is true that adding new identities is not a zero-sum game, the process of adding a new layer requires elective affinity, a certain *Wahlverwandtschaft* as Max Weber has called it, between mythology, narratives, and historical realities. This *Wahlverwandtschaft* is at least as great between Europe and the United States as a whole as within Europe. Second, important prerequisites for constructing a European identity are not in place. Education and warfare is still under national control, the mass media report with a national perspective, and there is neither a fixed cultural nor geographic boundary.

If there is little evidence of an emerging European Union identity in large parts of its populations, what are some of its consequences of its absence for the politics of European integration? First of all, it is important to note how far European integration was able to progress notwithstanding that national identity remained a powerful constraint for preferences concerning the level of European integration. The flip side of the shallow, “cold” European identity is that it is equally hard to stir up mass resentment for abandoning the EU. National identity per se is not an obstacle to European attachment. But national identity and European attachment only correspondent as long as European integration is believed to bring about tangible benefits. The European Union draws legitimacy from the sovereign states which form it. It is accepted for the most part, even taken for granted, but it does command much loyalty in its own right.

To a large extent, European integration is an elite project. Little wonder then that European self concepts are comparatively widespread among the educated, owners of businesses, managers, and professionals. The EU does have its founding narratives such as peace and prosperity. Such construals complement utilitarian attachments of its citizens, but they are too general to provide a collective self-description or a sense of direction. Their bonding force in times of conflicting preferences and perceptions is limited. Gratitude cannot be expected and past benefits count little when it comes to present evaluations.

As a corollary the continuation of political and economic integration hinges heavily on elites. The extent to which national attachment is affirmative or hostile to European integration depends very much on how it is framed by elites. As long as a national elite is uniformly in favor of European integration it is possible to ignore the general public for extended periods of time. As another consequence, we expect people's willingness to show solidarity throughout Europe for accepting re-distribution policies to stay fragile. Gratitude cannot be relied on as the EU is hardly perceived as a community of destiny. Exchange anywhere near to the magnitude accepted between the Italian North and the Mezzogiorno or between West and East German is unimaginable. Finally, identity holds no solution for the crisis of confidence the European Union is going through. It is no proxy for the justification of the EU's democratic deficit or compensating for temporary weakness in systems' performances.

The failure of the EU to infuse identity in terms of its citizen's self-definition as a member of a larger community is no bad news altogether. Identity remains a double-edged sword (Sen 2006). The history of nation-building suggests that such a project would go hand in hand with excluding the "other." If the absence of any Euro-"nationalism" is welcome, the dodging of taking EU constitutional issues to the people may be not.

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Chapter 12

Leisure and Consumption in Europe

Jukka Gronow and Dale Southerton

12.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an account of the socio-geographical patterns and developments of leisure-related consumption in Europe. Since the main theoretical questions concern possible processes of convergence and divergence in Europe (especially compared to the USA; cf. the Americanization thesis) our analyses are heavily dependent on, and restricted by, the availability of statistical data, particularly household expenditure and time diary surveys which allow for systematic comparisons between countries or groups of countries over time. Relatively good and easily accessible data can be found only after the late 1980s and 1990s – and even then mostly on the ‘old’ members of EU. The further back in time we go the more restricted, scattered and less comparable our data get.

The ‘breakthrough’ of modern mass consumption and consumer culture in Western and Northern Europe is often associated with the 1960s and 1970s.¹ One of the clearest indicators of a transformation towards societies where leisure and consumption come to dominate economic and social relations is the rapidly decreasing share of household expenditure on basic necessities, which even in the 1950s, accounted for a significantly large share of family budgets even in the economically most developed European countries. In Spain, Portugal and Greece this process of decreasing expenditure shares on necessities occurred at a later date, and in the new Eastern and Central European members and candidate members of the EU is on-going. In some respects the former socialist countries have retarded only to have started to recover, as far as some basic modern consumption patterns are concerned, as a consequence of the fall of the Soviet bloc. In Greece the share of food in household expenditure was 30% in 1970 compared to 20% in Great Britain, Denmark and Austria (Trentmann, 2006, 707). By contrast, several Eastern European (former socialist) countries have expenditure shares on food and drink today similar to those of Western European countries in the 1970s.

J. Gronow (✉)

Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

e-mail: jukka.gronow@soc.uu.se

¹Mass consumption is commonly identified with the period following the Second World War when mass production and rising levels of affluence in advanced capitalist societies heralded an exponential increase in the amount of time and money devoted to leisure and consumption. However, the mass production and consumption of goods dates back to the spice, tea and sugar trades of the seventeenth century (Fine and Leopold, 1993; see also Trentmann, 2006). Others highlight the Renaissance period as an explosion of material culture, while the growth of nineteenth century department stores represents another historical moment in the emergence of mass consumption and consumer culture (Benjamin, 1999).

The chapter begins with an outline of the key theoretical debates and of the data sources used to analyse patterns of European leisure and consumption. This is followed by two sections detailing geographical patterns, differences and similarities between social groups and the homogenisation or diversification of these social patterns across European countries. This is done first with expenditure data and, second, with time diary data. The amount of time and money devoted to leisure and consumption activities is the most reliable comparative measure because together they indicate the degree of opportunity, cultural importance and degree of commitment exhibited for different consumption practices across countries. In these more detailed analyses we have mostly to be content with studying selected groups of countries or pairs of countries, due to lack of more extensive comparable data.² Section 12.5 takes a detailed look at data on habitual practices, specifically at media, cultural activities and tourism. This allows for a more nuanced investigation of the general patterns revealed by household expenditure and time diary data. Throughout we draw upon previous empirical research to support our data interpretations.

12.2 Homogenisation or Diversification of Consumption and Leisure in Europe

Even though there is ample evidence that practices of leisure and consumption are converging across national borders, there is equally expansive accounts of differences being preserved and even increased. In addition to national and geographic patterns and differences, we will also address, where possible, the question of social differentiation according to socio-economic status, education, gender and age. The often presumed Americanisation of European consumption culture and leisure – in particular through the influence of popular commercial culture and consumption patterns – is an important and related issue to be addressed (Tenbruck, 1990; Appadurai, 1996; De Grazia, 1998). Whether it is possible to identify typically different models of consumption and leisure in Europe, in a similar way that social scientists have identified welfare regimes (see Esping-Anderson, 1999), based on different stages of economic development and socio-cultural conditions is a key concern. Hypotheses of different models of consumption based on assumptions that leisure and consumption are tightly correlated with economic development might include the following: major shares of family budgets are still devoted to buying food and the average expenditure on leisure and culture is almost negligent in Eastern European countries; in Southern European countries, where leisure is not as home centred as in the North, the share of the expenditure on restaurants and cafés is comparably high; and, consumption and leisure patterns differ in many respects between women and men in all countries as a consequence of their differentiated forms of engagement in paid and domestic labour.

In order to answer such questions we employ three different types of empirical data: family expenditure data; time diary data; and data on habitual cultural practices. In addition we shall present some concrete data on the typical consumption patterns of popular culture, such as TV, films and music, in the European countries. Family expenditure data and data of habitual cultural activities (visits to museums, cinemas, concerts, travel, etc.) are available in the (old) European Union countries since the late 1980s. Time diary data of leisure

²Gershuny's (2000) comprehensive study of the general trends of time use and leisure in 20 countries over 30 years is a rare exception and a good starting point.

activities in 2000 for 15 European Union countries, and at two points in time (the early-mid 1970s and late 1990s) across four countries (Netherlands, Norway, France, UK) are also analysed.

Interpreting household budget and time diary data confronts many difficulties. Households can differ in their composition (for instance, number of children or singles) from one country to another. Decreases or increases of household expenditure on some items could, for instance, just as well be due to changing prices than their more or less extensive consumption. Similarly, decreasing time use could signal either the declining popularity of some leisure time activities (let's say eating out occasions as an example) or that the activities have become more 'effective' in the way that they are provisioned (for instance fast food vs. restaurant meals).

There are many suspicions, not totally misplaced, about the validity and reliability of calculations based on people's recording and reporting of their time use which always threaten to invalidate deductions made from such apparently precise data. The main critique is that time diary data do not account for experiences of time or the meanings attributed to the activities that it measures (Adam, 1988; Paolucci, 1993). A second concern relates to the under-reporting of activities, especially in cases where more than one activity is being conducted by the respondent. Gershuny (2000) makes a robust defence of the time use survey data, demonstrating it to be as reliable as other survey data and that under or over-reporting and non-response rates are not significantly biased against particular social groups, especially when appropriate weights are applied to the data (as is the case in the data used in this chapter). For the purposes of this chapter we require time diary and household expenditure surveys to be no more than comparatively crude instruments giving access to broad brush maps of the organization of daily life. Moreover, the parallel use of time diary and household expenditure data (plus data on cultural practice) helps overcome some of these difficulties of interpretation by providing different angles from which to explore leisure practices.³ On the other hand, due to the lack of available comprehensive data, only some kinds of consumption practices and leisure time activities are amenable to systematic comparative analysis in this way.

Given the historical paucity and contemporary generality of the data it is difficult to answer the question whether something 'qualitatively' different has taken place – or is under way – in Europe during the last 10 to 20 years; something that would challenge the historical patterns of mass consumption and practices that emerged slowly after the Second World War in Europe. Obviously, some totally new leisure practices have emerged due to new technological innovations and developments (PCs, mobile phones) which have very rapidly become available to a large number of Europeans. Yet scant data are available for purposes of reliable cross-national comparative analysis to confirm or refute the significance of such highly visible new practices as radically transformative of the ways that Europeans consume leisure. Similarly, we know that European populations increasingly live in great cities and metropolitan areas, their apartments and houses gradually increase in size, they do their shopping in bigger malls, and their everyday life has become increasingly dependent on transport in private cars. These macro, massifying, trends can, however, draw attention away from the deeper, micro and diversifying, impacts on social

³To continue a previous example, should time spent eating out decline but expenditure shares remain stable or increase it would seem that the provision of the service has become more effective rather than that eating out has declined in popularity.

and cultural ways of organizing everyday life that result from differential local and group-specific understandings of consumption practices. As Miller (1992) shows, Trinidadians might watch American TV shows but they interpret the meanings and significance of the cultural references through their local knowledge: they watch through Trinidadian eyes. Our data will not permit answers to questions as simple or specific as to whether Europeans increasingly understand and attach the same meanings to particular cultural practices or whether global branding and advertising creates new forms of meaning and cultural associations. Our purpose is to address, where possible, a much broader and fundamental set of questions: have our habits of expenditure and practices of time use become more diversified or homogenised; has the European culture of consumption become more pluralistic allowing for an increasing number of leisure activities or does it, on the contrary and as feared by many cultural critics (e.g. Adorno, 1991), show more traits of a mass culture being repeated everywhere?

12.3 The Overall Structure of Household Expenditure on Consumption and Leisure-Related Consumption

The standard statistical classification of household consumption expenditure used in European statistics includes one item which is clearly related to leisure: recreation and culture. Inside this statistical category one can find such items as expenditure on the buying and repairs of audiovisual, photographic and information processing equipment; sports equipment; games, toys and hobbies; gardens and pets; recreational services; reading material, books and magazines; and, package holidays. Other expenditure categories also contain potentially relevant data related to leisure consumption, for example, expenditure at cafés, restaurants and on accommodation services. The relation and difference between leisure and work or other 'necessary' reproduction related activities is, however, empirically difficult to draw. Food expenditure could, for instance, include both routine work-day eating and recreational eating like festive family dinners or entertaining friends at home. Likewise, expenditure on transport, one of the items that in many European Union countries have increased rapidly during the 1990s, could include both trips from home to work as well as leisure touring or trips to a restaurant, a theatre or to a summer cottage. Eating out or staying overnight in a hotel could equally be part of a business trip or a weekend leisure trip. Overall, expenditure on recreation and culture is likely to underestimate on transportation to and from those activities, and data on restaurants, cafes and hotels includes expenditure incurred for both business and leisure purposes.

We begin by exploring the main changes in the structure of household consumption expenditure. Table 12.1 reveals that shares of recreation and culture were highest in 2005 in Austria (12.6%) and the United Kingdom (12.3%). In Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Finland and Sweden as well as in Malta and Czech Republic it was over 10%. It was lowest in Greece (4.2%), Italy (5.8%) and Spain (6.4%). Judging from the 10 European countries from which statistical historical data are available, the relative share of leisure and recreation has increased in all the countries during the 20 years, even though in some countries (Belgium, France, Greece and Italy) only quite slightly. Increase has been largest in the UK, Germany and Denmark and by 2005 they had replaced Belgium and Ireland as the highest spenders on recreation and culture among those European countries on which comparable data existed for 25 years ago. One should, however, bear in mind that due to a general increase in household expenditure over the time one could, with the

Table 12.1 The share (in percentages) of total household expenditure on recreation and culture and cafés and restaurants in the total household expenditure in eight European countries in 1979/1980/1981 and 2005

	Recreation and culture		Restaurants and Cafés	
	1979	2005	1979	2005
Germany	7.3	11.1	4.4	3.1
France	6.8	6.9	3.7	2.3
Italy	5.5	5.8	4.6	3.1
UK	7.7	12.3	3.3	6.4
Netherlands	8.5	10.9	3.2	4.2
	1980	2005	1980	2005
Belgium	9.1	9.7	3.6	3.9
Ireland	9.2	10.1	7.0	3.5
Denmark	7.7	11.4	2.0	3.0
Greece	3.7	4.2	5.3	7.7
	1981	2005	1981	2005
Spain	4.5	6.4	5.7	8.4
Finland	–	11.2	–	2.9
Sweden	–	12.2	–	3.2
Austria	–	12.6	–	4.9

Sources: Eurostat, Family Budgets, Comparative tables (1984); Eurostat: household Expenditure, 2005.

same share of total expenditure, buy quite a lot more products and services in 2005 than in 1979 or 1980 (depending, however, on the relative changes of prices). Furthermore, the absolute monetary difference in expenditure rates between the countries with the highest and lowest shares of recreation and culture expenditure was even greater than percentage shares suggest: in Greece the average total household expenditure was, for instance, 19,147 euros in 1999 compared with an average total household expenditure of 29,859 and 24,607 euros in 1999 for the UK and Netherlands, respectively.

Since the individual subclasses of which the total household expenditure consists of are mostly quite small and therefore their changes over time are also small, it is not easy to make any definite conclusions about such changes or to compare countries. It could be pointed out, however, that Sweden and the UK were, in 1999 for which data are available, the leading nations in the relative expenditure shares on recreational and cultural services (about 4%) and Sweden and Austria, in their turn, on package tours (about 4%). The Netherlands and Germany distinguished themselves with their relatively high expenditure on gardens and flowers, the UK on pets as well as games and toys. These relatively high shares seemed to have remained relatively stable over the last 10–20 years and reveal a persistence of nationally differentiated cultural traditions.

The fastest growing item of expenditure in the old EU countries during the last quarter of a century was housing, which on average accounted for about one-fourth to almost one-third of all household expenditure. Expenditure on communications has also, not surprisingly, increased in all countries but is still on a relatively modest level compared to other major expenses, like housing, transport and food, varying from 2.2 to 3.8% in 2005. Expenditure on transport has likewise increased in most countries. This tendency is not, however, universal since in France it has clearly decreased at the same time from 15.4 to 13.5%. Food and clothing are the items on which expenditure has decreased quite rapidly in all the old EU countries. Consumption on food was, in 1999, lowest in the UK and the Netherlands with 10.5% shares of the total expenditure. It was at the same level as in the USA and much lower than in Italy (19.0%) and Portugal (18.7%). As late as 1970

the share of food expenditure in UK household budgets was over 20% and recreation and culture only 8% (Blow et al., 2004). Evidence from UK expenditure data analysis testifies that declining expenditure on clothing is the result of the relative decline of clothing prices and that the volume of items purchased has increased for all social groups, and especially women, since the 1960s (Majima, 2004). This same tendency holds for food consumption taken at home, but not eating out (Warde et al., 2007).

If we take a closer look at the expenditure on culture and recreation, we can identify three groups of countries or areas in Europe: one in which both the total household expenditure and the share of recreation and culture are high; another in which the total household expenditure is relatively high but the share of recreation and culture is low; and, a third one in which both household expenditure and share of recreation and culture are low. The first group consists of the countries of North-Western and Northern Europe, as well as Germany and Austria. Only France, Italy and, with some reservations, Spain belong to the second group. Almost all the new European Union member countries (with the exception of Malta and the Czech Republic), candidate members and Russia⁴ belong to the third group. Within this last group of mainly Eastern and Central European countries the differences between individual countries are, however, quite big in both respects (see Table 12.2). The share of culture and recreation was, in 2005, lowest in Bulgaria (2.9), Romania, Greece (both 4.2) and Lithuania (4.3). In Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia as well as in Russia (Rosssiskii statisticheskii iezhegodnik 2005) it was about 6%, about as high as in Italy and France, but their overall standards of household expenditure were much lower. Slovenia and Malta stand much higher than Italy and France in relation to the share of the average household expenditure on culture and recreation.

Generally, with some exceptions, one could say that the share of expenditure on culture and recreation in Europe varies in reverse relation to the share of expenditure on food (see Table 12.2), which in the poorest European country (Romania) takes up about half the total consumption expenditure but only about 10% in the UK. The same tendency can be noticed following the changes over time in many individual countries. However, even in the most prosperous countries only a very small share of the money that has been saved by lower

Table 12.2 The share of total household expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages and recreation and culture in 11 new member or candidate member countries of the EU, 1005

	Food and non-alcoholic beverages	Recreation and culture
Cyprus	17.0	6.0
Malta	24.0	10.1
Czech Republic	23.5	10.6
Slovenia	19.1	9.4
Hungary	26.2	8.5
Slovakia	30.1	6.6
Estonia	25.3	6.4
Latvia	32.3	6.3
Lithuania	37.3	4.3
Bulgaria	35.3	2.9
Romania	50.0	4.2

Source: Eurostat: household expenditure, 2005.

⁴Greece and Portugal are included here as old EU member states.

expenditures on food and clothes is used on culture and recreation. Rapidly increasing expenditure on housing, energy and transport take care of a large share of the rest.

Within countries, the relative share of expenditure on food in individual households generally decreases with increasing total household expenditure. In all the European Union membership countries on which we have data (15 countries, all members before the last enlargement), the share of the expenditure on culture and recreation does not, however, necessarily follow the opposite direction. In Denmark, Germany and Ireland, for instance, it remains quite stable or rises very little from one quintile to another (data not shown here – Eurostat: household expenditure 1999). The expenditure shares on recreation and culture in the individual household budgets rise with increasing average expenditure in each country, most notably in Greece and Portugal where this share was generally on a much lower level. This means, among others, that the poorest households in these countries use comparatively little money on culture and recreation.

It is difficult to see any general overall patterns in Europe in the structure of the average household expenditure according to the household size and composition (data not shown here – Eurostat: household expenditure 1999). For instance, the share of the expenditure on culture and recreation was highest among single persons and single parents with dependent children households in Denmark. In Finland, France and in the Netherlands it was almost on the same level in all household types, in Belgium and in the UK much lower in single-person and single-parent households, while in Austria it was highest in single-parent households and households with two adults. Eating and drinking out is clearly a single's occupation in Finland, Sweden and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Denmark whereas, most notably in the UK and Spain the, admittedly rather few, households with three adults are the leading consumers of all kinds of catering services. In the Netherlands single parents with dependent children use relatively less money than other types of household on restaurants and cafés. In Germany both single adults and two adult households spend relatively more on these services.

Besides the consumption on culture and recreation, there is another interesting and rather clear-cut geographical demarcation line in Europe which, contrary to expenditure on culture and recreation, at least partly is independent of the general standards of living or household expenditure. Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, and Ireland differed quite clearly from the rest of Europe with respect to their consumption patterns in 1979–1981 (Table 12.1). People living in these countries used a lot more of their money on restaurants and cafés: on eating and drinking out (about 5% or more). This share has clearly increased in Spain and Greece since 1980 but slightly decreased in Portugal during the 1990s (data not shown here – Eurostat: household expenditure). Ireland is an interesting opposite case which had a very high level of this type of consumption as late as the early 1990s that has since decreased. The same is true of Italy whereas UK has during the last decade become one of the leading European eating out countries (6.4% in 2005). Finland, and somewhat surprisingly France, had the lowest expenditure share on eating out (among the EU-15), which was also relatively low in Germany, Denmark and Sweden. These figures suggest that leisure in Southern Europe is more oriented to activities out of home whereas people living in Northern and Central Europe (and the Nordic countries in particular) appear more home-oriented. These geographical differences are not any more as clear-cut. The UK appears an exceptional case here, with its high and increasing percentage expenditure on eating out. Italy is the other, opposite example of a Southern European country with only a small share of eating out expenditure.

Package holidays are also an item of expenditure which clearly distinguishes countries, and not exclusively along the lines of economic development. Austria, Sweden, UK,

Germany, and Belgium are the leading countries of mass tourism with an average expenditure share of 3 to 4% (in 1999). With the exception of Belgium the relative expenditure trend has been growing during recent times. In Southern Europe people do not use much money on package holidays even though Spain is clearly increasing its share. But their closeness to the Mediterranean coast, the traditional target of most Northern European package tours, is probably not the only explanation since, for instance, Finland, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France showed rather modest shares, even though clearly higher than Greece and Portugal. Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics it remains clear that in the new or candidate member EU countries the share of package holidays in the total expenditure is very low. In the poorer countries of Eastern and Southern Europe only the households in the highest quintile of total household expenditure use money on this item of recreational consumption. In general, the share of the expenditure on package holidays does not necessarily and unambiguously increase with the rising total household expenditure in individual European countries. These general patterns of tourism will be explored in more detail later in this chapter.

Despite some general trends in the development and structure of household expenditure, most notably the diminishing share of expenditure on food and clothing with increasing well-being and the opposite tendency of increasing shares of expenditure on transport and housing, the overall picture is characterised by big differences between European countries which have been mostly preserved during the last decades. Household consumption expenditure on culture and recreation has increased in most Western European countries rather slowly and steadily with increasing overall household expenditure rates. As far as the more specific items of leisure-related consumption are concerned the picture is quite varied and characterised by many cultural differences which cannot be explained in terms of economic prosperity alone. By no means do the changes over time always point in the same direction across all or some of the countries.

12.4 The Overall Structure of Time Allocated to Consumption and Leisure in 2000

When it comes to time use data, the standard measure of all leisure activities is almost always classified as ‘free time’ (a loaded and misleading category that will, nevertheless, do for our initial purposes here⁵). Tables 12.3 and 12.4 document the mean number of hours allocated to ‘free time’ in 15 old and new European Union member countries in 2000, and the percentage of that time devoted to different ‘free time’ activities. These tables are ‘static’ in that they do not reveal change over time. However, other studies do and the most common trend across nations is that ‘free time’ is increasing relative to time spent in paid and unpaid labour (see Gershuny 2000 for precise details).⁶

Tables 12.3 and 12.4 show the mean amount of ‘free time’ (in hours) for the populations of the 15 countries. While there is a tendency for greater total free time in old European states, especially the Northern nations, the overall volumes of time are scattered and no

⁵ ‘Free time’ suggests choice and discretion over cultural activities and implies that pleasure is derived from participation. This is not necessarily the case and free time should be read in the context of time diary data as time allocated to activities other than paid and unpaid labour or personal care (such as sleeping).

⁶ Manfred Garhammer (2001) showed in his extensive study that in several European countries and the USA the daily free time of those employed, in fact, decreased in the 1980s and 1990s.

Table 12.3 Percentage share of all 'free time' by categories of activity for men and women aged 20–74, 2000, in 'old' EU member states

	Belgium		Germany		Spain		France		Italy		Finland		Sweden		UK		Norway	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Total Free time (hours)	5.22	4.50	5.46	4.33	5.16	4.26	4.44	4.06	5.05	4.05	5.55	5.16	5.17	4.57	5.2	4.53	5.59	5.47
TV and Video	44	45	34	32	38	40	45	47	37	36	41	39	37	34	49	44	35	29
Socialising	13	17	18	22	18	18	15	18	19	20	14	17	18	23	16	20	26	34
Reading	10	9	11	12	5	5	8	9	7	6	12	15	10	12	8	9	9	11
Sport	7	5	8	8	17	14	13	9	12	9	10	9	10	8	6	4	9	8
Resting	8	10	5	6	8	10	2	2	10	13	7	6	7	8	5	8	3	3
Entertainment and culture	8	5	12	8	7	3	6	5	7	3	6	4	9	6	8	5	7	4
Hobbies and games	3	3	5	5	2	5	6	6	3	6	4	5	4	4	3	5	3	3
Volunteer work	3	3	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4
Unspecified leisure	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4

Source: Eurostat, 2006a.

Table 12.4 Percentage share of all 'free time' by categories of activity for men and women aged 20–74, 2000, in 'new' EU member states

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania		Hungary		Poland		Slovenia	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Total free time (hours)	5.28	4.35	4.45	4.07	4.47	3.45	5.29	4.38	5.21	4.31	5.32	4.27
TV & Video	48	48	48	47	54	53	51	55	48	46	40	39
Socialising	11	13	12	14	12	14	15	14	16	18	18	21
Reading	12	14	9	12	8	10	8	8	6	9	7	9
Sport	9	6	11	8	7	6	6	5	8	6	11	10
Resting	7	6	8	8	5	6	8	8	5	4	10	11
Entertainment and culture	3	2	4	2	4	1	4	3	5	3	5	3
Hobbies and games	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	3	5	5	3	2
Volunteer work	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
Unspecified leisure	3	4	2	3	4	4	2	3	6	8	4	4

Source: Eurostat, 2006a.

clear pattern revealed. Looking first at the old European Union nations (Table 12.3), what is immediately striking are gender differences. Fewer minutes are allocated as ‘free time’ for women in all countries, and the distinction is most marked in Southern European states (in Spain and Italy the difference being that men have, on average, 1 hour more than women allocated as ‘free time’ per day). When compared with new European Union countries the Southern European pattern is repeated with men, in all cases except Latvia, having almost 1 hour more per day of free time than women. Read a different way, gender differences are narrowest in Northern European nations and in societies with a social–democratic welfare systems (Norway, Finland and Sweden, and to a lesser extent the UK and France).

When looking at the distribution of free time across different categories of activity, old European Union countries show remarkable similarities (Table 12.3). Nations with comparatively low percentage time devoted to watching television and videos (Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Norway) tend to devote a slightly higher percentage of free time to socializing, which includes eating out (Table 12.3).⁷ The UK is the only exception to this trend – spending comparatively high percentages of free time watching television and video, and socializing. Here it is relevant to note that the UK is one of the countries identified earlier to spend relatively large proportions of household expenditure on eating out. This is further evidence of European national diversity as the UK’s apparently recent boom in culinary culture seems to have made eating out something of a matter of social distinction because it is the country where a relatively high proportion of money and time are devoted to the activity, especially among the most affluent members of society (see also Cheng et al., 2007; Warde et al., 2007).

Table 12.5 reveals the total percentage of men and women who participated in activities on the days of survey for old European Union member states. Participation rates for TV and video watching are high in all countries although in Germany, Spain, France and Italy, four of the countries with the lowest share of free time allocated to this activity, between 20 and 25% of the survey population did not participate. The extent of participation in socializing does, however, vary across nations. As might be expected from the share of free time devoted to the activity, participation rates are comparatively high in Germany, but not so in the other countries with high shares of time devoted to socializing. Rather, it is Sweden and Norway where participation in socializing is most widespread. Finally, it is worth noting that participation in sport is relatively low in Belgium and the UK.

Gender differences in the distribution of free time are also notable. With the exceptions of Belgium, Spain and France, men devoted a higher percentage of their free time to television watching than did women (Table 12.3). Women in all old European countries spent more of their free time socializing and, with the exceptions of Belgium and Italy, reading. Men in all of these countries allocated a greater percentage of their free time to sport and to entertainment and culture. Participation rates (Table 12.5) reinforce this picture. While little difference is revealed regarding TV and video watching, more women participated in socializing in all countries except Spain and Italy, countries in which participation in socializing was comparatively low. More men participated in sport than women in all countries except Germany, Sweden and Norway.

New European Union countries, by contrast, devoted a much higher percentage of their free time to television watching, and there were only slight variations between men and

⁷Socialising does not equate to out of home leisure activities as discussed earlier because the Eurostat category includes social events at home or at the home of others and talking on the telephone.

Table 12.5 Percentage of populations participating in categories of 'free time' activity, men and women aged 20–74, 2000, in 'old' EU member states

	Belgium		Germany		Spain		France		Italy		Finland		Sweden		UK		Norway	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
TV & Video	85	84	80	76	83	81	76	81	77	86	86	83	81	87	86	84	84	82
Socialising	49	58	67	73	50	50	48	58	57	52	66	60	76	53	66	75	88	88
Reading	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sport	23	17	29	33	41	38	28	32	25	38	37	32	33	17	13	30	31	31
Resting	55	58	28	33	30	32	16	38	41	38	41	36	42	28	37	24	24	27
Entertainment and culture	12	8	12	13	7	7	5	3	5	10	10	9	8	9	8	8	8	8
Hobbies and games	14	10	20	23	7	4	8	11	6	11	15	11	16	10	13	10	13	13
Volunteer work	10	10	13	13	6	10	11	12	3	2	4	2	5	0	5	1	1	1
Unspecified leisure	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Eurostat, 2006a.

women with respect to the percentage of their free time allocated to this activity (Table 12.4). Again, we see that women allocated a slightly greater percentage of their free time to socializing than did men, although compared with their old European Union counterparts the overall percentage is slightly lower. Women in all European Union countries spend more of their free time reading than do men (Tables 12.3 and 12.4) and the percentage of time devoted to reading for both sexes tends, overall, to be greater in the new European Union member countries. Finally, men in new European Union countries allocated a greater percentage of their free time to sport and to entertainment and culture.

Table 12.6 shows participation rates for new European Union member states. Patterns similar to those of old European Union states are revealed regarding participation rates across categories of activity and by sex. When Tables 12.5 and 12.6 are compared, it is clear that a greater proportion of the populations in new European Union member states participated in TV and video watching, and a much smaller percentage of their populations participated in socializing, sport, entertainment and culture, hobbies and games, and volunteer work, than was the case in the old European Union member states. This suggests that while TV and video watching is truly a mass cultural activity, new European Union nations present greater social exclusion in the range of leisure and consumption activities in which their populations participate.

Overall, looking at the percentage distribution of all ‘free time’ activities (Tables 12.3 and 12.4) and participation rates in those activities (Tables 12.5 and 12.6) reveal remarkable consistency in gender distinctions across old and new European nations. Differences are, on the whole, narrower in Northern ‘old’ EU member states but they do, nevertheless, persist. Men enjoy more free time in absolute terms – and they devote a greater proportion of it to activities such as sport, entertainment and culture. Women more than men participate in and tend to devote a greater proportion of what free time they have to socializing and reading. That gender differences are so consistent across nations is revealing of the continued unequal distribution of leisure and consumption in European societies regardless of socio-political or economic regimes and cultural geography.

Strong differences across countries remain. New European nations devote a greater proportion of their free time, which remember is less per day in mean hours, watching television than do old European nations. Reading represents a slightly greater proportion of free time in new European Union nations and socializing slightly less. Old European nations have far higher participation rates in all activities except TV and video, which is by far the most inclusive mass consumption activity of new European Union member nations. The impression is one in which mass consumer culture is emerging in new European nations; and that the more affluent old European nations, whose populations perhaps have greater discretion over leisure activity participation, devote a larger share of their free time to relatively more expensive leisure activities (for example, eating out compared with television watching or reading) and a larger number of people participate in a greater range of leisure and consumption pursuits.

12.4.1 Change Over Time of the Allocation of Minutes to Leisure Activities: UK, France, Norway and the Netherlands

Table 12.7 employs data from the Multi-National Time Use Survey (MTUS) to compare change in the allocation of time to leisure activities since the 1970s for four European

Table 12.6 Percentage of populations participating in categories of 'free time' activity, men and women aged 20–74, 2000, in 'new' EU member states

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania		Hungary		Poland		Slovenia	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
TV & Video	86	86	85	83	96	96	87	88	91	90	87	90
Socialising	n/a	n/a	39	47	63	67	49	45	60	64	61	64
Reading	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sport	n/a	n/a	25	24	33	30	16	11	26	22	33	31
Resting	32	29	35	33	33	34	28	23	28	25	51	45
Entertainment and culture	6	5	3	4	4	6	4	5	3	3	7	5
Hobbies and games	7	6	5	5	7	4	8	6	8	9	7	7
Volunteer work	12	12	7	8	6	6	6	5	12	12	8	6
Unspecified leisure	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Eurostat, 2006a.

Table 12.7 Mean minutes allocated to, and rates of participation (in brackets) in, selected leisure activities in France, Netherlands, Norway and the UK, 1970s to 2000, respondents aged 20–59

	France		Netherlands		Norway		UK	
	1998	Change since 1974	1995	Change since 1975	2000	Change since 1971	2000	Change since 1975
Gardening	9 (10%)	1 (-1%)	7 (34%)	0 (4%)	11 (17%)	-10 (-6)	17 (37%)	9 (11%)
Shopping	31 (40%)	5 (-12%)	27 (93%)	0 (1%)	18 (50%)	3 (15%)	27 (66%)	3 (-4%)
Eating at home	96 (98%)	1 (-1%)	66 (99%)	-10 (0%)	50 (93%)	-30 (-5%)	54 (97%)	-25 (-2%)
Leisure travel	n/a	n/a	27 (90%)	4 (3%)	32 (46%)	7 (8%)	31 (73%)	16 (18%)
Excursions	n/a	n/a	3 (19%)	1 (9%)	7 (9%)	-3 (1%)	6 (11%)	-2 (-6%)
Playing sport	15 (15%)	9 (9%)	17 (56%)	3 (7%)	7 (8%)	1 (2%)	11 (18%)	6 (6%)
Cinema/theatre	4 (3%)	0 (0%)	2 (11%)	0 (-1%)	2 (2%)	-2 (-1%)	2 (4%)	0 (-2%)
Socialising*:	58	2	90	-6	98	-3	62	-13
Social clubs	6 (4%)	2 (0%)	25	16 (8%)	20	-1 (6%)	9 (20%)	-15 (-25%)
Eat and drink out	30 (27%)	15 (4%)	5 (39%)	1 (21%)	14 (17%)	6 (5%)	25 (43%)	14 (11%)
Visiting others	16 (15%)	-7 (-10%)	41 (84%)	-7 (-4%)	34 (27%)	-3 (1%)	21 (43%)	-9 (-17%)
Entertaining	6 (7%)	-8 (-10%)	19 (62%)	-6 (-12%)	30 (36%)	-5 (10%)	7 (24%)	-3 (-10%)
TV, video	110 (74%)	32 (6%)	97 (96%)	14 (2%)	107 (83%)	48 (23%)	129 (95%)	7 (3%)
Reading:	19	-5	37	-15	32	4	19	2
Books	15 (22%)	5 (7%)	11 (40%)	0 (-9%)	8 (14%)	3 (5%)	5 (14%)	3 (3%)
Magazines & newspapers	4 (10%)	-10 (-23%)	26 (86%)	-11 (-10%)	24 (54%)	1 (-1%)	14 (47%)	-1 (-13%)
Hobbies	18 (16%)	-13 (-15%)	39 (91%)	-6 (0%)	13 (15%)	5 (4%)	17 (30%)	9 (9%)

Source: Multi National Time Use Survey, 2005.

* Includes social clubs, eating and drinking away from home, entertaining and visiting (which provides some consistency with the Eurostat data presented in Tables 12.5 and 12.8).

countries.⁸ We take these countries simply because of the limited availability of data necessary for this level of detailed analysis. The table shows the mean minutes allocated to each activity for the survey population and how that mean has changed since the 1970s. The figures recorded in brackets are the rates of participation in each activity. Taking each activity in turn demonstrates that there is no clear tendency towards either diversification or homogenization of the mean time and participation rates of leisure and consumption practices across the four countries.

Some practices represent similar trends across the countries. There are increases of mean minutes allocated to leisure travel, playing sport, and eating and drinking out across all countries and an increase of the number of people who engaged in these activities on the days of survey. Increased time spent in leisure travel is consistent with rising expenditure shares on travel, while the popularity of playing sport is, perhaps, testament to concerns regarding health and fitness in advanced capitalist societies (Featherstone, 1991; Savage, 1995; Sturgis and Jackson, 2004). All countries have witnessed an increase in the amount of time and number of participants watching television and video. However, even in these cases it is important to look more closely at the numbers. Norwegians spend much less time playing sport and fewer participate when compared with the other countries, while eating and drinking out is much less popular in the Netherlands and Norway than in France and the UK. Even television and video watching reveals national variations: the Dutch spend over half an hour a day less than the UK population in this activity, despite the difference between the two countries narrowing between the 1970s and 1990s. Norway has seen the greatest TV watching boom, yet together with France has comparatively small participation rates by contrast with those of the UK and Netherlands.

Other national distinctions in the distribution of time across leisure activities are clear. The UK has seen something of a mini-boom in gardening with more people participating in this activity and the mean minutes allocated to it rising by 9. By contrast, gardening has changed little in France and the Netherlands and significantly declined in popularity in Norway. The amount of time spent shopping remains relatively stable across the countries, but fewer participate in France and the UK at the end of twentieth century than did in the 1970s. Cinema and theatre has changed little over the period in all countries and remains most popular in France.

The MTUS data allow for the disintegration of Eurostat's socialising category into its component parts (see Table 12.7). Only in France have mean minutes spent socialising increased. When looking at the collapsed activities we see a clearer trend. In all countries less time is spent visiting and entertaining others and in France, Netherlands and the UK less people participate; in Norway more people spend less time in this activity. In France and the Netherlands there has been an increase of time and participants who socialize in social clubs (which exclude public houses, which are classified as eating and drinking out). Perhaps the association between Northern European nations and in-home leisure is weakening – although unfortunately we do not yet have comparable data for Southern European nations. There are also no clear trends or similarities regarding practices of reading or hobbies.

The picture painted is one in which, since the 1970s, leisure travel, playing sport, eating and drinking out, and watching television and videos have become more popular pastimes

⁸The MTUS data used here contain adults aged 20–59 only. This is a consequence of the process of harmonising the data sets. New harmonised data are available that includes all adults aged 16 and over. This is important for analysing the leisure and consumption practices of Europe's ageing population.

in the four European countries studied. However, variations across populations remain. It does appear that forms of socializing are changing in the four countries, with entertaining and visiting others (an activity likely to involve consumption of food and drink) in decline and eating and drinking out (the commercial provision of food and drink) increasing. Yet despite these apparent trends there are many national variations in the amount of time allocated to activities. Eating at home remains important in France, a country in which culinary tradition remains important to national identity (Ferguson, 1998). By contrast, eating out seems a relatively less treasured activity in Norway. And, gardening, shopping, reading and hobbies have become more diverse across the four countries with respect to the amount of time devoted to their conduct and number of participants.

12.5 Europe: Media, Cultural Activities and Tourism

Expenditure and time diary data are essential for providing a broad picture of the variations, similarities and trajectories of leisure and consumption across Europe. However, they offer few insights into the ‘content’ of those consumption activities. This section explores in more detail media (music, TV, films), cultural activities and tourism. Using a variety of data sources permit more detailed analysis of changing patterns of consumption across European societies.

12.5.1 Europe: Listening to Music, Watching TV Programs and Films

Watching TV and listening to music – music is often listened to and watched while engaging in other activities simultaneously, like driving a car or domestic work – are among the most popular leisure activities in which almost every European participates on a daily basis. In most countries about 40% of the population watch TV during the ‘prime time’ interval between 8 and 10 in the evenings (Television 2004, IP-Deutschland, 25). To explore the content of this consumption activity we pay attention both to unifying and separating features across countries or areas and geographical regions and the role of domestic and international (often US origin) popular culture in these countries. Again we have to restrict ourselves to the data which are available and which allows at least for some kinds of comparisons among the countries.

If we look at the most popular TV programs, film movies and series in some major European countries we can see that football is strongly presented in many countries and is probably the spectator sport which most effectively unites Europeans of different nationalities – although the most popular matches shown on TV vary from one country to another (see Television 2006, International Key Facts). However, in Italy, for instance, Formula 1 competes with football in its popularity, and ski jumping is the most popular genre of sport among TV spectators in Poland. Somewhat surprisingly, only one televised football game reached the top 20 programs list in the UK in 2005 (although this could be a consequence of much TV football coverage being pay-per-view). In the UK two well-known British TV series, *Coronation Street* and *Eastenders*, topped the list. It should, however, be remembered that this can depend on the different national agreements on the rights to broadcast (or not to broadcast) important football games on national TV channels. Some international ‘mega-events’ reached these lists too, but were not necessarily the same events in all the European countries. The funeral of Pope John Paul II was recognised by the TV audience

as an extremely important event in Poland and Italy but not, for instance, in France, Spain, UK or Germany.

The most popular TV series, on the other hand, are very national in almost all 'bigger' European countries. Together with daily news, weather forecasts and other daily commentaries they are the core of every European nations' own, essentially national, TV culture. In Germany the top 10 series list is totally German with *Tatort* and *Um Himmels Willen* topping the list; in France totally French with *Dolmen* and *Julie Lescaut* topping the list; and, in Italy Italian, *Il commissario Montalbano* and *Il Maresciallo Rocca V* at the top in 2005. Even in the Netherlands, Poland and the UK domestic series are very popular even if they do not dominate to the extent that they do in Germany, France and Italy. Whereas crime strongly dominates among German TV series, and is also prominent on Italian TV, in Poland crime programmes are totally absent among the most popular series. The British prefer daily soaps and reality shows, and in Spain the two most popular series are comedies.

The top ten film movies shown on the national TV broadcasts in these seven bigger European countries were either of domestic production (often also co-productions with some other country) or of US/North American origin. Some German or French films appeared on the lists even in other European countries. Some single films, most notably *Bridget Jones' Diary*, *Ocean's Eleven*, *Spider Man*, and *Harry Potter* – admittedly with different parts of this series in different countries – could be found among the most popular films in three or more of these countries and again reveals the existence of a common element of an 'European' popular culture.

The share of domestic vs. international in the repertoire of musical recordings sold in Europe differs greatly from country to country. In some countries, only a small part of all music sold is domestic by origin, in 2004 most notably in Austria (7%), Belgium (20%), Ireland (25%), Netherlands (19%) and Switzerland (18%). With the exception of the Netherlands, the populations of all these countries share a common language or languages, and at least in some cases a common cultural heritage with their larger neighbours, and it can be assumed that the music with 'international origins' comes to a great extent from these close neighbouring cultures. In other countries the share of domestic music varies between 30 and 70% of the total market, with countries like Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, Romania, and UK having the greatest proportion of 'domestic' music with shares between 51 and 77% (*The Recording Industry in Numbers 2005*: 141).

Despite these clear differences in the origins of the music sold in Europe, a few popular singers and artists appear at the top ten lists in several European countries representing what might be characterised as a shared European cultural experience. In 2004 Robbie Williams, Norah Jones and Anastacia, or at least two of them, were in the ten top album lists of several European countries with the notable exceptions of France, Greece, Portugal, Finland (only Robbie Williams appeared in the list in Finland), Spain (only Anastacia) and Sweden (only Norah Jones). Other than, this the musical scene of France, Finland and Greece was otherwise quite domestic (*The Recording Industry in Numbers 2005*). One should remember that the sales figures tell only part of the truth of the similarities and differences in national musical preferences and practices. Almost everyone has daily access to music on the radio, tape recorder or TV, and, increasingly, by downloading it from the internet.

Not surprisingly, a few musical genres, most notably Pop, 'Schlager' and rock music dominate the European market (Table 12.8). There are, however, some interesting national peculiarities. Rock and, in particular heavy metal, is more popular in the UK than in other

Table 12.8 Sales by musical genre in eight European countries in 2004

	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Hungary	Latvia	Netherlands	Poland	UK
POP/MOR	50	45	38	35	35	49	25	38
Rock/Metal	11	28	19	15	18	16	15	30
Country/Traditional	9	–	1	1	22	1	–	2
R&B/Urban	–	9	–	1	5	4	5	9
RAP/Hip Hop	1	3	–	3	5	3	17	7
Soundrack	2	1	2	3	1	3	–	–
Dance	2	3	6	6	5	3	8	7
Children’s	3	3	6	3	1	–	1	–
Jazz/Blues	3	5	2	2	2	5	8	3
Classical	12	1	8	4	2	6	9	3
Other	7	2	18	27	4	10	12	1

Source: The Recording Industry in Numbers 2005. IFPI, London 2005.

countries, classical music is popular in Austria, Germany and Poland but even in these countries its share of the sales is rather modest (about 10%). Jazz is liked by the Poles but what really distinguishes Poland is, above all, the popularity of Rap and Hip Hop music (17%).

The influence of North American culture on European spectators would seem to be strongest in films shown in European movie theatres. In all the 18 European countries of which the European Cinema Yearbook has statistics, US-produced films dominate (counted in market shares), particularly in Germany, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal. The share of domestic movies is quite high in some countries: Denmark with a market share of 39%; Finland (37%); and the UK (30%) in 2005. In Denmark and UK these numbers had increased during the 10 years, whereas in Finland their share has been equally high for a longer time until 2005 (European Cinema Yearbook 2006: 130, 136). During the last years the share of domestic production has, however declined in these three countries (Institut für deutsche Wirtschaft 2008: Archiv 1. Quartet, nr 8). It should also be noted that the annual number of visits to movie theatres declined sharply in the European countries in the 1960s and 1970s due to the quick spread of TV sets to individual households. It has, however, stabilised since then to about two annual visits per person and has even shown some signs of recovery under the most recent years.

The overall picture of the consumption of popular culture in Europe, in the light of these data, in many ways confirm the conclusions drawn on the basis of more general expenditure and time use data. Despite the fact that there are clearly unifying features in the form of popular international cultural products (often of North American origins) and globally televised major sporting events, European countries have, to varying degrees, their own specificities and popular national cultural products (such as TV programs, popular music and even films). This persistence of national variation, especially when taken together with the preservation of national TV channels and series, is even more remarkable given that many Europeans have, in principle, access to many more international TV channels than was the case even a decade ago (due to cable and satellite TV).

It would seem that some European countries are more dependent on cultural imports than others. This is true in particular of those European countries which share a language or a culture with their larger neighbours. The popular culture in some smaller Western and Northern European countries can be, on the contrary, quite domestic. Similarly, in many East European countries domestic productions dominate the market of popular culture.

This is probably a result of the long period of relative cultural isolation connected with the present-day low standards of living which make both (legal) cultural exports and audio-visual equipment expensive and rare. Whereas, for instance, CD players and Video/DVD players have effectively and quite rapidly penetrated Western European households, they are still quite rare in Eastern European countries. The same is true of other, more recent technological innovations. To take an example: the share of individuals who had used the internet in the last 3 months in 2005 was well over 60 (and in some countries over 70%) in Norway, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, and UK, but only just above 30% in Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Italy, and Cyprus. In Greece only one in every fifth adult had used the internet during the last 3 months (Eurostat: Individuals Internet Use 2006). Great hopes, as well as fears, are often directed to the future potentials of the internet in distributing both information and entertainment, as well as connecting people. What forms it will take in the future and what kind of an impact this will have in the long run on national cultures in different parts of Europe remains to be seen.

12.5.2 Cultural Activities of European People

Even though cultural activities, and in particular high-brow or 'elite' cultural institutions have always enjoyed a privileged position in the cultural policy of the European states, and are therefore better documented than many other areas of social life, systematic comparative studies of cultural activities across European states are scant. Reliable data which allow for general insights into the development of cultural activities over time in several European countries can be found. For example, the highly educated tend to actively participate in cultural activities, particularly the fine arts, in all countries on which we have data. This is hardly surprising since learning to know and to appreciate cultural products and performances has traditionally been, and despite some important changes in recent decades still is, an important part of the curriculum at European schools and institutes of higher education. As Pierre Bourdieu (1984) would express it: education is an important part of the cultural capital of the higher social class. Empirical studies of European cultural participation have, however, discovered some more surprising general features and changes.

In many European countries, both old and new members of the EU, most people do not take part in cultural activities such as theatre, concerts, sports events or visiting museums (Eurobarometer 2001 and 2003). Only 14% of the adult population (aged over 15) in France, 18% in Belgium and 9% in Portugal had visited a theatre in 2001. The figures (either 2001 or 2003) for concerts and sports events were slightly higher: France 22 and 20%, respectively; Belgium 21 and 28%; Portugal 20 and 31%; Sweden 44 and 50%; Finland 39 and 44%; and, UK 40 and 34%. The Czech Republic (40%) and Estonia (41%) distinguished themselves with their high rates of theatre visits. These same countries place themselves high also in visiting concerts as do Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia (participation rates in all between 35 and 45%).⁹ Ireland, Slovenia and Sweden were the leading countries as far as participation in sports events was concerned (about 50%). Museum visits followed more or less the same pattern with some exceptions. Sweden was

⁹In contrast to the participation rates recorded by time diary surveys (Tables 12.6 and 12.7) the data here show whether survey respondents had visited, or engaged in, specified cultural activities in the last year. Time diary surveys reveal participation rates on the days of survey.

the only country placed clearly among the top nations along all measures of cultural participation, followed closely by Denmark, UK, Finland, the Netherlands and, from the new member countries, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Czech Republic. This list consists predominantly of countries from North-Western Europe and previous socialist countries, in all of which cultural institutions have been quite strongly – at least up to quite recent times – financially supported by the state.

What these data tend not to reveal are the cultural preferences of the less educated. A recent study in the UK discovered a relatively large group of culturally disengaged people, comprising characteristically of manual male workers with a low education, who have very few cultural attachments. They watch TV over 5 hours on weekdays, prefer soap operas and horror movies, and especially dislike the cultural items with which the established middle class identify, such as going to opera, dining at a French restaurant or watching a current affairs programme on TV (Gayo-Cal et al. 2006: 229).

Other socio-demographic differences are amenable from the data. First, women are in many European countries overrepresented among the participators in high-brow culture. Second, in some countries there is a clear difference between older and younger generations or age cohorts in the cultural profiles of the better educated groups. Third, the cultural profile of the relatively small higher educated social groups are no longer (or not only) characterised by exclusivity or ‘snobbishness’ in relation to other social groups but has become more all-encompassing. This result was first discovered by Peterson in the musical preferences of North Americans’ during the 1980s, a characteristic described as cultural omnivorousness (Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson, 1993; Peterson and Kern, 1996). Fourth, a remarkable proportion of the populations in all European countries have very little participation in fine arts.

The measures of high-brow vs. middle-brow or low-brow cultural participation vary from one study to another and across countries. This makes overall comparisons problematic. As a rule, attending to opera, classical music concerts, ballet and/or other dance performances, visiting museums, art galleries or exhibitions are counted as fine arts in most studies. By contrast, attending pop, rock or folk music concerts or performances of traditional music, attending to arts and crafts exhibitions and viewing cinema movies are typically classified as middle or low-brow activities. Jazz and blues concerts and music have an interesting position in the cultural hierarchies since they have clearly been transformed into an important part of the fine arts over last decades in many European countries.

The empirical results in many European countries show that well-educated women engage in fine arts more than their male counterparts and they seem to have increasingly become the bearers of legitimate high-brow culture. This is shown by Katz-Gerro’s (2002) study of Italy, Israel, West Germany, Sweden and the United States. This result could be interpreted in two ways. Either educated women increasingly become the prime bearers of legitimate or ‘high’ culture – in other words, they have become or are on their way to becoming a new cultural elite – or the social status of these traditional high-brow cultural activities have declined. As a consequence, men have increasingly taken to other, new and higher valued activities. If this second explanation is reasonable it would mean that traditional high culture has lost, or is currently losing, its position as a marker of higher social status. If this were the case, what exactly the new alternatives to high culture favoured by men would be is not clear. One possible candidate would be the various forms of activities associated with new electronic home technology like PCs and the internet, the use of which is more readily associated with men (see for instance, Katz-Gerro and Sullivan, 2006).

Lizardo's (2006) elaborate study of men and women's cultural participation in the USA showed that the difference was in the favour of women mainly among those groups occupied in technical or commercial professions; that is, in the fields of economic activity where women's share in the labour force and professional education has traditionally been quite low. Well-educated men and women employed in the cultural sectors did not show any difference in this respect. The differences could, in other words, be explained by the different roles or relative positions of men and women in these occupations. So far we do not know whether this result holds only for the USA. A recent British survey about cultural distinctions would not seem to give empirical support to any similar conclusions in UK (Gayo-Cal et al., 2006).

Many signs point towards a rather clear transformation in the cultural orientation of the younger European generations who went to school in the 1960s or later and were born after the war, compared to older age cohorts. Vander Stichele and Laermans (2006) discovered that in Flanders the well-educated younger age cohorts, those who are under 45, combined a taste for so-called low and high culture ('the arts' and 'the popular') whereas the older cohorts were more exclusive in their cultural orientations. Similarly, Van Eijck (2006) found that in the Netherlands, during the period of 1983 to 1999, older generations had increased their participation in traditional culture, whereas younger generations increasingly focused on popular culture. The authors explain these new tendencies, indirectly supported by Schulze's (1992) findings in his study on the cultural scene in Nuremberg Germany in the 1980s, by the changing historical conditions of socialization and, in particular, by the increasing impact of the leisure industry and booming popular mass media. They also point to the democratisation of the educational system with the consequent decline of the classical ideals of 'Bildung' which used to dominate European education until the 1960s 'cultural revolution'. Similar findings are available from the UK. A recent comprehensive survey about UK cultural distinctions found a clear division between the cultural likes and dislikes of the older and younger generations of the relatively well-educated middle class. Whereas older middle class persons were more likely to show preferences for the established culture, like going to opera and French restaurants, they also occasionally went to a rock concert. The younger educated middle class had, on the contrary, a taste for rock music, heavy metal and science fiction. This is particularly true of men, whereas women are more likely to read, for instance, modern novels (Gayo-Cal et al., 2006: 226).

These results can be compared with the USA where DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004) detected a general decline among all age, educational and gender groups in the rates of attendance at all live cultural performances, both high (e.g. concerts and dance performances) and middle-brow (e.g. arts and crafts fairs). They explained these changes with greater competition from at-home entertainment options as well as changes in population composition and family structure.

According to several studies, the younger age cohorts seem, in fact, to have become increasingly all-encompassing in their cultural engagement. The trend towards cultural 'omnivorousness', originally discovered in the music world in the USA, would thus seem to be mostly a matter of a shift in the cultural orientation between older and younger generations. Whether the younger age groups who are more inclusive in their taste will preserve their orientation and preference to popular culture when they get older remains to be seen. This conclusion elaborates further the results of other studies that reveal, in addition to a group with an exclusive engagement in high-brow culture, well-educated social groups are more inclusive in their orientation toward combining activities that have traditionally

been identified as high and low-brow culture (Sintas and Álvarez 2002; Van Eijck 1999; Van Eijck 2001; Van Eijck and Knulst 2005; Van Rees et al, 1999). Even though many studies have identified such omnivorous groups, the results have otherwise been rather many faceted in terms of the exact identity of these groups and the exact nature of their involvement in culture. It also remains unclear as to whether their numbers are increasing, and in the USA (where cultural omnivores were originally ‘discovered’) the number of people with omnivorous cultural tastes appears to be declining. In sum, changes in the cultural orientations of some social groups in Europe are obviously taking place, but so far the evidence is far too scattered and unsystematic to allow for general and final conclusions about more permanent and comprehensive cultural change in the social divisions of cultural activities across European societies.

12.5.3 Tourism

The final set of leisure and consumption practices that we explore in detail is tourism. As a global industry tourism is one practice where we would expect to find some clear cross-national trends of similarity, especially in those European countries where personal affluence is widespread. In 2004, European tourists made, on average, at least two holidays of 4 nights or more (Eurostat, 2006b). However, this is largely a consequence of the more extensive tourism of the European nations with the largest populations – France (2.7 trips), Germany (2.3 trips) and the UK (2.2 trips). The countries with the least number of trips per person were the smaller nations of Estonia, Slovakia, Greece and Ireland with 1.1 trips, Hungary with 1.3 trips and Lithuania with 1.5 trips.

Northern European countries had the highest per capita expenditure on tourism in 2000 (WTO, 2002). Iceland (\$1,661 per capita), Austria and Belgium (\$1,146 per capita), Norway, Denmark and Sweden (between \$991 and 906 per capita) spent the most on travel; Belarus (\$13 per capita) and Romania (\$19 per capita) the least. Interestingly, the three European countries with the highest number of trips lasting at least 4 nights do not represent the highest per capita expenditure in 2000 – UK (\$607), Germany (\$582) and France (\$290). Those with the lowest number of trips over 4 nights per person also did not represent the countries with lowest expenditure per capita in 2000 – Ireland (\$778), Greece (\$430), Slovakia (\$232), Estonia (\$149), Hungary (\$109) and Lithuania (\$68). This discrepancy between expenditure per capita and number of trips of over 4 nights per person can be explained by exploring the destinations of travel. Table 12.9 shows the proportion of holiday trips over 4 nights for domestic and outbound destinations. Across Europe 57% of trips occur within country. Of the 43% of trips abroad, 66% are within EU countries. Strikingly, Southern Europeans disproportionately holiday in their domestic country. In France 88.1% of trips over 4 nights were taken domestically, which presumably accounts for the relatively low per capita expenditure. Those countries with a high proportion of ‘outbound’ destinations corresponded with those countries with a high per capita expenditure on travel. For example, 77 % of Belgian, 78% of Irish, 72.1% of UK and 64% of German holiday trips were outbound.

Taking the countries identified above, Table 12.10 indicates the most popular holiday destination for trips of 4 nights or more. With the exception of Belgium, Spain is the most popular destination for North-Western Europeans, although that popularity decreased marginally between 2000 and 2005. Of the countries with a low number of trips of 4 nights or more there is greater variation in destinations. Ireland follows the destination pattern

Table 12.9 Holiday trips of 4 nights or more by destination, 2004 (%)

	Trips by destination			
	Domestic Total	Outbound		
		Total	of which in the EU-25	of which outside the EU-25
EU-25 ¹	56.9	43.1	65.9	34.1
EU-15	55.7	44.3	66.6	33.4
BE	21.2	78.8	77.1	22.9
CZ	57.9	42.1	55.6	44.4
DK	30.9	69.1	72.3	27.7
DE	36.0	64.0	67.8	32.2
EE	50.7	49.3	–	–
EL	90.2	9.8	46.9	53.1
ES	88.1	11.9	59.1	40.9
FR	82.9	17.1	47.6	52.4
IE	27.4	72.6	78.0	22.0
IT	75.1	24.9	54.1	45.9
CY	–	–	68.7	31.3
LV	41.8	51.5	41.0	59.0
LT	38.9	61.1	43.2	56.8
LU	0.7	99.3	82.1	17.9
HU	72.8	27.2	–	–
MT	–	–	–	–
NL	37.7	62.3	76.0	24.0
AT	35.3	64.7	59.2	40.8
PL ²	81.8	18.2	71.9	28.1
PT	77.4	22.6	67.1	32.9
SI	27.0	73.0	14.1	85.9
SK	56.6	43.4	53.8	46.2
FI	69.5	30.5	58.9	41.1
SE	52.5	47.5	65.6	34.4
UK	41.4	58.6	72.1	27.9

1) EU-25 excluding CY (only for domestic and total outbound) and MT; EE and HU only for geographical breakdown.

2) Estimate.

Note: 2003 data for EL and LV.

Source: Eurostat, 2006b.

Country abbreviations (applies also to Tables 12.10 and 12.11): BE – Belgium; CZ – Czech Republic; DK – Denmark; DE – Germany; EE – Estonia; EL – Greece; ES – Spain; FR – France; IE – Ireland; IT – Italy; CY – Cyprus; LV – Latvia; LT – Lithuania; LU – Luxembourg; HU – Hungary; MT – Malta; NL – Netherlands; AT – Austria; PL – Poland; PT – Portugal; SI – Slovenia; SK – Slovakia; FI – Finland; SE – Sweden; UK – United Kingdom.

of other North-Western countries. The other countries tended to favour destinations in neighbouring countries, a pattern followed by all Eastern and Southern European countries.

Given the number of 4 night or more trips and the patterns of destination described above, mode of transport taken for the purpose of travel is relatively predictable. Table 12.11 shows that the most common mode of transport for all EU countries was private car (57.5%), followed by air travel (25.2%), rail (8.1%), coach (7.6%) and waterway (1.6%). However, there are significant variations across countries. Perhaps partly because they are islands, Ireland and the UK had the highest percentage of air travel at 65.9 and

Table 12.10 Holiday trips abroad of +4 nights by main destination for selected countries

	Belgium	France	Germany	UK	Estonia	Greece	Ireland	Hungary	Lithuania	Slovakia
2000	Fr 33%	Es 17%	Es 19%	Es 32%	–	De 12%	Es 35%	–	–	–
2003	Fr 31%	Es 17%	It 16%	Es 34%	Fl 64%	It 13%	Es 32%	–	–	Sk 12%
2004	Fr 31%	Es 15%	Es 15%	Es 32%	Fl 62%	It 11%	Es 32%	–	De 16%	Cz 11%
2005	Fr 31%	–	Es 16%	–	Fl 55%	–	Es 28%	De 15%	De 14%	Cz 11%

Source: Eurostat 2006b.

50.8%, respectively, while Greece had the highest percentage of travel by waterway at 21.9%. Generally, those countries with a relatively high percentage of trips abroad had a higher percentage of air travel, meaning that France and Southern European countries had above average percentages for private car and rail transport. The Eastern European countries which had a relatively high percentage for domestic trips and, when travelling abroad, tended to visit neighbouring countries, had the highest percentage for using rail and coaches as a mode of transport. Finally, Estonia had a relatively high rate of waterway transport, presumably because of its close proximity to Finland – the most popular foreign destination of Estonian tourists by some margin (see Tables 12.10 and 12.11).

Table 12.11 Break down of trips by mode of transport, 2004 (%)

	Private vehicle	Air	Rail	Coach	Water way
EU-25 ¹	57.5	25.2	8.1	7.6	1.6
EU-15 ²	57.3	27.0	7.5	6.4	1.7
BE	57.8	29.8	4.8	6.4	1.2
CZ	59.7	10.7	9.1	19.9	0.5
DK	43.3	39.0	6.6	8.7	2.3
DE	53.5	28.6	7.5	10.4	u:
EE	37.1	19.2	–	36.0	7.7
EL	55.8	8.4	1.8	13.0	21.1
ES	71.1	14.7	4.3	8.0	1.8
FR	72.5	12.1	12.3	2.4	0.6
IE	25.4	65.9	2.3	1.8	4.6
IT ³	60.9	19.0	9.3	5.0	5.8
CY	–	–	–	–	–
LV	42.6	16.4	17.0	20.0	4.0
LT	48.8	13.5	18.9	13.5	5.3
LU	52.1	37.5	4.5	4.5	1.3
HU	64.0	5.2	15.0	15.6	0.2
MT	–	–	–	–	–
NL	67.3	23.5	3.4	4.4	1.4
AT	55.4	30.5	6.5	7.0	0.7
PL ⁴	58.4	3.5	18.7	19.4	–
PT	64.6	21.5	2.8	9.1	1.9
SI	82.1	8.8	2.1	5.5	1.5
SK	47.9	14.7	11.0	26.3	0.1
FI	55.6	24.5	9.0	5.7	5.3
SE	52.0	34.5	4.2	5.8	3.5
UK	37.3	50.8	5.0	5.2	1.7

1) EU-25 excluding CY and MT; DE and PL for Waterway and EE for Rail.

2) EU-15 excluding DE for Waterway. 3) Provisional. 4) Estimate.

Note: 2003 data for EL, EE estimated (Air and Waterway only) and LV.

Source: Eurostat, 2006b.

Data (Eurostat, 2006b) on the accommodation type favoured by travellers reveal that EU members stay mostly in private accommodation (58.5%) rather than hotels (28.1%) and other collective establishments such as camp sites (13.4%). Interestingly, southern Europeans preferred private accommodation at a proportionately much higher rate than other Europeans (e.g. 86.2% of Greek and 77.5% of Portuguese nights during trips were spent in private accommodation). It is important to note that private accommodation includes second homes and staying at the homes of other people. In some countries, such as Scandinavian countries, it is likely that this figure is high because of privately owned second homes, whereas in Southern European countries, with traditions of holidaying at the homes of family and friends, the figure is likely to be high for different reasons. Belgian, Danish, German, Luxembourgian, Slovakian, Swedish and British travellers have the highest percentages for staying in hotels, while the Danish, French, Dutch and Slovakian have the highest percentage for 'other collective' establishments (which predominantly consist of campsites). Overall, it appears that national traditions for the type of accommodation and cultural conventions of holidaying (e.g. second homes, a family break abroad, camping, and visiting friends and families) continue to differentiate tourism patterns.

One final means of differentiating between tourist activities is to explore the extent to which different nationalities organize their trips independently or through a travel operator (Eurostat, 2006b). In 2004, 23.7% of trips were booked through travel agents, leaving over three-quarters of trips of 4 nights or more being organized independently. Speculatively, the growth of the internet may have played an important role in the number of trips organized independently, although there is no available data to support such a claim. That said, there is no clear correlation between countries with high rates of internet access and low levels of use of travel agents. For example, the largest use of travel operators was in Sweden (50.3%) and the Netherlands (35.3%) who have high rates of internet use, and the lowest in Greece (5.5%) and Poland (6.5%) – countries with comparatively low rates of internet use. On average, across EU member states, of all trips booked through a travel operator 69.4% were package holidays. In Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden over 80% of trips organized through a travel operator were package holidays compared with less than 50% in Greece, Spain, Luxemburg, Austria, and Portugal. Again, there is no clear pattern across regions of Europe whether based on geography, affluence, political region or the extent to which trips were domestic or foreign. The indication is that national cultural and institutional variations remain significant in the field of tourism despite the globalised scale of the industry.

12.6 Conclusions

The opening questions of this chapter focused on the distinction between homogenisation or diversification of leisure and consumption in European societies. Homogenisation suggests similarity of trajectory regarding trends and patterns in leisure and consumption as a consequence of global capitalism and the economic and cultural uniformity it espouses. Diversification, on the other hand, insists that trajectories of socio-cultural change are as much entrenched in national institutional arrangements as they are at the whim of global capitalism.

In some respects, the European societies were probably more homogenous in the past (e.g. 100 years ago), although earlier common features were limited to only some, and often higher, echelons of the societies. The highly educated Europeans were likely to have

read the same books, discussed the same topics and could often even communicate with others in a common language. Paris, as the centre of *haute couture* and *haute cuisine*, had, for instance, more to say on how the European elites dressed themselves and what they ate and drank in the 1950s than they did in 2000. That said, contemporary European societies reveal many groups of people that show greater resemblance to their like-minded counterparts in other countries than they do to their compatriots when it comes to leisure and consumption activities. Many youth cultures, with their own styles and consumption habits, have penetrated European societies. Similarly, one can find golfers and sailors as well as art lovers or movie ‘freaks’ with similar likes and dislikes as well as their own particular consumption practices in all European countries. Presumably their size, visibility and potential impact on the society at large vary greatly from one group to another, from one country to another.

At the most general level, analysis of the data on leisure and consumption practices demonstrates broad trends that point towards a degree of homogeneity. As shares of household expenditure on food decline, expenditure on recreation and culture increase. In economically more affluent societies much greater numbers are almost simultaneously touched both by the more permanent styles and tastes and rapidly changing fashions. They therefore appear as more consumption driven – as the bedrocks of consumer culture. Larger percentages of their populations participate in a broader range of leisure and consumption activities than is the case in less affluent societies.

This implies some commonality of cultural experience and economic and social trajectory that leads to homogenisation or convergence of cultural patterns; even if that trajectory is no more than towards greater inclusion of national populations in a range of leisure and consumption activities. This is a trajectory where south and new European Union countries are assimilated into the regimes of global capitalism and mass consumption common in Northern European nations, a consequence of which is that their overall structure of household expenditure comes to replicate those of Northern European countries. Time diary data lend some support to this assertion. Old European nations present a greater range of leisure activities in which large numbers of their (affluent) populations participate when compared with new European nations, where television remains, for the time being, the principal activity to which leisure time is devoted for the majority of people.

This is a story of ‘lagged adaptation’ in which Southern and new European nations creep towards an overall structure of household expenditure and time allocation to leisure and consumption similar to that of Northern European states. It suggests geo-cultural lines of demarcation along north – south, new – old European Union member states that are a consequence of the maturity of a particular form of economic and political organisation of those societies. Gender distinctions fit this schema – the Northern European societies being more equitable in the overall amount of free time available to the sexes; but fundamental gender distinctions in the kinds of activities in which men and women participate remain.

This is a neat conclusion – similar to that reached by many others (e.g. Gershuny, 2000). But it is a cursory and partial conclusion. At a deeper glance national variations are everywhere and north – south or old – new European distinctions collapse. Considerable national differences persist regarding household expenditure that runs contrary to the above story. Household composition matters in different ways in different countries – in some single households spend more on recreation and culture but not in others – regardless of geography. Time diary data make the point rather clearly. Even among apparently homogenising trends national variations remain fundamental. Television watching, on the

rise everywhere, but everywhere different in the percentage of the population who participate and the mean minutes allocated, is a case in point. For almost every other leisure and consumption activity there are no similarities across the European countries studied with respect to the trajectory of change, the mean minutes allocated to activities or their participation rates. While general trends in media, cultural activities and tourism can be identified, national cultural variations in the detail of those leisure and consumption practices stand out from the data analysis. In other words, to deny that macro trends in leisure and consumption are shared across European societies would be to ignore important economic, cultural and political processes of globalisation. Yet to talk of cultural homogenisation denies the fundamental importance of the national institutional arrangements that make leisure and consumption orientations across European countries so diverse.

So far, the European Union's attempts to re-direct the development of the national cultures of European countries or to create common European cultural institutions or platforms have been rather modest. The on-going and forceful homogenisation of the European institutions of higher education as well as the active promotion of student exchanges across Europe are probably examples of joint policies which can, in the long run, have unifying effects even on the national cultures at large. And yet popular all-European cultural mega-events, like the Eurovision song contest which pitches European nations in a (peaceful) competition of national superiority, still largely fail to capture European imaginations. Cultural tastes are never static, but variations across Europe are such that significant diversity of leisure and consumption practices remains. It seems unlikely that current trajectories of change will lead to common European cultural tastes beyond those measured using the very broadest parameters of cultural activity.

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Chapter 13

Life Course

Heather Hofmeister

13.1 The Life Course Perspective as an Orienting Strategy

People shape the direction of their lives with every action and decision they make, but they do so within the framework of society. Society shapes possible actions and decisions in ways that are sometimes obvious — like being required to go to war — and sometimes not obvious — such as when to become a parent. Life course research brings all other kinds of social science research into a time and place dimension, doing what C. Wright Mills calls for in the sociological imagination, the linking of individual human life with the social circumstances, history, and other features of the society: “The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society. That is its task and its promise” (Mills 1959: 2).

The core question scientists pose in the area of life course research is, how does an individual construct a life within historical and social events and constraints? How does a person mix his or her specific skills, goals, chances, obstacles, and past experiences together with the influences of other people and the geographic and social place and time where he or she resides? To what degree can an individual indeed actively construct a life, or are lives constructed mostly by outside forces like institutions and policies in society, wishes and expectations and requirements of others, or historical events? I will give some suggestions to these questions from contemporary life course research.


Each human being has certain abilities, goals, interests, and skills, a set of resources called human agency. Each individual’s life is linked to others through networks of relationships to others, both chosen and inevitable. Each person every moment is situated in a particular context: this place at this time. Each person has had specific and unique past experiences. Each person ages, in tandem with historical time. These are the very things that make each human being and each life different from every other. And these are the very things of interest to life course researchers.

Life course researchers study the ways time and place shape individuals and the ways individuals also shape their times and places (Fig. 13.1). Studying the life course means investigating pathways, connections between phases of life, and circumstances over time (Moen 1995; Moen et al. 1992) with the goal of “explaining how dynamic worlds change people and how people select and construct their environments” (Elder 1995: 102).

H. Hofmeister (✉)

Institute of Sociology with the specialty Gender Studies, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
e-mail: heather.hofmeister@rwth-aachen.de

Fig. 13.1 The reciprocal influence of the individual on his or her historical time and place



This chapter is different from other chapters in this volume. Whereas other chapters focus on a discrete subject area, this chapter will describe a way of thinking about and studying many subject areas. The life course is a perspective on the way human beings live across time and place. A diverse and changing Europe situated within an ever-more connected world makes this perspective supremely valuable. In this chapter, I first describe the life course as an orienting strategy for social science research, next lay out its primary concepts and relationships, and then finally give examples of research and findings that use a life course perspective to help explain contemporary European lives.

13.1.1 The Life Course: An Orienting Strategy

I conceive of the life course as an empirical orienting strategy or perspective, although it has also been called a theory, a metatheory, and a paradigm. Orienting strategies tell us what to consider important and what to ignore, and how to handle the information we consider important (Wagner 1984). An orienting strategy provides guidelines for approaching phenomena by establishing definitions of, and relationships among, concepts. It suggests the orientation of the theorist to the phenomena. Finally, it provides conceptual schema for how to use these definitions and relationships for building hypotheses and theories (Wagner 1984).

Orienting strategies tend to be so broad as to be untestable. The components *within* the orienting strategy are testable; in fact, the value of the orienting strategy is determined by how useful the theoretical statements are that are generated from it, not by whether it is true or false in itself, and by the usefulness of the framework it provides for establishing testable hypotheses and theories. Put another way, “one does not demonstrate the empirical truth or falsity of an orienting strategy; one *employs* an orienting strategy to demonstrate the truth or falsity of other ideas” (Wagner 1984: 27). One can use an orienting strategy such as the life course to organize other theories or other orienting strategies. For example, one can take a life course orientation and apply also an ethnographic, functionalist, rational choice, or conflict theory approach to the same research. I will show examples later in the chapter.

Paradigms and orienting strategies differ in that paradigms tend to reign supreme over a discipline and are mutually exclusive to each other. For example, Newtonian physics in its day was the only way to do physics, but has been replaced by the paradigm of quantum mechanics. By contrast, orienting strategies can coexist with each other (Wagner

1984). Theories and orienting strategies differ in that a theory is meant directly to generate hypotheses to be tested and should (in principle) be able to be disproven, whereas an orienting strategy organizes the information that would go into a theory test.

Some scholars use the life course perspective to describe the social system's impact on individuals (Elder 1995). This approach puts extra emphasis on the ways structures impact the individual. Other scholars tend more heavily to embed the individual in networks of relationships that impact the individual (Giele and Elder 1998a; Hofmeister and Moen 1999). Yet another focus of life course research sees the individual as an active agent in constructing the life course (Mills and Blossfeld 2005). But all life course scholars acknowledge that all of these influences create an individual's life course. I now describe the fundamental concepts of the life course perspective: human agency, linked lives, context, and timing, giving examples of each.

13.2 Components of the Life Course Perspective

13.2.1 Human Agency

The principle of human agency as part of the life course perspective views the individual as an active agent in shaping his or her own life chances according to his or her own goals, abilities, and sense of self (Elder 1995, Giele and Elder 1998). This means that human agency – the ability of individuals to make decisions about their own lives that have impact – is expressed through both early actions and decisions that have lingering consequences as well as continuing behaviors or behaviors that change course. Examples of change include returning to or leaving school, getting married or divorced, deciding to have a child, or changing jobs (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, and Kurz 2005).

Human agency is reflected by an individual's own self-definitions and goals, a point I will illustrate by example. Some women consider themselves primary household earners, others see themselves as secondary earners, and still other women think they should *not* have a role in earning a living but should rather be supported by men's earnings or by the state. These varying attitudes have strong effects on whether or not the women themselves participate in paid labor at all and for how many hours a week (Herring and Wilsonsadberry 1993; Lück 2006). It is also true that women's experience with paid work shapes their attitudes about it (Moen et al. 1997). Women (and the men in their lives) are likely to match their opinion about their lifestyles with the reality of their situations. As an example, most part-time working women believe that breadwinning should be the primary (but not exclusive) responsibility of men, and they see women as secondary earners whose primary (but not exclusive) responsibility is homemaking, care-giving, and domestic work (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997a). People tend to match their attitudes to their actions, but their attitudes also are shaping the actions they choose to take. To use another example, the same attitudes about the proper roles of men and women influence whether people are willing to marry someone with a different level of education than they themselves have. Those who believe that men should be primary breadwinners are likely to avoid partnerships where the woman's educational or earnings level exceeds the man's, because the male breadwinner norm defines wives as secondary providers and a better-educated or higher-earning wife may out-earn her husband and be the primary provider (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Blossfeld and Timm 2003).

There are many examples of human agency's effects on life courses in contemporary Europe. Throughout Europe as well as North America, human agency plays a role in the chances of young people to get their first jobs. Those youth who have more education are at lower risk of having temporary contracts, unemployment, and staying trapped in insecure first job positions (Blossfeld et al. 2005). The European labor market has changed in the last two decades of the 20th century, especially in the experience of young people entering the labor market. In most countries with the exception of Ireland, entry to the labor market became more difficult for young people in the 1990s (Mills et al. 2005). Young people exercise their own human agency by deciding how they respond to these changes. Some choose to stay in university or advanced study longer. Others postpone having a family or a partnership until things are more settled. One consequence is a rising age at first marriage, illustrated in Figs. 13.2 and 13.3, and a parallel rising age at first birth.

The principle of human agency is expressed in this volume in, for example, the chapters on collective action, deviance and crime, education, gender, identity, labor, leisure preferences and access.




Fig. 13.2 Average age of European men at first marriage, 1990–2003, by country Eurostat, online database, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>, extraction: 25.04.2007; UNICEF: TransMONEE database 2006, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (IRC), Florence. Accessed on 18 August 2008. Missing datapoints are inferred as the average of the data on either side of the missing data.

13.2.2 *Linked Lives*

Of course, an individual does not direct his or her life without other influences. The life course perspective recognizes that an individuals' life is connected with the lives and decisions of many other people. It recognizes a two-way street of influence between the self (ego) and each "close other" (alter) in a person's life: parents and children, a spouse,




Fig. 13.3 Source: Eurostat, online database, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>, extraction: 25.04.2007; UNICEF: TransMONEE database 2006, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (IRC), Florence. Accessed on 18. August 2008. Missing datapoints are inferred as the average of the data from the years on either side of the missing year.

siblings, friends, employees, coworkers, and employers. The individual’s development is influenced by these others, and at the same time the individual also influences the others (Elder 1995). The influence is not always intentional, but it occurs because of the proximity of the lives and the social nature of human beings.

When one applies the concept of linked lives across time, one sees also that people are affected by the choices and circumstances of earlier and later generations. Decisions can be made by parents that affect their children and even their grandchildren, such as migration decisions or whether to allow or support a child to attend university. For example, much research on social capital focuses on how the life chances of young people are affected by the education levels or occupation levels of their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe 2001; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Miller and Hayes 1990; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). This research is using the concept of linked lives to hypothesize and test the predictors of overall education level. To use another example, research shows that employed wives are likely to retire from their jobs around the same time their husbands retire, even if they would prefer to keep working or are not yet eligible for retirement benefits (Hofmeister and Moen 1998; Smith and Moen 1998). Other research examines what happens to women’s employment at marriage (Blossfeld 1995; Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2006). Studies find that husbands influenced their wives employment a great deal in the past: women had a high likelihood to quit their jobs at marriage in Europe but are much less likely to do so at the end of the 20th century. In fact, today across parts of Northern Europe (as well as North America) where wives’ incomes are very important for the well-being of the family, young men increasingly prefer to marry women with a high income potential (Blossfeld and Timm 2003: 333).

Linked lives are highly relevant where children are concerned. A new parent has the choice to reduce or eliminate paid work and stay home with children, in principle, only if he or she is in a partnership with someone who is willing to support the household

financially, or lives in a country where new parents are supported with public funds, or is self-supporting. In places where finding external childcare is difficult or non-existent, parents who both have paid employment rely on grandparents for childcare, if grandparents are willing and able. The principle of linked lives is helpful for asking important questions about one of the ways lives are organized and outcomes are determined.

Initiatives of the European Union are changing the context in which lives are or become linked. I describe more about context below, but examples of the new linkages of lives are many. For one, the Bologna Process initiatives encourage students to study outside their home countries, increasing the likelihood that they will form friendships and even lifelong partnerships with people from outside their own culture or language. Another example is the European Commission's priority on job mobility across national borders. Borderless work, international operations, and developing new markets are catchy phrases that in reality mean that individuals are traveling far from home or relocating for work. If these workers are young people before establishing a family, such long-distance relocation or commuting limits their opportunities to meet people in their home country and establish or maintain long-term ties of friendship or relationships and increases their chances of making friends and partnerships in the new country. If they are workers who already have partnerships and children, long distances between the primary home and the workplace challenge those relationships and may lead to higher risks of divorce or social isolation from the family. On the other hand, the social isolation of an unemployed person may be much higher – and have more serious health consequences – than the social isolation resulting from long-distance commuting. Gainful employment brings economic security as well as work-related network ties and workplace camaraderie, two aspects of linked lives that improve life quality. In any event, the EU priority of integrating Europe by dissolving borders through increasing trade, work, and educational exchanges will change the linkages of lives. To what specific degree is the subject of current and future research (Schneider and Meil 2008).

The changes in Europe that reduce the importance of national borders also include new opportunities to link lives in new ways, some of which result from or have consequences for social inequalities. As described in several places in this chapter, women in all European countries in the 21st century are more likely to work for pay than they did in the 20th century, and men's employment rates remain high. Yet the caregiving needs of children and elderly family members remain. In the absence of state-run child care and elder care or an affordable formal market option for these services, many European families look across borders for someone they can hire to do the caregiving – and housecleaning – services at rates they can afford. Lives are linked in the 21st century in Europe through the cross-border informal markets of paid service work. Women come from lower-wage countries in Eastern Europe to perform household work and caregiving in higher-wage countries, usually for cash, and usually off the books (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004; Hochschild 2001). Men from lower-wage countries come to higher-wage countries to work as day laborers or to establish informal businesses. The consequences for families left behind in the lower-wage countries are mixed. The additional income in the family is in many cases essential to provide for food, clothing, and educational chances. But the absence of family members for long periods of time can affect the cohesion of the family. As lives are newly linked through cross-border interaction, lives within countries and families are altered.

Other chapters in this volume that are likely to use the concept of linked lives are association and community, family and household, identity, well-being, and inequality.

13.2.3 Context – Lives in Time and Place

There are more influences on an individual's life than only his or her own goals and abilities and the lives of those in close social proximity. The life course perspective considers *context* as a third important principle. Important contexts for individual development and outcomes include historical, social, and demographic settings as well as their changes over time.

The decline in the relevance of national borders in Europe is a recent historic influence on life courses. Economic markets have changed with deregulation and privatization and with the presence of the Euro since 2002. Information and Communication Technology advances have altered the context in which relationships are formed and sustained. The Bologna Process attempts to create common ground in higher education in Europe. Pressures are higher for young people to work internships or study abroad. These components are setting a dynamic context within which individuals are managing their lives in new ways (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Blossfeld, 2006 and Blossfeld et al. 2006a; 2006b; Hofmeister).

Another important recent historical event for Europe and the world, with large consequences for the individual's historical context, is the fall of the Iron Curtain. Many life courses were drastically altered by this event. Opportunity structures have changed. Some things that were once taken for granted, like secure employment and access to health care, are no longer available for as many workers. Other things that were once very difficult, like access to information, cross-border travel, and establishing businesses, are much more possible for a greater proportion of the population.

Another example of changing context, one that is more social than political, is the acceptance of cohabitation. Cohabitation was not always widely accepted across Europe (Blossfeld 1995). As recently as the early 1960s, young people in Europe (as well as North America) had to marry in order to be legitimately permitted a sexual relationship, cohabitation, or parenthood. Non-marital cohabitation was even not particularly common in Sweden, a country where cohabitation has old roots. The primary cohabitators were older divorced and widowed people who might lose their alimony or pension if they remarried (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003). The historical context has changed, and cohabitation is widely practiced across all of central and northern Europe (though rates still lag behind in Italy).

Geographic context is also enormously important for shaping lives. Natural and built physical environments and infrastructures also influence individuals' life courses. Proximity to universities, employment possibilities, ports, and international airports, to give a few examples, can have imaginable effects on the shape of an individual's life course.

Using the example of part-time work and paid employment for women, attitudes toward women's employment and the rates of women's employment vary drastically across Europe from South to North. The European Union (EU) Labour Force Survey consistently shows that voluntary and involuntary part-time work varies by country. Employers in Italy, Greece, and France regard part-time workers as an unattractive disruption of normal production processes and workplace discipline, and so these countries have comparatively few part-time workers. Employers in Britain, by contrast, created a large permanent part-time workforce long before economic recession stimulated deregulation of labor contracts in most industrial economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The part-time workers of Sweden work enough hours to be classified as full-timers by the European Commission, while the short hours of many part-time workers in the Netherlands, Britain, and West Germany means that the European Commission would rather classify them as marginal workers (Blossfeld & Hakim 1997a: 1). Demand for service workers and the increasing levels education of

women interacted with different country contexts to produce different levels of women's full-time and part-time work in different countries between the mid-1950s and late 1970s (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997a).

To use another example of the impact of geographic location on the life course, today in Europe, many young people cohabit before or instead of marrying. But the trend in cohabitation varies by national context. Countries differ in the conditions that allow cohabitation. For example, is there affordable housing to live alone or in a partnership? In Spain and Italy, it's harder to find or afford an apartment compared to Sweden or Germany. Can one get legal and/or social permission to live together without being married? Is it socially acceptable or desirable to live with parents into adulthood? In Italy and Spain, adults often live with their parents; it's a normal arrangement, but in Northern Europe, this practice is more unusual. These geographically and politically rooted structures set incentives for individuals to make different choices in the life course (Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986; Nazio and Blossfeld 2003).

In Northern Europe, cohabitation has replaced marriage for many couples. In Central Europe, for example, Germany and the Netherlands, cohabitation precedes rather than replaces marriage: couples tend to marry when they have a child together (Blossfeld & Mills, 2001; Huinik & Röhrler, 2005; Nazio & Blossfeld, 2003). But in Southern Europe, cohabitation is still rare, typically only found among urbanites or, in Italy, in the urban North: "Among the youngest birth cohorts, about 50 percent of women in West Germany and about 40 percent in East Germany have adopted cohabitation before they eventually start a first marriage. In contrast, in Italy even among the youngest birth cohorts not more than about 10 percent of women have adopted cohabitation before eventually entering into first marriage" (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003: 31).

Context describes not just geographic circumstances. Context also refers to the personal circumstances of men's and women's lives. Education, ethnicity, marital status, family size, and biological age all have impacts on the way a life unfolds. Gender, meaning the way one conducts oneself socially as a male or female person in the world, is a very important context that affects the life course and reflects historical circumstances as well as physiological differences (Moen 1995). For example, at earlier historical times, women were not allowed to get higher education, to own property, or to continue with paid employment after marriage; men were forced into military service. And women's lives vary from men's due to the physiological difference that men cannot give birth or lactate. Even today, whether a person has a part-time job or not is situated within a gender context. The typical part-time worker will be female in every country of Europe, as can be seen in Fig. 13.4. Most part-time jobs are in service-sector industries and are lower-paid and less prestigious than full-time work (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997b). Thus women are more likely to work in service-sector industries and receive lower pay and less prestige in their work compared to men. In former socialist countries, women are also more likely than men to be unemployed.

Contexts that change, such as historical time, geographic location, and biological age, interact with contexts that do not change or change more rarely, such as nationality, ethnicity, and gender. Thus who a person is and what he or she is able to do is influenced by the interaction of various contexts. Examples abound. Many job positions and elected positions have minimum or maximum age restrictions; some have nationality restrictions as well. At a different historical time, one could marry in Europe at the age of 12 or 14; that is not generally true at the start of the 21st century. In some national contexts, such as the United States and Canada, it is possible to return to education at any age, but in others with strong age norms for education, such as Germany, returning to education in




Fig. 13.4 Percentage of employed women and men in part-time (at least 1 hour per week) in 2007 in Europe, as percent of total employed, divided by country. No data available for Ireland
 Source: Eurostat, online database: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>, extraction: 26.03.2009

later life is more difficult. Some national contexts require military service of young people. Sometimes the requirement applies only to men, as in Germany, and sometimes it applies to men and women, as in Israel. The impact on the life course is obvious not only in the delay of other events such as educational completion or paid employment and in the skills acquired through the mandatory service but also, in some contexts such as Israel, the marriage market that the military creates. In other words, in Israel many young people meet their first partner because of their military service.

This volume has several chapters that address the influence of context on lives. These include association and community, bureaucracy and the state, city, culture, collective action, educational context and institutions, elites and power structure, family and household, ethnicity, gender, leisure, population, religion, stratification and social mobility, social security, and inequality.

13.2.4 Timing

The fourth principle of the life course perspective is timing. This principle has at least two dimensions: on the one hand, it refers to the sequencing and duration of events within a given life (Giele and Elder 1998b). But timing also describes the placement of a given life and the age of the individual within a specific historical context.

Through this second meaning, context is inextricably tied to timing. Every context is time-dependent: each set of characteristics a person has is influenced by the historical time in which those characteristics are converging for their impact on the individual life. For example, being a certain race or ethnicity has mattered for life outcomes differently at different historical moments, as well as in different places. Contexts change over historical time. The intersection of these historical changes with an individual's biological and social age is what lends those historical times their impact. Momentous events – economic depression, war, political transformation such as the fall of the Iron Curtain – shape life courses, but the ways in which these effects are felt are likely to vary by the age of the individuals at the time of the event. That means that each birth cohort – a group of people born around the same time – is marked by the historical events that coincide with the age at which those events happened (Elder et al. 1994). For example, the fall of the Iron Curtain has affected people very differently based on whether they were young children at the time, or teenagers, or young adults, or mid-life adults, or seniors. People who were well-established in their careers under socialism have had a difficult adjustment to the market economy, whereas people who were young children at the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain find it normal to compete for employment contracts upon reaching adulthood. The Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s impacted children differently depending on their age. Those who were teenagers at the time felt responsible to assist with family finances and began lifelong habits of frugality and concern about resources, whereas those who were young children during the Depression did not develop the same sense of urgency about money and security (Elder 1995). Generations of women have had fewer potential marriage partners because of losses of young men who served as soldiers in wartime. The cohorts of women who were young adults during World Wars I and II, for example, were more likely to remain unmarried and/or childless or to be single parents than adjacent cohorts of women. They are also more likely to have experienced violence or the threat of violence because of invasions and occupations by troops (Griffin and Braidotti 2002).

Timing describes the interaction of a person's biological age with an opportunity structure such as the expansion or contraction of the educational system or the labor market.

Whether an individual's own life chances or situation remains stable during changes that happen in the world, or whether the individual's own experiences also change because of outside events are very important outcomes of the timing principle of the life course perspective.

There are several important definitions within the principle of timing: role, role sequence, role trajectory, role transition, and process. I now describe them so that the principle becomes clearer.

13.2.4.1 Role

To understand the way timing affects life courses, it is important first to understand the concept of role. A role is a social position in relationship to another person or to an institution. A person has the role of a child to his or her parent — *parent* and *child* are both roles, with specific expectations, responsibilities, and characteristics that are widely understood as meaningful. Being a *spouse* is a role, with specific expectations. *Student* and *teacher* have specific roles in relationship to each other and to the institution of the school and the broader education system. The meanings of these roles are socially understood. Each individual is likely to have many roles in a lifetime and to have multiple roles even at the same time.

Some of the roles available to individuals vary by national context. The role of housewife, for example, was not available in socialist countries before the fall of the Iron Curtain because full employment was required of all adults, men and women. The role of paid worker was and is not available to many in specific national contexts: for example, a legal mandatory retirement age forces people to give up their paid employment role when they reach that age. Some countries even set the retirement age differently for men and women, requiring women to retire earlier than men, even though women generally live longer than men. Through such policies, the country communicates that it expects men to have a stronger and longer role as the employed worker compared to women. The role of soldier, or volunteer, or employer, is available only under specific conditions in some countries. To use a familiar example from Germany, military service is required of young men, not young women, but young men can choose an alternative “civilian service” instead of military service. Should young women also take on the role of serving in the military or in the civilian service role? This debate is not yet resolved. One consequence of German men's serving in the military or civilian service and not women is that German men then enter the role of student in universities 1 year later than women do. Assuming studies take a uniform length of time, this means that German women also finish university studies when they are 1 year younger than their male classmates and enter the labor market 1 year younger.

Timing refers in part to “the incidence, duration, and sequence of *roles* throughout the life course” (Moen et al. 1992, 1995). For example, one can imagine that a person who experiences his or her parents' deaths when he or she is age 5 will likely have a very different experience of that loss and consequently a different life compared to a person who experiences the same event when he or she is age 55. One key reason for the difference in the timing of role events is whether the person has alternative roles for self-identity. A young child has few other social roles and is primarily defined in society through its relationship to, and dependence on, parents. This example gives an idea about how the timing of roles and the loss of roles may affect the life course. In another example, someone who takes on the role of a parent has a different life course than someone who never becomes a parent. Or, a student at age 20 who drops out of university, before he or she

has a job or a family, experiences a different kind of loss than a student who drops out at age 40, who is already working a full-time job and raising a family. The person with more alternative roles will experience the loss of one role as less dramatic than the person with few alternative roles.

The role of student is an interesting example. In Great Britain, a student can be finished with university by age 21 or 22. In Germany, the role of student lasts much longer – often until the late 20s. Thus the timing of post-university employment varies greatly across Europe. A 27-year-old in Great Britain may have 5 years of full-time work experience already or even a doctoral degree and a few years of teaching experience at a university. A 27-year-old in Germany may not yet be finished with the first university degree at the same time point. As Europe becomes more integrated, expectations of what roles are normal at which biological age may change. The 27-year-old student in Germany or the 17-year-old student in Great Britain may feel out of place in the broader European context.

13.2.4.2 Role Sequence

The exact order in which an individual occupies roles is called a role sequence. Some role sequences are logically prescribed: one must be a student before one can be a teacher. One must be a parent before one can be a grandparent. One must (usually) be an income-earner before one can be a pension-earner. Other role sequences can vary. Whether or not one is married before becoming a parent or starts employment before finishing education are examples of specific role sequences that vary across Europe and over time. Role sequences impact the life course in major ways, which I discuss more at length in the next section.

Role sequences are strongly nation-dependent. Some countries expect students to be full-time without alternative employment – a role sequence of first student, then worker – while other countries allow students to take part in studies part-time while doing full-time employment. Few universities in southern and central Europe have child care services for students. The institution of university therefore expects that the role sequence in these countries is first to study, then to become a parent.

13.2.4.3 Role Trajectory

Roles are social positions, as described above. Over time, these change. Sometimes roles change because of the way earlier roles are experienced. For example, the chances for employment depend in part in success at the role of student. A role trajectory is the series of roles that an individual has, the duration of those roles, and the concurrence or overlap of roles. The difference between a role trajectory and a role sequence is that the sequence describes the ordering of the roles, and the trajectory describes not only the ordering but also the duration in the roles. Role trajectories represent the way events link together throughout an entire lifespan. Trajectories have important consequences. The life course is very different for individuals who first get a job, then marry, then have children (taking on the roles of employee, spouse, and parent in this order, which is a strongly normative role sequence) compared to individuals who have children before marrying or having a paid job (first taking on the role of parent, then spouse or employee). The concept of role trajectory includes an acknowledgement that early life decisions and experiences have later-life implications and those implications in later life have consequences for future generations (Moen 1997). For example, several studies find that in Germany, women who enter the role of parent are more likely to leave the role of employee than women who do not enter the role of parent (Blossfeld 1995; Grunow et al. 2006). And the longer women in nearly

all European and north American countries stay away from the role of employee, the less likely they are to become employees again (Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2006).

Event histories are an important way to describe role trajectories. An event history is literally a “history of events” – the collection of events, in their chronological order and duration, that have happened to a person across that person’s life. Event histories are marked by particular events called role transitions, which I describe next.

13.2.4.4 Role Transition

The movement from one role to another is called a role transition. One example is the transition from single to married through the event of marriage. In the transition from non-parent to parent, the event that creates the role transition is the birth or adoption of a child (or the marriage or partnership to someone who already has a child). Role transitions are so central to the life course perspective that some scholars even define the life course as “a socially defined and institutionally regulated sequence of transitions” (Heinz 1996: 52).

It is true that the transitions from one role to another are often regulated or managed by institutions or social definitions. Consider the education system. Does the transition to “pupil” or “student” become regulated by the education system? Certainly. There are laws governing the age at which a child must be enrolled in school in most European countries. Is the transition out of the role of pupil regulated also by the institution? Yes – after a certain number of years of study with a certain rate of success, a student is released, sometimes directly to the institution of the labor market, with a credential that this institution finds valuable (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). After a certain number of years studying without success, some education systems deny students the chance to continue. The government regulates marriage roles and transitions as well, deciding that young children shall not be allowed to make the role transition to spouse (through a minimum legal age for marriage) and that individuals who are already married cannot marry another person until that first marriage is legally ended through divorce. Sometimes there are even required waiting periods between marriage-related role transitions such as between separated and divorced statuses and between divorced and remarried statuses. The institution of family regulates some role transitions. In many families, it is unacceptable for a family member to have a child before being married, or to live together in a consensual union before marriage, or to begin working for pay before leaving the educational institution, for example. The national context influences family norms, too. In Italy and Spain, for example, living together without being married is not as accepted a lifestyle as in Sweden and Denmark, where non-married cohabiting partnerships are common and accepted.

13.2.4.5 Process

Process is a series of role transitions (Moen 1995; Moen et al. 1992, 1995). Some roles are abandoned over the life course, others are entered. The role of parent is entered when a first child is born. The role of employee is entered when one gets a job and left when one leaves the job. Someone takes on the role of brother or sister when the first sibling is born. Process is the particular chain of roles and their overlap over the life course. The combination of process and timing lead to a picture of a life: what roles one has and does not have at a given point are defining that life. Some roles are more challenging to maintain simultaneously than others, but also depending on the cultural and political context. For example, being the primary caregiver (for one or more aging parents, persons with severe disabilities, or small children) combined also with being full-time employed. The logics of the ideal worker

(regular availability) and ideal caregiver (unpredictable time demands) are not compatible (Williams, 2000). Where work and family policies — such as limitations on work hours combined with state-provided or subsidized care — allow these roles to be combined more easily, such as in Scandinavia, more people will combine the roles. Other roles are not inconsistent and can be held at the same time: one can easily be a brother or sister while being someone's child, for example. Being retired from paid work and being a grandparent fit together well. Many people are workers and spouses at the same time. Many men are workers and parents at the same time, and in fact part of the social definition of the good father role is the good provider role. This last example highlights again the importance of the gender and national context in evaluating which roles are socially constructed to be compatible.

Aging is also a process. The biological organism of the human body changes over time, as well as the social meaning of the biological age. Not only external signs of aging but also internal developmental processes of maturity continue throughout life, into old age (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Elder 1995; Moen 1997). Life course scholars study aging as more than just biological aging. Biological aging is an important context; for example, the ability to conceive children, or loss of memory, affects the life course. But social age is also important for understanding which life course decisions and directions are taken. What age do others believe is too old or too young to become a parent? What age is appropriate to continue or exit paid employment, regardless of how fit one feels? To study at University? To get new job training? To get married? Many people direct their life courses according to social age norms (Settersten and Hagestad, 1996). Whether there is a singular social age norm for family transitions in Europe, or one is developing, as asserted by Hartmut Kaelble (1997), will require more historical perspective and/or a clear reference point outside of Europe. What troubles me about saying that Europe has one norm set for family transitions is that it ignores strong national differences within Europe. For example, from Figures 13.2 and 13.3, between Sweden and Lithuania at the extremes, there are 5–7 years of difference in the average age at first marriage, and though the age is rising in all European countries, the gap of 5 years for men, 7 years for women, also remains. Looking for European convergence in age norms also risks overlooking important differences within nations. Educational levels create large differences in the norms for partnership and parenting. For those with less education, marriage or parenthood around age 30 seems late, but for those with more education, age 30 or later is right on time. It's a matter of perspective. With rising levels of education and rising levels of labor market uncertainty, the trend is likely to be toward later ages at marriage and childbirth throughout Europe, but national policies play an influential role and create differences in these trends. Even the biological boundaries are being pushed by science so that becoming a first-time parent in the early 40s is not as unusual as it once was.

13.3 Life Course Studies in Contemporary Europe

Each life course is unique, but patterns emerge from examining multiple life courses. Do the commonalities of historical time and geographic continent create similarities within European life courses so much so that one may speak of a “European Life Course”? I will try to answer this question in the sections below by illustrating the concepts of the life course perspective using examples from real studies of European life courses conducted between 1995 and 2006. These studies cover a variety of topics, some of which

overlap with other chapters in this volume. Comparing the information in this chapter with that in other chapters of this volume will illustrate more about the difference the life course perspective can make in our understanding about individuals in their social contexts.

13.3.1 Transitions from Youth to Adulthood

Young people experience many different role transitions as they age into adulthood. In fact, the very distinctions between youth and of adulthood are organized around various important role transitions that tend to be correlated with biological age, but not perfectly. Individuals leave the strict regulation of the educational system and venture out into less strictly age-regulated domains. These include exit from the parental home, exit from the educational system, entry into the paid labor market, entry to homeownership, entry into a partnership, and entry into the role of parent. An individual who has some or all of these transitions is often considered an adult, and individuals without any of these transitions are generally considered to be behaving youthfully (the degree to which people perceive a mismatch between social age and biological age on these dimensions depends on the national context). In formulating ideas about adulthood, biological age is only one of several criteria.

How are these transitions influenced by the historical context? Are there massive changes in societies that are influencing the timing of entry into these adult roles? A recent volume, *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Youth in Society*, investigated young people's transitions to first job, first partnership, and first parenthood in 14 countries across Europe and North America in the last decades of the 20th century (Blossfeld et al. 2005).

The utility of the life course perspective is obvious when one considers the multiple and complex influences on a young person as he or she tries to make his or her way into the labor market, the marriage market, and into the role of parent. I now describe how the components of the life course perspective — human agency, linked lives, context, and timing — help explain how young people's lives have changed in Europe.

Context mediates the effects of human agency. Despite the fact that youth with more education tended to avoid unemployment more easily than youth with less education in most of Europe, the story was the opposite in Italy and Spain. Youth with high education in Italy and Spain had to strategize and in many cases wait a long time to get their first job until it was a “good enough” job or else they risked being trapped in a lower-level job than their education would justify. Italy and Spain are two national contexts where the labor market is organized into “insiders” and “outsiders.” Once inside the labor market, workers are strongly protected from job loss. But before getting in, new workers experience insecurity in the labor market: whether they can find jobs, how long they can keep their jobs, whether they will be allowed to work enough hours to earn enough, or whether they get vacation time, sick pay, or pension payments. Context is also clear from the Irish case, where Ireland experienced a drastic improvement in its economy in the last decades of the 20th century relative to previous conditions. This change helped young people find work and establish families at earlier ages than previous generations had been able to do (Mills et al. 2005).

The issue of timing is also clearly manifested in the lives of European youth. Those who aged into adulthood later in the 20th century were more affected by economic uncertainties than those who transitioned to adulthood in earlier decades. Timing within lives is also important. Marriage was an important prerequisite for having a child in central and

southern European countries. Leaving school was an important step before forming a partnership or becoming a parent in all countries.

The principle of linked lives manifests itself in the study of youth in several ways. Youth who stay home until finding a job or getting married, even when this may take years, can do so only through the support of their parents. In these cases, the lives of youth are clearly linked to their parents' ability and willingness to support them. In the transition to parenthood, linked lives are also highly relevant. Not only do most young people become parents only after they first create a stable partnership, but also the financial situation of the partner plays a role in whether the couple will become parents. In countries where male employment is generally privileged through cultural expectations and support, preferential hires and promotions of men, and tax advantages to single-earner households (such as in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands), men and women cope with the labor market uncertainty in very different ways in comparison to the youth in countries with more support for female employment such as Sweden, Norway, Canada, and the United States. In those societies that prioritize men's careers, women with low career chances and high rates of uncertainty in their labor market entry chances were more likely to become parents than women with better career chances and more likely than their male peers with similar disadvantages. In those same countries, men who had better labor market chances were more likely to become parents than men who did not. The linked lives aspect explains the opposite effects of gender — the interdependence of the partnership in these societies means that a woman relies on an earner to support her once she is a parent, rather than herself parenting and earning a living at the same time. Likewise, a man who has better earning chances also has a higher likelihood of forming a partnership with a caregiver for his children, enabling him to remain employed while being a parent. By contrast, women with high levels of education and strong career chances postpone parenthood in countries where careers and parenthood are structurally incompatible.

A different study of young people shows another aspect of linked lives. In their comparison of the rates of transition to cohabitation over time and across three national contexts, Nazio and Blossfeld (2003) find that the actions of the peer group, rather than the earlier generation, are more important for influencing young couples to live together without marrying first (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003).

Is there convergence or divergence of youth's transition experiences? On the one hand, one can say that there is some *similarity* of youth experience in Europe because youth have become more vulnerable to uncertainty across all countries except Ireland: later-born cohorts have more fixed-term contracts, more part-time work, more irregular work hours, and lower occupational chances than earlier cohorts did. That means that youth throughout Europe, and also North America, are having more difficulties entering the labor market than previous generations did, with the exception of Ireland.

But the story is more complicated than that, and, with a closer look, divergence is probably a better description. Depending on many things — the social structure; the policies that organize social assistance, education, labor market regulations; the employment structure; cultural norms of tolerance for security and insecurity; the chances of women relative to men on the labor market; the sense of relative privilege or deprivation compared to previous generations; religious and family priorities; the tolerance of the previous generation for having adult children remain at home — the lives of young people in Europe are organized very differently. Some find employment immediately after leaving education. Some experience on-the-job training; others learn job skills within the education system. Some must wait until an economic upturn before securing employment. Some wait until their jobs are secure before forming a partnership. Some wait until their jobs are secure before having

children. Some wait until they have a marriage before having children. Some don't wait for anything before having children because parenthood is the only realistic role identity available. Some never are able to organize any of these transitions, or do not wish to. Both the realities of the level of uncertainty and the options available to cope vary across Europe.

13.3.2 Women's Employment in the Middle of the Life Course

Women in Europe have diverse life courses. Their experiences vary based on contextual personal and national characteristics and historical time. Recent work compiled in the volume *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Women's Careers* illustrates the components of the life course perspective through multiple studies of women in 13 countries, 11 in Europe, in the last half of the 20th century (Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2006).

The liberalization of the labor market is expected to have an impact on women's careers in Europe. As employers try to respond to increasing competition, they seek flexible workforces. "Flexibilizing" measures — short-term contracts, part-time work, irregular work hours, and fewer benefits — tend not to accrue to insiders in the labor market, who are protected by legislation and the employers' interests in retaining at least a portion of their labor force as loyal and secure. Insiders have historically been mid-life men. Instead, uncertainties are shifted to outsiders, oftentimes youth who lack tenure and women who return to the labor market after having exited for care-giving. We find that women across many national contexts were indeed experiencing reduced employment chances under conditions of economic liberalization, including in Germany, Spain, the United States, Italy, the UK, Estonia, and the Czech Republic. But the apparent convergence of women's life courses toward rising uncertainty masks important divergences of experience. I describe these now using the principles of the life course perspective.

Human agency organizes the impact of uncertainty on women's careers. Women with more education are generally more shielded from unemployment and job quality reductions than those with less education. In addition, career-oriented women who avoid becoming parents are more likely to keep their labor market positions than women who exit for parenthood and try to re-enter later.

Women's linked lives with other people have an enormous influence on their careers. As stated above, the effect of children on women's life courses is drastic. Women who have children often experience the end of their employment, though this is shaped by context. Mothers who try to re-enter employment after some years are heavily penalized in some countries with either difficulty finding employment or employment that is below their previous level (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006).

Women's relationships to men influence their employment in two ways. On the one hand, women across successive birth cohorts are less and less likely to exit employment when they marry. On the other hand, the employment status of the husband is often an important reference for the wife's own career and the necessity of her own earnings. Women with unemployed husbands sometimes become the primary breadwinner themselves. In other cases, they themselves are also in similar disadvantage in the labor market, because of marital homogamy (the tendency to marry someone with similar skills or background) and experience disproportionately more unemployment themselves (Plomien 2006).

Context is highly relevant for women's careers. National contexts shape chances. Sweden and Denmark tend to protect mothers' employment and offer a large public sector

of employment (Grunow and Leth-Sørensen 2006; Korpi and Stern 2006). Here, the rising insecurity experienced by other women on the European continent is not felt so drastically. In Germany, women experience much more uncertainty to the point where even higher education fails to protect women from unemployment and downward job mobility (Buchholz and Grunow 2006). Women in Spain and Italy experience the conflict between full-time employment and care-giving (Pisati and Schizzerotto 2006; Simó Noguera 2006). This conflict is enhanced by the expectation in the society for maternal care-giving.

Timing plays an enormous role in predicting women's career outcomes. The longer a woman is in the same job, the less likely she is to move out of it – into either better or worse positions (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006). Shorter durations in care-giving or other kinds of exits lower the chance of unemployment or coming back to a reduced-quality job, and longer durations have the opposite effect. The timing of births within a woman's employment trajectory matter, because women who have a first birth quickly after starting a job are less likely to get that job back when they wish to return.

Historical context and timing are very important for women's careers, particularly in the post-socialist countries. Young women's career chances varied across the 1990s as the economies in these countries transitioned from command-style to capitalism (Bukodi and Robert 2006a; Hamplová 2006; Helemäe and Saar 2006; Plomien 2006). The shift from required full-time employment of women to the stark choices available between unemployment or full-time employment coincided with a withdrawal of state-provided child care support and new competition for work in a new kind of labor market. Maternity leave may be increasingly insecure as these countries face economic pressures and expenses in the process of modernizing their economies and infrastructures. Part-time employment is rarely available, though desirable, but the financial demands of households often require two full-time incomes. In a cultural context where a woman's place was in the home at the same time that the law required her full-time paid labor in the former socialist countries (resulting in a phenomenally taxing double burden), it is little surprise that gender attitudes have moved back toward a male-breadwinner–female-homemaker preference in these countries since the collapse of socialism; such an attitude is a luxury to idealize, even if the constraints of the market do not permit its expression in reality.

There are distinct variations among modern countries in terms of the importance of not only labor market agreements but also the availability of state-sponsored family supports or market-driven alternatives to women's unpaid care, all of which impact on the mid-life options and pathways of women tremendously (Esping-Andersen 1999; Orloff 2002). In some countries spells of unemployment tend to be short (Sweden, Denmark) and expansion of the public and service sectors greatly enhances women's employment opportunities despite fluctuations in the national economy (Grunow and Leth-Sørensen 2006; Korpi and Stern 2006). These nations share a social-democratic welfare regime philosophy that impacts women's life courses. In other countries (Italy, Spain, Germany), the lack of provisions for women's care-giving means women make choices between paid work and family: they reduce the number of children or avoid them altogether if they are committed to careers (Simo Noguera 2006; Pisati and Schizzerotto 2006; Buchholz and Grunow 2006). This trend also follows welfare regime logics.

Countries with few protections and a *laissez-faire* social policy regarding female and child poverty tend to leave poor women in the position of seeking informal solutions to childcare and accepting jobs almost regardless of the levels of constraints or the low quality of the position (United States, Estonia) (Hofmeister 2006; Helemäe and Saar 2006). British women are more vulnerable to unemployment when they have flexible, short-term, fixed-term, and marginal work (Golsch 2006b). But a means-tested benefit system and

flat-rate entitlements in Britain may contribute to a lack of incentive for either partner in poor households to seek employment. Women living in countries undergoing large-scale economic reforms such as the former socialist countries are the most vulnerable with the most potential to gain and lose (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006).

Flexible work remains marginalizing — that is, it does not lead to promotion and salary raises and is vulnerable to economic downturns. As this form of work expands and is filled primarily by women, the employment and career uncertainty of women in nearly all countries rises (Germany, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Britain, United States, Mexico, Italy, and Spain) or in the best case remains stable (the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark) (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006).

Qualitative interviews of the European Union project FEMAGE showed that migrant and native women in some areas have the same problems because of gender, for example, labor market disadvantages, a lack of child care, and underfunded pension systems (Backes 1993; FEMAGE 2008). In its international comparative analysis of nine countries, the study finds that migrant women have to face additional challenges beyond those of native-born women, for example, adjusting their culturally formed gender roles and expectations. This adjustment, together with the lack of family support system, leads migrant women to postpone their child-bearing. Again through this example, we see the influence of timing on life course outcomes. Some women may even decide to stay childless. A lack of social integration is an additional risk if their native language is different from the language of their resident country.

13.3.3 Men's Employment in the Middle of the Life Course

In the same historical times, in the same national contexts, what happens when one changes just one context of the life course — the gender context? What happens to men's careers, in comparison to women's, under conditions of economic liberalization?

The experience of European men in the labor market in mid-life is generally different from that of European women, a fact that points to the importance of the gender context of life courses. Because men have been traditionally responsible for the earnings of their families, their focus has tended to be on their labor market achievement throughout their lives. By mid-life, their life courses are marked by the early decisions to choose specific majors of study and trades of specialization that will earn well and provide reliable employment, to work continuously instead of taking interruptions for care-giving, and to seek promotions, sometimes at the expense of personal or family time. Employers have tended to organize their work forces around protecting their loyal mid-life male workers (Mills and Blossfeld 2006). The protections of this group come at a cost to other groups who are less protected, as described above. But even among men, the life course is not fully converged across European contexts, and important differences reveal themselves depending upon men's human agency, linked lives, context, and timing, as I illustrate with results from the volume *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Men's Careers* (Blossfeld et al. 2006).

Human agency has enormous influences on men's career chances. Men with more education, more job experience, or white-collar positions are generally protected in nearly all the countries studied (Mills and Blossfeld 2006). Men lacking these tend to experience long-term unemployment in all countries, a sign of the accumulation of disadvantage over the life course. The effect of a man's higher qualification level protecting him on all dimensions of job insecurity and job quality is significant and generally increasing over

time, leading to increasing inequalities of life course experiences based on men's human agency and access to educational opportunities.

National labor market context matters a great deal for men's careers. Those in an insider–outsider labor market experienced more stable careers and less downward mobility or unemployment as long as they were insiders. Men in countries with more open employment systems and fewer workplace protections experienced more turbulent careers under the influence of globalization but also shorter spells of unemployment. In short, whether men were subject to patchwork careers (frequent job changes and shorter job tenure) depended on their regional and national context. Social and political settings in Sweden, Italy, and Germany protect mid-career men from patchwork careers (Bernardi 2006; Korpi and Tåhlin 2006; Kurz et al. 2006). In Spain, a core group of men do not experience patchwork careers, but those with less human capital do (Simó Noguera et al. 2006). In Denmark, patchwork careers do not have adverse consequences because the state safety net protects men between jobs (Grunow and Leth-Sørensen 2006). Men in the Netherlands and the UK in Europe (and the United States and Mexico in North America) tend to experience rising or stable levels of patchwork careers (Mills et al. 2006; Golsch 2006b; Luijkx et al. 2006; Parrado 2006).

Historical timing had significant effects on men's employment outcomes in the post-socialist countries. Men who experienced the transition to capitalism in their later careers experienced lower job mobility, and when it did occur, it was more likely to be upward than men who were in their earlier careers at the moment when the Iron Curtain fell. These men experienced extreme turbulence and high levels of job mobility, both upward and downward. Career timing matters for many men. Longer spells in the same job mean that men are less likely to change jobs – sticking with a first job position increases the chances of being able to organize a stable long-term career (Mills and Blossfeld 2006).

In conclusion, men's mid-life career patterns do not show convergence across Europe. Rather, what had been relatively stable mid-20th century convergence of the male life course around lockstep paid labor market advancement is now diverging depending on the responsiveness of the policies and labor markets to liberalization forces. Men in different countries, with different skills and backgrounds, have very different labor market experiences. And we can even expect regional differences that result from different educational systems (Hillmert 2004) or economic opportunities. Some contexts – such as in central Europe – cement mid-life men's economic advantages and other contexts – such as the post-socialist experience – introduce new uncertainties to the male life course.

13.3.4 Retirement and Late Careers: Consequences from a Lifetime of Employment Experiences

How have later life courses been affected by the “flexibilization” of the labor market? The recent volume *Globalization, Uncertainty and Late Careers in Society* answers this question (Blossfeld et al. 2006). The modern economies of Europe require employers to change what they need and expect from employees in order to keep up with growing worldwide competition, stimulated by the historical contexts of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the rise of Asia's economies. But many European countries have worker protection laws in place that give a great amount of security to workers with seniority. These workers are less likely than younger workers to have the new knowledge-based skills needed by the emerging European labor market, and those workers are likely to be accustomed to

much higher wages than the world-wide economy would pay their competitors elsewhere. Employers have only a few options, varying by their legal context: (1) they can try to re-train their older workers with the new skills they need to be competitive; (2) they can lay off these older workers, shifting them into unemployment; (3) they can cut the wages of older workers; or (4) they can shift them into early retirement (Buchholz et al. 2006). Employers are under legal and practical constraints regarding their older workers which vary by nation and industry. Employers, employees, and nation-states are in a struggle about who should pay the high costs of supporting older workers whose productivity either does not match their expense or is assumed to be out of proportion. What are the pathways for individuals based on their own agency? How are retirement exits linked within couples? What is the response to these demands of employees and employers in various national contexts? Does timing play a role?

In many cases, individual characteristics and human agency affect the likelihood of a person leaving the role of worker. Those who have established their own businesses tend to stay in the labor market longer, both because no one is around to force them out and because there are fewer sources of payment for retirement (many states provide only minimal benefits to retired self-employed individuals). Early life events, such as educational attainment, have an influence late in the life course: those with more education are more likely to stay in the labor market longer. Another example of human agency comes in the form of personal goals and savings. In comparison to European countries, which tend to offer something in the way of retirement benefits and pensions that are high enough to support a reasonable standard of living, the economically liberal design of the United States' retirement policies means that older workers must be much more self-sufficient with personal savings and investments before they are able to retire financially (Warner and Hofmeister 2006). Is Europe moving in this direction, as pension systems struggle with an ever-higher proportion of older citizens? Incidents of labor market re-entry of already-retired individuals are higher in the United States than in most of Europe, although still not altogether common. When an American realizes he or she cannot personally afford the retirement, that person is likely to return to the labor market, a possibility that is closed to many Europeans because of age restrictions on employment and norms or policies discouraging the employment of older workers (Warner and Hofmeister 2006).

Research shows evidence of linked lives even in retirement timing. Couples often time their retirement to occur together, in cases where they are able to choose when to retire. The pattern is especially common that the wife takes retirement at the moment her husband retires, even when it is earlier than she would prefer to retire (Hofmeister and Moen 1999).

There is similarity in late career employment patterns in Europe in that older workers are less and less likely to participate in the paid labor market across historical time. This pattern is true also in North America. But there is a lack of convergence as to the precise timing of the employment exit and the pathway to that employment exit. Different nation-states and firms solve the dilemma of reconciling older workers with modern economies in a variety of ways, tending in two different directions (Blossfeld et al. 2006a).

Firms and/or governments are increasingly offering pension incentives that encourage older workers to leave the paid labor market: an *employment exit strategy*. Older workers in Italy, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands have tended to experience rising opportunities for early retirement over time (Beckstette et al. 2006; Bernardi and Garrido 2006; Buchholz 2006; Henkens and Kalmijn 2006). By the end of the study period (1990s), the rates of labor market participation of men aged 60–64 was between 20 and 40% in these countries.

Older workers in the United Kingdom, by contrast, are more likely to be required to adapt their skills to the demands of the labor market in a market-induced *maintenance*

strategy (Golsch et al. 2006). They have the opportunities to learn new skills on the job and experience less age discrimination in getting hired, but they also have also less financial security offered by the state, which increases their need to stay employed. Older workers in the United States have a similar experience (Warner and Hofmeister 2006).

Other European workers experience a related form of maintenance strategy in the labor market: a set of public-induced maintenance strategies. Here, the government serves as a large-scale employer, acting in combination with labor market policies that encourage workers to stay in the market and offering life-long re-training opportunities for new jobs. Workers in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway experience this kind of chance (Aakvik et al. 2006; Hofäcker and Leth-Sørensen 2006; Lindquist 2006). About half of the men aged 60–64 in these countries are still in the labor market, with the exception of Denmark, which instituted special policies that created a different direction for older workers there. In Denmark, first the policies encouraged early exit, but then these expensive policies were abandoned in favor of incentives to increase older workers' presence in the labor market (Hofäcker and Leth-Sørensen 2006).

There are other contexts besides the nation-state that affect exits from the role of worker. Industry and firm-level characteristics influence job exits. Workers in traditional industries are most likely to be encouraged or forced out of employment, while workers in the public sector are likely to remain in paid work the longest. Firm size also plays a role, with larger firms more likely to encourage exits and to be more able to afford them.

Older workers in countries that directly experienced the fall of the Iron Curtain had unique experiences compared to Western Europe. Under communism, older workers stayed in the labor market relatively long and in secure positions. In Hungary, workers who were in their late forties and early fifties at the time of the breakdown of communism were most strongly forced out as the economies underwent massive transformation (Bukodi and Róbert 2006b). Many workers were able to regain some employment after the initial transition shock, and the pattern of massive early exits decreased somewhat. But overall in Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, older workers were more likely to be forced out of the labor market at younger ages after the transformation than the earlier-born cohorts who reached retirement ages before the transformation (Bukodi and Róbert 2006b; Hamplová and Pollnerová 2006; Täht and Saar 2006). The situation in Estonia is particularly acute because older workers are forced out by employers who seek flexible labor, but neither the market nor the state provides viable alternative sources of income, leaving older Estonians with severe financial problems and few solutions (Täht and Saar 2006).

The situation of increasingly early exits in all the countries studied may be likely to reverse, based on even more recent policy changes. This is an area remaining for future research.

13.4 Conclusions: Can We Speak of a European Life Course, Now or in the Future?

Is there a “European Life Course”? The answer is a question: compared to whom? Or when? Compared to residents of North America and other continents, Europeans experience life courses with similar challenges and opportunities that shape their direction. It is true that one sees also the similarities of experiences under such macro forces as economic liberalization and within particular life stages and gender contexts. Empirical comparative

work on life courses in Asia, South America, and Africa brings us further in our understanding of the “Western” or European life course. Meanwhile, national comparisons point to the myriad ways in which context and timing combine with human agency and linked lives to create diverse pathways and experiences across the life course.

Will the European Union further push life courses to converge? Are the role trajectories and sequences of Europeans likely to become more similar as broader-scale institutions continue to suggest ideal life course pathways and stigmatize alternatives? We need further life course studies to assess these questions fully. My conjecture is that the European Union will not create a convergence of life course patterns, at least not very soon. National path dependencies and traditions will continue to create unique solutions that reflect cultural and individual differences even as the nations on the continent of Europe face a shared future.

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Chapter 14

Population

Tony Fahey

14.1 Introduction

Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Europe led the world towards the population explosion of the modern era. Today, along with Japan, it is leading the world on the new path of population decline. If we interpret the term 'decline' to include all those aspects of demographic change that cause observers to be anxious about Europe's future, then we can say that it has three major dimensions. The first is the move to a *smaller* total population, represented both by shrinking absolute numbers and, more sharply, by a declining share of the global population total. Having peaked in the early 2000s, Europe's population is soon about to begin to edge downwards (difficulties in counting immigrants mean that one cannot say exactly when the peak is reached and the decline has begun). By the middle of the present century, according to the UN's most recent central population projections, there will be about 10 percent fewer people living in Europe than there are today. This is not a catastrophic fall, but it avoids being greater only on the assumption that a steady flow of immigrants will counterbalance contraction in the numbers of native Europeans (and of course difficulties in predicting migration trends even for the near future underscore the conjectural nature of forecasts such as these) (United Nations 2006). Nevertheless, even taking the uncertainty of the future into account, it seems unlikely that the steady decline of Europe's relative weight in global population totals can be avoided in the foreseeable future.

The second aspect of decline is the move to an *older* population, as a result of low birth rates and rising longevity. The UN projection is that the median age of the population of Europe will rise to over 47 years by 2050, compared to about 39 years today and 30 years in 1950. Some might consider it ageist to speak of population ageing as 'decline' and indeed there are ways of thinking about what 'young' and 'old' means that cast present trends in a better light. For example, Sanderson and Scherbov (2005) suggest that we could define a young person not as someone who was born recently (the usual 'retrospective' approach) but as someone who has still a long time to live (the alternative 'prospective' approach). Even when the median age of a population (as usually understood) rises, increased life expectancy can cause its 'prospective age' to remain stable or even rise since the median number of years its members can still expect to live may increase (Sanderson and Scherbov 2005). The population of Europe could thus remain reasonably young in this sense even as

T. Fahey (✉)
Professor of Social Policy, University College Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: tony.fahey@ucd.ie

its median age rises. However, the more conventional view is that population ageing is real and will cause problems for pensions systems and public finances and, beyond that, may cause a decline in economic productivity, if not a wider loss of social and cultural vitality (for an early ‘crisis’ view of what population ageing can entail, see World Bank 1994; for assessments of the impact ageing on economic growth in the EU, see Carone et al. 2005; Prskawetz et al. 2007).

The third possible dimension of decline is that the peoples living in the continent of Europe will become *ethnically less cohesive*, arising from the expected role of migration in future European population dynamics. The concern here is not entirely clear-cut, since it could relate either to the European or the national level. At the European level, the prospect raised by some is that European identity and cultural distinctiveness could be weakened by the influx of non-Europeans, particularly Muslims coming from Europe’s southern hinterland in North Africa and the Middle East. Smil (2005), for example, refers to existing migrants into Europe from this Islamic hinterland as ‘the greatest influx of people the continent has seen in more than a thousand years’. He raises the prospect that their continued influx will give rise to ‘an eventual triumph of Islam’ if not in Europe as a whole then at least in the core states of Italy, France and Spain (Smil 2005: 611–12; for a more sober assessment of the role of Muslims in European population, particularly in regard to their fertility, see Westoff and Frejka 2007). The alternative, and for some no less worrying possibility, is that movement *within* Europe will undermine the existing ethnic profile of its nation states and thereby reduce the ethnic solidarity of European societies. For Coleman (2006), for example, present migration trends in a number of European countries could ‘lead to the displacement of the original population into a minority position’ by the latter part of the present century.

There are many uncertainties about this projected future of European population, two of which might be mentioned here. One is how likely it is to come to pass. All forecasts, whether of population or anything else, inevitably get the finer details wrong, but quite often too they are completely off the mark about the general thrust of developments. They fail to anticipate either the large rare events (such as wars, epidemics, ecological catastrophes or sudden leaps forward in technology) or the more gradual but nonetheless significant shifts in behaviour that regularly knock change off its existing course.¹ The social sciences make no claim to have theories of population change with predictive power (Lutz 2006) and in the past signally failed to anticipate major demographic developments such as the post-World War II baby boom or the collapse in birth rates that occurred in many developed countries in the closing decades of the twentieth century. Within the next decade, therefore, not to mind within the next half century, European population trends might head off in quite a different direction from that expected by demographers today (birth rates, for example, *could* stage a recovery). Population projections, based as they are on extrapolations from present conditions and recent trends, might thus be of interest less as predictions

¹A century ago, forecasters could hardly have predicted that a total European war would break out in 1914, initiating a decades-long phase of violence and instability – not to speak of demographic turbulence – unlike anything experienced before. In Europe today, observers often latch hopefully onto the smallest signs of demographic revitalisation – see, for example, *The Economist*, 14 June 2007, which speaks of a demographic ‘bounce back’ in European population. One might recall here economist Alec Cairncross’s well-known ditty: ‘A trend is a trend is a trend/But the question is, will it bend?/Will it alter its course/Through some unforeseen force/And come to a premature end?’ The most entertaining and stimulating attack on the follies and poor previous record of statistically based forecasting is N. N. Taleb’s *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (2007).

of the future than as another means of highlighting where we are today and where we have come from in the recent past.

A second general uncertainty about the emerging prospect of a smaller, older and ethnically less cohesive population in Europe is whether it is as worrisome a development as most commentary on it implies. The key point here, as Paul Demeny says, is that 'we do not know what optimum population size is, nor can we successfully nail down its first cousin, the optimum rate of population growth' (Demeny 2007: 28). He warns that we should not be beguiled by rising population numbers, nor cast into automatic despond by their absence, since 'numbers alone do not a civilisation make' (ibid.: 29; see also Demeny 2003). To take a more positive approach, one could view Europe's new demographic turn as a great and necessary experiment in sustainable development – a helpful contribution, perhaps, to reducing Europe's carbon footprint. As far as population ageing is concerned, one could view rising longevity as a great advance in civilisation and argue that its economic and social side-effects are intrinsically neither positive nor negative but depend on how flexibly and creatively we respond to them. The view of immigration as ethnic threat might also be modified by taking account of the very particular worldview it rests on. This is the worldview of twentieth century European nationalism, which defines Europe as a mosaic of ethnically homogenous, or near-homogenous, nation-states, viewed not as transient phase of recent European history but *the* normal form of cohesive societies.² It thus discounts as a model of normality the multi-ethnic polities that were the norm in Europe in the pre-nation state era (and out of which modern European nation-states were hewn with horrific violence and bloodshed – Ferguson 2006, Hobsbawm 1990) and are commonplace elsewhere in the world today, not least in the regions of European settlement such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Here too it is not only the facts of immigration that may count but the degree to which Europe can adapt its traditions of ethnic separatism and exclusivity so as to absorb and capitalise on the potential offered by immigration.

It may be difficult to judge either the inevitability or the significance of the contracting numbers, greying age profile and the changing ethnic mix now emerging in Europe, yet these are the major trends that cast their shadow over any consideration of European population change. The concern of this chapter is to provide a general account of these trends and also briefly to consider their implications for European integration. That is done partly by separating out the major components of population change – births, deaths, and migration – and looking at the sub-trends that make these up. In addition, a key concern is to give some sense of the internal diversity within Europe, since that diversity may prove great enough to amount to a new force for division between European regions, not least between the demographically stronger and weaker states within the European Union. Broadly speaking, north-west Europe (the Scandinavian countries and the North Atlantic rim) is in a reasonably strong demographic position, though even here some countries are to the fore in one of the dimensions of demographic 'decline' referred to earlier, namely, population ageing. The countries of southern and central Europe are somewhat weaker on most fronts, and problems increase as we move eastwards, culminating in what in many respects is a dire demographic situation in Russia. As we make the transition to the liminal territories that form the boundary between Europe and Asia – of which Turkey is the main

²Note Ernest Gellner's characterisations of nationalism as 'the doctrine that cultural similarity is the primary social bond' (Gellner 1997: 3) and as 'a theory of political legitimacy requiring that ethnic and state boundaries should coincide' (Gellner 1983: 1).

instance — we enter quite a different demographic regime, though one which in recent times has been converging rapidly on the mix of very low fertility and low mortality that became the defining feature of western demographic patterns in the latter decades of the twentieth century.

14.2 What Is Europe?

Before dealing with these issues, it is necessary to take note of a problem in dealing with the population of Europe — the ambiguity of the concept of Europe itself. Part of the problem here is the common tendency to refer to the European Union as Europe (not least in documents of the European Commission — see, for example, European Commission 2005). This tendency is easy to dismiss, since in fact, as we shall see below, the present European Union accounts for something less than 60 percent of the population in what by any traditional reckoning would be considered as Europe. The trickier problem lies in drawing the boundary between Europe and Asia. In geographical terms, Europe is a western peninsula of the Eurasian landmass, but there is no clear physical or cultural-political line of demarcation between the European peninsula and the Asian territory from which it projects. Europe's claim to be regarded as a continent is very much a matter of convention and could be seen less as an expression geographical scale or cultural distinctiveness than 'an anachronistic product of European cultural egotism' (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 69; this work provides a detailed account of the shifting spatial and cultural connotations of the concept of Europe over time). Whatever about its status as a continent, Europe can undoubtedly be regarded as a major world region but even then questions arise about where its eastern limits lie.

These questions have most demographic significance in connection with Russia and Turkey. The Russian Federation, to give its full title, with a current population of 143.5 million, is the most populous country in Europe. However, some 77 percent of its territory and 23 percent of its population lie east of the Ural Mountains and stretch across all of northern Asia to the North Pacific. The Ural range was promoted as an internal boundary between European and Asian Russia during Peter the Great's westernisation campaign in the early eighteenth century (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 27). It has since become widely accepted in the west as the conventional eastern boundary of Europe, though its meaning within Russia itself became less clear-cut with the rise of Russian nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century and the consolidation of Russia's eastern empire (Kaiser 1994). However, the practice in present-day international population databases, such as those of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, is to count the entire Russian population as European, even though the vast 'Asian' territory thereby implicitly added to Europe is larger than Europe itself. At the same time, the representation of Europe's population in maps typically cuts off Russia's huge trans-Ural region, so that the maps do not fully represent the territory the demographic data refer to (see, for example, the European population maps published by the Council of Europe — Council of Europe 2006). Here we follow these conventions by treating Russia as wholly European, but would note that as a result European population totals include some 39 million inhabitants who actually live in what is normally considered Asia (that is, in the three Russian Federal Districts of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East).

The boundary case represented by Turkey is demographically even more significant than the Asian regions of Russia, both because its population is larger (at 71.6 million)

and because its demographic patterns are more ‘un-European’. As a successor state of the Ottoman empire and the Islamic culture it represented, Turkey belongs to the classic oriental ‘other’ of the European imagination (as most famously analysed in Edward Said’s *Orientalism* – Said 1979). Geographers normally regard the Black Sea as part of the south-east border of Europe, thus placing most of Turkey on the Asian side (though 3 percent of its land area, including part of its largest city, Istanbul, lies on the European side of the Bosphorus, thus making Turkey a transcontinental country and Istanbul a transcontinental city). The United Nations classifies Turkey as an Asian state. However, even the Ottoman sultans claimed to be the heirs of Roman and Greek civilization (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 69), and Turkey’s internal orientation shifted towards the west with the advent of the secular republic in 1923. The Council of Europe has accepted Turkey as a member state since 1949, and the European Union has regarded Turkey as European on geographical grounds since 1963. Formal negotiations on Turkey’s admission to membership of the EU commenced in 2005. Turkey thus exerts a political claim to be included in Europe, though that claim is contested both in Turkey and in Europe (on popular attitudes in Europe towards Turkey, see Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2007). The demographic import of whether it is counted in or out of Europe is large. If included, it would increase the population of Europe by one-tenth and would have the third largest national population after Russia and Germany (United Nations, 2006). As we shall see further below, it would also lie somewhat outside the normal range of demographic diversity found across the national populations of Europe, particularly as it would be the only European country with above-replacement fertility and a rate of natural increase of population of above 1 percent per year. Its demographic ‘otherness’ is diminishing as its birth rates and age structure converge towards European patterns but in the meantime its population is growing rapidly and so it will loom even larger on the demographic landscape in the future than it does today.

There are other states whose European-ness is uncertain. However, their demographic significance is limited by their small size. Three such states are the Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which together have a population of 16.2 million people. They lie in the gap between the southern tip of the Ural mountains and the Black Sea, a territory where there is no clear physical boundary that can be used to demarcate Europe from Asia. Cyprus is also an important boundary case in political terms, as sovereignty over it is disputed between Turkey and Greece and since 1974 it has been internally divided between a Turkish and Greek zone. Geographically, it is closer to Turkey, which lies 75 km to the north, than to Greece, the mainland of which lies 800 km to the west. However, its demographic significance is slight, since the total island population is only 854,000 (2005 estimate).

The approach to the concept of Europe adopted here is flexible and varies according to context and database being used. Two main alternatives are drawn upon – the definitions of the United Nations and the Council of Europe (CoE). The UN definition is relatively restrictive: it includes all of Russia but excludes all the five border states referred to above (Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Cyprus). It yields an estimated population total for Europe in 2005 of 731 million (United Nations 2006). The CoE definition, on the other hand, is relatively expansive in that it includes all of Russia and all of the five border states. (Belarus is not a member state of the CoE and is omitted from the CoE’s strict definition of Europe, but it is included in a broader definition, labelled ‘Europa’, which we will utilize here.) The CoE definition yields a total population of Europe in 2005 of 815 million, which is 11.5 percent larger than that of Europe as defined by the UN.

14.3 Population Size and Increase/Decrease

The population size of the states of Europe, as set out in Fig. 14.1, varies enormously.³ The two largest states (Russia and Germany) together account for 27 percent of the total




Fig. 14.1 Population of the states and major regions of Europe* (millions), 2005
 Source: Council of Europe (2005).
 *Council of Europe definition.

³In addition to the states listed in Fig. 14.1, Europe has five micro-states (i.e. with less than 100,000 population): Andorra (76,900), Liechtenstein (34,600), Monaco (33,000), San Marino (29,700), and the Vatican (less than 1,000).

population, while the 32 states that make up the long tail of the distribution (from Greece to Iceland in Fig. 14.1) account for only 21 percent. Looking at the major blocks of states, the European Union as it was prior to the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 (the EU 15) makes up 46 percent of the European total, while the 12 new member states that joined since 2004 (NMS 12) make up 13 percent. Thus, summing these two blocks, slightly less than 6 out of 10 Europeans (59 percent) live in the current European Union (the EU 27). The unbalanced distribution of population across states that characterizes Europe as a whole is paralleled within the EU, where the ‘big five’ of Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain make up 62 percent of the EU population, while the smallest five (Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) make up only 1 percent. This unevenness in population weight across the EU states is an important instance of a demographic influence on European integration. It creates the challenge for the European Union of devising systems of representation and power-sharing between states of great differences in population size (where, for example, there are 100 times more Germans than Cypriots and almost 200 Germans for every Luxembourger).⁴

If we were to divide present-day Europe in two along the lines of the old Iron Curtain, then the population balance between the two halves would be tilted slightly to the west, with 397 million on that side of the line compared to 344 million in the former communist east.

All the major regions and countries of Europe had growing populations from the 1950s to the 1990s. However, the momentum of population growth has slowed in recent decades, as is revealed by two features of the picture set out in Fig. 14.2. First, growth in absolute numbers is running out of steam in western Europe and has already done so in eastern Europe. The eastern situation is exemplified in Fig. 14.2 by the Russian Federation and the NMS12 where absolute numbers had already peaked in the 1990s and were in slow decline as the present century began. It is possible, according to the projections set out in Fig. 14.2, that population in these eastern regions will be back to the level of the 1950s by the middle of the present century. In western Europe, as represented by the EU15 in Fig. 14.2, upward movement has not yet ceased but is likely to do so and turn downwards in the 2030s and 2040s. However, decline is likely to be relatively modest over this period and will leave the EU 15 with a slightly larger population in 2050 than it has today. It is also worth noting that within the EU 15, a number of individual countries may still be growing in population by 2050. This indicates that the time-span taken for population decline to spread throughout the states of Europe could be long, with the trend having started in the east in the 1980s and perhaps not yet being fully extended to the Atlantic seven decades later. This spread in the arrival of decline increases further if we include Turkey in the picture. Its strong growth over the whole period 1950–2050 is evident from Fig. 14.2: having had only one-fifth of the population of Russia in 1950, it will have come close to catching up with Russia by 2050.

⁴The extent of this challenge can be compared with that facing the United States, where differences in population size between states are significant but less extreme than in the EU. California (population 36 million) is by far the largest state in the USA (50 percent greater than the next nearest, Texas) but would count as only the seventh largest in the EU (after Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland). The smallest US state (Wyoming, population 509,000) is larger than the smallest EU states (Luxembourg and Malta, both less than 500,000). However, the USA has eight states with population less than 1 million, where the EU has only three (Cyprus plus the two already mentioned), so that the USA does have some real size discrepancies between states to cope with.




Fig. 14.2 Growth and decline of European population, 1950-2050
 Source: UN population database (2006 Revision, medium variant projections). Author’s calculations for EU15, NMS12 and EU27
 *UN definition.

A further feature of European population trends over the whole period from 1950 to 2050 shown in Fig. 14.2 is its shrinking share of total world population. In 1950, more than 1 in every 5 people in the world (21 percent) was a European. Today, that share has fallen to 1 in 10 and by 2050 is likely to have fallen to something in the region of 1 in 15. It is notable that the diminution in Europe’s relative population size was greater in the period 1950–1990, when its absolute numbers were growing, than it is likely to be over the next 50 years, when its absolute numbers will be falling. This reflects the slowing tempo of global population expansion: in the second half of the twentieth century, total world population grew 2.4 times, while it may grow by less than 1.5 times in the first half of this century (United Nations 2006). It is uncertain whether or when total world population will peak and turn into decline, but the very fact that a global population downturn may occur within the next century provides the context that allows us to interpret Europe as an early mover in the direction of population decline rather than as a global anomaly. Some commentators have suggested that Europe should take particular note of its share of population relative to what Demeny (2003) calls its ‘southern hinterland’ – the largely Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East, running from the Atlantic to India’s western borders (Demeny 2003, Smil 2005). The population of this hinterland outnumbered that of the EU 25 by 1.39 to one in 2005 but the corresponding ratio in 2050 could be as high as 2.76 to one (Smil 2005: 611).

Figure 14.3 elaborates on the long-term picture of population growth and decline in Europe by highlighting trends for the period 1950–2050 for a number of representative states. Romania is included in this figure as an extreme instance of population decline, though in this regard it is simply at the outer edge of the experience that is common to many east European countries. While its population numbers grew up to the mid-1980s, decline was already well underway by the 1990s and is projected to continue to the point where population may fall by one-third from the level of the year 2000 by the year 2050. The Ukraine, which is not shown in Fig. 14.3, is another large east European state (current





Fig. 14.3 Population index, selected states, 1950–2050 (2000=100)
 Source: UN population database (2006 Revision, medium variant projections).

population 47 million) which is projected to experience decline of around one-third up to 2050. Decline in Russia is less extreme, but yet is likely to be substantial (perhaps of the order of 25 percent between 2000 and 2050) and in this regard is closer to the typical prospect for east European states.

Decline is a less likely prospect in most of the western European states, but for the majority neither is there much prospect of substantial growth. Italy and Germany are two of the west European states where growth has already ceased and moderate decline is likely to set in within the next decade or two. The UK and France, on the other hand, are still experiencing modest growth and many have larger populations in 2050 than they have today. Strong growth is quite exceptional and is largely confined to Ireland and Turkey.

Patterns of growth and decline in population at the level of national states can often conceal a great deal of variation around the national trend between regions within states. Such variation can be seen from Map 14.1, which is reproduced from a study of population dynamics in almost 1,500 sub-national regions in 33 European states carried out by Hansjoerg Bucher and Ralf Mai for the Council of Europe (Bucher and Mai 2005). Looked at very broadly, this map reflects the differences in population dynamics across European states just described, with continued growth in much of the north-west rim, a mixed pattern in southern and central Europe and the most extensive swathe of decline found in eastern Europe. However, it also shows varying degrees of internal diversity within states. Turkey provides a case of sharp polarity between expanding and contracting regions: though it has the fastest growing population in Europe at national level, nine of its eighteen regions are in decline (Bucher and Mai: 21–22). Spain shows a west to east gradient, with decline



Map 14.1 Population change in Europe at NUTS3 regional level

Source: Reproduced with permission from Bucher and Mai (2005: 64). Map 3. Regional data not available for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro.

in the border regions with Portugal but regions of strong growth as we move towards the Mediterranean. Although the north-west rim is the demographically strongest zone in Europe, we nevertheless find some regions as the very northern edge of that rim, such as western highlands and islands in Scotland and the northern coast of Sweden, in decline. The highly varied nature of the pattern of decline is suggested by the limited differences found between rural and urban areas: decline is almost as common in urban as in rural regions, though the instances of greatest decline are largely rural (Bucher and Mai 2005, p. 22).

Figure 14.4 sets out the components of population growth in European states. Here the key distinction is between natural increase (the balance between births and deaths) and net migration (the balance between inward and outward migration). In 14 of the 33 states shown in Fig. 14.3, natural increase has already turned negative – and included among these demographically weak performers are two of the biggest states, Russia and Germany, while a third large state, Italy, is only barely on the positive side of natural increase. In three of the states with a negative balance between births and deaths (Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Greece), net immigration is sufficiently strong to retain overall growth in population. In the Mediterranean states, of which Italy and Spain are the most significant in population terms, large volumes of immigration have brought about quite respectable levels of population growth in spite of weak natural increase. For the most part, population decline is so far found only in the former communist states of eastern Europe. Germany is the only western European country that is already experiencing population decline, though even here the former communist East Germany contributes disproportionately to the total national decline (Kroehnert et al. 2006).




Fig. 14.4 Components of population increase/decrease, 2004
 Source: Author's calculations from Council of Europe population database (Council of Europe 2005).

14.4 Age Structure

Alongside its incipient decline in numbers, the second strand to Europe's demographic weakness is the shrinking share of young people and growing share of older people in its population. As Fig. 14.5 shows, Europe's age profile in 1950 was a broad-based pyramid, with some gaps among older children and adults aged in their thirties reflecting the effects of World War II. The weighting of population towards young people is indicated by the fact there were some 50 million infants compared to 21 million 60–64 year olds, a more than twofold differential. By 2000, population ageing had caused the pyramid to evolve into a pear shape, with a narrower base, a wide middle and a thickening top. The number of infants had fallen to 37 million, while the 60–64 year olds had more than doubled to just over 40 million, giving them a slight numerical excess over infants. The UN's forecast for 2050 shows a narrower pear standing on its thin end, with the wider portion concentrated from age 60 upwards. By then, the number of infants is projected to have fallen further, to about 32 million, and at that to be about two-thirds the number of 60–64 year olds (which will then could be around 46 million).




Fig. 14.5 Age pyramids, Europe* 1950, 2000 and 2050
Source: UN 2006 (medium variant projections for 2050).
*UN definition.

Change in the size of the very elderly population is even more dramatic. The number of Europeans aged 85 and over has grown fourfold over the past half-century (from 2.25 million in 1950 to 10.3 million in 2000) and is projected by the UN to increase a further threefold, to well over 30 million, by 2050. This is an increase from less than half a percentage of the total population in 1950 to 1.4 percent in 2000 and to a possible 5 percent in 2050.

Virtually no country in Europe has escaped considerable population ageing (Fig. 14.6). Turkey and Albania, because of their late decline in fertility, are the most youthful. Ireland, at the other end of the continent, shows the smallest increase in the elderly share of the population over the past half-century, for the reason that its elderly share was large by contemporary standards in 1950 and its demographic recovery since then has kept that share more or less static. Even in these cases, however, the absence of serious population




Fig. 14.6 Percentage of population aged 65+ in European countries, 1950 and 2000
 Source: UN Population database, 2006 Revision. No data for Serbia and Montenegro.

ageing to date is only a matter of delay rather than of permanent avoidance, since the next few decades will see them move down the same path of changing age structure already trodden by most of the rest of Europe. Italy is the country that is leading the way down that path (in the world as a whole, only Japan has aged to a similar degree). In 1950, Italy had less than 8 percent aged 65 or over. By 2000, that had increased to over 18 percent and, according to UN projections, it could reach 35 percent by 2050. Coming behind Italy is a mixed group of countries where the elderly share of the population had exceeded 15 percent by 2000. These include states from the former communist east (Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria), from southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal), and from central Europe (Germany and Austria), as well countries of the north-west rim (such as the UK and France) that are among the stronger demographic performers in Europe on many counts. This group of countries has arrived at current levels of population ageing through diverse paths (for example, in regard to the timing and extent of fertility decline and of increased longevity), which indicates that a changing balance between young and old people in the population is not the outcome of a single, uniform demographic process.

14.5 Low Fertility

The greatest single source of unease about Europe's demographic dynamism (or lack of it) comes from its low fertility rate (for general accounts, see Billari 2005, d'Addio and d'Ercole 2005, Frejka and Sardon 2004, Sleebos 2003). The indicator that receives most attention in this context is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is an estimate of the number of children the average woman would have if over her lifetime she bore children in line with the age distribution of births found in a particular year. This indicator is often criticised as misleading since it is based on birth data from a single year and as such is liable to fluctuate from year to year in a way that can be out of line with movements in the actual average number of births that women have. Nevertheless, it has an immediacy and intuitive appeal that over-rides its technical shortcomings. The story it tells of European demographic weakness in the past two decades has been dramatic: in 1990, no country in Europe had a total fertility rate below 1.3, but by 2001, 57 percent of Europeans were living in countries with such 'lowest-low' fertility (Sobotka 2004: 200).

The concern with Europe's fertility trend (along with that of its partner in fertility decline, Japan) is caused in part by its poor showing compared to the United States (Fig. 14.7). By the late 1950s, Japan had already fallen below the replacement fertility rate (2.1 births per woman) and it set out to decline further from the 1970s onwards. Europe's baby boom of the 1950s was muted compared to that of the United States, but by the mid-1970s, the US TFR had fallen sharply from the peak of the mid-1950s and had arrived at a point marginally below the European rate. However, since then, the USA has staged a modest recovery, and since the early 1990s, its birth rate has hovered just above 2. Europe continued to drift downwards, particularly in the 1980s as more countries joined the falling trend, and since the early 1990s the European fertility rate has hovered just at or below 1.5 births per woman. The discomfiting fact for Europe, therefore, is that for going on two decades now, the US fertility rate has consistently been up to a third higher than that of Europe.

Viewed in a longer historical perspective, Europe's fertility decline since the 1960s could be seen as a return to a downward trend that was already underway as far back as the 1880s but was interrupted by a brief resurgence in the period after World War II




Fig. 14.7 Total fertility rates in Europe, USA and Japan, 1950–2005
 Source: UN Population database, 2006 Revision.

(Therborn 2005, Chesnais 1992). France, the historical pioneer of fertility decline, already had a total fertility rate below 3 in the 1890s and fell below 2 in the years between 1915 and 1920. In the 1930s, low fertility spread over much of the most developed regions of Europe – both Germany and England and Wales, for example, experienced total fertility rates below 2 in this period (Chesnais 1992: 543).

The post-1960s phase, therefore, can be seen as a second wave of decline, distinguished from the first both in how low it has dropped and in how widely it is spreading around the world (Therborn 2005). Figure 14.8 picks out a number of indicative countries which show how this second wave of decline spread across Europe. France, the leader in the first wave of decline, stabilized in the post-1960s period at a rate that was merely low rather than, as in much of the rest of Europe, very low. By the early 2000s, its fertility was in the vicinity





Fig. 14.8 Total fertility rates in indicative European countries, 1950–2005
 Source: UN Population database, 2006 Revision.

of 1.9 and at that was touching the top of the European fertility league. This outcome was helped in part by high fertility among immigrants but also by a fertility rate among the native French that, at 1.65, was in the upper half of the distribution for the continent as a whole (Toulemon 2004; for an overview of the highly variable contribution of immigrants to fertility in a number of European countries, see Sobotka 2008). Germany, another early decliner, had a smaller recovery in fertility than France in the late 1950s and early 1960s and fell further than France in the second wave of decline. By the mid-1970s, German fertility had dropped below 1.5 and there it has remained since. While other European countries have since fallen even lower than Germany, none has had such a long exposure to sub-1.5 fertility rates. Germany thus stands out in Europe as a major instance of very low fertility that has persisted for at least a full generation.

Spain is included in Fig. 14.8 as a representative of the southern European experience. Here the second wave of decline was later to arrive – fertility rates remained above 2.5 until that late 1970s – but it caught up quickly with a precipitous fall in the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Spain and Italy were competing for bottom spot on the world fertility tables. During the 1990s, eastern Europe – represented by Russia in Fig. 14.7 – joined in the movement towards very low fertility. Family supports in the communist era had succeeded in keeping fertility rates above the replacement level, but in the post-communist transition, the majority of the former communist states quickly dropped into the critically low region of 1.3 or less, and in doing so took over from Italy and Spain as the weakest fertility performers in Europe. Looking at Europe as a whole, therefore, very low fertility could be said to have arrived in the north-west and centre in the 1960s and 1970s, to have spread to southern Europe in the 1980s and to have swept into eastern Europe in the 1990s.

The full range of national fertility rates now found around Europe is shown in Fig. 14.9. Though all are low by historical standards, the gap between top and bottom is wide. This is particularly so when Turkey is included in the picture – its fertility rate in 2005 of 2.19 is the equivalent of one child higher than that of the lowest, Bosnia-Herzegovina (at 1.19). Apart from Turkey, 11 of the other 40 states included in Fig. 14.8 have fertility rates in the ‘comfort zone’ of 1.7 or above, that is, where births may not be numerous enough to replace the population but which require only a manageable supplement from immigration to keep population either relatively stable or on a modest growth path. However, 26 states are in the discomfort zone below 1.5, nine of them in the crisis region below 1.3.

The latter very low rates are likely to be short term, reflecting the tempo effects of postponement of births among women since the early 1990s. Indeed in the last few years, total fertility rates in many European countries have begun to edge slightly upwards (thus sparking the hopes of a demographic ‘bounce-back’ in Europe referred to earlier). If, following postponement, women go on to have as many children as their precursors did in the pre-postponement period, completed family size will be higher than the total fertility rates of the 1990s and early 2000s would imply. While there are techniques for adjusting period fertility rates to take account of tempo effects (Sobotka 2004, Sobotka et al. 2005), it is a matter of some conjecture whether women who reached childbearing age in the years of deferred fertility in the 1990s will yet go on the ‘recuperate’ the births they missed out on by delaying the start of family formation. Unless they do so, at least to some degree, Europe outside the north-west rim faces the possibility, not of the modern equilibrium between low fertility and low mortality envisaged in the 1950s, but of a new disequilibrium where mortality is low but fertility is even lower and where, if the births deficit is wide and long-lasting enough, population could enter a new era of sharp, sustained contraction (Lutz 2006).



(a) 2004.

Fig. 14.9 Total fertility rates for European countries, 2005 or nearest available year

Sources: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey – WHO European Health for all database; all others – Eurostat New Cronos database.

While low fertility, and in many instances *very* low fertility, is now common in Europe, there are many differences between countries in what it entails. Some countries have had a considerable rise in childlessness and in some cases, particularly Germany, this has been identified as a major driver of fertility decline (in Germany, the incidence of childlessness rose from 11 percent among the cohort born in 1940 to 32 percent among the cohort born in 1965 – Birg 2001). However, countries differ in this regard. In a study of eight EU countries, Pearse (1999) found that, comparing the age cohort born in 1940 to that born

in 1960, three countries had experienced substantial increases in childlessness but five had not (for example, the percentage childless remained at 8 percent in France and rose only from 7 to 8 percent in Portugal). The unusually strong role of childlessness in Germanic countries is reflected in surveys of family size preferences: Germany and Austria stand out as countries with low average ideal family size (both below 1.8 among women aged under 35 in Eurobarometer data from 2002 reported in Fahey and Spéder 2004: 28–30), and that in turn reflects the unusually large minorities among those women who state ‘none’ or ‘one’ as their preferred number of children (Fahey and Spéder 2004, pp. 28–30; see also Testa 2007).

14.6 Mortality and Life Expectancy

One of the great achievements of modern civilisation is the successful war it has waged on early death. In the mid-nineteenth century, as a rough rule of thumb, it took two births to produce one live young adult. Today, survival from birth to early adulthood has generally exceeded 97 percent in developed countries. As a result, the latest phase of the war on death has shifted the battlefield from childhood and early adulthood to early old age and has implicitly redefined early death to refer as much to something that happens among people aged in their sixties and seventies as among younger people. This shift is evident in the huge gains in how long older people can expect to live that have been achieved in the past three decades. In the EU15, for example, life expectancy at age 65 increased by one-third between 1970 and 2005 (from 14.6 to 19.1 years – WHO European Health for All Database, accessed January 2008). The biggest contributor to this advance was a sharp fall in circulatory diseases. In the EU15, deaths from circulatory diseases among those aged 65 and over dropped from 3,500 per 100,000 in the early 1970s to 1,650 in 2005, a reduction of over a half (*ibid*). Deaths from cancer, the other major killer disease, have been slower to reduce: in the EU15, deaths among those aged 65 and over from this cause in 2005 (at 1,000 per 100,000) were only 5 percent lower than they had been in 1970 (1050 per 100,000).

Large and continuous gains in overall life expectancy have become so commonplace in the modern world that what stands out are instances where they have failed to occur. Europe today provides a case in point, represented by the dramatic reversal in life expectancy that has emerged in large regions of the former Soviet Union since the collapse of communism. The quite unexpected advent of this reverse, coupled with the collapses in fertility referred to earlier, gives an added and almost freakish element to demographic decline to this region of Europe, a degree of demographic crisis that is exceeded only by the AIDS-stricken regions of the world (most of which are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa).

Figure 14.10 shows the basic picture for major regions of Europe by reference to trends in life expectancy at birth. The EU15 has experienced continuous gain in this indicator over the past three decades, with a rise from just under 72 years in 1970 to just under 80 years in 2004. Turkey has gained even more dramatically, though starting at a low base in 1970 (life expectancy of 54.15 years) and with a slight reverse at the end of the period (down to under 69 years life expectancy in 2004 from a high point of 70 reached in 2001 and 2002). The ten new member states that joined the EU in 2004, which are dominated by eight ex-communist countries, showed little gain in life expectancy in the closing years of communist rule or in the early years of transition, but by 1995 they were on a steady upward path. The striking






Fig. 14.10 Trends in life expectancy at birth in Europe
 Source: WHO European Health for All database (downloaded November 2007).

deviation from the overall picture is found in the ex-Soviet sphere, represented in Fig. 14.10 by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, the association of eleven former Soviet Republics of which Russia is the largest member). Here a sharp reverse in life expectancy occurred in the early years of post-communist transition, most notably in Russia. Life expectancy at birth in Russia for males and females combined fell by almost 6 years between the late 1980s and 1994, and by 2004 little real recovery had taken place.

The main contributor to the new mortality crisis in Russia is an exceptionally high death rate among Russian men (World Bank 2005). Male life expectancy at age 15 in Russia fell by almost 8 years between the early 1980s and 1994, and by 2004, the gap between male and female life expectancy at that age had widened to 13 years, a uniquely wide gender differential (Fig. 14.11). The proximate cause of this outcome was an epidemic of self-damaging behaviour among Russian men, centred mainly on alcohol and tobacco. A World Bank study has estimated that drinking was the biggest contributor to Russian men’s exceptional health problems, with smoking not far behind – these two factors together accounted for 30 percent of excess loss of disability-free years of life found in Russia in 2002 (see table in Fig. 14.11). In most of Europe, key aspects of demographic contraction could be viewed as consequences of developments that are largely benign in themselves – fertility decline as a reflection of women’s greater control over their own reproductive functions, population ageing as in part a consequence of better health and greater longevity among older people. In the large ex-Soviet regions, however, the male mortality crisis of the 1990s added a dimension that has no redeeming features and that lends a direness to demographic decline that has no parallel anywhere else in the developed world.



Source: WHO European Health for All database (downloaded January 2007)

Russia: % of disability-adjusted life years lost attributable to 8 leading risk factors

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Alcohol | 16.5% |
| 2. High blood pressure | 16.3% |
| 3. Tobacco | 13.4% |
| 4. High cholesterol | 12.3% |
| 5. High body-mass index | 8.5% |
| 6. Low fruit & vegetable intake | 7.0% |
| 7. Physical inactivity | 4.6% |
| 8. Illicit drugs | 2.2% |

Fig. 14.11 The mortality crisis in the former Soviet Union
Source: World Bank (2005).

14.7 Migration

The impending decline in the number of natives in most European societies means that migration is likely to be a significant part of Europe’s demographic future. European citizens do not like that prospect, and already anti-emigrant attitudes are hardening in many European countries (Boeri and Brücker 2005). Academic commentators looking at the

demography of European migration have also sounded notes of alarm about what it may portend for Europe's future (Smil 2005, Coleman 2006).

Figure 14.4 has already presented a snapshot of recent levels of net migration in European countries. Here the concern is less with the details of migration than with its overall scale and significance. The point to be considered is whether the scale is as large as some of the commentary on the topic implies and whether its significance may lie as much in its implications for European mind-sets as in effects on European population. Despite the anti-migrant feeling now arising in Europe, one could remark at how little rather than how much population mobility occurs in Europe, particularly in the richer regions. There are difficulties in making precise statements on this question since the plethora of ways of counting migrants (not to speak of domestic movers) adopted by different states means that our grasp of the basic facts of population mobility is surprisingly poor (Lemaitre et al. 2007, OECD 2006).⁵ Yet it appears that workers in the richer parts of Europe are less willing to move to find jobs now than were their predecessors in the 1950s and 1960s and than are their present-day counterparts in major competitor countries (especially the United States). Boeri et al. (2002: viii), for example, judge that less than half a percentage point of the EU labour force changes region of residence a year, compared to 2.5 percent moving across states in the United States. Even when movement between sub-national regional units within EU states is included, the European Commission finds that labour mobility is only about one-third of the level found at inter-state level in the United States (European Commission, 2006: 220, 223). It is in this context that the Commission bemoans the lack of a 'genuine mobility culture' in the EU and laments the drag on EU economic growth that results (ibid., 207; see also Krieger 2008; on the relative importance of labour immobility compared to other factors as impediments to EU economic growth and regional convergence, see Funck and Pizzati 2003). Resulting economic sluggishness in turn contributes to resentment against immigration from outside, even where immigrant labour is needed to fill gaps that native labour will not respond to (Boeri and Brücker 2005). This creates what has been called the 'vicious circle of European migration': 'while migration is needed because European workers are immobile, the immobility of Europeans makes them less keen to accept migrants' (Boeri et al. 2002, p. ix).

A further aspect of the scale and significance of immigration in Europe relates to what Europeans understand by the term 'outsiders'. Here there is potential for great muddle since most of the outsiders who make up the migration flows into European countries are themselves European and so, from a pan-European point of view, are not outsiders at all. The OECD calculates that the top ten source countries in 2004 for immigration into the OECD's European member states provided those states with almost a million immigrants – but that over 800,000 of these came from other European countries (OECD 2006, p. 33). Romania and Poland were the two top countries of origin, between them accounting for

⁵In measuring migration *flows*, the main source of variation in counting practices lies in the degree to which data seek to exclude temporary migrants such as students and visiting family members. Recent efforts by the OECD to harmonise international immigration data focus on *permanent* migration and on that basis produce estimates of immigration for some OECD countries (particularly Japan, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Austria and the UK) that are substantially below usually published national statistics (Lemaitre et al. 2007, p. 6). In counting the *stock* of immigrants, the main issue is the distinction between the *foreign-born* population and the *non-national* population, with the latter referring only to those who have not adopted the nationality of their host country (for estimates of the migrant stock measured in both ways for a number of countries, see OECD 2006: 45). In Germany in 2004, for example, the non-national population was estimated at 8.9 percent of the total while the foreign-born population was estimated at 13 percent (ibid.).

close to four out of every ten immigrants into the rest of Europe. Morocco (with 12 percent of the total) and the United States (with 5 percent) were the only two non-European states to feature in the top ten list. Much of European migration, therefore, takes the form of a spatial re-shuffling of Europe's existing ethno-national populations rather than a genuine influx from 'outside'.

The corollary of this is that immigration from the 'real' outside has not yet been or is unlikely to become large, at least in comparison with other major developed countries that Europeans often take as comparators. Over the past two decades, the period in which immigration is said to have risen rapidly in Europe, net immigration from outside the continent amounted to the equivalent of 3.7 percent of its population at the end of the period (the concept of Europe referred to here is that of the UN and thus excludes Turkey). This compares to an immigrant inflow into the United States of 8.4 percent of population over the same period and 13 percent in Australia (calculations based on UN population database 2006 revision). The UN's medium variant projections up to 2050 envisage a net immigration total for Europe by the end of that period equivalent to 5.5 percent of population, compared to corresponding figures of 12 percent for the United States and 16 percent for Australia. Some regional areas within Europe will undoubtedly have more immigration than others but again not to an exceptional degree by world standards. In the United Nations projections, only Northern Europe is assumed to experience immigration totals in the 45 years from 2005 to 2050 that, at 8.4 percent of population, approximate those accumulated over the past 20 years in the United States.

14.8 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to describe the main constituents of what many people see as Europe's depressing population prospects – its apparently inevitable shift towards a smaller, greyer and less ethnically cohesive population in the future. Some disagree that the picture is as bleak as is often supposed, on the grounds that either the forecasts may be wrong (for example, in that birth rates may unexpectedly recover) or that, even if correct, their consequences may be more bearable than expected, particularly if Europe responds in sensible ways. Yet there is no doubt that present demographic trends cast a shadow over Europe's future and raise fundamental questions about the turn it should take to preserve its position as a leading world region.

Those questions apply with full force to the 'European project' itself, the European Union's attempt to modify, if not fully overcome, the modern ethno-national fragmentation of the continent. Mention has earlier been made of certain demographic aspects of that challenge, not least the sheer number of states the EU has to cope with and their great diversity in population size. In addition, the divergence now emerging between the stronger and weaker demographic performers among EU states (basically, between the still growing states of the north-west rim and the rest – the demographically faltering states of southern, central and eastern Europe) adds a new element of diversity to the European mix. Yet, as well as looking at how demography might shape the prospects of the EU, one might also ask what the EU might have to offer by way of solutions to Europe's demographic problems. One obvious aspect of such solutions is the very fact of union itself: Europe as an aggregation of discrete states might lose demographic weight in the world but the EU as a single political entity would still remain near the top of the global league in population

size (with its present 27 states, it could rest at third in the world list after India and China for decades to come – Demeny 2003).

The second potentially important consequence of European integration lies in its as yet unfulfilled capacity to unleash Europe's economic energies, particularly in regard to job creation. The demographic significance of this potential could lie in its impact on a key aspect of Europe's population weakness, namely, its low fertility. There has been much discussion of the pro-family policies that European states might implement in order to boost fertility. However, the lesson of the past two decades is that the best general support for fertility lies not in any particular mix of family policies but in an abundance of jobs, particularly jobs for women (see especially d'Addio and Mira d'Ercole 2005; also Castles 2003; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Ahn and Mira 2002; Sleebos 2003; Billari 2005). The underlying argument here is that Europe's sluggish fertility performance may well be a symptom of its sluggish economy and particularly of its dysfunctional labour market, as reflected in its static job numbers and high unemployment rates. The big question, then, is whether the EU can help deliver the surge in employment that may well be the most effective antidote to Europe's critical shortage of births.

A third aspect of a possible EU impact on Europe's population future relates to migration. Here the issue in part is how the EU may help manage migration flows (European Commission 2006). The more fundamental question, though, is whether it can mould European mind-sets so that the twentieth-century attachment to the mono-ethnic state, rooted in nationalist thinking, may give way to a multi-ethnic model of polity and society. The goal of detaching polity from ethnicity is at the heart of the EU project: it is central both to the politics of 'ever-greater union' and the economics of market integration. But it also has demographic implications, as it could help foster the fluid inter-mingling of the ethno-national populations that readier migration would entail. Relocation of people from one part of Europe to another does not of itself add to population numbers, but, as the champions of European integration argue, it may well be necessary for the kind of social and economic re-energising of the continent that is required to get Europe's demographic motor moving again.

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Chapter 15

Religion and Churches

Roberto Cipriani

The European social scene is changing rapidly, particularly in the field of religion and churches. New religious communities and religious organizations are settling in different parts of Europe, sometimes very far from their original habitats. The phenomenon of religious acculturation represents a challenge involving these immigrant religious movements and the indigenous peoples and cultures they meet.

The departure point is that Europe is characterized by a considerable presence of Christians (more than 550,000,000), including different versions of Catholicism, dominant in the centre and the south, and Protestantism, present in the centre and the north. For centuries other confessions have been present too, but recently new migratory flows have increased the presence of Islam and introduced a number of oriental religions.

15.1 From Polytheism to Monotheism

In ancient times polytheistic religions prevailed in Europe before being replaced later by the monotheistic religions of “salvation” such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Each culture expressed its peculiar religion in its own particular way, however. In fact, the original context in which a religion developed determined its specificity, also in terms of cultural identity. Identical worship was reserved for commonly shared gods.

It is important to remember that “polytheist populations of ancient times did not separate and distinguish the religious dimension from all other spheres of human activity” (Scarpi 2001: 5–6). Moreover “similar religious dimensions are closely connected with complex and multifaceted social phenomena, such as the division of tasks and labour, specialization, urban structure and the use of writing. Geographically speaking they were to be found in an area extending from Mesopotamia to the entire Mediterranean basin up to Central and Northern Europe, over a period dating between the end of the fourth and early third centuries BC and 28 February 380, when the edict of Theodosius *De fide Catholica* proclaimed Christianity the official religion. These worlds were neither closed nor communicatively isolated; on the contrary there was continuous intercourse between them”.

In Palestine, Christianity began with the birth of Jesus, whose message stemmed from an innovation of Jewish doctrine. The historical nature of Christianity is fundamental. It

R. Cipriani (✉)
Department of Sciences of Education, University of Roma Tre, Roma, Italy
e-mail: rciprian@uniroma3.it

spread through the whole of the ancient Roman Empire, and despite persecution, Rome became the See of the Popes.

By the end of the fourth century AD, the Emperor Theodosius proclaimed Christianity – as already stated above – as the official religion of the Empire, thus forbidding any other cult. In 496, Clovis, King of France, became a Christian and in 800 Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Sacred Roman Empire in Rome.

In 1054 the Eastern Schism split the church in two: the Roman Church and the Orthodox Church. In 1453 the Turks conquered Constantinople, thus contributing to the extension of Islam. In 1517 Martin Luther started the Protestant Reformation. In Switzerland by 1522 Zwingli was promoting the Reformation. In 1531 Henry VIII, King of England, quarrelled with the Church of Rome and named Thomas Cranmer Bishop of Canterbury, an act which led to the foundation of Anglicanism. Between 1530 and 1547 in Germany the Schmalkaldic League, a confederation, was set up to oppose Charles V's injunction to remain within the Church of Rome and which contributed to the spread of Lutheran Protestantism, despite losing the Eight-Month War. In 1562 clashes between Catholics and Calvinists began in France (where the Calvinists were called Huguenots, the victims of the Paris massacre on St. Bartholomew's Eve, 1572).

The Peace of Westphalia was decisive for Germany and Western Europe, because it put an end to the Thirty Years' War and reduced the political influence of religion and confirmed the principle whereby the religion of an area was the religion of its inhabitants: *cuius regio eius et religio* (those living in a region were expected to conform to its religion, otherwise they were obliged to go into exile leaving their property and goods behind them. In other words, subjects were obliged to follow the religion of their sovereign). In Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic areas the Peace of Westphalia was never implemented due to fear of the Turks.

Finally, it is important to recall that it was only in 1965 that the reciprocal excommunication between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches was revoked thanks to the stance taken by the Catholic hierarchy during the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council (1962–1965) in Rome.

Thus we can see how the primitive mythological and nature, funerary or sacrificial, polytheistic and pagan cults (including those of oriental influence) were replaced by monotheistic religions, inspired mainly by Sacred Scripture: Judaism and Christianity first, Islam later, including their various ramifications ranging from the Sephardic and Ashkenazi to the Zionist forms of Judaism, from the Catholic and Orthodox to the Protestant forms of Christianity, from the Sunnites and Shiites to the Sufi forms of Islam. Further subdivisions exist, especially within Protestantism, which also includes the so-called free Churches that do not formally accept the Reformation but actually belong to it. The free Churches include congregations like the Baptists (founded in England in 1640) and Methodists (established in Oxford in 1792). The Italian Valdese Church (whose present congregation stands at 46,000) represents a case apart; it preceded the Reformation because it was set up in 1176 thanks to the initiative of the Lyonnais merchant Peter Valdo.

Judaism had established itself in Rome long before the arrival of oriental cults and was destined to spread later throughout the whole of Europe. In fact “owing to the Arab-Islamic conquest of Spain in the seventh century, this country became the vital centre of Jewish history. Later on, numerous mystical movements appeared all over Europe until 1492, when, with the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, they continued in Palestine. The presence of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe became important where Judaism developed a peculiar culture of its own. During the century of Enlightenment theories of emancipation caused a radical rethinking of Jewish identity as far as both general and specifically Jewish

doctrine were concerned, generating a plurality of answers, which constitute the basis of contemporary Judaism” (Filoramo 2001: 174).

After the Babylonians destroyed the first Temple in 587–586 BC and the Romans destroyed the second Temple in AD 70, Judaism – which emerged during the second millennium BC – began its centuries-long Diaspora, which is strictly connected with the Judaic religion and has become an essential vehicle of cultural exchange with other religious experiences. The spread of Judaism at first to confined oriental territories and afterwards to Europe provoked profound disagreements within the religion. Judaism is first of all a religion of the book, or, more precisely, it is a religion of books called the Bible, which is based on the belief in a sole God. Its 39 books are divided into Law (Torah), Prophets and Writings, following an order which does not coincide with the Catholic Bible but which is accepted by Protestants. There is also the Talmud, a collection of law-ritual documents and normative topics.

During the heyday of Arabic expansion and up to 1492 (the year the Jewish people were expelled from Spain) the language spoken by the Jews was Arabic, which permitted then to interact with the communities that hosted them. Hebrew was spoken as well, however.

An important aspect of Judaism in Europe is the distinction between its two branches: the first branch is oriental or Sephardic which had its origins in the ancient Babylonian period and was the basis of the Spanish Jewish culture (Sepharad in medieval Hebrew meant Iberian Peninsula), this branch derived from previous Byzantine experiences. The second branch, called Ashkenazi (from Ashkenaz, which in medieval Hebrew meant Germany), developed Yiddish a language of Palestinian origin. This group is present in Central and Oriental Europe and spread from Northern France and Central Europe into Russia and the Eastern European countries. The two branches differ in behaviour and ritual.

After 1492 a decisive change in the presence of the Jews in Europe occurred: in The Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania and other Eastern European countries the Jewish population increased, as well as in Italy and all over the Turkish Empire. Later on, the ghettos were established, where Jews lived apart from the rest of the population (in Venice and Rome for instance).

Recent developments have generated three different Judaic perspectives: the orthodox or neo-orthodox perspective which is based entirely on the Torah; the reformed perspective (born in Germany and anxious to replace Hebrew with the German language) which is mainly God based; and the conservative perspective (born in Germany and representing an intermediate position between the first two) which attributes considerable importance to the idea of the Jewish people. Zionism, on the contrary, is political in nature. It began in Eastern Europe, is strongly anarchic-socialist and is against or indifferent to religion.

The picture remains incomplete if we fail to consider the fundamental importance of the presence of Islam in Europe, and not only in recent times (thanks to Turkish immigration into Germany) but also in the past. Islam means submission and is seen as an omni-comprehensive religion embracing every aspect of human life. It was founded by Mahomet, or Muhammed, in AD 622. Its fundamental book is the Koran, which means to recite, to read aloud. In fact, at the Koranic schools one learns to read, reciting the Arabic words out loud. The Koran has 114 *sura* (chapters); each *sura* has a title indicating its contents.

When Mahomet died in 632, he was succeeded by a number of caliphs, who were the chief religious and political authorities. Already by the middle of the seventh century, with Utman, the third Caliph, Arabian expansion penetrated Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

By 711 Spain and France were also a part of the Muslim sphere of influence until 17 October 732 when Charles Martello put an end to Islam by winning the battle of Moussais-La-Bataille (Poitiers). Spain instead remained mainly Muslim for the following 781 years, until 1492 (when, as Christians the Spanish won at Granada, the last remaining Arab fortress and both Arabs and Jews were expelled from the country).

In the meantime Islam expanded eastward as far as Lake Aral due to the annexation of the Umayyad Empire, present-day Kazakhstan. Later, in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans occupied Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans. In the centuries that followed, the Ottoman Empire included the Black Sea and its boundaries extended to Vienna and Kiev. In the nineteenth century the Arab-Muslim expansion started to recede, and territories were lost both in Western and Eastern Europe. However, previously Christian areas, like Anatolia, now Turkey, had become Muslim. Also in the many ex-Russian territories Muslims grew significantly in number.

15.2 The Religious Pattern in Contemporary Europe

We may say that the European continent can be divided into four main areas of religious influence (Barrett et al. 2001):

- 1) the Catholic Church is the main religious influence in central and southern areas (Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Central and South Ireland, Italy, Malta, Southern Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, part of The Netherlands, Latvia and Ukraine);
- 2) Protestantism is the main religious influence in central and northern areas (Iceland, England and Northern Ireland, Central and Northern Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and parts of Hungary, The Netherlands and Belarus);
- 3) the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches are the main religious influence in south-eastern areas (Greece and part of Cyprus and Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Russia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia and Belarus);
- 4) Muslim is the main religious influence in eastern Europe (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Albania and parts of Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Bulgaria and Bosnia Herzegovina).

Talking of minorities, there are considerable numbers of Jews living in Greece and in the Ukraine, while in the United Kingdom, in The Netherlands and in Russia there are large communities of Hindus. Hinduism in Europe is a minority religion which is spreading in all those countries where it existed previously, such as Germany, Norway, Russia, and especially England. Nowadays, migratory flows from India to other European countries, for instance Italy, are increasing. Sikhs are also migrating in great numbers from India to Europe (Denti et al. 2005) and their religion combines elements of Hinduism and Islam.

If Christianity occupies a dominant position in Europe, other religions are significantly present almost everywhere but mostly in larger urban areas, where non-Christian places of worship are so large and visible that they cannot be ignored. An eloquent example of this is the Islamic mosque in Rome, which is also a fascinating work of art, designed by the Italian architects Paolo Portoghesi and Vittorio Ghigliotti, and which was officially inaugurated in 1990. The main Jewish synagogue, which was built in Rome between 1899 and 1904, is

less recent. The mosque in Paris, which is also the residence of the great Imam, dates back to the 1920s. One must consider, however, that although the construction of such buildings for worship is relatively recent, that does not mean that members of those religions were not already resident in the same areas before. For example, the Jewish people were active in Rome before the advent of Christianity and have had synagogues all over Europe for centuries: in Venice as well as in Leghorn, Amsterdam and Berlin, in Prague (the famous Maysel) and Nuremberg, Essen, Köln and Plauen, Hamburg and Worms (as early as 1034), also Krakow and Frankfurt-am-Main, Regensburg and Poznań.

All this shows that religious differences in Europe did not begin in the twentieth century but their roots date back much farther. The same may be said for mosques, although they had received less protection, for reasons linked to the expulsion of the Muslims from Spain towards the end of the fifteenth century; nonetheless the great mosque in Cordoba (which dates back to 785) testifies to its glorious past. This building despite the treatise of 1492 which formally granted freedom of worship to Muslims, but in actual fact obliged them either to convert to Catholicism or to go into exile. Islamic reaction to the situation exploded around Granada in 1566 with the revolt of the Moriscos, but once more repression followed and the expulsion decree of 1609 marked the end of the Islamic presence in Spain. Finally, also in Greece, where the Orthodox religion prevails, there is a Roman Catholic cathedral; the same is true of Moscow. In the heart of Anglican London stands Westminster cathedral, the largest Catholic Church in the United Kingdom, built between 1895 and 1903, in Byzantine style.

Outstanding changes have recently taken place especially in Russia, where the former state atheism has been replaced by the old czarist triad of “orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality” as a result a growing number of places of worship have been restored or built. In the past, Moscow had 1000 churches, which were reduced to 40 by 1989. However, by 1999 there were already 300 and 378 by the year 2006; at present a further 90 churches are under construction and 33 more are waiting to have their religious status restored. As to higher education and science, Moscow and St. Petersburg both have an Orthodox university and Russia has 37 seminaries and 38 religious secondary schools. Membership of the Orthodox Church is increasing and rose from 51.7% of the population in 2001 to 64% in 2006. During the same period Buddhism reached 1% of the population while before that they accounted for only 0.4%. These data were provided by VTsIOM a Russian polling agency, the outcome of a research campaign which confirmed the fact that religious practice in Russia reached 84% while in 1989 it stood at a mere 34%. A similar increase is surprising and may lead one to doubt the methodological soundness of the poll and other specific factors. However, it is impossible to deny the fact that remarkable changes are taking place and that they seem to refute the Kääriäinen (1999) thesis, whereby after religious revival the initial situation stabilizes itself. In other words, an increase in the number of places of worship does not necessarily indicate a religious renaissance.

In fact “it is an exaggeration to speak of a ‘religious renaissance’ in Russia. Even if belief in God has increased since the end of the communist regime, people’s basic knowledge about religion is still poor. Religiousness is not organized or connected with a particular (i.e. Orthodox) confession; on the contrary, it is ill defined, based either on religious upbringing at home or on the religious information delivered by mass media. Only a minority (mostly older people, women and people with less education) believe in the basic doctrines of Christianity, and the nature of God is understood by most in a non-Christian manner. At the same time, most people have a positive, ‘open’ attitude towards religion and towards the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church, with its 1000-year-old history, represents stability in a society where many institutions of the

previous regime have collapsed” (Kääriäinen 1999: 44). Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church may be seen as a sort of “diffused religion” (Cipriani 2001) that, being historically rooted, emerges again whenever circumstances favouring its presence and ulterior canalization arise. It may be that in the last few years Russia has known a much more important renaissance than that registered by Kääriäinen towards the end of the 1990s.

Changes are also evident in other religions of non-European origin present in almost all of Europe. Besides the continuously growing migratory flows for reasons of employment, the arrival of vast numbers of refugees must also be taken into consideration. In 2005, 1,472,587 persons officially moved to Europe, the majority of whom settled in Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

The mixture of religions, churches and temples, but also of new religious movements (Barker 1991), is a clear indicator of the pluralism emerging from the *European Values Study* of 1999–2000 where specific convergences/divergences also create a common shared plateau of values (Inglehart 2003) in areas usually homogeneous. In traditionally Christian countries like Ireland and Portugal but also in predominantly Catholic countries like the Czech Republic, Slovenia, France, Belgium, Austria, Italy and Spain as well as Anglican Great Britain and Orthodox Greece there is a favourable tendency towards propitious secular and rational values and values of self-expression. These latter values are less evident in Poland, where there is a certain traditionalism as well as survival values; the same may be said for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Romania; for other countries such as Slovenia, Bosnia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Albania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine and Moldavia secular-rational and *survival values* are combined; finally, Protestant Europe is strongly characterized by secular-rational and *self-expression* values – especially in Germany, Finland, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden and Iceland. The relationship between state and religion is not the same throughout Europe: in some countries there is a clear separation between them, at times foreseen by the law (as is the case in France since 1905), in other countries there is a conservative regime (Spain, Italy and Portugal), while a minority of other countries has a state church (Scandinavian countries and Great Britain). In reality the situation is much more diversified and goes beyond declarations of principle and state legislation, funding of religious education is to be found for example in Belgium, Ireland and The Netherlands, with the churches acting as agents in hospitals and schools, in social assistance and hosting activities. At public level in particular, many attempts are being made to mediate between different values, thus trying to solve problems stemming from ideological and confessional pluralism.

As a matter of fact, in Europe, some secular states offer a number of privileges to religious communities. In other cases state and religion do not share a common perspective, yet they do not take completely opposite stances; sometimes they negotiate on issues as they arise. The same is true of majority churches in the case of minority Churches, movements and religious groups in the same country. Such de facto situations are officially highlighted by the Catholic Church itself for example, by Pope John Paul II during his apostolic letter issued after the synod in 28 June 2003, *Ecclesia in Europa*, where we read at point 20: “Particular Churches in Europe are not simple entities or private organizations. In actual fact, they operate within a specific institutional dimension which deserves to be recognised legally, in complete respect of civil institutions”. Besides, point 55 states that “it is necessary to build up a deep and intelligent *inter-religious dialogue* in particular with Judaism and Islam”. All this is focused on an evidently European perspective because, according to point 109 of the same exhortation, “in the present process of transformation, *first of all, Europe is asked to find its own true identity*. In fact, even if Europe comprises a diversified

reality, a new model of unity within diversity needs to be found, in order to become a community of reconciled nations open to other Continents and directly involved in the present process of globalization”.

15.3 The Decline of Religious Practice

There is a common datum relating to religions and churches in Europe: a visible reduction of religious practice and participation. According to *The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–1999*, France, Belgium and Great Britain have registered a higher reduction, respectively, passing from 23 to 5%, from 52 to 10% and from 16 to 4%. Apparently, unless we are in the presence of faulty sampling, the only exception in post-Communist Europe is Georgia, as far as the importance attributed to religion is concerned. Georgia appears to have undergone a significant increase in rates of religious belief, participation and attribution of value. Therefore, as far as religious awakening is concerned, the situation in Orthodox Georgia may be considered analogous to that of the recent position of Orthodox Russia. But according to the *European Values Survey* (and *World Values Survey*) in 1990, 1995–1997 and 1999, participation rates were increasing in Romania (weekly from 18.7 to 24.9%) and Slovakia too (weekly from 33.4 to 40.5%).

A useful religious indicator is provided by the frequency of preachers among the interviewees contacted by the *World Values Survey* between 1981 and 2000: the highest religiosity rate is that of Ireland, followed by Italy and Austria. At a fair distance behind stand Spain, Luxemburg, Germany, Belgium, for the Catholic area, as well as Finland, The Netherlands, Iceland, Great Britain and Denmark for the Protestant area. In Europe France is lowest down on the list.

Norris and Inglehart write (2004: 86) “traditional religious beliefs and involvement in institutionalized religion vary considerably from one country to another; and have steadily declined throughout Western Europe, particularly since the 1960’s. Studies have often reported that many Western Europeans have ceased to be regular churchgoers today outside of special occasions such as Christmas and Easter, weddings and funerals, a pattern especially evident among the young”. Moreover, belief in God diminished between 1947 and 2001, especially in Sweden (–33.6%), The Netherlands (–22%), Norway (–18.9%), Denmark (–17.9%), Great Britain (–16.5%), Greece (–12.3%), West Germany (–12%), Belgium (–11.2%), Finland (–10.8%), France (–10.1%), Switzerland (–7.2%), Austria (–1.9%). The same can be said of belief in life after death: –28% in Norway, –25% in Finland, –23% in Denmark, –22% in The Netherlands, –20% in France, –10% in Sweden and in Greece, –8% in Belgium, –4% in Great Britain, –3% in Switzerland, while it seems to have increased in Italy.

The relationship between religious participation and religious pluralism is quite interesting. There is a high rate of participation where the pluralism rate is low: in Malta, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Romania and Albania. There is a low rate of participation as well as low pluralism in Slovenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Luxemburg, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Russia, France and Sweden. There is low participation and a high rate of pluralism in Switzerland, Germany, Latvia, The Netherlands, Great Britain, Estonia and Czech Republic (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 101). High pluralism and high participation characterize Bosnia, Slovakia, Georgia and Moldova. However, differences do not regard these aspects only. In fact, it has been rightly noticed (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 116–117) that “societies in Central and Eastern Europe differ significantly in numerous factors that could plausibly act as

intervening variables conditioning the relationship between age and religion. These factors include a society's experiences during the transition and consolidation of democracy, as well as in its historical religious culture, the duration of Soviet rule, the relationship between Church and state under Communism, the success of its economic adjustment to the free market during the last decade, its integration into international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, as well as in its degree of ethno-religious homogeneity and fractionalization."

The conclusion reached by Norris and Inglehart (2004: 131–132) is insightful and apt: "It is the more homogeneous cultures, exemplified by the role of Catholicism in Poland, which have best-preserved faith in God and habitual church attendance, not the most plural. And today the post-Communist states with the greatest regulation of the Church turn out to be the *most* religious, not the least. We argue that this is no accident; it reflects the fact that human security encourages secularization, together with the political rights and civil liberties associated with religious freedom in transitional and consolidating democracies."

15.4 The Religious Communities

15.4.1 *The Catholic Church*

In a felicitous statement, one of the greatest experts of Catholicism, the French sociologist and historian Émile Poulat, calls the Church a world of its own, or as he puts it an "Ecclesiosphere" (Poulat 1986: 260). By this he wishes to indicate the Catholic Church's specific area of influence, somewhat akin to those of the United States or the Soviet Union (today of Russia). The Ecclesiosphere is "a sphere of influence of the Roman Catholic Church that forces the other spheres but also other countries to come to terms with it". Besides, the "sphere of the church goes well beyond the church itself as outlined in Canon Law; it can no longer be identified with the people of God, a doctrinal notion which is based on faith" (Poulat 1986: 267). In actual fact, this notion emerges from the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council, held in Rome from 1962 to 1965, which defined the church as "the people of God" at point 29 of its opening document, the Constitution of the Sacred Liturgy, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. But, in actual reality, according again to Poulat (1988: 53) the Catholic Church is something else and identifies itself with the Holy See a "power that is denied but recognized. Historians can tell us how, having been excluded practically from political power since the time of Comte, the church has found a way, little by little, of re-entering the international scene, causing surprise on the part of many outside the church and scandal on the part of some inside the church". To this must be added the capillary presence of Catholic religious structures and organizations, its numerous religious and lay educational institutions, both male and female, which operate all over Europe, especially in Italy and those other countries with a strong Catholic presence from Portugal to Spain, France to Austria, Germany to Poland. Forty-two European countries host ecclesiastical representations of all kinds: patriarchies, archdioceses and dioceses, prelatures, abbeys, apostolic exarchates and ordinariates for the faithful of the eastern rite, military ordinariates, vicariates, prefectures and apostolic administrations, and the so-called *sui juris* missions, a myriad of representatives including cardinals, bishops, prelates, abbots, exarches, military ordinaries, vicars, apostolic administrators. One must also take into consideration its widespread web of cultural institutions, Catholic universities (including, for example, Milan, Louvain, Krakow, Lublin, Warsaw, Bilbao, Lisbon, Nijmegen, the Catholic Institutions of Paris and Toulouse), academies, ecclesiastic and theological

faculties, institutes of education and of higher studies, colleges, boarding schools, seminaries, foundations, libraries, archives, museums.

Thanks to this extensive network, which also includes about 200,000 priests in Europe, the officiation of rites (Roman Latin, Ambrosian, but also several Eastern rites: Alexandrian, Antiochian, Armenian, Chaldean and Constantinopolitan or Byzantine) and religious assistance is guaranteed. Secular movements which support pastoral activity in various fields provide a source of even greater strength operating in areas ranging from schools to sport, health services to the mass media, from the work environment to culture and youth to adult associations.

A further source of Catholic influence is its various sanctuaries (including, among others, Fatima, Lourdes, Santiago de Compostela, Padua, Czestochowa, Mariazell), the destination of continuous pilgrimages with millions of visitors per annum.

From the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council on, the Catholic Church has shown a willingness to interrelate with the other denominations, both Christian and non-Christian, attempting forms of dialogue especially with the churches of the East. Important steps have been taken and declarations of reciprocal goodwill made, but not always in terms of total openness.

Most ecclesiastical action is managed by the Roman Curia and the Vatican Secretary of State, a cardinal who avails of the support of nine congregations for the various questions to be dealt with. Furthermore, one must not overlook the fact that the Vatican is a real state in every sense, with its ambassadors (called nuncios or apostolic delegates) to other states and the numerous diplomatic representations sent to Rome by other nations (over 170) to promote official contacts with the Holy See, that is, with the Pope.

At the national level special Episcopal Conferences have been set up to bring together the bishops of the single countries and take care of pastoral policy in their various districts, usually dioceses governed by a bishop and parishes run by a parish priest. In 1992 a New Catechism of the Catholic Church was issued, drawn up by a commission chaired by the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI. This document is the essential reference document of the Catholic faith, liturgical celebrations, the sacraments, Christian life and prayer. It contains 2,865 points, divided into four parts, in turn subdivided into sections, chapters and articles.

For many centuries the history of the Catholic Church was one with the history of Europe itself. It was only in the sixteenth century that it began to spread to the other continents, especially to the Americas. Meanwhile in Europe it suffered several splits, especially within the Eastern Church. Furthermore, it witnessed internal diversifications of ritual and local reference sites homologous to those of the non-Catholic Eastern Churches. Thus the following Eastern-Rite Catholic Churches emerged: the Byzantine-rite Grand Archbishopric of Lvov of the Ukrainians; the Byzantine-rite eparchy of Hajdudorog, in Hungary, having its principal See in Nyriegyhaza; the Byzantine-rite apostolic hexarchy of the Greek Catholic Church in Athens; the Byzantine-rite Slavic eparchy at Križevci (in Croatia); the Byzantine-rite apostolic hexarchy of the Bulgarian Catholic Church, at Prešov; the Church of the Rumanian Catholics at Blaj; the Byzantine-rite hexarchy in Moscow; the Byzantine-Rite Belarus Catholic Community; the Byzantine and Latin-rite Catholic Communities of Albania; the Byzantine-rite Italo-Albanian Community with its two dioceses (in Calabria and Sicily).

Considerable support was given to the Catholic Church and to its credibility by the numerous religious orders disseminated all over Europe. Of the orders of hermits and monks led by a superior (abbot or prior) one recalls the Benedictines (with monasteries at Montecassino, Italy and Einsiedeln in Switzerland) and the Cistercians (with abbeys at Clairvaux and Pontigny in France), founded several centuries previously, and the orders of

mendicants (who took a vow of poverty), including the various Franciscan orders (Minors, Monks, Capuchins), Dominicans, Augustinians, Carmelites. Monastic life in the charter-houses is particularly distinctive: here each monk has a cell and a small garden linked to a common cloister like the one in the Grande Chartreuse in Grenoble, France (the daily life of which was described in a recent, successful film called “The Great Silence”). The last two centuries have witnessed a significant expansion of the De La Salle order, devoted to the active life, in particular among the young.

It must be said that the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council has permitted the Catholic Church to emerge from its basic Euro- and Rome-centrism. But this new thrust did not reach the foreseen universal, Catholic objective fully. However, new attitudes compared to those of the past towards other Christian and non-Christian religions emerged. The same may be said of dealings with governments and states with which the Catholic Church had had problems in the past. It suffices to recall the *Ospolitic* initiated and fostered by John XXIII and Paul VI. Relations with the Russian Orthodox Church have remained problematic.

Meanwhile the Catholic Church has become less European: it is estimated that no more than 28% of all Catholics reside in Europe. Among European Catholics the Catholic Pentecostalism movement has become particularly relevant and, like Protestant Pentecostalism, it too exalts charismatic phenomena, the role of the Holy Spirit, oral expression, prayer, prophecy, healing, spontaneous manifestation. The development of this phenomenon is so powerful and differentiated that it is difficult to provide a precise outline, because it would have to be adapted to each of the numerous rather independent groups it embraces and which are preferred by many of the faithful because it is more direct, customized and better suited to meet individual needs (unlike the traditional forms of official Catholic religious practice).

There are also other forms of Catholic worship, like that of the so-called old-Catholic Churches which refer to the Union of Utrecht, of Jansenist and anti-Papal origin, present in The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bosnia, Croatia, Sweden, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal: these are in total communion with the Anglican Church which as England’s state religion is autonomous and capable of expanding (especially in Africa, in Nigeria). Anglicanism unites the characteristics of Lutheranism, Calvinism and Catholicism and that helps to explain the fact that it contains three principal branches: the *Low Church* close to the Protestant position, the *High Church* which appears well disposed towards Catholicism and the *Broad Church* which is broader, more liberal and more critical in outlook.

The Eastern Catholic Churches (or Uniates) are an important presence in Europe because they have around 9 million members, an Oriental rite parallel to the Latin, a local liturgical language and a communion with the Catholic Church. In particular, groups of Eastern-Rite Uniates or Greek Catholics live in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and The Ukraine, or in other parts of Eastern Europe, and number about 4 million. They played an underground key role during communist times. The small group of Armenian Uniates must also be mentioned.

15.4.2 The Orthodox Churches

The entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union in 2007 has increased the number of Orthodox believers in the EU. Their numbers are destined to rise from 40 to 200 million if the Union expands farther east. The Moscow patriarchate remains the most important and influential seat of Orthodoxy. Its recent increased visibility, power and

ability in public affairs do not hide that in the past it was more powerful and that the great number of schisms weakened its image. The problems that the patriarchate has to face are as follows: emergence of new independent national churches; recovery of ecclesiastic property as compensation for expropriations carried out after the Leninist decree on nationalization (the subject concerns the conflict with the Greek Catholic Church); lack of religious staff and furthermore its little basic knowledge; the competitive confrontation with Catholicism, Protestantism (both accused of proselytism in Orthodox areas) and Islam.

Russia is probably finding its identity in Orthodoxy, but elsewhere Orthodoxy is the cause of dissent and differentiation. This is the case with Ukraine (at least with part of it) and Moldova, as well as Latvia and Lithuania. The use of Old Slavonic as the language of Orthodoxy has the same function as Latin for Catholicism. This is a way of discouraging attempts at becoming independent (like in Ukraine, in Macedonia, in Bulgaria), typical of churches that use local languages to highlight their difference from the Russian Orthodox Church. The Polish Orthodox Church, on the other hand, has been independent for many years now, since 1924 when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople declared its independence.

Compared to Russia, Greece and Serbia, Bulgaria plays a secondary role within Orthodoxy. In other areas there is a closer relationship between the state and church, as if attempting to create a worship of the state and its rulers. This means that it is the population itself which supports religion through culture. "Forms of culture that comprehend universal Christian values such as sufferance and sacrifice, applied to solid religions (providential mission of the leader and the population, the fact to be chosen by God), and expressing in conventional civil forms the strong archaic worship of the leader, the prince priest, all that exerts a strong action that shows strongly in its historic universality. Worship of state leaders (Russia) is an actual and effective practice in these countries, which is still part of their recent history" (Bogomilova-Todorova 1996: 162). Specifically, in Bulgaria, religiosity is still mainly rural, peasant, pre-socialist and is associated with everyday life, with the work in the fields and a natural environment.

In recent times, and with reference to the vast area of Orthodox culture, boundaries of "canonical territories" have been vindicated to stress rights of supremacy, especially those of the Russian Orthodox Church over the Catholic Church. However, there are other facets to similar issues; in traditionally Islamic areas the thwarting of the hegemony of Moscow is seen as legal action. The same may be said of Buddhist *enclaves* and Jewish nuclei (whose members have dwindled considerably from the 5 million of the nineteenth century). At present, article n. 14 of the Russian Constitution states: "The Russian Federation is secular. No religion can be established as a state or compulsory religion". Moreover the document *Basis of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church* says that (III, 3) "the Church cannot take advantage of the points of view of the state". Also in the Ukraine secular education is envisaged by article n. 35 of the Constitution, while articles n. 5, 7 and 8 establish freedom of religious choice and organization.

The Serbian Orthodox Church experienced the disintegration of Yugoslavia very dramatically due to rising ethnic conflict in 1991 and the confrontation with Catholics and Muslims.

15.4.3 Protestantism

Most European Protestants reside in the north of the continent: Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Germany. These are a homogeneous group of countries where "there

is a growing interest in the matter of the relationships between Church and state both within and outside the Churches” (Harmati 1984: 13). Also the *folk church* of the Northern states is the church of the people because it is local and is therefore legitimated by close relations with the host nation. However, values of everyday life are quite different.

Resistance against Europe is also a feature of Protestantism, according to Dreyfus (1993: 128) who underlines the fact that the Protestant states of Western Europe are doubtful about the construction of a united Europe.

In Finland there has been freedom of religion since 1923. The Lutheran Evangelical Church is recognized by Finnish constitution but it is rather autonomous, more so than other churches of the north. The Pentecostals are the most numerous group of unregistered congregations, while the Methodists are considered a free Church. A good number of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons (a minority) are also present. There is some degree of collaboration between Lutherans, Orthodox and Catholics.

In Denmark, besides Lutherans, we also find Baptists, Pentecostals, Methodists, and Anglicans. In Sweden Protestantism presents a similar distribution. The same may be said for Norway, with Adventists and Mormons in addition. In Lutheran Iceland there are also Pentecostals, Adventists and Baptists. Pentecostals are present in Norway, Romania, Russia, and The United Kingdom.

If in Germany Protestantism and Catholicism are equally distributed, in France Protestantism is a minority religion (Bizeul 1991), except for the areas around the Massif Central, from Ardèche to Poitou, Alsace and Moselle and the Pays de Montbéliard, the Baptist area of Northern France; but they also reside in the Parisian region.

From Lutheranism in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway to Calvinism in Scotland and Switzerland, Protestantism in Europe presents a broad range of positions and numbers, which influence frontiers and boundaries, practices and values, behaviours and attitudes. Together with Baltic Protestantism, Russian Protestantism is one of the oldest forms of Protestantism in continental Europe. It emerged in the sixteenth century imported by groups of volunteer immigrants or prisoners of war. “The first Protestant Congregations were born not in the country but in the cities. As early as 1576 there was a Lutheran Church in Moscow composed principally by Latvian prisoners of war” (Hebly 1976: 17). Later on, Protestant immigrants, mainly German, arrived in Russia and settled mainly in Southern Russia. In 1909 the Pan-Russian Federation of Evangelical Christians was founded. But then persecutions started and lasted until the revolution of 1917. Later they were allowed a certain degree of freedom as antagonists of the Orthodox Church. In 1944 the Union of Evangelical Christians and Baptists was founded. After the war, they were allowed to register again as a religious community in 1947–1948. Therefore, the Evangelical Christians and Baptists were forced to live clandestinely in the USSR.

15.4.4 Islam

Arab-Islamic communities are on the increase in Europe, along with Turkish-Islamic, Albanian, Bosnian, Senegalese, Moroccan, Tunisian, Algerian, Egyptian and many other communities (Iranian, Pakistani, Bengali) who have settled either recently or a long time ago.

In Europe, the Islamic East is a recurrent theme with the media. The initial results are evident already. Immigration in Europe no longer regards the Spanish, the Italians, the Portuguese, but more and more frequently immigrants come from Morocco, Tunisia

or Turkey. They are all labelled as if belonging to one vague category: Arab Muslims, even if the individuals in question are neither Arabs nor Muslims. Generalization is the best way of avoiding a deeper knowledge, stigmatizing is the most convenient means of avoiding hosting and meeting others. That is why “Muslim immigrants, instead of *being, become* ethnic groups. Ethnicization is a classification process where social actors are under classed and reclassified so that a system of crossed and complementary imputations re-qualifies the social hierarchy. This way, racism confines immigrants to a stigmatized position that discredits them. However, isolated ethnicity never emerges. Ethnicities correspond to one another and are linked to each other” (Bastienier 1991: 15).

Allievi (2002: 30) states fittingly that “Islam is no longer *on the other side*, but is here, among us, in the millions of Muslims present and established and (definitely) European citizens. Estimates vary from between 8 and 15 million and more and definitions of Muslims depend on the countries chosen for examination and, obviously, depend also on the thesis to ‘demonstrate’. The frontier between the two worlds has changed: at present, there is no longer only one boundary. The question no longer concerns Islam and the Western countries: Islam is inside the Western countries. It is present-day history”. Islam is therefore an integral part of Europe, especially as regards the second generation which is completely socialized within European territories, speaking one or more European languages, and which represents the *de facto* Euro-Islamic generation (Allievi and Nielsen 2003; Maréchal 2003). In fact, “Muslim Europe is quite different from what we know as an institutional projection. To begin with, it is larger: it is not limited to the fifteen countries (whose inner and outer boundaries have no relevance to Islam), and is firmly expanding towards the East. In some East European countries there are significant non-immigrant Islamic minorities, with regular citizenship and in possession of longstanding and consolidated modalities of relationship with local majorities and with institutional management of a specific variety of the Islamic religion (which is also linguistic and cultural, as is the case of Turkish-speaking minorities, present-day residues of Ottoman domination) by the States involved. Thus Europe start from the Atlantic Ocean but it is heading more and more towards the Urals” (Allievi 2002: 141).

Allievi hypothesizes that Europe itself may be *dar al-islam*, which means “nothing but the European part of Umma, but having a different meaning from the traditional one: it is Islamic territory as well, and Islam is only one of the many, with no claim over the others, not even by definition”. Europe becomes a decisive ground for “Muslim Geopolitics” as well. In the future there is, however, a “plural” Europe (Allievi 2002: 179). Islam itself is “one and multiple”, as Pace affirms (2004: 12), thanks to the different solutions to public acknowledgement and state regulation of Islam and Muslim identity experienced in Europe.

Within a decade the Muslim population in The Netherlands doubled and in the meanwhile the Dutch society had to face economic recession. Second-generation Muslims in particular were damaged by this because they experienced a reduction of their rights. In Belgium there is a representative body of Muslims in contact with the Belgian government but also respects the law. Italy and Spain were initially open to flows of Islamic immigrants; later, however, restrictions were imposed. In 1992 in Spain an agreement in favour of recognition of the Islamic code was signed: but by the year 2000 law restrictions were enforced; however, in 2006 a Catholic publisher printed 15,000 copies of a textbook (in Spanish), *Descubrir el Islam* (Discovering Islam), to be used in Spanish primary schools. In Italy, the entry of Muslims of various origins is increasing: their juridical recognition poses problems as yet unsolved.

To conclude our outline of the Islam question in Europe (Bistolfi and Zabbal 1995; Cesari and McLoughlin 2005; Klausen 2005; Nökel and Tezcan 2007; Rath et al. 2001) a comparative analysis concerning Buddhists and Muslims as seen from the point of view of European citizens may prove interesting. In fact, perceptions of Islam by Europeans can affect legal decisions and the dynamics of future society (Liogier 2006). According to some studies carried out in France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, The United Kingdom, Scotland, Austria, Germany and other European countries, appreciation for Buddhism has increased, while appreciation of the Muslim faith has diminished. In fact, “everywhere in Western Europe Buddhist groups are recognised or about to be recognised, notwithstanding the sometimes small number of members. Recognition is accorded more promptly than in the case of Islam, which is more soundly established than Buddhism in Europe” (Liogier 2006: 78). Furthermore, Buddhism is (or appears to be) more European and westernized than Islam. Finally, Buddhism apparently represents the future of Europe, unless we conceive Islam as a sort of new Buddhism, based on some idiosyncratic religious values (Table 15.1).

Table 15.1 Religious membership in the European Union

Religions	EU15 (%)	EU25 (%)
Catholics	51	55
Protestants	16	15
Anglicans	6	5
Orthodox	3	3
Muslims	3	2.5
Jews	0.5	0.5
No religion*	20.5	19
<i>Inhabitants</i>	377,000,000	452,000,000

* It is difficult to obtain detailed information concerning this category which is presumably larger

The percentage increase in favour of Catholics is due to Poland’s entry into the European Union, with its elevated number of Catholic believers, while other rates decrease or remain basically the same. Particularly relevant is the reduction of the presence of Jews in Europe: it once hosted 90% of the world’s Jewish population and had decreased to 8% by 1996; therefore, it is no longer possible to identify it with Europe (Azria 1996: 254).

15.5 The State and Religion

From 1 January 2007 Bulgaria (together with Romania) entered the European Union. Various problems remain unsolved, in particular: “1) harmonizing legislature concerning state-church relationships availing of international legal apparati and European legal standards; 2) creating a favourable social context for adequate and effective development of the relevant laws” (Bogomilova 2005: 137). Such problems not only regard the Balkan area of Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia but they invest many countries inside and outside of the European Union. There are state churches in Finland, Greece and United Kingdom, there are separations but also agreements in Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain, there is only one great difference in France (but with contradictory situations at operative level). The Greek and Irish constitutions refer to religion, the German one permits *Invocatio Dei*,

the European one does not refer to it at all. Elsewhere, there is a reference to God in the introduction of the constitution (in Poland and Ukraine), religious tradition is recalled (in Czech Republic and Slovakia) or there is no mention at all and sometimes because the introduction is also lacking (in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia and Romania). In general, however, God is not mentioned (in Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro).

In reality the different options depend on the centrality or otherwise of belonging (Slav or Latin or Anglo-Saxon even European). Even today reference is still made to the “evangelizations” of Cyril and Methodius, “the apostles of the Slavs” in the ninth century to legitimize denominational rights within the continent. In Bulgaria myths regarding the divine mission of the people has long since been abandoned. This helps overcome the idea of the difference of others by favouring a less differentiated solution beyond the confines of Orthodox authenticity, of the sole Slav language, of the threat from outside, the enemy to defeat. This attitude favours the creation of a shared, more open and less hostile European spirit.

The conflict in Kosovo, lasting from 1990 to 1995, shows the possible consequences of extreme opposition between different religions. Now Kosovo is independent of Serbia-Montenegro, and the United Nations guarantees its autonomy after the disaster which, besides people, wracked havoc on hundreds of places sacred to Serbian Orthodoxy and on the Islamic part of Kosovo.

On the other hand, the attempt to create an independent Orthodox Church in Montenegro is not easily accepted by the Serbian government, which prefers to help Catholics and Muslims instead of local people, because it only recognizes the Serbian Orthodox Church which does not legitimate Macedonian Orthodox Church either.

In relation to what is happening in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as in Bulgaria and Macedonia, “it can be observed that Orthodox Churches themselves in these countries are not autonomous or independent of the state and politics: a) in their competitive position as one religion among others, where some of the others may have a richer and more effective experience in working in a democratic and pluralistic environment, the kind of environment to which the Orthodox Churches are not used; b) in matters of ownership, financing, religious education, which are hard to achieve where civil society is underdeveloped; c) as regards the status of some churches compared to other Orthodox Churches (Macedonia, Montenegro), and control of internal divisions and schisms (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro)” (Bogomilova 2005: 241).

Again, it can be said that the churches have at times favoured intervention, at others a more wait-and-see attitude. “Indeed, the marginal function served by the Orthodox Church in Russia in the past contrasts sharply with the greater social commitment adopted by the Catholic Church in Poland. Finally, one should not overlook the re-emergence of ethnic exclusiveness under the banners of nationality and the religion of origin. Some speak of a transition from communism to nationalism. The sociological context becomes still more complex when one examines the minority question – from the Hungarians in Romania, to the Volga Germans, to the Kurds, the Armenians, and the twenty-six native tribes in Northern Russia. In neighbouring countries heteroclite *enclaves*, in continuous relation with the original culture, are to be found. This is the case of Croats in Western Herzegovina (but also of Orthodox Serbians in Croatia and in Krajina and Slavonia, as well as of Magyars and Saxons in Romania, in Transylvania). An ‘ethnification’ of politics and a ‘politicization’ of ethnicity in general is occurring, which also means a “politicization” of religion as well as a “regionalization” of politics

(Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006: 287). As a consequence, activities and official interventions by the Churches have an increasingly more socio-political nature. In Croatia as well as in Poland, for instance, the Catholic Church has fostered the birth of a modern nation-state” (Martin 2005: 81, quoted by Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006: 289).

“In all this, much is new and surprising, has a form of a new beginning characterized by the novel experience of a transition towards democracy and the new democratic use of freedom, after being accustomed to totalitarianism. This, one could surmise, may also create results in the religious-ethical field and within the Churches in particular” (Cipriani 1994: 2). Moreover, the following prediction seems to be still valid: “one way or another, the Churches will maintain a role, perhaps more one of conservation and tradition than one of innovation and change” (Cipriani 1994: 16).

15.6 Religious Pluralism

Speaking of pluralism and respect of religion, Europe presents a number of different situations (Davie and Hervieu-Léger 1996; Rémond 1999; Davie 2000, 2002, 2006; Bolgiani et al. 2006). In some cases freedom is very limited, in other cases it is reduced, in some nations it is growing, in others diminishing. According to Asma Jahangir (who operates for the ONU on liberty of faith and religion), even in Europe freedom is limited: like in The Netherlands owing to emerging religious tensions and in France because of the law of 2004 (according to which Muslim women are not allowed to wear the *chador* and Christians are not allowed to wear big crosses). Moreover, in February 2006 Thomas Grimaux edited an official document of *Help to a Suffering Church* (a public association of European origin), reporting the following situation for the year 2005, “very limited” religious freedom in Albania, Kosovo and Turkey, and “limited” freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.

The different religions and churches operating in Europe manifest a variety of behaviours towards religious pluralism. This emerges from a wide-scale inquiry called RAMP (Religious And Moral Pluralism) carried out in many European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden (Dobbelaere and Riis 2002). The conclusions of this research are not univocal: “in the model explaining pluralism as a cultural enrichment the effect of Church commitment is positive, meaning that people with a high degree of commitment to their Church also tend to appreciate the cultural enrichment of religious pluralism. In the second model on pluralism as ‘a private patchwork’, the effect is negative, meaning that the most committed persons tend to state that people should adhere to the teaching of their own religion and refrain from picking and choosing from other religions. This fundamental difference expresses why it is important to refrain from combining these indicators into a single index on religious pluralism” (Billiet et al. 2003: 156). In actual fact “the Churches are challenged to change their positions. Formerly, the Churches as authoritative institutions could proclaim a truth that was taken for granted by Church members. In late modernity, the Churches become optional frameworks united by affective bonds, sustained by a common sacred language and shared traces of memory” (Billiet et al. 2003: 157). In practice resistance of churches is not absolutely guaranteed, because personal choices are always preferred.

According to Bontempi (2005: 162), “long a reality in Europe and still recently, the individualisation of the religious experience has led to a transformation of the intimate structure of belief”. This is the development of a pluralism of faiths that is a *fact* in Western society, internalized and lived, though not always positively, as a part of religious identity of the individual believer. However, “the abandonment of organised religion appears as a factor that favours not the decline of religion but its adaptation and re-composition on the part of individuals” (Bontempi 2005: 164).

The changes which are taking place do not allow old situations to continue, in particular in matters of relations between the state and the church, which are subjected “to a strong pressure for change. This impetus originates from below: with the diffusion of new religious identities, groups and organisations ranging from Buddhists, to the new Churches of Protestant matrix and the different Islamic communities. There are also pressures that come from above, from the effects of European integration that require a re-negotiation of long-standing Church-state relations” (Bontempi 2005: 166). The states decide from time to time with which religions they intend to have privileged relations, they start forms of co-operations, or create a basis for socio-political support of legitimization from below. After all, “Churches are important actors in many fields where the European Commission and European Parliament also act” (Bontempi 2005: 166). Notwithstanding the attempt of including in the European Constitution a reference to Christian roots, this did not succeed and in the constitution a number of forms and contents that refer directly to the life of European citizen still remain, therefore to their own culture and their religious expressions. Actually, “the elaboration of a European right to religion cannot result from any combination of national rights on the issue because the differences between the states are too great. Nonetheless, it is possible to pick out a common *fundamentum* in the principles of secularity of modern constitutionalism that guarantee the protection of the right to religious freedom” (Bontempi 2005: 168).

Since 1971 the Catholic Church created a Council of European Episcopal Conferences and in 1980 constituted a Commission of Episcopates for the European Union. Previously, other churches had created a Conference of European Churches, with more than 100 denominations. Besides any form of competition, all the churches together drew up the *Charta Oecumenica Europea* on 22 April 2001. “In EU law, religious freedom is explicitly sustained because it is a freedom relating to the individual” (Bontempi 2005: 171). Churches contribute practically to civil life, therefore they play an important role in the construction of European identity. In the meantime, “the local character of orthodoxy is deeply bound to national realities and, in some cases, to state institutions themselves” (Bontempi 2005: 173). After all, intercultural and inter-religious tendencies of many European countries foster the development of joint ventures, co-operations and agreements thus promoting integration processes.

It can be useful to verify the rate of pluralism by observing the presence of religious teaching (mandatory or optional) in European state schools (for another analysis of religion and education in Europe see also Jackson et al. 2007: part two; Genre and Pajer 2005; for Western Balkans Kuburić and Moe 2006). The resulting picture is once again complex and articulated (Table 15.2):

Bulgaria took opportune action in this regard: already by the academic year 1997–1998 the optional teaching of religion, both Christian and Islamic, was introduced in schools. However, relations between Christians and Muslims do not foster conflict, as a matter of fact fundamentalism does not seem to be so relevant, young people are open to new cultures and religions different from their own. Some prejudices, however, are still present as far as Gypsies are concerned (Bogomilova 2005: 236): they usually decide to follow the

Table 15.2 Countries and religious teaching in state schools

Country	Religious teaching
Austria	Catholic or Islamic or Other
Belgium	Catholic or Jewish or Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic; or Areligious-ethical
Bulgaria	Orthodox or Islamic
Croatia	Catholic or Orthodox or Islamic or Protestant or Other; or Ethical (secondary schools)
(Southern) Cyprus	Orthodox
Czech Republic	Knowledge of religions
Denmark	Lutheran; Religious History (prevailing) in secondary schools
Estonia	Ecumenical Christian
Finland	“Objective information” or Lutheran or Orthodox or Other
France	A free day in primary school to attend religious education in a chosen church; Catholic or Protestant or Hebrew in Alsace and Lorraine
Germany	Catholic or Protestant or Islamic or Jewish or Other
Greece	Orthodox (in historical and cultural perspective)
Hungary	Optional and extra curriculum
Ireland	Catholic
Italy	Catholic or Jewish or Other
Latvia	Religious or Ethical
Lithuania	Religious or Ethical
Luxemburg	Catholic or Lutheran or Calvinist; or Ethical
Malta	Catholic
Poland	Catholic or Protestant or Orthodox or Jewish; or Ethical
Portugal	Catholic or Ethical
Romania	Orthodox or Other
Russia	Cultural Orthodox or Other
Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo	Orthodox or Other
Slovakia	Catholic
Slovenia	Non-denominational, with some exceptions
Spain	Catholic or Protestant or Jewish or Islamic or History of religions; or Islamic out of school timetable
Sweden	Non-denominational
The Netherlands	Non-denominational: Protestant or Catholic or Other or Liberal
The United Kingdom	Interdenominational (Multifaith Religion)

dominant religion of the host country; that is why there are so many Orthodox, Muslims, Catholics and Jews as well as Protestants among them.

Confirmation of the reduced nature of fundamentalism among young people comes from studies concerning Malta (Abela 1995). In France (Talin 1995), however, fundamentalism still attracts, especially thanks to the Charismatic Renewal, to Opus Dei, to some forms of conservative movements, among some Protestants, Jews and Muslims. In Germany (Whal 1995) fundamentalist groups among young people are quite varied and are mainly due to problems of social affiliation and a need for gratifying membership. Finally, in the case of Turkey (Çelebi 1995), the youth movement known as “Young Turks” is not apparently inclined towards fundamentalism because they are not agents of political Islam.

15.7 Religions and/in Europe: A Conclusion

The four main religions (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Muslim) are actually the corner-stones occupying the four sectors of the European chessboard: the point of

convergence appears to be Brussels (or Belgium), where the presence of the four religions is clearly shown, alongside the Jewish faith a millenarian presence in Europe.

History and sociology teach us, however, that such religious blocks may represent an obstacle to a process of continental identity. It is also true that there are many instances of religious cohabitation. Reference to a common European identity may prevent the rise of inter-ethnic conflict. For instance, the entry of Romania into the European Union may reduce the amount of conflict between permanent populations and nomads like the Romany people for example.

Notwithstanding resistance and perplexities (for example, the problems emerging from the adoption of the Euro as a sole currency), there is a good level of agreement concerning the idea of Europe as a common social territory. The idea originated in Catholic and Protestant countries, but later spread to areas of Orthodox and Islamic culture (for quite some time now Turkey is seeking entry into the Union). In predominantly Catholic countries there is considerable consensus regarding the European Union.

Moreover what happens even in the remotest corner of the continent affects the rest, even if awareness of the interconnections is not always up to the situation: worry occurs especially when a war breaks out close to homes or in a place where we expected to go on holiday in, or even when it involves military intervention by our country, even if for mediation and peace.

The relations that other religions have with Europe cannot be denied. Bonds are evident, sometimes they are inextricable, and therefore they have a certain importance and have an influence on Europe. Understanding the significance, as well as appreciating the dynamics and evaluating possible consequences, is not so easy (Mortensen 2006; Friedli et al. 2004; *Journal of Religion in Europe*). Even collecting data may be an operation full of traps, misunderstandings, deformations, ideological censure; methodological and chronological difficulties are comparatively difficult too. Nonetheless, it was worthwhile consulting different sources, finding inferences, providing knowledge, so as to offer a broad, reliable, up-to-date picture despite the limitations of such a complex international approach.

Relatively recent data on 49 “European” countries (for a total of 740,000,000 inhabitants) are those provided below. They are drawn from population census (the dates are in brackets) and/or from individual informants (see the scholars acknowledged at the end of this essay). In some cases they are the result of a rough estimate, based on different sources (Table 15.3):

New arrivals, especially from Africa and Asia, are changing the inner composition of European nations, at religious level too, as can be seen in Table 15.4; the data are limited to 31 December 2000 and regard the 15 European members of the time and refer to foreign populations according to religion.

The impact of the Islamic presence in Europe is evident. The number of Catholics is worthy of note, although the total percentage is lower because they tend to join those nations where the Catholic presence is already conspicuous (Luxemburg, Belgium, Portugal and *in primis* Spain).

Therefore, it is foreseeable that boundaries, including religious ones, will tend to fade. The Mediterranean Sea towards Africa, the Bosphorus towards the Middle East and the Ustjurt Plateau with the Caspian Sea and Aral Lake towards Asia no longer appear as obstacles or barriers. They are actually becoming ways of access, places and bridges of connection.

Table 15.3 Religious membership in European countries. Per cent distribution

Believers→	Catholics	Protestants	Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Hindus
Albania (2005)	10		20	70		
Andorra (*)	92	0.5			0.4	
Armenia (*)	(some)	(some)	94 (Armenian Apostolic Church)	(Kurdish Sunnites)		
Austria (2001)	73.5	4.7; 0.9	2.2	4.2	0.1	
Azerbaijan (*)			(Russians; Armenian Apostolic Christians)	87 (Shiites)		
Belarus (2001)	15.7; 0.5 (Unitates)	35.7	44; 1.3 (Old Believers Church)	0.9	0.8	
Belgium (2005)	75	1	0.5	4	0.5	
Bosnia, Herzegovina (2002)	15	4	31	40 (Sunnites)		
Bulgaria (2001)	0.6	0.5	82.6	12.2	0.001	
Croatia (2001)	87.83; 0.01; 0.14	0.43	4.42; 0.91 (Serbians)	1.28	0.01	
Cyprus (*)			78 (Greeks)	18 (Turkish Cypriotes) ^o		
Czech Republic (*)	26.9	2.3; 3.2 (Hussites)	0.2	3	0.1	
Denmark (2002)	0.6	84; 2 (Christian churches)	13			
Estonia (2001)		14 (Lutherans)				
Finland (2005)	0.2	83.2 (Lutherans); 0.5 (others); 1 (non-registered)	1.1	0.1; 0.5 (non-registered)		
France (2006)	51	3	1	4	1	
Georgia (*)	0.8		65 (Georgians); 10 (Russians); 8 (Armenian Apostolic Church)	11		
Germany (2002)	33.4	33; 1.2 (free churches)	1.3	4	0.1	
Greece (*)	0.5	0.4	93 (Greeks)	4.5	4.5	0.05
Hungary (2001)	54.5 (Greeks)	15.9 (Calvinists); 3 (Lutherans)				
Iceland (*)	2	95				
Ireland (2002)	88.4	2.3 (Anglicans); 0.4 (Presbyterians)				

Table 15.3 (continued)

Believers →	Countries ↓	Catholics	Protestants	Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Hindus
	Italy (2004)	85.1	0.6	0.1			
	Kazakhstan (*)		2	44 (Russians)	0.5	0.005	
	Latvia (1999)	19.6	17	16.8	47 (Sunrites)	0.9	
	Liechtenstein (2002)	76.2	7	0.7	3.6	0.6	
	Lithuania (2001)	79	1.04	4.07 (Russians); 0.77 (Old Believers)	0.08 (Sunrites)	0.03	
	Luxemburg (2000)	87	1.1				
	Macedonia (2003)	0.35	0.03	64.78	33.32		
	Malta (*)	93.4					
	Moldova (2000)		0.5	95		1.5	
	Monaco (*)	90					
	Norway (2004)	1	86 (Lutherans); 1 (Pentecostals)	0.1	1.8	0.02	0.1
	Poland (2000)	95	1	2 (Autocephalous)		0.003	
	Portugal (2001)	84.53	1.410; 0.555 (Christian Churches)	0.2	0.138	0.02	
	Romania (2002)	4.73 (Romans); 0.88 (Greeks)	3.23 (Reformed); 0.12 (Lutherans); 0.08 (Evangelical Augustinians); 0.31 (Unitarians); 1.49 (Pentecostals); 0.58 (Baptists); 0.43 (Seventh-Day Adventists); 0.2 (Christian Evangelicals)	86.8; 0.17 (Old-Rite Christians)	0.31	0.03	
	Russia (2001)	1	1.1; 5.3 (Independents); 0.4 (Evangelicals); 0.4 (Pentecostal/Charismatics)	51.7 (Russians)	7.6	0.7	0.5
	San Marino (*)	90					
	Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo (2005)	4	1	78	5	0.010	
	Slovakia (2001)	68.9; 4.1 (Greeks)	6.9 (Lutherans); 2 (Calvinists)	0.9		0.042	

Table 15.3 (continued)

Believers→	Catholics	Protestants	Orthodox	Muslims	Jews	Hindus
Countries↓						
Slovenia (2002)	57	0.8 (Lutherans); 0.1	2.3 (Serbians)	2.3		
Spain (*)	79.3	0.5		2	0.1	
Sweden (*)	1	88	1	1		
Switzerland (2000)	41.82	33.05	1.81	4.26	0.25	
The Netherlands (2000)	17	15		5.7	0.1	0.5
Turkey (*)				68 (Sunnites); 30 (Shiites)		
Ukraine (2004)	13.5; (Greeks)	3.6	45.7	1.6	2.3	
United Kingdom (2001)	11.5	60.1 (Anglicans in GB; Presbyterians in Scotland; Methodists; Baptists; Pentecostals)	1	2.7	0.5	1
Vatican (*)	99					

(*) Estimate

(°) 98% in Northern Cyprus

Note: "Republics" with a certain autonomy are also to be considered, such as Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian, in Azerbaijan), Nahičevan (Islamic, in Azerbaijan), Chechnya (Islamic, in Russia) which seceded in 1992 from Ingushetia (Islamic, in Russia) and Kabardino-Balkar (Islamic, in Russia).

Sources: See text above.

Table 15.4 Religion of immigrants to Europe by 2000

Believers→					
Countries of immigration↓	Orthodox, %	Catholics, %	Protestants, %	Muslims, %	Total immigrants
Austria	14.4	11.9	0.0	35.5	757.900
Belgium	3.2	45.4	8.6	22.9	861.685
Denmark	4.7	13.7	18.3	37.4	258.629
Finland	10.8	10.2	15.2	20.6	91.074
France	1.1	33.7	4.7	46.5	3.263.186
Germany	15.4	25.2	3.9	38.8	7.296.818
Greece	—	—	—	—	655.000
Ireland	—	—	—	—	151.400
Italy	12.0	24.5	6.2	37.2	1.388.153
Luxemburg	4.7	69.5	8.5	3.6	162.285
The Netherlands	2.7	20.9	10.3	39.4	667.802
Portugal	0.7	55.5	13.8	6.5	207.607
United Kingdom	4.1	34.2	11.7	18.0	2.450.000
Spain	2.5	38.9	12.0	28.9	895.720
Sweden	7.4	16.4	34.4	23.4	477.313
<i>EU Total</i>	8.5	27.8	6.8	33.4	19.584.572

Source: Pittau, F. (2006) 'Europa, allargamento, immigrazione, religioni', *Religioni e Società XXI* (54): 115.

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Chapter 16

Sexuality and Family Formation

Elina Haavio-Mannila and Anna Rotkirch

When I met Matti I was in my late 20s. I skipped all my sexual adventures, because after I had seen him only a few times I knew he was my other half... We dated for a number of years, lived together and were married a couple of years ago; we have an almost one year-old baby and there will definitely be more to come. (A Finnish woman in her early thirties)

I married very early, when I was about twenty years old. He was my first great love. Our son was born the same year. First we lived with his parents, it was a very small apartment... I know my husband has had side-affairs and I have also had my share of infatuations. But I'm not going to divorce him, we have a lot in common - and we are raising our wonderful boy. (A Russian woman in her early thirties)¹

16.1 Introduction

Biological and social reproduction situate themselves at the heart of social life and of power structures. When is it suitable to begin having intercourse? Who may marry whom and at what stage of the life course? And who takes care of the children – the parents, public day care, relatives, or private nannies? In any society, the regulations of child making and childbearing provide a shortcut into how resources and power are divided between the sexes and between generations, as well as between social and ethnic groups.

In traditional societies, sexuality and family formation are strictly linked, especially for women but also for men. Kissing the wrong person at the wrong time can literally destroy a young adult's life. Traditional patriarchy characterised pre-industrial Europe and still prevails in some European regions, e.g. in agrarian parts of the Balkan countries. During the 20th century, all European countries witnessed gradual secularisation, liberalisation, and pluralisation of acceptable sexual and marital behaviours. Northern and Western Europe spearheaded this trend of de-patriarchalisation that would affect much of global development.

As a consequence of the Western sexual revolution we now tend to think of sexuality and family life as separate spheres, at least in some academic research. But it is analytically

E. Haavio-Mannila (✉)
Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: elina.haavio-mannila@helsinki.fi

¹These quotes are from solicited autobiographies about sexuality and love written by ordinary people and analysed in Haavio-Mannila et al. (2002).

more helpful to think about a sex–marriage complex and “locating marriage within a larger space of pre-marital and extra-marital sex, including homosexuality” (Therborn 2004, 132). In people’s life stories sexual and marital choices may also often be closely linked, as the two introductory quotes clearly illustrate.

In this chapter, we first focus on the main “horizontal” tie of families, the pair bond, in its more or less stable forms. We then look at families “vertically”, comparing fertility and family household structure, including generational interaction. Finally, we discuss European values concerning sexuality and family life.

We compare behaviour and values between European countries. Because many formerly socialist countries are not in the European Union, statistics and scholars still often ignore them. We will here include all European countries whenever data are available. For each topic we pay special attention to gender relations and differences. The gender differences in sexual behaviour and attitudes in several areas have been diminishing, but nowhere do the sexes behave and think identically (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila 1995; Schmitt 2005).

Many aspects of family and sexuality are not dealt with here, such as sexual fantasies and techniques, symbolic and media images of sex and gender, and specific social policy measures. Cross-national comparisons also overlook the huge and interesting intra-country variations that exist with regard to class, ethnicity, and cultural and regional specificities.

16.2 European Dividing Lines

European family patterns have historically divided into a Western and an Eastern part, following the so-called Trieste–St. Petersburg line. Extended and patriarchal households prevailed in Eastern Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. They typically had early marriage, high marriage rates, early childbearing, and high numbers of both children and infant mortality. Western Europe was characterised by later age of marriage with a corresponding higher degree of autonomy for the couple, later entry into parenthood, higher numbers of unmarried adults and unwed mothers, and lower infant mortality (Hajnal 1965; Therborn 2004, 144). The first radical fall in fertility also took place in continental Western Europe (Goode 1963; Therborn 2004).

The Western European patterns of family and sexuality are historically unique. Their support for individual autonomy and women’s rights has had a huge global impact, for instance, in how human, sexual, and reproductive rights are defined. In the latter part of the 20th century, it looked as if liberal and secular values in the sphere of family morality would eventually triumph everywhere. This trend appears less uniform today after the increase of religious fundamentalism, especially in some Muslim countries and the United States but also in formerly socialist European countries such as Poland and Russia.

Classifications of European family and social policy discern three to five main regional types or regimes (e.g. Titmuss 1974; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; Giele 1997; Mahon 2002; Duncan & Edwards 2003; Geist 2005; Anttonen & Sipilä 2005; Drobnic & Treas 2006). The criteria are often female employment and the extent to which social policy measures transfer informal care work to communal employees. In social and gender policy, Gösta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification into *conservative*, *social democratic*, and *liberal* welfare state regimes is still widely used. The First European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS 2007, 9) expands that classification into five types: *Nordic Regimes*, *Liberal Regimes*, *Continental Regimes*, *Mediterranean Regimes*, and *New European Union member states*.

Finnish family sociologist Riitta Jallinoja (1989) showed how family and work have been combined in Europe in three ways: *the housewife pattern* (in 1980 The Netherlands,

Italy and in 1960 also Norway, Sweden, France, Great Britain and The Federal Republic of Germany), *the moderate sex role pattern* (in 1980 France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain), and *the pattern of employed women* (in 1980 Soviet Union, Poland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Finland). She later found that among the politico-economically peripheral countries, the four Nordic countries form the most modernised territory as to gender equality and the family, whereas the Southern Europe periphery forms the least modernised territory (Jallinoja 1995).

Göran Therborn has in his outstanding work *“Between Sex and Power”* (2004) and in an outline of current variants of the European family (2007) divided Europe into four main areas with different family patterns: *the Nordic family*, *the Central Western European family*, *the Southern European family*, and *the Eastern European family*. A similar divide has been applied for European fertility patterns (Sánchez-Barricarte & Fernández-Carro 2007). Therborn (2004) stresses the unique traits of the Nordic and Western European family, while Eastern Europe is presented as part of the Eurasian family system. Therborn detects signs of a gradual convergence as other European countries grow closer to Western European practices, although clear differences remain. Some countries also appear to “switch sides”, notably, Greece is today more aligned with Western patterns while Portugal and Italy are in some respects approaching the Eastern European family pattern.

Except for the Trieste–St. Petersburg line, stemming from agricultural and social traditions, intra-European family variations mainly appear to stem from two major influences: the dominant form of religion and the legacy of state socialism. Most Protestant churches are today liberal. They allow gender equality within the church, including female priests, and rarely condemn specific sexual or contraceptive practices. For instance, when a Finnish transsexual priest in 2007 was about to lose her job in connection with a sex change from male to female, the church was widely criticised for intolerance and discrimination. Religion does not strongly influence lay sexual morality in today’s Protestant countries; it is rather the other way around.

The population of most European Catholic countries is also secularised. However, the Vatican’s continued opposition to abortion, contraceptive use, and divorces has influenced especially Ireland and Poland. The inhabitants of Catholic countries also often display greater formality and stability in family formations (Therborn 2007).

The Eastern Orthodox church is the majority religion in Greece and Cyprus and in most of the countries that belonged to the Soviet Union or its sphere of influence. During state socialism, the church’s social influence diminished and it could rarely intervene directly in sexual and marital behaviours. Today, fundamentalist Orthodox family values are being revived in several countries where the local Orthodox Church is aspiring to a more visible role as nation builder. In Russia, for instance, the church has successfully campaigned against sex education and acceptance of homosexuals. A minority of Russian Orthodox believers follow strict religious norms, including rejection of abortion and sometimes also contraception. Still, the overall influence of religion in Eastern European Orthodox countries is better compared to that of Catholic but secular France than Catholic and more religious Ireland.

Kosovo, Albania, and Turkey are European countries with a Muslim majority. Many European countries also have growing Muslim populations. European Muslims are today characterised by higher marriage rates and somewhat higher fertility. The differences between Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans are largely explained by marriage rates and level of religiosity. The differences between these groups also appear to be diminishing (Westoff & Frejka 2007).

In addition to religious impact, European families are shaped by the legacy of social democracy and state socialism, which promoted gender equality and women’s full-time

employment (Björnberg & Eydal 1995). From the 1930s onward social democratic governments created the so-called Nordic welfare state model in Scandinavia and Finland, combining generous state family policies with female wage work. At the same time, state socialism transformed the Eastern European family pattern towards a dual breadwinner, nuclear family. In sexual matters state socialism was, after the exceptional sexual freedom of the Soviet 1920s, restrictive and puritan. Sexual education and use of modern contraceptives were limited, while abortions became a common means of birth regulation. Therefore Eastern European countries often resemble the Nordic countries in issues such as female labour markets, but the Southern European ones in, e.g. contraceptive use (Haavio-Mannila & Rotkirch 1997; Rotkirch 2000).

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the social uniformity imposed by state socialism melted. Former Soviet republics such as Armenia have witnessed a revival of patriarchal norms, such as virgin marriages and bride theft (Temkina 2008), while Estonia has approached Central Western European patterns in fertility postponement and contraceptive use, as we shall see below.

We will in our analyses divide Europe into six regional blocks:

1. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden)
2. Western Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom)
3. The Western Mediterranean area (Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey²)
4. The Eastern Mediterranean area (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia)
5. Eastern Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia)
6. The former Soviet Union countries in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine)

The data are collected from official statistics of United Nations, European Community, World Bank, the World Health Organization, and World Values Surveys. We also use survey data from research projects in Finland and Russia (Gronow et al. 1996; Kesseli et al. 2005), a large survey from 12 Western European countries collected in the beginning of this century (Börsch-Supan et al. 2005). Similar data are also available from our own recent survey of baby boomers and their children in Finland (Gentrens 2007).

16.3 Sexuality and Couple Formation


We first analyse sexual initiation, use of modern contraception, rates of marriage and divorce, and numbers of sexual partners. In most indicators Europe has witnessed a century-long linear change, often further accelerated by the so-called sexual revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, which brought a change in attitudes and values discarding previous social and religious norms. Pre- and extra-marital sex, the number of sexual partners, and the type of techniques used have all increased. The gender gap is diminishing as women and men also behave in more similar ways. Tolerance towards sexual minorities, especially homosexuality, has grown (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila 1995).

²In spite of its geographical location Turkey is placed in this group mainly because it lacks the state socialist legacy of the Eastern Mediterranean group.

16.3.1 First Sexual Intercourse

The first experience of intercourse is a central rite of initiation into adulthood. One measure of the event’s importance is that almost without exception, people recall their first intercourse in detail. People of different generations also remember their first intercourse in very similar ways (Haavio-Mannila & Kontula 2003, 28).

Here we present survey findings on women’s age at sexual initiation in the age cohort born around 1970.³ With urbanisation, an earlier advent of sexual maturation and a loosening of social norms, the age of first intercourse has decreased in the last decades (Bozon & Kontula 1998). Map 16.1 shows that the lowest ages for women, under 18 years, are mainly found in the Protestant cultures of the Nordic countries and Western Central Europe, with the addition of the Czech Republic. In the Nordic countries, the age at first



Map 16.1 Median age at first sexual intercourse among women. Cohort born around 1970 (20–24 years of age in the 1990s)

Source: Bozon (2003) and own calculations on people born during 1968–1972 in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and St. Petersburg, data; see Haavio-Mannila & Kontula (2003). Labels with grids: 19 years and over.

³This cohort was 20–24 years old in the late 1990s when the Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) and sexual behaviour surveys were conducted in 22 European countries (Bozon 2003). Ages at first intercourse in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and St. Petersburg (here representing Russia) of people born in 1967–1972 are calculated on the basis of original data from surveys conducted in these countries in 1996–2000 (see Haavio-Mannila & Kontula 2003). We have found no statistics on the age of first intercourse from international institutions.

intercourse is lowest in Europe, on average 16.9 years. Of the Western Central European countries, people in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France have also started intercourse fairly early, making the average of this region 18.0. High ages, over 19 for women, are found in the Western Mediterranean area and in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania, three Catholic countries. The gender gap in the Mediterranean countries is over 1 year: women are in Portugal 2.4, Romania 2.2, Italy 1.9, and Greece 1.6 years older than men when first having intercourse. Elsewhere in Europe the gender gap is less than 1 year.

16.3.2 Use of Modern Contraception

In Europe, use of contraception at first intercourse has been steadily increasing (Bajos & Guillaume 2003) and the same trend applies to contraceptive use in later intercourse. Availability of and attitudes to contraception influence reproductive health and are also related to gender equality. The contraceptive prevalence for modern methods refers to the use of the following methods: female and male sterilisation, the contraceptive pill, the intrauterine device (IUD), injectables, implants, female and male condom, cervical cap, diaphragm, spermicidal foams, jelly, cream, sponges and emergency contraception and excludes the lactational amenorrhoea method (LAM), abortions, periodic abstinence, and withdrawal. Modern contraceptive devices such as hormonal pills and condoms were hard to obtain in the countries of the Soviet block. In the late 1990s, the line between frequent and rare use of modern methods followed the Trieste–St. Petersburg line (Map 16.2). Contraceptive prevalence refers to the percentage of women of reproductive age (usually aged 15–49 years), married or in union, currently using contraception.

In the Nordic countries and in the Western Central European countries about three-fourths of people currently use modern contraceptive methods. The use is quite common in some Eastern Central European countries, such as Czech Republic and Hungary, but rare in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The Eastern Mediterranean area shows great variation: in Albania only 8% of women reported use of modern contraception, in Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Montenegro less than 20% but in Slovenia 59%. In the former Soviet Union countries, on the average, 41% of the study subjects report modern contraceptive use at first intercourse. However, the use of contraceptives has also risen in this part since the 1990s.

In most state socialist countries, induced abortions were used as an alternative to contraception devices. Abortions remain more common in Eastern than Western Europe. In 2003, the highest rates of abortions per 1000 live births were found in Russia (1156), Romania (1058), Belarus (905), and Estonia (815). The lowest rates were in Croatia (139), the Netherlands (144), Sweden (146), Germany (181), and Finland (190) (WHO Regional Office for Europe 2007).

Our comparison between Finland, Estonia and St. Petersburg, Russia, shows that women having induced abortions have a different social and sexual background. In the high abortion rate countries Russia and Estonia, older women who have many children, have been married many times, and have not used contraception are overrepresented. They appear to continue the Soviet tradition and use abortion as the method of contraception. In Finland, where abortion rates are low, women having abortions tend to be less educated and to engage in risk behaviour (early intercourse, many sexual partners, high rates of sexually transmitted infections, and alcohol use).

Country	16.1. Mean age at first marriage for women 2006 ¹⁾	16.2. Mean age of women at the birth of the first child 2005 ²⁾	16.3. Total fertility rate of women 2007 ³⁾	16.4. Divorces per 1000 population 1998-2003 ⁴⁾
Nordic countries				
• Denmark	30,7	28,4	1,83	2,9
• Finland	29,3	27,9	1,84	2,6
• Iceland	30,3	26,1	2,08	1,8
• Norway	29,3	27,2	1,90	2,3
• Sweden	31,3	28,7	1,85	2,4
<i>Average</i>	30,2	27,7	1,9,0	2,4
Western Central Europe				
• Austria	28,9	27,2	1,40	2,3
• Belgium	27,3	–	1,66	3,0
• France	29,5	28,6	2,00	2,1
• Germany	28,9	29,1	1,32	2,5
• Ireland	28,2	27,6	1,90	0,7
• Luxemburg	29,2	29,0	1,65	2,3
• Netherlands	29,2	28,9	1,70	2,0
• Switzerland	31,3	28,9	1,43	2,3
• United Kingdom	28,3	30,0	1,84	2,7
<i>Average</i>	29,0	28,7	1,6,6	2,2
Western Mediterranean				
• Cyprus	26,7	27,5	1,47	1,9
• Greece	28,3	28,5	1,39	1,0
• Italy	28,6	28,7	1,32	0,7
• Malta	26,5	29,2	1,41	2,6
• Portugal	26,9	27,4	1,35	2,1
• Spain	29,2	29,3	1,38	1,0
• Turkey	–	–	–	0,5
<i>Average</i>	27,7	28,4	1,39	1,4
Eastern Mediterranean				
• Albania	–	23,9	–	0,8
• Bulgaria	25,7	24,7	1,37	1,5
• Croatia	25,4	27,2	1,38	1,0
• Macedonia	23,5	25,4	1,46	0,7
• Serbia and Montenegro	24,6	–	–	1,0
• Slovenia	28,3	27,7	1,31	1,1
<i>Average</i>	25,5	25,8	1,3,8	1,0
Eastern Central Europe				
1. Czech Republic	26,7	26,6	1,33	3,2
2. Hungary	25,9	26,7	1,34	2,5
3. Poland	25,4	25,8	1,27	1,3
4. Romania	25,2	24,8	1,31	1,5
5. Slovakia	26,2	25,7	1,24	2,0
<i>Average</i>	25,9	25,9	1,30	2,1
Former Soviet Union				
• Belarus	22,9	–	–	4,1
• Estonia	26,5	25,2	1,55	3,0
• Latvia	25,9	25,0	1,35	2,1
• Lithuania	25,0	24,9	1,31	3,1
• Moldova	22	21,9	–	3,0
• Russia	–	22,7	–	5,3
• Ukraine	22,8	22,4	–	3,7
<i>Average</i>	24,2	23,7	1,40	3,5


Figs. 16.1–16.4 Family and fertility

¹⁾Eurostat 6.3.2008, National sources; TransMONEE database; New Cronos database.

²⁾Eurostat 6.3.2008, UNECE 2005. The figure for Italy is from the year 2000.

³⁾Eurostat 26.8.2008; Belgium in 2005: UN Common Database.

⁴⁾UNECE 2005.



Map 16.2 Contraceptive prevalence: Use of modern methods, percent
 Source: United Nations Statistical Division – Demographic and Social Statistics. Social Indicators. Latest available figures from 1990s and 2000s. Labels with grids: over 60%.

Especially younger people in the former socialist countries have rapidly adopted a new contraceptive culture. Also migrants appear to adapt to safer contraceptives once they find themselves in a country with better reproductive health services (Malin & Gissler 2007).

16.3.3 Marriage and Divorce Rates

Humans everywhere form durable pair bonds. If individuals can decide for themselves, these bonds are typically based on sexual attraction and romantic love and sooner or later involve child raising. The stability of pair bonds varies widely, as does the extent to which other kin or social actors participate in child rearing, and whether homosexual unions are partly or totally recognised as equal with heterosexual unions.


Unions can be sanctioned by legal marriage or remain informal, as in cohabitation or LAT or living apart together relations. Formal marriage is less and less favoured everywhere in Europe. This trend started in Northern Europe, but has since spread throughout Western and most of Southern Europe (European Union 2002). The social alternative to formal and informal couples is single motherhood, with typically great involvement from the woman's own kin (Therborn 2003, 201).

The Trieste–St. Petersburg line has historically distinguished countries with regard to marriage age and marriage rate (Therborn 2007). Marriage age is highest in the West

and lowest in the East. In all countries men marry at a later age than do women. In the Nordic countries and Western Central Europe, mean age at first marriage is on the average 31–32 years for men and 28–30 for women (Fig. 16.2). The highest ages are found in Switzerland, 35 years for men and 31 for women. In these areas cohabitation without marriage is common which partly accounts for the late marriage age.

In both Mediterranean areas men marry for the first time when they are 28–29 years old and women at the age of 25–26 years. In the Mediterranean area, the highest age at first marriage is in Spain where men marry at 31 and women at 29 years – approximately the same as in Nordic and Western Central Europe, although there formal marriage is more often preceded by cohabitation. In Eastern Central Europe and the former Soviet republics, the respective ages are very low, 26–27 years for men and 24–25 years for women. Gender differences are largest (3.4) in the Eastern Mediterranean area, whereas in the other regions they are about 2.5 years.

Early age of marriage is associated with higher marriage rate. When we look at the proportion of ever-married women among 45- to 49-year-old women, we notice a distinct St. Petersburg–Trieste line (Map 16.3). Southeast of the line, there are plenty of countries where the proportion of ever-married women in this age group is at least 96%, on the Northwestern side scarcely any countries have such a high marriage rate (except Switzerland). The highest rate of ever-married women is in Albania, 99% (!), and the



Map 16.3 Proportion of ever-married women aged 45–49, percent
 Source: United Nations Population Division – World Marriage Patterns 2000, 2006. Labels with grids: over 95%.

lowest in Sweden, 84%. In Sweden this is related to the high prevalence of cohabiting couples.

People very frequently enter legal marriage in Southeastern Europe, even after the ideological pressure to marry under state socialism has disappeared. The highest marriage rates (more than 7 marriages per 1000 people a year) are from Cyprus, Albania, Macedonia, and Turkey, i.e. in the Eastern Mediterranean area (European Union 2002; table not shown here). In several former Soviet countries – Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine – marriage rates are between 6 and 7. They have fallen as the marital age has somewhat risen and as both cosmopolitan youth and impoverished people often prefer cohabitation. Marriage rates are lowest in Western Central Europe and the Western Mediterranean area.

Cohabitation, which is becoming increasingly popular, can take two distinct forms. Often it serves as a prelude to legal marriage or as a form chosen for subsequent unions after a divorce. In these cases, the birth of a child often makes the couple decide to formalise the relation by marrying. For instance, a Finnish couple's child is more often than not born outside wedlock today, while less than one-third of parents with two children are not married. In Russia, by contrast, legal marriage remains highly favoured, especially for the first union, and it is much more common to cohabit in a second or third union than in the first (Vishnevskij 2006).

Second, cohabitation may be a life-long alternative to legal marriage. In the Western European countries studied in SHARE, cohabiting at advanced age (50+ years) is most common in Sweden, Denmark, and Spain and least so in Italy and Greece. Divorce rates have grown in most parts of Europe. They remain low in the Mediterranean areas and in some Catholic countries (Ireland and Poland) (Fig. 16.4). The divorce rate is lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and highest in Russia. In Russia, the socially unstable 1990s affected especially marriages over 10 years old (Vishnevskij 2006). In other former Soviet republics (the Baltic countries, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) divorce is also very common, 3 or 4 per 1000. There the “universal early marriage” model was thus combined with high divorce rate. Again, if the dissolution of young cohabiting couples was counted in these statistics, the discrepancies between East and West would diminish.

16.3.4 Number of Sexual Partners

Part of the legacy of the sexual revolution is increased numbers of sexual partners during a person's lifetime. The number of lifetime sexual partners reported in Europe varies from 12 in Denmark to 5 in Poland according to Durex Global sex survey in 2005. The number of partners is highest in the Nordic countries (mean 12) and lower (7–9) in the other areas in Europe.

More scientifically collected, but older, data are available from surveys conducted in 1989–1992 in seven Western European countries (Leridon et al. 1998). Among men aged 18–49 years, the highest mean numbers of partners are from the Netherlands (20) and Finland (15). Then come France, Norway, Great Britain, and Switzerland (12), and the lowest number was found in Spain (10). Women reported half as many partners: 10 in the Netherlands, Finland, and Norway, 5 among Spanish and Swiss women and the lowest numbers, 4, for women in France and Great Britain.

The huge gender gap in reported numbers of sex partners has constantly bothered researchers. Clearly men have a tendency to overreport and/or women to underreport their sexual partners. Haavio-Mannila & Roos (2007) analysed the reported number of partners by gender in the Finnish sex survey data from 1999. They found that people with fewer

than 20 partners, both men and women, reported about 5 partners. There was no significant over- or underreporting. Those who report having at least 20 partners (15% of all study subjects) accounted for all the difference: men reported having on average 40 partners whereas women reported only 30 partners. The question of who is “cheating” researchers remains, but only for sexually very active people.

In sum, we can discern three major, distinct paths of sexual and couple formation in Europe. In the North, people have early sex, many partners, and late and often informal coupling. The many years of living as single, young adults raise the number of sexual partners for Northern Europeans. As the Finnish woman in the introductory quote remembered, it is when deciding to “settle down” that most people stop having sexual adventures. In Southern Europe, active sex life starts later and the number of total sexual partners is lower. Coupling also starts later. In the East, sexual life starts relatively late, the number of sexual partners is not as high as in the North, but coupling is formal and very early (cf. also Therborn 2004, 145). These patterns of love and desire are intertwined with childbearing and the division of work in everyday life, to which we now turn.


16.4 Household Composition and Fertility

Twentieth century Europe witnessed a decrease in the size of family households. The number of children was no longer directly related to its social class, and the growing middle classes often had least children, namely one or two (Tumin 1974, 108–109). Urbanisation, the decrease in infant mortality, and women’s growing independence continue to make families smaller around the world (Sanderson & Dubrov 2000). With the parallel increase in individualism and longevity, Europeans spend a bigger time of our lives living alone.

16.4.1 Household Size

Household size reflects both the practices of neo-locality (whether the young couple will live independently or not) and the number of children. The number of people living together varies greatly in today’s Europe. It is largest in Southern Europe: in Turkey (on the average 4.6 people), Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and additionally in the West Coast periphery, Ireland, and Portugal (Map 16.4). Household size is smallest in Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Germany.

The European household is a nuclear family consisting of parents and their children. As an example we present the members in the households of baby boomers, who are now 50–62 years old (Table 16.1, unfortunately no data from Eastern Europe). In this phase of life people have not yet widowed and as many as three-fourths of the study subjects live with a spouse. More than one-third has children at home. Only 2% house their parents, and 1% their parents-in-law or grandchildren. Siblings living at this stage of life with their sisters or brothers are rare, only 0.6%, and other relatives and other people are even less frequent. One in five of the study subjects lives alone. Having other kin than children living in the household (extended family) is more common with Italy leading (8%) followed by Spain (4%), Germany (3%), and Austria (2%). These are mostly parents or parents-in-law.



Map 16.4 Average household size. Latest available year 1995–2004

Source: UNECE Statistical Yearbook of the Economic Commission for Europe. Eurostat NewCronos. Labels with grids: three people and over.

16.4.2 Fertility

Childbearing has been postponed to a later stage of life in today's Europe (Billari et al. 2006; Chapter 14). This is related to modern contraceptive methods and to the social pressure to avoid childbearing before securing one's educational and social position. Contrary to what one would perhaps expect, increase in economic wealth lowers fertility, especially if that increase happens rapidly (Mace 1998; Hill & Reeve 2004). This appears to happen both on a country level and within countries in relation to social class and has made the length of time between first intercourse and first child longer and longer.


The connection between women's education and higher age for parenthood is often seen as a quasi-natural law. However, Eastern Europe and especially Russia display an interesting pattern, where very low fertility levels coexist with early age of coupling and first child. Even today, it is not uncommon for educated women to behave like the Russian woman in the introductory quote: to marry one's first great love and then have a child in the heat of the moment. The first child is described as a "fruit of love", whereas family planning and economic considerations enter the picture only with regard to possible additional children (Rotkirch & Kesseli 2008).

The Trieste–St. Petersburg line holds its historic position as the strongest marker of distinction for the mean age of women at the birth of their first child (Map 16.5). The age span reaches from 22 years in the Ukraine to 29 years in Spain. In the Nordic countries, Western

Table 16.1 Categories of people living in the household, percent and means. People born in 1945–1950¹

	Spouse	Children	Parents	Siblings	Grandchildren	Other relatives	Others	Household size people	N
Sweden	75.2	15.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	451
Denmark	72.5	10.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	1.9	382
Finland	73.4	10.8	1.3	No inf.	No inf.	No inf.	No inf.	2.1	1103
Ireland	69.5	35.5	3.4	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	2.3	203
The Netherlands	80.3	15.6	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	2.0	467
Germany	80.8	18.6	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	2.1	334
Austria	64.6	22.3	1.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	2.0	175
Switzerland	69.9	19.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	2.0	216
Belgium	74.1	24.0	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.0	2.1	467
France	69.4	22.3	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	2.1	431
Italy	81.1	47.9	3.9	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.0	2.7	407
Spain	81.1	43.0	8.6	2.9	0.4	2.9	0.4	2.8	244
Greece	73.5	53.4	1.1	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.6	442
Czechia	66.4	23.4	3.1	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.0	2.1	453
Poland	77.3	50.6	5.8	0.5	0.0	1.5	0.5	3.1	397
Total	74.4	28.6	2.1	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.2	2.3	5069

¹Source: SHARE CV and GENTRANS question 4.



Map 16.5 Mean age of women at the birth of the first child in 2005


Source: Eurostat 2008, UNECE Statistical Yearbook of the Economic Commission for Europe. Labels with grids: over 27.5 years.

Central Europe, and Western Mediterranean area women first become mothers older (27–28 years of age) than in the Mediterranean and Eastern Central European countries (23–25 years). The exceptions are the Western peripheral countries Iceland, Norway, and Portugal (and Austria) where women become mothers fairly young.

In spite of a later start of childbearing, the total fertility rate (children per 1000 women) is higher in the North and the West than in the South and the East (except for Turkey and Estonia, which have very high, respectively, low rates) (Fig. 16.3). Among European low fertility countries, the highest fertility rates appear in countries with high gender equity and long-term family-friendly social policies: this is often used to explain high fertility rates in the Nordic countries, France, and Belgium (1.84–2.00) as compared to those in South and Eastern Europe (Ronson & Skrede 2006; Santow & Bracher 2001; Sánchez-Barricarte & Fernández-Carro 2007).

Both type of religion and degree of religiosity affect fertility rates. Fertility is highest in Turkey (2.20), where the majority is Muslim, and fairly high also in Catholic Ireland. The lowest rates are from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland (about 1.20). Rates are low also in the other post-socialist countries and the Mediterranean countries, except Portugal and Turkey.

Map 16.6 shows the proportion of households with three or more children of all households with small children. The focus is on people who are currently of reproductive age. The variation is very high, from 5 to 7% in the Eastern and Mediterranean regions to almost



Map 16.6 Percentage of families (with children <18 years in the household) having at least three children
 Source: Eurostat, Census 2001, Households and families. Labels with grids: over 10%.

every fifth household in the Nordic countries. The high levels of Nordic fertility does not mean that all Nordic women have children, but that quite many women have three or four or even more children.

In sum, European fertility rates are today lowest in countries where women have entered the labour market fully but social policy supports are unstable or lacking. Although postponement of parenthood contributes to lower number of children, the European countries with highest fertility are not the ones where women and men become parents very young, but where also people with higher education can “recover” higher fertility levels in their thirties (Sánchez-Barricarte & Fernández-Carro 2007). Fertility is also influenced by the availability of kin help and the amounts of paid and unpaid work, which we present below.

16.5 Paid and Unpaid Work

Women represent almost half of the labour force in the Nordic countries and in the countries which belonged to the former Soviet Union (Fig. 16.5). In the other post-socialist countries, this proportion is closer to that of Western Central Europe and in the Mediterranean region, where it is 41–46% except for being even lower in Malta (31%) and Turkey (26%).

Children’s day care crucially affects women’s possibilities to participate in paid work (see Chapter 13). Most of the very young children seem, however, to be taken care of at home. Less than half of Europe’s children aged 0–3 years attend institutionalised day-care

Country	16.5. Share of women in adult labour force 2006 ¹⁾	16.6. Part-time employment of women ²⁾	16.7. Proportion of 0–3 years old children in daycare facilities ³⁾	16.8. Preschool child suffers of maternal employment ⁴⁾
Nordic countries				
• Denmark	47	22	64	18
• Finland	48	15	22	41
• Iceland	47	-	-	33
• Norway	47	-	-	-
• Sweden	47	20	48	38
<i>Average</i>	47	13	45	32
Western Central Europe				
• Austria	45	26	4	74
• Belgium	44	33	30	51
• France	46	23	29	56
• Germany	45	36	East 16 West 2	East 37 West 73
• Ireland	43	34	-	35
• Luxemburg	42	-	-	-
• Netherlands	45	60	6	46
• Switzerland	45	-	-	-
• United Kingdom	46	40	-	46
<i>Average</i>	45	36	6	46
Western Mediterranean area				
• Cyprus	46	-	-	-
• Gibraltar	-	-	-	-
• Greece	41	10	3	47
• Italy	40	24	6	81
• Malta	35	-	-	-
• Portugal	47	15	12	72
• Spain	41	16	5	46
• Turkey	26	12	-	-
<i>Average</i>	39	15	6	61
Eastern Mediterranean area				
• Bulgaria	46	(3)	10	61
• Croatia	45	-	-	-
• Macedonia	-	-	-	-
• Serbia	43	-	-	-
• Slovenia	46	8	29	47
• <i>Average</i>	45	5	20	54
Eastern Central Europe				
• Czech Republic	45	5	1	47
• Hungary	45	-	-	-
• Poland	46	17	5	63
• Romania	46	(13)	1	47
• Slovakia	45	4	46	77
<i>Average</i>	45	9	13	62
Former Soviet Union area				
• Belarus	49	-	-	-
• Estonia	49	(11)	19	65
• Latvia	48	(14)	13	63
• Lithuania	49	(11)	10	75
• Moldova	47	-	-	-
• Russia	49	-	-	-
• Ukraine	48	-	-	-
<i>Average</i>	48	12	14	68

Figs. 16.5–16.8 (continued)

facilities (Fig. 16.7). These proportions are highest in Denmark, Sweden, Slovakia, Belgium, France, and Slovenia.

Attitudes towards maternal employment are more positive in the West than in the East but the line is not as straight as in the case of part-time work. This was studied by asking whether respondents agreed with the statement “A preschool child suffers when his or her mother is working”. Answers correspond quite well to the enrolment of children in public day care (Fig. 16.8). The statement received less support in the Nordic countries and in Western Central Europe (except Austria, Western Germany, and Portugal). There is also a small group of Balkan countries – Greece, Slovenia, and Romania – where maternal employment is not so much condemned. The generally unfavourable views towards maternal employment in the East may be a reaction against the compulsory paid work of women in the socialist time and the patriarchal renaissance in this area since the 1990s.

The gender gap in unpaid domestic work is wide (Szalai et al. 1972) and is only slowly diminishing (Niemi & Pääkkönen 2002). Makiko Fuwa (2004) studied the effect of macro-level economic and political gender inequality on individual-level factors – relative income, time availability, and gender ideology – in determining the division of housework in 22 industrialised countries. She found that the equalising effects of time availability and gender ideology were stronger for women in more egalitarian countries; women in less egalitarian countries benefitted less from their individual-level assets. A later study of 33 countries showed that social policies affect not only the overall gender division of housework but also the dynamics of micro-level negotiations (Fuwa & Cohen 2007).

In the 11 European countries which are included in the Harmonized European Time Use Survey (2007), the amount of domestic work conducted by men is largest in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Sweden and lowest in Italy and Spain (Chart 16.1). Women spend about 5 h in domestic work in Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, and Estonia.

Part-time work, i.e. less than 30 h of wage work a week, is a typical solution for working mothers combining in some regions (Fig. 16.6). Among women, Europe is split on an East–West axis: in the East most women work full-time while part-time work is quite common in the West (except in Spain and Portugal, where full-time housewives are also more common than elsewhere). In the Netherlands three and in the United Kingdom two out of every five women are in part-time work. In Germany, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and Italy the proportion ranges from 20 to 36%. In the other Nordic and Mediterranean countries and in all Eastern European countries less than one of five women works part-time.⁴

Figs. 16.5–16.8 (continued) Facts and attitudes related to maternal employment, percentages

¹United Nations Statistics Division – Demographic and Social Statistics. Last update 2008.

²Part-time employment (<30 h a week) of total employment of women aged 15–64 in 2003. OECD 2005. Quoted from EQLS (2007, Table 2, p. 15). For countries without official data on part-time work, information on subjective part time in parentheses is presented on the basis of an Eurostat survey.

³EQLS (2007, Table 3, p. 18).

⁴Agrees with the statement “A preschool child suffers when his or her mother is working”. European Values Survey 1999/2000; European and World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981–2004.

⁴In some of the Eastern European countries there is no official data on working hours. Eurostat subjective survey data come very close to the objective official data. In Appendix Table 5 subjective data are marked in parentheses.




Chart 16.1 Time used in domestic work by men and women in some European countries
Source: European Time Use Survey 2004.

In Italy and Spain, two of the countries where women spend a lot of time in domestic work, the female share of the labour force is low, part-time work fairly common, and men do not spend much time in domestic work. In two others, Bulgaria and Estonia, on the contrary, the percentage of women in the labour force is high, part-time work is rare, and men conduct quite a lot of domestic tasks. These countries have a tradition of women's paid full-time work while ready-made foods and home technology have been expensive or hard to obtain.

16.6 Intergenerational Help

The predominance of the nuclear family type in Europe does not imply an absence of strong familial bonds between generations. Several studies have shown close ties including practical and financial transfers between parents, their adult children, and grandchildren (e.g. Attias-Donfut & Rozenkier 1995; Walker 1996; Millar & Warman 1996; Kohli 1999; Arber & Attias-Donfut 1999; Attias-Donfut 2000; Björnberg 2007). The results from the SHARE and the GENTRANS projects show that adults both expect and receive much economic and emotional support from parents and grandparents (Chart 16.2). Thus most so-called baby boomers, people born in 1945–1950, think that a grandparent's duty is to be there for grandchildren "in case of difficulties". The view that it is grandparents' duty to "look after grandchildren" is also widespread and almost as many agree that it is grandparents' duty to "support grandchildren economically".




Chart 16.2 Expects financial help from grandparents and has given financial gifts to adult children. Parents born in 1945–1950 in some European countries
 Expectations: Agrees with the statement that it is grandparents’ duty to support grandchildren and their families economically, percent.
 Practice: Has given financial gifts >250 euro to at least one of his or her four first-born children in the last 12 months, percent.
 Sources: SHARE Wave 2 and GENTRANS.

Expectations towards grandparents are more demanding in the Mediterranean area and France than in the other Western Central European countries and the Nordic countries. The exception is that also in Austria and Germany grandparents are expected to look after grandchildren. This was measured with reactions to the statement “Parents duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being”. Intergenerational solidarity in attitudes towards grandparents’ role is least popular in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland. Expectations towards parents are most demanding in the Mediterranean countries Greece, Italy, Spain but also in Sweden. In the Mediterranean area and at the core of Western Central Europe (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium) people more often think that “the family instead of the state” should bear the responsibility of giving financial support, help with household chores, and personal care to older people.

How do these attitudes translate into practice? We studied baby-boomers’ (who were about 60 years old) monetary gift-giving to their children and other kin and friends and found that it is, a bit surprisingly, most common in Finland and Sweden (see Chart 16.2). Then come the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain.

One explanation to this result is that the amount of provided financial assistance decreases if the adult children live at home. This is today rare in the North and much more frequent in Central and Mediterranean Europe. About 60% of baby boomers, now in their sixties, have children living at home in Spain, Italy, and Greece.⁵ In the North, in

⁵The high proportion of adult children living at parents’ home has become a public concern and popular research topic.

Finland, Sweden, and Denmark but also in Switzerland and Austria, only 11–20% of baby boomers house their children in their homes.⁶

16.7 Sexual Attitudes

We conclude by looking at some attitudes to sexuality and family life. First, we measure attitudes to abortion, sexual freedom, homosexuality, and prostitution.⁷ They indicate liberalism and gender equality, as well as how the unavoidable tension between these two is culturally solved. A highly liberal attitude to sexuality is not necessarily in favour of gender equality, and vice versa. The data are derived from the World Values Surveys conducted in 1981–2002; the average year is 1994.

Finding *abortion justifiable* is most common in the Nordic countries, where this is the view of almost three out of four persons (scores 5–10 on the scale ranging from 1 to 10, Fig. 16.9). Western Central Europe does not form a coherent region in this respect and the attitudes vary widely. The most negative attitudes are found in the Catholic Western Mediterranean countries. In Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece the percentages vary between 42 and 60 so half the population is opposed to abortions. Also in Eastern Mediterranean, Central European, and the ex-Soviet countries only every second person finds abortion justifiable. It is astonishing that the socialist legacy, with high numbers of performed abortions, should have left such a low support today. However, other studies indicate higher tolerance of abortions in, e.g. Russia and Estonia (Haavio-Mannila & Kontula 2003).

Agreeing with complete *sexual freedom* was studied by using the following question: “If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?” Here, least support came from Nordic countries and Eastern Central Europe (Fig. 16.10). The most liberal country is Spain and the most conservative ones are Malta, Denmark, and Norway.

Homosexuality is most accepted in the Western regions (Fig. 16.11). Finding it justifiable stretches from 4% in Albania and 9% in Turkey to 87% in the Netherlands! These values correlate with the legal and social status of homosexuals and the attitude to homosexuality of the dominant religion. In many Western European countries, homosexuality was classified as a disease until the 1970s or 1980s. Only during the last decade have homosexuals begun to receive marital and parental rights comparable to those of heterosexual couples. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the legacy of state socialism is still visible. In Soviet Union, for instance, male homosexuality was criminalised for being an asocial way of living, and lesbianism was regarded as a mental disease. Today, homosexuality is decriminalised in all European Union countries including Turkey and other countries applying for membership, but homosexuals lack full human and marital rights especially in Eastern Europe. Both the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox churches condemn homosexuality.

⁶We calculated these percentages from the data of the SHARE project conducted in the beginning of the 2000s in 12 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. The bulk of the 31,115 study subjects consists of people aged 50–74 years (Börsch-Supan et al. 2005; www.share-project.org).

⁷The attitudes correlate significantly with each other; complete sexual freedom least so.

	16.9. Abortion justifiable	16.10. Agrees with complete sexual freedom	16.11. Homo- sexuality justifiable	16.12. Prostitution justifiable
Nordic countries				
• Denmark	78	11	73	40
• Finland	65	28	57	31
• Iceland	65	23	81	27
• Norway	67	11	63	29
• Sweden	86	17	84	39
<i>Average</i>	72	18	72	27
Western Central Europe				
• Austria	52	39	56	41
• Belgium	55	27	62	34
• France	74	32	66	36
• Germany	56	24	60	41
• Germany West	45	25	65	48
• Ireland	25	17	49	24
• Luxemburg	63	-	68	32
• Netherlands	66	33	87	65
• Northern Ireland	30	22	-	-
• Switzerland	60	31	71	59
• United Kingdom	57	30	61	38
<i>Average</i>	53	26	70	42
Western Mediterranean				
• Cyprus	-	-	-	-
• Greece	60	-	57	26
• Italy	48	42	56	19
• Malta	4	7	24	4
• Portugal	42	23	36	12
• Spain	58	56	72	56
• Turkey	22	24	9	9
<i>Average</i>	39	30	42	21
Eastern Mediterranean				
• Albania	42	16	4	3
• Bosnia and Herzegovina	44	30	14	10
• Bulgaria	60	20	23	23
• Croatia	46	34	26	27
• Macedonia	44	-	13	8
• Serbia and Montenegro	60	27	16	11
• Slovenia	71	27	48	32
<i>Average</i>	52	26	24	15
Eastern Central Europe				
• Czech Republic	67	14	60	23
• Hungary	46	16	37	22
• Poland	39	20	25	18
• Romania	42	28	13	17
• Slovakia	53	13	55	33
<i>Average</i>	49	16	38	16
Former Soviet Union				
• Belarus	63	27	26	25
• Estonia	54	24	30	22
• Latvia	44	29	13	32
• Lithuania	47	25	13	20
• Moldova	38	25	17	21
• Russia	62	22	18	17
• Ukraine	46	23	21	13
<i>Average</i>	51	25	20	21

Figs. 16.9–16.12 Attitudes towards some sexual issues,¹ percentages²

¹Source: World Values Surveys 1996–2002.

²Values 5–10 on a scale of 1 to 10.

Acceptance of *prostitution* varies from Malta (4%) and Turkey (9%) to majority support in the famously liberal Netherlands (65%). Western Central Europeans accept prostitution more than the others, as more than two of five people consider it justifiable (Fig. 16.12).

16.8 Family Values

Do Europeans share the same family values? Far from it. On the basis of World Value Survey data we conducted a factor analysis of seven available variables measuring attitudes towards family issues. Three dimensions emerged. *Support of nuclear family and traditional femininity* (or traditional parenthood) was related to agreeing with the statements “a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled”, “women want a home and children”, “a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily” and to disapproval of single woman as parents.⁸ An *anti-institutional conception of family and marriage* was found among those thinking that family is not important in life, marriage is an out-dated institution and approving of single women as parents. Those supporting *women’s economic provider role* thought that husband and wife should both contribute to family income and also approved of single women as parents.

The counter-poles in traditional family values are on the one hand, the former Soviet Union countries, and on the other hand, the Nordic countries (Figs. 16.13–16.15). The other countries fall in between these extremes. The ideal of traditional parenthood is most common in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Central European countries and least common in the Nordic countries and in Western Central Europe.

Family and marriage as institutions are not important in the former Soviet Union countries and in the Western Central Europe (Figs. 16.16–16.17). Shared economic provision by husband and wife and single women as parents are rejected in Eastern Central European and Eastern Mediterranean countries (Figs. 16.18–16.19). It is most often accepted in the Nordic and Western Central European countries.

To summarise, the West–East dimension is a very important but not the only dividing line in European sexual patterns. Countries with long experiences of state socialist or social democratic rule are more prone to favour women’s rights. This is reflected in higher support for abortion and less support for prostitution and complete sexual freedom. A traditionally harsh rejection of homosexuality diminishes when legislation and public ideology changes. As we have seen this is not the case with all indicators – for instance, although female employment has long been a fact of life, many still oppose it.

16.9 Conclusion: Tradition, Equality, or Autonomy?

In the 1930s, the founder of comparative sociology Edward Westermarck (1936/1970) predicted two long-term trends in family and sexual life: marriage would preserve its popularity and cultural tolerance would increase. By marriage, he referred to any durable union

⁸Measured by the statement: “A woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man.” In Europe, there is a growing scientific interest in single parents’ economic and employment situation, also from an international perspective (Duncan & Edwards 1999; Millar & Evans 2003).

Country	Traditional parenthood			N
	16.13. Child needs a home with father and mother ¹	16.14. A woman has to have children to be fulfilled ²	16.15. Women want a home and children ³	
Nordic countries				
• Denmark	0.7	0.8	1.9	970
• Finland	0.6	0.1	2.5	991
• Iceland	0.7	0.3	2.6	936
• Sweden	0.6	-	2.2	951
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.6</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>2.3</i>	
Western Central Europe				
• Austria	0.9	0.3	-	1511
• Belgium	0.8	-	2.6	1873
• France	0.9	0.7	2.8	1578
• Germany	0.9	0.6	2.3	1982
• Ireland	0.7	0.2	-	968
• Luxemburg	0.8	0.4	2.6	1149
• Netherlands	0.7	0.1	2.2	994
• Northern Ireland	0.7	0.2	-	944
• United Kingdom	0.6	0.2	2.4	913
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>0.3</i>	<i>2.5</i>	
Western Mediterranean				
• Greece	1.0	0.7	2.8	1121
• Italy	0.9	0.6	2.8	1948
• Malta	0.9	0.4	2.8	991
• Portugal	0.7	0.7	2.5	971
• Spain	0.9	0.5	2.4	2331
• Turkey	1.0	0.7	-	4518
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.9</i>	<i>0.6</i>	<i>2.7</i>	
Eastern Mediterranean				
• Albania	1.0	0.9	0.6	985
• Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.9	0.9	-	1191
• Bulgaria	1.0	0.7	3.0	991
• Croatia	0.8	0.5	2.6	973
• Macedonia	1.0	0.7	2.7	1049
• Serbia and Montenegro	0.9	0.7	-	2187
• Slovenia	0.9	0.4	2.8	994
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>0.9</i>	
Eastern Central Europe				
• Czech Republic	0.9	0.5	2.8	1870
• Poland	1.0	0.7	3.0	1086
• Hungary	1.0	0.9	2.9	991
• Romania	0.9	0.8	3.1	1119
• Slovakia	0.9	0.4	2.7	1312
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.9</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>2.9</i>	
Former Soviet Union				
• Estonia	1.0	0.7	2.8	973
• Latvia	0.9	0.9	2.8	989
• Lithuania	0.8	0.7	3.1	943
• Russia	0.9	0.8	3.1	2451
• Belarus	0.9	0.8	2.9	976
• Ukraine	1.0	0.9	3.1	1170
• Moldova	0.97	0.8	-	999
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.93</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>3.0</i>	
Total	0.9	0.6	2.7	50889

Figs. 16.13–16.15 Traditional parenthood, means

¹Source: World Values Surveys 1999–2002.

²Range 0–1.

³Range 1–4.

Country	Anti-institutional family conception		Economically independent woman		N
	16.16. Family not important in life	16.17. Marriage is an out-dated institution	16.18. Husband and wife should both contribute to income	16.19. Approves woman as a single parent	
Nordic countries					
• Denmark	1.1	1.3	2.1	2.2	970
• Finland	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.3	991
• Iceland	1.1	1.2	2.3	2.7	936
• Sweden	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.9	951
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>2.3</i>	
Western Central Europe					
• Austria	1.1	1.4	-	2.1	1511
• Belgium	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	1873
• France	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.2	1578
• Germany	1.3	1.4	2.0	2.0	1982
• Ireland	1.1	1.4	-	1.9	968
• Luxemburg	1.1	1.7	2.3	2.1	1149
• Netherlands	1.3	1.5	2.6	2.2	994
• Northern Ireland	1.1	1.5	-	1.9	944
• United Kingdom	1.1	1.5	2.2	2.00	913
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.5</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>2.1</i>	
Western Mediterranean					
• Greece	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.9	1121
• Italy	1.1	1.31	2.0	1.9	1948
• Malta	1.0	1.1	2.2	1.4	991
• Portugal	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9	971
• Spain	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.6	2331
• Turkey	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.2	4518
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>1.9</i>	<i>1.8</i>	
Eastern Mediterranean					
• Albania	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	985
• Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.1	1191
• Bulgaria	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.2	991
• Croatia	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.5	973
• Macedonia	1.0	1.4	1.5	2.1	1049
• Serbia and Montenegro	1.1	1.3	1.6	2.1	2187
• Slovenia	1.2	1.5	1.6	2.4	994
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>2.1</i>	

Figs. 16.16–16.19 Anti-institutional family conception and economically independent woman, means (range 1–4)

Eastern Central Europe						
• Czech Republic	1.2	1.2	1.6	2.1	1870	
• Poland	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.2	1086	
• Hungary	1.1	1.3	1.6	2.0	991	
• Romania	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.2	1119	
• Slovakia	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.9	1312	
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>1.7</i>	<i>2.1</i>		
Former Soviet Union						
• Estonia	1.4	1.3	1.9	2.1	973	
• Latvia	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.3	989	
• Lithuania	1.4	1.4	1.9	2.4	943	
• Russia	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.3	2451	
• Belarus	1.3	1.3	1.7	2.4	976	
• Ukraine						
	1.2	1.3	1.8	2.0	1170	
• Moldova	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.9	999	
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>2.2</i>		
Total	1.2	1.4	1.8	2.0	50889	

Figs. 16.16–16.19 (continued)

between two adults of the opposite sex, thus including both institutionalised marriage and cohabitation.

As we know today, Westermarck’s predictions proved right. Alternatives to the traditional institutionalised heterosexual marriage have spread and sexual behaviour has become increasingly separated from marriage. Cohabitation, either before entering legal marriage or as a life-long form of living, is common in most European countries. Single motherhood is much less stigmatised than before. Homosexual couples and their children are increasingly recognised and approved of. At the same time, the most common family formation, the heterosexual nuclear family, is still dominant.

Within these general trends of change and stability, our division into six European regions presents distinct behavioural patterns of sexual, couple, and family formation (a list of the specific features of the six areas is presented in Chart 16.3). We have attempted to retain internal divisions especially in Eastern Europe, which are often overlooked. Nevertheless, our results point to the continuing relevance of the East–West division.

A visualisation of Europe’s couples and families may thus begin with that historical line, running vertically on the map, and then add more or less horizontal lines from East to West tracing religion versus secularism, or traditional family values versus gender equality, to the picture. Below, we sum up the findings for each region and then sketch three major dividing lines that emerged from our review and relate to gender equality, traditional family values, and individual autonomy.

The *Nordic countries* are characterised by gender equality, dual breadwinners, sexual permissiveness, and relatively high fertility. Young people have early sexual initiation, often use modern contraception, start to live independently early, have late coupling and late transition to parenthood and formal marriage. Cohabitation is common and the proportion of ever-married women is the lowest in Europe. About one in five parents have three or more children. Household size is, nevertheless, small. People receive little informal practical help from kin but get relatively generous monetary assistance. The share of women in the labour force is high, part-time work uncommon, and small children are often

Characteristics	The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden)	Western Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Switzerland, United Kingdom)	The Western Mediterranean area (Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey)	The Eastern Mediterranean countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia)	Eastern Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia)	The former Soviet Union countries in Europe (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine).
Sexuality and couple formation						
Age at first intercourse for women	low	fairly low	high	(fairly low)	high	high
Age at first marriage for women	high	high	lower	low	low	very low
Mean age of women at the birth of the first child	high	high	high	low	low	very low
Total fertility rate	high	high	fairly high	low	low	low
Use of modern contraceptives	yes	yes	some	no	no	no
Ever married women	low	fairly low	fairly low	high	high	high
Divorces	fairly low	fairly low	low	low	fairly low	high
Household composition						
Household size	small	small	large	large	small	large
Children living at home (people born 1945-50)	no	no	yes	Not studied	Not studied	Not studied
Families with 3+ children	yes	yes	no	no	yes	.no
Maternal employment						
Share of women in adult labour force	high	low	low	high	high	high
Part-time employment	low	high	low	low	low	low
Proportion of 0-3 yrs of children in daycare	high	low	low	low	low	low
Preschool child suffers of maternal employment	low	fairly low	high	fairly high	high	high
Women use plenty of time in household work	no	no	yes	yes	Not studied	yes
Intergenerational help: gives more than expected	yes	no	no	Not studied	Not studied	Not studied
Sexual values						
Abortion	strong yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
Sexual freedom	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Prostitution	yes	strong yes	no	no	no	no
Homosexuality	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
Family values						
Traditional parenthood	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Anti-institutional conception of marriage	no	yes	no	no	no	yes
Economically independent woman	yes	yes	no	no	no	yes

Chart 16.3 Summary of the characteristics of the six areas

enrolled in public day care. Attitudes towards employment of mothers are positive. Women do not use plenty of time for household chores, the gender gap in which is also comparatively small. Attitudes towards abortion and homosexuality are liberal but total sexual freedom is rejected. Family values favour dual breadwinners and also approve of single parenthood.

Compared to the North, *Western Central Europe* has lower overall fertility, less gender equality, and a greater emphasis on individual freedom in sexual and family matters. People start sexual intercourse and marry fairly early but get their first child at an advanced age. Use of modern contraception is widespread. Households are small, adult children do not live with parents, and there are many families with three or more children. The share of women in paid work is low and women's part-time work is common. Women spend more time in domestic work than do Nordic women but less than women in Southern and Eastern Europe. Western Central European men do housework as much as Nordic men. Sexually liberal attitudes prevail, particularly towards prostitution but also towards homosexuality and unlimited sexual freedom. However, abortion is not considered as justifiable as in the Nordic countries. Traditional family values are not very strong; people favour what we have named an anti-institutional conception of marriage and the family. Female breadwinners and single mothers are accepted.

In the *Western Mediterranean* area, we discern less gender equality and also less signs of liberal individualism. Young people stay longer in the parental home. They have later sexual initiation, coupling, and transition to parenthood. Modern contraception methods are not used very often. Fertility levels are relatively low and families with many children are rare, despite the higher presence of kin and relatives in daily life. Households are large and divorces relatively uncommon. Women are more seldom working for pay but use much time in unpaid domestic work. People often believe that a preschool child suffers if the mother is working. Attitudes towards sexual issues are conservative, with the notable exception of strong support for unlimited sexual freedom. Family values favour traditional parenthood, here measured as the view that a child needs both parents and a woman needs children.

Compared with the Western Mediterranean area, the *Eastern Mediterranean* area also favours traditional family values. In contrast to it, Eastern Mediterraneans experience earlier fertility and more gender equality in employment. Sexual initiation takes place fairly early and people marry and get children at a young age. Modern contraception is rare. The proportion of ever-married women is high and divorce is rare, but few children are born. Households are large, but there are few families with at least three children under 18 at home. Women work for pay relatively often and full-time. Much time is spent on household chores. Attitudes towards abortion and sexual freedom are liberal but homosexuality and prostitution are not considered justifiable. Family values emphasise traditional parenthood.

In *Eastern Central Europe*, sexual initiation is late, but formal marriage and transition to parenthood arrive early in the life course. Fertility levels are low and few women report modern contraception use. Average household size is small, but there are many families with at least three children under 18. As in the Eastern Mediterranean area, women's involvement in full-time wage work is high but children are not in day-care facilities outside the home. Abortion and homosexuality are considered justifiable but unlimited sexual freedom and prostitution are condemned. Traditional parenthood is valued.

Finally, in the region encompassing the *former Soviet Union*, sexual initiation occurs late but people marry and get children early. Fertility rates are low. Modern contraception is seldom used, although this is slowly changing. The proportion of ever-married women

is high and divorce common. Households are large but there are few families with at least three under-age children. Women often work for pay although people believe the children suffer from it. People approve of abortion and unlimited sexual freedom but not of homosexuality and prostitution. Family values favour traditional parenthood but also anti-institutional conception of marriage, indicating polarisation of opinions within the populations.

Depending on which indicator we study, the six European regions – a Northern, Central, and Southern region on each side of the Trieste–St. Petersburg line – align themselves somewhat differently. Generalising, we may look at these three horizontal “belts” of family formations as emphasising *gender equality in the North*, *individual autonomy in Central Europe*, and *traditional family values in the South*.

We grouped the family values of traditional parenthood, anti-institutional conception of family, and woman’s economic independence. Their counterpoles are the former Soviet Union countries vs. Nordic countries. In between these poles are Western Central Europe and both Mediterranean areas, where people support, e.g. large individual sexual freedom. In the Nordic and also in the Western Central European countries homosexuality is accepted more than elsewhere.

In Northern Europe, the spheres of sexuality and family life are less overlapping than in the South. Young adults in Nordic countries have a longer period of sexually active single life, before marriage and parenthood, while the age at first intercourse and first marriage is higher in Southern Europe. The gender differences are also higher in the South, reflecting the stronger presence and control of kin and husbands. Women spend a lot of time in domestic work in the Mediterranean area (and in France and Estonia) while in the Western Mediterranean area the proportion of women in the labour force is low.

Children also live in the parental home longer in the Mediterranean area than in the North. Expectations towards intergenerational support differ on the South–North dimension. Finally, in some behavioural patterns, we see alignments between South and East, making the North stand alone. Thus extended families (having other kin than children in the household) are usual in the Western Mediterranean countries and in Eastern Europe. Fear of negative consequences of maternal employment is rare in the Nordic and most of the Western Central European countries, but fairly common in the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries.

How will European families evolve? While signs of convergence are clear, there is also no doubt that century-old historical divisions continue and new regional variations appear (Therborn 2007). Family and sexual attitudes also change with different logic and pace. For instance, we have seen the enormous intra-European variation that currently exists regarding homosexuality. Negative attitudes to homosexuality build on stereotypes, fears, and revulsion. Fortunately, fast progress is possible and social attitudes may change rapidly, e.g. as legislation extends marital and parental rights to sexual minorities.

With regard to gender roles, the question of the pace of change appears more complex. Despite several decades of high female participation in paid work in all of Europe, attitudes to maternal employment were nowhere unequivocal. Even in the Nordic countries, with their uniformly supportive policies for gender equality, substantial amounts of people ascribe traditional domestic roles to women and do not approve of single motherhood.

There are crucial tensions between each pair of the three concepts freedom, tradition, and gender equality. In the minds of Europeans, complete sexual freedom may be opposed to gender equality, and great marital and reproductive choice does not always lead to stable and traditional families. As stressed in the beginning of this chapter, all sex–marriage patterns have their pros and cons. Remembering the women quoted in the introduction,

Table 16.2 Expectations related to support given and received by elderly in the family. Means, range 1–5. People born in 1945–50¹⁾

	Expectations towards support from grandparents and parents				Expectations related to the role of family and the state in helping the elderly				N
	Grandparents' duty is to be there for grandchildren	Grandparents' duty is to support grandchildren economically	Grandparents' duty is to look after grandchildren	Parents duty is to do their best for their children	Financial support for elderly should be given by family	Help in household chores for elderly should be given by family	Personal care of elderly should be given by family		
Greece	4.3	3.4	3.9	4.4	2.4	3.5	3.7	342	
Italy	4.2	3.6	3.9	4.3	2.7	3.3	3.1	313	
Spain	4.1	3.4	3.6	4.1	2.9*	3.2	3.2	221	
France	4.3	3.5	3.9	3.9	2.4	2.6	2.5	263	
Belgium	3.9	3.0	3.3	3.6	2.5	2.9	2.7	543	
Switzerland	3.6	2.5	2.9	3.6	2.5	3.1	2.9	121	
Austria	3.8	2.8	3.3	3.8	2.6	3.2	3.0	286	
Germany	4.0	2.9	3.6	3.2	2.7	3.4	3.1	335	
Netherlands	3.7	2.6	2.6	3.5	2.2	2.6	2.3	470	
Denmark	4.0	2.4	2.9	3.7	1.8	2.0	1.7	246	
Sweden	4.0	2.8	3.0	4.3	2.1	2.4	2.2	411	
Finland	3.8	2.6	2.6		2.3	2.6	2.4	1115	

¹⁾Sources: SHARE dropoff and GENTRANS question 102.

it may be an advantage to become a mother very early and raise your child with great help from your own parents, as in the East, but it may also be desirable to live an independent, adventurous prolonged Nordic youth – or a socially and economically protected, less adventurous single life of the Southern European young.

The choice between individual autonomy, gender equality, and traditional family ties is sometimes a real choice: not even in the best of all Europes could one probably ever select only the best parts of these family variations.

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Chapter 17

Stratification and Social Mobility

Péter Róbert

17.1 Introduction

When considering the relevance of stratification and social mobility for the European Union, it is impossible to begin this chapter in a different way but by making a point about the significance of the ‘hard-core’ stratification characteristics in the present European societies. This involves the importance of occupation (labour market participation), education (various kinds of human capital investments), financial circumstances (income differentiation, poverty) and in particular the ‘summary’ of the structural positions or ‘locations’, i.e. the *social class* and the *social status*. The handbook devotes several other chapters to the characteristics of social standing mentioned above, so this chapter focuses on the historically based, ‘aggregated’ and conceptually grounded approaches and developments related to structural positions people occupy in the system of social stratification.

Without going into the details of the debate on the ‘death of class’ (e.g. Pakulski and Waters 1996) and without providing any overview about such fashionable concepts like ‘individualisation’ or ‘globalisation’ (Beck 1992, 2000; Giddens 1999), this chapter has a starting point that various risks at the social and individual level root deeply in the classic and persisting forms of social stratification, summarised by class and status as well as in the unequal probabilities to make changes in structural positions, to become mobile both in intergenerational manner and over the course of working life. This view follows basically the arguments by Breen (1997) on transferring the risks by employers to employees which is not a universal process but occurs in a varying manner, in accordance with the employees’ different employment relations and class-related life chances, even under the conditions of the emerging globalisation and market insecurity in modern societies. The basic approach in this chapter is also in line with Goldthorpe’s (2002) opinion on the persistence of economic and social inequalities among members of different classes. In this light class structure as related to important differences between structural locations remains a relevant theory even under globalisation when inequalities and insecurities do not remain within the national borders. Despite the fashionable idea of being ‘beyond status and class’ or being ‘individualised’ in a global ‘risk society’,

P. Róbert (✉)

Marie Curie Excellence Senior Research Fellow, UCD Geary Institute; Associate Professor, Social Science Faculty of the Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE), and Senior Researcher, TÁRKI Social Research Institute
e-mail: peter.robert@ucd.ie; robert@tarki.hu

these persistent concepts related to social status and class as well as to the changes of these positions across generations or over individuals' working lives are in the heart of this study.

After having the Year of Mobility behind (the year 2006 has been designated as the '*European Year of Workers' Mobility*'), it is perhaps not necessary to provide a long list of arguments how much social mobility is crucial for the new Europe. In the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-language Europe, social origin, including place of birth, status or class of parents cannot determine the social chances and future prospects of individuals. Along the lines of the European Year of Workers' Mobility concept, this chapter is going to discuss some but not all forms of social mobility. Though the notion and the approach of mobility are getting wider in the European dialogue on individual freedom and equality of social opportunities, some forms of mobility like, e.g. migration will be left to other chapters. Here the main focus will be put on intergenerational transmission of advantages and disadvantages, class mobility and inheritance from one generation to the next.

The aim of the chapter is to present a *European perspective* on stratification and social mobility including converging and diverging trends within the societies in Europe. It is also crucial to describe how individuals' structural positions, class relations and mobility chances are embedded institutionally. For these purposes, empirical information is provided based on statistical sources for as many European nations as possible. Due to the limitations of space this information cannot be presented on the level of each European nation but overall picture on the European societies will be given from different viewpoints of class structure. Additionally, for taking into account the variation of the institutional characteristics of the different European societies, I will describe them by clusters of the countries where the grouping is based on their welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). Historical developments both conceptually for analysing stratification and social mobility and empirically for the social changes in the various European nations are considered, presented and discussed in the course of the chapter. Regarding data sources, I rely on large-scale surveys based on random samples in various European nations. Part of them was collected in the framework of European comparative projects like the *European Social Survey* where I can benefit from the demographic variables or the more targeted *Eurobarometer 2005* survey on mobility, while other data were collected on national level aiming the analysis of social stratification and mobility in national context.

17.2 Conceptual and Historical Background

Without any doubts, stratification and social mobility have perhaps the longest tradition and history in sociology regarding its theory, conceptual background and various forms of empirical measurements. Even an attempt at summarising this history would nearly be beyond the scope of this chapter but readers should be aware that both stratification and mobility are old concepts and phenomena strongly connected to the division of labour as well. Various forms of social stratification could have been observed in the different types of societies that have existed throughout the history, like primitive communal society, slavery, caste system, feudal estate system, already before the more recent industrial and post-industrial societies have developed. These forms of societies also varied according to the degree of openness and closure between the hierarchical divisions, ranks within

their system of stratification. The history of stratification has been extensively reviewed by Lenski (1966) who states that social inequalities are strongly connected to the level of technical development and to the amount of surplus goods produced. In fact, the growing amount of surplus goods is also an outcome of technical, industrial development in the society and the roots of power and privilege lay in the unequal access to the larger share of the surplus. However, one cannot speak about a clear trend on how technical development, social inequalities and the system of stratification relate to each other – though some scholars in mobility research tried to formulate such a hypothesis. But the famous expression by one of the founding fathers of social mobility analyses, Pitirim Sorokin, *trendless fluctuation* probably describes the historical developments better. From the perspective of social mobility, Sorokin (1927, 1959) also investigates the various types of societies throughout the history and concludes that there has not been any society with complete openness regarding the chances for mobility but there has not been any society (even not the Indian caste society) where complete closure would have been present. All research done on the historical development of the societies, including also of course the works by Marx, makes it clear that the existence of inequalities that shape the whole distributive system, the conflict over the access to the more valuable and consequently scarce resources and surplus goods make social stratification necessary. This also means that the idea of equal (or classless) society is probably completely naive. The realistic goal in this regard can be the *equality of chances* for the members of the society with different social, racial or religious background and this will be discussed in more detail in the section on social mobility.

There are competing paradigms of looking at the system of stratification. I cannot go into details in this regard either but it is unavoidable to summarise the *functional* and the *conflict* theories of social stratification. The famous article by Davis and Moore (1945) is perhaps the best representation of the functionalist approach. They state that certain occupational positions are more important in the society because of its proper functioning; these positions can be filled in only by distinguished persons who have the appropriate skills and abilities; these people in these positions deserve more reward in order to motivate them to act for the society in those important positions. This logic leads to the necessity of inequalities in the society, explains why unequal access to resources and surplus goods has a functional role and provides the ground for social differentiation and stratification. But from the viewpoint of the conflict theory, inequalities in societies follow a different logic. In fact, the higher rewards and the better access to scarce resources make these positions so valuable that individuals in the society try to reach them or keep them by any means. Several institutes in the society are used for this purpose to legitimate social inequalities in general or the selection processes of individuals to social position in particular.¹

These basic paradigmatic views on social stratification are also reflected by the way this topic is empirically investigated by different researchers, following the different conceptual approach of class by Marx and Weber in many respects. The Marxian view of class is based on the term of exploitation which is based on domination and property, ownership of production means; this approach is usually labelled as one-dimensional. The Weberian view of social stratification is, however, a multi-dimensional one; even class is based on

¹This handbook devotes a whole chapter to education; school system is typically regarded (e.g. by Bourdieu) as an institution which plays a large role in legitimating the reproduction of social inequalities.

other aspects of life chances in addition to ownership like opportunities of income, relation to production. In addition to class, status is the other crucial concept by Weber which is based on consumption of goods and a style of life members of the class follow. The chapter will provide examples for various class schemas that can be connected to these different theoretical approaches. Apparently, class analysts experiment with various class models because they have different theoretical views about the society and they believe that the particular class schema they use is the most suitable to grasp and describe social inequalities in the society. On similar grounds, other scholars prefer to use a status measure instead of a class location for describing one's social position. Beyond the different theoretical arguments, measurement issues influence the decisions on the empirical analysis of social stratification as well; class schemas are categorical measures while most of the status indicators based on occupation have a gradational character.²

Since the European perspective plays a crucial role in this discussion, perhaps it is worth to make a point about some specific distinction between the European and the American view of the problem related to stratification and social mobility. Although research in this field and especially its modern quantitative empirical realisation has developed out in several respects in the US social science, it is important to note that part of the 'pairs' of categories mentioned above like, e.g. the functionalist approach to stratification vs. conflict theory or the class location vs. social status can be seen from a viewpoint of the different ways of thinking, being characteristic of the European vs. American approach to the topic. Functionalism in social stratification has stronger traditions in social science in the USA, while conflict theory gets larger emphasis in the European way of thinking about social inequalities. Similarly, social status linked to the Weberian theory is more frequently used by US scholars of stratification, while the class approach is rooted deeper in the European view of stratification and social mobility.³

Apparently there are historical roots behind this existing distinction between the European and American perspective regarding the dominance of the conflict theory or that of the class approach. For instance the practice of class movements, in particular that of the worker class movement, or the stronger dominance of a class-based discourse on social stratification and reproduction of social inequalities can be mentioned as basis for the European traditions in the more political way of thinking on the topic. A good illustration to this can be the notion of 'class struggles' for which several examples can be found in the European history like struggles between landowners and peasants or capitalists and industrial labourers, while such 'wars' are not characteristic of the American history. It shows that class has traditionally constituted stronger political and ideological cleavages in Europe and has played a larger role in various collective actions in comparison to the USA (Therborn 1995).⁴

²A very good insight on both the theoretical and the empirical issues is provided by the Reader edited by Grusky (2008) including excerpts from original texts of various authors.

³This does not mean necessarily that one can speak about a Weberian vs. Marxian theoretical distinction appearing from the European vs. American perspective of social stratification. The European class approach of stratification and mobility is strongly based on the Weberian class concept, while the American class-based analysis by Erik Olin Wright is connected to a (neo)-Marxist theory (though this is somewhat exceptional and less characteristic to the US research in the field of stratification and mobility).

⁴Therborn (1995: 236–237) refers also to the celebration of Mayday which seems to exist all over in Europe (even if with an uneven political importance), as a sign of certain persistence of worker class traditions and identities, while the same phenomenon is not present in the USA.

17.3 Class Structure and Status Hierarchy

In accordance with the last argument above in the previous section, the chapter has more focus on class developments than social status, though I intend to present a brief overview on the European societies from the viewpoint of status distribution as a form of stratification as well. Regarding class there is a general claim that it refers to the historically defined period of time of *industrialisation*, when European societies moved from agrarian ones to industrial ones and when the division of labour and the distribution of the workforce changed dramatically during this process. Due to the industrial development, the percentage of the population living from agriculture dropped and the proportion of industrial employment started to increase. At a later point in time, the differentiation within the worker class became also more observable and growing inequalities emerged between the *skilled and unskilled* workers (cf. Kaelble 1986, pp. 154–172). In fact, historians use the term ‘labour aristocracy’, referring first of all to England already for the times of Industrial Revolution. The similar term in sociology is the ‘affluent worker’ for describing labourers after World War II who are better educated, better paid, work in relatively more secure jobs and tend to have even middle class-like social and political attitudes (Goldthorpe et al. 1968). Another important feature of industrialisation and modernisation is the emerging cleavage between the *blue-collar* and *white-collar* workers. Non-manual employment in Europe was statistically not significant until the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. Around 1910 the proportion of white-collar workers was low even in the more developed societies: 12 percent in France, 13 percent in Germany, 7 percent in Great Britain (Kaelble 1986, p. 174). From the beginning white-collar employees enjoyed substantial advantages over blue-collar workers in terms of salaries, work conditions or job security; their life-style was different and social prestige was higher. As higher education has become more widespread in modern societies, professionals started to form a separate social group and inequalities emerged between them and the lower non-manual workers, making the class system more complex and stratified. These processes described above leading to the development of the industrial society with marked class divisions occurred with a quite large temporal variation in Europe, starting first in England in the late 17th century, reaching, e.g. Germany during the 19th century, but taking place in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe only after World War II during the communist transformation. The process itself was relatively slow even in Western Europe: the proportion of industrial workers grew, e.g. in Belgium by 10 percent between 1846 and 1910, in France by 6 percent between 1866 and 1921, in Italy by 7 percent between 1881 and 1921 (Kaelble 1984, p. 491). The decline in the proportion of the labour force working in agriculture was not rapid either. Even in 1960, this proportion was 14 and 10 percent in Western and Northern Europe, respectively, but 47 and 49 percent in Southern and Eastern Europe, respectively (Bell 1976, p. 16). The strongest increase in the industrial production occurred after the war and at the same time post-industrialisation and expansion of the service society also started to take place due to further technological changes and to the reorganisation of the work activities. These changes happened again earlier to Western and Northern Europe and with a temporal delay to Eastern and Southern Europe. In the 1990s, the proportion of agrarian labour force was around only 5 percent in Western and Northern Europe and around 12 percent in Eastern and Southern Europe (Therborn 1995, p. 75).

From the standpoint of this chapter, however, it is also important how theoretical thinking in social sciences on class reacted to these developments. Apparently, as the societies have become more complex in their social structure, it became impossible to think about

them in terms like landowners and peasants, aristocracy and bourgeoisie, capitalists and workers, and sociologists started to develop more stratified class schemas in order to describe the more complex social reality. The chapter intends to consider more than one class approach and provide alternate looks at the European societies. The most influential classification is probably the EGP class schema that is usually labelled as following the (neo-)Weberian approach with a focus on market situation (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 2000). On the contrary, Erik Olin Wright's class schema is built on the (neo-)Marxian terms of control and power relationships as well as exploitation (Wright 1997, 2005). A straightforward response to the post-industrial transformation is the 'post-Fordist' class categorisation developed by Esping-Andersen (1993). Finally, the most recent and very ambitious development which cannot be neglected is the project on developing a European Socio-Economic Classification (ESeC) in the European Union in collaboration with the EUROSTAT (Rose et al. 2001; Rose and Pevalin 2003; Rose and Harrison 2007).

17.3.1 Employment Relations and Class

In this section the so-called Goldthorpe class schema (known also as EGP classes) is presented including its conceptual background as well as the empirical appearance of the class distribution in the European societies. Regarding its theory behind, the schema is based on employment relations, making a distinction between employers/self-employed who own the means of production and employees on the one hand and, for the latter group, distinguishing between service relationship and labour contract to the employer, on the other hand (Goldthorpe 1982; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The two forms of employment relations are based on the difference in the degree of *specificity of human assets* and *difficulty in monitoring*. Service relationship is characterised by large asset specificity, job-specific skills, knowledge and expertise as well as by high monitoring difficulties regarding measuring the quantity or controlling the quality of the work. This makes service relationship between the employer and the employee more trusted leading to higher level of work autonomy, long-term contracts with larger safety, more promotion and career prospects, or additional forms of compensation beyond salaries for the service class, managers and professionals.⁵ At the same time, labour contract is characterised by low asset specificity and low monitoring problems, being typical especially for unskilled workers and part of the skilled workers, too. These employees have less secure jobs, can be dismissed without any previous notice and can count on much less financial compensation, have fewer promotion and career prospects and earn typically weekly wages instead of monthly salaries. In between these basic forms of employment relations, there are so-called mixed relationships connected to routine non-manual workers, technicians and supervisors (Goldthorpe 2000; Breen 2005).

Empirically 11 categories are distinguished in the most detailed form of the class schema: (I) High-grade professionals, administrators, managers; (II) Low-grade professionals, administrators, managers; (IIIa) Routine non-manual employees, high-grade technicians; (IIIb) Routine non-manual employees, low grade in sales and service; (IVa) Small proprietors with employees; (IVb) Small proprietors without employees; (IVc) Farmers

⁵Employees working in service relationship are also labelled as salariat. It is important to note that service relations are not restricted to the service sector; the service class appears in other economic sectors as well.

and smallholders; (V) Supervisors and low-grade technicians; (VI) Skilled manual workers; (VIIa) Semi- and unskilled manual workers; (VIIb) Agricultural labourers. This classification is presented in Table 17.1 for 25 European nations, separately for men and women.

Table 17.1 The distribution of the EGP schema in 25 nations⁶

Class categories	Distribution (%)		
	Men	Women	Total
I. High-grade professionals, administrators, managers	16.9	9.7	13.2
II. Low-grade professionals, administrators, managers	17.4	22.6	20.1
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees, high-grade technicians	4.1	14.9	9.7
IIIb. Routine non-manual employees, low-grade sales and service	4.7	18.3	11.7
IVa. Small proprietors with employees	3.9	1.6	2.7
IVb. Small proprietors without employees	4.2	3.4	3.8
IVc. Farmers and smallholders	4.8	2.4	3.6
V. Supervisors and low-grade technicians	5.3	1.0	3.1
VI. Skilled manual workers	15.4	6.7	10.8
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers	20.7	16.6	18.6
VIIb. Agricultural labourers	2.6	2.8	2.7
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	19,448	20,492	40,940

According to these data about one-third of the European population belong to the service class.⁷ Men are overrepresented in the higher level and women are overrepresented in the lower level of the service class. This may provide an argument for sociologists arguing about existing and persisting gender gap in the labour market and also support the assumption about a ‘glass ceiling’ that hinders women’s career prospects in the society.⁸ Even stronger gender discrepancy can be observed for the routine non-manual employees where women have a much higher share. At the same time a bigger proportion of men can be found in the manual sphere, especially among skilled manual workers. This indicates the existence and persistence of a gender-specific blue collar–white collar gap in the labour market where men with a middle level of qualification tend to specify to manual jobs while women with a middle level of qualification tend to carry out office work. The proportion of self-employed is about 10 percent with an overrepresentation of men, while only 2–3 percent work(ed) as agricultural labourers.⁹

⁶The calculations were made on European Social Survey data from 2004 to 2005 using Harry Ganzeboom’s recode program (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). The distribution is based on the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

⁷The distribution in Table 17.1 refers to everybody who has ever been in the labour force. Part of this population is not in the labour force anymore, e.g. those in pension. The proportion of the service class for the present labour force (a younger population) is 40 percent.

⁸When looking at occupational gender gap, the differences in the level of qualification between men and women should also be taken into account. Another chapter of the *Handbook* deals with education but women tend to have higher level of schooling in comparison to men as recent statistics reveal.

⁹The share of self-employed is a bit larger for the (younger) population in the labour force, while that of the agricultural labourers is even smaller for them.

17.3.2 Power Relations, Exploitation and Class: The Wright Approach

One of the key notions in Wright's class concept is social relations. By this term he means particular relations within production and not only market relations. Market relations describe locations regarding market capacity, and differences in these locations lead to the variation of life chances different occupations and class locations provide to those who occupy them. Relations within production cannot be restricted to technical diversities expressed, e.g. by the division of labour. Social relations within the production involve different degrees of power relations and of having control over productive resources. This leads to the variation of locations people occupy on grounds of how much rights and powers they have and this creates the class relations.

Wright states that the main distinction between his approach and the one by Goldthorpe is the fact that Goldthorpe's concept is built on characteristics of occupations, positions in the division of labour, like difficulty of work monitoring or level of human asset specificity. His concept, on the other hand, is built on the actual, individual situation of the persons in the given occupations and on how people carry out their daily work activities. The most important feature making a difference between individuals and describing their situation in social relations of production is given by the categories of 'the haves' and 'the have nots'. This refers to the ownership of the means of production first of all, but also to various assets people have as well as to job characteristics by which people's daily work can be described and categorised.

Ownership, i.e. having or not having any means of production, is the crucial division in producing class relations because this feature is the basis of exploitation creating a system of domination and subordination. In this respect, capitalist is a straightforward class location but it can take various forms measured by the number of subordinates. Self-employed workers, however, occupy a contradictory class location (in an earlier version of Wright's class schema) because these people own the means of production but do not exploit anybody.

Wright distinguishes between two kinds of assets, the organisational ones and the skill assets. Organisational assets characterise the managers and supervisors who have power and control over the subordinates within the system of production, while professionals and experts are defined by their skill assets and this also provides them certain power and control. The most important features of a job Wright uses for demarking class locations are decision making, authority (basically supervisory position), managerial location (position in the formal hierarchy) and work autonomy. The class schema is largely based on the combination of the organisational and skill assets taking into account the job characteristics. It is important to underline that the skill assets, i.e. having them or not having them, play a role here in defining classes unlike in the EGP schema where the conceptual distinction lies in the degree of the human asset specificity to be considered for separating class positions.

The categories of Wright' exploitation class model are as follows: (1) Capitalist (with more than ten employees); (2) Small employer; (3) Self-employed (with no employees); (4) Expert managers (combining high levels of organisational and skill assets); (5) Expert supervisors; (6) Experts (with high levels of skill assets but without subordinates); (7) Skilled managers; (8) Skilled supervisors; (9) Skilled workers; (10) Low-skilled managers (with high levels of organisational but low levels of skill assets); (11) Low-skilled supervisors; (12) Low-skilled workers. Table 17.2 presents the distribution of this schema for 25 European nations.

The specificity of Wright's class model is that it provides a very detailed picture about class locations with different degrees of organisational and expert skills. The schema is

Table 17.2 The distribution of Wright’s exploitation class model in 25 nations¹⁰

Class categories	Distribution (%)		
	Men	Women	Total
1. Capitalist	1.2	0.3	0.7
2. Small employers	6.4	2.2	4.2
3. Self-employed	9.9	6.3	8.1
4. Expert managers	3.9	1.6	2.7
5. Expert supervisors	3.2	1.9	2.5
6. Experts	3.8	3.1	3.4
7. Skilled managers	6.7	3.3	5.1
8. Skilled supervisors	7.7	6.4	7.1
9. Skilled workers	22.7	17.4	19.9
10. Low-skilled managers	3.0	2.6	2.8
11. Low-skilled supervisors	6.0	11.1	8.6
12. Low-skilled workers	25.5	43.8	34.9
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	17,349	18,346	35,695

very much pyramid-like with a large bottom class including about a proportion of one-third (35 percent) of proletariat (low-skilled workers). For women nearly 44 percent belong to this category, while for men it is every fourth person. Apparently this is a very ‘dark view’ about the European societies where such a large percentage of the population¹¹ can be characterised by ‘have nots’ in terms of Wright’s concept, i.e. employees without any means of production, any kind of organisational or skill assets. A closer look at this broad category reveals that, in addition to semi-skilled and unskilled manuals, even low-level administrative associate professionals appear here and this proletariat involves basically all office clerks, secretaries (who are called as ‘routine non-manual employees’ in other class schemas), as well as service workers and sale persons too. Indeed, this is a clearly different view about class locations in modern societies in comparison to the one by Goldthorpe; while he suggests to ‘upgrade’ service workers and to separate them from other manual workers, Wright looks at these people as being exploited because of not having any assets.

In this class model the second biggest category is the skilled workers (about one-fifth) and the gender differences are not so marked for them. From this perspective there is a substantial worker class in the European societies (about 55 percent), people with very limited rights, power or control over the relations in the system of productions. Another specificity of this classification is that it separates the owners of the means of production from the managers and professionals unlike the EGP schema. The entire proportion of the ‘owners’ is 13 percent though the majority is own-account workers. The combination of organisational and skill assets provides a very fragmented picture about expert, skilled

¹⁰The calculations were made on European Social Survey data from 2004 to 2005 using the recode program developed and presented in Leiulfusrud et al. (2005). with some modifications because of the different measure for work autonomy in ESS Round2. The distribution is based on the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

¹¹The distribution in Table 17.2 refers again to everybody who has ever been in the labour force. For the actual labour force this percentage is lower, only 28 percent. The proportion of men drops to one-fifth, that of women to one-third approximately.

and low-skilled managers and supervisors. For those with power or control possibilities (managers and supervisors) it is their qualification, the degree of expertise which puts them into different levels. The proportion of experts with high levels of skill assets but without any organisational assets and, consequently, with low level of rights and power or control possibilities is only about 3–4 percent.

17.3.3 Classes in the Post-industrial Society

As a response to the claim that classes are outdated because industrialism becomes less significant in modern societies, Esping-Andersen (1993) states that new regulative mechanisms and institutions began to be effective as driving forces of class formation. He refers to the welfare state, the collective bargaining system, modern corporations, mass education and new family arrangements. This means that the former industrial class system (in his terms the 'Fordist' class system) tends to disappear but division of labour persists to generate class relations in the society, even if with strong modification and changing institutional settings. At the same time the new post-industrial class system tends to be more 'floating' than the previous Fordist one which used to have a stronger hierarchical character. For building the conceptual background of this class approach several elements of various theories are applied. First, in line with Bell (1976) or Gouldner (1979) increasing meritocracy and features of the 'new class' theory like cultural control, knowledge-based differentiation, emerging technical and scientific expertise are emphasised as important attributes to the class position. In addition to human capital assets, autonomy and trust relationships are important features generating a new kind of division of labour. Second, the danger of an insider–outsider cleavage is considered referring to the growing youth and long-term unemployment, early retirees and, consequently, a decline of the labour force. The insider vs. outsider character of the labour market is crucial for the employment protection regulations. The legislative rules employer can apply for hiring or firing employees affect the chances for a faster labour market entry or re-entry and a shorter job search period with an effect on youth unemployment and long-term unemployment. Third, the previous industrial class schema which described a dominant male workforce is replaced by a new post-industrial class structure which takes into account the emerging service sector, the rising educational level of women, their growing participation in the labour force, in particular in the emerging sectors of employment as well as the changing family constructions and arrangements. These emerging sectors are the different forms of the service sector, the business (or producer) services, the social services (health, education, welfare) and the consumer services. Fourth, Esping-Andersen assumes that the new post-industrial service jobs differ from the former traditional Fordist jobs in the sense that they represent different career and life chance regimes. This is a consequence of the decline of standard employment, an increase in the flexibility of the work (e.g. part-time employment, temporary work contracts), the convergence of the male and female employment, in fact the *feminisation* of the male labour. The structure of employment is reshaping and institutions like the welfare state, education and the industrial relations contribute to and strengthen this process leading to the post-industrial stratification system. Esping-Andersen emphasises the international differences and the country-specific character of the institutional settings and these deviations can affect against the convergence in the European societies.

Empirically Esping-Andersen distinguishes a Fordist and a post-industrial hierarchy. The previous one contains (a) the managers and proprietors including also the petite bourgeoisie; (b) routine clerical, administrative and sales workers; (c) skilled manual production workers; (d) semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers and manual occupations in production and distribution. The latter one includes (a) professionals and scientists; (b) semi-professionals (e.g. teachers, nurses) and technicians; (c) skilled service workers; (d) unskilled service workers and service proletariat (Esping-Andersen 1993, pp. 24–25). In Table 17.3 the distribution of this schema is presented for 25 European nations, separately for men and women.

Table 17.3 The distribution of Esping-Andersen’s Fordist and post-industrial schema in 25 nations¹²

Class categories	Distribution (%)		
	Men	Women	Total
The Fordist ‘fraction’ of the class schema			
1. Proprietors	4.2	2.1	3.1
2. Managers	7.5	2.8	5.1
3. Petty bourgeoisie	2.3	1.0	1.6
4. Routine clerical workers	7.7	19.1	13.6
5. Sales workers	5.6	11.4	8.6
6. Skilled manual production workers	21.9	5.2	13.2
7. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations in production	13.7	6.5	10.0
The post-industrial ‘fraction’ of the class schema			
8. Professionals and scientists	9.5	6.6	8.0
9. Semi-professionals	4.0	13.1	8.7
10. Technicians	5.9	3.2	4.5
11. Skilled service workers	3.7	5.2	4.5
12. Unskilled service workers and service proletariat	6.6	18.6	12.8
The primary sector ‘fraction’ of the class schema			
13. Farmers	4.3	2.1	3.2
14. Farm workers, agricultural labourers	3.1	3.1	3.1
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	19,445	20,940	40,385

Looking at the percentages, roughly half (55 percent) of the European population¹³ can be found in the Fordist classes. At first sight, this is quite a large number for the post-industrial Europe. Nevertheless, certain class categories like, e.g. proprietors will not die out even if the Fordist class concept is losing its relevance. The managerial class is also quite persistent and self-employment may even increase under the circumstances of growing labour market flexibility. Consequently these classes, including also the routine clerical workers or sale workers, may be considered as part of the post-industrial class schema as well. Similarly, certain classes like, e.g. the professionals are part of the post-industrial ‘fraction’ because of their increasing significance in the modern societies, though

¹²The calculations were made on European Social Survey data from 2004 to 2005 using the recode program developed and presented in Leiulfstrud et al. (2005). The distribution is based on the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

¹³The distribution in Table 17.3 refers again to everybody who has ever been in the labour force.

they were present in the Fordist era as well. The proportion of the European population in the post-industrial class categories is nearly 40 percent. (About 6 percent belong to the private farmers and farm labourers.)

The gender distribution of the class categories is completely in line with Esping-Andersen's theoretical considerations on the feminisation of the post-industrial labour market. This distribution is almost equal for women, 48 and 47 percent in the Fordist and the post-industrial categories, respectively. The gender differences are partly caused by the fact that fewer women are working among proprietors, managers or in the petty bourgeoisie but they are strongly present in clerical and sales jobs. This is what we have seen for the European societies when applying the EGP classification as well. There is a very strong overrepresentation of women among the unskilled service workers (service proletariat). Another typical feature of gender inequalities in the post-industrial labour market is that men have a bigger share among high professionals, while more women can be found among semi-professionals. The latter fact is a consequence of the large number of various occupations in education and health where there are plenty of female employees belonging to this class but the existence and persistence of the occupational gender gap seem to be clearly displayed by the class schema as well.

17.3.4 Toward the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC)

Apparently there is a large variation among countries regarding existing empirical research on social stratification and class system. In this respect, the efforts of British sociologists and of the British National Statistics stand out to establish a national socio-economic classification. The theoretical background of this socio-economic classification is very close to the one described above regarding the EGP schema and builds on Goldthorpe's class concept in many respects. The classification is derived from information based on occupation usually combined with employment status claiming that 'the life chances of individuals and families depend mainly on their position in the social division of labour and on the material and symbolic advantages that derive from it' (Rose and Pevalin 2003, p. 17). This national research has expanded to an international project aiming to develop a European socio-economic classification. The ESeC schema distinguishes between employers, self-employed and employees and the number of employees serves as further characteristic to differentiate between large and small employers. The distinction between service relationship and labour contract for employees is based on the same theoretical approach by Goldthorpe derived from difficulties of work monitoring and human asset specificity (Rose and Harrison 2007, p. 463) leading to a service relationship and a labour contract. The previous one involves managerial, professional and senior administrative positions, the latter one is characteristic especially for the unskilled worker class.

Despite the similarities in the conceptual background, classes in ESeC differ somewhat from those in the EGP schema. Empirically the following categories are distinguished: (1) Large employers, higher grade professionals, administrators and managers; (2) Lower grade professionals, administrators, managers and higher grade supervisors and technicians; (3) Intermediate (administrative, clerical) occupations; (4) Small employers and self-employed, own account workers; (5) Employers and self-employed in agriculture; (6) Lower grade supervisors and technicians; (7) Lower service, sales and clerical occupations; (8) Lower technical occupation (= 'skilled workers'); (9) Routine (basic) occupations

Table 17.4 The distribution of the European socio-economic classification in 25 nations¹⁴

Class categories	Distribution (%)		
	Men	Women	Total
1. Large employers, higher grade professionals and managers	13.0	6.8	9.8
2. Lower professionals, managers, higher supervisors, technicians	17.3	22.0	19.7
3. Intermediate (administrative, clerical) occupations	4.5	14.9	9.9
4. Small employers and own-account workers	8.9	4.7	6.7
5. Employers and self-employed in agriculture	3.7	1.6	2.6
6. Lower supervisors and technicians	11.7	5.8	8.6
7. Lower service, sales and clerical occupations	5.8	16.8	11.6
8. Lower technical occupations (production, agriculture)	16.4	5.9	10.9
9. Routine (service, sales, production, agriculture) occupations	18.7	21.5	20.2
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	19,564	21,277	40,841

(=‘semi- and unskilled workers’).¹⁵ The distribution of this classification is presented in Table 17.4 for 25 nations.

The impression that we can get from this schema on the European societies implies partly similar features we have seen before for the EGP classes. From this perspective one-tenth of the European population¹⁶ belongs to the class of large employers and higher grade managers and professionals. Men turn out to be overrepresented again in this class category, while there are more women in the occupations at the lower level of service relationship. In fact, this means that difficulties of work monitoring and human asset specificity are characteristic to a larger extent to the employment of men in comparison to women. A larger proportion of men is working in the class of small employers and self-employed both outside and within agriculture. At the same time more women have a job in the so-called intermediate class which involves mostly administrative and clerical occupations. The ‘usual’ gender differences appear in the lower part of the class system. Women seem to work more typically in lower service, sale, clerical occupation, while more men can be found in lower technical occupations. Unlike in the case we have seen for the ‘service proletariat’ defined by Esping-Andersen as the bottom class, women are only slightly overrepresented here in the routine (semi- and unskilled) occupations. The explanation of this contradiction lies in the dissimilar definition of these positions (see also the different size of the categories in percentages). The bottom class in ESeC involves machine operators and assemblers, i.e. chiefly male occupations in addition to unskilled jobs, while service proletariat consists of service workers, shop and sale assistants, even low-ranked clerks, i.e. mainly female jobs.

¹⁴The calculations were made on European Social Survey data from 2004 to 2005 using the ESEC ‘derivation matrix’ developed for that purpose. The distribution is based on the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

¹⁵Rose and Harrison (2007) provide examples on the level of occupations, e.g. lawyers, scientists, university professors, chief executive officers are in Class 1. But school teachers, managers with less than 10 employees are in Class 2. Typical intermediate occupations in Class 3 are mostly clerical and administrative ones. Shop workers, retail assistants, care workers can be found in Class 7. The typical occupations for Class 8 are toolmakers, fitters, plumbers, while cleaners, assemblers, machine operators are put into Class 9.

¹⁶The distribution in Table 17.4 refers again to everybody who has ever been in the labour force.

The different approaches applied by these schemas, leading to different outcomes regarding the content of categories, are particularly relevant for the existing cross-country differences within Europe. For example, the ESeC classification was investigated from a Southern European perspective by Maloutas (2007) who argued that the central classifying principles of employment relations applied for ESeC (or also for the EGP schema) have less relevance in the Southern European context. In those countries the share of employees is smaller in contrast to a larger percentage of self-employment and a substantial part of the employees work in such smaller firms where, e.g. work monitoring has a different meaning in comparison to larger companies.¹⁷ Having supervisory role is an important element of class schemas and – as the European Social Survey data indicate – the proportion of these respondents is over 40 percent in the United Kingdom but below 25 percent in the Southern European countries. Another recent paper by Bernardi and Garrido (2008) focuses on Spain. On the one hand, they found an increase in employment going against the Southern European pattern mentioned above but they also report about an emerging post-industrial service proletariat in accordance with the Esping-Andersen classification presented earlier. The available statistics reveal that working in the primary sector, basically in agrarian occupations, dropped from about 20 to 5 percent in Spain between 1977 and 2005, while working in the service economy increased from 21 to 40 percent.

These examples call the attention that class schemas should be carefully investigated in the different countries and their validation should also be examined. This task is far away from being completed yet, but some developments will be mentioned in the next section of the chapter.

17.3.5 Validation of the Class Stratification

In social sciences it is getting a norm to validate empirical measures which are expected to be used widely in practice. Therefore class analysts put a large emphasis on investigating the validation of the various class schemas because it serves as a kind of proof with respect to the relevance of the concept as well as of the empirical realisation. There are two basic types of testing the relevance of a given class categorisation: the *construct* and the *criterion* validity. The first one refers to the capacity of the class schema to display such associations with other variables that can be expected theoretically. The latter one refers to the fact whether the class categorisation captures those differences, e.g. the ones related to job or employment relation, which were assumed to be captured when the schema was developed.

In fact, analysing construct validity means investigating the explanatory power of the class. This means that class is considered an independent variable and the analysts define different kinds of dependent variables for which their variation is expected to be well explained by the class categorisation. The dependent variables for which the discriminatory capacity of the class is investigated usually express and describe some meaningful, sociologically relevant content which was not part of the construction of the class measure, i.e. they can serve as an independent variable. Few typical examples will be summarised in the next paragraphs representing various mechanisms linking class to possible sociological outcomes.

¹⁷The percentage of firms with less than 10 employees is over 40 percent in Greece, Portugal and Spain, while it is below 20 percent in the UK where ESeC has been developed.

17.3.5.1 Income

For sociologists a relevant assumption is that income should be related to class position.¹⁸ In several of his articles, Goldthorpe presents empirical evidence that age-specific earning curves differ significantly for the categories of the EGP classification (e.g. Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). Income security, short-term fluctuation of income, and prospects for rising income over the life course are used for investigating the construct validity of the ESeC categorisation as well. The first version of the Wright's schema was also used to predict income differentiation; Wright (1979) applies data from several sources for the purpose of displaying how his classification explains income variation.

17.3.5.2 Political Behaviour or Party Preferences

In the context of the debate on the 'death of the class', one of the 'battlefields' is the issue of class voting, namely that representatives of the worker class tend to vote to leftwing parties, while members of the middle class tend to vote to rightwing parties. In the beginning of the 1990s, *International Sociology* gave room to a discussion on the topic; Clark and Lipset (1991) published an article where they expressed doubts about the persistence of the historical validity of the class concept and questioned – among others – the relevance of the traditional patterns of class voting described above. Later several edited volumes were devoted to the issue based on both American and European empirical data, pro and contra (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1999; Evans 1999; Clark and Lipset 2001). Part of the studies found more evidence on class voting, others found less similar clue.

17.3.5.3 Health Inequalities

Social scientists use frequently data on health, fertility and mortality to display class differences and to prove the existing discriminatory capacity of the class schemas. In the recent literature, some chapters in the volume by Rose and Pevalin (2003) focus on the analysis of these outcome variables in the light of the socio-economic classification of the British National Statistics (NS-SEC, which served as a basis for the ESeC). These studies show that class differences have significant impact on mortality rates (according to death registration data), on the probability of low birth weight as well as on other health-related characteristics.

17.3.5.4 Unemployment

Economic security and insecurity are assumed as being significant outcomes of class differences as well. Analyses reveal that the risk of unemployment is significantly higher in classes based on manual and routine non-manual occupations (Elias and McKnight 2003; Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). Nolan and Whelan (1999) also found a strong relationship between occupying a worker class position and being in poverty and the high risk of unemployment turned out to be a major mediating factor for the economic insecurity and instability of these people. Studying employment histories, Gallie et al. (1998)

¹⁸For example, economists do not put large emphasis on class in this respect. They suppose that earnings tend to depend on education. Thus, they prefer to investigate the income returns to human capital investments, the wage premium individuals get when having higher level of schooling.

found that the odds of becoming unemployed is significantly higher for those males whose last class position was unskilled or skilled manual worker in comparison to managers and professionals.

Turning to criterion validity, most of the studies I can quote here relate to the EGP class schema and to the British socio-economic classification (NS-SEC). The EGP class schema has been investigated using a number of job attributes which were considered as empirically relevant characteristics of the job and not of the person. These job attributes cover three dimensions: employment contract, promotion prospects and job autonomy which are closely linked to the concept of the class schema and, consequently, are appropriate for the aims of the criterion validity test (Evans 1992, 1996; Evans and Mills 2000). Applying various statistical techniques (e.g. latent class analysis), these studies found basic support for the validity of the schema. Nevertheless, some class boundaries, e.g. those between managers and professionals, seem to be elsewhere as expected by the EGP classification. Several further studies were devoted to the criterion validity of NS-SEC based on measures of employment relations and conditions (Part II in Rose and Pevalin 2003). Using similar data and analytical tools as for the EGP schema, Evans and Mills (1999) investigated the class structure in two post-socialist societies, Hungary and Poland, and found strong cleavage between the salariat and the working class and also for the (new) self-employed group. Another analysis on the validity of the EGP class schema in Hungary found that the difference between the managers and professionals tend to be smaller, while distinguishing between high-grade and low-grade professionals, administrators, managers tends to be more relevant. At the same time, the so-called routine non-manual employees, low-grade sales and service workers are closer to the manual than to the non-manual fraction of the class structure in Hungary, unlike the EGP classification assumption (Róbert and Bukodi 1999).

17.3.6 More Detailed Patterns in the Class Structure

So far, a general picture has been presented on the class structure of the European societies applying different class approaches. This section tries to go into the details to some extent. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse each country one by one for which data are present, instead a country typology has been applied which is largely based on the welfare state typology by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). By the original concept, three welfare regimes were distinguished: the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic ones and the Mediterranean type was added to the typology later. It is apparent that the class structure in a given society is not a simple consequence of the welfare regime the country represents. Nevertheless, the relationship between the welfare system and the social structure cannot be neglected or denied. The welfare regime is part of a complex institutional system together with other sub-systems like the employment, educational or family system. These systems are interrelated and connected to both political and economic processes. For example, employment relations play a crucial theoretical role in class formation and are not independent from welfare arrangements as much as either employment protection regulations or the types and forms of the collective bargaining system are part of the welfare regime. Class structure is an empirically observable social phenomenon and is, in part, an outcome of the redistribute processes affected also by the welfare state developments. Consequently class distributions can be expected to differ systematically by welfare regime types.

One of the obvious shortcomings of the existing welfare typologies is that they do not consider the new EU member states. There are only few attempts so far which try to find the place of the former communist countries on this ‘map’. In this chapter there is no possibility to elaborate on this limitation of the welfare types; this would mean a special research on the validity of the typology. Therefore, as a simple solution, one more column for the post-socialist countries is added in Table 17.5 which displays the EGP classification by this grouping.

Table 17.5 The distribution of the EGP schema in 25 nations by regime types¹⁹

Class categories	Regime types (%)					Total
	Liberal	Conservative	Social democratic	Mediterranean	Post-socialist	
I. High-grade professionals, administrators, managers	15.3	14.2	16.2	8.6	11.5	13.2
II. Low-grade professionals, administrators, managers	20.3	25.4	21.4	11.8	17.2	20.1
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees, high-grade technicians	7.0	12.2	8.2	6.3	10.4	9.7
IIIb. Routine non-manual employees, low-grade sales and service	16.7	11.7	14.7	12.0	8.1	11.7
IVa. Small proprietors with employees	3.1	2.5	2.8	4.7	1.8	2.7
IVb. Small proprietors without employees	4.1	2.8	3.4	8.1	2.9	3.8
IVc. Farmers and smallholders	3.7	2.3	3.3	9.5	2.2	3.6
V. Supervisors and low-grade technicians	3.2	3.6	3.2	2.2	3.0	3.1
VI. Skilled manual workers	7.5	8.9	7.7	10.6	16.4	10.8
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers	18.1	15.0	17.4	23.0	21.5	18.6
VIIb. Agricultural labourers	1.0	1.4	1.7	3.2	5.0	2.7
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	3768	12,664	7432	5486	11,093	40,443

Looking at the EGP class schema from this perspective, data reveal that the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic regimes have similar profiles where 36–40 percent of the population works in the two salariat classes. The same ratio is far lower in the Mediterranean and in the post-socialist countries (20 and 29 percent, respectively). The fraction of the routine non-manual employees is the largest in the conservative regime. The higher proportions of the low-grade sales and service jobs in the social democratic and the liberal regimes (15–17 percent) indicate a more developed service sector appearing in these countries. On the contrary, the service sector is apparently less developed in the post-socialist regime. These societies still have a bigger fraction of industry as shown by the higher percentages in the skilled, semi- and unskilled worker categories. While only around one-fourth of the population in the liberal, conservative and social democratic regime appears in these classes, the same ratio is nearly two-fifths in the

¹⁹Out of the 25 nations, formally the liberal countries are only represented by the United Kingdom and Ireland; the conservative regime consists of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France; the social-democratic regime involves Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Finland; the Mediterranean type includes Spain, Greece, Portugal and Turkey; and post-socialist countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

post-socialist countries. Agriculture still plays a bit larger role (5 percent) there in comparison to the 1–2 percent in the liberal, conservative or social democratic regime. A final typical deviation from the perspective of the regime types is the high share of the own-account workers in the Mediterranean type of countries; the proportion of the whole self-employed fraction in this regime type is about twice as much as the mean for all of the countries.²⁰

17.3.7 Temporal Changes in the European Class Structure: Convergence or Divergence

As mentioned earlier it is crucial from a European perspective whether the stratification system of the European societies indicates a converging or rather a diverging trend. A straightforward intention of the EU25 is to strengthen the integration of member states and to reinforce all processes leading to the direction of making one European society out of the societies which constitute the EU at present. The larger the variation within these societies, the bigger the institutional differences, the stronger the processes going against this convergence, the more difficulties the European societies should face on the road to a stronger integration. Converging vs. diverging trends in the stratification system will be investigated in the next paragraphs from different aspects.

17.3.7.1 Changes from the 1970s up to the 1990s

Unfortunately the availability of similar large-scale data sets with so many European countries is scarce for earlier points in time. The study by Breen (2004) can partly be used for the purpose of investigating changes over time but only for a limited number of countries like France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden. In any case it is worth to have a look at these ten countries based on a somewhat collapsed EGP classification, presented for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s as well as for men and women separately.²¹

The essence of the results from Table 17.6 is in line with the modernisation and industrialisation processes in Europe: there is an increase in the service class (professionals and managers) and a decrease in semi- and unskilled employment as well as in agriculture-related occupations either for labourers or for self-employed farmers. These main trends hold for both men and women. In fact, the increase in the share of the salariat class is slightly bigger for women than for men. Nevertheless, it is important to call the attention that women's class distributions depend largely on female's labour force participation. This has also changed a lot between the 1970s and the 1990s; the rate for women's participation in labour force has increased in the European societies. This rate is the highest in the Scandinavian welfare states and the lowest in the Mediterranean countries. Consequently women's class distribution is getting to be less selective, though deviations persist. The

²⁰A more detailed picture on the EGP-like class structure in the EU25 nations with a similar approach of welfare regime typology can be found in Bukodi and Róbert (2007).

²¹The figures in this table are from calculations on all countries. The same source contains a larger table as well which separates the countries (Table 3A.1. p. 74).

Table 17.6 Aggregate class structures in ten countries by decade and gender (%)

Class categories	Men			Women		
	1970s	1980s	1990s	1970s	1980s	1990s
I+II. High-/low-grade professionals, administrators, managers	23.1	28.6	30.8	22.1	30.5	34.6
III. Routine non-manual employees, high-grade technicians, low-grade sales and service	8.7	9.0	10.1	32.8	32.3	35.1
IVa+b. Small proprietors with/without employees	7.9	8.6	10.4	6.5	6.0	6.1
IVc. Farmers and smallholders	8.6	5.7	4.0	8.6	4.4	2.3
V-VI. Supervisors, low-grade technicians, skilled manual workers	27.7	27.6	27.1	6.1	6.3	7.1
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers	20.6	18.3	15.7	21.1	18.6	13.7
VIIb. Agricultural labourers	3.5	2.3	2.0	2.8	1.7	1.2

Source: Breen (2004, Table 3.4, p. 46 and Table 3.15, p. 64).

general trend holds less for the post-socialist countries where female labour force participation used to be high throughout the whole communist era after World War II but it has declined in the 1990s.

The strong overrepresentation of women among routine non-manual employees persisted over the decades. The same holds for the larger share of male labourers working as skilled manual workers. There is an increase in self-employment outside of agriculture, at least for men. It can be viewed as an indication of growing flexibility in the European labour market, i.e. secure and permanent employment tends to decline and the availability of jobs of this kind is becoming scarce. Consequently, more and more job applicants, especially young job seekers, are not able to find gainful employment in the labour market but have to work as self-employed. As Breen (2004) describes, national class structures show growing similarities for both genders. But despite the general tendency towards increasing similarity, there is also a considerable national variation behind the general picture. For men, the salariat class increased stronger in Great Britain (from 31 to 42 percent) and the Netherlands (from 37 to 49 percent), while self-employment has grown more markedly in Britain, Sweden, Hungary and in particular in Poland.²² There is no substantial variation in the decline of the class of semi- and unskilled workers, while the proportion of private farmers has fallen markedly in France (from 10 to 5 percent), Ireland (from 22 to 9 percent) and Poland (from 26 to 12 percent). The strongest drop for agricultural labourers has occurred in Hungary (from 15 to 7 percent). The largest changes over time occurred for women also in Hungary and Poland, while Sweden seems to have the most stable class structure.

17.3.7.2 The Cohort Perspective of the Class Structure in the European Societies

In addition to this picture, there is an alternate way to provide some further proxy information on temporal changes and this can be gained from the distribution of the class structure by age cohorts for the 25 European societies available in the ESS Round 2 data set. According to the figures in Table 17.7 the youngest and the oldest age cohorts differ

²²In the two former communist countries, political transformation, privatisation and transition to market economy have obviously contributed to the changes in the class distribution.

Table 17.7 The distribution of the EGP schema in 25 nations by age cohorts

Class categories	Age cohorts (%)						
	<25	26–35	36–45	46–55	56–65	>66	Total
I. High-grade professionals, administrators, managers	4.2	13.2	15.4	14.2	13.9	14.3	13.2
II. Low-grade professionals, administrators, managers	14.0	25.2	22.1	22.4	20.2	13.7	20.1
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees, high-grade technicians	9.0	10.4	10.3	9.7	9.7	7.6	9.5
IIIb. Routine non-manual employees, low-grade sales and service	25.0	12.6	11.2	10.0	9.4	8.2	11.8
IVa. Small proprietors with employees	0.8	2.0	3.4	3.0	3.4	2.9	2.7
IVb. Small proprietors without employees	2.6	3.6	4.0	4.5	3.6	4.0	3.8
IVc. Farmers and smallholders	1.0	2.0	2.9	3.5	3.8	7.2	3.6
V. Supervisors and low-grade technicians	2.2	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.5	3.1
VI. Skilled manual workers	15.4	11.0	9.2	9.9	10.6	11.3	10.9
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers	22.8	15.3	16.7	17.8	19.6	21.6	18.7
VIIb. Agricultural labourers	3.0	1.8	1.5	1.8	2.6	5.7	2.7
Total (No. of cases = 100%)	4175	6715	8123	7816	6324	7013	40,166

markedly from the middle ones.²³ Basically the differences between the four middle-aged groups above 25 and below 65 are not as salient as the differences between the middle-aged and the youngest or the middle-aged and the oldest cohort. The most important observation is that only a small proportion (18 percent) of the youngest cohort can be found in the two highest service classes in comparison to the whole sample of the European population where one-third is in such a privileged position. In fact there is a slight increase from the oldest to the 26–35 years old cohort for having a job in the salariat class. But young people below 25 seem to occupy jobs in worse class positions, e.g. one-fourth of them work in low-grade sales and service jobs, this ratio is more than twice as high as the mean in the whole sample. Part of the explanation of this outcome can be that those under 25 represent a selected group. Part of these youngsters in this cohort is still in (higher) education, those with a job represent partly (early) school dropouts who occupy worse class positions most probably. This holds less for the next age cohort though time spent in education is expanding in modern societies. From the perspective of the oldest cohort above 65, their majority is practically classified by their ‘last occupation’ held before moving to pension. Self-employed are also underrepresented in the youngest cohort; they might not have enough time yet to accumulate the various assets required for an own business. Otherwise self-employment is growing from the younger to the older cohorts. At first sight this trend is a surprising phenomenon in the light of the flexible labour market theory. Labour market flexibility predicts that an increasing proportion of the young labour force can enter the labour market only as own-account worker and have difficulties with finding stable employment. The increasing trend by growing age is less pronounced if farmers are not considered. Their proportion is especially high in the oldest cohort over 65 years. Skilled and unskilled workers are overrepresented in the youngest cohort, 38 percent of those below 25 belong to one of these two categories, while only 30 percent of the whole sample can be found in these classes. There is a linear trend for the other cohorts being in line with the expectations based on the modernisation theory and on the growing post-industrialisation. By

²³Like earlier, the distribution in the table refers to everybody having ever been in the labour force. In this case this has particular consequences because the cohort analysis displays the consequences of changes over time (period effects) and of getting older individually (ageing effects). It is taken into account when the results are discussed.

this trend the proportion of those in the manual worker classes is declining from the older cohorts to the younger ones. Similar decreasing trends can be observed for the agricultural labourers.

In order to see how biased these results are, a look at only those who are in labour force (not presented here) shows that the selection effect does not play any significant role for the younger age cohorts. In fact, those under 25 are strongly underrepresented in the salariat class anyway. This indicates that, indeed, there are no fast career routes for the youngsters to the top class positions in the European societies; they have to wait and work for getting promoted. At the same time, the youngest cohort is represented in the low-grade service occupations to a remarkable extent. Obviously, this growing sector offers the most opportunities for labour market entry after completing schools. There are more marked differences for the oldest cohort over age 65. In the subgroup of them being still in the labour force, there are much more representatives of the high-grade and low-grade professionals, administrators and managers, or of self-employed without employees, and there are much less employees in skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled worker or agricultural labourer positions. It is apparent that people in higher class positions continue to work after reaching pension age with higher probability, while people in lower class positions leave the labour market and tend to get retired.

17.3.7.3 Converging or Diverging Class Structures in Europe?

In order to provide an even more comprehensive view on temporal changes of the class structure in Europe, one more approach of the issue is presented. The EUROBAROMETER survey data from 2005 is used for this purpose. In comparison to ESS Round 2, two advantages of this source can be mentioned: it includes more new EU member states and it contains information on first job at labour market entry. This latter fact makes it possible to detect the temporal changes in the class structure more precisely because first occupation can be more informative from the viewpoint of period effects on changes while the present (last) job is always an outcome of career mobility developments over the life course, i.e. ageing effects. The EGP class schema has been constructed on the EUROBAROMETER data²⁴ for the first job; labour market entry cohorts were defined and the results on temporal changes are displayed in Figure 17.1A–E by five large class categories as well as by country types based on the welfare regimes as used above.²⁵ In the figures the vertical axes show the percentages within the labour force belonging to the given class category, the horizontal axes indicate the period captured by labour market entry cohorts and the lines display the changes in the class structure over time for the six different country types.

²⁴For being accurate, a disadvantage of the EUROBAROMETER data should be mentioned: it has no information on number of subordinates/employees and, consequently, the computation of the class variable is somewhat less precise.

²⁵The country typology is based again on the welfare state concept by Esping-Andersen. However, the countries covered by the EUROBAROMETER survey allow to making a distinction within the group of former socialist countries and to separate the Baltic ones which are of more liberal character and the Central Eastern European ones which are of more conservative character (Bukodi and Róbert 2007). Thus in this case the country clusters were constructed as follows: Social-democratic regime: Denmark, Finland, Sweden; Liberal regime: Ireland, United Kingdom; Conservative regime: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; Mediterranean regime: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain; Post-socialist liberal regime: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Post-socialist conservative regime: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.




Fig. 17.1 Distribution of persons by labour market entry class, labour market entry cohort and welfare regime type (%)
A Service class. **B** Routine non-manual class. **C** Routine service class. **D** Skilled labourer class. **E** Unskilled labourer class
 Source: Bukodi and Róbert (2007).

Increasing and decreasing trends are clearly visible on these graphs and converging or diverging trends are also well displayed.

As modernisation theory would predict, Fig. 17.1A displays an increase in the service class in all country types but in the conservative post-socialist societies of CEE. The rate of increase appears to be higher for the more recent labour market entry cohort, especially in case of the social democratic and the Mediterranean regimes. For the 1991–2005 cohort, on average, about 25–30 percent of the respondents entered the labour market in managerial or professional jobs, but this proportion was considerably lower, only 20 percent, for the CEE countries despite the assumptions that political transformation speeded up the generational replacement. In sum, the picture indicates some converging trend.

Figure 17.1B shows a considerable regime variation in the share of the routine non-manual class as an entry position. The most striking rise appears for the Mediterranean regime, by about 12 percentage points over time, resulting in a pattern where about every third respondent in the most recent labour market entry cohort started to work in this class. For the other regimes, there were no substantial changes in this regard. The routine non-manual class as the first labour market position is the least frequent in the liberal

post-socialist countries. For the new EU member states a quite modest increase can be observed and only for the period after the collapse of the communist system.

According to Fig. 17.1C, 20–27 percent of the most recent labour market entry cohort started to work in a job belonging to the routine service class. With the Mediterranean and the social democratic regimes as exceptions, where the related percentages were already at high level, the share of this class increased substantially over time but in particular in the last 15 years. In case of the social democratic type, the share of these jobs was very high even for the oldest labour market entry cohort and this is the main reason for the stability over time.

The rate of increase was the most pronounced for the liberal and for the two post-socialist regimes. But contrary to the social democratic case, entering the labour market as a routine service worker was quite rare for the oldest cohort in these regimes, which partly explains the steep rise in the proportion later on. In sum, the picture seems to be more convergent for the youngest cohort in comparison to the oldest one.

In accordance with the post-industrialisation tendencies in the European societies, Fig. 17.1D indicates a uniform decrease for entering the labour market as a skilled labourer. Nevertheless the extent of the fall differs quite markedly by country types. The largest drop appears for the conservative regime, from 31 to 14 percent. The pace of decrease proved to be the modest for the conservative post-socialist countries, where 13 percent of even the youngest labour market entrants belong to this class. Apparently, when comparing the oldest and the youngest labour market entry cohort, the convergence is the most important phenomenon.

By Fig. 17.1E, an almost uniform decline in the proportion of the unskilled labourer class is also apparent, though there are substantial regime differences as well. A relatively strong drop with about 11–16 percentage points can be observed for the Mediterranean regime and also the former socialist countries, while the rate of decrease is only 5–6 percentage points for the social democratic, the liberal and the conservative countries. Despite the larger decline in the share in the former socialist societies, every fifth of the new labour market entrants still find a job in the unskilled labourer class. The conclusion on this picture would also be a slight tendency toward convergence.

17.3.8 Hierarchical Approaches of Social Stratification

Class schemas presented in the above sections have a common feature: they are basically *relational* and aim to describe the societies with nominal groups, which are ordered but describe an exact hierarchy to some extent only. The more hierarchical socio-economic scales have stronger traditions in the American sociology as mentioned above. Two typical examples are the occupational prestige scores (Treiman 1977) and the socio-economic index (SEI score) developed originally by Duncan (1961).²⁶ Below a set of information is provided on European societies from the perspective of these hierarchical measures. Figures 17.2 and 17.3 display the rank order of the countries by the mean of the prestige scores and the socio-economic indices, respectively.

²⁶Apparently there are examples of continuous measures in social stratification in Europe as well, e.g. in the British context the Hope-Goldthorpe scale and more recently the Cambridge scale (Prandy) or the prestige scale by Wegener in Germany.




Fig. 17.2 The rank order of 25 countries by occupational prestige (SIOPS) based on the mean value²⁷




Fig. 17.3 The rank order of 25 countries by the socio-economic status (ISEI) based on the mean value²⁸

According to the calculation on the ESS Round 2 data the grand mean of the occupational prestige score is 40.2. People living in the Netherlands have occupations with the highest prestige in Europe (43.5) while Turkish people are in the bottom of the country hierarchy (35.9) in this respect. The level of occupational prestige in Switzerland, Denmark, Germany and Hungary is above 42, while it is above 41 in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Norway and Finland. The countries with occupational prestige around the mean are Slovenia, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain, Austria, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Countries where the level of occupational prestige is below the mean are Poland, Ukraine, Greece, Portugal and Turkey. Based on this rank order, it seems that six of the first ten countries belong to the conservative type of the welfare states. For this regime, Austria is an exception because the mean prestige score is much lower (39.6) there than in all of the other countries belonging to this type. The level of the occupational prestige is high in three societies with a social democratic welfare regime too. The countries with low level of occupational prestige are typically Mediterranean and post-socialist nations but Hungary is an exception in this respect. The occupational prestige is also relatively high in another post-socialist country, Slovenia. The two states with

²⁷For more details on calculating SIOPS, see Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).

²⁸For more details on calculating ISEI, see Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).

liberal welfare regimes, the United Kingdom and Ireland, score in the middle of the rank order by occupational prestige.

The ISEI score is based on the occupational prestige, the level of education and the level of available income connected to the job titles. Its value is somewhat higher than the SIOPS; its grand mean is 41.8 in the European societies. The rank order is very similar to the one based on the occupational prestige. Again the Netherlands has the highest score (46.3) and Turkey has the lowest one (35.7). Countries in the upper section of the rank order include states belonging to the conservative and social democratic welfare regime, and Hungary as the only post-socialist nation is also there. The lowest section of the countries contains Mediterranean states (Portugal, Greece and Turkey) as well as post-socialist ones. The liberal countries (United Kingdom and Ireland) occupy again middle positions. Thus, the hierarchy of the countries is very similar from both perspectives of the occupational prestige and of the socio-economic status.

17.4 Intergenerational Social (Class) Mobility

Both conceptualisation of social mobility and empirical investigation of the topic are strongly related to the analysis of social structure. The theoretical views on social structure have their impact on the approach of investigating social mobility. Class analysts tend to study social mobility from a class perspective (class mobility), while status attainment models are developed in those cases if social structure is observed as a status hierarchy. Both approaches are relevant in their own right and are conceptually grounded in a coherent manner but the focus of this section will be on class mobility in the European societies in accordance with the larger emphasis on class structure in the previous parts of the chapter. In fact, there is a theoretical tradition for building a link between class formation and social mobility, social openness and closure in accordance with the Weberian definition of social class. This approach states that the degree of the closure of mobility chances, the homogenisation and the limitation of individuals' experiences to move to different occupations facilitate the structural formation of classes (e.g. Giddens 1973; Parkin 1974). Nevertheless, one of the arguments the supporters of the idea on the death of the class prefer to emphasise is apparently the increasing social mobility which is assumed to undermine the class formation.

Studying intergenerational (class) mobility obviously goes beyond its academic and scientific relevance because it is an important research topic from a normative and political viewpoint as well. Social openness and equal opportunities are important values in every society. We can go back to Sorokin (1927) who states a strong relationship between democracy and social mobility by arguing that in democratic societies the social position of an individual cannot be determined by birth. Mobility chances and prospects are significant indicators of individual freedom and making a society mobile or open is an important goal setting in political terms as well. Advocates of both functionalist and conflict theories seem to agree that social exchange between classes from one generation to the next is a requirement in modern industrial societies.

Throughout this part of the chapter, I intend to raise the problem of meritocracy, the relationship between ascription and achievement, the amount of social mobility from a comparative perspective within Europe but also outside of Europe, the converging and diverging trends in mobility, the persistence and the existing variation of social fluidity.

17.4.1 Less Ascription and More Achievement?

The claim regarding the trend towards less ascription and more achievement in modern industrial societies is one of the classic hypotheses in social mobility research. The original formulation of the theory, labelled as *industrialisation thesis*, is strongly connected to the status attainment approach of the topic (Treiman 1970) but is relevant to the intergenerational class mobility as well. Basically Treiman assumes a historical shift in the stratification process from ascription to achievement in consequence of the growing urbanisation, mass communication and industrialisation which should lead to greater social openness of the society. The core of the argument is in accordance with the theory of rising meritocracy in modern societies where ascribed characteristics, in this case mainly socio-economic background, have a decreasing impact on achieved status that is more determined by the individuals' abilities, efforts, motivation or ambition. Since these merits are less measurable, education is included in most status attainment analysis as a mediating variable between origin and destination. Adapting this thesis to the concrete case of social (occupational) mobility, Treiman assumes that the influence of the father's occupational status on the offspring's occupational status as well as on the offspring's educational attainment should decline, while the influence of the offspring's educational attainment on his/her occupational status should increase.²⁹

In any case, the thesis essentially speaks of the long-term decline of the importance of family background or of class of origin in determining individuals' occupational status or class position. In a recently emerging debate, Goldthorpe questions this assumption or more generally the thesis of rising meritocracy in modern societies. He argues that social origin tends to persist in influencing mobility chances, ascription continues to play a crucial role in mobility processes and achieved class is an outcome of class origin even through mechanisms of direct inheritance of economic, cultural and social resources, independently from educational attainment. This occurs partly because of the educational expansion and an increasing variety of qualifications, leading to the fact that employers cannot trust anymore the signalling function of education so much, but partly because of the growing appearance of such service jobs in the modern post-industrial societies where personal and ascribed characteristics can matter more for the employers than accumulated knowledge within the school system. On the one hand, employers tend to have new ideas about merit and their preferences are getting more connected to broadly defined social skills, ascribed personal and lifestyle characteristics than to achieved scholarly competences. On the other hand, this shift back to ascription (or to a re-definition of achievement where merit is getting more ascribed than achieved) is more typical to those segments of economy, chiefly to the various forms of services, which are gaining more importance in the modern post-industrial societies (Jackson et al. 2005; Goldthorpe 2007).

17.4.2 How Extensive Is Social Mobility in Modern Europe?

As mentioned above the political claim for more mobility, which means more democracy and freedom at the same time, is characteristic for and persists in the European societies

²⁹This is the particular reason that this chapter does not deal with status attainment models in more detailed manner because elaborating more on this process would lead to a large overlap with educational attainment, inequalities in educational inheritance discussed elsewhere in the volume.

these days as well. The political implications of more mobility (in practice *upward* mobility, of course) are straightforward: social (occupational) mobility carries people to the right place in the society (or at least in the division of labour) by correcting the ‘mistake’ that birth distributes individuals in families randomly. The chances and prospects for upward mobility provide a route for the most capable and ambitious people to climbing up the social ladder and to strive out from the lower classes if they were born at the ‘wrong’ place. Larger mobility serves as legitimating the political power and political institutions which are expected to act for the ‘poor but talented’ and to ensure the equality of opportunities for all disregarding birth, religion, ethnicity. Nevertheless, the ideological importance of high degree of social mobility is also a relatively new phenomenon in the 20th century. A historical approach of studying the topic (Kaelble 1984) finds that social mobility was not a typical feature of the Industrial Revolution and of the era of organised capitalism but became more common in the post-industrial society where substantial changes took place in social stratification, the concept of welfare state emerged and the equality of opportunities became a central issue in politics.

However, families follow different ‘selfish’ mobility strategies in the everyday life despite the general goal of all recent political regimes and despite the fact that most individuals would support the idea of increasing mobility chances by developing rules, mechanisms and institutions which tend to overcome and counterbalance the inequalities of social origin. In line with the human nature, all parents will do their best to inherit their benefits to their offspring. Parents in advantageous class position try everything and use all of their economic, cultural and social resources in order to maintain that class position from one generation to the next. This holds for those parents in less advantageous class position as well but they have fewer resources for the fulfilment of this goal. All parents hope that their children will reach at least the same class position they have, their children will possess the same amount of economic and cultural goods they have; in other words this means that the main ambition of families is to avoid *downward* mobility. Despite the claim (and probably fact) that social mobility has increased in modern societies during the historical developments and modernisation processes of the societies in the 20th century, families’ efforts at maintaining class position and inheriting advantages to their offspring tend to lead to a strong barrier to the increase in the amount of mobility. Despite all efforts of economic and political support for those who were born in lower classes and despite even the positive discrimination of the disadvantaged, the probabilities for ending up in high class positions in the society persist to be greater for those who were born in high class position than for those who aspire to get there from below.³⁰

Social mobility is a complex process and measuring the amount of mobility raises a series of questions both of theoretical and of empirical kind. When analysing vertical mobility, Sorokin (1927) writes about *intensiveness* and *generality* of social mobility. The previous indicator refers to the social distance, the number of strata (or classes) an individual goes through during the upward or downward move; the latter indicator means the number of individuals who change their (class) position in comparison to the one their parents occupied. In the first era of social mobility research this latter indicator, the proportion of mobiles and immobiles, became the most clear-cut measure for the amount of mobility. The immobile individuals are those who stay in the same class in which they were born,

³⁰The example of the former communist countries where administrative and discriminative measures were applied to support upward mobility strongly supports this claim, see, e.g. Szelényi (1998).

the persons on the *diagonal* of the mobility table. The mobile individuals are outside of the diagonal, their origin and destination classes differ and they move either upward or downward in comparison to the class position in which they were born. These observed or *absolute* mobility rates are further indicators of the amount of mobility. Tables 17.8 and 17.9 display these mobility rates for a group of European nations for three different points in time, separately for men and women.

Table 17.8 Proportions of total, upward and downward mobility in selected European countries in three points in time (men)

	Total mobility			Upward mobility*			Downward mobility*		
	1970s	1980s	1990s	1970s	1980s	1990s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Germany	61.6	62.1	60.3	31.7	33.6	33.3	12.4	12.2	13.0
France	66.6	67.5	67.0	25.9	29.1	29.9	17.9	16.8	16.4
Italy	–	69.5	72.1	–	29.0	35.9	–	11.8	10.4
Ireland	56.7	61.3	66.1	21.6	27.9	31.4	18.4	14.7	14.1
Great Britain	63.0	61.8	60.8	32.8	33.1	31.7	17.9	17.7	19.0
Sweden	70.8	71.4	71.0	35.1	35.3	36.6	19.0	19.4	18.6
Norway	–	71.9	68.1	–	39.3	34.2	–	15.9	17.9
Poland	59.4	61.0	67.4	22.1	24.8	26.3	18.8	18.0	19.6
Hungary	77.5	74.9	71.6	26.9	34.7	35.9	26.2	21.1	17.8
The Netherlands	66.3	67.7	65.7	36.1	38.9	37.7	14.5	15.2	16.3
Mean	66.3	66.9	67.7	28.0	32.6	33.4	18.7	16.3	16.2

Source: Breen (2004, p. 48, Table 3.6).

* The sum of upward and downward mobility equals vertical mobility. This sum is not equal with total mobility because part of total mobility is non-vertical mobility.

Table 17.9 Proportions of total, upward and downward mobility in selected European countries in three points in time (women in labour force)

	Total mobility			Upward mobility*			Downward mobility*		
	1970s	1980s	1990s	1970s	1980s	1990s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Germany	74.0	75.6	72.3	25.8	29.6	32.2	22.8	19.2	15.2
France	71.4	77.6	77.2	27.8	32.9	33.2	13.9	12.8	12.8
Italy	–	74.3	75.0	–	38.5	36.7	–	12.5	11.3
Great Britain	78.8	76.3	73.9	27.5	29.0	30.6	24.6	23.7	22.5
Sweden	73.1	73.6	73.2	23.9	27.5	33.5	31.5	28.9	24.4
Norway	–	76.2	77.4	–	34.4	37.1	–	19.8	15.9
Poland	50.8	66.3	76.2	19.5	31.7	34.1	14.4	16.8	16.2
Hungary	81.0	79.5	76.5	23.3	38.8	42.0	30.8	19.4	13.7
Netherlands	74.0	73.9	72.3	30.9	33.6	34.8	20.5	17.8	18.8
Mean	72.5	74.8	75.7	25.6	32.9	35.3	22.2	19.0	16.5

Source: Breen (2004, p. 66; Table 3.17).

* The sum of upward and downward mobility equals vertical mobility. This sum is not equal with total mobility because part of total mobility is non-vertical mobility.

On average, two-thirds of men were mobile according to these data. The variance between countries in observed mobility rates seems to be rather small, though the figures are lower in Germany and Britain but higher in Sweden, Hungary and Italy. The sum of upward and downward mobility does not exceed 50 percent; this means that there is a substantial amount of horizontal mobility between classes at the same hierarchical level.

About two-thirds of vertical mobility goes into upward direction; this reflects the observable structural shift in the class system: an increase in the proportion of the salariat and a decline in the proportion of unskilled and agricultural workers, as discussed in this chapter earlier. The amount of upward and downward mobility remained relatively similar over the three decades with the exception of Hungary and Ireland where upward mobility rates increased and downward mobility rates declined markedly.

Total mobility is higher for women than for men. But this does not mean that women have more mobility chances in these societies but it comes from the comparison of women's class to their father's class, which contains the gender-specific differences of the class distribution for males and females leading to larger marginal discrepancies in the mobility table. Since sum of upward and downward mobility (vertical mobility rates) does not differ much for males and females, horizontal mobility between classes at the same hierarchical level is more characteristic for women than men. Women also seem to experience more downward mobility than men but this diversity is more present in the 1970s and tend to disappear for the 1990s.

Later as analysis of social mobility has developed, the interest of researchers turned away from observed, absolute mobility rates which mirror chiefly the changes in the structural processes and directed to *relative* mobility rates, measured by odd's ratios, which describe better the relative chances for changing one's class position from one generation to the next in comparison to remaining in the same class one was born.³¹

From a conceptual viewpoint Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) elaborated further on the structural effects that can affect the amount of mobility. In principle, social mobility is influenced by three factors: the desirability of class destinations people aim to reach; the differences in economic, cultural and social resources what people, as coming from different social background, use for their mobility aspirations; and the barriers people face in gaining access to different class positions. In accordance with these assumptions, four effects are distinguished influencing the patterns of *social fluidity*, using the term applied by Erikson and Goldthorpe. Hierarchical effects refer to social distance, the hierarchical aspects of the class schema described earlier in the chapter. Inheritance effects describe the mechanisms which increase the likelihood that people can be found in the same class of destination where they originated from. This likelihood is larger if someone originated in self-employed class and especially in the case of self-employed farmer origin. Sector effects express the advantages and barriers for moves within and between sectors in the class structure like mobility between agricultural and non-agricultural class positions or between self-employed and employee positions. Finally, positive and negative affinity effects describe cultural similarity and dissimilarity which exist for certain classes. For example, mobility barriers are smaller and social fluidity is larger within the white-collar class, between the clerical workers and the salariat. There is a cultural similarity increasing mobility chances between self-employed and managers; members of both classes can be characterised by comparable habitus like capability for decision making or preferences for autonomy. The similar common habitus increases social fluidity between members of the various self-employed classes. But on the contrary, negative affinity, cultural dissimilarity contributes to the low probability of mobility chances between the classes on the top and on the bottom of society in addition to the hierarchical effects.

³¹I cannot go into technical details of the statistical procedures in this regard but see, e.g. Breen (2004, pp. 20–25).

These mechanisms are clearly present in influencing the relative mobility chances in modern societies as the country studies in Breen (2004) prove. Moreover, as Goldthorpe (2007) states, the variation in intergenerational class mobility is considerably larger on the level of absolute mobility rates caused by the structural differences in modernisation and industrialisation in comparison to the differences in the relative mobility chances produced by the fluidity effects. Thus, the invariance in the relative mobility rates appears to be rather high in Europe leading to both temporal stability and cross-national commonality. This conclusion is especially striking from the viewpoint of the hypothesis that social fluidity varies according to the social democratic, liberal or conservative character of the political regimes. One could assume that the different institutional settings of these regimes would lead to dissimilarity in the amount of social fluidity, e.g. supporting the disadvantaged, trying to compensate and counterbalance the drawbacks of those coming from poor social origin is stronger in countries with a social democratic regime. The comparative work by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) found only little support of this assumption for Sweden representing the social democratic regime in comparison to England and France. Two socialist countries in the time of the research, Hungary and Poland, showed more dissimilarity, too, and turned out to be rather inconsistent with respect to the different fluidity effects. For example, Hungary was characterised by a lower level of inheritance effect increasing social fluidity and a higher level of hierarchical effect decreasing social fluidity. In their monograph Erikson and Goldthorpe also tested the macro-sociological assumption that income inequalities have an impact on the association between class of origin and destination. Indeed, they found that nations with lower level of economic inequality have more open class structure and chances are bigger for mobility. At the same time, however, a similar analysis reported in Breen (2004, pp. 396–397) does not confirm this result. The Gini index as a measure of income inequality has no significant impact on social fluidity and the sign of the effect goes even the opposite direction as assumed.

17.4.3 The ‘Big Competition’ Between East and West and Between Europe and the USA/Japan

As mentioned earlier, social mobility analysis has a significant normative and political context. Though the exact field within sociology, its major terms were already developed in the early works by Sorokin, the large bulk of empirical studies started only after World War II. In the atmosphere of the cold war, social mobility has become one of the ideological battlefields. Since social mobility research is comparative almost ‘by nature’ (cf. Simkus 1981), the amount of mobility in a country was always discussed in relation to other countries. An obvious direction of these comparisons related to the amount of mobility in the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, i.e. in the communist societies and in the market economies by raising the question which type of society is ‘better’, more open, provides additional possibilities to those children who were born in disadvantaged families for moving up on the social ladder. The early analyses based on absolute mobility rates concluded that social mobility was higher in the Eastern European countries than in the West but the interpretation of this result was further debated. A closer look at the reasons for the bigger observed mobility rates makes it clear that its explanation is less the higher openness of the communist societies but rather the extensive changes in the occupational structure between two generations due to the delayed process of industrialisation and modernisation. A larger drop in the agricultural labour force and a more substantial increase in industrial

employment, the rise in the proportion of the non-manual and the professional employees has occurred in many Eastern European countries only after World War II and these developments resulted in the fact that the percentage of offspring who ended up in different classes in comparison to their parents turned out to be larger. In addition to industrialisation, apparent political decisions also increased social mobility, e.g. establishing agricultural cooperatives in the communist countries (except in Poland) forced people in the countryside to find jobs in the industry of the larger towns.³² As we have discussed above for the Hungarian and the Polish case, more recent studies by applying advanced analytical techniques that control for the structural developments did not find the patterns of intergenerational class mobility to be particularly different in these countries in comparison to Western European societies.

From the perspective of the ‘big competition’ the Soviet Union could have been a special case. Unfortunately, for most part of the communist era and in particular for the period of the cold war after World War II no reliable nationwide mobility data were available on the Soviet Union and even reports on local data are scarce (for a review, see Marshall 1997, pp. 145–147). Nevertheless, data collections after the collapse of communism, e.g. in 1991 or 1993, can already be used for analysing intergenerational mobility and one can argue that these data basically mirror the mobility patterns of the communist era in Russia. Following this logic, Marshall (1997) analysed the 1991 data of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) by applying the methodology of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). This research finds that intergenerational class mobility in Russia was a ‘common experience’ where even bigger jumps from the working classes to the salariat could occur. But the more accurate statistical analysis on social fluidity (and a comparison to the British ISJP data) reveals no particular differences in the relative mobility chances and the claim that Soviet Russia was much more open society than the Western capitalist counterparts did not find support. (In Table 17.10 the simple and easier understandable descriptive percentages also show that the degree of mobility in Russia used to be within the European range.)

Table 17.10 Proportions of total, upward and downward mobility in Europe, USA, Japan and Russia

	Total mobility	Upward mobility*	Downward mobility*
European range	58–76	30–42	8–18
USA	73	40	15
Japan	73	39	12
Communist Russia	66	38	18

Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, p. 330, Table 9.4 and p. 354, Table 10.5) and Marshall (1997, p. 152, Table 7.2).

* The sum of upward and downward mobility equals vertical mobility. This sum is not equal with total mobility because part of total mobility is non-vertical mobility.

Turning to the other segment of the ‘big competition’, I am going to present some comparisons between the mobility patterns of Europe and the USA and Japan. For doing this I rely mostly on the findings of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) who devoted to these nations

³²The same structural and political reasons explain why social mobility seemed to be bigger under communism than before, though the communist political propaganda liked to interpret this as a proof of stronger democracy and social openness of the communist political order in comparison to the pre-communist era.

separate chapters in their monograph.³³ For the USA, an apparent starting point is the well-known phrase of ‘American exceptionalism’ that refers also to the high rates of social mobility and roots back to the classic work by Tocqueville (1835/1968), *De la démocratie en America*, where he writes about a larger instability in the American families in terms of intergenerational inheritance of inequalities. In addition, the view in the general public is also strongly connected to another idea about the USA as being the ‘land of opportunities’. Regarding the empirical evidence on this issue, the first systematic attempt to synthesising the results from analyses on social mobility emphasises the *similarity* of the mobility rates across industrial societies, including the USA (Lipset and Zetterberg 1959). At the same time, in the last pages of their monograph where discussing the relationship between opportunity and democracy, Blau and Duncan (1967) conclude that ‘upward mobility from the working class into the top occupation stratum of the society is higher in the United States than in other countries’ (op. cit., p. 434) as an example of exceptionalism regarding the relatively better opportunities of disadvantaged Americans. The public view on the openness of the American society and the varying conclusions from empirical studies make the competition between Europe and the USA particularly interesting. As displayed in Table 17.10, the different types of American mobility rates are high but stand within the range of the extent of mobility in Europe, though close to the upper limit of this range. While this statement holds for the upward mobility rates as well, the more elaborated analysis of the patterns of social fluidity by Erikson and Goldthorpe revealed a lower level of the hierarchical effects, expressing social distance in the society, and this gave some support of the greater openness in the American mobility regime. More generally, however, Erikson and Goldthorpe did not find convincing the claim on the American exceptionalism with respect to a higher level of social fluidity.

The competition with Japan, as a non-Western society with a high level of industrialisation, is understandable on grounds of Japan’s economic performance and presence in the world market. At the same time, Japan is frequently viewed as a society with non-Western cultural traditions with respect to democracy or individual freedom; both are highly important from the perspective of social mobility based on a liberal theory; and even its economic success is repeatedly put down to sociological features related to culture, traditions, hierarchy. Consequently, the question arises whether the high level of industrialisation leads to a high level of social mobility and openness of the Japanese society as expected for the Western democracies in Europe or in the USA. Investigating social fluidity in Japan, Erikson and Goldthorpe found a stronger level of inheritance, above all in the agricultural sector, on the one hand, and a higher level of ‘negative affinity’, mobility between the top and the bottom of the society, in particular a lower level of downward mobility from the service class to the worker class, on the other hand. They conclude that Japan is a relatively open society overall but there are indications of rather low fluidity as well. When turning to the absolute mobility rates which, in fact, reflect stronger to the industrialisation and economic restructuring of the Japanese society, the total mobility rates turn out to be rather high and the level of downward mobility is low (see Table 17.10). These figures are in line with the picture of a ‘catching up’ modernisation and rapid technological and industrial development. But at the same time, in the light of the analysis of the relative mobility rates when controlling for the changes in the structure of the labour force, Japan could not be regarded as a ‘land of opportunities’.

³³This kind of outlook is unfortunately missing from the more recent work by Breen (2004).

17.4.4 Converging and Diverging Trends of Social Mobility

As mentioned above, in analysing social mobility there is a long tradition of looking for trends and testing hypotheses accordingly by applying advanced statistical methodology for these goals. Lipset and Zetterberg (1959) belong to the first scholars who developed a thesis on the convergence of the patterns in social mobility. The LZ thesis assumes that the mobility patterns are very similar in the various developed societies and this is related to economic expansion. However, no simple correlation exists between mobility rates and expansion rates, rather social mobility becomes high once industrialisation and economic expansion reach a certain level. Later, Featherman et al. (1975) modified the LZ thesis assuming that their theory is not valid for the absolute mobility rates (the phenotypical pattern of social mobility) because they differ according to the occupational structure in the various societies and to the changes in the marginal distribution of the mobility table. Nevertheless, the growing international similarity holds for the relative mobility rates (the genotypical pattern of social mobility). This became the FJH thesis, labelled also as common social fluidity. The assumption holds for industrial societies with market economy and nuclear family system.

Regarding converging or diverging trends in social mobility, the empirical evidence from the existing studies is not straightforward. The most comprehensive attempt on analysing intergenerational class mobility in comparative perspective is not a very recent study (Ganzeboom et al. 1989). Here the authors analyse a large number of data (149 mobility tables classified by a collapsed version of the EGP schema from 35 countries within and outside of Europe) with the aim of testing the common social fluidity hypothesis across countries and over time. This paper concludes that ‘there is a basic similarity in mobility *patterns*’ but ‘there are substantial cross-national and cross-temporal differences in the *extent* of mobility’ (op. cit., p. 47). This result would mean the failure of the common social fluidity hypothesis. Moreover the authors also claim that there is a trend towards increasing openness over time.

Beyond the fact that this conclusion cannot be called as the ‘present situation in Europe’ (e.g. because it reflects a period before the collapse of communism), Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, pp. 100–101) express their doubts about the validity of the results. In their analysis they found less evidence of general trends towards higher level of total class mobility; a tendency that absolute or relative mobility rates are changing in any consistent direction; and an increasing cross-national similarity over time. Their analysis on social fluidity does not support the assumption that mobility rates tend to become more equal in the European societies. The nature of the evidence on absolute mobility rates is closer to trendless fluctuation (as assumed by Sorokin), while the relative rates show considerable stability (op. cit., pp. 102, 367). The more recent research based also on more recent data, however, concludes that there is a convergent trend among countries in their absolute mobility rates, chiefly in consequence of the similar trends in the class structure of the societies. The convergence in mobility flows is more clear-cut among women than men. But in contrast to this and in agreement with the findings of Erikson and Goldthorpe, it is impossible to recognise any tendency towards either convergence or divergence among European countries in their social fluidity (Breen 2004, pp. 73, 401).

Thus, it seems that even a temporary conclusion is dubious because of the variety of the results based on the different analyses. The most recent picture on temporal changes by countries is even so displayed in Table 17.11. These results reveal an increasing tendency for social fluidity, though not for every country and not for all men and women in each

Table 17.11 Trends in social fluidity in selected European countries

	Men	Women		Men	Women
Germany	↑	–	Sweden	–	↑
France	↑	↑	Norway	↑	↑
Italy	↑	–	Poland	–	↑
Ireland	↑	n.a.	Hungary	↑	↑
Britain	–	?	Netherlands	↑	↑

Source: Breen (2004, p. 388).

Legend: ↑ = increase in social fluidity; – = no change in social fluidity according to the country reports; ? = uncertain results.

country. In some cases no significant changes in social fluidity could be observed between the 1970s and the 1990s but there seem to be no tendency for a decline in social fluidity.³⁴

17.5 Concluding Assessment on the Empirical Evidence

This chapter intended to provide a European perspective on stratification and social mobility. My starting point was that class structure and structural locations remain a relevant concept even under the conditions of globalisation. More than one class approach was considered and alternate looks at the European societies were provided. Changes in the stratification system of the European nations mirror the historical developments of industrialisation and modernisation, a shift from the agriculture-dominated society to an industrial one and a further shift to a post-industrial society. Despite variations in the historical timing of this process in the different nations, where England took the leading role and the new EU member states are the last in this development, the *converging trend is the European experience* the data display regarding the class distribution in the various countries.

But despite the convergence in the class structure of the European societies, marked deviations are still persisting, mirrored also by the different class schemas, various scholars in stratification research developed in accordance with their different theoretical views on the class structure of the European societies. According to one approach, employment relations are the key concept in class stratification and this concept has an increasing relevance in the European societies by distinguishing between *service relationship* characterised by trust, high level of work autonomy, long-term contracts with large safety, more promotion and career prospects, additional forms of compensation beyond salaries and *labour contract* where the attributes mentioned above are not present, work autonomy is lower, jobs are less safe and stable, there are fewer promotion prospects, etc. Along these lines, the variance in the European stratification is clearly visible when grouping the countries into clusters based on different *welfare regimes*. In this perspective societies belonging to the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic regimes have similar profiles in class distribution with a larger fraction of population in service relationship, while employment with labour contract is more characteristic for the Mediterranean and

³⁴In fact, a trend for decrease in social fluidity may still appear in Hungary in the light of data from 2000 (Róbert and Bukodi 2004) and in Russia (Gerber and Hout 2004).

the post-socialist countries. These differences should be considered for the intention on the European integration as well.

Contrary to this view, an alternate class model for the European societies displays a more pyramid-like distribution where about one-third of the population can be found in the bottom class of proletariats. This picture would call for other policy measures in integrated Europe with a stronger focus on the disadvantaged. A further approach emphasises the shift from industrial (Fordist) society to the post-industrial society and tries to describe the European societies accordingly. Emphasising country variations is the strongest by this view of the European societies.

The picture on social mobility is even less clear-cut for contemporary Europe. One of the difficulties for making stronger statements is that mobility research distinguishes between absolute (observed) and relative rates. The former one is more connected to industrialisation and modernisation and, consequently, it is easier to be more conclusive: the most recent evidence, in accordance with the trends for the changes in the class structure, supports a *converging trend among the European societies*. This is not the case, however, for the relative rates that reflect on mobility chances from one generation to the next and on association between class of origin and class of destination, independently of the changes in the class structure. In this perspective, social fluidity seems to show no tendency towards either convergence or divergence in Europe.

Regarding the social openness of the European societies, the mobility chances described by the observed rates display a favourable picture; the *amount of the absolute mobility is relatively high*, both for men and for women. Although the larger part of the observed vertical mobility has an upward direction, downward mobility is also present; thus intergenerational mobility process does not always lead to higher class position for all mobile persons. With respect to relative mobility rates, there is no evidence for increasing openness in Europe, social fluidity can be characterised by a large degree of temporal stability and cross-national commonality. Analyses from macro-sociological aspects did not lead to convincing results either. Expected differences by political regime exist only to some extent; social fluidity is greater in some Scandinavian countries but the evidence is not straightforward. In fact, there is a danger that social closure persists and disadvantaged social groups have no bigger chances for breaking up from the bottom of the society. There are important policy implications in this regard. Part of the policy questions is associated with the educational inequalities not investigated in this chapter. But apparently, the generally accepted ideas of the 'knowledge-based' society and 'lifelong learning' can also contribute to the decline of social closure and to an increase of intergenerational mobility at the European level. Another part of the issues is connected to the social welfare system supporting disadvantaged families. The related policy questions in this regard raise the problem of the general vs. targeted programmes for children of the disadvantaged families.

The issues of stratification and social mobility play a significant role in the integration of the European societies. This chapter attempted to investigate the similarities and the differences in the stratification system also from this European perspective. As has been demonstrated, the trends related to industrialisation and modernisation usually lead to an increase of the similarities in the economic development of the nations and contribute to European integration. Post-industrialisation, however, can open the room for diverging tendencies. The class system of the societies is strongly embedded into institutional settings of employment and labour market legislation. The various patterns of this legislation, the various roles collective bargaining agreements play in regulations can contribute to the growing national differences in outcomes regarding employment protection or different forms of employment (flexible work schedules, various forms of work contract). When

European societies tend to diverge with respect to these characteristics, their stratification system has stronger country-specific features and this tendency can undermine the unification process at European level and provide arguments against these efforts. The chapter tried to provide examples when the general rules applied for constructing class schemas failed to some extent due to nation-specific characteristics. Nevertheless, the main goal was the generalisation and the analyses on the validity of the class schemas also serve the same aim: to prove that Europe is getting integrated in terms of the class structures. Part of the class schemas provided more evidence, part of the class schemas provided less evidence in this respect.

As far as mobility is concerned, one of its aspects, the migration of the labour force, definitely contributes to the integration of Europe. This chapter, however, investigated the opportunities and barriers of intergenerational (class) mobility. The relationship between intergenerational mobility and freedom, democracy, equality makes this issue particularly relevant. Openness should be the basis of European integration and the expression of fluidity seems to describe very well the general aims European societies should follow. This means the removal of all types of barriers that hinder the freedom of social mobility. In the light of the – contradictory – empirical evidence from mobility studies, it is too early to be very optimistic in this regard. Even some slight tendencies into this direction can already be considered as an important step. Further integrated common efforts are needed to decrease the efficient functioning of the rules of reproduction of advantages from one generation to the next and to support the equality of opportunities for intergenerational mobility.

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Chapter 18

Transnationality

Steffen Mau and Sebastian Büttner

18.1 Introduction

In recent decades much research has been undertaken to identify the roots, the distinctiveness and the uniqueness of European society. This endeavour has been set in motion because the process of European integration demands reflections on the specific traits of Europe. Policy-makers as well as social scientists have frequently referred to the character of European society and the shared traits of the European nation states and the European people in order to justify the process of supranational community building. In their view, the European Union constitutes more than a random cluster of countries that decide on a particular form of cooperation. Moreover, it also embodies a particular sense of, commonness, which backs the current process of integration. Indeed, though the European continent has been the locus of excessive nationalism, it can be argued that there is a common ground that unifies the European countries, going beyond mutual recognition and political cooperation.

In historical perspective we can see that there has been a high density of interaction between people from different regions and parts of the European continent. As Giner (1993: 153) underlines, “The lives and destinies of the European peoples have been inextricably intertwined for a very long time, indeed, and no emphasis on internal varieties and variations can ever disguise the fact that the continent has shared one single civilization over centuries.” In other words, Europe did not consist of unconnected islands between which exchange was rather rare and exceptional, but there were many institutionalised and informal social ties. For example, the aristocratic families of Europe have always been closely interlinked and their marriage patterns engendered a dense web of transnational relations. There are countless examples from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries in which family bonds crossed borders. Monarchies used the strategy of initiating blood connections to safeguard their rule and power and to forge alliances. As a result, a European courtly society came into being. From the beginning of the medieval period onwards, scholars and scientists have also moved and communicated across Europe and thereby dispersed and accumulated knowledge. There was always a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in many places all over Europe before the rise of modern nation states. The major towns and capitals of the multi-national empires or the major port cities actually were multi-cultural places, with people and groups of different origin living in spatial and social proximity.

S. Mau (✉)

Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, Germany
e-mail: smau@bigsss.uni-bremen.de

There was no large-scale unified system that regulated freedom of movement. Yet, the control of mobility was in the hands of local authorities, landlords, and feudal lords in earlier times. But despite these local restrictions on mobility, this was a system that allowed a frequent coming, going and staying of non-native people and did not require an anchoring of people in a given territory (cf. Therborn 1995).

Along with the establishment of modern nation states, a new type of political order emerged. One of the main features associated with modern nation states was territorial closure, by which state authorities attempted to control and govern population and territory (Rokkan 2000). The invention of the passport, border controls, the regulation of mobility, the endowment of people with citizen status — all these measures contributed to the ability of the state to take hold on the society (Torpey 2000). As a consequence, clear demarcations between distinct “national” groups became the common feature in modern Europe. Some scholars even claim that there were no pre-modern societies as clearly separated and demarcated as the modern nation states (Giddens 1990). After the “golden age” of the nation state and the many instances of national rivalry and conflict, Europe has entered an era of reconciliation and political integration. Though post-war Europe underwent a deep divide with two geopolitical blocs standing against each other, this was also the period when the foundations of European integration were laid down: starting with ambitions of economic integration, then becoming a more and more political project of supranational system building and, finally, reaching out to the social level of integration (Leibfried and Pierson 1998). Since the middle of the previous century, the dynamics of European integration continually bound more and more European nation states together. After the collapse of the communist system and the following tremendous eastward enlargement, a large part of the European continent constitutes the territory of the European Union (EU) today. Besides that, during the previous decade a single European market with a common currency came into being fostering considerable flows of intra-EU economic transactions. Consequently, the EU has also acquired huge regulatory power and authority over the meantime to interfere in various policy areas formerly defined as distinct national issues (Wallace and Wallace 1998; Cowles et al. 2001; Rumford 2002; Featherstone and Raedelli 2003).

Essential for a sociological understanding of the process of European integration is not, however, the supra-national economic and political mechanisms shaping contemporary Europe but the social dynamics of transnational interdependencies as well as the changes in individual citizens’ lives against the backdrop of ongoing European integration (cf. Kaelble 1987; Bach 2000; Immerfall 2000; Beck and Grande 2004; Delhey 2005; Fligstein 2008; Mau and Verwiebe 2009). In fact, if one only looks at the breakdown of national borders and the subsequent facilitation of cross-border exchanges we can expect a significant impact of European integration particularly on the level of individual citizens. Therefore, sociologists assume that growing interaction and interdependency between citizens of different European member states is slowly transforming national societies and their boundaries and may catalyse a new type of integration and solidarity at the European level (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

Since Durkheim’s (1960 [1893]) classic book on *The Division of Labour in Society*, the link between growing societal interdependence and solidarity is one of the core theorems of the sociological analysis of the genesis of solidarity. Durkheim assumed that intensified exchange and entanglement engender social and emotional bonds between the interacting strangers. With regard to European integration, one may concede a growing degree of interpenetration and dependency between the EU member states. Adopting Durkheim’s approach, it stands to reason that the more interwoven the European member states are, the more likely solidarity bonds across national borders are to develop. In fact, Durkheim

himself, albeit more than 100 years ago in an era of excessive nationalism, indicated such a possibility for the European nations to come about: "...among European peoples there is a tendency to form by spontaneous movement a European society which has, at present, some idea of itself and the beginning of organisation. If the formation of a single human society is forever impossible, a fact which has not been proved, at least the formation of continually larger societies brings us vaguely near the goal." (Durkheim 1960 [1893]: 405 f.).

Karl W. Deutsch's "transactionalism" (Deutsch 1957, 1968) has also taken such a perspective as a point of departure and emphasised that political integration also needs to entail intensified communication and exchange between different nations. According to Deutsch, it is of political importance that integration does take place not only at the economic level but also at the level of personal contacts and interactions (cf. Delhey 2004). He describes the dynamics of this process as a cybernetic model – a self-propelled process – within which economic and political transactions trigger further individual-level transactions. With the intensification of border-crossing exchanges, more and more people would start to become aware of the advantages of these flows and start to participate in transnational interaction, social distances would diminish and prejudices be weakened. One can justifiably question the optimistic perspective of such a deterministic theory. Nevertheless, we can generally assume that institutionalised and politically fostered forms of exchange and interaction, such as the creation of a common market, cross-border cooperation or investment in transport systems, provide an infrastructure encouraging ever more individual cross-border transactions. Hence, the emergence of transnational interactions and inter-individual networks in contemporary Europe can indeed be conceptualised in close relation to the overall macro-structural change in the conventional system of nation states.

If we look more closely at the various possible types of interconnectedness among the citizens of different European countries, we can see that this phenomenon in multi-faceted and different aspects may play a role. Delhey (2004) distinguishes between a quantitative and a qualitative dimension of transnational interconnectedness. The *quantitative* dimension circumscribes the mutual relevance of different national societies measured in border-crossing transactions and activities such as communication flows, stays and travel abroad, cross-border purchases, inter-group friendships, acquaintances and contacts, inter-group marriages and migration, mutual attentiveness, interest and knowledge and, last but not least, transnational social comparisons and yardsticks. The *qualitative* dimension rather entails aspects such as help across borders, positive mutual perceptions and attitudes and the issue to what extent a shared community feeling overrides existing national divides. We can, however, assume that the quantitative and the qualitative characteristics are closely interwoven with dense cross-border networks and interaction also strengthening community feelings and forms of solidarity. And exactly along this line, it has been suggested that the enormous increase in border-crossing interactions might contribute to a shift of political loyalties and identifications away from national societies to the European and global level (Münch 1999, 2001; Fligstein 2008).

However, one can also question that cross-border interaction necessarily leads to "subjective" manifestations of Europeanisation. Interaction across borders may trigger feelings of reciprocity and commonness; but there are also many instances and social situations, indeed, where such a spill-over does not take place. Even Durkheim, who is always referred to as the classical proponent of a functional logic of social evolution and change, reminds us of the fragile nature of solidarity bonds across borders with his reflections on anomie

(cf. Münch and Büttner 2006). According to Durkheim, it is possible that trans-boundary integration might break down at any point in time due to revived national protectionism and excessive national inclusion (Durkheim 1961: 195f.). In fact, this has been the usual case throughout Europe's whole modern history. Thus, increasing border-crossing exchange and interaction do not naturally create the feeling of commonness or the emergence of a new solidarity "community" with a common identity. This would always require to be embedded in "lived" social institutions. This means that it must be routinely practised and reproduced by individuals and, at least to a certain extent, materialise in values of commonness and reciprocity. However, if this is the case in contemporary Europe is a matter of ongoing political and scientific debate.

Yet, what is widely shared today is the perception of an enormous increase in transnational interactions in everyday life. Despite some scepticism, we assume that these everyday cross-border transactions indeed catalyse transnational integration among European citizens, namely by ending national containment, fostering pan-European connectivity and adjusting individual citizens' lives and experiences on a European scale. We claim, therefore, that aside from "top-down" political processes these transnational interactions in everyday life possess a quality of their own and it is necessary to have a closer look at this horizontal dimension of European integration – or as Favell (2005: 1115) put it more pronouncedly:

Political scientists think of voting and "revealed preferences", of course, but 'being European' nowadays is as much likely to be about this, as it is about shopping across borders, buying property abroad, handling a common currency, looking for work in a foreign city, taking holidays in new countries, buying cheap airline tickets, planning international rail travel, joining cross-national associations – and a thousand other actions facilitated by the European free movement accords. These ways of being European (that can all be counted, or interrogated for meaning), are notably also enjoyed by many who overtly profess themselves to be Eurosceptic or to have no European identity at all. Thought of this way, we may indeed discover "social identities" that are genuinely transnational, if they turn out to be rooted behaviourally in new forms of cross-national action and interaction.

In the following sections we will mainly describe different forms, so-called bottom-up forms, of horizontal cross-border activities within Europe in order to map the degree of transnationality and interconnectedness among European citizens. We will focus on the frequency and density of horizontal activities in everyday life, such as communicating, travelling or working together across borders.¹ The prevalence of transnational interconnectedness in an ever-integrating Europe is often taken for granted in theories and studies on Europeanisation. However, the data available for capturing such horizontal cross-border movements and connections are still rather limited. So far, most of the research undertakings interested in Europe are comparative in nature, and we still lack knowledge as regards the character and the extent of horizontal networks between peoples.² Thus, the data presented in the following are to a large extent data published by EU institutions and other

¹However, we do not take business relations, economic exchanges and political cooperation into consideration, although we acknowledge that also these kinds of professional relations, and particularly those at the micro-level of society, constitute an important part of horizontal Europeanization. Yet in this chapter we focus on those connections which are primarily social in character.

²A first comprehensive attempt to "measure" transnationality for the case of Germany represents Mau (2007).

official bodies, which do not fully satisfy our sociological demands. It would require additional data on transnational friendships, family ties and transnational practices to gain a more comprehensive picture. However, as such studies are still in their infancy – at least on a European level – the picture we will provide here will remain preliminary and partly incomplete.

In the next section we start with a spotlight on the infrastructure of transnational interaction, although its development is strongly dependent on top-down political and economic decisions. Nonetheless, we consider the extension of transport and communication networks both an important enabling factor and an indication of bottom-up transnationalisation (cf. Larsen et al. 2006; Urry 2007). If there was no demand for transnational movements and exchange, the infrastructure would not have to be expanded and vice versa. In fact, exactly along these lines we consider individual behaviour and macro-structural conditions related, and they must be singled out analytically. After looking at the infrastructure, we turn to several accounts of transnational movements, such as intra-European migration and tourism, student and youth exchanges, town twinning and other forms of regional cross-border cooperation. As we will show, large-scale pan-European movements take place at the grassroots level of society, already bringing about a reasonable degree of pan-European connectivity in everyday life.

18.2 The Infrastructure of Transnationalisation: Transport and Communication Networks

Thinking of incidences and enabling factors of horizontal interactions across and beyond national borders in Europe, we often primarily think of the major political steps undertaken during the 1990s to foster cross-border exchanges and mobility of Europeans, such as, above all, the establishment of the European Common Market, the abolition of rigid border controls between Schengen states, or the creation of the Euro-zone. Indeed, these changes have brought European nation states closer to each other than ever before, especially the member states of the European Union (Mau 2006). But besides these major steps of economic and political integration, the development of a trans-European network of transportation and the opening of telecommunications markets have also decisively accelerated cross-border activities of European citizens.

One short glance at the extent of motorways or railroad connections all over Europe reveals that networks of transportation already transcend the borders of European nation states to a large extent (cf. Espon 2004, 2006b). Various border-crossing motorways, railroads and waterways have been built in the past two or three decades in particular in order to facilitate cross-border travel between neighbouring countries. National railway companies increasingly cooperate with each other and put huge efforts into offering ever faster and cheaper international railroad connections between major urban centres. Neighbouring countries and regions increasingly work together in order to raise the number of border-crossings and make regular border-crossing traffic ever easier.³ And besides the respective governments of neighbouring countries, the European Commission above all has been very

³One outstanding example of these cross-border construction projects is the *Eurotunnel*, an underwater railroad connection of about 50 km in length across the English Channel between Calais (France) and Dover (Great Britain). Most interestingly, this project was already envisaged at the beginning of the 19th century, but always postponed due to multiple animosities and mutual distrust between the French and British governments. The final completion of this project, however, had to wait until the end of the 20th

active in promoting the idea of trans-European mobility in conjunction with the realisation of a common market. In fact, the European Commission expects the traffic to double between EU countries by the year 2020. Consequently, many international motorways and railroad connections are planned for the near future. The Commission has defined major priorities for the further development of trans-European transport networks and it also provides member states with respective financial support (cf. European Communities 2001, 2005).

Another important, if not even the most important, aspect of the current extension of border-crossing traffic in Europe has been the liberalisation of air traffic in EU member states, also mainly driven forward by the European Commission. The liberalisation brought about the abolition of long-existing state monopolies in air transportation. Private air carriers have full market access nowadays, and they are more or less free in determining their own prices and tariffs (European Communities 2004). A direct consequence of this reform was an enormous increase in both European air carriers and pan-European air connections. Today, there are more than 130 airlines in Europe connecting a network of more than 450 European airport locations.⁴ Above all, the rise of new so-called low-budget air carriers over the past few years has revolutionised the transportation market indeed and significantly raised opportunities for travelling across Europe. These new airlines have usually opened up new airports at places outside the main metropolitan areas and established new pan-European connections, sometimes even to the most outlying places in Europe. Furthermore, prices for international pan-European flights have fallen tremendously – to the benefit of international travellers, but certainly at the expense of growing environmental problems as well, as not only environmentalists have repeatedly admonished.

Today European low-cost airlines carry more than 100 million passengers per year with a current annual growth rate of about 20%.⁵ In 2006, more than 50 low-cost carriers were offering their services in Europe, amounting to a market share of about 16% of all European flights (Eurocontrol 2006). In accordance with the expansion of low-cost carriers, the total number of passengers transported by air in the area of the European Union (former EU-25) has risen significantly over the past years. Between 2003 and 2004 it grew 8.8% up to a total of 650 million passengers.⁶ Just about one quarter (24%) of these air passengers were on domestic flights, 34% took extra-EU flights, and 42% – that represents almost 300 million of all EU air passengers in 2004 – chose intra-EU connections. Thus, a large part of air traffic in Europe is border-crossing and trans-European in nature, which is at least an indication of the extent of regular trans-European mobility today.⁷

century, when both governments decided to realise the tunnel in the spirit of increasing cross-border cooperation and European integration. Today, the Eurotunnel, which was officially opened in May 1994, is used by about 7 million persons per year crossing the English Channel between France and Great Britain (taken from www.eurotunnel.com, cited 10 Feb 2007).

⁴As of end of year 2006 according to Eurocontrol (www.eurocontrol.int, cited 10 Feb 2007).

⁵This information derives from a recent analysis of the European low-cost carriers market undertaken by the Arthur D. Little consultancy, Switzerland (<http://www.adlittle.ch>, cited 10 Feb 2007).

⁶The number of passengers increased between 2003 and 2004 in all EU-25 member states. However, by far the highest growth rates can be identified for the eight Central and Eastern European member states, with Slovakia (73%) and the three Baltic States (between 40 and 50%) at the top. Nonetheless, the total amount of passengers is still significantly lower in Central and Eastern Europe compared to the old member states (EU-15) (cf. De La Fuente Layos 2006).

⁷The most frequented intra-European air connections are those between Great Britain and Spain (with 33.6 million passengers in 2004) as well as between Germany and Spain (19.3 million). Other highly frequented air connections exist between France and Great Britain (11.1 million), Ireland and Great Britain (10.6

In fact, over the past few years there has been a huge increase in same-day return connections all over Europe, which is, in our point of view, a good indicator of how transnationally interconnected some localities in Europe already are. Looking particularly at “daily accessibility by air”, it becomes evident that Europe’s 72 major urban agglomerations and cities are highly interconnected with each other (see Espon 2006b: 34 ff.). Hence, there seems to be a corresponding demand for transnational trips at least between major European centres on a daily basis. That accounts, above all, for the central area of the European Union between cities like Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt and London, of course, where plenty of options for return trips on the same day are available. With slight restrictions, this is also true for other cities such as Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne, Munich, Zurich, Prague, Vienna and Rome (see Fig. 18.1 below). In some cases overall accessibility by air is faster than by car or train from the “hinterland” in direct proximity.

However, taking all means of transportation together – motorways, waterways, railways and air connections – we can see that the trans-European transport network is far from being spread equally all over the territory of the European Union. Generally speaking, there is a distinct West–East gap in terms of interconnectedness and accessibility as well as a significant North–South divide (see Espon 2004, 2006a). The countries in Central Europe with the highest population density such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France are strongly interconnected with each other in terms of regular cross-border traffic. This includes various daily air connections, but even more so a multitude of border-crossing motorways and railway connections (Strelow 2006). Relatively high levels of interconnections, especially by air and by train, can also be found between the Central European area (Benelux, France, Germany and Austria) and the British Isles as well as Italy. In relation to that, railroads and motorways between these West-Central European states and their Eastern neighbours are still weakly developed. In fact, the most accessible places in the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, and all over Eastern Europe in general, are a few so-called airport islands, namely the capital cities and a few regional centres. This also holds partly true for Northern and Southern European countries. Though these countries are quite well interconnected internally, the most important nodes of international travel are some outstanding urban centres such as Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Athens, Istanbul, Madrid, Barcelona or Lisbon and major tourist destinations such as Palma de Mallorca, Malaga, Nicosia or Thessaloniki.

Besides cross-border traffic and transportation networks, another dimension of trans-European connectivity can be particularly attributed to the enormous expansion of new opportunities for international communication in Europe over the past decade. Certainly, a huge part of current transnational interactions in everyday life does not take place by means of physical cross-border mobility, but via telecommunications and different forms of electronic communication. Never before has communication beyond national borders and over long distances been as fast, cheap and easy as today. Indeed, the expansion of new communication opportunities makes it much easier to maintain long-distant relationships between friends and relatives.⁸ Both the digitalisation of data transfer and – similar to the case of air

million) as well as Germany and Great Britain (10.1 million). The most significant connections between old (EU-15) and new member states can be found between Great Britain and Cyprus (2.8 million) as well as between Great Britain and the Czech Republic (2.1 million) (cf. De La Fuente Layos 2006; Eurostat 2006).

⁸For the case of Germany, see Mau (2007).




Fig. 18.1 Daily accessibility by air between major European urban areas (2003)*

*Source: Espon Atlas (2006: 39), own reproduction.

**Thin black lines*: daily return trips possible in both directions (2003); *black spots*: main airports in Europe

transportation – the removal of national state monopolies on the telecommunications sector in EU member states during the past years have strongly contributed to a huge increase of international communication. On the one hand, the rise of new internet technologies has brought about an enormous expansion of communication via email. Many people now have their own mail accounts and contact friends and relatives all over the world via email on a regular basis, which was not the case to this mass degree even less than 10 years ago. On the other hand, the market situation in telecommunications has completely changed since the abolition of state monopolies in 1998. Above all, prices for long-distant phone calls, which had been relatively extraordinary and expensive ventures only some 10 years ago, have fallen exorbitantly. In Germany in 1997, for example, right before the fall of the state

monopoly, a long-distance domestic call of ten minutes cost approximately 2.80 Euros. An international call of the same length was sometimes even twice as expensive, depending on the distance and the direction of the call. Ten years later, the same phone call costs only about 4% of the former monopoly price on average – no matter if it is a domestic or an international one, especially for calls within the core area of the European Union.⁹ This has strongly affected the conventional use of telecommunications and, certainly, increased the opportunities to maintain many different kinds of long-distant relationships across borders. Due to the marked reduction of prices, international phone calls are no longer an expensive exception and, consequently, have become a normal element of everyday communication on a mass scale. However, little data are available on the overall increase in international communication in Europe, but it can be expected that it has expanded to a similar extent to the fall in prices.¹⁰ Moreover, the spread of new internet technologies and the respective expansion of efficient broadband connections even enable people to make phone calls free of charge all over the world.

Certainly, the expansion of new communication technologies is not a specific European phenomenon; and the development of new opportunities for communication is by far not restricted to Europe. However, the digital revolution and the specific liberalisation of the European telecommunications markets have brought Europeans closer to each other as well. In terms of the technical infrastructure of electronic communication, Europe is one of the most highly developed areas in the world, offering huge opportunities for regular transnational digital connectivity. According to a recent study on telecommunications in Europe, there are about 226 million fixed phone lines (EU-25) and there has been a huge expansion of mobile phones in EU countries up to more than 400 million subscriptions (Lumio 2006). As regards the spread of the internet, more than 90% of all European companies and about half of the EU population have access to the internet and use it on a regular basis. This study also mentions that Europeans mainly use the internet for email communication and information searches. This at least indicates that the people in Europe embrace the new opportunities of electronic communication and make great use of new communication technologies. Nonetheless, there is a marked North–South gap in Europe concerning the use of the internet. In countries like Iceland and Norway as well as in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, regular use of internet for private purposes is most widespread (more than 75% of the population). In Southern European countries, in turn, and in the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe alike, these levels are significantly lower (30% and less) (Demunter 2005a). A “digital divide” is noticeable, above all, with regard to the age, employment status and educational level of European citizens. Certainly, the internet is still the medium of the younger, well-equipped and better-educated generation. In all EU member states (EU-25) the vast majority of students, more than 85% of people aged 16 or more at schools or universities, and more than 60% of employees regularly used the internet in 2004. This also accounts for 77% of those Europeans (EU-25) who have completed tertiary education. In marked contrast, only 13% of the retired and 25% of those people with lower secondary education at most used the internet at this point. Nevertheless, the new information and communication technologies have become widely available to the masses

⁹This information derives from an analysis of telecommunications (“Sprachtelefonien”) published by the *Bundesnetzagentur* of the Federal State of Germany. (<http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de>, link: Sachgebiete: Telekommunikation, cited 02 Feb 2007).

¹⁰For the United States, the OECD indicates that the number of international calls increased from 200 million in 1980 to 5.9 billion in 2002 (OECD 2005: 73 f.).

both in terms of accessibility and costs in recent years. Especially within Europe, the digital divide is rather likely to shrink in the near future, and international communication and exchange will become increasingly common and widespread (Demunter 2005b).

18.3 Transnational Migration in Europe

For most of its history, Europe has been a migrant-sending continent, if one only thinks about the pathways of colonialism or the big waves of emigration to the “new world” in the past centuries. Moreover, during the process of industrialisation a significant share of the fast-growing European population emigrated to North America, Australia and South America. Between the mid-19th century and 1915 nearly 42 million people left Europe; half of them went to the United States (Fischer 1985). Moreover, during times of war in the first half of the 20th century alone, tens of millions of people from all over Europe became victims of forced migration. It is estimated that about 60 – 80 million people were forced to leave their homes by expulsion, deportation, evacuation, population shifts and transfers or resettlement (cf. Kulischer 1948). These various forms of forced migration and “ethnic cleansing” even continued in some European countries for decades after the Second World War (Schechtman 1946; Therborn 1995; Naimark 2001).

During the second half of the last century, nonetheless, Europe – and especially the industrial core regions of Europe – increasingly became an area of immigration and a major destination for migrants from all over the world (Bade 2003; Currie 2004). This was partly due to post-colonial migration movements of people coming from the former colonies, especially to the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, who were entitled to privileged access and residence permits. A second wave of migration emerged in the aftermath of the post-war economic boom, when countries like Germany or Austria started to recruit workers in the Mediterranean region to shore up their labour force. Though initially intended as a temporary form of migration to fill labour market vacancies, a large part of the labour migrants continued to stay and even initiated ongoing further follow-up migration of family members. Nowadays, in contrast, significant flows of migration to the area of the European Union consist of people emigrating from poorer areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America, increasingly also entering the territory via “unauthorised” channels (OECD 2006). Moreover, in the past two decades a reasonable part of migratory flows to Europe has also been constituted of refugees and asylum seekers, above all civil war refugees from South-Eastern Europe and other major conflict regions in the world. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Europe has also experienced a marked East–West flow of migration due to the fall of the “Iron Curtain”.

Yet, whereas European policy-makers deliberately took action to regulate and limit the inflow of migrants from outside Europe and to establish joint regulations for immigration,¹¹ intra-European mobility has been strongly encouraged in recent years. Since the deinstitutionalisation of borders was regarded as an integral part of the project of European integration, EU citizens were granted freedom of movement and the right to choose their place of residence – though some temporary restrictions for the new accession countries still exist. Whereas in earlier days of European integration, full mobility rights were only allowed for employees, and therefore strictly limited to the field of economic integration,

¹¹For further information, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm, cited 31 March 2007.

they have now been extended to all holders of EU citizenship, and partly also to those non-Europeans who possess a permanent residency permit in one of the EU member states. In addition, the EU has made serious steps forward towards removing all barriers to mobility and migration related to protective labour market regulations or restrictions of access to national welfare benefit schemes.

Against this backdrop one might think that intra-European migration must be a widespread phenomenon. Most surprisingly, however, official statistics show that the extent of intra-European migration is still much lower than the amount of immigration from countries outside the European territory. So far, only approximately 1.5% of all EU citizens permanently settled down in other EU countries; and a large part of this marginal share still originates from the first wave of recruitment of “guest workers” in western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s (Rother 2005). Though the shares of EU citizens residing in other EU countries have grown since 1985 in most EU member states, they still seem to be quite marginal, especially in relation to the ambitious aims of the architects of a common European space. In a country like Germany, for example, which has the highest amount of non-nationals of all European countries (almost 8 million people), intra-EU migrants only account for about one-third of all non-nationals (Recchi et al. 2003). Although there are some substantial differences among the EU member states – and some exceptions such as Luxembourg – the share of EU citizens residing in other EU countries does not exceed 3% of the respective total population (Verwiebe 2006: 160 ff.).

A recent analysis of the 2005 *Eurobarometer* survey on geographical and labour market mobility also reveals that Europeans are relatively immobile indeed compared to the population in the United States, the frequently cited example of high-level internal mobility (Vandenbrande et al. 2006: 7 ff.). According to this analysis, which is based on a representative sample of EU citizens, only a tiny minority of 4% has moved to another EU country, and only approximately 18% of the EU population have even moved outside their region of origin.¹² In fact, people do not usually tend to move to another country or region if they are well situated in their local environment and perceive their current economic situation as acceptable. However, it is not only the pure socio-economic situation which influences migration decisions, but such decisions are also largely dependent on social and cultural factors (see Faist 2006). And, certainly, an important obstacle to large-scale trans-European migration might still be the fact that many Europeans do not speak any foreign language (European Commission 2006).

But this should not lead to the rash conclusion that hardly any internal cross-border migration is taking place within Europe or that it is a negligible phenomenon of a second order in an ever-integrating Europe. On the contrary, the current stage of political integration does allow for various forms of transnational movement that are not yet reflected in official migration statistics. New research on intra-EU migration shows that for many European labour migrants, the old concept of migration as leaving one country for good and living in the host society for a longer period of time does not apply anymore (Mau et al. 2008). Rather, more and more people migrate on a short-term or mid-term basis, go abroad for seasonal employment or commute across national borders on a regular basis. Thus, for the study of intra-European migration and transnational mobility in Europe, the perspective of long-term migration is by far not sufficient and even misleading. Consequently, the

¹²In the United States the gross regional mobility flow amounts up to 3.05%, whereas it varies in EU countries from 2.28% at highest in the UK to 0.13% in Slovakia (Vandenbrande et al. 2006: 15).

current research on migration has already started to explore the various forms and characteristics of migratory flows within Europe and beyond. Increasingly, migration researchers are becoming aware of the prevalence and significance of new, genuinely transnational types of migration (Faist 2000; Levitt et al. 2003; Pries 1999, 2001, 2004; Verwiebe 2004). Above all, they have explored the emergence of new transnational spaces of mobility and interaction between and beyond different places all over Europe: such as the spaces of seasonal workers who temporarily migrate from their original places of residence to other cities and regions in Europe with more favourable income and employment prospects; or the spaces of so-called shuttle migrants who constantly commute between their home regions and places in other countries. Besides that, seasonal workers and shuttle migrants of today often leave their home countries without giving up their close ties and connections to their home regions. Consequently, however, many of the contemporary European trans-migrants neither really live in their home countries, nor in their respective host societies anymore; they rather constantly “live in-between” two countries.

The most comprehensive attempt to investigate the dynamics of intra-EU mobility and migration has been made by the PIONEUR project directed by Ettore Recchi (see PIONEUR 2006). Though outlined as a large-scale international project, it proved difficult to reflect a detailed picture of the motivations, patterns and consequences of intra-European migration, mainly due to a lack of reliable data sources. The intra-EU migrants appeared to be a “hidden population” because they are not registered in any systematic sense by their host countries and because it is difficult to reach them with standard survey questionnaires. A large part of the mobile people does not pass information to the official bodies either in their home or in their host country. The PIONEUR group has been able to generate a sample of 5,000 European citizens resident as foreign nationals in the five EU member states France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain. It was discovered that the classical push and pull factors do not fully explain why people move to another EU member state. As mentioned above, non-economic reasons such as family bonds and romantic relationships or the overall quality of life also play an important role. Asked for their subjective motivation for moving, about 30% of the sample mentioned “family/love”, 25% “work opportunities”, 24% “quality of life”, 7% “study” and 13% other reasons. The study by Verwiebe (2005) also highlights other reasons than job opportunities, such as interest in living in an attractive place.

However, the reasons and patterns of migration still largely differ in terms of the social status of the respective migrants and the socio-economic situation in their country or region of origin – and this has become more relevant particularly in Europe again since the fall of the “Iron Curtain”. While in former times temporal intra-European migration mainly consisted of seasonal migration of people from Southern Europe (Recchi et al. 2003), a large part of trans-migration flows is now made up of people from Eastern Europe, where unemployment is quite pervasive and average wages are still relatively low compared to Western European standards. In the past decade, many people from Eastern Europe have chosen to work in Western European countries on a seasonal basis – as nurses, au pairs, cleaners, farm workers, craftspersons, mechanics, etc. – rather than staying in their home countries (Morokvasic 1994; Hess 2005). This trend has been further reinforced in the new EU member states since their EU accession in May 2004. In Poland, for example, with 38.5 million inhabitants by far the largest EU member state in Central and Eastern Europe, a survey recently revealed that about 3 million people have worked abroad since May 2004. The case of Poland is particularly telling with regard to the thesis of growing interdependence of European societies. Until recently, in fact, most of the Polish emigration went to non-European destinations, especially to the United States and Australia. However, since

the regime change and after EU accession most of the Polish migrants do not go overseas anymore but look for new opportunities in Western EU countries.¹³ According to the survey about 1.1 million Poles were employed or were looking for jobs abroad by the beginning of 2007, most of them in other EU countries; even more have worked abroad for a certain period and returned home in the meantime.¹⁴ The most important destination for Polish job-seekers in 2007 was Great Britain with a share of 26% of the current 1.1 million migrant workers, and another 10% went to Ireland. This is not surprising, since these countries had already removed all employment restrictions for people from the new EU member states in 2004. In this sense, one can say that the characteristics and types of intra-European labour mobility and migration depend to a large degree on existing regulations and restrictions on immigration and employment. Nonetheless, 16% of the current Polish migrant workers also chose to travel to Germany, the Western neighbouring country, although Germany still restricts employment and residence for Poles and people from the other new EU member states. However, migrant workers often simply bypass more restrictive employment regulations in countries by constant trans-migration. Since citizens of the new member states are allowed to travel throughout all EU countries and stay for 3 months without any kind of obligations, many of them travel home when their residence permit expires and come back as soon as possible.¹⁵

Although the present intra-European labour migration is to a certain degree shaped by the socio-economic gap between East and West, short- and mid-term migration has also become quite common and widespread for people in Western Europe. This strongly relates to the structural changes in labour markets and working conditions in Europe over the past few decades. On the one hand, unemployment has been more pervasive all over Europe – even in most prosperous EU member states. On the other hand, Europeans are increasingly experiencing a de-standardisation of working careers and a rise of more dynamic, more flexible, but also more precarious forms of employment, such as temporary or casual employment (Sennett 1998; Smith et al. 1998). The structural changes in working conditions also entail an increase in interregional and international mobility. More and more Europeans are sent abroad to foreign divisions and subsidiaries by their employers for a certain period of time. More and more Europeans have started to look for job opportunities beyond the national scope. Germany, for example, has experienced an increase in labour migration with destinations such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria or Norway, all countries with a demand for skilled labour. No wonder that the highly skilled groups constitute the majority of migrants leaving Germany.¹⁶ However, besides highly skilled labour, people with vocational training and certified skills are also starting to look for new employment opportunities abroad. For the European system of migration, the role of institutional support structures must be emphasised. The European Employment Service (EURES),

¹³The first “big push” of Polish people towards the United States at the end of 19th century is impressively portrayed in the classic study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* of Thomas and Znaniecki (1984 [1918]). The current decrease of Polish immigrants has even become an issue of public debate in the United States (c.f. Joe Carroll, “In expanded EU, Poles no longer flock to the US for a better life”, *International Herald Tribune*, 8 March 2007).

¹⁴The study was published in March 2007 by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) in Warsaw (www.cbos.pl, cited 13 March 2007).

¹⁵These patterns are changing substantially again since the end of 2007, when Poland officially became part of the Schengen area.

¹⁶See <http://idw-online.de/pages/de/news174095>, cited 29 Sep 2006.

for example, is a cooperation network between the European Commission and the public employment agencies in the member states, which supports labour market mobility within the European Union by means of providing information and help for job seekers. Potential migrants receive information about job opportunities, employment regulations and terms and conditions of working in other European countries. Especially for skilled workers, the new internationally oriented employment services, both private and public, are one important door-opener into other labour markets (Mau et al. 2007).

Looking more broadly at the multi-faceted movements of people in Europe, we can observe as a general pattern that all migratory flows, both within and to the area of the European Union, are age-specific and regionally targeted (see Espon 2006b: 10 ff.). Undeniably, younger people constitute the most mobile group of migrants in Europe. The younger generation of today mostly prefers to live in more dynamic urban areas rather than in sparsely populated rural areas. A marked growth of the population can be observed in many local and regional centres and in the major European metropolitan areas in particular. Above all, metropolises such as London and Paris, but also Brussels, the dynamic urban centres in Ireland and Great Britain as well as most prosperous areas of Sweden, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Germany and also Switzerland are Europe's most preferred destinations. Hence, these urban areas are the most multi-cultural places in Europe today, often hosting a huge number of different European as well as non-European ethnicities. Correspondingly, however, the population in economically less favourable, mostly rural and geographically remote regions, but also in declining old industrial areas, tends to decrease, in fact, and to become older as well as more "homogenous" on average. Another aspect of intra-European migration that is increasingly relevant is the movement on the other side of the age scale: the emigration older middle- and upper-class people to areas with pleasant surroundings and a certain level of regional attractiveness (Williams et al. 1997; King et al. 1998). In fact, it is becoming increasingly popular for older Europeans to move to attractive tourist regions in France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, but also to the Southwest of England and Scotland, after retirement.¹⁷ The central criterion for this emigration to tourist regions after retirement is the quality of living conditions, rather than the particular level of incomes or prices for goods and services. Often, experiences and impressions made during many holidays abroad in the decades before stimulate the decision to change life after retirement and finally move abroad.

Hence, summing up, we can observe that Europeans are much more frequently on the move today than they used to be a few years ago in times of closed borders and national containment. Fewer people regard the internal European borders and cultural differences as a major hindrance for migration. The risks of failure in the "foreign world" are more and more calculable and bearable. It is becoming ever easier today to maintain close relationships with old friends and family members over longer distances and to come back home. But again, one has to acknowledge that the level of mobility of Europeans is still quite moderate, and this is not expected to change dramatically in the near future (cf. Vandenbrande et al. 2006: 31 ff.). Nonetheless, especially taking the territorial dimension of migration into account, it has definitely changed the structure of the population in many localities, and it will do even more so in the upcoming decades.

¹⁷It is estimated, for example, that there are more than 500,000 Germans in Spain who have moved there just for the reason of living, rather than for work (Die Zeit, 6 July 2006, 23).

18.4 Tourism in Europe

Besides permanent and temporary migration, another significant indication of increasing trans-border mobility of Europeans is the rise of international tourism in Europe over the past decades. Ever more people are leaving their home for holidays and look for recreation outside their familiar domestic environment (Opaschowski 2006). In fact, travelling abroad has become an important, if not the most important leisure activity of Europeans. In terms of accessibility and costs of holiday, destinations inside or outside one's own country no longer differ greatly. Moreover, the new tourism movement with its mass character and its well-developed infrastructure even makes it possible that destinations abroad are often less costly and even more convenient to reach than places in geographical proximity. Correspondingly, the percentage of people going abroad for holidays has increased substantially in most of the OECD countries.

According to the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), international tourism – measured in terms of international arrivals – has risen world wide by a multiple of 30 since the middle of the past century: from about 25 million international arrivals in 1950 up to more than 800 million in 2005.¹⁸ Despite the growing threat of terrorism, the shock of devastating environmental catastrophes in the Asian Pacific or the United States as well as the marked increase of prices for petrol over the past few years, the growth of tourism is unbroken. The number of international arrivals is expected to exceed 1 billion by 2010. Hence, in many countries tourism has developed into a flourishing industry and even become the most important source of income for large parts of the population. This accounts not least for Europeans, since Europe is the most important tourist region world wide both in terms of international arrivals (about 500 million) as well as revenues from tourism (UNWTO 2006). Seven European countries can be found on the list of top-10 tourist destinations world wide. Six of these are current EU member states (Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany and Austria, in the order of their position); the seventh one is Turkey, a candidate for EU membership over the medium term (*ibid.*). But Europe is not only the top destination of world tourism, it is also the top generator of international tourist flows – and a huge part of this border-crossing travel by Europeans takes place within Europe itself. Consequently, most Europeans have had experiences of other countries and with other European nationals via tourism.

Thus, tourist activities have become the most common way of getting in contact with other cultures and lifestyles and might therefore be considered one of the central components of Europeanisation “from below”. However, authors have been sceptical as to what extent tourism might be conceived as triggering new social bonds. Meethan (2001: 142), for example, argues, “As tourists cross borders in the literal sense, they also cross cultural barriers. (. . .) Such cross-border and transnational movements are by their nature temporary, and contacts between hosts and guests are transitory. Tourists as transient visitors may remain outsiders, as anonymous to their hosts, as the hosts are anonymous to their guests. Each party will view the other as a generalised type, as the opportunities to develop any form of social interaction above and beyond the superficial level are generally limited, may not even be desired or encouraged.” The anthropologist Ulf Hannerz, well-known for his studies on globalisation and new forms of transnational relations in everyday life, stated

¹⁸It has to be pointed out that business trips are also part of this UNWTO calculation of international arrivals, accounting for 16% of all international arrivals in 2005. However, half of all international arrivals consist of holiday and leisure trips, and another 26% are for “other purposes”, such as visiting friends and/or relatives, religious motivation or health reasons (UNWTO 2006).

even more bluntly: “Tourists are not participants; tourism is largely a spectator sport.” (Hannerz 1990: 242).

In our view, nonetheless, there are good reasons to assume that there are spill-over effects from tourism to other forms of transnational contacts. Tourist experiences are very often a first opportunity to “get to know each other” and may diminish the distance between the nations, for example if they engender new relationships or migratory movements. In fact, a recent *Eurobarometer* study on the use of languages in Europe reveals that holiday-making abroad is the most important reason for Europeans to learn and use foreign languages, far more important than the regular use of foreign languages at work or at home (European Commission 2006: 18 ff.). Though not all tourist visits will have strong repercussions on people’s everyday lives, such visits may act as door-openers to other cultures and may extend people’s cognitive and behavioural horizons. Therefore, tourism should be seen as a very significant part overcoming physical and cultural barriers between nations, getting in touch with foreign people and foreign life-worlds, enhancing trust among people of foreign nations and, eventually, even feeling more, European, (see also Mau 2007).

A recent Eurostat study on tourism shows that in 2004 about 197 million EU citizens (EU-25) made about 400 million longer holiday trips of four or more overnight stays both within and outside their home countries¹⁹ – that accounts for approximately 40% of the total EU-25 population (see Bovagnet 2006a). Thus, those Europeans who went on holidays made two longer trips per year on average. But this also means that a considerable amount of EU citizens still did not undertake any longer holiday trip of four nights and more at all. Unsurprisingly yet most significantly, the study reveals that there is a huge divergence between old and new member states in terms of participation in international tourism. Thus, the vast majority of tourist activities in Europe still take place within and between a limited number of Western and Southern European countries.

Certainly, the decision upon holiday-making and travelling away for holidays strongly depends on the respective financial situation of individuals and households. But besides budgetary constraints, other factors such as age, education and occupational status also play an important role with regard to decisions on holiday-making (European Commission 1998: 1). As far as the preferred destinations of travels are concerned, the most important criteria for Europeans are scenery and climate, whereas financial factors such as the cost of travel or cost of accommodation only come second (*ibid.*: 9). The most active group of travellers in Europe are people between the ages of 25 and 39, especially students and those with higher education, followed by the “40–59” group. These age groups can be regarded as the driving forces of international tourism, in fact. However, this has been changing noticeably over the past few years. While in former times the older generations used to be most reluctant to travel and often did not leave home for holidays at all, the elderly Europeans of today are much keener on holiday-making and travelling abroad than their predecessors. Thus, given the current demographic trend and the favourable financial situation of many pensioners in most of the Western European countries, the current imbalance between generations in terms of tourist activity will definitely disperse in the near future.

However, looking more closely at the major destinations of tourist travel in Europe, the aforementioned Eurostat study also reveals that many EU citizens who go on vacation still prefer to stay in their home countries for their major holidays. In 2004 about 57% of all longer holiday trips of four or more nights were not border-crossing in nature at all. On

¹⁹Short holiday trips of less than 4 nights were not taken into consideration in these calculations. A total of 85.3% of all considered trips lasted 4 to 14 nights, whereas the vast majority of these trips are shorter trips of a maximum of 1 week (4–7 nights). The length of the holiday trips diverged considerably between different European countries (see Bovagnet 2006a).

the other hand, more than two thirds of all longer outbound trips of Europeans went to other EU-25 countries (see Table 18.1). Especially people from smaller EU countries such as Slovenia and Luxembourg, but also the populations of Belgium, Ireland, Denmark and Germany, travel abroad more frequently than people from other EU countries. Nonetheless, quite a few countries can be identified, in turn, in which the preference to stay at home is widespread. With the exception of Poland (82% of all longer holiday trips), almost all these countries are located in Southern Europe, namely Greece (90%), Spain (88%) and France (83%). Many people live from tourism, there, and if they go on vacation themselves, they tend to stay in their own country and visit their friends and relatives in the countryside.

The most popular European tourist destinations for Europeans (EU-25) measured by overnight stays of non-residents are Spain, Italy and France. The other European top tourist destinations – but not as popular as the leading three – are Austria, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Ireland. These 10 countries account for almost 90% of international tourism in the area of the European Union (European Communities 2006: 3 ff.). In general, however, major tourist flows in the European

Table 18.1 Holiday trips of 4 nights or more in Europe by destination, 2004

Country	Holiday trips by destination			
	Domestic total	Outbound		
		Total	of which in EU-25	of which outside the EU-25
EU-25¹	56.9	43.1	65.9	34.1
EU-15	55.7	44.3	66.6	33.4
BE	21.2	78.8	77.1	22.9
CZ	57.9	42.1	55.6	44.4
DK	30.9	69.1	72.3	27.7
DE	36.0	64.0	67.8	32.2
EE	50.7	49.3	:	:
EL	90.2	9.8	46.9	53.1
ES	88.1	11.9	59.1	40.9
FR	82.9	17.1	47.6	52.4
IE	27.4	72.6	78.0	22.0
IT	75.1	24.9	54.1	45.9
CY	:	:	68.7	31.3
LV	41.8	51.5	41.0	59.0
LT	38.9	61.1	43.2	56.8
LU	0.7	99.3	82.1	17.9
HU	72.8	27.2	:	:
MT	:	:	:	:
NL	37.7	62.3	76.0	24.0
AT	35.3	64.7	59.2	40.8
PL ²	81.8	18.2	71.9	28.1
PT	77.4	22.6	67.1	32.9
SI	27.0	73.0	14.1	85.9
SK	56.6	43.4	53.8	46.2
FI	69.5	30.5	58.9	41.1
SE	52.5	47.5	65.6	34.4
UK	41.4	58.6	72.1	27.9

Source: Bovagnet (2006a: 2), own reproduction.

¹ EU-25 excluding CY (only for domestic and total outbound) and MT; EE and HU only for geographical breakdown.

² Estimated by Eurostat.

Union display a strong preference for Southern Europe. Spain is by far the most popular tourist destination in many European countries, namely in all Northern and most of the Central European countries.²⁰ People from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg tend to prefer France over other foreign destinations, whereas people from the Baltic States and Poland most frequently travel to Germany (see Fig. 18.2). However, one has to



Fig. 18.2 Most important targets of outbound tourism in Europe (EU-25) by country*

Source: Bovagnet (2006b, 5); own reproduction.

*The *arrows* mark the most important targets of intra-EU outbound tourism for each of the EU member state (EU25).

²⁰Since 1995 Spain has experienced the highest increase of all EU member states in terms of tourism. While classical top destinations of Europeans, such as France, Austria or Italy, have had difficulties over the same period, it gained most from international tourism within the EU-15 area, together with Greece (European Communities 2006: 38).

acknowledge that the trans-European tourist flows are far more complex and not as one-dimensional as they are shown on the map. This map only displays a general tendency; it indicates the main flows of outbound tourism by country in relation to other outbound destinations in 2004. The data capture only longer trips of four nights or more and thus the great significance of shorter trips of less than four overnight stays for European tourism is not taken into account at all.

A broader look at the statistics on travelling and holiday-making in Europe - that does not only take longer trips of four and more overnight stays into consideration - reveals that more than half of all holiday travels in Europe are short-term (less than three nights). Most strikingly, the increase in these trips has been much higher than that of longer trips of four nights and more, particularly since 2000 (see European Communities 2006: 23 ff.). The highest proportion of preferences for short-term trips can be observed for Finnish, Swedish and Spanish tourists (70% and more). In Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Luxembourg, the growth of shorter trips was higher than that of longer ones. Especially in Denmark as well as in Greece and Germany, the number of longer trips decreased between 2000 and 2004, whereas the amount of trips of 1–3 nights increased tremendously (more than 14%). It has to be pointed out that most of this short-term travel consisted of leisure activities, and only a small amount of these short trips were in fact business trips.

Against this backdrop, one can say without exaggeration that holiday travels to other European countries and shorter cross-border trips have become normal and regular for a growing amount of Europeans. This is definitely strongly relating to the aforementioned structural changes that have taken place in Europe over the past decade. Most of all, the expansion of low-cost airlines in Europe over the past years has strongly affected the travel habits and routines of many Europeans. It accelerated the growth of smaller and shorter intra-European trips. These new airlines do not only provide new travel opportunities for regular travellers, they also attract new groups of travellers, including those with limited budgets. The huge expansion of these airlines makes it easier for travellers to reach places all over Europe faster, more often, and more spontaneously than in former times, and consequently further boosts the expansion of tourist travels particularly in Europe. This certainly has repercussions on respective tourist localities: foreign people, foreign lifestyles and foreign languages are becoming a normal part of everyday life (cf. Urry and Sheller 2004).

18.5 Student Mobility, Student Networks and Youth Exchanges

The cross-border mobility of students is a rather special, but very important part of bottom-up transnationalisation in Europe. Indeed, it has been – and still is – one of the driving forces of the development of transnational bonds and networks. Leaving the familiar local environment and studying or working abroad for several months, or even years, usually entails a much more intense experience than shorter holiday or business trips could ever do. It often is the most important “cut” in the life-course of young people as regards international experiences – and sometimes even the starting point of an international career. At least it constitutes at least constitutes an important step in the usual course of education for acquiring “intercultural competences”, such as learning foreign languages, adapting to other cultural contexts, socialising with foreign people, problem-solving under unknown conditions. However, it is not only the mobility and exchange of students, but of young people in general, that has been a driving force of transnationalisation in post-war Europe.

Certainly, the younger generation constitutes a special group in terms of transnational mobility and exchange among Europeans, and, thus, deserves special attention in our discussion. However, since cross-border exchanges often take place before the entrance to universities and are by far not limited to the world of university students, we will not only describe some basic features of trans-European student mobility in the following, but also point to the dimension of youth exchanges and international youth mobility in an ever-integrating Europe.

Indeed, large-scale student mobility across Europe is nothing new. Hundreds of years ago, students travelled from university to university all around Europe in order to acquire the most up-to-date knowledge of that time. In this sense, the universities have always been nodes of transnational exchange and globalisation (Stichweh 2000).²¹ However, with the rise of modern nation states and the respective national restructuring of educational systems during the 19th and the 20th centuries European universities became less internationally oriented. This has been changing radically over the past two decades again. Studying abroad has increasingly become usual for students, the experience of a multicultural environment an integral part of standard educational careers. International student mobility has risen enormously over the past 25 years. According to UNESCO data on the sector of higher education, 2.5 million people worldwide studied in a foreign country in the year 2004. Europe is in fact the most frequent destination of foreign students. Europe's top three host countries for foreign students are the United Kingdom, Germany and France; they account for about 30% of all international students together. The largest receiving country, however, is the United States with its share of 22% of foreign students worldwide (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2006). Most strikingly, international student mobility does mainly take place within the OECD world. Yet it must as well be highlighted that a large number of foreign students in OECD countries also originate from countries outside the OECD area (OECD 2001, 2004: 11 f.).

A comparison of world regions, based on the UNESCO data on world wide student mobility in 2004, shows that the traditional so-called Western countries (North America and Western Europe) host the vast majority of 70% of all international students (see Table 18.2). These countries – and especially the leading four just mentioned: the United States, the UK, Germany and France – are the most important destinations for students from all areas in the world. In almost all world regions the shares of students who study abroad in North America or Western European countries are much higher than those of all other destinations.²² However, the share of international students originating from Western countries is not the highest of all outgoing students in the world. Table 18.2 also shows that the number of internationally mobile students in 2004 was much higher in East Asia and the Pacific (700,999 outgoing students) than in the Western countries (486,601). This is mainly due to the huge amount of Chinese students, which are by far the largest group of outgoing students worldwide with an amount of 343,126 internationally mobile students,

²¹ Stichweh (2000) highlights the importance of research networks and exchange of scientists across and between continents for global integration. In fact, universities and research centres can be seen as one of the most important nuclei of the recent wave of globalization, not least if one only considers the revolutionary effect of internet and digital communication technologies, which were invented and first applied at university level before they started to cover the globe on a mass scale.

²² The only exception is Central Asia where the majority of students go to Central and Eastern Europe or to other countries in Central Asia.

Table 18.2 International student mobility by world regions (2004)*

			Origin of outgoing students by region								
			East Asia and the Pacific	North America/Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	South and West Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Arab States	Latin America and the Caribbean	Central Asia	Unspecified
Total	2,455,250		700,999	486,601	298,093	194,231	193,871	177,372	145,639	72,570	185,874
Destination of ingoing students by region	North America/Western Europe	1,704,735	413,476	441,968	224,232	151,660	135,901	140,747	117,652	13,336	65,763
	East Asia and the Pacific	379,919	280,372	24,030	3,443	32,459	7,575	5,468	3,410	1,561	21,601
	Central and Eastern Europe	168,015	1,993	14,283	62,394	2,533	1,158	5,434	337	35,090	44,793
	Arab States	61,983	1,685	1,737	716	1,475	4,689	23,277	129	256	28,019
	Sub-Saharan Africa	59,801	99	54	50	16	40,946	55	7	-	18,574
	Latin America and the Caribbean	36,536	592	3,976	79	64	1,805	145	24,071	40	5,764
	Central Asia	33,958	1,095	86	7,051	2,769	3	757	3	22,089	105
	South and West Asia	10,303	1,687	467	128	3,255	1,794	1,489	30	198	1,255

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2006).

*This table shows the absolute numbers of internationally mobile students of about 180 states or territories worldwide aggregated in terms of 8 major world regions. These absolute regional amounts are not comparable with one another, in fact, since the regional aggregates are not equal in terms of size and they are not weighted according to the amount of population. Nonetheless, the table indicates the overall flows of worldwide student mobility and the regional concentration of international students. The world regions are defined by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, and they contain the following numbers of countries, respectively: *Arab States*: 20 countries or territories; *Central and Eastern Europe*: 20 countries or territories; *Central Asia*: 9 countries or territories; *East Asia and the Pacific*: 34 countries or territories; *Latin America and the Caribbean*: 41 countries or territories; *North America/Western Europe*: 29 countries or territories; *South and West Asia*: 9 countries or territories; *Sub-Saharan Africa*: 45 countries or territories. For more information on the construction of world regions, see cf. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2006: 188ff.).

mainly going to the United States, Japan or the UK (UNESCO 2006: 132 ff.).²³ In North America and Western Europe only 10% of all outgoing students go to countries outside the Western world. Therefore, the amount of students going abroad is much lower than that of incoming students. It is almost four times lower, in fact, and in the two Anglo-Saxon top

²³The country with the second largest amount of outgoing students in the world is India with 123,559 mobile students in 2004 by the majority going to the United States as well as Australia and the UK, and third is the Republic of Korea with a share of 95,885 mainly travelling to the United States and Japan (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2006: 132ff.).

destinations for international students, the United States and the UK, the outgoing–ingoing ratio is even much lower.

Looking at student mobility within Europe in more detail the data display that there are specific patterns of student mobility for each of the European countries. It turns out that student mobility is highly dependent on respective historical pathways as well as factors like geographic or social proximity of different nations. Table 18.3 indicates flows of international student mobility in selected EU countries according to areas of origin and main destinations: at the top of the table the five most attractive EU destinations for international students and below them a few other selected EU countries.²⁴ We can see that the UK, Germany and France indeed accommodate the lion's share of all international students in Europe.²⁵ Yet it turns out that the places of origin of incoming students differ remarkably among these top three destinations, each of the countries has its own major linkages. While the majority of students in the UK derive from North America or Western Europe as well as East Asia and the Pacific, the largest group of incoming students in Germany are from Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, Germany is one of the most important destinations for students from CEE countries. In France, in turn, students from Western Europe and Northern America account only for 16% of all foreign students, whereas half of all incoming students originate from Arab States and Sub-Sub-Saharan Africa – this is definitely an effect of the colonial history of the country. It is striking that the difference between incoming and outgoing students is relatively high in all of the three countries. In the UK, the students are even more immobile internationally as compared to France or Germany, and if British students go abroad, they tend to prefer other English speaking countries, above all. The same is true for Ireland, where the vast majority (90%) of outgoing students go to the UK or the United States.

Table 18.3 also shows that the incoming–outgoing ratio for the Southern European countries of Italy and Portugal is quite even; only Greece's ratio is much higher. In 2004 half of the internationally mobile Greek students went to UK, another 15% to Germany. Outgoing students from West-central European countries, such as Belgium, mostly tend to go to surrounding countries, most of them to France and the UK, but also reasonable shares go to the Netherlands and Germany. Yet international mobility of students is quite low in Belgium, compared to other countries of equal size and in relation to incoming students; the same is true for Sweden. Last but not least, it is worthwhile highlighting some general characteristics of student mobility in the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. First, outgoing mobility is much higher than the number of incoming students; the incoming–outgoing ratio for Poland is 1:4 and for Latvia and Romania it is about 1:2. Second, outgoing students from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe are mainly aiming for countries in Western Europe and the United States. And third, the majority of foreign students in Central and Eastern Europe come from other countries of that area, most from more Eastern non-EU countries such as Ukraine or Moldova. Thus, there is clear trend of successive movement of students from Eastern parts of Europe towards

²⁴For reasons of clarity we selected only one or two typical proponents of the different geographical areas of Europe besides the top five countries in terms of incoming students. Data also derived from UNESCO (2006).

²⁵These three countries are perceived as having the best established and most prestigious study programmes of all European countries as a recent study on the perception of European Higher Education in “third countries” reveals. In fact, this is also often due to a lack of information about other countries (see <http://www.iienetwork.org/?p=Perceptions>, cited 07 Dec 2007).

Table 18.3 International student mobility in selected EU member states (2004)*

Country	Number of incoming students	Top three shares of incoming students by regions of origin			Number of outgoing students	Top five destinations of outgoing students	Incoming – Outgoing Ratio
Top five EU destinations:							
United Kingdom	300,056	North America Western Europe	East Asia and the Pacific	South and West Asia	23,542	1. United States (36%) 2. France (11%) 3. Germany (9%) 4. Ireland (9%) 5. Australia (7%)	13:1
Germany	260,314	Central and Eastern Europe	North America Western Europe	East Asia and the Pacific	56,410	1. United Kingdom (21%) 2. United States (16%) 3. France (12%) 4. Switzerland (10%) 5. Austria (10%)	5:1
France	237,587	Arab States	Sub-Saharan Africa	North America Western Europe	53,350	1. Belgium (23%) 2. United Kingdom (21%) 3. United States (13%) 4. Germany (13%) 5. unknown (12%)	5:1
Italy	40,641	Central and Eastern Europe	North America Western Europe	Latin American and Caribbean	38,544	1. Germany (21%) 2. Austria (16%) 3. United Kingdom (14%) 4. France (12%)	1:1
Belgium	37,103	North America Western Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Arab States	10,729	1. France (26%) 2. United Kingdom (23%) 3. The Netherlands (19%) 4. Germany (10%) 5. United States (8%)	4:1
Selected cases (according to geographical location):							
Sweden	32,469	North America Western Europe	<i>Unspecified</i>	Central and Eastern Europe	13,392	1. United Kingdom (25%) 2. United States (23%) 3. Norway (8%) 4. Australia (8%) 5. Germany (6%)	2:1
Portugal	15,483	Sub-Saharan Africa	North America Western Europe	Latin American and Caribbean	11,213	1. France (24%) 2. United Kingdom (24%) 3. Germany (17%) 4. Spain (12%) 5. United States (8%)	1:1
Greece	12,456	North America Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	Arab States	49,631	1. United Kingdom (46%) 2. Germany (15%) 3. Italy (14%) 4. France (5%) 5. United States (4%)	1:4
Ireland	10,201	North America Western Europe	East Asia and the Pacific	South and West Asia	17,570	1. United Kingdom (84%) 2. United States (6%) 3. France (3%) 4. Germany (3%) 5. Australia (1%)	1:2
Romania	9,730	Central and Eastern Europe	North America Western Europe	Arab States	20,680	1. France (22%) 2. Germany (20%) 3. United States (16%) 4. Hungary (15%) 5. Italy (6%)	1:2
Poland	7,608	Central and Eastern Europe	North America Western Europe	Central Asia	28,786	1. Germany (54%) 2. France (11%) 3. United States (10%) 4. Austria (4%) 5. Italy (5%)	1:4
Latvia	2,390	North America Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	South and West Asia	3,730	1. Russia (27%) 2. Germany (25%) 3. United States (11%) 4. Estonia (8%) 5. United Kingdom (5%)	1:2

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2006), own calculations.

* This table shows the amounts of incoming and outgoing students in selected EU member states as well their main regions of origin and main destinations, respectively (in percentage of respective amounts). Definition of world regions according to UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2006: 188 ff.)

more Western parts, from new EU member states to the older ones in Western Europe and from non-EU member states to the new Eastern countries of the European Union.

Especially within the European Union, there is a high degree of trans-European student mobility on the basis of growing transnational institutional cooperation and international exchange programmes. In fact, the internationalisation of study programmes has grown tremendously during recent decades. In this context, international and supranational organisations such as the OECD or the European Union have been very active in promoting the international mobility of students. Many study programmes have now been “Europeanised”, or at least adapted to the so-called Bologna standards.²⁶ Moreover, many major obstacles to international student mobility, such as residence permits over a longer period of time and the recognition of foreign studies or qualifications, have been significantly reduced in the past two decades. All this contributes to a dense integration of the European universities and the proliferation of student mobility.

The most successful European measure for promoting temporary trans-European student mobility and cooperation between European institutions of higher education during the past years is the so-called ERASMUS exchange programme first launched in 1987.²⁷ Since then, this programme has rapidly become the most visible European educational programme and a major driving force of trans-European student mobility. Today, the ERASMUS programme is the most established and standardised framework for intra-European students’ exchanges. It mainly supports study stays abroad of a half or at most one academic year, and, in principle, it is based on reciprocity and symmetrical exchange between participating institutions. Due to this, it can be ensured that participants of the ERASMUS programme get free admission to host universities and that acquired grades and exams are mutually accepted at participating universities. In addition, ERASMUS students are also provided with some financial support and usually get preferential treatment at their host universities.

Since its introduction, more than 1.4 million students have studied abroad within the framework of the ERASMUS programme. It started with 3,000 participating students in 1987/1988 and grew to an annual number of 144,000 in 2004/2005.²⁸ Today, the exchange includes about 2,200 higher education institutions in 31 countries – namely the EU-27 countries Turkey, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. In the 2004/2005 academic year, the country with the highest number of outgoing ERASMUS students was Germany with

²⁶The current process of “Europeanisation” of educational programmes was stimulated by the Bologna Declaration of the European ministers of education in June 1999. The ministers agreed to increase the compatibility and comparability of higher education in Europe in order to foster the mobility, competitiveness and employability of European students (Bektchieva 2004). For further information, see http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/educ/bologna/bologna_en.html, cited 10 Feb 2007.

²⁷This name, which intentionally recalls the Dutch theologian and outstanding “European cosmopolitan” Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466–1536), serves as an acronym for *European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students*. Due to the success of the ERASMUS programme, EU support was enlarged in 1995 by the so-called SOCRATES programme, in order to further enhance the quality and further reinforce the development of the European dimension in higher education including teaching staff mobility, curricular innovation and special support for non-mobile students in addition to ERASMUS exchange. Since then, ERASMUS has been a sub-programme of SOCRATES. For further information, see <http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/erasmus>, cited 10 Feb 2007.

²⁸Download <http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/erasmus/statisti/table8.pdf>, cited 02 Feb 2007.

about 22,500 participants, followed by France with 21,561 and Spain with 20,819 participants. These three countries, in turn, were the most important destinations for ERASMUS students, respectively. According to a recent study on the professional value of ERASMUS mobility, many former ERASMUS students believe that their study stay abroad was “helpful in obtaining their first job” and that such a stay is gaining importance when employers select amongst applicants. Moreover, former ERASMUS students take over international tasks in their jobs twice as often as formerly non-mobile students (cf. Bracht et al. 2006). However, the importance and frequency of ERASMUS exchanges also strongly vary according to fields of study. Students of economics, social sciences, arts and law usually tend to go abroad more frequently than, for example, medical students or students of mechanical engineering (ibid.).

It must be pointed out, however, that the ERASMUS programme is indeed not the only possibility for European students to study abroad. More and more students decide to go abroad on their own account and enrol for their whole studies at foreign universities or for entirely transnational study programmes, which have flourished at universities in Europe during the past few years.²⁹ Nonetheless, the ERASMUS programme and its succeeding programmes within the broader SOCRATES framework are still the most frequented and the most advanced, and they also provide some opportunities for those who usually would not or could not go abroad to stay in another country for a longer period. Indeed, the ERASMUS programme has fostered a high level of intra-European student mobility. A comparison of the development of outgoing student mobility within the ERASMUS framework since 1990 in France, Germany and the UK and the respective annual number of outgoing students who went to the United States during the same period of time reveals that intra-European mobility has been growing enormously in the past two decades, whereas transatlantic mobility has remained stable (see Fig. 18.3 below). The cases of France and Germany are particularly indicative in this regard. A remarkable exception, however, is the United Kingdom, where outgoing ERASMUS mobility rose until 1995/1996, but has decreased since then. Indeed, there is no straightforward explanation for that at hand. Yet as mentioned above already, the British system of higher education is the most attractive one all over Europe and the imbalance of incoming and outgoing students is one of the highest worldwide. There is a huge inflow of students from other countries, but at the same time British students have the tendency to stay at universities within their country for the whole course of studies. Moreover, the British system of higher education is the most commercialised one in Europe. Presumably, British universities are much more reluctant to support ERASMUS exchange, since this programme which is based on the principle of gratuitous and mutual exchange among European universities undermines their aim of attracting as many foreign students as possible for profit from all over the world.

Apart from the growing number of studies abroad, international student exchanges and transnational study programmes, another indication of transnational integration of students' lives in Europe is the emergence of international and genuinely “transnational” student networks and associations. In fact, European students are increasingly acting

²⁹Just to mention but a few examples, the French-German University, where enrolled students may acquire degrees or diplomas of both countries during their exchange (cf. www.dfh-ufa.org, cited 31 March 2007) the consortium of universities offering a *European Master of Business Sciences* (EMBS) to foster intra-European exchange (cf. www.swan.ac.uk/EMBS, cited 31 March 2007) or private universities like the ESCP-EAP, which offers a number of transnational study programmes at campuses in five major European cities (cf. www.escp-eap.net, cited 31 March 2007).




Fig. 18.3 Outgoing students in Germany, France and UK: ERASMUS versus US stay*

Source: European Commission¹; Institute of International Education (USA).²

*This figure displays a time series of annual amounts of students going abroad within the framework of the ERASMUS programme on the one hand, and to the United States on the other, in France (F), Germany (D) and the United Kingdom (UK), the three most important countries of Europe as regards international student mobility. *Thin black lines*: students going abroad to the United States from France, Germany and the UK since 1993/1994; *thick black lines*: students going abroad on the basis of ERASMUS exchange from France, Germany and the UK since 1990/1991.

¹<http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/erasmus/statisti/table8.pdf>, cited 02 Feb 2007.

²<http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/page/113181/>, cited 24 Nov 2007.

and working together by means of self-organised international student exchanges, summer schools and work experience. These new types of transnational joint ventures and institutions are often not implemented by a top-down political process, they have mostly evolved from the bottom-up. An outstanding example in this regard is AEGEE, one of the largest interdisciplinary student associations in Europe, consisting of more than 15,000 students in more than 40 countries all over Europe.³⁰ AEGEE was founded in 1985 at an international students' conference with the aim of promoting intercultural exchange in Europe. It is an independent, supranational non-profit organisation, without organisational structures on national levels, but only at universities and at the European level. It offers a wide range of activities, such as transnational summer universities, training, projects and action days, aiming at promoting the idea of a unified Europe without Europe, the creation of an open, tolerant and humane society, and cross-border cooperation between Europeans.

³⁰AEGEE stands for the acronym *Association des Etats Généraux des Etudiants de l'Europe*. For further information, see <http://www.aegEE.org>, cited 10 Feb 2007.

As mentioned above, the many different forms of international youth exchanges in Europe are also significant in terms of triggering transnational contacts. Their origins date back to the spread of various anti-authoritarian hikers' movements (esp. the *Wandervogel* movement) before and after the First World War. Since the middle of the 20th century, however, these exchanges became an important tool of political reconciliation between formerly divided European nations. From that time onwards, they were therefore strongly promoted by national governments. One typical example of this kind was the foundation of the bilateral youth exchange programme between France and Germany in 1963.³¹ The founding principle of this exchange programme was to deepen the relations of young people and youth workers in both countries. The programme supports youth and student exchanges, language courses, international work experience, and various other forms of intercultural learning. Since its foundation in 1963, more than 7 million young people from France and Germany have taken part in its activities—that means an average of 200,000 participants and about 7,000 activities per year. To the present day, participation in the activities of this programme is unbroken, but the original bilateral scope of the programme has been enlarged towards the promotion of European values in general and the integration of young people from other countries, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe. Apart from national institutions, the most important promoter of common European values and intra-European exchange during the post-war period, especially with regard to youth issues, was the Council of Europe. It was the first genuinely 'European' intergovernmental organisation focusing on cultural approximation among European ethnicities. In the past decades the Council of Europe was very active, particularly in promoting the idea and practice of intercultural youth education as well as the development of interest articulation for young people on the European level.³²

Many Europeans who belong to the older generation gained their first experiences with other European cultures and their first contacts with European counterparts via youth exchanges and international youth camps in the post-war period. This strongly contributed to broadening the scope of many young Europeans beyond their particular local environment and enlarged their horizons across the borders of nation states. Besides these classical politically initiated exchange programmes, a huge variety of other possibilities exists for young Europeans to make friends all over Europe, explore foreign cultures and countries, and learn foreign languages.³³ Nowadays it is almost exceptional if a student does not take part in any activity of intercultural learning, such as youth exchanges, study trips or internships, during his or her educational career. Many schools have their own international partners and offer exchanges on a regular basis. Young people can apply for a multitude of institutionally embedded language courses, internships, voluntary work programmes, etc. Local youth organisations, sports clubs and scouts groups often organise international events or take part in huge international summer camps all over Europe. Considering these various forms of activities altogether, they account for a huge amount of transnational experiences, contacts and exchanges among today's young Europeans.

³¹For further information, see <http://www.dfjw.org>.

³²For further information, see <http://www.coe.int/youth>.

³³For further information, see <http://europa.eu/youth/>.

18.6 Town Twinning and Cross-border Cooperation

Another significant indication of how extensively trans-European networking has seized local life-worlds all over Europe is the wide spread of international twinning arrangements between European cities, towns, smaller provinces and local authorities. ‘Town twinning’ is a concept based on the idea that two or more towns institutionalise long-term relationships, with the goal of fostering personal contacts and constant staff exchange in many different societal realms, be it on the level of public administration and economic associations or in various cultural and social ways. This clearly exceeds the level of individual experiences and random transnational contacts, but entails more stable and more formalised forms of exchange across borders. Naturally, they are the beginning of further and more intensive exchange among citizens, especially between young people, and often lead to closer economic and cultural collaboration. However, town friendships and official twinning arrangements are often the result of preceding personal relationships between ordinary citizens. Official twinning arrangements, however, are usually established between towns and municipalities with common interests or certain characteristic similarities, e.g. a similar size, historical experience, religious orientation, social and economic structure, geographical location or just a similar name.

Certainly, town twinning is by far not limited to the European continent. In fact, many cities, towns and smaller communities also have at least one if not various twinning partners on another continent. In Europe, however, the twinning movement became popular in the era of European integration and reached its highest degree of diffusion and institutionalisation in the past 50 years. The first international twinning arrangements of our contemporary kind were established in the first half of the 20th century. However, similar to the case of intra-European youth exchanges, the enormous rise and diffusion of twinning arrangements all over Europe began after the end of the second World War, as a means of reconciliation and mutual recognition between European nations. From that time onwards, the European twinning movement was so successful that half a century later there is hardly any city or town in Europe without international twinning partners. Apart from the post-war period, a new wave of twinning arrangements washed over Europe during the 1990s with the fall of the Iron Curtain, in order to build bridges between Western and Eastern European societies (Vion 2002). Today, in fact, European twinning arrangements are mostly established in the spirit of European integration and trans-European cooperation in a globalising world. Not surprisingly, therefore, the idea and practice of twinning has been increasingly promoted by supra- and international actors and institutions, too. Besides the Council of Europe, again the European Union has increasingly taken on the role of actively promoting twinning since 1989.³⁴

The most important promoter of twinning arrangements in Europe, however, is the *Council of European Municipalities and Regions*, the official self-organising body of European towns and municipalities consisting of more than 100,000 members from over 35 European countries.³⁵ Another example of constant trans-European exchange, cooperation

³⁴For example, local and regional authorities in Europe can apply for up to four different European awards from the Council of Europe: the “European Diploma”, the “Flag of Honour”, the “Plaque of Honour” and the “Europe Prize” (<http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Committee/ENA/EuropaPrize/prizeindex.htm>, cited 10 Feb 2007). The European Union also announces awards for twinning projects and promotes the intensification and establishment of twinning projects in the action framework of the promotion of active citizenship (cf. http://ec.europa.eu/towntwinning/index_en.html).

³⁵<http://www.ccre.org>, cited 10 Feb 2007.

and interest formation of municipalities is the EUROCITIES network of larger European cities, which even exceeds the current area of the European Union. It was established in 1986 in order to “(. . .) share knowledge and ideas, exchange experiences, analyse common problems and develop innovative solutions through a wide range of forums, working groups, projects, activities and events”.³⁶ The network currently consists of more than 130 larger cities in over 30 European countries and is active in a wide range of policy fields. The first genuinely trans-European twinning arrangement, in fact, is the so-called *Douzelage association*, a multi-national network of municipalities in almost all EU member states. It was founded in 1991 by 12 municipalities of the respective member states of that time and has continually enlarged with the accession of new member states to the European Union. The main aim of this network is to promote and support inter-European exchange, mainly in the form of common cultural, youth and sports projects.³⁷

Finally, an increasing part of constant cooperation of localities, local actors and local administrations across national borders takes place in the so-called INTERREG framework of common European regional policy. Since the end of 1980s the European Union has actively stipulated cross-border cooperation of adjacent regions from different countries, transnational cooperation among national, regional and local authorities as well as international cooperation and exchange between regional bodies all over Europe.³⁸ Today, nearly all smaller European border regions (NUTS-III level) – and the major part of the current European territory consists of border regions – cooperate in at least one so-called transnational “Euro-Region” or at least in joint working groups. The highest percentage of transnational cooperation weighted by population can be found around the Baltic Sea, especially in Southern and Central Sweden, most of the Finnish regions, Central and Northern Norway, in the three Baltic States, north-eastern Germany, and also in northern Scotland (Espon 2006c: 56). These cross-border cooperations are quite relevant for many regions involved in these programmes. Since many of these regions are mostly located in the periphery of the countries they belong to, cross-border cooperation opens up new opportunities to take advantage of the geographical location. This often initiates political, economic and social exchanges and sometimes even fosters stronger social bonds beyond the national “container”. It also might contribute to disperse the single dependence on support from the national centre and the feeling of belonging together with regard to other areas of the national territory.

18.7 Final Remarks

In the previous sections we mapped several transnational linkages and forms of connectivity across Europe. We did so on the basis of the assumption that the European integration process is not only characterised by economic and political forms of trans- or supranational cooperation, but that Europe also is emerging as a social space with a higher density and frequency of cross-border interaction. However, our main intention was not to celebrate the end of nation states, or even the advent of a common European society, but to buttress theoretical assumptions on pan-European integration of everyday life with more empirical evidence than is usually the case. Often, assumptions on the dynamics of *bottom-up*

³⁶<http://www.eurocities.org>, cited 10 Feb 2007.

³⁷<http://www.douzelage.org>, cited 10 Feb 2007.

³⁸For further information, see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/interreg3/index_en.htm.

Europeanisation are rather speculative or overemphasise political and economic interactions. As we have shown, in fact, ordinary citizens in contemporary Europe are much less “locked-in” in national containment, and they are engaged in various and multi-faceted encounters with citizens from other EU countries and beyond – be it through leisure activities, family and friendship networks or in employment contexts. However, as already pointed out our findings are still incomplete and preliminary, indeed, due to a lack of appropriate cross-national survey data and respective research activities. It can be assumed that there are numerous other incidences and phenomena of transnationalisation from below, which are not reflected in our description (cf. Favell 2005 and 2008; Fligstein 2008).

Yet, most indicators presented above portray an extent of cross-border linkages and activities which were quite unknown and unnoticed until recently. As we have shown, much of the current horizontal interaction and integration across the borders of European nation-states, such as pan-European communication, mobility and exchanges as well as different forms of cross-border cooperation, has increased over the past two or three decades. Moreover we have also stressed that all these different aspects of transnational integration do not apply to all Europeans at the same level. In fact, we have pointed to the existing differences in access to means of cross-border transportation and international communication across countries and highlighted that by far not all Europeans travel abroad for holidays or participate in any of the established exchange programmes. Some qualifications also have to be made for intra-European (labour) migration, which is still not at high level, and mainly limited to younger age groups. But we have also mentioned new and growing phenomena of mobility such as old-age migration from the Central and Northern to the Mediterranean region, forms of cross-border commuting and larger numbers of people who live temporarily in other European countries for educational purposes or long-term holidays. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Eastern part of Europe has also become involved in cross-border activities – still to a lesser degree than in the older EU member states, but in the process of rapid catching up. The citizens of these countries are making extensive use of the new opportunities especially with regard to labour migration and leisure activities; and it might take less than a generation until they reach the West European level of transnational integration and pan-European connectivity.

From all these everyday movements and communications across the national “containers”, we can expect long-term effects on inter-group marriage patterns, family ties and friendship networks. Furthermore, there is also some evidence that the proliferation of transnational contacts may also facilitate attitudinal changes. The classic contact theory (cf. Allport 1954), for example, asserts that contacts between different (especially ethnic) groups, reduce prejudices and foster mutual understanding (see also: Pettigrew 1998). At least for the German case it could be demonstrated that those people who are more involved in cross-border exchanges exhibit more positive attitudes towards foreigners (cf. Mau et al. 2008). Moreover, this study also indicates that transnational trust, the willingness to support supranational political solutions and the attachment to Europe and a European identity are positively correlated with the degree of individual involvement in transnational activities (cf. also Mau 2007; Favell 2008). Notwithstanding the conflicts, disappointments and misunderstandings that go along with the process of European integration, the involvement in transnational activities and networks seems to be favourable for engendering positive attitudinal stances.

However, although in the preceding sections we have particularly highlighted the interconnectedness of Europeans and of local life-worlds in Europe, the dismantling of national borders cannot be exclusively attributed to the process of Europeanisation. The literature on globalisation likewise predicts a new and unprecedented level of interconnectedness

with a lesser relevance of state borders as interrupters of interaction (cf. Held et al. 1999). Certainly, the rate of cross-border interchange amongst individuals, institutions and societies has increased substantively over the last 30 years, not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. This leads to the empirical and conceptual question as to what extent the observed cross-border linkages can be attributed either to processes of globalisation or to Europeanisation, respectively. Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle both processes, since the indicators capturing and identifying either globalisation or Europeanisation are identical to a large extent (cf. Delanty and Rumford 2005). One way of doing so is to detect the spatial extension of the cross-border transactions, and undeniably we will find that the territorial horizon of many of these processes seem to be European in nature. However, there are also significant transactions that exceed the boundaries of a European space, however defined, and reach out to other OECD countries or even beyond. Furthermore, viewed from a larger distance, European integration may appear as part of a broader tendency of growing global communication and interaction (cf. Stichweh 2000) – as an intermediate step towards a “world society”.

For the time being, one cannot preclude such a long term development, but there is also good reason to emphasise the specific nature of the process of Europeanisation. A number of forms of transnationalisation “from below” would not have happened, at least not to the same extent, if some European governments had not de-institutionalised borders; helped to build a dense infrastructure of communication and transportation; supported different forms of mobility, migration, exchange and cooperation. As demonstrated, the process of European unification acts as an important driving force and facilitator of new cross-border activities. It provides a framework due to which old forms of national containment lose their grip and within which pan-European forms of connectivity can emerge. In this way, Europeanisation “from above” creates more than political and economic institutions, it also promotes contacts between people and the building of pan-European networks. Given this, it could well be that the European integration, understood in social terms, will not be supplanted and superseded by an even larger social entity, but will crystallise into a European society. But such a ‘European *society*’ would be less integrated than the old territorially bound national societies and involved in larger (global) networks and would not just reproduce the logic of external inclusion and internal homogenisation of the era of national containment. In fact, Europe might well represent a new type of macro-regional clustering with a higher degree of intra-communication and interaction, half-way between the former nation state and world society.

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Chapter 19

Welfare State

Thomas Bahle, Jürgen Kohl, and Claus Wendt

19.1 Introduction

The welfare state is at the heart of the institutional structure of all European societies. Yet there are major variations across countries due to different historical developments. The origins of social policy date back more than 120 years, but the real expansion of the welfare state did not take place until the end of World War II. In the 1950s, social programmes in most western European countries entered into a historically unique period of growth, which lasted until the 1970s (Flora 1986–1988). Since the early 1980s, however, the dominating issues of the welfare state debate have been crisis and retrenchment (Pierson 2001). Today, the expansion of state welfare has come to an end in most countries, but the core institutions and features of the welfare state have survived (Kuhnle 2000) and even been stabilized and consolidated. After more than 20 years of crisis debates and retrenchment policies, the welfare state has successfully adapted to domestic as well as international pressures (Castles 2004) and is supported by the vast majority of citizens in all European nations. The role of the state in social security, on the other hand, has changed during this time.

This chapter comparatively investigates the institutional structure and development of the welfare state in Europe, analysing trends and major variations between countries. The chapter is divided into six sections: The first provides a brief overview of major historical developments, the second maps major structural variations by discussing typologies of welfare regimes, and the third outlines social expenditure developments and structures since the 1980s. In the following sections, we more thoroughly analyse institutional variations in three areas of welfare: pensions (Section 19.5), healthcare (Section 19.6), and family policy (Section 19.7).

Pensions and healthcare belong to the historical core of the welfare state and represent its two most important spending areas. The role of the state has changed significantly in both fields: Private pensions have become more important, and forms of public (state) regulation have changed considerably. These developments have had a major impact on the role of the state in welfare provision. As a more recent element of the welfare state, family policy is less important in terms of spending, though growing in relevance. It is therefore a good contrasting case for studying the state's changing role in social welfare.

T. Bahle (✉)

Mannheim Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim, Germany
e-mail: thomas.bahle@mzes.uni-mannheim.de

19.2 Historical Developments

This section provides a concise overview of the historical development of European welfare states. While numerous comparative and individual country studies on this topic exist, hardly any that take both Western and Eastern Europe (after 1945) into account are available. The mainstream comparative welfare state research, such as the typological approaches following the seminal study of Esping-Andersen (1990), has focused on Western Europe and the OECD world. Therefore, this chapter discusses developments in Eastern European countries only to a limited extent.

The welfare state is both an element and a product of modernization related to industrialization and the rise of both the nation-state and democracy (Flora et al. 1977). The growth of industrial society has formed new social groups and social risks that need to be addressed. Furthermore, the development of both the nation-state and democracy has provided for the politicization of social problems. Welfare policies have thus become a battleground for social and political conflicts. Variations within these processes explain major differences in the timing and structure of welfare state policies and institutions. The welfare state has become a major element in the institutionalization of class conflicts (Dahrendorf 1957; Korpi 1983) and part of the social compromise that has characterized Western Europe since World War II (Crouch 1999).

Girvetz (1968) defines the welfare state as “the institutional outcome of a society’s assumption of legal and therefore formal and explicit responsibility for the basic well-being of all its members” (521; cited in Kaufmann 2001: 17). The welfare state is thus characterized by institutionalized social rights, which are effectively realized by actual social policies (Flora et al. 1977: 707). This state assumes responsibility for the welfare of its citizens by devoting a large share of economic resources to social purposes (Alber 1982).

The welfare state interacts with other institutions and forces within a complex system of welfare production in society. The state was neither the first nor the most obvious resort for solving social problems deriving from industrialization and social change. Organizations and institutions such as private charities, local communities, the Church, and mutual benefit organizations (organized, for instance, by the labour movement) had played important roles in social security before the state entered this field. Yet, the institutionalization of social rights distinguishes the welfare state from other social welfare actors (Marshall 1964; Kaufmann 2003). The scope and character of these rights has structured modern societies in a fundamental and long-lasting way (Therborn 1995; Offe 2003).

The following overview presents the main variations in Europe with respect to timing (year of introduction of social programmes), basic structure (character of social rights) and size (measured in terms of population coverage and social expenditures). This section is purely descriptive and shall not consider explanations for differences between countries. As our focus is on social policy programs, we shall exclude the analysis of industrial relations and the regulation of labour markets and education, which are broader elements of the welfare state, for these fields are covered by other chapters in this handbook.

19.2.1 Institutional Foundations

In the literature, the history of welfare state development is often presented as a typical cycle spanning from early formation and institutional foundation via expansion and growth to crisis and reform. The historical periods which are usually associated with these stages are

the period before World War I (early formation), the interwar years until the end of World War II (institutional foundation), the golden years of post-war capitalism from 1950 to the early 1970s (expansion and growth) and the period since the 1980s (crisis and reform).

This cyclical description, however, is based on a narrowly European perspective, indeed a *Western* European view, because it does not take into account differences in developments between socialist Eastern and capitalist Western Europe. Yet even before 1945, historical and structural conditions varied a lot between West and East as well as between Northern, Central and Southern Europe. This is first of all due to the different impacts of industrialization and urbanization. Also political conditions varied substantially. In the Western part of the continent, the formation of nation-states was almost completed when the welfare state came into being in the late 19th century, whereas in the East the rule of the Austrian–Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires lasted until 1917/1919. Thereafter most Eastern European countries went through a very short period of national independence that was soon ended by Nazi occupation and the following Soviet regime for a long time. Thus, in Eastern Europe, imperial power in various forms lasted virtually until the fall of Communism in 1989. Moreover, in the interwar period in most parts of Europe, the democratization process came to a halt and was even reversed with Britain, Switzerland and Sweden being major exceptions. These huge socio-economic and political variations across European countries are of importance for a better understanding of the historical development of welfare state institutions that are sketched in the following paragraphs.

Table 19.1 summarizes the historical periods when individual countries introduced their core old-age pension and unemployment insurance programmes. Data are predominantly taken from the seminal study on the historical development of welfare states in *Western* Europe by Alber (1982). The periods are roughly divided by the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries and the two historical watersheds of World Wars I and II.

Table 19.1 Introduction of old-age pensions and unemployment insurance

		Old-age pensions		
		<1900	<1918	<1945
Unemployment insurance	<1918	Denmark	France United Kingdom (Ireland) ^a	Finland Norway Netherlands
	<1945	Belgium Germany	Sweden Austria Luxembourg (Czechoslovakia) ^b (Hungary) ^b (Poland) ^c	Italy Spain Canada USA Russia
	>1945			Greece Portugal Switzerland Japan

Sources: Own depiction based on Schmidt (2005: 182); Siegel (2007: 237); Alber (1987²: 28); Inglot (2008: 109); ILO (1925, 1933).

Unemployment insurance abolished or fundamentally limited after 1945 in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Russia.

^aUntil 1922 part of the United Kingdom.

^bUntil 1918 part of the Austrian–Hungarian Empire.

^cUntil 1918 divided between Prussia, Russia and the Austrian–Hungarian Empire.

Three European countries (Belgium, Denmark and Germany) introduced public pension programmes before 1900. Two of them, the German and Danish cases, are often referred to as two paradigmatic different approaches to social security. The German system, the first in the world, introduced compulsory social insurance for workers in industry, financed out of social insurance contributions. Although pensions were low and only paid in case of incapacity to work due to old age, in the long run this programme led to an occupationally structured pension system with earnings-related benefits known as the social insurance type (see ILO 1942). The social insurance approach was a real innovation and meant a significant departure from the old European tradition of public poor relief that at that time characterized almost all social policies. This road was taken by most Continental European countries.

The Danish system by contrast introduced general flat-rate pensions for the whole population based on residence (citizenship) and financed out of general taxation. Still, entitlements to benefits were principally based on a means-test. Yet the system soon covered large population groups, indeed a higher proportion of the elderly than the German occupationally based system, because the means-test was more and more relaxed. By this development, the system paved the way for general flat-rate pensions for all elderly citizens. This road was later taken by other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom (See Section 19.5 on pensions).

Until 1918 the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria and France had also introduced public pension programmes following one of these two main approaches. No Southern or Eastern European country was among these forerunners with the exception of the Czech lands, the lands of Hungary (both covered by Austrian legislation) and large parts of Poland which at that time had not yet achieved national independence. In Silesia, German legislation was in force and Austrian regulations in the SouthEastern parts. When Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary gained independence after World War I, they kept the core elements of this former imperial social legislation (see Inglot 2008). During the interwar years, then, most European countries introduced public pension programmes, including Southern Europe.

The interwar years also experienced the biggest wave of legislation on unemployment insurance. Only few countries had introduced such programmes prior to World War I. In the beginning, unemployment insurance was often organized by trade unions and subsidized by the state. Since this form of public-private mix was first institutionalized in the Flemish city of Gent, it is known as the Gent system. In some countries, in particular in Scandinavia with strong labour movements, this system still constitutes the basis of unemployment insurance. In most other countries, however, a general state-organized scheme was established, following the British example of 1911. Generally, there is a positive association between the timing of pension and unemployment programmes. However, there are also considerable exceptions. Germany, for instance, being the pioneer in social insurance generally, introduced unemployment insurance not before 1927 because this was a politically highly contested area. Again, the laggards can be found in under-developed Southern Europe as well as in Switzerland.

Family policy started considerably later than social insurance programmes. In most countries, family allowances were introduced only in the period following World War II, long after the core social insurance programmes had been established (see Table 19.2).

Pioneers in family allowances are found among two groups of nations: the Catholic countries of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world except Britain and Canada. Belgium and France undoubtedly were the most ambitious pioneers of family policy in the world, but also the economically less advanced Southern European countries Italy, Portugal and Spain played a role in this early phase. In the South, family policy was an integral part of

Table 19.2 Completion of social insurance and introduction of family allowances

		At least three of four major social insurance systems in place ^a		
		<1918	<1945	>1945
Family allowances	<1945	Belgium France	Italy Portugal Spain The Netherlands (USA) ^c	
	<1950	United Kingdom (Ireland) ^b Norway Sweden Austria Luxembourg	Finland Japan	
	>1950	Germany Denmark	Greece (Canada) ^c	(Switzerland) ^c

Sources: Own depiction based on Schmidt (2005: 182); Siegel (2007: 237); Alber (1987²: 28); Inglot (2008: 109); ILO (1925, 1933).

^aAccident, sickness, old age and unemployment insurance.

^bUntil 1922 under UK jurisdiction/legislation.

^cNo general family allowances systems.

nationalist population policies, implemented by authoritarian regimes. In France, the population policy motive was prominent as well, but it was amalgamated with a strong component of Social-Catholicism (see Schultheis 1988; Gauthier 1996).

The timing of core social insurance legislation gives a first impression of the historical development of the welfare state. This needs to be supplemented by information about the character of social rights and the size of the welfare state in terms of population coverage and resources spent on social expenditures.

Until the 1930s, there were basically two kinds of social programmes: social insurance and traditional social assistance (see ILO 1942). In the first type, entitlements are usually based on employment (or more narrowly on occupation) and earnings; in the second, on membership in society (or a specific population group) and need. The first kind of system has led to an occupationally fragmented system of particular social rights, the second (by gradually and eventually completely removing the means-test) to a general system of universal social rights, although according to Therborn (1995: 89–97) this only rarely happened in reality. Though there are manifold variations between countries and even within countries (between different programmes), the European landscape shows a relatively clear pattern of social rights (Therborn 1995: 96). In most countries, an occupationally differentiated system of (particular) social rights predominates. Only Scandinavia and partly Britain (after the Beveridge reforms) have taken the road to universalism.

Interestingly, all Eastern European countries under the Socialist regime are grouped by Therborn (1995) among the particularistic regime of rights. Indeed, their social security systems relied strongly on employment, sometimes even more than in the typical social insurance countries of Western Europe like Germany. One reason for this is that after 1945 most Eastern European countries retained the core of their old pre-war social insurance systems based on principles of Bismarckian occupational insurance. Another reason was that communism itself produced new categorical distinctions between different population groups. The Socialist system favoured politically and economically important

social groups. Moreover, in the Socialist economy the firm became the centre of welfare provision, especially for social and medical services. Therefore, social policy in the former Socialist countries can be classified as being even more employment-related than in Western Europe. This is supported by the fact that after the breakdown of Communism, most Eastern European countries did not follow the Scandinavian road to universalism but the Continental way of occupational social insurance (see Götting 1998; Inglot 2008).

19.2.2 Growth

Until the 1950s, the institutional foundations of the welfare state had been established almost everywhere in Europe. Only in the less developed Southern countries and in the strongly decentralized Switzerland, this process was not yet completed. At the same time, the structure of welfare states widely varied in terms of both social rights and size of social programmes. Moreover, the post-war political order of Europe brought about a new major divide between East and West, which became crucial for differences in the welfare state.

Before presenting some basic data, the major differences between social policies in socialist and capitalist countries should be emphasized. In Western Europe the welfare state was combined with capitalism (market economy) and in most cases with democracy (Mishra 1990; Kaufmann 2003). This combination produced a rather competitive environment for the welfare state which in the long run proved to be quite successful. On the one hand, a dynamic market economy generated the economic resources necessary for social programmes. Not all of them had an equalizing effect, to be sure, because social insurance has often focused on income maintenance (security) rather than equality. On the other hand, the welfare state also served to stabilize mass consumption in growing economies. The combination with democracy also had largely positive effects on the dynamics of welfare state development, because social policy became a major issue in the electoral competition. This was especially so in countries in which two pro-welfare camps competed, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, even though their actual policies differed (Wilensky 1975; van Kersbergen 1995).

In Socialist countries of Eastern Europe both of these institutional contexts were missing. It might be argued that this contributed to their falling behind compared to the welfare state development in the West. However, it also shows that in Eastern Europe the welfare state needs to be analysed in a different context. Despite some variations among them (Inglot 2008), all Socialist countries shared major structural features of the welfare system that clearly distinguished them from the West (see Deacon 1993; Fajth 1999; Tomka 2004). First of all, social policy was interwoven with economic policy. Social policy never reached the status of an institution independent of the economy. Employment and the firm were the crucial channels for access to welfare. Alternative channels did not exist, except in healthcare which sometimes was organized on a residence basis. There was basically no general welfare system, only a rudimentary social assistance scheme and no unemployment assistance. On the other hand, the population benefited from employment security and very high price subsidies for housing, transport, and basic goods such as food. Indeed, these were major elements of social policy in the socialist economy that nowhere in the Western capitalist world were matched.

Second, the strong employment-relatedness of social policy resulted in a benefit structure by which the active population was highly favoured. In the long run, especially pensioners suffered heavily from this structural bias, because in contrast to most Western European countries pensions were not automatically adjusted to rising living standards.

However, family policy was more developed in the East than in most of Western Europe. This is not only true for childcare services (in fact, in this area Eastern European countries differed a lot), but even more so with regard to family allowances. Their value relative to average (national) wages was, at least since the 1970s, usually higher than in Western Europe (Voirin 1993: 42).

These crucial differences between capitalist and socialist welfare states should serve as a template when interpreting the following figures on the quantitative development of welfare states in Western and Eastern Europe. The size and social significance of social security programmes can be measured by the share of the population covered and by social spending as a proportion of national income.

Table 19.3 shows the long-term development of social insurance coverage in selected European countries.¹

One can clearly identify four historically leading countries with respect to coverage: Germany, Sweden, Great Britain and Denmark. In these countries, the proportion of the economically active population covered by the four major social insurance programmes by far outnumbered figures in the other countries at least until 1935. It is noteworthy that some of those countries that were identified as welfare state pioneers on the basis of the timing of social legislation are lagging far behind in this indicator. This is particularly true for France, Austria and Belgium. The reasons for this discrepancy are different. In France, for example, old-age pension insurance was not fully implemented until after World War II. In Austria, the occupationally segregated social security programmes covered only small parts of the population, because the country was not yet heavily industrialized.

Table 19.3 also shows that by 1955 social insurance programmes covered the majority of the workforce in most countries. Only in Italy and Finland still less than half of the economically active population was covered. Coverage rates grew further until the

Table 19.3 Social insurance coverage rates¹ in selected countries,² 1915–1975

	1915	1935	1955	1975
Germany ³	42.8	57.8	73.3	81.8
Sweden	37.0	47.8	78.9	86.8
United Kingdom	36.3	71.8	90.0	86.8
Denmark	30.8	70.8	74.8	81.0
Norway	17.8	24.5	74.5	91.5
Belgium	17.5	34.8	60.8	87.0
Austria	13.0	39.8	62.8	82.0
France	11.5	31.5	54.5	86.8
Switzerland	10.8	34.5	67.8	71.3
The Netherlands	7.3	38.5	62.0	85.0
Italy	4.8	36.0	45.0	71.3
Finland	2.0	8.3	39.5	83.3
Ireland	(...)	33.3	58.5	75.3

Source: Own depiction based on Alber (1987²: 152).

¹Percentage of economically active persons covered by accident, sickness, old-age pensions and unemployment insurance (average).

²Countries ranked by coverage rate in 1915.

³From 1955 Federal Republic of Germany.

¹Figures are taken from Alber (1982) who, however, provides no information on Eastern Europe.

mid-1970s when most countries practically reached full coverage. In this respect, the Western European countries converged to their “limits to growth”. In 1975 only Italy, Switzerland and Ireland still had coverage rates lower than 80% (note that Southern European countries are not included in the table, except Italy).

Unfortunately, no comparable figures are available for Eastern Europe. It can be assumed, however, that most employed persons were covered by social insurance, except in the agricultural sector which was particularly large in Poland and Hungary. Moreover, agriculture was not everywhere as strongly collectivized as in the German Democratic Republic. In particular, in Poland and Hungary, self-employed peasants remained a large group with fewer social rights than other occupational categories, especially compared to workers in heavy industries.

Few studies have tried to compare social expenditure in Eastern and Western Europe. In addition to the caveats mentioned above with respect to the different context of welfare states in capitalist and socialist economies, it should be noted that these figures are not directly comparable, because the national accounting systems differed. Yet some basic variations and trends can be found in Table 19.4.

In relative terms, measured as a percentage of GDP or NMP, the size of welfare states in East and West shows a mixed picture in the mid-1960s. The leading country in this respect was Czechoslovakia, closely followed by Austria and Western Germany. In a historical perspective, one might say that the pioneers of social insurance in the 19th century still took the lead in the 1960s. The Scandinavian countries still ranked behind the Continental social insurance countries including the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Italy. Except Czechoslovakia (being on top), Central Eastern European countries generally occupied positions in the middle of the overall distribution. At the bottom, the economically less developed countries of Southern Europe and the “liberal” welfare state laggards USA and Switzerland were assembled.

By 1975 the picture looked rather different. In almost half of the Western European countries, social spending had increased to more than 20% of the GDP. This level was never reached in any of the Socialist countries.² In the most advanced Socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, growth was slow (in the former) or even stagnated (in the latter case). Only Hungary had a significant growth comparable, for instance, to Finland which was, however, by Western European standards, still a welfare laggard by the early 1980s.

Thus, in most Western European countries, the welfare state expanded strongly in relative as well as in absolute terms due to high economic growth during the “golden age” of welfare capitalism. Especially the Scandinavian welfare states together with the Netherlands, Belgium and France went through a phase of extraordinary welfare growth. Compared to that, even the former leading welfare spenders, Germany and Austria, fell back.³ Data for 1986, that is shortly before the fall of Communism, support this general impression of stagnation in welfare spending in Eastern European countries. However, the less developed Southern European countries still ranked behind the more advanced Eastern European welfare states.

²It should be kept in mind that social and economic conditions were rather different in capitalist and socialist economies. In the latter, for example, unemployment did not exist officially. Hence, there is no need for unemployment compensation. Also, for instance, basic goods such as food, housing and transportation were heavily subsidized which does not show up in the figures.

³The more recent developments in social spending are analysed in Section 19.3, although on a different data basis.

Table 19.4 Total social security expenditures in selected countries, 1965–1990

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1986	1990
<i>As % of NMP</i>						
Czechoslovakia	18.0	18.0	17.2	18.9	21.5	16.0 ^a
GDR ¹	12.7	12.3	14.3	16.0	14.2	
Yugoslavia	12.2	13.1		11.1	11.7	
USSR	11.6	11.9	13.6	14.2	15.5	10.4 ^{aa}
Hungary	10.9	11.0	14.9	18.3	16.2	18.4 ^a
Bulgaria	10.0	13.7	16.0	12.2	13.4	16.5 ^a
Poland	9.3			15.5	17.1	18.7 ^a
<i>As % of GDP</i>						
Germany ²	16.6	17.1	23.7	24.0	23.4	25.5 ^a
Austria	16.6 ^c	18.8 ^b	18.3 ^b	21.4 ^c	24.4 ^a	24.2 ^a
France	15.8	15.3	23.7	24.0	28.6	26.7 ^a
The Netherlands	15.5	18.9	25.5	28.3	28.6	29.7 ^a
Belgium	14.6 ^c	18.1 ^b	20.9 ^b	24.5 ^c	27.5 ^a	25.6 ^a
Italy	13.8 ^c	16.3 ^b	20.7 ^b	16.3 ^c	21.6 ^a	23.1 ^a
Sweden	13.3 ^c	18.8 ^b	24.4 ^b	31.2 ^c	31.1 ^a	32.2 ^a
Denmark	11.9 ^c	16.6 ^b	21.0 ^b	26.2 ^c	25.9 ^a	28.7 ^a
UK ³	11.7	13.7	16.0	17.3	20.4	19.6 ^a
Norway	10.5 ^c	15.5 ^b	17.6 ^b	19.8 ^c	20.0 ^a	27.1 ^a
Finland	10.2 ^c	13.1 ^b	15.2 ^b	18.0 ^c	23.4 ^a	25.2 ^a
Ireland	9.8 ^c	11.6 ^b	15.6 ^b	20.6 ^c	22.9 ^a	19.2 ^a
Greece	9.2	10.8	10.8	12.2	19.5	19.8 ^a
Switzerland	8.0 ^c	10.1 ^b	13.2 ^b	12.8 ^c	17.4 ^a	20.1 ^a
USA	6.5 ^c			12.2 ^c	13.4 ^a	14.1 ^a
Portugal	5.2	5.6	11.0	9.7	10.4	14.6 ^a
Spain	3.6		11.7	16.0	18.1	19.6 ^a

Sources: Own depiction based on the following sources: data given without footnote: Voirin (1993: 44); a ILO (2000: 1–5); ^{aa}Data refer only to Russian Federation in 1996; ^bFlora et al. (1983: 456); ^cCastles (1986: 217).

Notes: All figures in the table refer to total social security expenditures as defined by the ILO in “The Cost of Social Security”, which basically includes income maintenance and health. The figures, however, are taken from different sources which slightly deviate from each other, for instance with respect to the inclusion/exclusion of administrative expenses. In all cases in which multiple data were available for one date and country, the deviance between the different sources was less than 1 percentage point.

Figures for (former) Socialist countries are given as percentages of Net Material Product, which is not exactly comparable to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) used as reference value for capitalist market economies.

More recent figures on social expenditures will be given in Section 19.3. These data refer to the EUROSTAT definition which is more encompassing than the one used here.

¹German Democratic Republic; ²Federal Republic of Germany; ³United Kingdom.

To conclude, the Eastern European welfare states which were among the most developed in the 1960s fell back dramatically compared to most Western countries during the following decades. This finding is further accentuated if one considers real spending levels. Thus, the Socialist welfare states which had started with high aspirations and strong social institutions were dismantled in the end. Yet also in the Western part of Europe, the growth of the welfare state came to a halt in the early 1980s (Flora 1986–1988). Pierson (2001) argues that by that time a “new politics of the welfare state” has emerged that entails the logic of retrenchment and replaced the former long-lasting mechanism of expansion.

The next sections explore whether this new stage in welfare state development together with the historical watershed of 1989/1990 has resulted in new welfare state trends and assess variations between European countries. In this context, the question whether the Eastern European countries form a separate “world” of welfare remains a crucial one. During the transition phase, they have partly kept or revived their old social insurance traditions. Partly they have also installed new systems of social protection, particularly in pensions and social assistance. Overall, it seems that this kind of historical institutional “layering” in Eastern Europe has produced complex welfare systems, which do not easily fit into the typologies developed on the basis of variations across Western Europe.

19.3 Welfare Regime Types

When comparing a larger number of countries, it is necessary to reduce the complexity of existing social policy programmes by concentrating on their main characteristics. This can be done by distinguishing, within the broad definition of the welfare state referred to above (see Section 19.1), different types of welfare states or welfare regime types.

The probably most prominent and influential, though not undisputed, typology of welfare states has been developed by Esping-Andersen in his book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). He suggests “to move from the black box of expenditures to the content of welfare states” and to distinguish “categorically different types of states” (1990: 20 f.).

Although Esping-Andersen does not explicitly refer to the Weberian method of ideal types in his 1990 volume, in his earlier work he clearly states that his *Three Worlds* are based upon Weber’s methodology: “The objective of such ‘regime analyses’ is not to provide exhaustive comparisons across either time or societies, but rather to identify ‘ideal-typical’ cases (in the Weberian sense)” (Esping-Andersen 1987: 7). The concept of “welfare regimes” “seeks... to specify the welfare state’s relative position within the broader welfare mix — in particular in relation to market and family provision of welfare” (Hicks and Esping-Andersen 2005: 518).

In order to capture the most important aspects of welfare states, Esping-Andersen (1990: 21 ff.) has suggested the concept of de commodification, which reflects the level of social entitlements and citizens’ degree of insulation from market dependency.⁴ Its theoretical basis is formed by T.H. Marshall’s theory of social citizenship (1964). According to this theory, individual social risks are recognized as a common public responsibility. Therefore, citizens’ well-being should at least partly be made independent of the market, of charity or of the family. It is this *social right element* that distinguishes welfare state involvement from support by family members, employers, charity and further actors in this field.

With regard to the characterization of welfare state regimes, Esping-Andersen has also been strongly influenced by Titmuss (1958, 1974), who distinguished a “residual welfare model”, an “industrial achievement-performance model” and an “institutional redistributive model” of social policy. As Esping-Andersen’s work demonstrates, the aims and

⁴As a second approach to characterize different welfare regime types, Esping-Andersen uses the concept of “stratification” by arguing that “the welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). It should be noted that the two methods of identifying clusters of welfare states lead to similar but not identical classification of countries (Kohl 1999).

virtues of using the ideal-typical method lie especially in its ability to highlight – by way of comparison between ideal types and real historical cases – the various differences existing between cases, as well as to identify institutional changes taking place over time. Moreover, the construction of welfare regime types implicitly contains hypotheses on the causes and effects of welfare states, according to the following logic:

- similar socio-political conditions result in similar institutional patterns of welfare states;
- similar institutional characteristics of welfare states have similar effects on the living conditions in a society, for instance with regard to social rights.

In an effort to explain the historical emergence of different institutional designs of welfare states, Esping-Andersen (1990) primarily builds on the power resource theory, as developed by Korpi (1978, 1980), who argues that working-class mobilization is the major determining factor with regard to distributive effects of social policy measures. Depending on the distribution of power resources, class conflicts produce different levels of redistribution and institutional set-ups. These, in turn, produce long-standing vested interests, and this perpetuates the once-established structure of the welfare state.

In the following we will not reiterate at length the welfare regime debate (see, for instance, Leibfried 1992; Kohl 1993, 1999; Abrahamson 1999; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Bambra 2005). Instead, we will discuss how welfare states can be classified on the basis of this concept, whether changes have taken place over time and what effects can be attributed to different types of welfare regimes. In a recent consolidating article, Hicks and Esping-Andersen (2005) select the following criteria for constructing different welfare regimes: “population coverage”, “role of private market”, “target population”, “decommodification”, “defamilialization”, (re-)commodification”, “redistribution” and “poverty reduction” (Table 19.5).

Table 19.5 Welfare state regimes and welfare policy indicators

Regime Elements and Outcomes	Regimes		
	Conservative	Liberal	Social Democratic
Population coverage	Occupational	Selective	Universal
Role of private market for welfare	Low	High	Low
Target population	(Male) employed	The poor	All citizens
Decommodification	Medium	Low	High
Defamilialization	Low	Low	High
(Re-)commodification	Low	Medium	High
Redistribution	Low	Low	High
Poverty reduction	Medium	Low	High

Source: Hicks/Esping-Andersen (2005: 513).

“*Social democratic*” welfare states are characterized by universal coverage, a residual role of the private market, high level of decommodification (social benefits are largely independent of the market), high defamilialization (low dependence on support from family members), high (re-)commodification (employment of all citizens is facilitated), high redistribution and successful poverty reduction.

“*Liberal*” welfare states predominantly focus on the poor by using strict criteria for eligibility and allow only modest social benefits. Market solutions (for instance, individual saving plans) are preferred for improving income security. Hence, levels of

decommodification and defamilialization are low, and redistribution is neither aspired nor achieved.

“*Conservative*” *welfare states* give families the main responsibility to see after their own, combined with a continued adherence of the traditional “male breadwinner model”. Employed persons are in general covered by various social insurance schemes. The high dependency of social benefits on labour market participation makes for a medium level of decommodification, and since social benefits are related to income, the level of (vertical) redistribution is rather low.

Several authors have tested the empirical robustness of the *Three Worlds*. Kangas (1994), for instance, found some support for the existence of three types of welfare states. Other authors distinguish the Southern European countries from the conservative type due to their highly fragmented income protection, a high degree of familialization, developing NHS systems, patchy minimum income schemes and generous pension systems (Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996). Obinger and Wagschal (1998) tested Esping-Andersen’s classification by using cluster analysis. In addition to the original three types, they distinguished a “radical” and a “hybrid” European cluster. Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001), finally, collected data for 58 characteristics of labour markets, tax regimes and social protection schemes and, by using principal component analysis, largely confirmed Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of welfare states. Instead of widening the number of subgroups by adding further criteria, it might therefore be advisable to accept the existence of hybrid cases and that no particular real case perfectly fits in any particular ideal type (Kohl 1999; Arts and Gelissen 2002).

In the following, we will investigate whether (and if so, in which direction) welfare states have changed. When comparing the level of decommodification for 18 countries in 1980 (provided by Esping-Andersen, 1990) with data for 1998/1999 (provided by Bamba 2005a,b), the high stability of cluster affiliation, indicating a high level of path dependency, becomes evident (see Table 19.6). However, there are four “exceptions from the rule”: we see Canada changing from the “Liberal” to the “Conservative” world, Japan from the “Conservative” to the “Liberal” regime, Finland from the “Conservative” to the “Social Democratic” regime and, finally, Denmark taking the opposite direction from the “Social Democratic” towards the “Conservative” regime cluster. Thus, 4 out of 18 countries have changed their regime type affiliation between 1980 and 1998/1999.

Scruggs and Allan (2006a,b) replicated Esping-Andersen’s data and made annual data available on the programme characteristics which are included in the decommodification index. When adjusting the classification of countries according to the replication by Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 61), Japan would have to be placed in the “Liberal” cluster and Canada in the “Conservative” cluster already in 1980. Without discussing the various differences between Esping-Andersen’s original version and the reanalysis done by Scruggs and Allan (2006a,b), existing welfare states might be said to have experienced an even stronger process of path dependency than suggested in Table 19.6.

However, neither Esping-Andersen’s original version nor the discussed replication provide clear guidance how the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be classified. Are CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries part of the “Liberal”, the “Conservative” or the “Social Democratic” world? Due to the high emphasis on social insurance after 1990, CEE countries adapted, for instance, major characteristics of the “Conservative” regime type. At the same time, still existing comprehensive childcare facilities indicate a high level of defamilialization (and therefore characteristics of the “Social Democratic” type). In some countries, more recent pension reforms have both strengthened the link between earnings and pension benefits, on the one hand, and introduced strong

Table 19.6 Degrees of decommodification, 1980 and 1998/1999

Country	Decommodification, about 1980	Welfare regime type, 1980	Decommodification, 1998/1999	Welfare regime type, 1998/1999
Australia	13.0	Liberal	13.5	Liberal
USA	13.8	Liberal	14.0	Liberal
New Zealand	17.1	Liberal	11.5	Liberal
Canada	22.0	Liberal	27.9	Conservative
Ireland	23.3	Liberal	22.1	Liberal
UK	23.4	Liberal	15.4	Liberal
Italy	24.1	Conservative	27.6	Conservative
Japan	27.1	Conservative	18.3	Liberal
France	27.5	Conservative	31.5	Conservative
Germany	27.7	Conservative	27.7	Conservative
Finland	29.2	Conservative	34.6	Social Democratic
Switzerland	29.8	Conservative	29.7	Conservative
Austria	31.1	Conservative	31.1	Conservative
Belgium	32.4	Conservative	31.9	Conservative
The Netherlands	32.4	Conservative	28.0	Conservative
Denmark	38.1	Social Democratic	29.0	Conservative
Norway	38.3	Social Democratic	34.0	Social Democratic
Sweden	39.1	Social Democratic	34.7	Social Democratic

Sources: Adapted from Esping-Andersen (1990: 52); Bamba (2005: 203); Schmidt (2005: 222).

incentives for additional private pension insurance on the other, thus decreasing levels of decommodification and emphasizing characteristics of the “Liberal” type (e.g. in Poland, Estonia and Latvia, see Standing 1996: 239ff; Müller 2000). By using cluster analysis, Fenger (2007) demonstrates that the post-communist welfare states cannot be reduced to any well-known type of welfare state, and Cerami (2006) argues that Central and Eastern European countries show characteristics of a new European welfare regime.

19.4 Social Expenditures

The comparative quantitative analysis of European welfare states over the past 25 years reveals two major findings. First, the years of the so-called welfare state “crisis” (OECD 1981) have in fact been a period of surprising overall stability in social spending. Second, the historically developed variations between different country groups or “families of nations” (Castles 1993) have also remained relatively stable. Even in the years of retrenchment policies and political attacks on the welfare state, it is above all stability that characterizes its development.

This can be seen from aggregate social expenditure figures. Social expenditure measures the overall “size” of the welfare state, but not its specific role within the mixed economy of welfare. Data include expenditures on old age and survivors’ benefits, health and invalidity, unemployment, the family, housing and social exclusion. Both social transfers and social services (including benefits in kind) are covered; not included are education and tax

benefits. This might lead to some distortions in the findings for individual countries, but does not change the whole picture. Data are taken from the two most important international data sources EUROSTAT and OECD, which partly deviate from each other. In the following analysis, long-term developments of overall social spending over the past 25 years are based on OECD, recent cross-sectional data on EUROSTAT. OECD data distinguish between public and private social spending, which allows studying the overall size of the welfare state in a more differentiated way. However, it should be noted that private social spending is often mandatory and strongly regulated by the state. Therefore OECD distinguishes between mandatory and voluntary private spending.

A first indicator is public social spending measured as a percentage of the GDP. In the Nordic countries, public social spending has always been well above the OECD average (see Fig. 19.1).

At the same time, there has always been wide variations among the Nordic countries. They have never been such a homogeneous group as is sometimes assumed (see Kolberg 1992). Sweden and Denmark have always been top social spenders. Their social expenditure ratios have only exceptionally fallen below 25% of the GDP since the 1980s. There was a peak in the early 1990s, more pronounced in Sweden than in Denmark, followed by a decrease until 2000 and a slight recovery since then. This development reflects the impact of the severe economic crisis that hit Scandinavia and particularly Sweden (and Finland). The welfare state reacted to this development with a certain time lag. As Sweden was more affected by the economic shock, it shows less continuity in social spending than Denmark. The Finnish development deviates from this pattern. Still in the 1980s, Finland was a laggard in welfare state development, but caught up to the leading Scandinavian nations rapidly until 1990 when it was hit very hard by the economic crisis. Since then, Finnish social spending figures went down significantly and fell to a level much below the Swedish or Danish figures. The two other Nordic countries, Iceland and Norway, have always been outliers within this group. Norway has always been a moderate social spender that was able to keep its welfare state at a relatively modest level due to its special economic position and wealth. Iceland, on the other hand, never had a sizeable welfare state and in many respects looks more like countries of the liberal welfare regime where social spending has always been comparatively low (Eydal 2000).

In all countries of the liberal type social spending has been below or close to the OECD mean with Britain being mostly on top and the USA being on the bottom of this group. Over time, the most significant changes occurred in Ireland which moved from a position close to Britain to one near the USA. However, this development is not due to social retrenchment policies in Ireland. It is rather the result of the economic miracle in this country with strongly rising national income since the 1990s. Switzerland moved the other way round, so to speak. At the beginning of the period, it was close to the USA, but the size of social spending increased continuously since then, and in 2003 with slightly above 20% it has reached the OECD average. The Swiss welfare state was a laggard but has slowly moved towards the more developed European welfare states. In contrast to the USA where the federal system has set strong limits on welfare state expansion, the Swiss combination of federalism and direct democracy has unfolded a more positive dynamic for social spending (Obinger 2005).

In the advanced Continental European countries, public social spending has been well above the OECD average over the whole period. Moreover, there has been a moderate tendency of growth from slightly below 25% in the early 1980s to a little above 25% at the beginning of the new millennium. The variation between countries in this group has been very small generally. There are only two exceptions: France and the Netherlands.




Fig. 19.1 Public social expenditures, 1980–2003

In 1980 the French welfare state was very moderate compared to the other countries in this group, but since then social spending has increased steadily and today France has the highest social expenditure ratio of this type of welfare state and is also close to the European top. The Netherlands exhibits the reverse development. They started from the highest expenditure ratio in this group in the 1980s, but have cut down the relative size of their welfare state significantly to the OECD mean and therefore well below the other Continental countries since the mid-1990s. In this respect, one might speak of a veritable “path departure” in the development of the Dutch welfare state.

The Southern European countries were latecomers in welfare state development. In 1980 their social spending relative to national income was rather low except in Italy that has always been more advanced than the other Southern countries. Yet Greece and Spain soon caught up and by 1990 had reached the Italian spending level of about 20% of GDP. Since then the Italian and Greek figures have increased moderately and continuously, whereas the Spanish rate of social spending reached its peak in the mid-1990s and since then levelled off. As in the case of Ireland this is mainly due to an exceptional economic growth that has surpassed social welfare expenditures by far. If Southern Europe can be regarded as a laggard in welfare state development in general, Portugal may be characterized as the latecomer among the latecomers. Until 1990 Portuguese social spending remained at a modest 10–12% of the GDP, but then a fast increase set in that has brought this country to the second position in social spending in this group, closely behind Italy.

In the Eastern European countries social spending is currently at about the same level as in Southern Europe and close to the OECD average. Due to varying economic fluctuations after the fall of Communism, the development in the individual countries was different. In the Czech Republic there has been a moderate increase since 1990 whereas social spending in Poland went up suddenly in the first years of the transition and then declined strongly since 1992 when the big shock of the first transition period was absorbed. Yet due to high unemployment in Poland compared to the other Eastern European countries, social spending remained relatively high.

The picture of variation between countries slightly changes if one adds to public expenditure also mandatory and voluntary private social expenditure (Adema 2001). Besides public social programmes of the welfare state there are various social benefits which are delivered by non-public actors under private law either mandatorily (that is required by the state) or voluntarily. It makes good sense to include mandatory private social expenditure under the rubrics of the welfare state, because such policies often are functional equivalents to public programmes. For example, the welfare state may grant sickness benefits in case of temporary incapacity to work, but employers may also be legally obliged to continue wage payment for a certain period of time. It also makes some sense to include voluntary private expenditure, because though the state does not legally enforce these measures it most often subsidizes them, for example, through tax concessions. A good example is occupational pensions provided by employers.

Figure 19.2 shows the size of total social expenditure, including mandatory and voluntary private expenditure for 1980 and 2003.

The significance of private benefits has generally grown over this period, but the inclusion of private social expenditures in the total has not changed the differences between countries dramatically. There are only four cases where they really make a big difference and bring these countries closer to the high social spenders: Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. In Switzerland the welfare state expanded both in its public and its mandatory private form. This development is mainly due to mandatory occupational pensions and to the reform of the health insurance system in 1996, which introduced




Fig. 19.2 Total social expenditure, OECD

compulsory subsidized private health insurance. Taking into account these expenditure items, the Swiss welfare state expanded strongly over the past 25 years. In the USA and the UK, by contrast, it is voluntary private expenditure that counts most. This means that it is up to private actors whether and which benefits they provide to whom. If they provide benefits, however, the state grants them generous tax concessions. This is the case, for example, with employer-based health insurance in the USA and with part of the large occupational pension system in the UK. If one takes into account private social expenditures, USA moves up its position significantly and comes close to Italy and Finland (Adema 2001).

Interesting is also the case of the Netherlands. As we have argued above, public social expenditure in this country went down as a percentage of the national income since the mid-1990s (see Fig. 19.1b). But this has largely been offset by a growth in private voluntary social expenditure. One should therefore not speak of a general decline of the welfare state, but of a shift in the welfare mix: the Netherlands have thus “privatized” large parts of social welfare and thereby moved towards the liberal welfare regime type.

All countries are increasingly affected by population ageing which leads to problems of securing a decent income in old age and to growing costs in health and social care systems. Yet although in all countries social expenditures on old age (including survivors) and health (including disability) represent by far the largest proportions of the total, there is significant variation in this respect (see Fig. 19.3).

In Ireland spending on old age and health makes up for less than 70% of the total whereas in Italy both items account for about 90%. In Italy and Poland roughly 60% of total social expenditures go to old-age pensioners and survivors alone; in Norway and Iceland only about 30%. In general, the Southern European countries tend to spend the highest proportions of their totals on old age, the Scandinavian countries the least. Continental and Eastern European countries are in between. The more “gerontocratic” (Alber) welfare states are typically found in the South and a little bit less in the East, the more family- and child-oriented welfare states are located in the North and West of Europe. This clearly




Fig. 19.3 Structure of social expenditure, Europe 2004

shows the rudimentary character of the Southern European welfare states where only the core institutions, mainly pension systems, are well developed.

This is also reflected in the share that benefits in kind represent among total social expenditure (see Table 19.7).

In 1990, all countries with a strong social service component were found in the North and West of Europe; only Portugal was an exception. The low-service welfare states were typically found in the South, in the rudimentary welfare states. Yet also some “big” social spenders like Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands spent low shares on social services. Together with Luxembourg, Italy and Germany these three “advanced” countries represented the well-developed, but mostly transfer-oriented welfare state typical for the Christian democratic world, respectively, Continental welfare states (see van Kersbergen 1995) that was strongly influenced by the ideas of Social Catholicism.

In 2004 we still find that the Scandinavian and the English speaking countries of Northern and Western Europe had the highest shares of expenditure on services in Europe, but in the middle and at the bottom of the distribution the picture has become blurred and individual countries have more or less erratically changed positions in the rank order. The Netherlands, for example, has clearly become more service-oriented whereas Belgium has remained relatively low near the bottom. This again shows that the Dutch welfare state since the 1990s has changed significantly whereas Belgium has remained relatively stable. The general tendency across Europe has been a moderate expansion of social services.

The last dimension of variation in European welfare states addressed here is the structure of financing. The methods and sources of financing the welfare state have been major areas of conflict during the ongoing reform debates in recent years. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the most visible political conflicts occurred in countries which depended on high proportions of general tax revenues, the situation has become reversed today. The tax-welfare backlash of the 1970s, for which Denmark was the outstanding example, was replaced by heavy conflicts over social security contributions paid by employers and employees, because they add to high overall labour costs and hence are often regarded

as one of the main reasons for high unemployment. Today it is the conservative welfare regime type in Continental Europe that has come under severe attack from economists and interest groups, because these countries have traditionally relied most on social security contributions as a method of financing.

Table 19.7 shows the share of social contributions as a source of financing social welfare for 1990 and 2004. In 2004 the Northern and Liberal countries relied least on social contributions as a source of financing. Yet with respect to the other families of nations the picture is somewhat blurred. Most of the advanced Continental welfare states like Austria, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands still rely heavily on social contributions. The share of general government revenues in these countries is lower than 40% or even 30%. It seems therefore that the two classical welfare state models, Bismarck versus Beveridge, can still be seen in the structure of financing in highly developed welfare states. The Southern European and the Eastern European countries, however, do not show such a clear pattern. On the one hand, we find countries like Poland and Portugal in which the welfare state is heavily financed by general tax revenues. On the other hand, Spain and

Table 19.7 Spending and financing patterns: social services and social contributions, Europe 1990 and 2004

Country group	Spending on social services as % of total social spending			Financing by social contributions as % of total financing		
	1990	2004	Difference	1990	2004	Difference
<i>Northern countries</i>						
Denmark	36.1	38.9	+2.8	13.1	29.8	+16.7
Finland	36.2	35.9	-0.3	52.1	50.3	-1.8
Iceland	50.0	51.5	+1.5	32.2	34.0	+1.8
Norway	38.6	39.9	+1.3	36.4	43.7	+7.3
Sweden	38.4	41.1	+2.7	40.6	49.4	+8.8
<i>Continental Europe</i>						
Austria	26.4	29.1	+2.7	64.1	64.0	-0.1
Belgium	21.7	28.1	+6.5	67.0	71.1	+4.1
France	33.0	34.9	+1.9	79.5	66.0	-13.5
Germany	28.8	29.8	+0.9	72.1	63.8	-8.3
Netherlands	23.6	32.7	+9.1	59.0	68.7	+9.7
<i>Liberal Countries</i>						
Ireland	36.7	47.1	+10.4	40.0	37.6	-2.4
Switzerland	27.6	28.8	+1.2	64.7	62.3	-2.4
United Kingdom	33.4	40.2	+6.8	55.0	48.7	-6.3
<i>Southern Europe</i>						
Greece	30.7	35.4	+4.7	59.0	60.8	+1.8
Italy	26.3	26.9	+0.5	70.3	56.0	-14.3
Portugal	35.1	33.2	-1.9	61.7	47.5	-14.2
Spain	26.7	31.8	+5.1	71.3	67.2	-4.1
<i>Eastern Europe</i>						
Czech Republic	x	35.0	x	x	79.2	x
Hungary	x	35.7	x	x	59.0	x
Poland	x	16.9	x	x	51.7	x
Slovenia	x	33.0	x	x	67.0	x
Slovak Republic	x	33.1	x	x	69.8	x

Source: EUROSTAT Social expenditure and financing data.

the Czech Republic seem to follow the Bismarck model with a high share of social security contributions.

Though there are still big differences between European welfare states in this respect, there has been a slight convergence in financing structures over time. Countries which in 1990 had a very high share of social contributions have moved towards increased tax financing in 2004. This is above all true for France, Germany and Italy. France, for example, which in 1990 had the highest share of social contributions of more than 75% reduced it to less than 65% in 2004. Thus, the old “Bismarck”-type welfare states have at least partly shifted financing and put more burdens on taxpayers. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries have increased the share of social contributions in this period. Denmark in particular, which in 1990 was the opposite case to France and had with less than 15% the lowest share of social contributions, increased this source of financing to more than 25% in 2004. By these developments the extremes of the spectrum moved closer to each other and the European countries have converged somewhat, although the major structural differences have remained.

One may thus conclude that there seems to be an astonishing overall continuity of the European welfare states. At the same time the historically developed differences between the various families of nations in Europe tend to persist. In fact, there have only been rare cases of fundamental changes. Indeed, in the strict sense only the Netherlands might be a real case of path change. Though in most countries there have certainly been significant reforms in many social policy areas, the overall architecture of the welfare state as a whole has shown great stability.

19.5 Pensions

19.5.1 The Historical Evolution of (Public) Pension Schemes

Historically, public pension schemes in Europe (and elsewhere in the Western world) have evolved along two basic models almost diametrically opposed to each other – commonly referred to as the Bismarckian vs. the Beveridgean tradition.

Typically, these models can be characterized as follows:

In the Bismarckian tradition, pensions are provided in the framework of social insurance schemes. The insured population is typically restricted to workers and employees, sometimes to all those in gainful employment (including the self-employed). The main (distributive) goal is to provide earnings replacement in case of old age, invalidity and, in the case of death, for their survivors.

This implies that pension benefits have somehow to be related to former income from employment. Thereby, for the insured population as a whole, the structure of benefits is bound to preserve the hierarchical pattern of income inequality generated during their employment careers. From this basic idea, later the goal has evolved to upgrade benefit levels so as to allow the maintenance of living standards attained in working life. According to the principles of social insurance, these earnings-related benefits have to be financed by earnings-related contributions so that there is a fairly strong contribution–benefit linkage, usually referred to as the (structural) equivalence principle. Contributions are usually shared between employers and employees and, as a rule, there are also state subsidies to total public pension expenditures. Historically, compulsory old-age

pension schemes have sometimes been preceded by state-subsidized voluntary schemes (see below).

In the Beveridgean tradition, the dominant goal of public pensions is to provide a minimum level of income to all elderly citizens, effectively protecting them against the risk of poverty in old age. The Beveridgean system stems from the even older “poor law” tradition where, however, benefits were subject to a means or income test. It departs from the “poor law” tradition in that it grants an entitlement to these minimum benefits “as of right”, i.e. as a social citizenship right, without recourse to a means test. It follows from this dominant distributive goal of providing basic security that benefits should be “flat rate”, i.e. not related to former income or contribution but to social needs.

In the liberal spirit of Lord Beveridge, state responsibility with regard to pensions should be restricted to providing minimum benefits and should leave room to, indeed encourage, private initiative to secure adequate living standards. Therefore, public pension schemes should be complemented by occupational and private pension schemes.

According to the original “poor law” tradition, but to some extent deviating from Beveridge’s own plan, basic pension schemes are typically financed by taxes, be it from general state revenues or from ear-marked taxes. Consequently, these schemes imply a fair amount of redistribution from the upper to the lower income strata and almost no linkage between contributions or taxes paid and the entitlement to benefits.

The Bismarckian tradition, first instituted in Imperial Germany in 1889, has also been adopted by the Austrian–Hungarian monarchy and has later been followed by Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Some other Continental European countries (France, Belgium, Italy and Spain) first started with the public subsidization of voluntary schemes, but later also changed to compulsory social insurance schemes (France 1910/30, Italy 1919, Belgium 1924/25).

The precursors of the Beveridgean model, namely tax-financed, usually means-tested flat-rate pensions were introduced as early as 1891 in Denmark and Iceland and later in the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1908. The Scandinavian countries have also built their first old-age pension schemes in this tradition (Sweden 1913, Norway 1936, Finland 1936). Flat-rate pensions according to the Beveridgean principles, i.e. without a means test, have been introduced shortly after World War II in the United Kingdom and Ireland (1946), in Sweden (1948) and also in the Netherlands (1956/1957) (Fig. 19.4).

Later developments have, however, shown a tendency towards convergence from the original “pure” forms, so clearly opposed in their basic principles (see Wilensky 2002: 216 ff.). In the countries following the Bismarckian model, the road to convergence consisted of two elements: First and most importantly, minimum benefits were introduced in the basically earnings-related schemes so as to provide better protection against poverty in old age for those with low earnings and/or shorter and interrupted employment records. Second, the coverage of schemes, originally restricted to industrial workers, was extended to include other segments of the working population (such as salaried employees, farmers and craftsmen). Yet groups without an employment career at all (in particular housewives) remained excluded from compulsory membership in these schemes.

Germany is the only clear case that stuck to compulsory earnings-related schemes without a minimum pension component. However, it is only a partial exception, because it strengthened the legal entitlement to (means-tested) social assistance for pensioners with low pension benefits.

In the countries following the strategy of minimum income protection, first the early means-test requirements were relaxed or abolished. More importantly, in addition to the

Strategy I: Secure minimum protection		Strategy II: Secure income maintenance	
1. Tax-financed means-tested minimum pensions		2. Tax-subsidized voluntary pensions	3. Compulsory earnings-related pensions
Denmark (1891) Iceland (1891) New Zealand (1898) Australia (1901/1908) United Kingdom (1908) Ireland (1908) Canada (1927) Sweden (1913) Norway (1936) Finland (1936)		France (1895) Belgium (1900) Italy (1898) Spain	Germany (1889) Austria (1906) Luxembourg (1911) The Netherlands (1913) USA (1936)
1. Stuck to minimum pensions	2. Introduced (additional) compulsory earnings-related pensions	1. Introduced minimum pensions	2. Stuck to compulsory earnings-related pensions
Denmark Ireland Australia New Zealand The Netherlands (1956)	Sweden (1959) Norway (1966) United Kingdom (1975) Finland (1961) Iceland Canada	France Belgium Italy Spain USA Austria Switzerland (1946)	Germany

Fig. 19.4 Pension policy trajectories in the long run: convergence towards a mixed system of income security for the aged in OECD countries

Source: Adapted from Wilensky (2002: 219, Figure 5.1) and Alber (1982: 232ff., Table A2).

flat-rate basic pensions for all citizens, compulsory earnings-related supplementary pension schemes for the employed population were introduced in the late 1950s and 1960s in the United Kingdom as well as in the Scandinavian countries. As a result, in these countries dual pension systems emerged, consisting of a universal flat-rate minimum pension component and an earnings-related, usually contribution-based component for the working population.

In institutional terms, however, considerable variation remained among the original Beveridgean countries.

Strictly speaking, only the Scandinavian countries (Sweden 1959, Finland 1961, Norway 1966) and Canada (1965) “established a second *public* pillar, which was contribution-based, unfunded (at least in principle), yielded an earnings-related supplementary pension and included redistributive provisions in varying degrees” (Hinrichs 2000: 81).

A second group of countries sought to attain the goal of income maintenance by topping up their basic flat-rate scheme by *occupational* pension schemes that were either mandated

by law (Switzerland 1985, Australia 1991) or were established through collective agreements (Netherlands, Denmark). “In these four countries the second pillar is funded and private, but. . . publicly regulated and controlled” (Hinrichs 2000: 81).

The United Kingdom constitutes a special case in that it set up a State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1978, but allowed for contracting-out into employer-sponsored occupational schemes or into tax-subsidized private pension plans (PPP), both of which are usually funded schemes. Currently, the latter *non-public* forms of pension provision clearly outweigh in importance the *public* PAYG scheme.

In a functionalist interpretation, this move towards convergence may be seen as the result of the inherent shortcomings of the “pure” ideal-typical models: The Bismarckian model, although geared to secure income maintenance, does not provide an effective protection against poverty in old age (in particular, for those social groups with marginal employment careers or those outside the labour market). The Beveridgean model, while it may provide a better minimum protection for all elderly citizens, does not secure adequate living standards for the larger part of the working population. Put in another way, the trend towards convergence can be interpreted to reflect the growing political recognition among citizens as well as policymakers in European countries that providing basic security for all older citizens and securing adequate income maintenance for the working population are both legitimate and desirable goals of public pension schemes.

19.5.2 Typologies of Contemporary Pension Systems

In addition to the priority goals of pensions provision — poverty alleviation vs. income maintenance — the resulting levels of benefits provided by public pension schemes should be taken into account. For instance, a universal flat-rate pension may be so low that it will not effectively protect against poverty in old age. Or in order to achieve adequate income maintenance, an earnings-related scheme should not fall short of a 50% net replacement rate. Combining these two aspects, the institutional characteristics and the level of (minimum and standard) benefits, Palme (1990: 73 ff.) has distinguished four models of public old-age pension schemes:

- a *basic security* model, with universal coverage (based on citizenship) and a minimum pension of at least one-third of an average production worker’s wage, net of taxes;
- an *income security* model, with earnings-related benefits and a net replacement rate for a standard worker’s pension of at least 50%;
- an *institutional* model, which combines a basic pension based on citizenship with an earnings-related supplementary pension meeting the criteria of the income security model; and
- a *residual* model which meets neither the criteria of the basic security model nor those of the income security model.

Based on these operational criteria, pension schemes in OECD countries around 1985 can be classified as in Fig. 19.5.

The OECD has suggested a different typology of pension systems which, at first sight, bears some resemblance to the “three-pillar” classification suggested by the World Bank (1994):

		Basic Security	
		No	Yes
Income Security	No	Residual Australia USA Switzerland Ireland United Kingdom	Basic Security New Zealand (1947) Denmark (1960) Netherlands (1965) Canada (1980)
	Yes	Income Security Austria (1950) Belgium (1960) Germany (1960) Italy (1970) Japan (1975) France (1985)	Institutional Finland (1965) Sweden (1975) Norway (1980)

Fig. 19.5 Classification of OECD countries according to models of old-age pensions

Source: Palme (1990: 90, Table 4.2).

Note: Year of entry indicated in parentheses.

- a publicly managed system with mandatory participation (first pillar),
- a privately managed mandatory savings system (second pillar), and
- voluntary savings (third pillar).

This classification is, however, rightly criticized because “it is a prescriptive rather than a descriptive typology” (OECD 2005: 22).

Leaving aside the third pillar of *voluntary* provisions and focusing on the *mandatory* parts of pension arrangements, two tiers are distinguished according to their objectives or functions: the first tier is called the redistributive part and the second one the insurance part. The redistributive components of the first tier “aim to prevent poverty in old age” (OECD 2007: 21) by ensuring that “pensioners achieve some absolute minimum standard of living” (OECD 2005: 22). The insurance components of the second tier aim “to ensure that retired people have an adequate replacement rate (retirement income relative to earnings before retirement)” (OECD 2005: 24).

The two basic objectives or functions of pension schemes can be performed by different institutional arrangements. Therefore, within these tiers schemes are classified further by their institutional form: public or private, defined benefit or defined contribution. In this way, the overall pension system of a country is not assigned to a single type, but can be characterized by the mix of its constituent parts (see Fig. 19.6).

The first-tier redistributive schemes can be of three different types:

- In *basic pension schemes*, the benefits are flat rate, i.e. the same amount is paid to every retiree, and additional income from other sources does not change the entitlement to the basic pension. This sub-type clearly conforms to the original Beveridgean concept.

	First tier			Second tier	
	Universal coverage, redistributive			Mandatory, insurance	
	Resource-tested	Public		Public	Private
Basic pension		Minimum pension	Type	Type	
Austria	X			DB	
Belgium	X		X	DB	
Czech Republic	X	X	X	DB	
Denmark	X	X			DC
Finland			X	DB	
France	X		X	DB	
Germany	X			DB	
Greece	X			DB	
Hungary				DB	DC
Iceland	X	X			DB
Ireland	X	X			
Italy	X			NDC	
Luxembourg	X	X	X	DB	
The Netherlands		X			DB
Norway		X	X	DB	DC
Poland			X	NDC	DC
Portugal			X	DB	
Slovak Republic			X	DB	DC
Spain			X	DB	
Sweden			X	NDC	DB + DC
Switzerland	X		X	DB	DB
United Kingdom	X	X	X	DB	
Australia	X				DC
Canada	X	X		DB	
Japan		X		DB	
New Zealand		X			
USA	X			DB	

Fig. 19.6 The structure of pension systems in OECD countries

Source: OECD (2007: 23, Table 1.1).

Notes: DB = defined benefit, DC = defined contribution, NDC = notional defined contribution.

Mandatory private schemes include quasi-mandatory schemes with broad coverage.

- *Resource- or means-tested programmes* are targeted at low-income earners, i.e. they pay higher benefits to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off retirees. In the calculation of benefits, they may take into account at least other retirement income or, more often, other sources of income and assets.
- *Minimum pensions* also aim to prevent pensions from falling below a certain level, not by means-testing, but by setting a floor in an otherwise earnings-related pension scheme. In other words, they constitute the redistributive parts of earnings-related social insurance schemes.

It is important to note that all of these programmes with a redistributive character are provided by the public sector. On the other hand, the insurance programmes designed to provide retirees with an adequate income relative to previous earnings, while mandatory, may be publicly or privately organized. A further distinction can be drawn between defined-benefit schemes (DB) and defined-contribution schemes (DC). In DB schemes, the target benefit (usually an earnings replacement rate) is defined first, and the contribution

rate is set accordingly. This type most closely conforms to the Bismarckian model. Thus, the amount a pensioner will receive depends on the number of years of contributions and on some measure of individual earnings from work.⁵ In DC schemes, on the other hand, the contribution rate is defined first, and the benefits the pensioners will receive depend on the accumulation of individual contributions and investment returns. Consequently, in a DC scheme, replacement rates cannot be guaranteed in advance, but will vary considerably by age cohorts. As a rule (but not necessarily), DB schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis while DC schemes are funded.

Finally, there are so-called notional defined-contribution (NDC) schemes which are some kind of hybrid between DB and DC schemes, and which have received increasing attention in recent pension reform debates. On the one hand, these schemes mimic the principles of a DC scheme, i.e. benefits are calculated according to accumulated individual contributions and an assumed rate of return, but they are “notional” in the sense that both the contributions and the rate of return applied to them exist only on the books of the managing institution. That is to say, in these NDC schemes, actually no capital is accumulated, but they are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.

The classification of countries according to their combination of first- and second-tier schemes presented in Fig. 19.6 can be summarized as follows.

Concerning the first-tier schemes with the goal of poverty prevention in old age, 8 out of the 22 European countries listed have a basic pension scheme and 13 have instituted a minimum pension in their basically earnings-related social insurance schemes. Germany and Austria are among the few European countries that have neither a basic nor a minimum pension. But even in these countries, as in most others, there exists a safety net for the elderly poor in the form of means-tested social assistance schemes.

Concerning the second-tier schemes with the goal of maintaining living standards relative to previous earnings, public defined-benefit schemes are the most common form of pension insurance provision. In 15 out of 22 European countries such schemes of the Bismarck type are in force. Three more countries (Sweden, Italy and Poland) have implemented, in the course of recent pension reforms, notional defined contribution plans under the guidance of the public sector. The next most common form of mandatory pension insurance provision is defined-contribution schemes, organized either as occupational schemes or as private pension plans. In six European countries, mandatory insurance is now organized in this way, operated by private sector institutions. Four countries (Netherlands, Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden) have private occupational defined-benefit plans. In these countries, the contribution rate as well as the minimum rate of return and a mandatory annuity rate is set by government regulation so that the system, although it looks like a DC scheme with capital funding, has strong elements of a DB plan.

This evidence confirms the trend towards convergence described above. With a few exceptions, almost all countries in Europe and even the overseas OECD countries pursue the goals of prevention of poverty in old age and of adequate income maintenance of the

⁵The method of calculating, “pension points”, used in some countries, is just a variant of a defined benefit scheme.

pensioners simultaneously.⁶ This does not mean, however, that they perform these functions equally well, for instance, ensure effective protection against poverty in old age or attain similar levels of earnings replacement (see below).

In many countries private pensions have become a significant part of old-age security. Though there seems to be a trend towards privatization, countries differ a lot with respect to their public–private mix. Moreover, the role of the state in private pensions widely varies. The distinction between mandatory and voluntary private schemes is fundamental in this respect, but also voluntary schemes can be more or less regulated or subsidized by the state or both.

Table 19.8 The composition of total pension expenditures (as % of GDP) in 2003

	Public	Mandatory	Voluntary	Total
Austria	12.8	a	0.6	13.4
Belgium	7.2	0.0	2.3	9.5
Czech Republic	7.8	0.2	a	8.0
Denmark	7.2	a	2.2	9.4
Finland	5.8	2.7	0.2	8.7
France	10.5	0.1	0.1	10.7
Germany	11.3	a	0.7	12.0
Greece	11.5	a	0.5	12.0
Hungary	7.5	a	a	7.5
Ireland	2.9	a	a	2.9
Italy	11.4	1.2	0.2	12.8
Luxembourg	4.5	1.6	a	6.1
The Netherlands	5.4	0.0	3.2	8.6
Norway	7.0	a	0.7	7.7
Poland	11.4	a	a	11.4
Portugal	8.8	a	0.1	8.9
Slovak Republic	6.4	0.1	0.3	6.8
Spain	7.9	a	0.0	7.9
Sweden	10.1	a	2.0	12.1
Switzerland	6.8	4.5	0.0	11.3
UK	5.9	0.5	4.2	10.6
Australia	3.9	0.5	2.5	6.9
Canada	4.0	a	4.2	8.2
Japan	8.0	0.6	2.6	11.2
New Zealand	4.4	a	a	4.4
USA	5.5	a	3.8	9.3

Source: OECD Social Expenditure Data; data extracted from OECD.

^aData do not exist.

Table 19.8 shows pension expenditure as percentages of the GDP, broken down by public, private mandatory and voluntary schemes in 2003. Countries already differ a lot in overall pension expenditures summing up the different schemes. This “pension effort” varies from about 3% in Ireland to more than 13% in Austria. Higher shares of private systems can be found in three country groups: in the Nordic welfare states of Denmark, Finland and Sweden (but not Norway); in liberal Britain; and in the Continental countries Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. With the exception of Belgium, all of these

⁶There is only one country (Hungary) that does not have any of the three variants of minimum protection, and only two countries (Ireland, New Zealand) do not have some form of mandatory second-tier pension, be it public or private.

countries can be subsumed under the Beveridgean legacy with strong flat-rate first pension pillars. Here private pensions are a necessary supplement in order to secure the standard of living of pensioners. This is not the case in countries with a Bismarckian system, because here already the first pillar is meant to fulfil this purpose.

Yet countries with strong private pensions differ with respect to the mandatory character of these schemes. In Finland and Switzerland, private pensions are required by law (for employed persons) while in the others they are largely voluntary. Thus the role of the welfare state is very different, although most voluntary schemes are also strongly regulated and heavily subsidized by the state.

19.5.3 *The Performance of Pension Schemes*

The performance of pension systems can be measured with respect to the two major goals: maintaining the standard of living and preventing poverty in old age. A good indicator for measuring to what degree the first goal has been achieved is the earnings replacement rate. More precisely, it is the *net* earnings replacement rate, i.e. “individual *net* pensions relative to individual *net* earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions” (OECD 2005: 51 ff.), which seems to be the most appropriate indicator to measure the maintenance of previous living standards.

Most often, the ratio of average (net) pensions to average (net) earnings is used to characterize the generosity of a pension system. This may be misleading for it neglects the impact of the benefit *structure* of a pension scheme. As a result, the earnings replacement rate may not be uniform for all pensioners, but different at different earnings levels. For instance, a flat-rate pension will lead to high replacement rates for low-income earners, but to low replacement rates for high-income earners. Only a pure earnings-related pension scheme will yield the same uniform replacement rate at all (gross) earning levels. Taking account of the usually lower taxation of pensions, compared to earnings, such an earnings-related scheme would, indeed, imply gradually higher *net* replacement rates at higher earning levels.

Table 19.9 presents net replacement rates of mandatory pension programmes⁷ at different earnings levels⁸ based on a complex modelling of pension entitlements developed by the OECD (see OECD 2005, Chapter 3). Thus, benefits from all schemes detailed for the respective countries in Fig. 19.6 are included and aggregated. To interpret the comparative evidence correctly, one should be aware of the methodological rules: In principle, *future* pension entitlements are calculated on the basis of the *current* pension legislation and *current* pension system parameters (concerning pensionable age, indexation procedures, etc.) and on the assumption that these pension rules remain unchanged.

The results are partly as expected, but also reveal some interesting unexpected features: On average, for all OECD countries, net replacement rates are highest at low earning levels and are gradually diminishing with increasing levels of income. This suggests that the need for compulsory public or mandated private provision is felt most urgently for low-income earners, while at higher income levels, more choice is left to individuals to make private provisions for old age.

⁷These include public plus private mandatory schemes. Systems with near-universal coverage (as occupational schemes in the Netherlands and Sweden) are also included, provided they cover at least 90% of the employees.

⁸For reasons of comparison, earnings levels are standardized, ranging from 50 to 250% of average earnings.

Table 19.9 Net replacement rates by earnings level, mandatory pensions, men (percent of individual pre-retirement earnings)

	Individual earnings, multiple of average					
	0.5	0.75	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5
Austria	91.2	93.4	93.2	93.5	79.3	63.2
Belgium	82.7	63.8	63.1	53.3	42.7	36.0
Czech Republic	88.3	68.3	58.2	42.9	35.3	31.0
Denmark	95.6	68	54.1	42.5	35.5	30.8
Finland	90.7	78.8	78.8	79.2	78.3	79.3
France	98.0	70.8	68.8	62.6	59.2	57.0
Germany	61.7	66.6	71.8	79.2	67	54.2
Greece	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9
Hungary	86.6	90.9	90.5	99.1	92.6	81.8
Iceland	95.8	77.1	65.9	54.1	57.2	55.1
Ireland	63.0	47.0	36.6	27.4	21.9	18.3
Italy	89.3	88.0	88.8	88.4	89.1	89.0
Luxembourg	125.0	115.0	109.8	105.6	104.2	100.1
The Netherlands	82.5	88.2	84.1	85.8	83.8	82.8
Norway	85.5	73.1	65.1	58.2	50.1	42.8
Poland	69.9	69.7	69.7	69.8	70.5	71.0
Portugal	115.9	79.8	79.8	84.4	86.3	86.9
Slovak Republic	58.2	59.4	60.2	63.1	65.7	67.8
Spain	88.7	89.4	88.3	88.4	83.4	68.8
Sweden	90.2	76.4	68.2	70.1	74.3	75.0
Switzerland	71.4	68.9	67.3	53.0	41.4	34.3
United Kingdom	78.4	57.7	47.6	38.2	29.8	24.7
Australia	77.0	61.2	52.4	43.1	36.5	31.3
Canada	89.4	67.6	57.1	39.5	30.6	25.1
Japan	80.1	66.3	59.1	51.9	44.3	35.8
New Zealand	77.1	52.0	39.5	27.9	22.0	18.1
USA	61.4	54.6	51.0	44.9	39.0	35.5
OECD average	84.1	73.2	68.7	64.3	59.4	54.5

Source: OECD: Pensions at a Glance 2005: 52.

This pattern is most visible for countries in the Beveridgean tradition of flat-rate pensions (UK, IRE, NZ, AUS), but also – to a lesser degree – for countries with earnings-related schemes that have instituted minimum pensions for low-income earners and ceilings on pensionable earnings for high-income earners (like CH, BE, FR).

While this pattern holds true for most countries, there are some significant exceptions from the rule in earnings-related schemes, most significantly in Germany. Because of the mechanism of lower taxation for pensioners outlined above, the individual net replacement rates actually increase which seems counterintuitive to any social policy logic. In some other countries (GR, NL, IT), the net earnings replacement rate remains practically uniform across all income levels. In Sweden, surprisingly, the replacement rate is lowest for the average earner, but higher both for low- and high-income earners.

Because of the impact the benefit structure (flat-rate vs. earnings-related) of a pension system has on the replacement rates, the rank order of countries changes considerably if one compares the replacement rates at various earning levels. While in the upper income brackets, the highest replacement rates can be achieved by earnings-related schemes, this

does not apply to below-average income earners. Here, some of the countries with universal flat-rate pensions perform equally well as earnings-related schemes (or even better), depending on the minimum benefit level.

While the individual earnings replacement rate shows best to what extent the *previous personal* standard of living can be maintained, it does not answer the question of whether an *adequate* standard of living, relative to the average income situation in a given country, can be sustained. Individual replacement rates may be quite high (for instance, 100% for a low-income worker), but his pension benefits may still amount to 50% or less of the economy-wide average earnings. Therefore, pension adequacy is better measured by the relative pension level which shows “what benefit level a pensioner will receive in relation to the average wage earner in the respective country” (OECD 2005: 45). “Only for an average wage earner, the replacement rate and the relative pension level will be the same” (ibid.).

In countries with “pure” flat-rate (or resource-tested) pension benefits, the relative pension level is virtually independent of previous incomes (UK, IRE, CAN, AUS, NZ, DK, CZ). On the other hand, in “pure” Bismarckian earnings-related schemes, the relative pension levels increase with individual earnings in an almost linear way. There are six countries with a very strong link between relative pension levels and pre-retirement earnings (GR, HU, NL, IT, PL, SK) and six more countries with a strong link (AUT, GER, FIN, SW, LUX, ESP).

The protection against (or the alleviation of) poverty in old age is the second central goal of pension policy about which there is a broad political consensus. The “success” of pension policies in this respect can best be measured directly by the incidence of poverty among the elderly population. Of course, the incidence of poverty among the elderly does not depend solely on the retirement income provided by public pension programmes. It is also affected by the degree of income inequality prevailing in society at large (or, more specifically, by the distribution of market income among the working population). Likewise, it must be taken into account that retirement income is only part of the “total income package”⁹ of pensioners (households), albeit in most cases the most important item. It may be supplemented by continued, though reduced, income from work and by interest income from capital assets. In addition, the pooling of resources within households and support from other household members may reduce the risk of pensioners to fall into poverty.

Table 19.10 presents some comparative information on the evidence of poverty among the elderly in 15 EU countries, as of 1999.¹⁰ A total of 50% of the national median equivalent income has been adopted by the EU as the quasi-official poverty line in its research programmes to combat poverty. A total of 60% of median income has come into use as a “milder” poverty line, also including those groups “at the risk of poverty”. It makes sense to use both poverty lines in conjunction as a sensitivity test of how a change of the baseline by 10 percentage points affects the poverty rates measured.

Using these yardsticks, about 10% of the elderly in the EU are living in poverty (at the 50% threshold) and about 17% at the 60% threshold. In Greece and Portugal, relative poverty rates are higher than 20%, that is, more than two times the EU average. Also in

⁹The “total income package”, i.e. net equivalent household income, is the basis for setting the relative poverty lines which are used for calculating the poverty rates.

¹⁰These data are based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 1999. There are certain methodological problems associated with the ECHP (e.g. the non-imputation of rents in case of home ownership) which do not allow drawing definite conclusions.

Table 19.10 Poverty rates and risks among the elderly 1998

	Relative poverty rates among the elderly (65 years and over)					
	50% of median			60% of median		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria	8	12	10	15	29	24
Belgium	11	12	12	20	22	22
Denmark	10	14	12	26	35	31
Finland	1	8	6	9	23	17
France	8	12	10	16	21	19
Germany	5	6	6	9	13	11
Greece	24	25	25	34	33	33
Ireland	7	19	14	26	41	34
Italy	7	9	8	12	16	14
Luxembourg	3	4	4	6	10	8
The Netherlands	4	5	4	7	7	7
Portugal	18	25	22	30	36	33
Spain	7	7	7	16	16	16
Sweden	2	3	3	6	10	8
United Kingdom	7	13	11	17	25	21
EU-15	7	10	9	15	19	17

Source: European Commission (2003: 28, Table 2).

Source of data: ECHP, 6th wave, 1999.

Ireland and the United Kingdom and, surprisingly, in Belgium and Denmark, poverty rates of the elderly are above the EU average. At the other end, poverty among the elderly is lowest in Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, followed by Germany, Finland, Spain and Italy. At the 60% threshold, the pattern among EU countries remains largely the same, but the differences concerning the risk of poverty among pensioners seem to be even more pronounced. More than 30% of pensioners live at the risk of poverty in Ireland, Greece, and Portugal (and, again surprisingly, in Denmark), while in Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the respective rates are below 10%.

Additional analyses on the basis of ECHP data show that the risk of poverty increases with age and is highest among the very old (75+). On the EU average, the poverty rates and risks are somewhat higher for elderly women than for men, but here two groups of countries emerge: one group where the poverty risks of elderly women are at least 50% higher than for men (POR, IRE, UK, FIN, FR, AUT) and another group where the gender difference is far less significant (BE, NL, ESP, GER, LUX, GR).

Furthermore, it is interesting from a social policy point of view to examine whether pensioners suffer from higher risks of poverty than the younger age groups and whether the range of income inequality prevailing among households of working age is reduced (or perhaps even widened) during the retirement phase. On the EU average, pensioners have only slightly higher risks of poverty than younger households (of working age) nowadays, but there are again two distinctly different groups of countries: in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Austria, pensioners (and among them, in particular women) still have significantly *higher* poverty risks, while in Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, poverty risks among pensioners are actually lower than among households of younger age, or for that matter, among the population at large.

Finally, while on the EU average, income inequality among pensioners is somewhat less pronounced than in the working-age population, this general tendency holds no longer true for all member countries: in Germany and the Netherlands, there is virtually no difference, and in Greece, Austria, Belgium and Denmark, inequality among pensioners seems to be more expressed than among younger age cohorts.

19.5.4 Trends of Pension Reform

In the last two decades, most pension systems in Europe and the Western world have come under increasing strains, above all, from the demographic pressures of ageing populations and by economic pressures arising from mass unemployment and slow economic growth, exacerbated by processes of globalization. These pressures have led to increasing imbalances between the revenues and expenditures of pension systems and thus have challenged the stability and future viability of existing pension schemes. Governments have responded to these real and/or perceived challenges by a variety of reform and adjustment strategies. In general, it can be hypothesized that the scope and direction of reform strategies is determined:

- by the institutional set-up of existing schemes (“path dependency”) and
- by the interests of the political actors involved (“pension politics”).

Since both factors vary cross-nationally, it can be expected that the political and administrative measures will also vary considerably. Indeed, a large variety of measures have been taken to stabilize the expenditure and/or the revenue side of public pension schemes.

Nonetheless, certain common trends of reform can be identified in most countries (see Hinrichs 2000; Schludi 2005):

First, “reforms have strengthened the equivalence principle in social insurance-type pension schemes and have thus reduced elements of interpersonal redistribution” (Hinrichs 2001: 85). Such measures usually imply lower pension benefits for those with a less than full employment record.

Second, “the reforms are aimed at increasing the age of entry into retirement, be it by gradually raising the standard retirement age or by blocking pathways into early retirement” (ibid.: 87). In particular, attempts have been undertaken to reverse the trend of ever lower employment rates in the upper age brackets.

Third, “increased tax financing . . . can be identified as a further trend” (ibid.: 87). The purpose of this measure has mostly been to contain or even reverse increases in the contribution rate to the schemes which would have otherwise added to non-wage labour costs and thus have been detrimental to the international competitiveness of the national economy.

This trend seems to be at odds with the principle of contribution financing of social insurance schemes, and also with the first trend mentioned above, of strengthening the equivalence principle. Both trends can, however, be rendered compatible if tax financing is used for the redistributive parts of social insurance schemes while the insurance parts continue to be financed by contributions. In this way, the schemes can even be made more transparent and acceptable for the citizens.

Fourth, in almost all countries “unpaid family work was incorporated into benefit calculation” (ibid.). In contrast to tightening eligibility criteria and strengthening the equivalence principle, this obviously is an expansionary and, moreover, a redistributive element in

recent reforms. But insofar as child-bearing and -rearing are recognized by such measures, they may also be justified as extended “equivalence in real terms” which goes beyond equivalence in monetary terms (i.e. of contributions).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a major trend of reform can be observed in most countries: shifting the balance in the public/private mix in pension provision in favour of the latter, by giving more weight to occupational schemes and personal pension plans. By the same token, pay-as-you-go financing prevailing in public schemes is gradually shifting towards capital funding which is the predominant mode of financing in non-public schemes.

It is sometimes argued by the proponents of such a shift that in this way the reduction of entitlements and benefits in public schemes can be compensated by increased benefits from non-public schemes. It must be questioned, however, whether such a shift is socially desirable because of the negative distributional consequences it entails. First, the redistributive elements of the pension income package will be further reduced and, second, the tax advantages usually given to companies and individuals as incentives for making private provisions tend to benefit the upper income brackets and may turn out to be very expensive for the public budget.

Just because “the non-public components are not completely private, but are shaped by public regulation and fiscal welfare” (Hinrichs 2000: 80), the regulation of the non-public forms of pension provision will probably become a crucial issue in future pension reform debates.

19.6 Healthcare

Healthcare systems form a major part of modern welfare states and alongside pensions are the biggest consumers of resources. Furthermore, they are among the largest employers in countries where most health services are offered by public providers. Healthcare systems provide security against a major life risk, and access to healthcare services is highly valued in all developed countries (Mossialos 1997; Kohl and Wendt 2004). Therefore, even in countries without National Health Service or nation-wide compulsory insurance, the state guarantees access to basic healthcare for all citizens. Due to the high importance of health and healthcare, the medical profession has obtained a special role in modern societies and – with respect to healthcare reforms – has a strong veto power (Immergut 1992). While for many years healthcare systems have expanded, from the early 1990s onwards cost pressures have increased, and in a context of permanent austerity (Pierson 2001) healthcare systems are increasingly confronted with structural reforms.

In this section we discuss different types of healthcare systems and the variations between them regarding expenditures, financing and service provision. With respect to expenditure and financing it is asked whether processes of convergence can be detected and whether “laggard countries” have increased expenditures faster than “pioneer countries”. This would support Peter Flora’s “growth to limits” thesis. In addition, the structure (public–private mix) of financing is addressed. This includes a discussion of “the role of the state” in healthcare systems: Do healthcare systems face a retreat of the state from financing and an increase of private funding? With respect to service provision, the development of various sectors (in-patient [hospital treatment], out-patient, pharmaceutical and dental healthcare) is analysed. Since out-patient services are mostly offered by private providers while in-patient services are still dominated by public ones, a shift from in-patient to

out-patient services would also result in a privatization of healthcare (Tuohy et al. 2004). The section concludes with an overview of healthcare reforms and reflects on processes of convergence or divergence among European countries.

19.6.1 Types of Healthcare Systems

Healthcare systems have never been a major issue in the distinction of different welfare state models (see above). Only data on sickness benefits, but not institutional structures of service provision have been taken into account (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 2003; Scruggs and Allan 2006). The analytical focus has been on cash benefits whereas healthcare and social services have been largely ignored in developing welfare state models (Alber 1995; Bambra 2005a,b).

Healthcare systems are mainly grouped by their way of organization and funding: the Social Insurance (SI) type on the one hand and the National Health Service (NHS) on the other (see, for instance, Freeman 2000; Wendt 2009; Wendt et al. 2009). The first compulsory health insurance system for workers was established in Germany in 1883. This system was developed by the German chancellor, Bismarck, at that time, and in the following decades was adopted by other European countries. Even countries that are today known for their National Health Service, for instance Great Britain or Denmark, had first introduced health insurance for selected population groups and changed their systems only decades later. The main idea of health insurance is that the state has to organize compulsory insurance against the risk of sickness for those parts of the working population that are considered to be unable to fend for themselves by private means. At a later stage, additional population groups like dependent family members, pensioners, handicapped persons and students gained access to social insurance. Some of these groups were covered even without paying own insurance contributions (especially dependent family members). Today, most social insurance systems cover nearly the whole population. Thus in most European countries the original character of a worker's insurance was gradually replaced by the idea of a citizen's insurance.

After World War II the second type of healthcare system was installed. In 1948, Great Britain implemented the National Health Service. Since the NHS widely followed the recommendations made by the 1942 Beveridge Report, it is also known as the Beveridge type of healthcare system. The main characteristics of NHS systems are tax financing, universal coverage, and a major role of the state in organizing and providing healthcare services. The Scandinavian countries also finance their healthcare systems mainly out of taxes and offer healthcare as a "social citizenship right". Therefore, they can also be included among the NHS type of system, but in contrast to the hierarchical structure of the British NHS, in Scandinavia healthcare is mainly organized and financed at the regional or even local level.

In principle, a third type of healthcare system can be distinguished. In some countries, neither a NHS nor compulsory insurance has been implemented. In these cases people either have to rely on private insurance or finance healthcare to a large extent out of pocket. In the early 1960s, in a number of countries less than 60% of the population was covered by a NHS or compulsory health insurance (Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Spain, USA; see OECD Health Data 2006). Today, however, only in the USA the majority of the population relies on private insurance. Private healthcare systems are characterized by a high share of

private funding and service provision and are mainly coordinated by market mechanisms (see Table 19.11).

In some countries a system shift took place. Italy, for instance, replaced social insurance by a NHS in 1978. Other Southern European countries, too, implemented NHS systems in the 1970s and 1980s (Portugal in 1979; Greece in 1983; Spain in 1986). Since they are characterized by a comparatively high level of private funding, these “late developing” NHS systems can be distinguished from earlier developed ones.

In the 1990s, a substantial number of CEE countries established social insurance systems (Dubois and McKee 2004), which from the beginning have been confronted by rising costs and a growing share of private funding. In contrast to Western Europe, private health insurance has not gained ground in CEE countries. If these later implemented social insurance schemes are separated from the “pioneer” systems of Western Europe, five “real” types of healthcare systems can be distinguished (see Table 19.12).

In Table 19.12, 22 European countries for which data are available in the OECD Health Data are grouped according to the 5 types of healthcare systems. Additionally, the USA and Japan have been included to compare European countries with two countries from other world regions. Due to the large share of private funding and the great importance of market mechanisms we classify Switzerland and the USA as private healthcare systems. Since the introduction of general compulsory insurance in 1996 the Swiss system certainly contains many characteristics of a social insurance system, but without departing from the traditional high level of private out-of-pocket funding.

19.6.2 Health Expenditure and Financing

When analysing those European countries which have been members of the OECD already in 1970 (without Central and Eastern Europe, CEE), we see on average an increase of *total health expenditure* from 5.0% of GDP in 1970 to 9.2% in 2005. Health expenditure has increased at a high rate in the 1970s, followed by a more stable development in the 1980s, and again by a rapid increase from the early 1990s onwards.

Switzerland has been the country with the highest level of total health expenditure in 2005, followed by Germany and France. Luxembourg, Finland and Ireland are at the other end of the scale. While countries with a social health insurance in general show a higher level of total expenditure, nearly all countries below the OECD Europe average have a National Health Service. When comparing 1970 and 2005, it becomes evident that the rank order of European countries has changed remarkably. Today, we find Sweden and especially Denmark, “big spenders” in 1970, below the OECD Europe mean. Southern European countries which had implemented National Health Services only in the 1970s or 1980s, on the other hand, have experienced a high increase of total health expenditure between 1970 and 2005. While Japan has experienced a similar expansion as European countries and today is close to the European mean, USA has doubled its health expenditures relative to GDP since 1970 and is today by far the biggest spender in healthcare (15.3% of GDP in 2005).

The hypothesis that countries with a higher GDP per capita spend a greater share of their GDP for healthcare services (Alber 1988; Castles 2004) has been confirmed in many empirical studies. It is also supported when using OECD data for 1970. In 2004, however, the correlation between the wealth of a country and the percentage of GDP spent on healthcare has declined remarkably (see Fig. 19.7).

Table 19.11 (Ideal) Types of healthcare systems

Type	Underlying values and principles	Financing	Service provision	Regulation
National Health Services	Equity: Equal access to services for everyone	Public: taxes according to income (direct taxes) and consumption (indirect taxes) Societal: social contributions according to income	Public providers	Hierarchy; encompassing planning and tight control by the state
Social Insurance system	Solidarity: Equal access to services for all members of insurance funds	Societal: social contributions according to income	Private and public providers	Collective bargaining; legal framework and some control by the state
Private (insurance) system	Principle of equivalence: service with respect to ability to pay	Private: premium according to individual risk	Private providers	Markets; limited control of insurance and service provision by the state

Source: Rothgang et al. (2005).

Table 19.12 “Real” types of healthcare systems

Private health systems	Social Insurance systems: Western Europe	Social Insurance systems: CEE countries	National Health Service systems: Western and Northern Europe	National Health Service systems: Southern Europe
Switzerland USA	Austria Belgium France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Japan	Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic	Denmark Finland Iceland Ireland Norway Sweden United Kingdom	Greece Italy Portugal Spain

Note: USA and Japan have been included to compare European healthcare systems with examples from outside Europe.




Fig. 19.7 GDP per capita and THE in % of GDP (without CEE region)
Source: OECD Health Data (2006).

When CEE countries are included (Fig. 19.8), it is possible to identify different groups of healthcare systems. The CEE countries at the bottom are characterized by both a low




Fig. 19.8 GDP per capita and THE in % of GDP, 2004 (CEE region included)
Source: OECD Health Data (2006).

GDP and a relatively low level of total health expenditure. Within the Southern European group, we find countries with a relatively high level as well as with a lower level of total health expenditure. The Social Insurance systems of Western Europe generally spend a higher share of GDP on healthcare than the “mature” NHS systems of Western and Northern Europe. The type of healthcare system, therefore, has a strong influence on the level of health expenditure. Especially NHS systems proved to be successful in stabilizing healthcare costs.

With respect to processes of convergence or divergence the following developments can be outlined:

- Due to the strong increase of total health expenditures in “late developing” NHS systems and the more stable development in “pioneer NHS countries” from 1970 to 2005 a convergence has taken place in Western Europe. The coefficient of variation decreased from 28.8 to 13.4 in this period (OECD Health Data 2006, own calculation).
- When comparing NHS systems and Social Insurance systems, due to the catching up of Southern Europe, today NHS countries are more similar to each other and experienced a stronger convergence than Social Insurance-type countries.
- Besides the institutional setting of the respective healthcare systems, the European Union seems to have a positive impact on convergence. Convergence in countries which have been members of the EU for a longer period of time (EU 12) and divergence in non-EU 12 countries lend some support to the European Integration thesis (Wendt et al. 2005).

When analysing the share of public financing as a percentage of total health expenditure, no general retreat of the state can be detected. On average, the share of public funding has remained quite stable in European healthcare systems from 1970 to 2005 (OECD Health Data 2006). In certain healthcare sectors, however, changes in the public–private mix turned out to be more far-reaching than in the healthcare system in total. While in-patient healthcare is still funded by more than 80% by public sources in nearly all OECD countries, public financing for dental services has been reduced, and in 2005 only in Germany, Luxembourg and Japan the public share exceeded 50%. In countries like Spain, Switzerland and the USA, on the other side, public financing is almost absent in dental healthcare.

The differences with respect to the financing of healthcare systems become even more evident when public funding is subdivided in to tax financing and social insurance contributions and private funding in private insurance and private out-of-pocket payments. The NHS systems of Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom are still financed by more than 80% out of taxes whereas healthcare systems in Luxembourg, Germany and France are overwhelmingly financed from social insurance contributions. In Switzerland, compulsory health insurance for the total population was introduced in 1996, followed by an increase of social insurance financing which in 2005 exceeded private funding. Yet still the Swiss system is financed to a large extent by private out-of-pocket payments. It therefore represents a mixed model of healthcare financing. Today the CEE countries belong to the group of systems which are financed mainly out of social insurance contributions. In the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the respective shares are even higher than in the “traditional” Social Insurance systems of Germany or France. In Hungary and Poland, the level of social insurance financing is also comparatively high, but supplemented by a high share of private out-of-pocket payments. Private insurance, on the other hand, is of hardly any importance in CEE countries.

Taking the share of public funding as an indicator for the interventionist power of the state, Alber has argued that in times of austerity, countries with a higher share of public funding are more successful in controlling total health expenditure (Alber 1988). While in 1970 (in a period of welfare state expansion) nearly no correlation between public financing and the level of health expenditure could be identified, the data provided for 2004 in Fig. 19.9 support this hypothesis with a strong negative correlation between the share of public funding and the relative level of total health expenditure.




Fig. 19.9 Public financing in % of THE and level of THE in % of GDP
 Source: OECD Health Data (2006).

19.6.3 Health Service Provision

Healthcare systems represent the “service heavy” part of the welfare state. The lion’s share of resources is spent on healthcare personnel while financial transfers today are of minor importance. Healthcare services can either be measured as “monetary inputs” or as healthcare personnel. Due to differences in income and prices, important distinctions concerning the development of monetary and non-monetary resources can be identified. The analysis of health service provision will therefore be based on both “inputs”.

When calculating the share of monetary resources for different healthcare sectors, it becomes evident that some countries (especially Iceland and Switzerland, also Italy, Austria and Norway) give in-patient healthcare by far the highest importance while in Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and Spain less than one-third is spent on this sector (see Fig. 19.10). In Sweden and Spain, out-patient healthcare is even of higher relevance than in-patient healthcare. CEE countries, too, spend a relatively low share on in-patient healthcare. Especially the Slovak Republic, Poland and Hungary can be distinguished from the other countries by their comparatively high share for pharmaceuticals. In most European countries, the relative importance of in-patient healthcare has decreased in recent years.

When focusing on healthcare personnel, we find an increase of the number of healthcare providers per 1,000 inhabitants in almost all European countries (OECD Health Data 2006). This trend indicates that even in times when welfare states are facing enormous cost containment pressures, growing needs have pushed service supply.

In contrast to health expenditure, no convergence with regard to healthcare providers can be identified (Wendt et al. 2005). This heterogeneity is indicated by the remarkable differences in the numbers of healthcare personnel in European countries. In 2004, the total number of health service providers varied from 59.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in Switzerland to 13.5 in Portugal. At the top we find the UK and Iceland, where most service providers are employed in hospitals, and Germany and Norway, where most providers work outside




Fig. 19.10 Monetary resources for healthcare sectors, 2004
Source: OECD Health Data (2006).

hospitals. In countries with a low overall number of healthcare personnel, however, provision is primarily inside hospitals. The number of healthcare personnel in CEE countries is higher than in most Southern European NHS systems, but much lower than in Western Europe.

Since at the top we find Social Insurance-type systems (Switzerland, Germany), NHS systems (Norway, Iceland, United Kingdom) as well as the privately dominated US system, it is not the *type of healthcare system* that can be considered as the main factor for different service levels.

In general, there is a positive correlation between total health expenditure (in US\$ per capita) and total health employment per 1,000 population. Again, certain groups of healthcare systems can be identified. Figure 19.11 shows that especially CEE Social Insurance systems as well as Southern European NHS systems form rather homogeneous clusters. Within the group of Western European social insurance systems, however, Germany offers a much higher level of health employment than France at a similar level of health expenditure (in US\$ per capita). Likewise, within the group of “mature” NHS systems




Fig. 19.11 THE in US\$ per capita (ppp) and total health employment per 1,000 persons, 2004
 Source: OECD Health Data (2006).

Finland has reached a higher level of health employment than Denmark although the costs are much lower. Denmark can be taken as an example for a close cooperation between in-patient and out-patient healthcare with in-patient social care and home care services. This close cooperation is considered to be one reason why patients can be transferred earlier from hospitals to social care facilities. Therefore the number of healthcare providers in Denmark can be lower than in most other countries (see Wendt 2009).

19.6.4 Reform Trends

In response to growing cost pressures, health reforms have been implemented at an accelerating rate. While for many years strong veto groups succeeded in defending the established structure of healthcare systems, from the 1980s onwards health politicians increasingly implemented structural reforms (Giamo and Manow 1999; Freeman and Moran 2000). The increasing role of policy learning and the orientation at “best practice” may have had the effect that countries have to a greater extent left their traditional reform path and implemented new elements into their systems (Marmor et al. 2005).

This can be demonstrated by the dawn of market mechanisms especially in NHS systems. Referring mainly to ideas introduced to the health policy debate by Enthoven (1985), a so-called internal market was implemented in the British NHS in 1991 where money would follow the patient. A purchaser–provider split was introduced with general practitioners (GPs) being allowed to hold their own budget which would cover in-patient treatment as well as all out-patient referrals and all diagnostic tests. Hospitals were given the opportunity to become NHS trusts and thus to compete with one another on the basis of performance to secure purchaser contracts and replace the existing hierarchical command-and-control system.

Other NHS systems followed the British example. For instance, in Sweden, Finland and Italy (less extensive) experiments with internal markets to stimulate competition between healthcare providers and thus improve efficiency were undertaken. In Sweden a series of planned market models were implemented in the 1990s. The reforms sought to enable

patients to choose between different health centres or hospitals. A purchaser–provider split within the county council’s administrative apparatus was intended to generate incentives for competition and for more entrepreneurial behaviour (Saltman and Bergman 2005).

NHS-type systems thereby changed their character by implementing instruments that used to be more common in private systems. In recent years, however, the British NHS experienced changes that might better be described as “devolution”. In 2001, Primary Care Trusts had been established in Great Britain. Within these entities, cooperation between service providers is of major importance and therefore the utilization of market elements has lost ground. One important effect can be seen in a convergence within the NHS type. Healthcare provision in Sweden, Denmark and Finland is traditionally organized at a local or regional level (Saltman and Bergman 2005), and the process of devolution brought the British system closer to the Scandinavian countries.

While Southern European countries have approached the level of health expenditure of earlier developed NHS systems, major differences remain with regard to the organizational structure. Especially in Greece and Portugal part of the former, social insurance schemes continue to operate in parallel to the NHS (Davaki and Mossialos 2005; Oliveira and Pinto 2005). The NHS systems of these countries have not yet obtained characteristics of a universal system. Patients, for instance, face much higher direct costs than in most other NHS systems. There have also been debates on implementing a purchaser–provider split, but this was barely implemented in Southern Europe. On the other side, the healthcare systems of Greece, Portugal and especially Spain also experienced processes of devolution. In Spain, for instance, the responsibility for healthcare provision has been transferred to the regional governments (Lopez-Casasnovas et al. 2005). These reform processes towards the regional or even local level might lead to convergence among NHS systems.

Social insurance systems, on the other hand, can be characterized by a high level of self-regulation. Especially in Germany, sickness funds and doctors’ associations negotiate on budgets and conditions for healthcare provision. From the early 1990s onwards, however, the self-regulatory core came under pressure from two sides. The state improved its capacity for direct intervention and at the same time market mechanisms have been implemented, as some commentators argue, to bypass established veto positions (Tuohy 1999; Giaimo and Manow 1999). An important structural effect of this development is that the traditional strength of corporate actors within social insurance systems is losing ground.

The market-derived changes were different from those implemented in NHS systems. In Social Insurance systems, a separation of purchasers and providers exists almost by definition (Freeman 2000). In some Social Insurance systems (e.g. Germany, The Netherlands), however, competition between sickness funds has been strengthened in the belief that this would increase efficiency and quality (Saltman et al. 2004). Further, the distinction between sickness funds and private insurance has been reduced in the Netherlands and Switzerland while in other Social Insurance systems neither competition between insurance funds nor a convergence between public and private insurance has taken place. The group of Social Insurance countries is, therefore, today more heterogeneous than in the past.

The Social Insurance systems in CEE countries are still distinct from those of Western Europe. The reforms of the early 1990s were driven by the ideas of departing from the centralized state model, of liberalization of health service provision and of enforcing accountability of providers and consumers of healthcare (Dubois and McKee 2004). The concept of self-regulation, however, has not achieved such a dominant role like in Western European systems. Another prominent difference is the minor role of private health insurance in Central and Eastern Europe. In common with NHS systems of Southern

Europe, most CEE Social Insurance systems rely on a relatively high share of private out-of-pocket funding. In these countries, the risk of sickness is therefore to a larger extent “privatized” than in “mature” NHS or Social Insurance systems.

Since in most Social Insurance systems compulsory coverage has been extended to the total population, these systems today contain certain elements that used to be typical for NHS systems. Further examples are the introduction of global budgets by the state and of “gate keeping” models in many Social Insurance systems. Healthcare system types are today therefore not as “distinct” as they used to be. Examples for the increasing importance of “policy learning” are the introduction of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), a system that intensifies competition between hospitals (Rothgang et al. 2005). Thereby the integration process of the European Union seems to have hardly contributed to these developments (Freeman and Moran 2000). Yet it has been argued that the common European market and the open method of coordination (OMC) provide ground for an increasing importance of market mechanisms and competition in the field of healthcare (Gerlinger and Urban 2006). In this context, international hospital groups or pharmacies have gained access to the healthcare market in many European countries. These processes can be seen as an indicator for a general “economization” of healthcare provision.

19.7 Family Policy

Family policy is one of the “youngest” and still less developed parts of the welfare state and has often been initiated by “private” actors rather than the state. The Catholic Church, for instance, was a major competitor of the state in the field of family law, but had a strong influence on social services and particularly childcare as well. Local communities, especially the notables and representatives of the local bourgeoisie, played an important role in implementing the poor law and providing basic collective goods such as water supply, electricity and public transport. Employers and trade unions were major actors in income policies for families. Family allowances, for example, were first introduced voluntarily by Catholic employers rather than by the state. Most, if not all, state family policies were historically launched by civil society actors which emphasizes the strong intermediary structures in European societies.

This specific constellation was also the starting point for public family policy that can be defined as programmes by which the state intervenes into the family (as a social group and institution) or into the relationships among family members or both. The aims, instruments and degrees of state intervention vary between European societies.

19.7.1 The State and the Family: Family Policy Forms in Europe

The historical development of family policy in OECD countries is analysed by Gauthier (1996). According to her, differences in family policy between countries can be explained by two major factors: the impact of pro-natalist movements and of the women’s movement. The two major aims to stabilize/increase birth rates and to improve gender equality have certainly been among the major driving forces of family policy in Europe. The first motive is related to the competitive, conflict-ridden European nation-state system and to nationalism evolving in the 19th century, the second to the historically relatively favourable position of women in European societies which is one of the historical legacies

of Christianity. Yet a third major driving force for family policy was industrialization. Since its beginnings in the late 19th century, family policy has been closely linked to economic and social problems, in particular related to working-class families.

Kaufmann (1994, 2002) distinguishes five *Leitmotifs* for family policy that have shaped policies in different countries to varying degrees: the population motive, the individual rights motive (linked to gender equality and children's rights), the social motive (originally linked to the issue of living wages for working-class families), the anti-poverty motive and the social control/social integration motive. The mix of these motives and the degree to which they have been actually transformed into policies vary between countries.

Variations in European family policies do not exactly fit with Esping-Andersen's three worlds of welfare regimes discussed above, but there are some broad commonalities. One can broadly identify five models of family policy in Europe which are the result of long-term structural and institutional developments (Bahle 1995, 2008a).

The first is based on principles of universality and equality and aims at reconciling family and work. It is characterized by modest but universal child benefits and highly developed childcare services integrated with parental leave policies. This approach fits well with Esping-Andersen's social democratic welfare regime type.

The second model is based on the principle of subsidiarity in which the family is supported by the state as a social group and institution. There is also a preference for supporting large families or low-income families. A major characteristic of this form of family policy is that parental leave is developed better than public childcare services which means that childcare within families is preferred. This approach fits with Esping-Andersen's conservative welfare regime type.

In between these two models there is a "modernized conservative" model. Historically, the countries in this group have started from a conservative policy profile, but have added highly developed services and today come closer to the Scandinavian group. France and Belgium represent this "in-between form", but it seems that more recently also Germany is moving in this direction. This approach does not fit with Esping-Andersen's categories or it must be interpreted as a hybrid form or a path change.

The fourth group of nations can be characterized as the non-interventionist family policy model. These countries share the principles of universality and equality with the Scandinavian world, but do not actively support the compatibility of work and family life. By contrast, the concept of non-intervention into social relations is very strong. Thus, there is a lack of public social services. This approach fits with Esping-Andersen's liberal welfare regime type, although in family policy the Netherlands also belongs here.

Finally, there is a group of countries that does not follow any explicitly developed model. One can characterize this type as the "traditional approach" or the "no family policy" group (see Flaquer 2000). In these societies the family still performs many social functions without state support. These countries are characterized by a lack of coherent family income policy and a lack of social services. The family is also not supported in its care-taking function, for example, through generous leaves as in the conservative approach. These countries represent Stephan Leibfried's (1992) "latin rim" group.

Historically, that is before World War II, the Eastern European countries had been close to the conservative approach, but after 1945 they established the socialist model with its strong emphasis on work and population growth, albeit with variations. After the fall of Communism in 1989 it seems that most of these countries have returned to a conservative approach in which the family is an important social institution. Yet it is too early to say whether this is really a return to history or whether it simply reflects the difficulties

of the transition period in which the state cannot shoulder a higher level of care-taking responsibilities.

Kaufmann’s (1994) “families of nations” nicely fit with the models described above, except that he did not classify the Socialist countries. Künzler (2002) and Fux (2007) have introduced similar typologies. Fux, for example, distinguishes between “etatistic”, “familialistic” and “individualistic” approaches to family policy. The etatistic policy pattern fits with the social democratic approach, the familialistic one with the conservative and the individualistic pattern with the liberal approach. Yet Fux (2007) does not identify a “traditional” Southern European approach – rather he sees it as an underdeveloped conservative model – and he treats the former Socialist countries of Eastern Europe as a group of their own.

In the following empirical part it is analysed to what extent these historically developed “families of nations” can be identified in present family policies. The analysis is based on comparative quantitative indicators such as social spending on families and the value of child benefits.

19.7.2 Family Policy Patterns

Total social spending on the family is the most encompassing indicator to quantify family policies and shows total effort in supporting the family (see Fig. 19.12).




Fig. 19.12 Social expenditure on the family, Europe 1990 and 2004

Comparing total social spending on the family in Europe at two points in time, 1990 and 2004, reveals sizeable variations across countries. Generally there is a slightly positive relationship between a country's wealth and its social spending on the family. Yet one can roughly identify four different groups of countries in this respect. There are first the wealthy countries that spend a high level of their income on the family. These are the Scandinavian countries (with Denmark being on top) and the three Continental countries Austria, France and Germany. Belgium and Ireland are also close to the high family policy spenders. There are, second, a few wealthy countries with low social spending on the family: the UK, the Netherlands and also Italy and Spain, although at different levels. Less wealthy countries tend to spend less on the family, but again two different groups can be identified. The Southern European countries are generally wealthier than the former Socialist states, but they have less developed family policies. The Eastern European countries are all among the poorest EU countries, but their efforts in family policy vary. For example, Poland and Lithuania spend about 1% of the GDP on the family whereas Hungary and Slovenia spend more than 2%; Hungary's spending level is (in relative terms) in fact as high as in France.

Looking at developments over time, the general pattern has not changed significantly between 1990 and 2004, but some individual countries have "moved" a lot (as demonstrated by the arrows in Fig. 19.12). In all countries real wealth has increased, indicated by a growth in GDP per head of population (in Euro at constant prices as of 1995). But the size of this growth varies a lot. The most spectacular rise in real income occurred in Ireland which now belongs to the richest countries in Europe. Also in the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK increases in wealth have been strong. Compared to this, most Southern European countries have fallen back. Italy was surpassed by the UK and today, after the spectacular rise of Ireland, all poorer "old" EU member states are located in the South. In most Continental and Northern European countries real incomes have risen. Only France and Germany are exceptions with moderate changes between 1990 and 2004. In Eastern Europe, the development was different. After the fall of Communism these countries suffered from a strong decline in real income, but by 2004 all are on the increase, although at a modest level.

With respect to family policy one can observe different developments. In most "old" EU member states social spending on the family (measured as a percentage of the GDP) went up closely in line with the (moderate) increase in real wealth whereas in most new member states spending on family policy declined. Overall, there is no sign for a strong family policy boom in Europe since the 1990s. But there are exceptions to these trends. Denmark has increased its family policy spending strongly and has now clearly moved on top position in Europe whereas over the same period Sweden's family policy declined. Also in the UK and in the Netherlands family policy is currently on a (relative) decline despite significant increases in real income. In Germany and Austria family policy increased at a higher rate than the European mean whereas in the pioneer countries of family policy, France and Belgium, spending declined. Both Germany and Austria now have surpassed France and Belgium in family policy spending. In Germany the rise was strongest among all countries.

There is also a strong correlation between real income and the value of the average child benefit which in most countries is a core element of income policies for families (Fig. 19.13).

In 2004 the average child benefit (calculated by the average rate for the first, second and third child in a family) was highest in Germany and lowest in Poland and Greece. There is an outstanding group with high benefits including the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Austria and Belgium, but also the UK and the Netherlands, two countries with low overall




Fig. 19.13 Average child benefits, Europe 2004

spending on the family. “Real” child benefits in Eastern Europe are significantly lower, mainly due to the much lower level of national income in these countries. Yet also in Southern Europe child benefits are very modest compared to their more favourable income position. The case of France needs an explanation. France has a low average child benefit here, because it is the only European country in which the first child does not receive benefits. However, in France the biggest part of income support for families is granted through the tax system which is not included here.

Yet in childcare, France is clearly among the leading European nations (see Fig. 19.14).




Fig. 19.14 Childcare enrolment rates, Europe 1990–2004

This is due to the long tradition of preschools that started in the 19th century (Bahle 2009). The strong competition between the liberal secular state and the Catholic Church

was a major factor for the expansion of this system, as in Belgium and other Catholic countries (Willekens 2009). Still today these countries have the highest coverage rates for children above the age of 3. The religiously mixed countries of Continental Europe and the Scandinavian countries follow behind.

Services for younger children below the age of 3 are generally less well developed. Here the Scandinavian countries, and once again France and Belgium, are the leading nations. In contrast to preschools which have been dominated by the aims of socialization and education, services for children below 3 have been closely linked to the rise of female employment. It is therefore not the position of the Church (*vis-à-vis* the state) which is important here, but the position of women in society. In the Scandinavian countries, but also in the French culture and society, women have had a more powerful position than in other European countries since long. The working mother in particular was not regarded with such suspicion as in many Continental European societies, in particular in German speaking nations, and in England.

In Eastern Europe the legacy of the Socialist system in which women were required to work is still visible. The Socialist countries had extensive services for children of all ages, although with some variation. After the fall of Communism, however, many of these institutions were abolished. In particular services for children below 3 declined significantly whereas the kindergarten institutions have remained more stable. It seems that during the difficult transition years with high unemployment the model of the working mother was partly replaced by the caring mother for very young children. In this sense, the Eastern European countries have come closer to the Continental European pattern, in a way returning to their historical traditions from before Communist times.

Looking at developments over time, from 1990 until the mid-2000s, one can see a mixed picture of varying growth in childcare services across Europe, with the exception of the former Socialist countries. For children 3–5 there were only minor changes since in most countries coverage rates were already high at the beginning of the period. There are only two exceptions, the Netherlands and Portugal, where services for this age group grew strongly and which at the same time saw a strong increase in female employment rates.

For the younger age group services grew strongly in most countries. In absolute terms the increase was strongest in Sweden and Denmark, the two countries that already had the most developed services at the beginning of the period. But also the UK saw a high increase in childcare facilities over the past 15 years. In relative terms the increase was also strong in Austria, Germany and Ireland, countries which had started from very low levels in the 1990s.

Though childcare services have been extended in most countries, with the exception of Eastern Europe, there was no convergence in general family policy effort and in policy patterns between European countries (Fig. 19.15).

General effort can be described by an index that includes a whole package of individual family policies, for example, income policies like child benefits, childcare services and paid parental leave. In 2004 there was only a modest positive relationship between a country's overall family policy effort and the size of the welfare state in general.

Yet one can identify different groups of countries in this figure. On the one hand there are the Scandinavian and some advanced Continental European countries (France, Austria, Germany and Belgium) which have not only a relatively large welfare state but also a strong commitment to family policy. This is the traditional group of family policy fore-runners since the last century. Today Denmark is well ahead of all other countries and has probably the most developed family policy in the world. Compared to this group, the Southern European countries perform very badly in family policy. Not only in absolute




Fig. 19.15 Index of family policy, Europe 2004

terms, but even compared to the overall size of their welfare states, family policy is rudimentary. Interestingly, Slovenia, which is the most “Southern” of the former Socialist new member states, now also belongs to the Southern group whereas the other new member states have a more family-oriented welfare state. A little bit out of place in this pattern are the liberal countries UK, the Netherlands and Ireland. The UK and the Netherlands have advanced welfare states, but their family policy efforts are relatively modest. Ireland is at about the same level with respect to family policy, but has a more limited welfare state in general.

Family policies can further be characterized by different profiles. Countries with the same general “effort” may exhibit quite different forms and packages of family policies. One way to identify different family policy profiles is to compare policies supporting family income with policies aiming at a better balance of family and employment. Among the first policies would be tax deductions in favour of families and family allowances, among the latter childcare services and paid parental leave. Policies of the latter kind also tend to focus on young families in the phase of family formation whereas income policies are usually directed towards all families (see Fig. 19.16).

In Fig. 19.16 one can once more identify five country groups sharing similar family policy profiles. These groups of countries represent the five families of nations of family policies distinguished above. The first group is made up of the Scandinavian countries with a profile characterized by both high-income support and a high childcare policy index. This policy favours especially families with young children. Also France belongs to this group. A second group consists of “advanced” Continental European countries: Belgium, Austria and Germany. Here income policies are more developed than childcare policies. The UK, the Netherlands and Ireland are close to this group, but the UK and the Netherlands have less well-developed family policies in both dimensions than the other countries. On the left lower side of the figure are the Southern European countries with very weak policies in




Fig. 19.16 Family policy profile, Europe 2004

both dimensions. The former Socialist new member states have preserved a family policy profile that focuses more on childcare than on income policies.

In comparative perspective the Scandinavian policy pattern today is the most successful with persistently low child poverty rates and relatively high birth rates. This is the reason why some other European countries have partly adopted Scandinavian policies in particular with respect to childcare and the support of working families. France and Belgium did so already years ago, Britain and Germany have followed since the late 1990s. The least “successful” countries in terms of outcomes are found in Southern and Eastern Europe. In both areas, structural problems of the labour market and in welfare systems have a negative impact on the situation of families resulting in very low birth rates and high poverty among children. The major exception here is the Czech Republic which was able to keep poverty at a very low level, lower than in most Western European countries. The two Anglo-Saxon countries are characterized by high poverty rates, but also high birth rates. Yet Britain recently succeeded in lowering poverty among children significantly due to major policy changes introduced since the late 1990s. Finally, in Continental European countries both child poverty and birth rates are at a medium level within the Europe spectrum.

19.8 Conclusion

Although the “golden age” of welfare capitalism has undoubtedly come to an end, the welfare state has remained an integral part of the institutional structure in European societies.

In historical perspective, the “success” of the welfare state, i.e. the diffusion and adoption of its principles and core institutions and their long-term expansion in terms of

coverage and social expenditures, can be attributed to the multiple favourable effects it had on other spheres of modern societies (Kaufmann 1997, Ch. 4).

- *Economically*, welfare state institutions have rather successfully coped with major social risks of industrial societies and have contributed to improving human capital resources, for instance, by health and educational policies.
- *Socially*, the welfare state has played a major role in the (re-)distribution of “the wealth of nations” among social classes and thereby improved the living conditions of citizens on a large scale.
- *Politically*, the welfare state has contributed a lot to the mitigation of class conflicts through the institutionalization of new modes of conflict regulation and thereby increased the legitimacy of the social and political order.
- *Culturally*, the welfare state has emphasized values like social justice, social security and solidarity and has thereby contributed to the social integration of modern societies.

No doubt, since the late 1970s European welfare states are facing major challenges:

- *Demographic* challenges, arising from declining birth rates and increasing life expectancy, leading to ageing populations and demographic shifts, in particular between the economically active and non-active parts of the population, which give rise to issues of generational equity.
- *Economic* challenges, arising from declining economic growth rates and mass unemployment, accompanied by profound changes in employment patterns, which threaten to undermine the resource basis of the welfare state, in particular the established method of pay-as-you-go financing of social expenditures.
- Challenges from the *international* economy, arising from the globalization of markets and increased competition which eventually limit the feasibility of national economic and social strategies and even the political capacities of nation-states in general.
- *Social* challenges, arising from changing family patterns and life-styles which call for a better recognition of the role of private households and civil society associations in welfare production.
- *Cultural* challenges, resulting from changing value orientations and calling for a new balance between individual and collective responsibilities.

But it must also be recognized that in many countries major social policy reforms have been undertaken during the last three decades in order to meet these challenges and cope with the economic and fiscal strains on the welfare state. Although these reforms have taken different routes, they have by and large succeeded to adapt the welfare state to changing environments and conditions. If anything, one can conclude that the welfare state has relatively successfully survived its crisis.

These generalizing statements can be made, notwithstanding the variety of European welfare states. From the beginnings of modern social policy in the 19th century, different types of welfare states or welfare regimes have emerged due to different political traditions and power constellations. The development of national welfare states is characterized by a high degree of institutional continuity (“path dependency”), while at the same time allowing for expansionary trends concerning the scope of risks covered, the coverage of social groups, and benefit levels. In this sense, the European welfare states have always had to adapt to large-scale socio-economic and political changes and thus have proved to be dynamic rather than stable systems.

Despite the diversity of national welfare states, some distinctive features of European welfare states stand out when contrasting the European experience with that in other regions of the world. Therborn has aptly alluded to this aspect when calling Europe “the Scandinavia of the world” (1997). Compared with the OECD average, European welfare states are characterized by a higher degree of state interventionism and higher levels of social expenditures. All of the countries belonging to the social democratic regime type and almost all countries clustering around the conservative regime type are located in Europe, whereas most countries following the liberal regime type of welfare capitalism are found in the overseas areas of the OECD world.

Moreover, certain trends towards convergence between European welfare states can be observed. Castles (2004), for instance, has convincingly demonstrated that over the period from 1980 to 1998, the European welfare states (in different demarcations) have indeed grown more similar in terms of general government expenditure and social expenditure, in particular.¹¹ Convergence in institutional terms, however, is likely to proceed much more slowly, due to the inertia of established institutional arrangements and commitments.

Yet, since the 1990s, deliberate political efforts are undertaken by the European Union to forge a ‘European Social Model’. The main instrument to initiate and facilitate a process of convergence of social policies among the member states is the so-called open method of co-ordination (OMC). The promising idea behind this new approach is to reach a political consensus about social policy *goals* to be achieved, but to leave the choice of instruments and strategies to the member states. Although at present the various European countries can still be grouped into different welfare regime types, the differences between them appear to be blurred. The reason is that there have been similar trends across Europe, in particular with respect to the role of the state in welfare production and distribution. In all countries one can observe the growth of mixed economies of welfare, but at different speeds and with very different mixes between public and private actors. The general trend, however, is one of less direct state involvement in welfare production. At the same time, this partial retreat of the welfare state is compensated for by more public regulation and control of “private” actors and institutions.

This can be seen foremost in pension policy where the public pillar has been limited in most countries whereas the private pillars have gained significance (see Section 19.4). This partial shift from public to private pensions does not, however, signal a fundamental retreat of the welfare state from the area of pensions, because most private pension systems are strongly regulated and often also largely financed (directly or indirectly through tax subsidies) by the state.

Also in healthcare one can observe some converging trends with respect to the role of the state. In most National Health Services systems, different forms of market mechanisms have been introduced, and in many Social Insurance systems, the regulating role of the state has been strengthened. Even in largely private insurance-based systems like Switzerland, the role of the state has become more important.¹² In particular in healthcare, complex forms of mixed economies of welfare have emerged in which the role of the state has been changed, but was not fundamentally dismantled.

¹¹Convergence has here been measured by the coefficient of variation of the respective expenditure ratios.

¹²The USA remains the big outlier among the developed industrialized nations with its mainly voluntary and incomplete private system.

Moreover, in the field of family policy (and also in social services) the welfare state has continued to expand over the past decades despite the general impression of “crisis” and retrenchment (Bahle 2008b). In these areas, the state has played a more “indirect” role from the beginning, in particular with respect to service provision. In most Continental European countries, non-profit welfare organizations rather than the state provided the majority of services. In Scandinavia and in Britain, the local communities were major providers. Thus, the mixed economy that has now emerged in the core areas of welfare state activities has always been present in these fields. Here, institutional re-formation was less dominant than the belated quantitative expansion accompanied by more public financing and control.

The evidence presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the development of European welfare states is characterized by great stability and a process of consolidation rather than decline or even breakdown. While there has undoubtedly been retrenchment and dismantling in some fields, others have expanded. Even in those policy areas from which the state has partially retreated as a direct welfare provider, increased private provision has been combined with more state regulation and control. Though the welfare state has altered its mechanisms and institutional features, the basic idea of politically regulating the social sphere has not been abandoned. The welfare state thereby maintains a flexible stability in which institutional arrangements have shown remarkable adaptive capabilities while the core principles of the welfare state have been maintained. The future character of the welfare state will certainly continue to be a contested issue, but there will be a future (to the) welfare state.

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Chapter 20

Well-Being and Inequality

Petra Böhnke and Ulrich Kohler

20.1 Introduction

Well-being is a favourable state of life. It is something desirable for every human being in the world at all times, or, as Ng (1996, 1) puts it, it is “the main, if not only objective of life”. If a person were allowed to choose between two states of life, he or she would always choose the one which offers a higher degree of well-being. This conceptual definition, albeit fairly simple, opens the field to a rich bundle of research questions. The major questions to ask are what characteristics a state of life should consist of in order to be a favoured one, and how well-being is distributed. It is the answer to these questions and its utmost significance that has attracted scholars from many different research disciplines. Although they use different terms for well-being – “quality of life”, “happiness”, “satisfaction”, “utility” or “living a good life”¹ – the unifying questions are what makes people *happy*, and why some people are less happy than others.

Interest in living conditions and the distribution of life chances in different European countries has grown considerably alongside European enlargement. The impact on well-being of the rapid social change experienced by most of the post-communist countries vitalises this research branch. Moreover, harmonised data, which allow a comparative perspective and comprehensive analysis of well-being in the old and new European member states, have only recently become available.

The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the results of comparative quality of life research. It is structured into three broad research topics:

1. The distribution of well-being in Europe (Section 20.3): Do European countries share a typical quality of life, or are there large differences in well-being between European countries? How far can we speak of families of nations within Europe that share certain life circumstances?
2. The explanation of well-being (Section 20.4): How can well-being be explained? What are the major determinants that make Europeans happy? Are common dimensions of social inequality – income, social class, gender, etc. – of importance for the individual quality of life of people?

P. Böhnke (✉)

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin
e-mail: boehnke@wzb.eu

¹ We will use the above terms interchangeably throughout this chapter.

3. Country differences in the production of well-being (Section 20.5): Is there a universal model of well-being, or are there country-specific patterns in the determination of well-being? What roles do economy, politics and culture play as prevailing circumstances in shaping the ingredients of well-being?

The answer to the above-mentioned research questions must rely to a large extent on survey data. The availability of survey data therefore restricts the scope of the analyses that can be made. For most of the above questions we have used the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), a large-scale survey project carried out in 2003 on behalf of the “European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions” in 28 European countries. The EQLS offers a unique opportunity to study the well-being of these 28 European countries. It does not, however, offer the possibility of placing these 28 European countries into the broader context of other countries such as the United States, Russia or Japan. Neither can one widen the scope of the analysis to years before 2003 when using the EQLS. As it is impossible to find directly comparable surveys for other countries and time periods, we did not attempt to give the exact comparable figures for any other country or time period. However, we provide information about how far the substantive results that we obtain for Europe also hold in other countries.

Before we go into the details of the three research topics, we would like to give a description of two conceptualisations of well-being that exist in the literature (Section 20.2). We will term them the objective approach and the subjective approach. It will be shown that the two conceptualisations differ in how they measure the theoretical concept of well-being. While the objective approach uses an operational definition, the subjective approach applies a measurement hypothesis. It will also be shown that each of the two conceptualisations is suitable for answering specific research questions. While the objective approach is better suited to a dense and informative description of the aggregated quality of life of societies, the subjective approach is better suited to the identification of the causes or determinants of well-being. Hence, our section 20.3 can be seen as an application of the objective approach, while section 20.3 and 20.4 are applications of the subjective approach.

20.2 An Understanding of Well-Being

20.2.1 Two Approaches to Studying Well-Being

We can conceptually distinguish an objective and a subjective approach in the study of well-being. The objective approach is based on an operational definition of well-being. It is primarily used in studies that aim at a dense description of well-being across time and space. The Swedish “level of living” approach (Vogel, 2002), the social indicator series of the OECD and the monitoring system of the “European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions” (Fahey et al., 2003) are just three examples of this approach. In contrast, the subjective approach sets up a measurement model by using a subjective indicator for the latent construct of “well-being”. This approach is primarily used in studies that investigate the causes and correlates of well-being. It has been used by psychologists and sociologists and has also attracted economists. We will describe the two approaches and their implications in some detail in this section.




Fig. 20.1 Two approaches to the study well-being

Figure 20.1 illustrates the two approaches to well-being by means of path diagrams. In such path diagrams, circles are used to display theoretical concepts and rectangles are used to display observed indicators. Arrows are used to show causal connections between concepts and indicators. The arrow starts from the concept/indicator that has a causal effect, and the arrowhead points to the concept/indicator that is influenced. The figure highlights the similarities and differences between the two concepts of well-being.

Well-being is at the heart of both approaches and both of them regard well-being as a *favourable state of life*, as something desirable in itself. A second similarity is that both approaches regard well-being as a consequence of several factors. In Fig. 20.1 we have denoted these factors X1 and X2, but it should be understood that X1 and X2 represent a whole set of factors like income, quality of accommodation, security, health. The question of what these “Xs” are is an important topic for researchers of well-being. Some of the more prominent factors that are said to influence well-being are dimensions of social inequality; we are going to deal with them in some detail later on. However, for now it is enough to say that scholars agree that there are many such factors; in this sense well-being is a *multidimensional concept*.

The major difference between the two approaches lies in the treatment of “subjective” well-being. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that subjective well-being comprises observed values taken from survey questions such as life satisfaction or happiness. In the subjective approach an arrow goes from well-being to *subjective well-being*. This represents the *hypothesis* that well-being influences the answer to questions about life satisfaction and happiness so that high well-being typically results in high subjective well-being. Hence, subjective well-being is treated as an indicator of well-being. The Xs, on the other hand, are treated as *causes* of well-being; in other words factors such as high income, being in good health and having a nice dwelling influence well-being. As a consequence, subjective well-being is also linked to these commodities, as they effect well-being, which in turn effects the observed values of subjective well-being. Conceptually it is therefore impossible to observe a change in one of the Xs without observing a corresponding change in subjective well-being. If we do not observe such a correlation, one (or more) of the causal hypothesis represented by the arrows on the left-hand side of Fig. 20.1 must be

false. Either a specific X does not really influence well-being, or subjective well-being is not a good indicator of well-being. Therefore, the advantage of the subjective approach is that it offers a way to select the set of commodities: The important ones are those that strongly effect subjective well-being.

The objective approach does not treat subjective well-being as an observed indicator of well-being. Instead, subjective well-being appears as yet another factor that influences well-being. Note the difference to the subjective approach in terms of expected correlations: the path diagram displays no causal link between the commodities (represented by X_1 and X_2) and subjective well-being. Instead, subjective well-being influences well-being just like the other commodities. This means that regardless of how many goods or commodities a person possesses, a low subjective well-being will always reduce his or her individual well-being to some extent. On the other hand, even for individuals with a very low subjective well-being, one would state that they have a high quality of life if they rank high on the causes for well-being. Overall it is conceptually *not* expected that any of the commodities and subjective well-being correlate; however, the possibility is not excluded.

A final point concerning the objective approach shown in Fig. 20.1 is that it does not contain a measurement *model* for well-being. A measurement model should treat observed indicators – like income, health, – as a consequence of the construct that is measured (well-being). Treated that way, one would claim that what people earn and how healthy they are depend on their well-being, which is clearly not a convincing hypothesis. It is much more convincing to state that income, health, etc. influence well-being than the other way around. Unfortunately this latter hypothesis cannot be analysed without an explicit measurement of well-being, which in turn requires a measurement model. The only way out of this vicious circle is to apply an operational *definition* for measuring well-being. One can *define* well-being as a mixture of a specific set of indicators. Well-being then simply *is* the proposed mixture of indicators. Such a definition cannot be true or false. Instead it is something that one has to agree upon. The objective approach must therefore start with agreement between researchers on the set of indicators for the measurement of well-being. If the researchers do not agree, an external criterion for deciding who is right is missing. In practise there is no broad consensus on the indicators to be included in the measurement of well-being. There is not even any agreement on whether subjective well-being should be included into the definition of well-being or not. Some include them (Fahey et al., 2003); others do not (Vogel, 2002; Atkinson et al., 2002). But regardless of whether subjective well-being is included, it is always the researcher who decides what indicators well-being consists of. We call this approach the objective approach, because the production function for happiness is set by the researcher.

As already stated, the two concepts of well-being are typically connected to different research questions. We will describe them in some detail in the next section.

20.2.2 The Research Scope of the Objective and Subjective Approaches

The objective approach to analysing well-being is commonly used for comparisons of well-being between countries or between different time points. Describing the quality of life in different societies in terms of subjective well-being is often considered as too narrow. The subjective approach is typically used for research on the causes of well-being. To investigate the causes of well-being, a measurement of well-being is needed that is conceptually independent of its causes. Subjective well-being is therefore taken as an indicator that reveals well-being as well as possible. In what follows we give an overview of the research

scope of the two approaches with information about typically related research questions, hypothesis and measurement issues.

20.2.2.1 The Objective Approach

How does well-being develop over time? This has always been one of the guiding questions of the analyses of well-being using the objective approach. People like to know how the overall quality of life has developed over time, and the broad view on well-being integrated in the objective approach is capable of providing a much more comprehensive picture than the narrow subjective approach. The question itself is often linked to some sort of modernisation theory that expects an increase of well-being in quantity and quality over time. In addition, the question of whether *there are different levels of well-being in different countries* is important in order to be able to compare country performances internationally. This descriptive approach is often expanded with the question of whether *the dimensions of well-being are interrelated*. Conceptually the factors that define well-being in the objective approach are not causally linked together. Whether they are correlated or not is therefore an empirical question. If they are strongly correlated, one will often observe what has been called “multiple deprivation”, which means a low status in more than one dimensions of quality of life. The correlation between the dimensions of well-being might also vary over time or between countries, which leads to another dimension of describing societies’ well-being across time and space.

With regard to measurement issues, the objective approach tries to set up a list of goods that are necessary for a good life. Such lists might contain goods like health, working conditions, income, housing, safety, integration. A survey then finds out whether and how much of these goods each respondent has been able to achieve. The objective approach measures well-being by observing whether individuals have control over certain resources or not. This raises the obvious question of what the most important goods that should be observed are. In an overview of conceptualisations of well-being, Fahey et al. (2003, 53–60) conclude that it is commonly agreed to refer to the domains health, integration in the labour market, education, income and security. There is also a clear majority for including the domains housing, family, social relationships and the environment. However, there is much disagreement about the inclusion of some other living conditions. The Swedish tradition, for example, includes political resources; German social reports refer to leisure and media consumption; and the New Zealand social report uses domains covering human rights, culture and identity.

However, the highest level of disagreement about how to measure well-being is about the issue of the inclusion of subjective well-being. Approaches that do not include subjective well-being in the conceptualisation of well-being are the Swedish “level of living” approach (Erikson, 1993; Vogel, 2002), the OECD system of social indicators and the “Laeken indicators” adopted by the European Council to measure social inclusion (Atkinson et al., 2002). The divergent view, which includes subjective well-being, is represented by official social reporting in Germany (Zapf, 1984; Noll, 1997) and by the influential work of Erik Allardt (1993). This approach was also adopted by the EU-wide monitoring system of the “European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions” (Fahey et al., 2003).²

² Subjective well-being is also sometimes considered as a multidimensional concept in itself. Diener and Suh (1997), for example, state that it consists of three interrelated components: life satisfaction, pleasant

In practice, the conceptual difference between the externally observable “objective” living conditions and the externally unobservable subjective well-being often diminishes. Indicators taken to represent objective living conditions are often derived from respondents’ subjective evaluations of these living conditions. It is not uncommon for surveys to ask questions about the respondents’ evaluation of, for example, their own health. Such questions can be either regarded as an indicator of the *objective* health condition or as a dimension of the *subjective* satisfaction with it.

20.2.2.2 The Subjective Approach

In the subjective approach, the theoretical concept of “well-being” is measured by people’s subjective evaluations of their own lives. Therefore, the subjective approach leaves it completely up to individuals as to what goods they desire. Because the subjective approach has this measurement model – and given that the measurement model is true – it is possible to analyse the relationship between the acquisition of goods and well-being. Such analyses can be used to empirically answer some of the questions passionately debated under the objective approach: The core question of the objective approach is to agree upon a list of goods that are necessary for a good life. As soon as one accepts the possibility of measuring the degree of well-being independently of a list of goods, this question can be answered empirically: People’s desires, wants and needs are what increase subjective well-being. Whether *desires* are universal or not then also becomes an empirical question: People’s desires are universal as long as the same set of goods affect subjective well-being in a similar way in all societies; the cultural dependency of people’s desires is reflected in goods that affect subjective well-being differently under various social settings. Another important hypothesis in the study of well-being is whether people change their desires and wishes according to the circumstances in which they live in. As Inglehart (1990, 212) puts it: “(. . .) happiness is not the result of being rich, but a temporary consequence of having recently becoming richer”. If we were able to measure the subjective well-being of individuals over time, we could control whether increasing wages cause a permanent or only temporary rise in well-being – as the aspiration hypothesis implies. Finally, scientists discuss not only which desires are included, but also how far they have to be fulfilled. Does happiness increase if one obtains simply more of a certain good, or does it increase if one obtains more of this good than others, or more of this good than one has expected (Layard, 2005)?

All in all, the subjective approach can be used to give empirical answers to questions that could only be theoretically debated under the objective approach. It is this distinction that makes the subjective approach so attractive to empirical-oriented sociologists and economists. However, it must be taken into account that these analyses rest on the assumption that people’s subjective evaluations of their state of life are valid and reliable measurements of well-being. A large body of research using the subjective approach is therefore preoccupied with measurement issues.³ Some of the more important findings in this realm are the following: Different measures of subjective well-being correlate well

effects and unpleasant effects. “Effects” refer to moods and emotions, whereas life satisfaction is rather cognitive (Diener and Suh, 1997, 200). Which dimension of subjective well-being should be part of the conceptualisation of well-being is therefore always questionable.

³ A survey on various measures of subjective well-being can be found in Andrews and Robinson (1991).

with one another (Fordyce, 1988). Happy people are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik et al., 1993; Lepper, 1998; Costa and McCrae, 1988). Subjective well-being is relatively stable and sensitive to changing life circumstances (Ehrhardt et al., 2000; Headey and Wearing, 1991). Happy people smile more often during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1990). Happy people are less likely to commit suicide (Koivumaa et al., 2001). Changes in the electrical activity of the brain and heart rate account for substantial variance in reported negative effects (Davidson et al., 2000). Taken all together “the measures of happiness seem to contain a substantial amount of valid variance” (Diener 1984, 551).⁴

In the context of international comparisons, an important issue is whether mere linguistic differences in the interpretation of the survey questions about happiness are responsible for differences in subjective well-being between countries. A closer look at Switzerland, however, reveals that country differences cannot be attributed to language per se. Regardless of the language they speak, the Swiss rank far above the Germans, Italians and French, with whom they share their languages. Similar results have been achieved for Flemish and French speaking Belgians (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986, 39–42). Finally, country rankings are fairly stable, regardless of the indicators used to measure subjective well-being.

20.3 Well-Being in Europe

20.3.1 Country Performance According to Basic Desires

As stated above, nine domains are ubiquitously seen as essential for well-being: health, labour market, education, income, security, housing, family, social relationships and environment. In this section we will illustrate research findings for each of these domains. We therefore use data from the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), a large-scale survey project carried out on behalf of the “European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions”. The EQLS was conducted in 2003 in 28 European countries, including all 15 countries that were part of the EU at that time, and the 10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004. In addition Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria were included in the survey project. The EQLS asked about a wide range of indicators for each of the above-mentioned domains and for some other domains as well; it is therefore an invaluable source for describing the well-being of European countries based on the objective approach.⁵

The values of the indicators we have selected are compiled in Fig. 20.2. Therefore, the figure uses one graph for each domain, and the name of the respective domain is given above the graph. The value of the indicator for each country is displayed with a black marker symbol. In each graph, high values indicate “better” well-being in the respective domain. Hence, the further to the right the values of a specific country are, the higher is the quality of life in that country. The countries in the graph are presorted into three country groups. The first group is the 15 traditional EU member states; we will refer to them as the

⁴ Further evidence of this sort might be found in Andrews and Robinson (1991); Michalos (1991); Larsen and Fredrickson (1999); Schwarz and Strack (1999) and Veenhoven (1993).

⁵ The results we are presenting here can only give a very rough overview of the results ascertained by this survey in particular. Readers are therefore asked to additionally refer to the rich literature provided on the website of the European Foundation <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu>. Additional information can be found in Alber et al. (2004, 2008).




Fig. 20.2 Components of well-being by country

“old” EU member states (OMS). The remaining countries are separated into two further groups. The first group consists of the 10 former communist or socialist countries, which are now all EU members. We refer to these countries as transformation countries or former communist countries (FC). The remaining countries Turkey, Malta and Cyprus form a third group. These countries are neither old EU members nor transformation countries. We will not use any specific name for them, but we will often refer to the traditional market economies to refer to the old EU members *and* to these three countries. For convenience we have plotted the country group’s average value of each indicator as a vertical line.

When people are asked what contributes most to a good life, being in good health is top of the list (Alber and Kohler, 2004). Moreover, good health and its protection is incorporated into the fundamental goals of the European Union. To show how well countries perform with regard to *health*, we have selected the indicator “self-rated health”, which has proved to be a relatively good measure of health status (Robine et al., 2003, 103). The EQLS asked whether the respondents regard their own health as excellent, very good, good, fair or poor. Our figure shows the proportion of people who regarded themselves at least in “fair” health. In general respondents from traditional market economies rate their health much higher than people from the transformation countries. Self-rated health is especially low in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Out of the former group of countries, only Portugal ranks below the average of the latter group. The highest self-rating health can be found in the Mediterranean countries Malta, Cyprus and Italy.

More and better jobs and reduced unemployment are major goals of the EU’s Lisbon strategy. *Employment* situation is therefore a core dimension of any attempt to measure well-being across countries. In Fig. 20.2 we have measured integration in the labour market by the proportion of households with at least one employed member.⁶ The results suggest that there is no general difference in integration in the labour market between the transformation countries and the old EU members. The major difference between countries seems to be rather within the country groups distinguished here than between them. Integration in the labour market was especially low in the United Kingdom, Germany and Rumania, whereas it was high in Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Slovenia. Irrespective of the small differences in the overall labour market integration between East and West European countries, it should be noted that the working conditions tend to be worse in the former countries (Alber and Fahey, 2004, 23–28).

Educational skills are not only an (increasingly) important prerequisite for labour market integration, but also form the basis for social integration and participation in a modernised world. To sum up, education is an important dimension of present and expected well-being. In practice, education is often measured by the formal degree of education, and such data tend to show few differences between the transformation countries and the traditional market economies. English language skills can be used as a more direct measure of educational attainment, particularly with a view to the needs of a modern, rapidly developing global labour market. In Fig 20.2 we have therefore used the proportion of EQLS respondents who state that their English reading ability is very good or quite good. The differences between the transformation countries and the traditional market economies (without United Kingdom, Ireland and Malta) are very large in this respect. Overall the proportion of people with good English reading ability is around 16 per cent in the transformation countries, but more than 40 per cent in the traditional market economies. Further

⁶ This mirrors the incidence of jobless households used in the so-called Laeken indicators (Atkinson et al., 2002).

analyses not presented here indicate that the ability to read English among younger people from Eastern Europe is starting to catch up with the traditional market economies (Alber and Fahey, 2004, 29–30).

In modern societies, money can be used to buy the goods one desires, and if people successfully match their consumer decisions to their desires they should produce what economists call utility and others call satisfaction, happiness or well-being. Income is therefore one of the less debated dimensions of well-being. For an assessment of the overall standard of living in terms of *income*, Fig. 20.2 uses the median of the net household equivalence income expressed in purchasing power standards.⁷ By construction, this index controls for differences in the purchasing power of one Euro between countries and for differences in household sizes. High values of this indicator can therefore be regarded as a measure of the money people have for consumption. The data in the figure clearly indicate that living standards are still much higher in the old EU member countries than in the other European countries. The poorest West European country – Portugal – is still above the average of the transformation countries, while the richest transformation country – Slovenia – is below the average of the West European countries.

The level of *security* was measured by a question about whether the respondents think that it is safe to walk around at night in the area in which they live. Although the majority of respondents feel rather safe or very safe in almost all countries, transformation countries seem to offer a lower level of security than the traditional market economies. This is especially true for Lithuania and Latvia, which are the only countries where the majority feel unsafe.

“The home is a place of rest and physical regeneration. . . . It is the centre of family life, where children are born and raised, where socialisation takes place and family ties are nurtured.” (Alber and Fahey, 2004, 15). Adequate accommodation can even be a matter of survival. Hence, the importance of *housing* as a dimension of well-being cannot be exaggerated. For *housing quality* we have applied the indicator “mean number of rooms per person”. Figure 20.2 suggests that housing quality is much higher in Western Europe compared to the rest of Europe. Even Greece, the country with the smallest dwellings among the old European member states, has on average larger dwellings than the Czech Republic or Estonia, where dwellings are relatively large by standards of the transformation countries.

Families can be considered as the basis of the social integration of individuals in a large community, and patterns of family life therefore form an important indicator for the social cohesiveness of a country. Figure 20.2 uses the proportion of respondents *not* living alone as one possible indicator for the incidence of families. According to this indicator, family integration is somewhat higher in the transformation countries than in the old EU member countries. However, a closer look suggests that family integration is more connected with religious tradition than with the communist past. Among the traditional market economies, family integration is high in the catholic countries of Southern Europe (like Spain, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta), and the same is true in the transformation countries’ group (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria). Among the countries with a relatively low level of family integration are the protestant countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic countries.

Social integration can also be provided by social relationships with persons outside the family. Figure 20.2 therefore displays the proportion of people having regular contact with

⁷ Data for Germany are not shown because of validity problems of the income variable in the German EQLS sample.

friends and neighbours as another indicator for *inclusion*. The results show that there is little difference between the three country groups distinguished in the figure in this respect. However, there is again a high degree of inclusion among some of the catholic countries (Portugal, Ireland, Poland, Bulgaria).

Finally, the local *environment*. The local environment is a part of living conditions that cannot be changed or influenced actively by the individual on their own. To be born into a threatening environment limits well-being, no matter how successful an individual is within this environment. The EQLS asks about complaints of the local environment in four respects: noise, air pollution, lack of access to green areas, and water quality. We present the proportion of respondents that have only a few or even no reasons to complain. The data in Fig. 20.2 once again suggest a division between the former communist countries and the old EU members. However, this time the East–West division belt is accompanied by sharp North–South differentiation. The lowest degree of criticism can be found in the three Scandinavian countries, while criticism with regard to the environment is widespread in Italy, Greece, Malta, Turkey, and Cyprus.

The discussion, so far, might be rich in detail but an overall picture cannot be easily drawn from it. This is a general problem of the objective approach. Applications of the objective approach often result in the wish to produce a summary index from all the dimensions used; the United Nations “Human development index” is one of the most successful examples of such attempts. However, the value of such summary measures has been hotly debated, and it seems that this debate really cannot come to an end. In our view, the reason for the fruitlessness of these debates is built into the objective approach. Because it is an operational definition (Section 20.2), it lacks an external criteria for the selection (and weighting) of the different domains. Fahey et al. (2003, 59) therefore conclude that attempts to construct a summary index should be avoided.


In what follows we try to go for an intermediate solution, something in-between an arbitrary construction of a summary index and the complete avoidance of providing an overall picture. We try to draw an overall picture of well-being in Europe by using a biplot as device. Although the statistical foundations of biplots are fairly complicated,⁸ they are easy to interpret; Fig. 20.3 is the biplot of the data shown in Fig. 20.2.

Basically, biplots show as much information as possible of a multivariate description in a two-dimensional space. They therefore use arrows for showing information about the variables (the dimensions of well-being) and marker symbols for displaying information about the observations (countries). If the angle between the arrows is close to 0 or 180°, the correlation between the respective dimensions of well-being will be high; the correlation will be low if the angle between the arrows approach 90 or 270°. Hence, income, security, housing and education are closely related, forming a well-being dimension that might be termed as “modernisation”. Family and environment are fairly uncorrelated to this modernisation dimension; incidentally, where family integration is high, quality of the environment tends to be low, and vice versa.

The positions of the countries along the variable arrows approximate the values of the country on the respective dimension of well-being. Cyprus, for example, appears far out on the arrow for health, meaning that self-rated health is high for Cyprus. As a consequence,

⁸A biplot can be seen as a graphical device of a principal components analysis (PCA). It shows observations (countries) and variables (dimensions of well-being) in the space of the first two principal components. Biplots allow us to depict variable values, correlations between variables, and Euclidean distances of a multidimensional space at one time. They were originally invented by Gabriel, 1971. An easy-to-read introduction with many interpretation examples is given by Kohler and Luniak, 2005.

Fig. 20.3 Biplot of the components of well-being



countries that appear close together in the figure can be said to have a similar “well-being”.⁹ A group of five countries form such a cluster: Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium. These countries can be characterised as countries with high values on the modernisation dimensions (income, security, housing, and education), intermediate values on health and employment, and fairly low values of family integration. No other countries form an obvious cluster. Obviously, the transformation countries tend to have lower values on the modernisation dimension than the old EU members. However, Portugal, Greece, the Czech Republic and Slovenia cross-cut the division between old and new member states on this dimension. The countries differ in a less systematic way according to the other dimensions of well-being; at least a slight differentiation between a family-oriented south and a less family-oriented north is visible.

20.3.2 Country Performance According to Subjective Well-Being

We will now describe the well-being in European countries by using an indicator for subjective well-being. As explained in Section 20.2, subjective well-being is sometimes seen as yet another dimension of well-being in the objective approach. Further, it is seen as the main indicator for well-being in the subjective approach. In this sense, this section can be seen as an application of either the objective approach or the subjective approach.

In Fig. 20.4 we have plotted two different indicators of subjective well-being by a manifestation of *objective* well-being. The two measures of subjective well-being go back to the question about life satisfaction from the EQLS 2003¹⁰ and a question on happiness taken

⁹ Countries that do not have a value on one of the indicators shown in Fig. 20.2 cannot be used in the biplot.

¹⁰ The question was “All things considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your life these days? Please tell me on a scale of one to ten, where one means very dissatisfied and ten means very satisfied.”




Fig. 20.4 Subjective well-being by ranked order of the Human Development Index for EQLS and ISSP

from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).^{11,12} Countries are ranked according to the Human Development Index, a summary index of GDP per capita, life expectancy and educational attainment used by the United Nations human development reports.

The first insight of Fig. 20.4 is the strong correlation between information about a country’s well-being derived from summary statistics (objective approach) and the two measures for subjective well-being. Consequently, the core results of the previous section are also visible when we use indicators of subjective well-being: there is a high between-country variance in well-being and a sharp distinction of well-being between the old European member states (OMS) and the former communist countries (FC). Life satisfaction is highest in the Scandinavian and Continental European Countries and lowest in the Baltic States and in Bulgaria. Portugal is the only old member state with a level of life satisfaction comparable to the former communist countries. Additionally, the lower panel of the figure reveals that the mean happiness scores of the old European member states are similar to those countries which share their high *objective* quality of life (i.e. USA, Japan, Switzerland and Norway).

¹¹ The question was “If you were to consider your life in general, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole.” Respondents could answer on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being completely happy and 7 completely unhappy. The scale was reversed for subsequent analyses.

¹² The EQLS has been described in some detail in the previous section. The ISSP 2002 is round 15 of a continuing program of cross-national surveys. Between the end of 2001 and February 2004, surveys were carried out in 33 countries, 20 of them being EU members or EU candidates. The target population of the samples are residents of age 18 and older. Sample sizes vary between 1,000 in Latvia and 2,947 in United Kingdom. The ISSP has been made available by the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne. The study number (ZA-Nr.) is s3880.

The figure suggests that well-being is causally related to economic success. In fact, if we compare different satisfaction levels between countries, the most obvious explanation is that well-being is related to indicators of a nation's prosperity. The lower the GDP per capita in a country, the lower the satisfaction levels throughout the population (Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000; Di Tella et al., 2001; Fahey and Smyth, 2004). However, there is another way of looking at the 'economic success hypothesis': If the hypothesis is true, this should imply that rising GDP in a specific country should also raise the average well-being in this country. To analyse this implication, we have plotted in Fig. 20.5 the means of general life satisfaction measured at several points in time between 1970 and 2002 against the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the respective years.¹³ If the guiding hypothesis were true, all the lines in the figure should increase, which is obviously not the case: The wealth of a nation correlates significantly with life satisfaction in only 4 of the 15 EU old member states (Denmark, United Kingdom, France and Italy). In most countries life satisfaction and GDP do vary independently from one another, and in Belgium there is even a significant negative relationship.

These results mirror a well-established finding that rising prosperity in the long run does not go along with increasing satisfaction levels (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2005; Inglehart and Rabier, 1986; Lane, 1998, Graham and Pettinato, 2001; Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). Given the high correlation between subjective well-being




Fig. 20.5 Subjective well-being by GDP based on Eurobarometer data from 1970 to 2002

¹³ The data used for this plot are the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. The data set has been made available by the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne. The study number (ZA-Nr.) is s3521. For Fig. 20.5 the data set has been enriched by some additional years by the WZB.

and GDP across countries, this finding is a paradoxical result. It has vitalised the controversy about the origin of subjective well-being for decades. All in all, three explanations for it can be found in the literature:

- Other important aspects remain hidden behind economic affluence. Richer countries tend to have more stable democracies, less corruption, better average health care supply and basic human and social rights are secured more effectively. These factors are more relevant than economic success in promoting overall well-being. Therefore, Inglehart (1990) argues for a cultural explanation for country differences. Such cultural factors might also explain the outstanding position of Chile, Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines in Fig. 20.4, which reveals high levels of subjective well-being despite relatively less advanced economies and lower levels of modernisation. However, referring to cultural features remains a bit vague.
- It is assumed that it is not the absolute level of income that matters most, but rather one's position relative to other individuals (Irwin, 1944; Duesenberry, 1949; Becker, 1974; Easterlin, 1974; Easterlin, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Firebaugh and Tach, 2005; Layard, 2005). Consequently, a rise in average income fails to raise the happiness of all.
- The utility of additional material goods is only transitory. Individuals compare their possessions with those of their own past and are commonly satisfied when they notice progress towards more goods or a better quality. They then quickly fall back to the initial level of satisfaction (Helson, 1964; Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Campbell et al., 1976; Parducci 1995; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).

Hence, this first empirical impression of how subjective well-being is distributed across Europe suggests how challenging the attempt is to understand its determinants comprehensively. Income, our starting point, is undoubtedly important, but not completely sufficient. In the following section we will shed further light on factors which explain subjective well-being within and across countries.

20.4 Well-Being and Dimensions of Social Inequality

In this section we will use the subjective approach of Fig. 20.1 in order to link the study of well-being with studies of social inequality. As already mentioned, many of the dimensions that constitute well-being are dimensions of social inequality. One of the core topics of sociological research on social inequality is the question of which core dimensions of social inequality structure people's life chances and behaviour. As it stands this question is strongly linked to the question about the core dimensions of well-being in the objective approach. Using subjective well-being as an indicator for the overall quality of life allows the analysis of the correlations between subjective well-being and dimensions of social inequality in order to give answers to these questions.

The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to assemble known empirical results concerning the connection between dimensions of social inequality and subjective well-being; on the other hand we would like to illustrate the effects of each inequality dimension for Europe as a whole. We hope to show how relevant the dimensions of social inequality are for the Europeans as one single group. For this purpose, we have used a series of regression models relying on data from the EQLS (see Section 20.2.1).

The results of the various regression models are compiled together in Table 20.1. Some particularities of those regression models are worth noting before dealing with the effects of each inequality dimensions.

20.4.1 A Primer on the Regression Models

We apply linear regression models to describe the influence of individually experienced inequality on subjective well-being. The dependent variable of all regression models is life satisfaction, measured on a 10-point scale from 1 (unsatisfied) to 10 (satisfied); thus high values represent high levels of life satisfaction. The influence of each inequality dimension is given by its unstandardised regression coefficient. A regression coefficient of 1.5 means that a 1-unit increase of an independent variable increases the average life satisfaction by 1.5 points. Most independent variables of the regression models are dichotomies, so that this interpretation can be further simplified. A dichotomous variable can increase by 1 unit only once. Therefore the regression coefficient of 1.5 would mean that the average life satisfaction of one group is 1.5 points higher than those of the other.

In the first column of Table 20.1 we show the *gross impact* of each inequality dimension. By this we mean the effect of the respective inequality dimension without controlling for any of the variables. In the subsequent columns we add other inequality dimensions step by step. The order of the inclusion is guided by a rough idea of a causal order among the inequality dimensions. We have assumed that age and gender are exogenous to all the other inequality dimensions, and that education, employment status, social class and income are exogenous to housing quality, sociability or life style.

The regression models are based on data from 28 countries. These countries are heterogeneous in many respects. They have different compositions of socio-demographic attributes, and there might be cultural influences on how to react on survey questions, to name just a few aspects countries can differ in. In order to carry out a statistical analysis of the impact of inequality on well-being, the heterogeneity has to be controlled, so that the impact of an inequality dimension cannot be a simple consequence of specific country characteristics. We have controlled the heterogeneity of countries by controlling for country dummies in all models, including those for calculating the gross effects. Hence, all coefficients in the table cannot be biased due to any general country characteristic.

At the bottom of Table 20.1 we print out the variance explained by countries. These numbers can be regarded as a measure of how all country-specific characteristics taken together impact on life satisfaction. Without any further individual variables, around 20 percent of the variance of life satisfaction is explained by the country as such, and even after controlling for all inequality dimensions, this number stays at around 14 percent. This means that only a small part of the country differences in subjective well-being can be explained by individual composition effects. In other words, countries do not differ so much in well-being because some countries have a higher fraction of rich, healthy or sociable persons than others. There must be other characteristics of countries that are responsible for the country differences: culture, habits, traditions of norms and values and welfare policy characteristics are promising candidates in this respect.

Finally, the second last row of Table 20.1 shows how much of the variance of satisfaction can be explained by the inequality dimensions used in each model. Note that all inequality factors together explain about 22 percent of the variance of life satisfaction. Adding both

variance components together leads to an overall explained variance of 36 percent. Hence, important reasons for life satisfaction variation exist that are neither a country characteristic nor a dimension of social inequality. These factors include genetics, personality and measurement errors (Hamer, 1996; Lykken and Tellegen, 1996; Arvey et al., 1989; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000).

20.4.2 Effects of Social Inequality on Subjective Well-Being

20.4.2.1 Gender

Are there differences in subjective well-being between men and women? In a study of 16 nations, Inglehart (1990, 222) found that life satisfaction is marginally higher among women than among men, with Russia being the exceptional case, where it is the other way around. At the same time, women do, however, also report higher levels of depression than men (Donovan and Halpern, 2002). A recent book by Halpern (2005) explains these seemingly contradictory findings with the hypothesis that women are more socially connected and therefore more exposed to the satisfactions and disappointments of their environment. We cannot confirm this hypothesis with our results for 28 European countries: Overall, men are more satisfied than women, although only very slightly. A gender difference only becomes visible if one also controls for measures of sociability, like marital status, working for voluntary organisations and contacts with neighbours and friends. These findings suggest just the opposite explanation compared to the patterns found by Halpern.

20.4.2.2 Age

Most studies report lower levels of satisfaction with one's life in general for middleaged people and higher levels for the oldest and youngest age groups (Campbell, 1976; Herzog, 1982; Campbell, 1981; Inglehart, 1990; Helliwell, 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). In Table 20.1 the curvilinear relationship between age and life satisfaction is modelled by a quadratic age-term, and it turns out that life satisfaction in fact first diminishes with age, but then goes up again. However, it must also be noted that the curvilinearity disappears after controlling for health. This indicates that the lower life satisfaction of middle-aged people is mediated by their lower health satisfaction.

20.4.2.3 Location

A further possible cause of well-being is the dichotomy between urban and rural areas, or between what has been called the "metropolitan corridors" and beyond. It is argued that the speed of economic and social development in Europe has been increased in the highly urbanised belt running from London to northern Italy, leaving the rural areas offside as slow developing and deprived regions. Some time ago, Mooser (1983) showed that living in rural areas creates a situation that is different from that in cities in many respects. Living in the countryside is typically connected with better quality of the environment, but also with difficulties, and hence high costs, in reaching the workplace, shopping and cultural

Table 20.1 Multiple linear regression models of well-being on dimensions of inequality

	Gross	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Gender (reference: women)</i>							
Men	-0.00	-0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11*	-0.09*	-0.14
<i>Age (metric, in years)</i>							
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.01*
Age (squared)	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00
<i>Type of community (reference: rural)</i>							
Urban	-0.01	-0.01	0.16*	0.21*	0.13*	0.13*	0.11*
<i>Income (reference: first within country quartile)</i>							
Second quartile	0.42*	0.36*	0.31*	0.28*	0.28*	0.28*	0.23*
Third quartile	0.82*	0.69*	0.60*	0.52*	0.52*	0.45*	
Fourth quartile	1.17*	0.97*	0.87*	0.77*	0.76*	0.65*	
<i>Employment status (reference: employed)</i>							
Homemaker	-0.19*		0.11	0.10	-0.05	-0.02	0.05
Unemployed	-1.19*		-0.80*	-0.75*	-0.72*	-0.69*	-0.64*
Retired	-0.35*		-0.13*	-0.12*	-0.13*	-0.10	-0.17*
Still in education/other	0.13*		0.19*	0.18*	0.20*	0.17*	0.12
<i>Class (reference: upper white collar)</i>							
Lower white collar	-0.29*		-0.13*	-0.12*	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.05
Self-employed	-0.22*		-0.10	-0.11	-0.10	-0.08	-0.06
Skilled worker	-0.72*		-0.36*	-0.32*	-0.28*	-0.24*	-0.17*
Non-skilled worker	-0.94*		-0.49*	-0.43*	-0.37*	-0.32*	-0.20*
Farmer	-0.61*		-0.23*	-0.18	-0.18	-0.19	-0.05
Other	-0.33*		-0.13	-0.10	-0.04	-0.02	0.05
<i>Education (reference: low)</i>							
Intermediate	0.33*		0.14*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.02
High	0.65*		0.20*	0.16*	0.15*	0.12*	0.03
Other	0.49*		-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.06
Housing							
Rooms per person	0.02			-0.03*	0.06*	0.06*	0.04*

Table 20.1 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gross						
Accommodation problems	-0.55*		-0.42*	-0.41*	-0.40*	-0.31*
<i>Marital status (reference: married, living with partner)</i>						
Separated/divorced	-0.81*			-0.68*	-0.65*	-0.51*
Widowed	-0.54*			-0.57*	-0.58*	-0.43*
Single, never married	-0.19*			-0.46*	-0.45*	-0.34*
<i>Contacts with friends/neighbours (reference: no)</i>						
Yes	0.33*			0.34*	0.24*	0.18*
<i>Voluntary work (reference: no)</i>						
Yes	0.46*			0.30*	0.24*	0.18*
<i>Church attendance (metric, 7-point scale)</i>						
Church attendance	0.07*			0.07*	0.07*	0.06*
<i>Internet user (reference: no)</i>						
Yes	0.58*				0.18*	0.19*
<i>Long-term illness (reference: no)</i>						
Long-term illness	-0.78*					0.10*
<i>Health satisfaction (metric, 11-point scale)</i>						
Health satisfaction	0.31*					0.30*
Constant	<i>n.a.</i>	6.64*	6.40*	6.18*	5.88*	3.77*
ρ (var. exp. by country)	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.14
r^2 (within)	<i>n.a.</i>	0.01	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.22
<i>n</i>	18,600	18,600	18,600	18,600	18,600	18,600

* $p < 0.5$

facilities, medical assistance, etc. On the other hand accommodation costs tend to be lower in the countryside, and it is possible to cut the cost of living by farming on a sideline basis. People living in the countryside more often own inherited brown-fields than people living in cities. In the countryside, friends are more often recruited from the close neighbourhood, etc. Hence, there are many reasons to believe that well-being is different between the urban and rural population, although it is not quite clear what direction the difference might show.

The EQLS offers only a crude measure of the urban/rural dichotomy, based on the ratings of the respondent. As shown in Table 20.1, the European urban and rural population does not differ in their subjective well-being overall. However, the results also reveal that the association is covered by the fact that people in the countryside typically have somewhat higher incomes than those living in cities. If one compares urban and rural population holding income on a constant level, the urban population turns out to be more satisfied with their lives. Hence, the advantages of living in a city seem to count more than the disadvantages, and many people living in the countryside probably just do not move into the cities because they want to save money. However, one should probably not over-interpret these findings. People living in a rural area quite often have chosen to live there, which means that they have a preference to do so. Hence, if they had lived in a city, they would have been even less satisfied.

20.4.2.4 Income

Income is clearly one of the most frequently studied causes of subjective well-being under the subjective approach. It is a robust and general result of these studies that richer people, on average, report higher subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, 409). The effect of income has been demonstrated in regions as different as the USA (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), the EU member states (Böhnke, 2005; Delhey, 2004; Di Tella et al., 2001), Switzerland (Frey and Stutzer, 2000) and Latin America (Graham and Pettinato, 2001). It is also a common finding that the relationship between income and well-being is nonlinear, i.e. the income effect is stronger with low incomes and extenuates weaker with higher ones (Argyle, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2002). However, although there is not much doubt that income has a positive effect on well-being, the size of the income effect is usually considered as small compared to other factors such as unemployment and divorce (Diener et al., 1999; Gardner and Oswald, 2001; Helliwell, 2003.)¹⁴

Looking at the effect of income on the population of the 28 countries covered by the EQLS, we can replicate most, if not all, of the above-mentioned findings. Life satisfaction increases steadily from the lower to the higher income quartiles, although the gain in life satisfaction diminishes as one steps along the income range. Without controlling any further variables, people in the highest income quartile have on average a 1.17 point higher life satisfaction than people in the lowest one. The general appearance of the income effect stays the same even after controlling for other variables, but it diminishes slightly when controlling for other dimensions of socio-economic status, for housing quality, marital status and health status. Hence, the gross effect of income is partly caused by the non-monetary effects of unemployment and typical characteristics of the occupations of those

¹⁴ Another important line of research is on the direction of causality. It could either be that rich people are more satisfied with their lives, or that happy people are economically more successful. The study of the causal direction requires, at least, longitudinal data, which is not available for Europe as a whole. Studies of well-being before and after sudden and unexpected gains of income suggest that income in fact causes gains in happiness (Smith, 1995; Brickman, et al., 1978; Gardner and Oswald, 2001).

with high income, and it is partly mediated through its effect on housing quality, on family situation and on health conditions.

20.4.2.5 Employment, Occupation and Social Class

Integration in the labour market and the quality of the employment position is another important aspect of the objective approach when studying well-being. Among scholars of the subjective approach there is also little doubt that unemployment is linked to well-being because of its connection to income loss. However, the major question is whether unemployment is also effective in non-pecuniary ways (Feather, 1990). The answer to this question is of crucial importance when considering assertions that the social benefit system is exploited by free riders, who choose leisure time instead of regular work. Such assertions imply that, after controlling for income, the subjective well-being of unemployed persons should be higher than that of economically active persons. Available research, however, clearly indicates that this is not the case. Subjective well-being is lower for unemployed persons, even after controlling for personal income and various other factors (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Di Tella et al., 2001; Delhey, 2004; Böhnke, 2006). Hence, unemployed persons are on average less happy than the economically active, even if they have the same income. This means that the unemployed do not enjoy their leisure time, as is often supposed. On the contrary, unemployment seems to produce depression and anxiety and results in a loss of self-esteem and personal control (Goldsmith, et al., 1996). Böhnke (2005) found that unemployment also leads to strains in personal relationships. In the long run the psychological cost of unemployment seems to diminish a little, however (Clark et al., 2001).¹⁵

Most empirical analyses differentiate only between unemployed or economically inactive persons on the one hand and the economically active on the other. Therefore, far less is known about the consequences of the different types of economic inactivity for well-being. This is a bit surprising, because retirement and homemaking provide interesting control cases for some of the theoretical reasoning made in the context of the consequences of unemployment. Retirement, for example, leads to a similar life situation to unemployment in respect of leisure time and income loss, but it is very dissimilar from unemployment with respect to the stigmatisation attached to it. If it were the stigmatisation of unemployment that causes the lower life satisfaction of the unemployed, the life satisfaction of retired people should be higher than those of unemployed. Probably the life satisfaction of the retired is even higher than that of the economically active, because of the leisure time they have on their disposal, which might be, however, visible only after controlling for their physical ability to actually take advantage of their leisure time. Yet another case is homemaking. Homemaking is not stigmatised, and it is questionable whether homemakers have more leisure time than the economically active. Comparing the well-being of homemakers and the economically active might therefore bring up a sort of psychological utility of employment. Such psychological utilities of employment would not just be the other side of the coin of the psychological costs of unemployment. While the latter operates through stigmatisation, the former stems from the explicit acceptance or “social approval” (Wippler,

¹⁵ There is also a debate about the causal relationship between unemployment and well-being, i.e. do unhappy people become unemployed? Available research suggests that the main causality runs from unemployment to unhappiness, and not vice versa (Dew et al., 1992; Graetz, 1993; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Marks, 1999).

1990, 189) by colleagues and business partners, as well as from prestige and the self-realization at work. Unlike many paid jobs, homemaking does not produce a finished piece of work and is more likely to resemble the Sisyphean challenge. Moreover, lack of social approval by other family members is a frequent source of dissatisfaction for homemakers. In our empirical illustration of the effect of labour market attachment on life satisfaction for Europe, we have therefore not only differentiated between economically active and inactive respondents, but also between the three mentioned types of the economically inactive.

Looking at the results in Table 20.1, the finding that the unemployed are less satisfied with their lives can be replicated for the entire European society. Overall, the unemployed are about 1.19 points less satisfied than the economically active. The difference diminishes considerably when controlling for income, which is an indicator of the monetary effects of unemployment. The remaining effect of 0.80, on the other hand, represents the non-monetary effect of being unemployed. Since the effect does not diminish much further when controlling for further control variables, it seems that this non-monetary part operates fairly directly as psychological costs. However, this non-monetary unemployment effect also operates through sociability to a slight extent and can also be explained with reference to health problems.

The gross effect of retirement shows that retired people are less satisfied with their lives than the economically active, but more satisfied than the unemployed. Although reduced in size, this general pattern remains fairly stable when controlling for income and most other dimensions of social inequality. However, after controlling for health, retirement turns out to have a positive effect on life satisfaction, which fits well to the theoretical considerations made above. In short, retired people are less satisfied than the economically active because they have a lower income and more often suffer from health problems, but if they do not, they will be even more satisfied than the economically active.

The effect of homemaking changes considerably depending on which factors are additionally controlled. Overall, homemakers are less satisfied than economically active, but more satisfied than unemployed or retired persons. If one only compares homemakers and the economically active at the same income level, it turns out that homemakers are in fact slightly more satisfied with their lives than employees. Hence, the negative effect of homemaking stems from income losses, which are typical for male breadwinner households in comparison to dual-earner households. But why are the homemakers more satisfied with their lives than the economically active? A look at model 4 in Table 20.1 offers an explanation. In this model, several indicators for sociability, including marital status, are added, leading again to a change in the sign of the homemaker effect. The employment status of homemaking is typically connected with being part of a married couple, and married couples are typically happier than anybody else. Hence, the slightly higher life satisfaction of homemakers has its roots in a satisfying family life. Finally, after including indicators for the physical health, homemakers yet again have a slightly higher life satisfaction, although they do not significantly differ from the economically active.

One more result from the comparison of homemakers and the economically active is important: we can only find, at best, a mild sign of a psychological utility of being economical active. Several explanations for that come to our minds. It could be that the social prestige of homemakers is that of the occupied person in the household, and homemakers therefore also share a part of the “psychological utility” of the occupied person. Another explanation could be that it is not true that any kind of occupation produces a psychological utility. Only occupations with working conditions that support interactions with colleagues and self-realization can offer a psychological utility of paid work. This brings us to the inequality dimension of social class.

It has been shown that many of the typical features of work in a labour-divided environment reduce job satisfaction, which in turn strongly effects overall subjective well-being. Besides good pay and job security, such features are opportunities for personal control, for skill use and for interpersonal contacts, as well as supportive supervision, future expectations and variety (Warr, 1999; Clark, 1998; Clark et al., 2001). Social class provides an indicator for several of these features of the work environment. Class positions with a working contract are, for example, highly divided, offer little opportunity for skill use and personal control and career prospects are relatively limited. Higher service class positions, on the other hand, are seen as favourable in many of those aspects (Goldthorpe, 1982; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Looking at the impact of social class on general life satisfaction given in Table 20.1, we can see that upper white collar classes are more satisfied with their lives than any other class. A major amount of the difference between the classes is, however, mediated by the monetary effects of the occupations. After controlling for income, the self-employed do not differ significantly from upper white collar anymore.¹⁶ Hence, the non-monetary aspects of higher white collar classes and self-employment is relatively similar. The main difference is between higher white collar positions on the one hand and working class positions on the other.

20.4.2.6 Education

Although education is a an undisputed component of well-being in the objective approach, applications of the subjective approach show that education generally has only small effects on life satisfaction, and that these effects seem to be mediated by income, health and social capital (Diener et al., 1999; Helliwell, 2003). However, these results do not turn out in our European data set. Although much of the gross education¹⁷ effect is mediated by its effect on income, the higher educated are more satisfied with their lives even after controlling for the various other aspects of the socio-economic status and for measures of sociability. It is only when controlling for health satisfaction and long-term illness that the education effect becomes insignificant. One might conclude then that the higher educated might be more satisfied because they live in healthier conditions. However, it must be remembered that subjective health evaluations of the sort used in the models are chronically error prone and often contain more valid information about personality than about objective health status (Okun and George, 1984). One could also explain the education effect by personality differences between the different educational groups.

20.4.2.7 Housing

Despite its utmost importance as a component of well-being in the objective approach, there has been only sparse analysis that looks at the effects of housing quality on life satisfaction so far. We know from several studies that having a nice home is mentioned among the most important factors contributing to quality of life (Burns and Grebler, 1986; Kiel and Mieszkowski, 1990; Delhey, 2004). Using data from the EQLS, Domanski and Alber (2006, 102–104) show that housing deficits like rotten windows or lack of flushing toilets strongly influence the general life satisfaction of Europeans. Other factors, like the quality of the housing environment or the number of rooms, seem to be less important. Ownership

¹⁶ Self-employed income is typically relatively low in Eastern Europe, unlike in Western Europe.

¹⁷ Education was measured as terminal education age in the EQLS.

itself does produce higher life satisfaction in Western Europe, but not in the former communist countries. This pattern has been called the “housing paradox” in Eastern Europe and can be explained by the rapid privatisation policies carried out during the transformation.

In Table 20.1 we replicate an analysis made by Domanski and Alber (2006) with a slight variation. Accommodation problems are measured by counting how many deficits people perceive (rotten windows, no flushing toilet, damp leaks) with regard to their home. We also include information about shortage of space, which is measured in objective terms by the number of rooms per person: Accommodation problems lower subjective well-being considerably, although partly so because they are indicative of low income. The effect of accommodation problems diminishes further when controlling for health, which might be taken as a sign that serious deficits of housing cause health problems. In addition, the table illustrates the relative small effect of the dwelling size for satisfaction with life in general.

20.4.2.8 Family and Inclusion

Many studies have dealt with the impact of social relationships on subjective well-being and showed, for example, the positive influence of marriage on life satisfaction. Divorce, separation or widowhood reduce subjective well-being to a remarkable extent, even when income is taken into account (Diener et al., 1999; Böhnke, 2005). Other findings underline the importance of social relations outside the family, and it has also been shown that social engagement, sports activities and participation interact with positive well-being (Helliwell, 2001). Even the negative effects of unemployment on subjective well-being can be buffered by strong supporting networks (Böhnke, 2004.)

In order to estimate the effects of sociability on well-being for Europe, we applied three different indicators, namely marital status, having regular contacts with friends or neighbours and doing voluntary work. The results indicate that married persons are generally more satisfied with their lives than others. The difference is particularly strong between married and divorced persons comparable to the difference of being in the third income quartile instead of the lowest. The gross effect of being single in comparison to being married is relatively small, but rises considerably after controlling for age. Hence, if one compares singles with married persons of the same age, the positive effect of marriage stands out more clearly. People who have regular contacts with friends and neighbours, or who meet others because they actively participate in voluntary organisations, also have higher subjective well-being rates. The effect of working for voluntary organisations can thereby be partly traced back to rich, employed, higher educated persons with upper white collar occupations, which supports the idea that being integrated in favourable working relationships also favours social relations outside the immediate working environment.

20.4.2.9 Life Style

Life style is one of the most recently detected dimensions of social inequality. Based on concepts found in the work of Max Weber or Georg Simmel, sociologists conceptualise life styles as a multidimensional concept formed by activities and expressive preferences. They empirically measure life styles as combined indices from a huge number of leisure time activities and attitudes (Spellerberg, 1995; Otte, 2004). In a 1976 survey, respondents were asked whether they consider leisure or work as more important for their subjective well-being. More than 40% of employed people stated that work is more important to them; even 34% of housewives were of this opinion (Veroff et al., 1981, 261–262). However, as Lane (2000, 169) pointed out, leisure has become increasingly important for Americans.

Donovan and Halpern (2002, 25) show that British people who exercise regularly are more satisfied with their lives than those who do not. Similarly, regular gardening seems to make people feel better (Donovan and Halpern, 2002, 25). Other leisure time activities that raise life satisfaction are social engagement and participation in religious activities (Helliwell, 2003). It is however likely that at least some of these leisure activities influence well-being through their socialising aspects.

The EQLS contains very little information on leisure time activities. Involvement in voluntary organisations and contacts with friends or neighbours have already been mentioned above. Another activity is church attendance, which slightly increases subjective well-being. Moreover, people that are connected to the Internet are considerably more satisfied with their lives, although much of this effect is based on the socio-economic status of the typical Internet user.

20.4.2.10 Health

Being in good health has been an extremely important component of well-being in the objective approach (Section 20.2.1). However, the subjective approach of well-being has found that objective health indicators only have a small impact on subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999). The effects of bad health on life satisfaction seem to be only temporary (Brickman et al., 1978). However, self-reported, and hence subjective, health indicators have a strong effect on well-being (Helliwell, 2003, 339). The importance of such subjective health evaluation for well-being might be explained by personality (Okun and George, 1984), and self-reported health might be therefore used to control for such personality differences.

Two subjective health indicators are available in the EQLS: the question of whether one has a long-term illness or disability that limits one's activity and health satisfaction. Both indicators are subjective in the sense that whether they think that they are limited in their activities, or whether they are satisfied with their health, depends on the respondents' subjective reference points. The strong gross effect of long-term illness and health satisfaction mirror the known results that subjective health evaluations are important factors in subjective well-being. The coefficient for long-term illness, however, changes its sign after controlling for health satisfaction. That is to say, out of two respondents with the same health satisfaction, the person with long-term illness tends to be more satisfied with life than the person without.

20.5 Country Differences in the Production of Well-Being

20.5.1 Modernisation and the Production of Well-Being

The question of how inequalities are related to subjective well-being has until now been investigated in a global perspective: Which dimensions of inequality explain life satisfaction throughout Europe irrespective of country differences? A study of the available data shows something like a universal structure of well-being in Europe. However, the unexplained variance in the models and the fact that countries as such add explanatory value for life satisfaction outcomes suggest that country-specific patterns of life satisfaction compositions must exist. Following the idea of Ronald Inglehart (1977) one can expect that *goods become less valuable when they can be taken for granted*. This version of the modernisation theory suggests that the more developed a country is, the more important non-materialistic

inequalities like “social integration” become for well-being compared to inequalities like “economic affluence”. In what follows we will describe two empirical tests of this general idea.

20.5.1.1 The Relative Importance of Domain Satisfactions

In the European quality of life survey, the respondents were asked how satisfied they are with several domains, including health, education, standard of living, accommodation, family and social life. In a sense, these so-called domain satisfactions can be seen as subjective evaluations of the major components of well-being. Following the idea raised above that goods become less valuable when they are taken for granted, it can be expected that more materialistic domains like education, standard of living and accommodation should be more important in the poorer countries, while *post-materialistic* goods like family life and social life should be more important in the richer ones.

In order to explore this implication, we have estimated the effect of each domain satisfaction on general life satisfaction. Therefore, we have estimated linear regression models of life satisfaction for each country and each domain satisfaction separately.¹⁸ The Figure 20.6 shows whether these regression coefficients co-vary in the expected way with the economic affluence of countries.¹⁹ The results support the expectation that post-materialistic goods are more important in the more affluent countries. In poorer countries, i.e. in countries with low levels of GDP per capita, the effect of satisfaction with standard




Fig. 20.6 Country-specific effects of domain satisfactions on well-being by GDP per capita

¹⁸ Gender, age, age-squared, income, employment status and marital status were used as control variables.

¹⁹ Coefficients of Luxembourg have not been plotted in Fig. 20.6 because of Luxembourg’s outstanding values for GDP per capita.

of living is clearly higher than in the more affluent countries. The same can be observed with regard to the effect of education, although less pronounced. At the same time, satisfaction with family and social life becomes more important in the richer countries. The effects of satisfaction with health and accommodation do not interact with a country's economic prosperity.

This illustrative example can be confirmed by a more formal statistical analysis. We have set up a random-intercept multi-level model, where we have used data from all countries together and treated countries as the first-level variable. The models included GDP per capita and interaction terms between GDP and each domain satisfactions, one at a time. It turns out that the coefficients are significantly positive for the interactions of GDP with the two post-materialistic domains, while they were significantly negative for the interactions of GDP with the two materialistic domains education and standard of living. Hence, the higher the GDP, the more important the satisfaction with family and social life for well-being. At the same time, the importance of satisfaction with standard of living and education decreases.

20.5.1.2 The Relative Importance of Materialistic and Non-materialistic Goods

Up to now we have used subjective indicators to show that the materialistic components tend to be of smaller value for life satisfaction outcomes in the more affluent countries. In the following, we present a corresponding analysis based on more objective indicators for similar domains. The analysis basically uses variants of the regression models presented in Table 20.1, but this time we calculate them for each country separately. Like before we record regression coefficients of interest and analyse whether they vary systematically in size depending on a country's economic affluence. More specifically we look at the following contrasts:²⁰

- Unemployment vs. employment as an indicator for the domain employment.
- High vs. low formal education as an indicator for education.
- Highest income quartile vs. lowest income quartile.
- No problems with accommodation vs. at least two specific problems as an indicator for housing.
- Married vs. not married as an indicator for the family domain.
- Regular contacts with friends and neighbours vs. not having those contacts for the domain sociability.

Again, we expect high influences of post-materialistic goods like family and sociability in the more affluent countries, while we suppose the materialistic goals to have a stronger impact in the less affluent countries. Figure 20.7 shows the results.²¹ Overall the data shown in Fig. 20.7 support the idea of a lower value of materialistic goods in more affluent countries. However, the results are not as clear-cut as they were in the analysis using subjective domain satisfactions. Income obviously loses some of its explanatory power for

²⁰ We have not used an indicator for health because it is unclear whether the available indicators can be regarded as "objective". All models included gender, age, age-squared, employment status, income and education as control variables. for the effect of "contacts with friends and neighbours" we also included marital status as a control variable.

²¹ Coefficients of Luxembourg have not been plotted in Fig. 20.7 because of Luxembourg's outstanding values for GDP per capita.




Fig. 20.7 Country-specific effects of dimensions of inequality on well-being by GDP per capita

well-being in the more affluent countries, while being married is becoming more important. The slight decline visible in the graph for contacts with friends and neighbours is contrary to expectation. However, this decline is insignificant in a random-intercept regression model similar to those described in the last section; thus, we do not regard this declining effect as evidence against the post-materialism hypothesis. All other effects show a more or less unsystematic connection with a country's affluence and can therefore not be taken as supporting evidence for the post-materialism hypothesis.

20.5.2 The Relative and Absolute Value of Money

Do desires have to be fulfilled in a relative or in an absolute sense? In other words, is it enough to possess a desired good, or do I need more of it than others have? Such questions are especially debated among economists, who investigate the relative and absolute income effects from the perspective of "utility". Duesenberry stressed the high importance of relative income for individual consumption and savings behaviour as early as 1949. Easterlin (1974) explained the puzzling result that economic growth has not increased people's happiness with what has become known as the "comparison income" or "relative utility" effect (Easterlin, 1995, 2001, 2005). He argues that raising the level of an individual's income above the income of other comparable people is more important for people's utility function than its absolute level. Increasing the income of all will therefore merely raise the aspiration levels instead of individual happiness. In a similar vein Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) define a value function over gains and losses with respect to some natural reference point, and hence relative to this reference point. This idea of a "comparison income" has inspired a number of studies to compare the relative and absolute income effect (Mcbride, 2001; Stutzer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Kohler, 2007). Most of these studies stress the importance of relative income.

The subjective approach of the study of well-being can be fruitfully related to the debate about absolute vs. relative, especially when used in a comparative way. This section illustrates this with two examples that highlight the importance of the absolute income effect.

20.5.2.1 Relative Income and Absolute Deprivation

One way to disentangle the relative and absolute effects of income is to set up different measures for relative and absolute income. An obvious measure for *relative* income is a categorisation of income into country-specific quartiles. People in the upper quartile in poor countries can therefore be regarded as relatively rich – even if they are poor compared with persons from rich countries. Likewise, people in the lowest quartile in rich countries are relatively poor, even if they have an income that would qualify them as rich in a poor society.

Now for the measure of *absolute* income: In the EQLS, respondents were asked whether they could afford a list of goods: keeping their home adequately warm, 1 week holiday per year, replacing worn out furniture, a meal with meat once a week, new clothes, having friends or relatives for a drink once a month, a car, a home computer and a washing machine. We have defined people to be severely disadvantaged when they lacked three or more items in this list because of financial shortcomings. It is possible – and in fact even quite likely – that relatively poor persons in rich societies are not poor by the standards of this measure. Moreover, it is possible (and again not unlikely) that someone who is relatively rich in a poor country lacks more than three items anyway. Hence such a measure can be considered as a measure of absolute deprivation.

In Fig. 20.8 we have calculated the country-specific differences of the average life satisfaction of the relatively rich and the relatively poor (graph on the left), and of the absolute rich and absolute poor (graph on the right). The higher the difference, the higher the respective income effect.

First, note that it is a general pattern that life satisfaction is distributed according to the individual's income position. People in the top income quartile are more satisfied than people in the bottom income quartile in every country. Likewise, people who are not absolutely deprived have a higher life satisfaction than people who are absolutely deprived. However the difference between the relatively rich and the relatively poor tends to be far more pronounced in the poor countries than in the richer ones. With regard to *absolute deprivation*, the picture is remarkably different. Leaving the three poorest countries aside (Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania), the difference in life satisfaction between people who cannot afford basic goods and people with higher incomes is much stronger in the more prosperous countries than in the poorer ones.

Putting both together, one might say that income, in general, is less important in rich societies, but being *absolutely* poor in a rich country is worse than being absolutely poor in a poor country. Several explanations can be offered for this striking result. One explanation would be that in poor countries, being absolutely poor is much more common and hence less stigmatising. Another, related explanation would be that being absolutely poor in poor societies is somehow buffered by social networks or by a subsistence economy.

20.5.2.2 How Relative Is Absolute? The Internationalisation of Reference Points

Do people need a specific amount of income to be satisfied, or do they strive for more income than people comparable to them? This question is not as clearly stated as it seems at first glance. Obviously, a “relatively” rich person in a poor society might be considered




Fig. 20.8 Country-specific influence of relative income and absolute deprivation on life satisfaction by GDP per capita

as poor by the standards of a rich society, and one is therefore tempted to regard this ideal typical person as relatively rich but absolutely poor. However, this classification rests on the usage of the co-nationals as the reference point for the definition of the relative income position. If one had used the joint population of the rich and poor countries as reference point for the definition of the relative income position, the person would have been not only absolutely but also relatively poor. The absolute and relative income position would be indistinguishable then.

The selection of the reference point tends to be somewhat arbitrary. In the European definition of income poverty, individuals are regarded as poor if they earn much less than the country average. Hence, co-nationals are used as a reference point for this definition of income poverty. However, other reference points are sensible as well. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), for example, uses co-nationals with the same age as reference points and defines individuals to be relatively poor if they earn less than the average of their birth cohort. Fahey (2007) argues towards the use of a common EU threshold for the definition of poverty; his work can be understood as a plea for using the Europeans as a reference group. Obviously, the larger the group from which the reference point is derived, the less distinguishable relative income and absolute income gets. If the reference point were derived from the entire world population, absolute and relative income positions would be indistinguishable. In other words, what is often called an absolute income effect can be translated into a relative income effect – relative to a reference point derived from a population that goes beyond the national realm.

How do we know which reference point is the right one? In a recent publication Delhey and Kohler (2006) have demonstrated one way to answer this question. They show that the way people compare their own living conditions with the living conditions in other countries affect their subjective well-being. The lower individuals assess their own living

conditions relative to those in foreign countries, the less content people are with their lives. This holds true for such different populations as the Germans, Hungarians and Turks and was more recently also verified for all European countries (Delhey and Kohler, 2008). A further key result of the study was that upward comparisons matter more than downward comparisons. If people feel personally deprived, relative to other countries, they are less satisfied with their lives. Conversely, knowing themselves to be better off than those abroad only makes people a little more content.

Let us back-translate these results to the issue of relative and absolute income effects. To be in a relatively good position compared to one's co-nationals is often not enough to produce high subjective well-being. People also strive to achieve relatively good positions compared with people in other countries. One might want to call this an "absolute income effect"; however, it is probably more correct to say that the people with whom we compare ourselves are not only co-nationals.

20.5.3 Quality of Society and Its Impact on Well-Being

In the previous sections we have repeatedly analysed what role individually attained goods – either materialistic or non-materialistic ones – play in the production of well-being. Political and cultural circumstances as a provider of life chances are severely neglected in this debate. The potential role of societal surroundings has been pointed out by Amartya Sen (1993, 2000), when he emphasises "capabilities" as an important factor in understanding social inequality. In his view, political and institutional settings play an important role in limiting the ability of individuals to take advantage of certain life chances. In his eyes not only are the goods that individuals possess important for well-being, but also the possibilities a society offers for their production, availability and usage.

The empirical evaluation of the impact of political and societal circumstances on well-being is, however, problematic. Some studies deal with general information about a country's economic prosperity and about its governance performance of welfare policy characteristics in order to establish guidelines to compare one country with another (Clark, 2003; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Helliwell, 2003; Hofstede, 2001). However, options and self-realisation as aspects of capabilities are not necessarily objective features of a society. Certain societies might offer a good chance of earning a high income, but restrict chances of leading a satisfying social life. What is considered as a "good" society also depends on its citizen's desires. Another operationalisation for freedom or limitations to act might therefore be the respondents' subjective evaluations of the quality of a society (Böhnke, 2005): How people evaluate welfare state institutions and public services, whether they trust other people or if they perceive many conflicts around them indicate worries and insecurities that might be negatively interrelated with personal well-being. Such a subjective measure of the quality of a society can be constructed on the basis of EQLS data. Figure 20.9 shows results for four different dimensions of (subjective) quality of society. The upper left graph shows how people evaluate the quality of the social benefit system and state pension system in their country, whereby high values reflect high quality in this branch of the society. The graph indicates that the social system is rated much lower by people from the former communist countries (FC) than from the traditional market economies. Basically, no transformation country has values above zero, which is the European average. A similar result also arises if one looks at two of the other dimensions of the subjective quality of society. The quality of public services




Fig. 20.9 Average subjective evaluation of the quality of society by country

(i.e. health services, educational system, public transport, social services and state pension system) and trust in other people are both much lower in the former communist countries than in the old European member states. It is only in the awareness of cleavages between groups like young and old, men and women, rich and poor, managers and workers, and between ethnic groups that the differentiation between former communist countries and old European member states is not that large; the strongest tensions between groups are seen by people from Greece, France and Turkey, while people from Denmark and Cyprus see few tensions between population groups.

The four subjective dimensions of quality of life can be considered as yet another component of well-being under the objective approach of well-being. However, under the subjective approach the question arises of whether the quality of the society really affects subjective well-being independently of other life domains such as access to material resources. Figure 20.10 shows country-specific regression coefficients for the influence of the quality of society on subjective well-being (controlling for gender, age, income, employment status and education). The results are quite clear-cut. All regression coefficients are positive, meaning that the better people evaluate the quality of their society, the higher their individual well-being. How living conditions are embedded and which opportunities and life chances people are provided with obviously count considerably towards life satisfaction. Although material shortcomings and perceptions of society are interrelated and people living in poverty are likely to evaluate their society more critically than others, these two different dimensions determine life satisfaction independently of each other noticeably throughout Europe. The important message is that fighting poverty and social disadvantage is not enough to increase subjective well-being.




Fig. 20.10 Country-specific effects of perceived quality of society by GDP per capita

The second result shown in Figure 20.10 is also clear-cut. The quality of society impacts far more on life satisfaction in the former communist countries than in the old European

member states. More generally, there is a correlation between the overall level of prosperity in a country and the importance the quality of society has for the subjective well-being of the people. The lower the GDP per capita in a country is and, one might conclude, the weaker the social security net is, the more decisive is the perceived quality of the society to explain life satisfaction outcomes. Despite single deviations, this is the overall tendency the graphical display suggests. All in all, the findings clearly demonstrate the influence societal circumstances have on individual well-being.

20.6 Summary

We need a comprehensive approach in order to be able to understand well-being in Europe. The aim of this entry was to give an impression of how controversial the issue of well-being is scientifically and how different the approaches to study well-being are. Furthermore, the results show how heterogeneous the distribution of various facets of well-being across Europe is and revealed the important dimensions of inequality. First, we focused on well-being in terms of objective dimensions such as income, education, employment and their distribution. Scandinavian and continental European countries perform quite well in several dimensions, while the former communist countries tend to have lower values. However, lots of variation and heterogeneity question this clear-cut picture. With regard to family integration and solidaristic values, Southern and Eastern Europe perform much better than the North. High between-country variance is also the dominant impression when we deal with life satisfaction and happiness outcomes, although the sharp distinction between old European member states (high subjective well-being) and former communist countries (low subjective well-being) is remarkable. Furthermore, we asked about the determinants of subjective well-being as a proxy for well-being. Income, housing quality and integration in the labour market are important providers of well-being. But values other than materialistic ones also count; on the contrary, family and social network integration as well as health count as universal mechanisms which increase subjective well-being. Moreover, country-specific analysis showed that family life and social contacts are more important for life satisfaction in countries where the general standard of living is high and material shortcomings are not dominating the daily routine. Finally, we would like to emphasise the role of political and social settings as important prevailing circumstances that shape life chances. The quality of a society, measured as the perception of conflicts, trust in people and the evaluation of social and public services impact strongly on life satisfaction outcomes; this is especially obvious in the transformation countries. The political circumstances in which someone experiences a decent life or miserable living conditions matter a lot: Societal surroundings turn out to be an influential domain for individual well-being.

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Chapter 21

Conclusion: European Integration and the Elusive European Dream

Stefan Immerfall and Göran Therborn

Life has changed for the Europeans because of the European Union. Its impact runs from wage laws to road tolls; its decisions can affect where EU citizens go to college or how they retire. This is what makes the European Union a fascinating topic for sociologists. Turning the question about EU's impact on how Europeans organize their lives around, sociologists also have to probe the implication of societal developments for the evolution of European institutions and politics.

In this conclusion we would like to take stock of what we have learned while editing this handbook. This is not a summary of the individuals' chapters. We are approaching the questions of the sociology of Europe expecting a fuzzy set of nested and partly overlapping social institutions, practices, exchanges and other relations, and cultural mindsets, with blurred local, national, regional, continental, and global boundaries. Still we want to elaborate on the causes and consequences of the emerging or, in our view, rather the forestalling of a European society by referring to selected findings of the handbook.

21.1 Faces of a European Society

Sociologists have long pondered the emergence of a European society. Many historical developments and peculiar circumstances added to foreseeing its emergence.

Looking at its cultural geography, Europe is a "macro region," a region of different, but none the less interlacing regions (Haller 2009). There are enough similarities in terms of environment, religion, language or demography to warrant the proposition of a European culture area (Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan 2004). An additional European feature is its endogeneity of its route to modernity (Therborn 2000a). Sure it was one of civil wars, revolutions, and religious conflicts, but the mayhem was mostly self-inflicted.

Europe was also the birthplace and starting place of many of "social inventions." One important example is the nation-state (Rokkan 2000). The consequential idea of the nation-state or the institutionalization of the welfare-state and concomitant concepts like nationalism or socialism have been borne in Europe and exported all over the world. This development opened up the possibility for the internal structuring – and the pacification – of conflicts through mass party politics (Bartolini 2005).

S. Immerfall (✉)

Humanities Department, University of Education at Schwäbisch Gmünd, Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany
e-mail: stefan.immerfall@ph-gmuend.de

European idiosyncrasies pertained to public and private life as well. Peculiar constellations in society which are fundamental for private life such as family, work, consumption have developed all over Europe. European commonalities showed in forms of social inequality and milieus, social movements, and education. While there were always different trajectories, on balance more divergences have disappeared or leveled out than opened up (Kaelble 2007).

Soon after Europe's outward expansion went into reverse after its self-inflicted collapse in 1945, European integration presented a new historical phase in the development of Europe. The next 40 years saw the emergence of a European peculiarity once again: the expansion of an international organization with authority to impinge upon state sovereignty and to harness European rivalries. Through the expanding jurisdictions of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and the EU Court of Justice, Europe has become a normative area (cf. Therborn 2002). No other configuration of nation-state cooperation accrued as much status and power as what later became the European Union.

Little wonder then that many sociologists agree that it does make sense to speak of a European society, above and beyond its component states and regions (Hettlage/Müller 2006, Martinelli 2007, Fligstein 2008, Münch 2008, Outhwaite 2008). Our findings tend to question that idea, both conceptually and empirically.

How does a European society look like when one sees one? This is obviously a difficult question. A society is a web of social relationship, relations which may be abstract and indirect. Nevertheless, to call a web of social relationship a "society," it must be distinguishable from other groups, with more in-group than between-group commonalities. One important social aspect of a European society is the extent to which the multitudes of European people believe in their common distinctiveness. Is there any widespread European umbrella conception of a manifest destiny (Hedetoft 1998)?

Most proponents of the thesis of a European society make a virtue out of necessity. They emphasize structured diversity, disunity, polymorphy, poly-identity as the essence of a European society. This attribution is nothing new (De Madariaga 1951; Morin 1990; Barzini 1983), and it is historically true to the extent to which it points to discord and conflict as driving forces of Europe's historical development. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, and in contrast to other continents, Europe never became subjugated to one single imperial power for an extended period of time. The European condition of a *unitas multiplex* does not tell us, however, whether a single European society is emerging or not. For instance, there was always a kind of a European public since the Middle Ages, even if one of the elites, of scholars, clergymen, and nobility (Kaelble et al. 2002).

21.2 Nested Societies, Multiple Sociability

Instead of looking at a possible feature peculiar to a European society and then decide whether this feature is present or not we propose a more dynamic perspective. Do processes of convergence prevail with the consequence of building and intensifying the web of social relationship? This approach may not provide a clear-cut answer to our initial question, but it produces useful evidence. There are at least three aspects to consider empirically.

A European society to emerge would require, in our view, intra-European differences subsiding to the level of differences within national societies. This can be called the structural level. Second, there would also be a rapprochement required concerning the institutions that shape the daily life of the individuals. This we call the institutional level.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, members of a European society would need to recognize each other as fellow members of a common society. We call this the social level. What do our chapters tell us about each level?

21.2.1 The Structural Level

When one looks at some basic living and working conditions such as health, labor market, income, security, housing, or environment, one cannot help being astonished about huge differences of countries (Böhnke/Kohler, this handbook; for a more extensive survey see Alber et al. 2008). Then there are huge differences in growth, public debt, inflations figures, unemployment rates, just to mention a few of the more common social indicators. Even the rating for government bonds in the Euro zone and, accordingly, the interest to be paid for the public debts by its individual member states has widened on the heels of the financial crisis.

In terms of power structure there is clearly no overall European model of elite formation and elite integration. Europe's elites are still nationally structured in their overwhelming majority. This is true for patterns of elite education, recruitment, and sectoral interlocking (Hartmann, this handbook). This finding is particularly surprising in the field of business because of the strong Europeanization of the economy. Two-thirds of all exports go into the single European market, barriers to cross-European mergers and acquisitions have been removed, and the Commission watches over unfair competition practices. Yet mergers usually take place within cultural macro regions denned along linguistic-cultural and religious lines, rather than in the European Union at large (Haller 2008: 115–123).

The increasing popular idea of business schools should also have added to the Europeanization if not internationalization of business elites. In Germany, for instance, the idea of putting a cap on bonuses and salaries of top managers was strongly rejected with the argument that otherwise talented managers would leave Germany in droves to hire with foreign companies. The truth of the matter is, however, according to Hartmann's meticulously compiled career data that even the top echelon in multinational enterprises is still strongly nationally entrenched. The situation is even more closed for the political, judicial, and administrative elites where career mobility across national borders is almost nonexistent. So far, specific national traditions and balances of power seem to outweigh any influence of the increasing strengthening of central EU institutions.

There are at least two commonalities in European power structures, however. One is the social exclusivity of elites even if the elite recruitment is a bit more socially open in the Scandinavian and in the transformation countries of Eastern Europe. The high degree of self-cruitment of the elites is not confined to Europe, however. A second commonality, and more of a European peculiarity, may be the declining importance of the armed forces all over EU-Europe. Given the new glory of European armies in fighting the barbarians of Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan, this commonality is perhaps in danger of becoming a thing of the past though.

A better case for convergence is religion. There are certainly continued differences in religion as an institution and in the influence of the respective national churches. Nevertheless, there is a decline in church attendance and religious observance even in a country like Poland. In most countries religious belief is highest among parts of immigrant communities. The European situation seems to contrast considerably with that in the USA (Cipriani, this handbook). It would be wrong, though, to describe the European situation as secularization in the sense of a disintegration of institutionalized or individual religiosity.

Moreover, enlargement is blurring the overall religious culture in the EU as it increases the proportion of those who regard religion as a prescription to societal problems (Gerhards, this handbook).

While religion represents a case of convergence to peculiar European patterns, the rise of leisure and leisure-related consumption is a general trend associated with increasing wealth. This has been aptly observed and documented since the days of the Prussian statistician Ernst Engel in the 19th century. Yet the breakthrough of modern mass consumption and consumer culture did happen much later in Western and Northern Europe than in the United States and still later in Southern and Eastern Europe. There is a debate as to which mass consumption is a truly American invention and, furthermore, whether consumption styles still differ between Europe and the USA. Hartmut Kaelble (2007) contends European preferences for extended holidays, a larger amount spent for food and clothes, and a continuing discourse and critique on mass consumption as examples of European peculiarities. Manfred Garhammer (1999) examining individual time resources and their embeddedness in collective time institutions finds convergence over time because of European countries moving toward US patterns. For instance, lunch gets more and more compressed to a hurried food even in France or Spain.

National differences remain despite this convergence through Americanization (or globalization). Spending patterns are one example, particularly in the distribution between what is spent on household goods and on activities outside the home (Gronow and Southerton, this handbook). A differentiated picture also emerges with regard to popular culture. Europeans either are listening to American or domestic music. The same is true for movies while the most successful TV productions are almost always home-made. There is little Europeanization of media and very limited appearing of a common European popular culture, not only because macro trends in media activities and consumption follow American practices, but also because national variations remain substantial (Gronow and Southerton, this handbook).

Western Europe brought forward a historical unique pattern of family and sexuality with later child-bearing age, lower number of children, smaller households, and a comparatively high emphasis on women's rights. This model had a huge global impact (Therborn 2004). A gradual diminishing of family pattern variations took place in Europe, including the trend to low birth rates, the rise in the age of marriage, an increase in the number of couples who do not have a formal marriage, and a rise in divorce. There still is considerable diversity, however. Differences include the number of sexual partners, the frequency of different forms of cohabitation as well as attitudes toward sexuality and family. The West–East dimension seems to act as an important dividing line in European family patterns corresponding not only to the lingering impact of State Socialism but also reflecting even older family patterns. Additionally, a South–North dimension continues to be crucial, effectively putting limits to convergence of European Family patterns (Haavio-Mannila and Rotkirch, this handbook).

There is more convergence in demography. Europe will become older and ethnically less cohesive (Fahey, this handbook). Net migration into Europe is now the largest component of population change in almost all countries. Another similarity is the lack of a “genuine mobility culture,” so dearly bemoaned by the European Commission. European workers, particularly in the richer regions, are much less willing to migrate not only across but also within states than their American counterparts (Mau and Büttner, this handbook).

With some exceptions in the Mediterranean and post-socialist countries, Péter Róbert (this handbook) reports similar trends in stratification and social mobility all over Europe. One example is the increase in the service class, another decrease for entering the labor

market as skilled laborer. While there was a lot of change in the social structure, he finds comparatively little change in mobility rates if one takes structural differences in modernization and industrialization into account. The extent of social fluidity in the USA seems to be at the upper limit, but not outside of the range of mobility rates observed in Europe. Trends may be similar but Róbert finds no clear evidence for either convergence or divergence among European countries in their social fluidity.

Now there is always the possibility of future convergence. This has happened in the past and is going to happen in the future. But at the same time certain socially divergent trends have narrowed, other gaps have opened up. While changes in the occupational structure of eastern and central European countries since the collapse of state socialism can be seen as moving toward the social structures of western countries, for instance, we also see a “de-westernization” because of the reduction of female employment (Crouch 2008). Another example is the birth rates in southern Europe, which not only declined to the European average but, in a complete historical reversal, is now the lowest in Europe (Fahey, this handbook). Still another example is public bureaucracy. All over Europe public bureaucracy grew to one of the largest institutions. New management ideas and dissatisfaction with its working lead to market reforms which, together with Europeanization through the need to implement European regulations, does appear to produce some converging in the nation’s administrative systems. Yet, the continued impact of state traditions and the differential acceptance of ideas guiding reforms put an effective barrier to convergence (Peters, this handbook).

Cities represent still another case. Here we continue to see something specifically European but we also see divergence. Europe was created by cities, or city-states (Le Galès and Therborn, this handbook). Europe was always rife with strong city centers claiming more political clout and autonomy than other continents. Its cities were more important for the public representations of the upper classes. There still is more public planning, usually better public service, and, on average, less segregation in European cities than in American ones. Yet, the direction of European urban development began to diverge in the last quarter of the last century. The European context is now made up of a few declining cities, many dynamic medium size and large cities, and two large “global” cities.

21.2.2 The Institutional Level

Education certainly qualifies for one of the most important institutions in modern life. Moreover, similar processes of educational expansion have taken place all over Europe. Examples are the decline in the proportion of low education, the improvement in the relative position of women, the differentiation in educational systems and, more recently, the introduction of management-based school reforms.

Despite its powerful role in shaping individual lives and social development, varieties of educational systems condition its impact. The timing of educational reforms differed and differences in national educational structures remained which condition the impact of the aforementioned processes. The European Union has little power in determining the content of education. Its member states jealously guard their educational prerogative. It is therefore unlikely that the educational systems will help in turning German or Frenchmen into Europeans as the nationalization of education had done before for their national states. The national idiosyncrasies are likely to remain (Müller and Kogan, this handbook).

Nonetheless there are European similarities. One is the important role accorded to the state not only as an overseer but also as a provider of education. This is much less true for the United Kingdom, however. Another similarity, and indeed, a politically induced process of Europeanization, could be seen in the Bologna process where universities across Europe are asked to adopt a system of easily readable and comparable degrees. Convergence in tertiary education in Europe can be expected more in name than in substance, however. Or, as Müller and Kogan (this handbook) have succinctly put it: “While before the reforms, different things in different countries had different names, they may have the same name now.”

Somewhat similar to education, the welfare state experienced a long-term expansion both in terms of coverage of groups and of social expenditure, the family policy being the latest field of expansion. Its death has been proclaimed several times but it is surviving remarkably well. The welfare state is one of the European social inventions and Europe still shows a higher degree of state interventionism and higher levels of social expenditures than the non-European OECD average. In no European country the majority of the population relies on private insurance as it does in the United States. But the welfare state construction followed national trajectories which prove to be highly resilient (Bahle et al. this handbook). Different institutional designs will make a unified European welfare state very unlikely to emerge any time soon even though certain common trends in reform can be identified in most countries. Variegated attempts to replace direct state involvement by indirect regulation are a case in point. This is particularly true for pension reform where the European Union has had an impact.

The welfare state is but only one area where it has been argued that common problems would lead to the harmonizing of national policies and the evolution of European institutions. Crime is another example where drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal immigration, and terrorism call for cross-border collaboration in policing and judicial assistance. But, again, historical variation in criminal justice looms large. Even such universally criminalized acts as homicide, burglary, or assault are defined differently in EU countries (Barberet and Joutsen, this Handbook).

Competitive party systems are central institutions in modern governance structures with democratic aspirations. The formation of a European party system should not raise a problem because it has the European Parliament as its institutional locus. Yet, the evolution of EU parties competing for votes within an EU-level political space has proven to be a “drawn-out affair” (Berglund and Ekman, this handbook). While there are numerous scenarios for potential European-level party developments (Heidar 2003), sociological analyses will usually look for “cleavages.” Cleavages represent political differences entrenched in territorial, cultural, or economic interests that structure parties in a predictable and persistent way.

The cleavage model has worked well for the West European nation-states at least (Rokkan 2000; Flora 2000). According to a phrase coined by Stein Rokkan, “Votes count, but resources decide.” He meant to say that in mass democracies corporate interests and organized lobbying has to be balanced by numerical democracy best being served by competition between clearly demarcated party collectivities. Following this model, EU cleavages would cross-nationally combine cultural identities, political loyalties with territorial, foremost national, and other institutional differentiations. Democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, however, has occurred without the expected cleavage formation (Berglund and Ekman, this handbook). While a European party system could perhaps be possible without cleavage crystallization, continued party fluidity in Central and Eastern Europe, rising degrees of electoral volatility in Western Europe, and the fundamental

weakness of the European Parliament distort political accountability and undermine the formation of a European party system. Its absence is bound to keep up the gap between political elites and the public.

21.2.3 The Social and Individual Level

The life course straddles the border between the institutional and the individual level as individuals construct their life within a given historical and social context. Heather Hofmeister (this handbook) finds similarity and convergence, for instance, in youth experience that have become more vulnerable to uncertainty across all countries or in women's reduced employment chances under conditions of economic liberalization. On closer look, however, the lives of young people or of women are organized very differently in Europe. National path dependencies and traditions continue to create unique solutions that reflect cultural and individual differences even as the nations on the continent of Europe face a common destiny. Other areas, such as men's mid-life career patterns, do not show convergence whatever. Hofmeister doubts whether the European Union will generate convergent patterns any time soon.

Do Europeans compare their plight with that of fellow Europeans? Has the European Union altered the ways from which the reference groups are drawn? Delhey and Kohler (2006) find that most people still compare their own living conditions within a national frame of reference. But a growing minority also takes the living conditions in other countries into account. Interestingly enough, upward comparisons are more important than downward comparisons. The more people feel personally deprived, relative to other countries, the less satisfied they are with their lives. If so, enlargement should have increased disaffection as more people find themselves in a comparatively more unfavorable position.

Will Europeans increasingly organize across borders to better their lives? There is a myriad of EU-related lobby activity both in the nation-states and in Brussels. But is there a "civil society" emerging in the process of European integration? If there is not much of either pro-European or at least cross-European civic associational activity, what about Europeanization of politics through contestation? This is what the history of nation-states would imply. The territorial responses against centralizing elites, somewhat inadvertently, transformed a highly fragmented politics into nation-wide alignments (Rokkan 2000; Caramani 2004).

There is the rise of euro-skeptic groups in many countries and the EU institutions are also significant targets of protest groups with particular grievances such as truck drives, fishermen, or residents annoyed by the environmental damage caused by EU mobility-induced transit traffic, and there is a European trade union presence, occasionally in the streets as well as, mainly, in buildings of lobbying. Nevertheless there is little of permanent uniting such EU-related protest activities across national borders. National patterns of collective action remain dominant. If there is little or no Europeanization of collective action, there are nevertheless European idiosyncrasies in collective actions patterns. Collective action seems to be more regulated and ideology driven than in other continents (Rucht, this handbook).

The majority of EU citizens feels proud to be European. More people with a positive image of the EU are proud than those with a negative image. But the reverse is much less true (Immerfall et al., this handbook). Attachment to Europe is too unspecific to carry over into one's self-definition as a member of a larger community. "Right or wrong, my Union"

is not something a lot of Europeans would subscribe to. For most people the European Union holds little intrinsic value. The EU is no imagined community and the European flag and the Anthem of Europe (Beethoven's Symphony No. 9) do not send shivers down the spine of most people. Whereas the EU is an occasional locus of political orientations, it is not a matter-of-course site of belonging. The nation state remains the political arena in which most citizens feel emotionally at home. Cosmopolitanism is something for intellectuals and elites. Yet most people accept the EU as part of the status quo. As long as they do – and as long as central parts of most national elites continue to vest their interest into the integration process – even a further increase of euro-skeptic groups will not endanger the European Union.

Jürgen Gerhards (this handbook) estimates about 80 percent of EU citizens to support the basic principles of a representative democracy. This bodes well for the future of European democracy. There are two caveats, however. First, EU expansion politics is diluting support for the EU civil society, as civil societal engagement in accession countries is lower on average and tolerance of authoritarian rule higher. Second, support for the basic principles of a representative democracy needs to be accompanied by trust in co-citizens. The political minority has to have faith in the elected majority that it will accept a possible political defeat in the future. There is indeed a high level of trust within most European countries but these positive feelings do not extend in the same way to other Europeans (Priller et al., this handbook). Moreover, EU membership does not matter when it comes to trusting or not trusting other nationalities. Differences between “us” (co-nationals) and “them” (other Europeans) still matter a great deal.

Some progress has been made, though, as the proportions of citizens is declining who feel their neighboring countries to pose a threat to peace and security of the own country. Europeans tend to be more impartial toward each other. Perhaps the increasing exchange of goods, persons, and information between the European nations will additionally foster a sense of community. Mau and Büttner (in this handbook) show how much trans-European mobility, communication, travel, and trade has grown though geographically unevenly distributed. In terms of cross-border interaction Europe is indeed emerging as a social space. Ordinary European citizens are much less “locked-in” in national containment than were their ancestors less than 30 years ago. The extent of cross-border linkages and activities is certainly a strong case in favor of the European society thesis. Two further considerations need scrutiny, however, the systemic nature of most cross-border transactions and the socially uneven distribution of horizontal linkages.

Do personal contacts between European nationals increase approval of European integration? At least for the case of the German society, it could be demonstrated that people involved in cross-national exchange exhibit more positive attitudes toward transnational activities (Mau 2007). This finding needs to be reconciled with the fact that there is no spillover to the aggregate level: there is little or no relationship between various transaction measures and public opinion (Delhey 2007). Two mechanisms may explain this apparent contradiction:

For one thing, most transactions go unnoticed by the mass public and therefore add little to the sense of community between nationalities. For assessing the trustworthiness of foreign populations, for instance, Europeans resort to key characteristics like socio-economic modernization, population size, and cultural affinity of the target population, not to the density of transactions flowing between them (Priller et al., this handbook). Second, those people with regular personal cross-border interaction such as phone and e-mail contacts, country visits, and face-to-face interaction are still a minority and predominantly better educated, or managers, professionals, and the owners of businesses (Fligstein 2008). The

same applies to the so-called Eurocracy, the mesh of national and European bureaucrats and EU politicians that basically runs the EU day to day (Haller 2008).

Most citizens take not part in the extensive linkages of the Europeanized elites with their counterparts across Europe and those parts of the population firmly wedded to their nation-state may depreciate deep cross-national ties. Even an increase in attachment to Europe and a European identity due to individual involvement in transnational activities does not preclude a possible backlash against European integration. There is a clear mismatch between EU integrations as an elite project and public opinion (Immerfall et al., this handbook). All in all, transactions do much less for identity building than classical transactionalist theorists like Karl Deutsch had hoped for. Social developments and political integration diverge, the consequences of which has to be discussed in the next section.

21.3 Societal Diversity as Barriers to the Construction of a European Polity

A new global space of social imagination (Therborn 2000b) is transcending the national space, or as Ulrich Beck and others have called the methodological nationalism of the second third of the 20th century (Beck and Sznaider 2006). In that context, what a “society” is has become problematic. It is no longer the sociability that is confined by political boundaries, nor the social universe, as it was to Spencer and Durkheim. Since the local push of urban and community studies after World War I, sociologists have been aware of societies possibly being nested inside each other, like an urban or village society inside a nation. While we do not think the question, Is a European society in place, is capable of eliciting a final answer, empirical approaches like the ones of this handbook may still be illuminating to shed light on some of the problems the European integration is in. All in all, we were repeatedly astonished to notice both the sturdy persistence of national path dependencies and traditions and the limited impact of the integration process on many basic tenets of social life.

We have repeatedly noted historical European commonalities – its classical tradition of antiquity, its unique family system, its long historical interaction and its collective memories, its distinctive road to modernity and the nation-state, by revolution or other internal conflict. There were post-World War II commonalities of economic growth and regional integration, East and West. The EU has brought most of the historical halves of Europe together, in important matters of institutions and relations, but the other effects of the deliberate integration process are quite modest in comparison with the historical commonalities.

Most of these peculiarities developed long before the European Community formed. Many European peculiarities were well underway even before the heyday of the nation-states and developed long before the political integration started. Communism was also part of the European reality. Shared (West) European specificities should not be confused with the emergence of a European society. On other institutional characteristics, such as the convergence between European welfare states in terms of expenditure, the impact of the European integration seems to be quite limited, much smaller than the lasting influence the nation states continue to command. For still other objectives, foremost peace and prosperity, the self-proclaimed attribution to the European Union can at least be put into perspective (Haller 2008).

True, there are converging trends, but it seems that they are mostly neither confined to European societies nor outcomes of Europe's integration. There seem to be few signs of any unambiguous increase of a European distinctiveness. On the contrary, there are at least some indicators in the opposite direction. Continental European capitalism has increasingly, if not fully, adapted to American and Anglo-Saxon capitalism, of speculative finance, "shareholder value," "flexible labor markets," and extraordinary executive remuneration. Just before the American onslaught from the mid-1980s there had been a keen learning of Japanese management methods. The Clinton administration's attack on social assistance was probably the first time ever that American social policy has had a positive echo in Europe. As a multicultural, immigrant society, Europe has also become much more similar to USA. This is by no means a very large, not to speak of full, picture, but it is hard to find any socio-economic counter-examples. What has made Europe more distinctive in the world is its development of transnational legislation and jurisdiction, by the European Commission and by the European Courts of Justice and of Human Rights.

Cross-linking is part and parcel of the European history. Ubiquitous conflicts with switching alliances made the inhabitants of a comparative small continent familiar with each other. Borders and populations moved almost constantly. Historical sociologists as different as Stein Rokkan or Charles Tilly emphasize that building territorial organizations involved boundary control as well as boundary transcendence. Internal development was set in a wider European order. This why social historians like Hartmut Kaelble are able to prove common features in particular developments in the family, in social mobility and inequality, or the rise of the welfare state. Yet the link between advancements in interdependence and systemic interaction on the one hand and individual orientations and identification on the other works in quite different ways and not always in favor of political integration.

Does the EU really need features of a common society? What are the consequences of its absence? Which pattern of political integration does socio-cultural heterogeneity allow? Obviously integration on the level of states may continue as long as the EU is merely an interest-driven bargain club. It will be more difficult for constitutional matters, for common defence, for re-distribution policies, or EU taxes. It is not by chance that these topics either have been met with fierce resistance or remained on the back-burner of the EU agenda. We contend that the absence of a European society creates a three-forked predicament where European elites, institutional diversity, and the national societies and their populations are counter-balancing each other. Thus, the welfare state has remained an integral part of the institutional structure of European societies. Still a European order to correct negative externalities from economic liberalization is hardly attainable not only because of enjoying little support among major parts of the European elites. It is also difficult to realize on the ground that public support (Brooks and Manza 2006) is firmly tied to country-specific structural and institutional characteristics. Therefore, the Rokkanian "vote" cannot prevail over "resources". The same mechanism may also work against European elites' strategies to advance the integration process (Haller 2008).

We furthermore contend that because of the absence of European society (a) feelings of solidarity between European populations will remain weak and (b) under pressure European government will resort to variegated, but familiar national ways of doing things. The current financial crisis is a good example. Although the European Union has a strong economic constitution it had no answer to the enfolding events. The individual member states differ in their fiscal and economic responses. Measures range from cuts in value-added taxes to directly buying toxic assets from the financial system and to subsidizing selected industries.

Still, all governments realize that both the crises and their policies affect each other. After its stock market plummeted, Ireland was the first European government to guarantee all deposits and debts of the country's major banks, thus prompting savers to transfer money from British to Irish banks. Shortly after the Irish move, Germany reversed its initial position and pledged similar guarantees to private depositors. Finally the British government caved in and increased its limit for deposit guarantee. Billion-bailout packages from the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank were given to EU members like Hungary and non-members like the Ukraine or Iceland alike. Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area, however. Its aggressively expanding banks were able to do business all over the EU without prudential oversight. Ireland, the poster-child of economic liberalization, is particularly hit hard by the financial crisis. Its securitization laws after 1991 and its lax banking regulations attracted a flow of financial institutions. It allowed the creation of special purposes vehicles (SPVs) with low capital adequacy and their emitting of innovative security packages. Many of these securities later turned toxic and brought down their parent companies on the continent especially in Germany. There are no European financial regulations while the national regulators were unsuspecting.

During the month of banking and financial crisis, the Commission played more the role of a bystander or a government administration than an independent actor. It was for national governments to decide which course was to be taken. Their strategy was a mixture of national and coordinated measures. The same holds true for the climate protection. This once prestigious project was tuned down according to the needs of each individual member state's industries but not given up completely. We expect to see more of this uninspiring, yet fine grained mixture in the future, with or without the "Constitutional" or "Reform treaty" in force: Europe's national leaders will remain in the driving seat but they will strive for as much cooperation as possible. This pandemonium reflects quite well the state of the European society. We see interdependencies and interactions, partly based on and following historical patterns. Yet social integration does not follow structural integration. Life has changed as more of the lives of Europeans are organized on a common basis, but a European identity remains shallow. In that sense, a European society is yet to develop.

The sociology of Europe had better be seen as consisting of social life still predominantly institutionalized and experienced nationally, with a large amount of national heterogeneity, of localities and provinces, but under mounting influence both of global flows and of pan-European institutions. The sub-continent is crisscrossed by transnational fault lines, of the Mediterranean South versus the North, with shifting boundaries, from Rome or the Alps to the Rhine-Main line or the Baltic and North Sea. And of an East–West line, which in terms of sex–gender–family has run for a 1000 years or more from Trieste to St. Petersburg, but which in terms of modern politics has run along the Elbe. The currently dominant political science approach to the EU is one of "multi-level governance." That of sociology has to be of multi-level sociability.

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