

CHAPTER 4

Power and Status and the Power-Status Theory of Emotions

THEODORE D. KEMPER

Power and status theory has an ancient provenance, extending back as far as pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. The power-status theory of emotions, a somewhat different matter, is modern, but depends, of course, on the earlier theory.

Power and status theory holds that when human actors orient their behavior to each other, two fundamental dimensions, namely power and status, are operative.¹ This is a bold statement and it took philosophical daring to assert it during its earliest incarnation. Fortunately, modern social science also provides strong support for the exclusiveness of the power and status dimensions in human social relations.

The power-status theory of emotions is a contemporary application of power and status theory. It takes seriously the claim that social relational behavior can be described and elaborated in two dimensions and derives from it a theory of how emotions result from outcomes of interaction in terms of those dimensions. In this chapter, we first discuss power and status theory and then the power-status theory of emotions.

POWER AND STATUS THEORY

Few nonspecialists read pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, but Freud did. "Empedocles," he wrote, "was my great predecessor" (1959:349–350). Writing a century or so before Plato, Empedocles was a typical thinker of his time in judging that the basic constituents of nature were earth, air, fire, and water. Like his contemporaries, he observed that these elements constantly changed their

state: Water evaporated into air; air condensed and became water; earth could be ignited into fire; and fire turned into smoke (air).

How can we explain this dynamic quality of nature? *Love* and *strife*, said Empedocles, produced the changes in nature's constituent elements. Love binds the elements together, making them cohere. However, strife inevitably arises to disintegrate the whole and reduce the elements to their prior state (Cleve 1969; Wright 1981). It was not a great leap for Freud to see that love and strife were cognate to his two basic forces: Eros and Thanatos, the instincts of life and death, respectively. Using modern methods, social scientists have more recently confirmed what Empedocles asserted.²

The contemporary version of love and strife, here named status and power, respectively, emerged during a period of methodological innovation and empirical investigation during and following World War II, when it was deemed important to understanding military leadership.

The principal tool of discovery was factor analysis, a mathematical technique for determining underlying patterns in large sets of correlated variables. Developed by psychologist Spearman (1904) and later refined by Thurstone (1934), it was used at first to study whether intelligence was unitary or composed of different basic "factors" (e.g., verbal intelligence, mathematical intelligence, and so on). Factor analysis soon became a leading method by which analysts in many sciences explored how many factors or basic dimensions underlay the data of their field.

The utility of such inquiry is manifest. In a field without a good grasp of its basic dimensions, the work is largely anarchic, responding often to idiocentric interests but rarely leading to a body of valid statements about the domain in question. On the other hand, if one can sensibly circumscribe the basic properties of one's field, then one can work on a set of questions whose answers might cumulate into a coherent body of findings and an overarching theory to account for those findings.

Factor analysis also allows work at the level of "theoretical constructs" as opposed to "observables" (Willer and Webster 1970). The latter are any set of indicators, such as demographic variables like age, sex, race, or religion or attitudes or behavior—whatever is subject to direct perception by observers or can be obtained through self-report. According to Willer and Webster, observables do not lead to cumulative theory. In an example, they translated the observables occupation and sex into the construct "status characteristic." Theory about status characteristics can be generalized to other observables that share the same underlying status property as occupation and sex. Factor analysis is one method for generating a smaller set of constructs from a larger set of observables.

With respect to power and status theory, Carter (1954) wrote perhaps the seminal paper. It confirmed and extended what *his* great predecessor, Empedocles, had discovered earlier, but with an important sociological extension. Carter (1954:487) asked, "What are the characteristics which can be evaluated by observing people interacting?" In his work with Couch (Couch and Carter 1952), he found that three dimensions accounted for the variance in ratings of the group behavior of college males on 19 variables. This was an interesting finding in itself, but it gained importance because it was the culmination of a line of corroborative research that began with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Assessment Staff (1948) study of OSS candidates, which was factor analyzed by Sakoda (1952), Hemphill and Coons's (undated) study of leadership, Wherry's (1950) study of army officers, and Clark's (1953) study of army rifle squads in Korea.

The important discovery was that each of these investigations, despite differences in group size, tasks, social locations of subjects, and types of measurement, had found essentially the same three factors or dimensions or theoretical constructs underlying the larger number of variables that were used in these studies. Carter named the three factors *Individual Prominence and Achievement*, *Group Goal Facilitation*, and *Group Sociability*. This was a rare

convergence in social science, and modern power and status theory was essentially launched by this development.

Two issues arise from Carter's work. First, although power and status theory entails two factors, Carter found three. Second, there is the matter of definition: How do (two of) Carter's factors translate into power and status? On the two-versus-three factor question, it is useful to recognize that Carter's solution to the problem of dimensions is more sociologically comprehensive than the power-status approach. This can be seen as follows.

Where we try to imagine a starting point for sociological theory, it must inevitably be grounded in the fact that humans are an interdependent species and that this implies a division of labor. Reproduction requires two actors and the exigencies of human survival after birth also require other actors to nurture and care for the neonate. Added to the division of labor of reproduction and parenting is a partly efficiency-based, socially constructed further specialization of tasks, with wide variation between groups in the particulars. But whatever the details, whatever the local variations and whatever their origin, we can conclude without a sociological doubt that a division of labor is always present in human groups. Proceeding, we judge that the division of labor consists of a distribution of tasks, or what can be thought of as *technical activities*, assigned to different actors and designed *in toto* to accomplish the goals of the group: from simple survival, at one end of the scale of complexity, to the most recondite and arcane interests, such as are involved in modern science, at the other end.

If this sociological account of activity in human groups is adequate, we have a way of accounting for Carter's Group Goal Facilitation factor. The items that mark this factor support the analysis based on the division of labor. They include such traits and behaviors as: efficiency, cooperation, adaptability, pointed toward group solution, helpful, effective intelligence, and enable group members to recognize their function. These address the technical and task problems that the group confronts and indicate members' efforts to undertake and solve problems of that kind.

However, humans do more than task or technical activities. They also act toward each other—something we call social relations. This is the arena in which the details of who gets how much of the available rewards and benefits and by what means are settled. Social relations differ analytically, and usually empirically, from technical activity.³ In terms of this chapter, social relations are constituted wholly by the power and status dimensions. We now offer a provisional definition of power and status.

Power

We deem it useful to use Weber's (1946:181) definition of power, namely when actors are able to "realize their own will . . . even over the resistance of others." Thus, to have power in a relationship is to be able to coerce others to do what one wants them to do even when they do not want to do it. When compliance is obtained, it is involuntary. When there is a relatively stable power structure—that is, a relationship in which one actor reliably has more or higher power than the other actor(s)—we can predict that this actor will be able to obtain his or her way more often and in more domains than the other actor(s).

The ability to coerce others in this way depends on an arsenal of power tactics, which range from the horrific to those that are so subtle that they remain largely out of sight. Killing is the ultimate power tactic, but it is a boundary condition because it terminates the relationship between the killer and the killed and, therefore, removes the possibility of compliance. However, killing serves as a manifest threat to others by showing what will be done to them if they refuse to comply.⁴

Proceeding in some rough order of intensity, at the extreme high end, we can think of the infliction of physical pain—beating, scourging, slapping. Next comes physical confinement, which includes the whole repertoire of limitations on free movement. Also included are various forms of short-term control of the individual's space—pushing, shoving, blocking access, and so on. Additional physical means of coercion include cutting off vital resources for survival, such as food or air or water.

Further down the power scale, we see emotional violence, including screaming and shouting, as one form, and verbal abuse as another form. The latter includes insults and depreciation of the individual or the individual's identity groups or valued group symbols or beliefs. Yet further along are deprivations of customary or promised benefits and rewards, such as the parent's "grounding" an offending offspring or the denial of sex to a spouse or intimate other. Less apparent, but still power moves, are such tactics of verbal behavior as interrupting, talking-over, ignoring the other's topic, and refusing to discuss what the other wishes to discuss. The "silent treatment," whether used as a calculated snub or as an emotional rejection of contact, is also a form of power exercise.

All the above tactics and others that are related to them may be either initiated or threatened. In either case, the object is to obtain compliance when it is not forthcoming. Once compliance is obtained, the relationship begins to stabilize in power terms. The actor with more power—however achieved—is known to be willing to employ one or another tool of power to subject the other actor(s) to his or her will.

Once a power relationship has stabilized, power acts per se are relatively rare. This is because it is clear to the actor(s) with less power that he or she will be punished for rebelling or refusing to comply when asked for something. Under these circumstances, the individual will usually comply, even against his or her will, rather than receive punishment for noncompliance. Except in the most egregious cases, there are supervening institutional limits on how much power can be employed. Thus, although a parent has the right to spank his or her child, the parent is proscribed from holding the child's hand over a fire to obtain compliance.

Power is often exercised after the fact, so to speak, as a punishment for noncompliance. Punishment is designed to inform the actor who disobeyed that equal or worse punishment will follow further disobedience. Power tactics are also designed to weaken the will to be disobedient or to rebel. A nasty retort to a spouse informs him or her that there is a price to pay for repeating what has evoked the retort.

To this point, we have described tactics of overt power. They directly confront the other actor. Indirect forms of power are also available. These include manipulations such as deception and outright lies, which bring about the actor's compliance voluntarily, but on a false basis. Gossip and rumor are kindred forms. They enlist others who then shun or scorn the actor, thus depriving him or her of allies. The target is now weakened and made more likely to conform to the wishes of the actor who initiated the manipulation.

Status

In addition to the involuntary compliance that marks the social relations of power, there is authentic voluntary compliance. Actors willingly and gladly defer to, accept, approve, support, respect, admire, and, ultimately, love others without compulsion or coercion. We call this status-conferral or status, in brief. An actor with high status is one who receives many benefits and rewards from the other actor(s) in the relationship. Although status differentiation is endemic, the smaller the group, the less likely there will be large status differences among members.⁵ In large groups, to

use Collins’s (2004) terminology, there are “central” members and “peripheral” members. The former are the focus of group attention and receive the most rewards; the latter are almost invisible and exist in a penumbra on the margin of the group, with little attention or interest directed toward them. As is the case with power, stable status relations generate a structure in which actors give and receive status according to a settled pattern.

In sum, status and power embody Empedocles’ love and strife, respectively. Heuristically, they constitute what actors do with, to, for, and against each other in social relationships. Enacting power and status and the activities related to them—such as status-claiming and power-building, as will be discussed below—comprise, along with technical activity, an asymptotically complete program of what goes on in social life.

We now return to the second issue arising out of Carter’s work, namely the connection between Carter’s factors, Individual Prominence and Achievement and Group Sociability, and power and status. Individual Prominence and Achievement is identified by such items as authoritarianism, aggressiveness, leadership, forceful, bold, not timid, and confidence. Additional items include quick to take the lead, initiation and organization, alertness, and competence. This list leads us to judge that this is the power factor. Group Sociability lends itself easily to identification as the status dimension. The items that define this factor include sociability, behavior which is socially agreeable to group members, genial, cordial, well liked, and pointed toward group acceptance. We have thus linked Carter’s empirical results with the power and status conceptual domain, thus providing an empirical basis for what originated as a philosophical speculation.

Because of the way in which power and status emerge in factor analytic studies, the two dimensions can be represented as orthogonal axes in a two-dimensional space. Any-and-all power and status relationships can be depicted in the space. An example is shown in Figure 4.1, in which A and B are any two actors. P_a and P_b are A’s and B’s power, respectively, and S_a and S_b are A’s and B’s status, respectively. (A more complex depiction of power-status relationships will be offered in the discussion of love relationships.)

Beyond Carter’s early support for power-status theory, there is an abundance of empirical work that supports the model of two dimensions: small-group interaction analysis, cross-cultural




FIGURE 4.1. Power and Status Relationship Between Actors A and B.

studies of interaction and language, and semantic analysis. Details and supporting evidence are in Kemper (1978, 1990a, 1992) and Kemper and Collins (1990).

A continuing and encouraging source of support for power-status theory is featured in the work of two important and interlocked traditions of research in psychology: the Interpersonal Circle (IPC) and Five-Factor Model (FFM) approaches to personality. The IPC method (Freedman et al. 1951; Leary 1957) assesses personality in terms of two orthogonal dimensions, named Dominant-Submissive and Friendly-Hostile, both clearly cognate with power and status, respectively. Kiesler (1996) and Plutchik and Conte (1997) reviewed the broad range of IPC work.⁶

Five-factor model theorists declare five traits fundamental to human personality. They partition these into two that are interpersonal or social—Extraversion and Agreeableness—and three that are not deemed social—Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness (see McCrae and Costa 1989:586). Furthermore, the two social traits are considered equivalent to the IPC Dominance and Friendliness dimensions (Pincus et al. 1998) and, hence, also to power and status.

Going even further, McCrae (in Hofstede and McCrae 2004:74) asserted that the FFM “traits [including the power-status equivalents] are construed as *basic tendencies* that are rooted in biology” (emphasis in original). This reaches well beyond a sociologically less determinative view, but two bodies of collateral data cast some light here. First, given the evidence for specific physiological differences between different emotions (Funkenstein 1955; Gellhorn 1967, 1968) and given that power and status give rise to emotions (as will be detailed below), Kemper (1978) proposed that there is a necessary linkage between power and status, emotions and physiological processes, and thus a nexus between social relations and biology. Second, Chance (1976, 1988) and Waal (1982, 1988) have shown that power and status are fundamental in nonhuman primate behavior, thus providing a phylogenetic ground for the biological anchorage of the power and status dimensions (see discussion in Kemper and Collins 1990).

Power and Status as Macrodimentsions

Up to this point we have examined power and status as a model of microinteraction. Certainly, this is where power and status behavior are closest both to ordinary and scientific observations. However, power-status theory is applicable as well to large groups and to interaction between large groups and to the emotions generated both within and between large groups.

In order to achieve a better understanding of the power-status dimensions at the macrolevel, a change of terminology will be useful. At the societal level, we refer to power and status as issues of *freedom* and *justice*, respectively. These terms accommodate well to historical trends. Over a long period, as observed by Tocqueville (1945) and others, societies in the Western world and, increasingly, elsewhere have struggled toward the twin goals of moderating and regulating power (freedom) and providing for a just and equitable distribution of benefits (status). Social movements in fact are normally motivated by one or another of these interests (Kemper 2001). The intriguing question is whether or not such interests are reflected in the fundamental dimensions of societies.

Although there is not as much empirical work here as in face-to-face and other small-group settings, the results strongly suggest that the power and status dimensions are fundamental to interaction within any size group or between groups of any size. Kemper (1992) examined a set of studies dealing with fundamental dimensions of societies and of interaction between nation-states. Considerable complexity is observed at this level, but the essential technical activity and power (freedom) and status (justice) factors emerge. In sum, the power and status dimensions are grounded theoretically and empirically at both the microlevel and macrolevel.

Although technical activity, power acts, and status acts are the immediate “stuff” of social life, they do not fill up the whole social calendar. There are also metaprocesses devoted to gaining power or status and, sometimes, to reducing the other actor’s power or status. We turn to some of these processes now.

RELATIONAL METAPROCESSES

In any given relationship, an actor might or might not be satisfied with his or her power or status standing vis-à-vis the other actor(s). When satisfied, the actor need only tread water, so to speak, to maintain that state. This may entail modest adjustments of conduct. When dissatisfied—this usually means a sense of insufficiency in the power or status dimensions—the actor is motivated to change either his or her standing or the standing of the other actor. This sets in motion processes for the enhancement (or reduction) of the power or status configuration of the relationship. These processes have not previously been identified as such,⁷ but a review of some of them will reveal that they constitute what might be thought of as “social filler”—what individuals do in daily social interaction that is not task related or relational in the immediate sense (i.e., using power or conferring status).

Status Deficit

Probably the most frequent of the relational metabehaviors in social life is dealing with real or imagined status deficit. A status deficit refers to the feeling—it is an emotional state—that one is not receiving a suitable, appropriate, or deserved level of appreciation, respect, approval, acceptance, or love.⁸ Depending on the institutional setting and its properties, the actor might engage in the following actions.

1. *Formal Attainment According to Universalistic Criteria.* In this option, the person seeks to enhance status through achievements that are universally regarded as deserving status. In modern societies, this would include obtaining educational credentials or other evidence of preparation for satisfactory or superior occupational performance. A bachelor’s, graduate, or professional degree ensures higher status than lesser education in terms of more interesting work, higher pay, and acceptance into higher-prestige (status) circles. Correlative to this type of status attainment, the status level of the educational institution where one obtains one’s credentials also matters. Schools with top standing confer their status on their graduates. More generally, any major occupational step-up or attainment—frequently marked by higher monetary reward—is a notice to others that one deserves more status, not only within the occupational setting but outside it as well. For example, because women in many cultures value male occupational achievement highly, such attainment has a sexual and reproductive payoff (Buss 1989). Because educational and occupational credentials often take years to acquire, to launch on such a path to improve one’s status absorbs much interaction time.

2. *Normative Appeals.* In dealing with institutions, or in settings enduring long enough to develop an acknowledged tradition, the person with a felt status deficit may appeal to norms of fairness or justice. Formal or legal procedures might exist by which such claims can be adjudicated. In the United States, federal and state Equal Opportunity Commissions are vehicles through which normative claims of this kind can be pursued. However simple appeals—“That’s not fair!”—addressed to group members or even superiors may be undertaken. All such appeals rely on the existence of accepted rules and guidelines for status conferral and for repair of deficits when they are brought to light.

However a different strategy might be called for in bureaucratic settings. Those who feel a status deficit might desist from pressing their case so as not to be viewed as “troublemakers” and thus even more likely to be denied deserved status in such settings.⁹ The usual hope is that circumstances will change in some way—the boss might leave or have a heart attack and so pass out of the picture—so as to create an improved environment for status receipt.

3. *Extreme and Dangerous Attainments.* In informal groups, individuals who want to win more status might resort to extreme and often perilous gambits. This is a frequent tactic among adolescents who do not have the firm ground of high educational or occupational achievement to sustain their status ambitions. The wish to be found sexually attractive, a major status challenge, also fuels often unwise and sometimes fatal status-claiming actions.

4. *Claims to Insider or Expert Knowledge.* Anyone who can sustain a claim to inside knowledge about a topic of group interest is virtually guaranteed attention and appreciation for sharing that knowledge. The “inside dopest” of Riesman et al. (1952) amasses status capital in this way. The more private the knowledge, the better. Even if the individual lacks special knowledge, a mere stance of knowledge might suffice to earn some status. This is frequently established by the phrase “I know” when someone purports to share information presumably known only to the speaker. Even if this method does not earn status, it somewhat reduces the status of the speaker and thus keeps the status system more equilibrated according to the needs of the one who feels the deficit.

5. *Claims to Deep Experience.* The individual who can claim to have had a deep emotional experience is accorded a special regard. One simply raves about how good, great, excellent was the concert, the play, the movie, the restaurant, the trip, the date, the family occasion, and so forth or how deplorable, awful, lousy it was. Such expressions of extraordinarily deep feelings are often effective in gaining attention and regard. Sports talk, when not based on the “expert” enumeration of statistics about past performance, is often of this kind (e.g., “What a *great* play!”) and is accompanied by the appropriate body language of amazement and intense appreciation.

6. *Early Adopter.* The person who is first to introduce a high-status fashion or practice into a group earns a certain standing. Leading others to what is becoming *au courant* is one version of this. Bolder, but more risky, is to stake out avant garde territory. Although this will certainly earn attention, it might also earn contempt from those whose status is invested in the status quo (no pun intended).

7. *Exemplary Conduct.* Each group has its purpose and its standards. To meet the standards in an exemplary way is to purchase status from group members. Those wishing to move up in standing often perfect their performance of group roles, removing any grounds for complaint and establishing their bona fides as devoted group members. This often involves outdoing other group members—a form of potlach.

8. *Humility.* A frequently successful tactic in gaining increased status is to desist from claiming it, despite the acknowledged or suspected legitimacy of the claim, thus indicating one’s humility in the hope of being recognized for it. Humility also adds merit to support the original claim. Cinderella not only had the right-sized foot but also a history of uncomplaining dutifulness. Although the source of the deficit might be in a specific area—for example, one is not being recognized for one’s talent—the status that is eventually earned might have to do with the humble character one presents. This is because groups ordinarily value outward harmony and undisturbed process and are willing to pay in status coin when someone with a legitimate complaint does not press that complaint, but waits for the group to come around on its own.

9. *Victimhood and Complaints.* In victimhood, the group is put on notice that it has a special case of deprivation that must be compensated. Such claims have their perils, especially if the putative victimizers are fellow group members, who might resist the designation and reduce the

putative victim's status even further. This metabehavior is more likely to succeed when the victim can claim to have been victimized by members of another group.

One of the most frequent vehicles for securing status is to voice complaints about an unfair, distressing, or terrible experience one had to endure at someone else's hands. It could be as banal as a traffic tie-up (Katz 1999) or as heartfelt as the rejection of one's pet ideas. What is sought is a sympathetic response from a listener (Clark 1997). Often the listener is a targeted person in this respect. It could be the spouse, who has the acknowledged role as emotional nurturer and fixer; or it could be a friend, with whom one exchanges roles, sometimes as complainer, sometimes as nurturer. Children seek this kind of solace from parents and, at a later point, from their friends. In fact, what marks a friend is precisely that one can reveal one's chagrin and status neediness to that person, who will, when the occasion presents itself, reciprocally avail himself or herself of the same privilege. In virtually all cases, the listener is a status-equal, as status superiors are likely to be uninterested and status inferiors likely to gloat.

10. *Jesting and Joking*. Some group members earn increments of status through entertaining the members with wit, jests, jokes, or humorous stories. Some of this might even be prepared in advance, the reverse of *esprit d'escalier*. Also, one might develop a reputation as a fount of humor. Although this might have nothing to do with the purpose of the group, it is often a highly desired social lubricant. Humor serves to bring all those who are entertained by it onto a more or less equal status plane for the moment while elevating the status of the person who can accomplish this (think of the jester in various Shakespeare plays). Although some levity is generally acceptable, some groups, taking themselves very seriously, deny status to anyone who attempts such status leveling.

11. *Nostalgia Retrieval*. One of the more enjoyable ways to pass time in social discourse is to retrieve the elements of a common past. These are fragments of shared biography that display ideal or idealized sectors of time. Recalling these in the company of those who were also there is to reexperience with them the features that contributed to their bond and, by recapturing those features, strengthen the bond in the present. As membership and solidarity mechanisms, they confirm the validity of the members' status. It works like a Durkheimian (Durkheim 1965) solidarity ritual, in the manner examined by Collins (2004).

12. *Games, Contests, and Recreational Activity*. Games, contests, and sports are simulacrum of social life. The elements of skill and contestation are played out in constructed settings where chance, as in real life, might also play a part. From chess to Scrabble, from baseball to tennis, from Monopoly to draw poker, players strive to win over other players. Gaining what?—status for being skilled and competent performers or for being extraordinarily favored by luck; that is, someone deserving status. When the game is played for real stakes, such as money, it is no longer a status exercise, but a power exercise.

13. *Boasting*. A dangerous route to status enhancement is through boasting of accomplishments or experiences that normally earn status, if true. Ordinarily, the boaster comes to be disbelieved and, hence, extruded from the group, except if membership is secure on other grounds (e.g., he is a member of the family).

Power Deficit

Power deficit is a threatening state, as can be surmised from the list of power tactics discussed earlier, to which one is vulnerable when one lacks sufficient power to defend oneself. It provokes metarelational activity to gain more power for the self or, what is essentially the same thing, reduce the power of the other.

1. *Dependency Reduction*. Emerson (1962) formulated a cogent statement of power and dependency: $P_{ab} = D_{ba}$ and $P_{ba} = D_{ab}$, which reads as follows: The power of *a* over *b* equals the dependency of *b* on *a* and the power of *b* over *a* equals the dependency of *a* on *b*. Although absolute independence is a theoretical option, it is not feasible, except in such fictions as *Robinson Crusoe*. Where a power-status structure exists, a reduction of dependency, by whatever means, leads to a reduction in the power of the other.

2. *Coalition-Building*. Where dependency reduction is not relevant or feasible, one can augment one's own power by recruiting allies who will either be guided by one's own strategies or will act independently against the one whose power is being opposed. Coalition partners can be variously motivated. When the potential partner has a grievance against a common enemy, the main task is to work out a satisfactory division of labor in conducting the struggle. However, when the potential partner has no prior interest in the conflict, the burden is to negotiate terms that will pay the partner enough to bring him or her into the fight. International diplomacy—including all those dinners—is substantially devoted to building and maintaining coalitions and power blocs.

3. *Bluffing, Propaganda, and Disinformation*. A common strategy when there is a power deficit is to attempt to deceive the other about one's true strength, making it seem as if one has more power than is the case. When successful, this nullifies some of the power of the other and can also be persuasive in recruiting coalition partners.

These examples of status claiming and power gaining by no means exhaust the field of such efforts. Taken together, these activities, which are separate from the direct enactment of power and status behavior, consume a sizable amount of interaction time that is also not technical or task oriented.

Provisionally, we have established a model of social relations both at the interpersonal and the intergroup levels, which is understandable in terms of power and status. Social life is also a fount of emotions, and an important benefit of power-status theory is that it enables us to predict the emergence and persistence of those emotions in terms of the dynamics of the two relational dimensions.

THE POWER-STATUS THEORY OF EMOTIONS

The power-status theory of emotions derives from the proposition that a "large class of emotions results from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes in social relationships" (Kemper 1978:43). Real outcomes are those that happen in "real time," so to speak (i.e., in the immediate framework of interaction, e.g., there is an insult and a consequent flare-up of anger). Imagined outcomes include those in fantasy scenarios of what-might-be or what-might-have-been or are recalled from past interaction (e.g., someone recollects a first kiss). Anticipated outcomes are those that are projected as a result of future interactions (e.g., tomorrow is my first day at a new job and I don't think the "old timers" will like me). Social relationships are power-status relationships—that is, actors who have a certain standing vis-à-vis each other in a space defined by the power-status dimensions.

We must now consider the matter of outcomes. What can occur when there is interaction in power-status terms? For simplicity, we will confine the analysis to the dyad. When actors A and B interact, 12 outcomes are possible: A's power can rise, decline, or remain the same; B's power can rise, decline, or remain the same; A's status can rise, decline, or remain the same; and B's status can rise, decline, or remain the same.

Given that both A and B have both a power and a status position, it should be apparent that any interaction between them will necessarily result in some combination of 4 of the 12

possible outcomes. For example, A's power might remain the same (0), A's status might decline (−), B's power might remain the same (0), and B's status might rise (+); or A's power might rise (+), A's status might remain the same (0), B's power might rise (+), and B's status might rise (+). For terminological purposes, we will refer to A's and B's power and status as relational channels.

Now combining and permuting the outcome possibilities among the 4 relational channels, we obtain a total of 81 possible sets of outcomes of social relations in any interaction episode, beginning with an increase in all 4 relational channels (+ + + +), through no change in any relational channel (0 0 0 0), and ending with decrease in all 4 relational channels (− − − −). By definition, 1 of the 81 possible outcomes will occur. This might seem a daunting number of outcomes to deal with and, thus, to inhibit work with such a theory of emotions. However, the following can be argued in mitigation.

First, if anyone has doubted that a “mere” two-dimensional model of social relations can handle the acknowledged complexity of human interaction and emotions, the multiplicity of outcomes just described should allay that concern. Second, given the complexity of interaction outcomes, the power-status model affords a useful entry point into the question of mixed emotions or mixed feelings. Not only is there an entry point but also, importantly, a theoretical explanation, namely the fact that interaction outcomes will always occur in four different relational channels and, thus, will always have the potential to produce four different emotions. Parenthetically, we note that one outcome is often regarded as dominant and hence reduces any interference, so to speak, from any less intense emotions that derive from what occurs in the other three relational channels. Third, as we will see below, emotions will be assigned to relational channel outcomes one relational outcome at a time; that is, each discrete emotion is assigned to a discrete outcome of a given relational channel. The link between relational channel outcome and emotion is stated unambiguously.¹⁰

Heuristically, we conceive of three types of emotion: *structural*, *anticipatory*, and *consequent*. We define structural emotions as those that result from a relatively stable power-status relationship, for example, as is usually the case between spouses or parents and children or between workers and their supervisors. This is not to say that such structures are frozen. Ongoing interaction will result in immediate outcomes that will tip the structure in one direction or another, but these will often be slight and only transient changes. For example, spouses might have an argument and their power-status positions might shift for a period, but then the couple will reconcile and return to the earlier structure. Thus, we can speak of structural emotions—those that prevail in relatively stable social relationships.

Anticipatory emotions result from contemplating future interaction outcomes. Such contemplation takes into account interactions of a similar nature in the past and especially their outcomes. This information will be factored into an appraisal of possible outcomes in the future interaction and an anticipatory emotion will result.

Consequent emotions result from immediate outcomes of ongoing interaction in power-status terms (e.g., an abusive spouse threatens his or her mate in an argument and the target feels fear). These emotions constitute the surface flux of emotional life, because they are often short term and most susceptible to change and variation with the ongoing flow of interaction.

Before turning to these three types of emotion, we introduce the concept of *agency*. Even given the complexity of 81 possible outcomes of any single interaction episode between actors A and B, the model thus far does not account for who is felt to be the party responsible for the outcome(s). We hypothesize three agents: *self*, *other*, and *third party*. Self and other are quite straightforward with regard to agency. Third party might be a person, or an abstraction, such as God, or fate, or luck, or “the way things are,” thus indicating immutability or irremediability, as

when someone dies. Emotions are likely to differ, as will be seen below, depending on who is regarded as the agent. The three possible agents also give us three possible directions for emotion: to self, other, and third party.

Structural Emotions

When there is a stable structure of social relations, we propose that there are also emotions that correspond to the position of the actors on the power-status dimensions. Here we do not speak of the outcome of interaction, as in the general presentation above, because the standing of the actors on the power-status dimensions is stable. To get at the emotions in this situation, we must formulate the question in terms of *excess*, *adequacy*, or *insufficiency*. This will allow us to offer hypotheses about the long-term emotions that are felt in stable social structures.¹¹ In dyadic interactions, each actor will have an emotion that derives from his or her own power, his or her own status, the other's power, and the other's status.

Power

Own Power Adequate. When one is satisfied with the amount of one's own power, we hypothesize that the emotion is a feeling of *safety* or *security*. This has not been identified previously as a separate emotion and we propose that it is a subclass of the general sense of satisfaction or contentment. Contentment might not be consciously experienced and might only be detected or, better, recollected in the moment of its loss. Notwithstanding, having enough power to manage the relationship to one's satisfaction is one key to being content with the relationship. Importantly, one might not be content with the relationship overall because other relational channels are not satisfactory. Finally, with respect to the adequacy of one's own power, the notion of adequacy is relative and can be variably related to the absolute amount of power involved.

Own Power Excessive. When one feels that one's own power is excessive, we hypothesize that the emotion is *guilt*. Guilt involves unpleasant feelings of ruefulness and remorse—a sense that one has wronged or oppressed another through one or another tactic of coercion. Moral standards from virtually all of the major religious traditions condemn transgressions that employ excess power—from killing to lying and cheating. Also, given that the moral sense, as used here, is often derived from a religious tradition, to violate the tradition and to experience guilt is to experience a desire for punishment as a means of atonement. Excess power can be exerted through any of the various power tactics discussed above.

Own Power Insufficient. In a relationship in which one senses that one's own power is insufficient, we hypothesize that the emotion is *fear/anxiety*.¹² One is concerned that one cannot prevent the other from coercing one to do what one does not want to do. Given that the other might actually or potentially engage in such coercion, one's time horizon is importantly curtailed. "Anything can happen," because of one's weakness, and the sense of this augments fear/anxiety.

A realistic appraisal of this situation might suggest that other emotions are also likely in this situation (e.g., anger at the other and shame because of one's weakness). This is indeed true, but not accurately represented as stemming from the insufficiency of power; that is, anger and

shame in such a situation derive not from the power dimension but from inadequacy in the status dimension. Because four relational channels are involved in every examination of emotion, we must include them all in order to understand the emotions that result from a given relationship structure. We will defer the discussion of anger and shame until we come to the status channel below.

Other's Power Excessive. Although power is not entirely zero-sum, it frequently approximates such a condition. This allows us to see the level of other's power as reciprocal to the level of one's own power. Thus, the condition of other's power excessive is tantamount to own power insufficient. The emotion here would be *fear/anxiety*.

Other's Power Adequate. On the basis of the reciprocity principle described above, other's power adequate is tantamount to own power adequate. The emotion would be *safety* or *security*. Because power is always a threat, it can be conjectured that there is a psychological disposition never to deem another's power adequate, but always, regardless of how much it is in absolute terms, excessive. Although this in fact may be a valid view, there are institutional frameworks that can impose normative standards and cause a reframing of what is considered adequate or excessive. For example, although employers might not care to have their workers represented by a union—a counterpower to their own power—they generally accept the union as a legitimate entity that has power to a certain degree in the employment setting.

Other's Power Insufficient. The reciprocity principle makes other's power insufficient equivalent to own power excessive and the hypothesized emotion is *guilt*. Again, there might be some psychological resistance to such a notion, but the more or less zero-sum nature of power invites this rendering of the emotional landscape.

Status

Own Status Adequate. When one senses that one's own status is adequate, one feels *satisfied*, *contented*, or *happy*. This might be a covert feeling that does not rise to consciousness, unless probed or attended to in reflection or in comparison with the emotional state of previous times or the emotional state of others in like situations. In relational terms, status adequacy means that one is receiving the amount of acceptance, regard, deference, and benefits that one feels one deserves.

Own Status Excessive. When one senses that one's own status is excessive, we hypothesize that the emotion is *shame/embarrassment*. This must be understood as follows: As Goffman (1959, 1963) has well described, individual actors expend a fair amount of energy creating an image of themselves that will lead to acceptance in one group or another. The presented image constitutes, in our terms, a status claim (see discussion of metaprocesses earlier); that is, depending on how well polished and with what degree of *éclat*, it will earn deference, attention, approval, acceptance, and so on to a certain degree. As Goffman observed, group members are ordinarily prepared to accept each other's status claims more or less on faith because, in that way, the group can get on with its business without always having to check too deeply into members' credentials.

However, given that a status claim has been accepted, it is the member's duty to see that it is not tarnished by unworthy action. With respect to feeling that one has enjoyed excessive status,

that clause has been violated. We speculate that shame/embarrassment might be an evolutionarily developed capacity to feel that one has wronged the group if one overvalues oneself with other group members.

There are countless ways in which one can fall into shame/embarrassment: solecisms and faux pas, inadvertent revelation of discreditable information about oneself, failure to retort adequately to a jest at one's expense, being caught "backstage" (Goffman 1959) without one's pants on, so to speak, and so on.

We are now prepared to examine the difference between shame/embarrassment and guilt. The latter, as discussed above, is concerned with doing wrong to another via excess power, frequently in violation of a moral standard. The former is simply the sense that by acting as one did, one does not deserve to receive the amount of status one has claimed for oneself. In a given situation, one might feel one or the other of these emotions or both of them. However, it is important to keep them distinct, because they stem from different relational channels, and how one copes with these emotions might differ substantially.

Guilt, as indicated above, is absolved through punishment. Only when one has "paid for one's sins" can one feel that atonement has been made. In shame, on the other hand, one has acted discreditably. The solution here is not punishment (unless the incriminating act was also one of excess power), but compensatory action; that is, an act or actions that reinstate the person as one who deserves the amount of status originally claimed that has been lost. Thus, if someone acts in a cowardly manner and has thus brought shame on himself or herself, the solution usually is to engage in immoderately risky behavior to show that the act of cowardice was an aberration and not characteristic. The ultimate here is the Japanese response of *sepuku*.

Own Status Insufficient. When one believes that one is not receiving one's status due from the other, the hypothesized emotion is a complex amalgam of *sadness-depression* and *anger*. In sadness-depression, one's focus is on the deprivation and one suffers from it in the same way that one suffers from a missed meal—hungry from the lack of sustenance. In anger, one's focus is on the unjustness of the deprivation and on the stupidity or malice of the other who deprived one of one's status deserts.

Whether sadness-depression or anger predominates is a matter of how agency or responsibility is assigned. This is to say, who is to blame for the insufficiency: self, other, or a third party? In the case of self as agent, the dominant emotion is sadness-depression. One simply could not "cut the mustard," as the expression has it. One failed to elicit status because one had not met the prevailing standards for status-conferral and it was one's own fault. When agency is assigned to the other—"he or she did this to me!"—the dominant emotion is anger. One's emotional force is directed toward the status-denier, the culprit. When third party is the agent and if the third party is another person or other social entity, then the resulting emotion is anger. If the third party is a condition, such as fate or any other irremediable situation, then the emotion is sadness-depression.

Other's Status Adequate. Given the dyad, when other's status is adequate, it can only be because one is voluntarily according deference, benefits, attention, and so forth in sufficient amounts to the other. Of course, this is one's own judgment. The other might disagree. However, if this is the judgment, then one will feel *contented* or *satisfied*. As in the case of own status adequate, there will be no recognition of the emotion unless the matter is challenged in some way. Extending the setting beyond the dyad, we might suppose that if other members of the group are not according the target other his or her deserved status, then the fact that one is doing so might

induce a certain invidious self-righteousness; that is, one is doing the “right thing” when others are not. If, on the other hand, one is giving less than others are, one might feel anger toward the others (third parties), who, by their acts, are impugning one’s own status; that is, one is not acting in a status-worthy manner.

When modest amounts of status are involved, such as casual politeness according to the rules of manners or etiquette, very little is at stake. However when the amount of status is massive, as in the case of love (treated below), then contentment is too pale a version of what is felt; rather, delight and swooning at the opportunity to give to the other.

Other’s Status Excessive. This would seem to be an odd and perhaps null category because, by definition, status is voluntarily given. We might suppose that uxoriousness partakes somewhat of the condition of excess status-conferral, or foolish doting. It is only by contrast with what is the usual amount of status conferred in such situations by others that one might come to judge one’s own level as excessive. Here we might conjecture some internal debate as to whether, on the one hand, one is doing what one truly wants to do and that the amount one is conferring is truly deserved, and on the other hand, that one is somehow being coerced. This can be subtle. In the dyad, social relations require that if there is coercion, it came from the other. However, the actor himself or herself could be the coercer of himself or herself. Even without grounds, he or she might fear what the other might think or do if any lesser amount of status is given. Thus, the fear in this instance is the result of an imagined outcome. (See Kemper, 1978:381–382, for discussion of how any relational act may be partitioned between power and status components.)

Other’s Status Insufficient. When other’s status is insufficient, it is because one is not conferring it in adequate amounts. This can lead either to *guilt* or *shame/embarrassment*, or both. If the reason for the deprivation of the other is a power tactic by the self, it will lead to guilt. One has, after all, acknowledged that the other deserves more, but one has intentionally granted less. If the reason, on the other hand, for the deprivation is an inadequacy of the self, then the emotion is shame/embarrassment. The inadequacy here might be one of means (one simply does not have the resources) or of manners (e.g., one might be acting out of fear of what a third party will say if one conferred the proper and due amount of status on the other).

Anticipatory Emotions

Thinking, as Mead (1934) explained, involves a rehearsal of future events. When that future involves self and others in interaction, emotions are at least shadow outcomes of the interaction in the thought process. Because the actual interaction has not yet happened, there is a special set of emotions that reflects the fact of anticipation.

The anticipatory emotions are derived from two factors: *optimism-pessimism* and *confidence-lack of confidence*. Optimism-pessimism depends on the cumulation of all past experiences, especially outcomes of prior power-status interactions. A history of more or less successful interactions (i.e., where one has received status as desired and has had adequate power) leads to a general expectation of good outcomes, or optimism. Frequent failures in these areas lead to a general expectation of poor outcomes, or pessimism. Confidence depends on an appraisal of one’s

TABLE 4.1. Anticipatory Emotions

Optimism		Confidence		Anticipatory emotion		Outcome	Emotion
High	+	High	=	Serene Confidence	+	Favorable	Mild satisfaction
High	+	Low	=	Guarded Optimism (anxiety)	+	Unfavorable	Consternation
Low	+	High	=	Grudging Optimism (anxiety)	+	Favorable	Strong satisfaction
Low	+	Low	=	Hopelessness (anxiety)	+	Unfavorable	Mild disappointment
						Favorable	Mild satisfaction
						Unfavorable	Mild disappointment
						Favorable	Astonishment
						Unfavorable	Resignation

resources in relation to the future interaction at issue. If the setting, the interaction partner, and other features augur success, then confidence ensues, otherwise, there will be lack of confidence. When the two variables are cross-classified, we postulate a set of anticipatory emotions, and when the actual outcome is factored in, the likely emotions at the end of the sequence. These are displayed in Table 4.1.¹³

Consequent Emotions

Consequent emotions result from immediate outcomes of interaction. A insults B and B feels anger. C compliments D and D feels happy; and so forth. However this is a deceptive simplicity. If A and B are in a relational structure in which A grants adequate status to B (from B's point of view) and B does not anticipate change, then B might be shocked by A's insult and the anger might be lessened while B tries to establish whether it actually was A's intention to be insulting. If C and D are in a relational structure in which D feels that C does not confer sufficient status and D does not anticipate a change, then the compliment might elicit satisfaction as well as astonishment and uncertainty as to its sincerity, which we consider to be a mild anxiety. Clearly, then, consequent emotions need to be considered as grounded in both structural and anticipatory emotions. This complicates the predictive task considerably.

Recall that we begin with 81 possible structural states of relationship between 2 actors. Then factor in the possible anticipatory emotional states, the possible states of agency, and the direction of the emotion (toward self, other, or third party). A complete theory must not shun any of these, but such a theory is presently out of reach. The measurement problem would be huge and to locate supporting evidence in the literature for a complete set of hypotheses is well nigh impossible.

As in all sciences, when such a degree of complexity is encountered, certain simplifying assumptions must be made. Kemper (1978) proposed several such shortcuts. One is to subsume the structural aspects of the relationship between the two actors under the rubric of a simple dichotomy: *liking* versus *disliking*. (Below we discuss liking in the context of love. Here it is sufficient to accept liking as a summary judgment on the felt adequacy of the overall power-status

relationship as seen from the perspective of the focal actor with whom we are concerned.) This assumption reduces the number of emotional outcome cells by a factor of 4.

A second simplifying assumption is to accept the power-reciprocity principle discussed above, namely that an increase of one's own power is equivalent to a decrease in other's power and that a decrease in one's own power is equivalent to an increase in the other's power. This reduces by a quarter the remaining number of cells that must be addressed in hypothesizing consequent emotions.

A third simplifying assumption is to assume that under certain structural conditions, an outcome of interaction might not lead to a separate emotion, but only to an intensification or attenuation of the structural emotion already in place. For example, if one's status in the relationship is felt to be adequate, then an interaction outcome that continues the state of adequacy, without either gain or loss, could be expected to continue the satisfaction or contentment level already present. Gain would likely lead to an intensification of the prevalent emotion, whereas loss would lead to a different emotion. Parsing relational structures for these kinds of unremarkable outcome and excluding them further reduces the complexity of the predictive task.

Kemper (1978) provided hypotheses and supporting evidence for a reduced number of cells in a consequent-emotion matrix. The attempt establishes that although there is empirical work to support predictions for many cells in the matrix, numerous cells remain empty because there are no empirical findings to provide the basis for a hypothesis. Space does not permit more than a suggestion here of how this work is set up. The two examples given below, in which only the structural summary (indicated by the numbers 1 and 2) changes, display both the potential and the complexity of the analysis. The emotions proposed are hypotheses.

Relational Channel: *A's status*

B's Anticipatory Emotion: *Serene confidence*

Interaction Outcome: *Status loss by A*

Agent: *Third Party*

1. Structural Summary: *Liking for A*

B's consequent emotion directed to parallel: *Consternation, Sadness*

B's consequent emotion directed to A: *Sympathy*

B's consequent emotion directed to third party: *Anger*

2. Structural Summary: *Dislike for A*

B's consequent emotion directed to parallel: *Schadenfreude*


B's consequent emotion directed to A: *Contempt*

B's consequent emotion directed to third party: *Liking*

In order to obtain a full set of hypothesized consequent emotions, each of the defining conditions of structure—anticipation, relational channel, agency, and outcome—would need to be varied, and this is presently beyond our ability. Although the power-status theory of emotions begins with only two dimensions of relationship, the addition of only a few other elements takes the task of prediction to a high level of intricacy and specificity.

Love and Liking

Love and liking are elusive emotions—both in fact and in theory—and generally not addressed by sociological theories of emotions. Power-status theory is an exception.



Seven Types of Love

- 1-1 Adulation by fans
- 2-2 Ideal love
- 3-3 Romantic love
- 4-4 Divine, parental, mentor love
- 5-5 Unfaithful love
- 6-6 Unrequited love
- 7-7 Parent-infant love

FIGURE 4.2. Seven Types of Love Relationship.

We begin with the recognition that love as an emotion stems from love as a relationship, which we define as follows: *A love relationship is one in which at least one actor gives, or is prepared to give, extreme amounts of status to another actor.* This definition says nothing about power, so we can assume that power can vary freely in love relationships. With this definition of a love relationship, we can generate seven ideal-typical versions of relationship in which at least one actor actually or potentially gives an extreme amount of status and power varies freely. The seven types are shown in Figure 4.2. We now label and discuss these briefly.

1. *Adulation by Fans.* In relationship 1-1, one actor gives extremely high status to another and neither has any power. This seems to approximate the swooning and adoration that fans lay on their icons. However it is also the way most love relationships begin; that is, one actor finds another actor worthy of receiving very large amounts of status. The other actor might not even be aware of the first.
2. *Ideal Love.* Relationship 2-2 shows that both actors are conferring extreme amounts of status upon each other and there is no power in the relationship. This is arguably the most blessed type of love, as each is voluntarily complying in the extreme with the other and there is no coercion. It is also a model for doctrinally inspired “brotherly (or sisterly) love” or for the vision of the peaceable kingdom, when the “wolf shall dwell with the lamb” (Isaiah 11:6). Whether this state can ever be attained as a general condition for humanity

is problematic. What is not problematic is that it is a transient state for two individuals. All who have experienced this state in a love relationship can testify that the bliss of this early stage does not last. It is no frivolity to assert that it is often a matter of moments and rarely lasts more than a few weeks.

3. *Romantic Love*. In relationship 3-3, we see the natural evolution of relationship 2-2, ideal love. Ideal love devolves into a relationship in which not only is there extreme mutual status-conferral, but also extreme power for both actors. We know that power enters love relationships when the actors feel that they cannot live without each other, that the other is not only a source of the greatest pleasure, but also often of the greatest pain.

Ironically, power enters love relationships because of how good the actors feel in the ideal stage. Who would not want such delight to continue ad infinitum! Thus, one becomes dependent on the other for the continuation. However, as we know from Emerson's (1962) formulation, dependency on another puts one in the power of the other. Thus, the full-blown romantic love relationship entails both extremes of status-conferral and extremes of power. As with the ideal stage, relationships cannot remain forever at this stage. At best, the status-conferral remains high and the power decreases significantly, although probably not to zero.

The adulation, ideal, and romantic types of love comprise the "attraction" phase of a long-term relationship. How the relationship develops from there and the problems—for now there *are* problems—that need to be addressed comprise the "maintenance" phase. Very specifically, fear and anger become more prominent and, sometimes, dominant emotions (see Kemper and Reid 1997).

4. *Divine, Parental, or Mentor Love*. In relationship 4-4, we find that both actors are receiving extreme amounts of status while one also has extreme power. This is the paradigm for a number of love relationships in which both actors give to the other, but only one is dependent on the other for what is given. Divine love is of such an order, in which although God loves humanity, God has all the power and the glory (status). On a less exalted plane, parenting, mentoring, and therapeutic relationships are of this type. In the best instances of these, the parent, mentor, or therapist loves the child, mentee, or client and the child, mentee, or client loves in return. However, the parent, mentor, or therapist holds power in the relationship because the other member of the dyad is dependent in an important way.
5. *Unfaithful Love*. In relationship 5-5, one actor retains extreme status and power while the other actor has only high power. This is one way in which a 3-3 romantic relationship can devolve. It is a model of infidelity, where the betrayed has (were all known) lost the status formerly given by the betrayer, who still receives high status. We know that the betrayed, despite the loss of status, has high power because the betrayer ordinarily wants to keep the infidelity secret, lest the betrayed use his or her power vengefully. If, in fact, the infidelity becomes known and the betrayed does not use his or her power, the relationship devolves even further and becomes the next type infatuation.
6. *Unrequited Love*. As shown in relationship 6-6, when one actor has all the power and status and other none, we can speak of infatuation. Against all sense or logic, the actor with no power or status continues to give (or is prepared to give) extreme amounts of status to the other, although there is little hope of recompense. This type of love is common among adolescents and also among adults with a pathological inability to seek satisfaction from someone who is likely to reciprocate.

7. *Parent-Infant Love*. Relationship 7-7 allows us to distinguish between two types of love involving parents. Prior to the kind of parent-child love that is modeled in relationship 4-4, there is parent-infant love. The neonate (and for some time after birth) receives extreme amounts of status. Whatever the infant needs for survival, at whatever cost, is given. However, the neonate gives nothing in return. Its cognitive and emotional capacities are too limited to recognize and to be grateful to the source of its survival. Although receiving no status, the parent has complete power over the infant and is capable of coercing the infant in any way the parent wishes; however, these “coercions” are usually for the infant’s benefit.

These seven types of love relationship derive from power-status theory. They do not speak to the feeling or the “emotion” of love, to which we turn now. Because love involves the giving of extreme amounts of status, we must ask how that is possible, or why one would want to give anyone status in any amount, whether extreme or not.

Status, as defined, is voluntary compliance. Yet, in a manner that is not simply verbal byplay, voluntary compliance is *nonvolitional*. This conundrum can be explained as follows and depends on the seminal work of Hamblin and Smith (1966). These investigators studied the dynamics of status accorded to professors by students in academic departments. Their crucial finding was that when students held certain values or standards—for teaching, publication, mentoring, and so forth—and professors manifested excellence in these areas, students accorded them high status. However, the amount of status accorded followed the same mathematical model that accounts for nonvolitional psychophysiological responses. Hamblin and Smith daringly concluded that “having feelings of approval, respect or esteem for someone appears to be beyond the individual’s direct choice” (p. 184). Importantly, this makes the psychological state behind status-conferral an emotion. Further, “as with all nonvoluntary responses, these feelings are presumably controlled by the unconditioned or conditioned stimuli which elicit them. Apparently, *an individual must provide the valued attributes and behavior which produce in the other the feelings of approval, respect or esteem; then and only then may these feelings be communicated as genuine status*” (p. 184, emphasis added).

In other words, if one has standards for certain behaviors, traits, or qualities, when another person displays these behaviors, traits, or qualities, the feeling of approval, esteem, and so forth comes automatically and nonvolitionally, unmediated by a process of choice. Thus, we have in Hamblin and Smith’s approach a ground for understanding why any status in whatever amount is ever conferred at all. It is because someone displays a quality that matches a standard. Now we may ask how this applies to love, which entails the conferral of massive amounts of status.

We conjecture that standards are deeply held structural parts of personality and identity. They constitute us as actors in the world, providing us with evaluative guidelines so that we can measure experience and act in accordance with our valuations, whether it involves a matter of aesthetics, of culinary art, or of persons. By giving standards such an important place, we can better understand how individuals might respond with such enthusiasm and pleasure when standards are met.

When the standards are for beauty and character, they touch on fundamentals that are possibly evolutionary in origin and certainly culturally fostered from earliest childhood both by family models and by all of the agencies and media of socialization. What comprises and defines the attractive and good person, the one who promises to be an ideal mate or lover, is both an explicit and implicit topic in much informational and anecdotal talk and in literature, which depicts models of desirable and undesirable conduct.

Thus, armed with these standards, when we meet someone whose traits and qualities match those standards extraordinarily well, there is a nonvolitional response of approval, acceptance, respect, and so forth. The emotion has been described extensively in poetry. However, for present purposes, it can be understood as a certain *joy*, giddiness, or high spiritedness. It comes from having a rare experience, namely a match between oneself and the outer world. Consider that, ordinarily, we stand athwart the business and affairs of social life. There are misunderstandings, lack of consideration, indifference, failure to accommodate or acknowledge, cross-purposes, violence, and more. We are frequently rubbed the wrong way in all kinds of ways.

Then miraculously, it seems, someone appears who matches our standards for beauty, common sense, humor, ethics, and so on. How can we not respond! It is as if all contradictions are resolved, all contraries reconciled. The world is indeed a wonderful place if it has such people in it; and, *mirabile dictu*, he or she regards us in the same way. Joy! Joy! Joy! Thus, love is the status emotion carried to the extreme. We then voluntarily give, gratify, reward the other who has such qualities that match our standards so perfectly.

However, what of liking? Liking is often confused with love as if it were a lesser amount of the same commodity. However, it has long been recognized that there is another conundrum here, namely that one can love someone but not like him or her. This cannot be if liking is simply a lesser amount of love. The answer is that liking, like love, is also a status-related emotion, but, unlike love, it is not a response to the other's qualities, but *a response to the amount of status the other confers on us*. If someone pays us attention, esteems us, or rewards and gratifies us, it feels good. We want it to continue and we take pleasure in having that person near us. In sum, we "like" that person. We are pleased to have that person around us; we are available to him or her when he or she wants to see us. That person satisfies our need for attention and acceptance and we feel grateful. The emotion of gratitude in this incarnation is the feeling of liking. Of course, we can like someone without loving him or her, that is, their qualities do not match our standards (Kemper 1989).

We can love someone—because their qualities match our standards—but we might not like them, because they do not do much for us, literally. They do not reward or gratify us. However, because love is all about giving, it is indifferent to what one gets in return. It is important to understand that once love devolves into contingent reciprocity—one gives only if one gets—it is no longer love, regardless of the institutional formula or framework (e.g., marriage).

Postdicting Emotions

The power-status theory of emotions is couched in relatively plain language. This means that ordinary actors, without extensive training, can learn to examine their social encounters in power-status terms. Because everyone from an early age has used power (only saints have not) and has been on the receiving end of power, everyone is familiar with it. One has only to learn that the label applies to the structure of a relationship and to the range of behavior (the tactics) described above. Everyone is also familiar with status, often because of a felt sense of insufficiency of it. Thus, although power and status are technical terms in a scientific vocabulary, they are also easily accessible to anyone with a modicum of ability for abstraction and generalization.

Given that this is the case, we propose that the power-status theory of emotions is an easily acquired tool to help one better maneuver through the emotional shoals of social life. Here it is best to use the theory for predictive purposes; that is, in a Meadian type of rehearsal, one applies the theory to achieve or avoid specific interactional, ergo, emotional outcomes. Indeed, this is often a coping mechanism (Thoits 1990), although without benefit of a formal theory of emotions to guide the reflections. Often it is done exceedingly well and we praise the person who can

do this. Of course, he or she is intuitively employing a theory of emotions to guide his or her examination of prospective behaviors and their probable outcomes. Presumptively, if the theory were made explicit, it would strongly resemble the power-status theory of emotions.

Often enough, we do not forecast events very well and there are emotional currents and outbursts that surprise us. We have somehow missed the cues or misunderstood them, either those of others or our own. We must now extricate ourselves from something of a mess; that is, at least for purposes of retaining our self-respect, we must understand what was going on and how it went wrong.

We propose that here, again, the power-status theory of emotions can be of use. It is a forward-running theory that links emotions to their social relational antecedents. However, there is no reason the theory cannot be run backward. If the emotion has already occurred, what was its social relational antecedent? What did you say or do or what did he or she say or do? What is the power-status structure within which what you said or did or what he or she said or did that conveyed a certain power or status implication and produced consequent emotions, the very ones that require explanation? Examples of this would be using the power and status dimensions to postdict emotions at the microlevel (Kemper 2004) and the macrolevel (Kemper 2002).

TESTS OF THE THEORY

Although the sociology of emotions has been prolific in producing theory, it has been scant in providing tests of theory. The power-status theory of emotions is not special in this regard. However, several tests have shown it to be nicely robust.

Kemper (1991) analyzed a portion of data collected in an eight-nation study of emotions by Sherer et al. (1986). These investigators asked subjects to describe the situations in which they had experienced four primary emotions: joy, sadness, fear, and anger. Respondents provided answers in the form of vignettes, varying in length from a few lines to a whole page. In two studies, Kemper tested the power-status theory of emotions with 48 cases from the West German sample.

In study one, two coders were trained in the power-status theory of emotions and given edited vignettes from which identifying labels or descriptions of the emotions themselves were removed; the coders only had before them the relational details of the situations that had produced the emotion. Their first task was to specify these details in power-status terms and then to identify the emotion. Although only four emotions were actually being reported in the data, the coders were encouraged to think that a full spectrum of emotions was involved. Altogether, the coders examined 192 vignettes (48 subjects times 4 emotions).

Twenty-two of the descriptions were judged nonsocial by one or both coders and these were omitted from coding.¹⁴ An additional 8 situations were inadvertently omitted, leaving 162 situations. Using the known emotion to which the situations ostensibly pertained as the criterion, the two coders reached 74.6% and 69.7% accuracy in their judgments. Given that chance alone would have made for 25% accuracy, the results were highly encouraging.

Study two was undertaken in order to preclude the possibility that the coders had, entirely unaware, first detected the emotion in the episode and then translated it back into its theoretical power-status antecedents. A third coder was trained in power-status theory, without any intimation that it could be used to predict emotions. The coding task, in the 162 situations was simply to specify the power-status conditions there. In this "blind test," so to speak, the coder correctly specified 64.8% of the situations in power-status terms; that is, the coder identified the power-status conditions that theoretically should give rise to the emotion of the anecdote. Although the

third coder's accuracy was slightly lower than that of the first two coders, it was sufficiently above chance to warrant the results as a successful test of the theory.

A second test of the power-status theory of emotions was undertaken by Simon and Nath (2004). Using a random sample of 1,346 cases from the emotions module of the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS), they undertook a competitive test between the power-status theory of emotions and the "normative" theory of emotions (Hochschild 1975, 1981). Simon and Nath derived hypotheses about males' and females' emotional experience based on the two approaches. The results were as follows: "Taken as a whole, our findings for emotional experience are more consistent with predictions based on Kemper's structural theory about emotion . . . than with Hochschild's normative theory about emotion" (p. 1168). The value of this confirmation of the power-status theory of emotions is that it demonstrates that the theory is sufficiently general to be applicable to domains other than what the theory specifically proposed.

A third investigation also supports the power-status theory of emotions in a competitive test—this time with Heise's (1979) Affect Control Theory (ACT). Although they are methodologically very different, the two theories share some common roots, principally the results obtained by the Semantic Differential (Osgood et al. 1957). The main substantive difference is that power-status theory relies on two factors and ACT relies on three. Power and status in the one theory is matched by potency and evaluation in the other. The third factor in ACT is activity, which we have suggested (Kemper 1978) might reflect the division of labor, but is not relevant for the prediction of emotions.

Robinson and DeCoster (1999) and Robinson (2002) compared predictions from the two theories, using a sample of undergraduate women who were asked to describe recent events that elicited a strong positive and strong negative emotion. The reported events were coded according to each theory and then the power-status codes were transformed into ACT codes in order to obtain a single coding metric. Results showed that both theories did well in predicting emotions, particularly along the potency and evaluation (i.e., power and status) scales. However, the two approaches also diverged, as follows: (1) ACT made predictions of all social events reported, whereas power-status theory had some missing cells according to the method employed in this analysis and therefore no predictions were available. (2) Where both approaches made predictions, power-status theory was somewhat more accurate, and this degree of accuracy did not depend on the subset of cases where ACT made predictions and power-status theory did not. As with the confirmatory findings of the Simon and Nath study, these results demonstrate that power-status theory can be adapted to research questions that are distant in type and approach from what the original statement of the theory proposes.

RESEARCH AGENDA

Kemper (1990a) proposed three items for a research agenda for the power-status theory of emotions that are of continuing interest: universality, social relational precedence, and sociophysiological integration.

Universality

A fundamental assumption of the theory is that the power-status antecedents of specific emotions apply universally across the spectrum of social and demographic categories (e.g., sex, race, ethnicity, social class, and so forth). Heuristically, it is plausible to think that at least what might

be thought of as primary emotions—fear, anger, depression, and happiness-contentment—are connected in the same way to social relational outcomes in all social categories and groups. This position is based in part on the communication or signal function of emotions (Buck 1984).

Were the primary emotions to vary in their relational precursors, considerable social ambiguity would result. It would be hard to understand the social state and feelings of a person in a different social category from one's own, and this would make problematic which emotion might, in an evolutionary sense applying to all humans, have emerged. In addition, it would confute one of our best understandings of why emotion is expressed to a great extent by the face and in visible body movements.

Another reason to support the universality assumption is that virtually everyone has multiple memberships and identities; hence, each is a member of overlapping social categories—for example, a lower-class Italian white male, a middle-class English black female, and so forth. Were the emotional effects of power and status outcomes to vary greatly by social category, it would be difficult to reconcile the effect of different categories on the experience of emotion in given relational situations.

Social Relational Precedence

The assumption here is that emotions result from outcomes of power and status relations and not from cultural imposition. This means that when another person uses power against us, we are going to feel fear, even if cultural fiat were to dictate another emotion, such as joy. Although it might seem odd to contemplate that culture would somehow wish to substitute joy for fear—this is an extreme example—it is a fact that culture has sought to direct emotional response away from what power and status outcomes would entail *naturally*. Think of how a puritanical sex code can insist on disgust as a response to sexual stimuli. The work here must investigate whether and to what degree and with what consequences culture can mediate or transform emotions that would ordinarily arise from power-status outcomes.

Sociophysiological Integration

This assumption is that power and status are linked, via emotions, to underlying physiological processes, thus indicating a theoretical arc between the biological and the social. The research in this area needs to be directed to the general question of specificity of physiological patterns both in emotion and in the experience of power and status. Sociologists have in general shunned physiological issues, although see Robinson et al. (2004). A model for such work can be found in Kemper (1990b), in which outcomes in the power and status dimensions, renamed dominance and eminence, are seen to produce hormonal changes, specifically in testosterone levels.

CONCLUSION

Power-status theory is a deceptively simple formulation about what actors do to, with, for, and against each other in social interaction. However, from only these two dimensions, which have strong empirical support, it is possible to generate quite complex examinations of emotions across a very broad spectrum of social situations.

When power and status actions and outcomes stabilize into a continuing structure, we can assign what we call structural emotions, which are based on actors' power and status positions

vis-à-vis each other in the structure. In the normal course of ongoing interaction, actors look ahead to the outcomes of future interactions and develop expectations, based on past power and status outcomes and future power and status contingencies. These expectations give rise to what we call anticipatory emotions. Structural emotions and anticipatory emotions provide an orienting context within which what we call consequent emotions occur. These are the emotions instigated by immediate interaction outcomes in power and status terms. Together, structural, anticipatory, and consequent emotions provide a comprehensive account of emotions in social life when looked at from a relational perspective.

NOTES

1. A third dimension, technical activity, is also present, but because it does not lead directly to the power-status theory of emotions, it will receive less attention in this chapter. Kemper (1995) contains an extended discussion of how technical activity, power and status, and other constructs contribute to a social psychological understanding of social structure.
2. Unlike Freud, no modern social scientist has acknowledged Empedocles' prior discovery.
3. Although technical activity, on the one hand, and power and status, on the other hand, are analytically distinct, there can be empirical overlap between the two. For example, a carpenter might ask a fellow carpenter for a tool in one of several ways: casually, politely, formally, peremptorily, and so on. This example is elaborated in Kemper and Collins (1990).
4. Although killing is usually dedicated to such power interests, at least one genocide, namely the Holocaust, was undertaken simply for an ideological purpose. It was not intended to prevent the Jewish victims from frustrating the Nazi drive to realize "their own will," nor even as a demonstration to cow other people into submission.
5. In a chilling rejection of what might be thought of as the most likely case of status equality, the French poet Charles Baudelaire (1983:23–24) wrote, "Love greatly resembles an application of torture or a surgical operation." Even if "two lovers love passionately and are full of mutual desire, one of the two will always be cooler or less self-abandoned than the other. He or she is the surgeon or executioner; the other, the patient or victim."
6. Although varying nomenclature is employed in different IPC studies, examination of the items that define the two dimensions supports their identification as power and status. Among them are assertiveness and likeability; control and affection; autonomy versus control and love versus hostility; dominance and friendliness; control and affection; interpersonal deprivation and interpersonal seeking; tendency to use socially unacceptable techniques and tendency to use socially acceptable techniques equal versus unequal and cooperative and friendly versus competitive and hostile; and up-down and positive-negative. Sources for these factor names can be found in Kemper (1991:333).
7. In fact, they might need a Goffman, as in his "Presentation of Self in Everyday Life" (1959), to do them justice. His forte was to detect subtle nuances in social life.
8. The underlying emotions here are depression or anger. This is discussed in the power-status theory of emotions below.
9. Even if one tries the strategy of "exit" (Hirschman 1970), in relatively closed circles, such as academic departments in a given discipline, someone labeled as a troublemaker usually has difficulty obtaining a new post after being so labeled.
10. When multiple or mixed emotions occur, it is not clear how physiological processes accommodate this state.
11. Evidence for these hypotheses is cited extensively in Kemper (1978).
12. Although many investigators distinguish between fear and anxiety, we will not do so because the distinction is not germane here.
13. Table 4.1 is from Kemper (1978:75).
14. For example, more than a few respondents chose dangerous driving conditions (e.g., icy roads) for their fear situation.

REFERENCES

- Baudelaire, Charles. [1930] 1983. *Intimate Journals*. Translated by Christopher Isherwood. San Francisco: City Lights.
- Buck, Ross. 1984. *The Communication of Emotion*. New York: Guilford.

- Buss, David H. 1989. "Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in Thirty-Seven Cultures." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 12: 1–49.
- Carter, Launor F. 1954. "Evaluating the Performance of Individuals as Members of Small Groups." *Personnel Psychology* 7: 477–484.
- Chance, Michael R. A. 1976. "Social Attention: Society and Mentality." Pp. 315–333 in *The Social Structure of Social Attention*, edited by M. R. A. Chance and R. R. Larsen. London: Wiley.
- . 1988. "Introduction." Pp. 1–35 in *Social Fabrics of the Mind*, edited by M. R. A. Chance. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Clark, Candace. 1997. *Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Clark, R. A. 1953. "Analyzing the Group Structure of Combat Rifle Squads." *American Psychologist* 8: 333.
- Cleve, Felix M. 1969. *The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct Their Thought*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Collins, Randall. 2004. *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Couch, Arthur, and Launor F. Carter. 1952. "A Factorial Study of the Rated Behavior of Group Members." Paper read at Eastern Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
- Durkheim, Emile. [1912] 1965. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Free Press.
- Emerson, Richard. 1962. "Power-Dependence Relations." *American Sociological Review* 40: 252–257.
- Freedman, Mervin B., Timothy Leary, Abel G. Ossorio, and Hubert S. Coffey. 1951. "The Interpersonal Dimensions of Personality." *Journal of Personality* 20: 143–161.
- Freud, Sigmund. [1937] 1959. "Analysis Terminable and Interminable." Pp. 316–357 in *Collected Papers*, Vol. V. Translated by Jon Riviere. New York: Basic Books.
- Funkenstein, Daniel. 1955. "The Physiology of Fear and Anger." *Scientific American* 192: 74–80.
- Gellhorn, Ernst. 1967. *Principles of Autonomic-Somatic Integration: Physiological Basis and Psychological and Clinical Implications*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 1968. "Attempt at a Synthesis: Contribution to a Theory of Emotion." Pp. 144–153 in *Biological Foundations of Emotion: Research and Commentary*, edited by E. Gellhorn, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
- Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- . 1963. *Behavior in Public Places*. New York: Free Press.
- Goldberg, Lewis R. 1990. "An Alternative 'Description of Personality': The Big-Five Factor Structure." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59: 1216–1229.
- Hamblin, Robert L., and Carole R. Smith. 1966. "Values, Status and Professors." *Sociometry* 29: 183–196.
- Heise, David R. 1979. *Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hemphill, John, and Alvin Coons. Undated. *Leadership Behavior Description*. Columbus, OH: Personnel Research Board, Ohio State University.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hochschild, Arlie R. 1975. "The Sociology of Feeling and Emotion: Selected Possibilities." Pp. 208–307 in *Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science*, edited by M. Millman and R. M. Kantor. New York: Anchor Books.
- . 1981. "Attending to, Codifying, and Managing Feelings: Sex Differences in Love." Pp. 225–262 in *Feminist Frontiers: Rethinking Sex, Gender and Society*, edited by L. Richardson and V. Taylor. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Hofstede, Geert, and Robert R. McCrae. 2004. "Personality and Culture Revisited: Linking Traits and Dimensions of Culture." *Cross-Cultural Research* 38: 52–88.
- Katz, Jack. 1999. *How Emotions Work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kemper, Theodore. 1978. *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- . 1989. "Love and Like and Love and Love." Pp. 249–268 in *Emotions, Self and Society: Essays and Research Papers in the Sociology of Emotions*, edited by D. Franks and E. D. McCarthy. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- . 1990a. "Social Relations and Emotions: A Structural Approach." Pp. 207–237 in *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions*, edited by T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- . 1990b. *Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- . 1991. "Predicting Emotions from Social Relations." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 54: 330–342.
- . 1992. "Freedom and Justice: The Macro-Modes of Social Relations." *World Futures* 35: 141–162.
- . 1995. "What Does It Mean Social Psychologically to Be of a Given Age, Sex-Gender, Social Class, Race, Religion, etc.?" *Advances in Group Processes* 12: 81–113.
- . 2001. "A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions." Pp. 58–73 in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, edited by J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, and F. Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- . 2002. "Predicting Emotions in Groups: Some Lessons from September 11." Pp. 53–68 in *Emotions and Sociology*, edited by J. Barbalet. Oxford: Blackwell/The Sociological Review.
- . 2004. "For a Good-Enough Theory of Emotions, Post-Diction Is Good Enough." Paper presented at August meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco.
- Kemper, Theodore, and Randall Collins. 1990. "Dimensions of Microinteraction." *American Journal of Sociology* 96: 32–68.
- Kemper, Theodore D., and Muriel T. Reid. 1997. Love and Liking in the Attraction and Maintenance Phases of Long-Term Relationships." *Social Perspectives on Emotions* 4: 37–69.
- Kiesler, Donald J. 1996. *Contemporary Interpersonal Theory and Research*. New York: Wiley.
- Leary, Timothy. 1957. *The Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality*. New York: Ronald.
- McCrae, Robert R., and Paul T. Costa. 1989. "The Structure of Interpersonal Traits: Wiggins's Circumplex and the Five-Factor Model." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56: 586–595.
- Mead, George H. 1934. *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff. 1948. *Assessment of Men*. New York: Rinehart.
- Osgood, Charles H., George C. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum. 1957. *The Measurement of Meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois.
- Pincus, Aaron L., Michael B. Gurtman, and Mark A. Ruiz. 1998. "Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (SASB) Circumplex Analysis and Structural Relations with the Interpersonal Circle and the Five-Factor Model of Personality." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74: 1629–1645.
- Plutchik, Robert, and Hope R. Conte. 1997. *Circumplex Models of Personality and Emotion*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Riesman, David, Nathan Glazer, and Ruell Denny. 1952. *The Lonely Crowd*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.
- Robinson, Dawn T. 2002. "ACT and the Competition: Some Alternative Models of Emotion and Identity." Paper presented at the Conference on Research Agendas in Affect Control Theory, Highland Beach, Florida.
- Robinson, Dawn T., and Vaughn A. DeCoster. 1999. "Predicting Everyday Emotions: A Comparison of Affect Control Theory and Social Interactional Theory." Paper presented at annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in Chicago.
- Robinson, Dawn T., Christabel L. Rogalin, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2004. "Physiological Measures of Theoretical Concepts: Some Ideas for Linking Deflection and Emotions to Physical Responses During Interaction." *Advances in Group Processes* 21: 77–115.
- Sakoda, James M. 1952. "Factor Analysis of OSS Situational Tests." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 47: 843–852.
- Sherer, Klaus R., Harld G. Wallbott, and Angela B. Summerfield. 1986. *Experiencing Emotion: A Cross-Cultural Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Simon, Robin W., and Leda E. Nath. 2004. "Gender and Emotion in the United States: Do Men Differ in Self-Reports of Feelings and Expressive Behavior?" *American Journal of Sociology* 109: 1137–1176.
- Spearman, Charles E. 1904. "General Intelligence, Objectively Determined and Measured." *American Journal of Psychology* 15: 201–293.
- Thoits, Peggy A. 1990. "Emotional Deviance: Research Agendas." Pp. 180–203 in *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions*, edited by T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Thurstone, Louis L. 1934. "The Vectors of the Mind." *Psychological Review* 41: 1–32.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. [1835] 1945. *Democracy in America*, Vol. 1. New York: Vintage.
- Waal, Frans B. M. de. 1982. *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among the Apes*. London: Counterpoint.
- . 1988. "The Reconciled Hierarchy." Pp. 105–136 in *Social Fabrics of the Mind*, edited by M. R. A. Chance. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Weber, Max. 1946. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wherry, Robert J. 1950. *Factor Analysis of Officer Qualification Form QCL-2B*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Research Foundation.
- Willer, David, and Murray Webster, Jr. 1970. "Theoretical Constructs and Observables." *American Sociological Review* 35: 748–757.
- Wright, M. R. 1981. *Empedocles, the Extant Fragments*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.