

Peace Psychology Book Series

Series Editor: Daniel J. Christie

Joseph de Rivera  
*Editor*

# Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace



Springer

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Editor

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*Editor*  
Joseph de Rivera  
Department of Psychology  
Clark University  
Worcester, MA  
USA  
jderivera@clarku.edu

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# Preface

The discipline we now know of as “peace studies” began shortly after the Second World War. However, the idea of using education to create a culture of peace was only introduced in 1986 (by Filipe MacGregor) and not seriously considered until UNESCO’s International Congress in 1989. The congress led Elise Boulding to write *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of Human History* and to the work within UNESCO and the UN (by David Adams, Federico Mayor, Ambassador Chowdhury, and others) that resulted in the endorsement of a General Assembly resolution to create a culture of peace. Since that time hundreds of organizations and millions of people have become involved. Although UNESCO and the UN are currently only devoting minimum resources to promoting a culture of peace, the Foundation for a Culture of Peace and other organizations in civil society continue to press for its development. The concept has two particularly important merits.

First, the concept has the potential for providing a positive goal that unifies the different social movements of our times—the movements for democracy, gender equality, human rights, peace, tolerance, and sustainable development. It helps to unify these movements because it shows the interconnections between them and reveals how they can be parts of a whole.

Second, since culture involves popular attitudes and norms as well as the norms and values that affect state behavior, the concept can be used to reveal the connection between citizen action and the behavior of governments. Indeed, the UN resolution calls for both citizen and state action, and the idea of building a culture provides a roadmap for how individuals can affect their society.

Both these merits suggest that the concept of a culture of peace should be an important component, perhaps even the central component, for peace studies programs. Certainly, it is important for any program that attempts to relate the behavior of individuals to the peacefulness of the society in which they live.

The concept of a culture of peace is complex. It has many aspects and may be viewed from a number of perspectives. This handbook attempts to cover the full extent of this complexity. It aims to contribute both to the development of the concept and to the development of the cultures suggested by the concept.

This book exists because the Francis L. Hiatt Fund generously supported two conferences at Clark University. These enabled scholars from different countries to discuss the possibility of establishing cultures of peace and how the extent of such

cultures might be assessed and promoted. I want to thank my colleagues at Clark and all those scholars and practitioners who so generously contributed the chapters for this handbook. Royalties will support the University's Peace Studies Program.

I also want to acknowledge the helpful commentary of Eric Charles, Marjorie East, and Paul Kimmel, the secretarial assistance of Peggy Moskowitz, the able manuscript editing of Jodi Boduch and Lisa Mann, and the supportive encouragement of my wife Deborah.

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# Contributors

**Ernesto Anasarias** is the coordinator for the Research and Development Program of Balay Rehabilitation Center in Quezon City, the Philippines. The Balay Center is a non-profit human rights organization that conducts psychosocial development response to communities affected by armed conflict, particularly in Mindanao. A graduate student in community development at the University of the Philippines, he has been involved in studies on social trauma and community-based rehabilitation. For over 5 years he has been doing community-building projects in the Space for Peace in Pikit, North Cotabato.

**Sandra Azar** is professor of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, and on the faculty in the Child Clinical Training Program. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Rochester (1984) and has held faculty positions at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec, and at Clark University in Worcester, MA. She has published extensively on the topic of child maltreatment and parenting risk with a focus on theory, assessment, treatment, and legal issues, and has served on the advisory boards of a number of national surveys and federal grant review panels. Her research has included comparative treatment-outcome work, etiological model testing, and measure development. She is currently conducting research on the cognitive components of parenting, including work with cognitively challenged parents.

**Daniel Bar-Tal** is Branco Weiss Professor of Research in Child Development and Education Social Psychology at the School of Education, Tel Aviv University. His research interest is in political and social psychology studying socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making. He has published over 15 books and over 150 articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals and books. He served as a president of the International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his work.

**Karolina Baszarkiewicz** is a doctoral student in the Faculty of Social and Caring Sciences at the Åbo Akademi University in Finland. She graduated from Jagiellonian University of Cracow, Poland with a MA in Sociology (2004) and year later from Dalarna University, Sweden with a Masters in International Relations. Before enrolling in the PhD program Ms Baszarkiewicz worked in different NGOs in peace, conflict resolution and women's rights fields.

**Peter Berliner** is associate professor of Community Psychology at the Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, and the head of the University of Copenhagen Centre for International Traumatic Stress Research and Practice. His research is in the area of community-based support to people impacted by organized violence and treatment of torture survivors in post-conflict areas. He holds extensive field experience, including being a consultant psychologist to the UN police force in former Yugoslavia, and working with the International Red Cross/Red Crescent, and the Research and Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims. Much of his recent work has been in the combination of research and development in post-conflict areas including: Kosovo Honduras, Guatemala, the Philippines, India, and Lebanon. Website: <http://www.psy.ku.dk/english/index.html>

**Bruce Bonta** worked from 1963 to 1999 as a librarian at the Library of Congress, the Colby College Library, and the Pennsylvania State University Library. His interest in the subject of peaceful societies began in the early 1990s and resulted in *Peaceful Peoples: An Annotated Bibliography* (1993). His other scholarly publications on the subject can be identified via his personal website at <http://www.geocities.com/brucebonta/index.html>. The Peaceful Societies Website ([www.peaceful-societies.org](http://www.peaceful-societies.org)), a logical outgrowth of this passion for promoting the study of human peacefulness, seeks to facilitate the study of the subject by students, researchers, and general readers.

**Abelardo Brenes** received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Birmingham, England (1977). Currently he is an advisor to the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development and to Earth Charter International. During the 1990s he directed several educational projects in Central America in support of peace-building processes in the region. He is currently building upon this experience as a member of the Drafting Committee of *The Earth Charter* in working with educators and public officials in Costa Rica and other contexts in exploring its educational and public policy potentials.

**Meenakshi Chakraverti** is deputy director, International and Science Programs at the Public Conversations Project (PCP; [www.publicconversations.org](http://www.publicconversations.org)), through which she offers dialogue training, facilitation, and consultation to US-based and international groups. Meenakshi lives in San Diego where she has also taught international negotiation at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. Before entering the fields of dialogue and negotiation, she worked in the field of economic development, both with multilateral organizations and at the grassroots level in India. Meenakshi has a Master of Public Affairs Degree from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Cornell University.

**Michelle Cromwell** is an assistant professor at Pine Manor College where she has a joint appointment with the Center for Inclusive Leadership and Social Responsibility. She was born in Trinidad and holds a Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from Nova Southeastern University, Florida. Her areas of specialty, practice, and teaching include: multiculturalism, violence prevention, peace mak-

ing/keeping, social capital, coalition and capacity building, race and ethnic relations, conflict transformation, and culturally sensitive mediation.

**Joseph de Rivera** is Professor of Psychology and director of the Peace Studies Program at Clark University. He attended Bowdoin College, graduated from Yale, and received his doctorate from Stanford University. After serving in the Navy Medical Service Corps, he taught at Dartmouth and NYU before coming to Clark. He is the author of: *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* and *A Structural Theory of the Emotions*, the editor of *Field Theory as Human-Science, Conceptual Encounter*; and *The Analysis of Emotional Experience*, and a coeditor of *Psychology and the Promotion of Peace, Emotions and Justice*, and *Believed-in Imaginings: The Narrative Construction of Reality*.

**Eduardo I. Diaz** is Executive Director of Miami-Dade County's Independent Review Panel (IRP). He has served as President of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) and is President-Elect of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence; the Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association (APA).

**Ray S. Franklin** is director emeritus of the Michael Harrington Center for Democratic Values and Social Change, professor emeritus of Economics at Queens College, and professor emeritus of Sociology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley. Franklin is author of three books—*The Political Economics of Racism* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973, co-author, S. Resnik), *American Capitalism: Two Visions* (Random House, 1977), and *Shadows of Race and Class* (University of Minnesota Press, 1991)—as well as numerous articles on political economy, race, class, and urban issues. He recently completed a manuscript titled: *Failed Visions and the Quest for a Sane Society*.

**Douglas P. Fry** is professor and docent in the Developmental Psychology Program at Åbo Akademi University in Finland and an adjunct research scientist in the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology at the University of Arizona. He received his Ph.D. of Anthropology from Indiana University in 1986. He is co-editor of *Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution: Alternatives to Violence* (Erlbaum Associates, 1997) and *Keeping the Peace: Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Societies around the World* (Routledge Press, 2004). His book *The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence* (Oxford University Press, 2006) shows how anthropology—with its extensive time frame and comparative orientation—can provide unique insights into the nature of war and the potential for peace.

**Natalie J. Goldring** is a senior fellow in the Center for Peace and Security Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr. Goldring serves on the advisory boards of Women in International Security and 20-20 Vision, and the editorial board of The Nonproliferation Review. She is also a member

of the International Association of University Presidents/UN Commission on Disarmament Education, Conflict Resolution, and Peace, and is a former chair of the board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Goldring has written extensively on conventional and nuclear weapons, the international arms trade, non-proliferation, and small arms and light weapons. She earned her PhD in Political Science at MIT. of Political Science from MIT, with a specialization in Defense and Arms Control.

**Megan Goslin** is a doctoral student in the Child Clinical Psychology Department at Pennsylvania State University. She is conducting research on children's adjustment to divorce and continued exposure to inter-parental conflict and the role of social support networks in reducing negative child outcomes. In addition, she is also involved in research on causes of child maltreatment and working with a prevention program for first-time parents that focuses on the co-parenting relationship. Prior to coming to graduate school, she worked as a research assistant at the Mount Hope Family Center in Rochester, NY, where she conducted neuropsychological evaluations on low-income mothers and children with abuse and neglect histories. She received her bachelor's degree from Duke University in 2000.

**Michael Kisielewski** is Consulting Research Officer for the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions—Global Forced Evictions Program. His areas of interest include fostering “bottom-up” approaches to the equitable participation of indigenous and local peoples in political processes, participatory decision making, and general international relations theory. Mr. Kisielewski has presented numerous conference papers on themes ranging from international security, democratization, and state sovereignty to the political participation of underrepresented peoples in impoverished nations. He holds a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

**Timothy LeDoux** is a Ph.D. candidate in Geography at Michigan State University. His areas of research include the intersection of space, place, and power, urban political ecology, inequality and social movements, residential segregation, urban hunger and food insecurity, and critical geopolitics.

**Shira Loewenberg** teaches at The New School, Graduate Program in International Affairs. She is a director at the Outward Bound Center for Peacebuilding and serves as an associate specializing in media issues at the Center for International Conflict Resolution at Columbia University. Ms. Loewenberg holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Pennsylvania and a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. Her research interests include the role of media in conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and the impact of new media technologies on freedom of expression and access to information.

**Katya Migacheva** studied pedagogy, foreign languages, and cultures in Russia and continued her education in the area of psychology in the United States. She is currently a graduate student in the Social Psychology Doctoral Program at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, with a concentration in the Psychology of

Peace and Violence. She has a keen interest in cross-cultural communication, and her current research interests include facilitation of intergroup contact, trust, and tolerance in post-conflict societies.

**Steve Nisenbaum** is past president of the Massachusetts Psychological Association and the Massachusetts Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts. He is past president of Public Service Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association. Dr. Nisenbaum was the recipient from MPA of the Ezra Saul Award for Outstanding Contributions to Psychology. He also serves on the Board of Directors of the Massachusetts Council of Family Mediators. Dr. Nisenbaum holds a B.A. from Northwestern University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a M.A. and Ph.D. from Clark University.

**Yuko Okado** is a doctoral student in clinical psychology at Pennsylvania State University. Her master's work examines how one's risk for perpetrating child maltreatment may be influenced by the amount of emotional distance experienced with one's parents in the family of origin. Her research interests include the impact of trauma examined from a developmental psychopathology perspective and adult psychotherapy research. Yuko previously studied international relations, earning a B.A. from Stanford University and a M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Howard Richards** holds doctorates in curriculum planning (Toronto), philosophy (University of California at Santa Barbara), and law (Stanford), as well as an Advanced Certificate in Education from Oxford (UK). He has served as an evaluator of cultural change projects for the Organization of American States and for Canada's International Development Research Centre, evaluating projects in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. His book *The Evaluation of Cultural Action* was published by Macmillan (UK) in 1985. He has been professor of Peace and Global Studies at Earlham College, USA; a visiting professor at universities in India, Scotland, and Argentina; and a member of the Governing Council of the International Peace Research Association. Currently, he is on the faculty of Transcend Peace University, the world's first online peace university. His most recent book, written with Joanna Swanger, is *The Dilemmas of Social Democracies* (Lexington Books, 2006).

**Gavriel Salomon** is currently director of the Center for Research on Peace Education at the University of Haifa, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in educational psychology and communication from Stanford University (1968) and has taught at the Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University in Israel, Universidad Ibero Americana in Mexico, and at Harvard, Indiana University, Stanford, USC, University of Michigan, and University of Arizona in the USA. Salomon is a fellow of the *International Academy of Education* (2006) and the recipient of an *Honorary Doctorate* from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium (1999). He has written four books: *Interaction of Media, Cognition and Learning* (1979/1994); *Communication and Education* (1981); *Communication* (Hebrew, 1981); and *Technology and Education in the Information Age* (Hebrew, 2001), edited *Distributed Cognitions* (1993), and *Peace Education: The Concept, the Principles and the Research* (2002), and published more than 120 articles in a variety of professional journals.

**Úrsula Oswald Spring** is a professor/researcher at the National University of Mexico in the Regional Multidisciplinary Research Center (CRIM). She is founder secretary general of the Colegio de Tlaxcala, a postgraduate research institute. Since September 2005, she has also been the first MRF-Chair on Social Vulnerability at United National University Institute for the Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). As minister of Ecological Development (1994–1998) and General Attorney of Ecology in the State of Morelos (an ombudswomen for the environment; 1992–1994) she planted over 30 million trees and produced safe water for the whole population. Ursula has been president of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and General Secretary of the Latin American Council of Peace Research (2002–2006). She has written 45 books and 328 articles and book chapters.

**Ralph Summy** is currently an adjunct professor of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Queensland. He also is a co-convenor of the Nonviolence Commission of the International Peace Research Association, and a founder and current co-editor of *Social Alternatives*. He established the peace and conflict major/double major at the University of Queensland and from 1997–2000 was director of the Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawai'i. His research interests and many writings have centered on the Australian peace movement and on the theory and dynamics of nonviolent politics. His most recent book was coedited, *Nonviolence: An alternative for defeating global terror(ism)*, 2008

**Carolyn Stephenson** is associate professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, as well as being a member of the Program on Conflict Resolution, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, and the Population Studies faculty. She has a B.A. from Mt. Holyoke, and a M.A. and Ph.D. from Ohio State, and was previously director of Peace Studies at Colgate. She worked with the Culture of Peace program at UNESCO in 2001, and taught and did conflict resolution as a Fulbright Scholar in Cyprus in 2002. She is currently completing a book on NGOs at the UN, She has also written on alternative security systems and on the evolution of the field of peace studies.

**Joanna Swanger** is assistant professor and director of the Peace and Global Studies Program at Earlham College. Her doctorate is in Latin American History (University of Texas at Austin). She currently serves as co-convenor of the Global Political Economy Commission for the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). Swanger recently co-authored (with Howard Richards) *The Dilemmas of Social Democracies: Overcoming Obstacles to a More Just World* (Lexington Books, 2006).

**Barbara Thomas-Slayter** is research professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University. She has resided in Kenya, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, and carried out research in various countries of East Asia, South Asia, and Africa. She is a founder of Oxfam America where she has served on the Board of Directors. Thomas-Slayter earned her Ph.D. from Brandeis University and subsequently has been a visiting scholar at Boston University's African Studies Center, a Fulbright scholar in Zimbabwe, and

a fellow at Radcliffe's Bunting Institute. A political scientist, she is author of *Southern Exposure*, *International Development and the Global South in the Twenty-First Century*; *Politics, Participation and Poverty: Development Through Self-Help in Kenya*; *Gender, Environment, and Development in Kenya* (co-authored with D. Rocheleau) and has co-edited *Power, Process and Participation: Tools for Change*; and *Feminist Political Ecology, Global Issue and Local Experiences*.

**Barb Toews** is a practitioner, trainer, and educator in restorative justice and victim offender dialogue in prison, community and educational settings. Her most recent program experience was with the Pennsylvania Prison Society as a program manager where she applied restorative justice in prison settings, incorporated the philosophy into offender and offender family programs, and collaborated with incarcerated men and women as they developed their own restorative projects. She serves as a volunteer facilitator with the Office of the Victim Advocate Mediation Program for Victims of Violent Crime (Harrisburg, PA). Toews teaches classes in restorative justice and criminal justice as peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University (Harrisonburg, VA) and Haverford College (Haverford, PA). She authored *Little Book in Restorative Justice for People in Prison* (Good Books, 2006) and co-edited, with Howard Zehr, *Critical Issues in Restorative Justice* (Criminal Justice Press, 2004). She holds a Master of Conflict Transformation from Eastern Mennonite University and is a Ph.D. student at Bryn Mawr College's Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research.

**Linda R. Tropp** is associate professor of Psychology and interim director of the Psychology of Peace and Violence Concentration at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She is a member of the Governing Council of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and serves on the editorial boards of *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* and *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*. Tropp has worked on state and national initiatives to improve race relations in schools and has been involved in a number of efforts to integrate contributions from researchers and practitioners in the study of intergroup relations. She is a recipient of the Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize for her research on intergroup contact. Her main research programs concern experiences with intergroup contact among members of minority and majority status groups, identification with social groups, interpretations of intergroup relationships, and responses to prejudice and disadvantage.

**Johanna K. Vollhardt** holds a Master of Psychology from the University of Cologne, Germany. She is currently an advanced doctoral student in the Psychology of Peace and Violence Ph.D. concentration within the Social Psychology division at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of Social Issues*. Her research has focused on the effects of learning about structural causes of violence on attributions and judgments of perpetrators, and attitudes toward human rights among members of previously victimized groups.

**Jaan Valsiner** is a cultural psychologist with a consistently developmental axiomatic base that is brought to analyses of any psychological or social phenomena.



He is Professor of Psychology at Clark University and has been a visiting professor in Japan, Australia, Estonia, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. His most recent books are *The Guided Mind, Culture and Human Development* and *Comparative Study of Human Cultural Development*. He has edited (with Kevin Connolly) the *Handbook of Developmental Psychology* (London: Sage, 2003), as well as the *Cambridge Handbook of Socio-Cultural Psychology* (with Alberto Rosa). Valsiner is founding editor of *Culture & Psychology*. He established the new journal on individual case analyses—*International Journal of Idiographic Science* (2005—www.valsiner.com) and is the editor of *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences* and *From Past to Future: Annals of Innovations in Psychology*. In 1995 he was awarded the *Alexander von Humboldt Prize* for his interdisciplinary work on human development.

**William B. Vogele** is a professor of Political Science at Pine Manor College in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. He has a B.A. in Peace and World Order Studies from Colgate University and a Ph.D. in Politics from Brandeis University. His current research project assesses the process of democratic development in post-conflict societies, focusing on El Salvador. He is involved as an associate editor of a new four-volume international encyclopedia of peace (Nigel Young, editor). He is the co-editor of *Protest, Power and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action*. He is the author of numerous articles on international affairs and nonviolent struggle.

**Michael Wessells** is senior advisor on Child Protection for Christian Children's Fund, professor of Clinical Population and Family Health at Columbia University in the Program on Forced Migration and Health, and professor of Psychology at Randolph-Macon College. He has served as president of the APA's Division of Peace Psychology and of Psychologists for Social Responsibility and saw the former co-chair of the IASC (UN-NGO) Task Force on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings. His research on children and armed conflict examines child soldiers, psychosocial assistance in emergencies, and post-conflict reconstruction for peace. He regularly advises UN agencies, donors, and governments on the situation of children in armed conflict and issues regarding child protection and well-being, and helps to develop community-based, culturally grounded programs that assist children, families, and communities affected by armed conflict. He is author of *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection* (Harvard University Press, 2006).

# Introduction

Joseph de Rivera

## Introduction

If we are to build a more peaceful culture, we must both use imagination and face current reality. On the one hand, building requires us to imagine what we want to construct, and we know that societies are moved by positive images of the future, images that pull behaviors that bring that future into being (Polak 1972). On the other hand, we must face both our propensity for violence and our capacity for peace. In *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History*, Boulding (2000) points out that our warlike culture is accompanied with a concurrent culture of peace. We are taught a history of power and conquest, our religions portray a holy war against evil, and our minds are so full of violent images and language that is difficult for us to imagine a peaceful culture and believe in its possibility. Yet, much actual history is of a peaceful dailiness, our religions also portray peaceful gardens that cultivate the oneness of humanity and are sanctuaries of nonviolence, and our minds know that we are interdependent and must learn to live with one another.

In a culture of peace, people behave in ways that promote mutual caring and wellbeing. These behaviors are supported by particular institutional arrangements, and they reflect particular societal norms, values, and know how. Boulding (2000) observes that such a culture attempts to offer mutual security by acknowledging the importance of diversity, an appreciation of our human identity, and our kinship with the earth. This handbook is about building such cultures. It is based on the UN initiative to build a culture of peace for the world's children.

## The UN Initiative

The idea of encouraging the building a culture of peace was developed during the 1989 UNESCO International Congress. The delegates were influenced by two works that they discussed at length: the Seville Statement on Violence and a work by a Peruvian educator, Father Felipe MacGregor. The Seville Statement concludes that biology does not condemn humanity to war and that a species who invents war is also capable of inventing peace (see Adams 1991). The work by MacGregor (1986)

describes a cultural arrangement that resolves conflicts with nonviolent as opposed to violent means, a 'culture of peace' that could be contrasted with a culture of war and could be developed by educational initiative. The congress recommended that UNESCO 'help construct a new vision of peace by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights, and equality between men and women' (UNESCO 1989: 51). This concept of a culture of peace, somewhat modified by political forces within the UN, became the basis for a resolution that was adapted by the UN General Assembly (<http://www.culture-of-peace.info/history/introduction.html>).

UN resolution (A/RES/52/13) defines a culture of peace as involving values, attitudes, and behaviors that (1) reject violence, (2) endeavor to prevent conflicts by addressing root causes, and (3) aim at solving problems through dialogue and negotiation. It proposed that both states and civil society could work together to promote such a culture by acting to promote eight bases for such a culture. These are: (1) education (and especially, education for the peaceful resolution of conflict); (2) sustainable development (viewed as involving the eradication of poverty, reduction of inequalities, and environmental sustainability); (3) human rights; (4) gender equality; (5) democratic participation; (6) understanding, tolerance, and solidarity (among peoples, vulnerable groups, and migrants within the nation, and among nations); (7) participatory communication and the free flow of information; (8) international peace and security (including disarmament and various positive initiatives).

Each of these bases is related to others and the overall goal of building a peaceful culture. And each is much more complex than first apparent and must confront serious problems and challenges that will be examined in subsequent chapters.

## Challenges and Contradictions

The UN resolution is a social and political proclamation rather than a scientific document, and consensus requires enough ambiguity to encompass multiple perspectives. Yet when we empirically examine peaceful societies, we find that they often do reflect many of the above bases. For example, they are often egalitarian and democratic. However, they also have certain characteristics that are not mentioned in the UN documents. In particular we discover that they value and nurture children, exhibit a harmony with nature, and *define* themselves as peaceful. Rather than assuming that we know how to create cultures of peace, we take the building of such cultures as an empirical challenge, ask how we can go about its development, and feel free to suggest some friendly amendments to the bases proposed by the UN.

One might imagine that the UNESCO proposal might be resisted as a Western cultural imposition. Certainly there is a sort of taboo against advocating cultural changes that has been noted by theorists who have recognized the importance of culture for development and written about how political leadership may influence culture (Harrison and Huntington 2000; Harrison 2006). However, such theorists have tended to only focus on economic development and to view contemporary

Western culture as a model that others should emulate. In focusing on economic progress, they overlook certain problems in liberal culture and the extent to which the prosperity of some nations may rest on military dominance. The advantage of using a culture of peace as a standard is that it reflects a range of values that is much broader than economic progress and that holds economically developed nations to agreed-upon standards. Western cultural imposition will only occur if we insist there is only one culture of peace by not qualifying the different ways in which each of the bases may be achieved.

In fact, the most controversial aspect of the proposal proved to be its contrasting a culture of peace with a culture of war. The implication—that we are currently living in a culture of war—was resisted by the most powerful nations in the UN who insisted that all references to a culture of war be removed (Adams 2001). In so doing, the powerful appear to be asserting that their military power is preserving the peace rather than reflecting the dominance involved in a culture of war. This confounds legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Probably most of us believe that legitimate, consensual authority can empower development and facilitate the maintenance of order. A majority believe that laws must be enforced and that sometimes force is necessary. However, power may be used to dominate as well as to enforce, and when powerful nations insist on the priority of their own interests and resist the development of international law and UN reform in order to cling to their power, they are clearly reflecting a culture of war and hindering the development of a culture of peace.

It seems likely that a global culture of peace will require some sort of supranational system of lawful authority to insure global justice, and this will require loyalty and some common values. We now have a genuine global transnational community, but Howard (2000) argues that, historically, peace has relied on highly qualified elites who could exercise moral authority. If he is correct, the world will need a transcultural elite with shared cultural norms who can make these norms acceptable within their own societies. The values reflected in the concept of culture of peace may offer such norms. However, there are two obvious problems. First, Howard points out that many of the current elites in underdeveloped countries are small minorities with out-of-proportion wealth, minorities who are perceived as culturally subversive and beholden to alien powers. Such a situation will produce authoritarian regimes, warlords, or populist theocracies. Second, although Howard observes that modernization requires a framework of social and political order, he fails to note how the most powerful nations are blocking needed reforms.

## **Assumptions and Propositions**

Culture, as we use the term, is not a static concept, but a process, and we may use the term either to refer to a global culture of peace or to the different cultures of peace developed by different nations or communities. Hence, it might be more accurate to speak of building cultures of peacemaking. Further, we are referring not

only to things such as language, or a set of beliefs and common practices, but also to complex wholes that include governmental policies, economic and justice systems, relations with the environment, social inequalities, etc. In this sense, culture is a system with interacting parts; we cannot change one element without affecting others. Thus, we might speak of building a peace *system* (Irwin 1988) as an alternative to the domination systems described by Wink (1992) and Zimbardo (2007).

We tackle the problem of creating peaceful societies by embracing two fundamental propositions. First, we propose that human nature is essentially relational and far more complex than what is often assumed. Whatever our biological character, cultures have evolved and differentiated themselves to produce a wide range of behavioral patterns—from extremely violent to very peaceful and much between the two. Second, although we accept the UN’s concept of a culture of peace, we do not assume that we know exactly how to build such cultures. We view building peaceful cultural alternatives to war as our primary hope if the future of the world is to escape from the war machines of the major industrial countries, but we take an empirical approach as to how this may be accomplished. Since these propositions are fundamental, let us we consider what we know about human nature, and the history and empirics of peace building efforts.

## **Our Human Nature**

In our contemporary Western society we are apt to think of persons as primarily individuals who exist independently of one another and who relate to each other by contracts (of marriage, work, property ownership, etc.). The selfishness of these individuals is mitigated by feelings of attachment to, or love for, a few other individuals or a social group with which we identify, but this fundamental self centeredness places severe limitations on how peace may be obtained and leaves little room to imagine how we might construct a peaceful world. Hence, it is important to realize that this view of human nature simply reflects the organization of our current society and the stress that it places on individual autonomy and market structures. Fiske (1991) suggests that this “market pricing” view is only one of four primary forms of human relations. He articulates three other forms of fundamental social relationships: communal sharing (the we-ness involved in love and identification), authority ranking (relatively minimized in our own culture but reflected wherever differences in status and power exist), and the “equality matching” that is reflected in demands for fairness and justice. Fiske contrasts all four of these forms of social relations with the asocial relationships that occur in violence and coercion. In imagining the building of cultures of peace, it may be useful to remember that we can draw upon all four of the structures of social living.

Many believe that peace is desirable in theory, but impossible to attain. For them, a peaceful world is not a realistic goal to have and work for. They are thinking of their personal experiences with violence, the violence they hear about, and the apparent necessity to use violence to control the behavior of those bent on violence.

They forget that war, like slavery, is a societal institution, that behaving violently is an aspect of culture, and that institutions and cultures can dramatically change. Yet much of human behavior is governed by culture, the meaning we make of situations largely depends on cultural norms, and the very way in which we understand human nature is shaped by culture. The dominant contemporary Western view—that we are basically individuals who look out for ourselves—may be contrasted with the views of cultures who believe that humans are essentially group members or with cultures that believe that humans are essentially peaceful. In point of fact, human beings are not either essentially violent or peaceful. The most essential aspect of human nature is that we are dependent on others. These interdependencies occur in all cultures and are shaped by the culture in which we find ourselves and that we help create.

In fact, we may view persons (as contrasted with other biological organisms) as only *existing* in their relationships with other persons (Macmurray 1961). From this perspective, contemporary psychology's emphasis on the contrast between love and hate misses our fundamental dependence. Since we are always in relationships, the more essential contrast is between our love for others and our fear for ourselves. This fear for self begins to dominate whenever we are hurt and leads to splits between mind and body, reason and emotion, ideal and real. Persons and whole cultures become overly individualistic or conformist, liberal or conservative, idealist or realist. Yet, we can only become whole when people care for one another. Hate occurs when our dependency on the other is frustrated by the other's failure to care for us. War cultures involve domination and the fear of being dominated or destroyed. Their mythology places evil destructiveness outside of the self and believes that order can only be restored with the use of violence. By contrast, peace cultures involve mutual nurturance so that caring for what is other prevails over fear for self. Their mythology sees fear and selfishness as ubiquitous and redemption as requiring acknowledgment of our human frailty (see Wink 1992). To imagine cultures of peace, we need only to shift our mythology. To create what we imagine, it helps to review what we know about the history of peacebuilding.

## **The Empirics of Peace**

People differ in their assessment of the degree to which peacefulness must be secured by force, and Howard (2000) points out that people are divided between those who feel that we have relative peace and this must be *maintained* by strength, and those who are aware of the absence of real peace and believe that such peace must be *attained*. The perspective of this handbook is that a peace that includes justice must be *attained*. However, it does not automatically reject the idea that peace may also need to be maintained. Pinker (2002) points out that the capacity for violence is part of our biological makeup, and if we are not inherently warlike, neither are we inherently peaceful. We humans have created cultures of war as well as cultures of peace, and the morality that works within groups often fails between

groups. As Howard notes, states make war possible, but in our contemporary situation, they also make peace possible and, thus far, are the only effective way that masses of people can govern themselves. Yet the chapter by Fry, Bonta, and Baszarkiewicz not only shows that peaceful cultures exist, but that whole cultural systems may be relatively peaceful. The position taken in this handbook is that the problems involved in building contemporary peaceful cultures must be solved empirically. We cannot yet be sure about the best way for states to be constructed so that power can be shared among different ethnic groups or the best way to balance the different types of human relationships.

Yet, we do know a good deal. The power of violence and the strength of those who perpetuate it can be demoralizing, and it is heartening to remember the many successful challenges to that power and the numbers, strength, and persistence of those working for peace and the power of nonviolent action. Those building a global culture of peace may draw strength from the mobilization of students, peasants, and workers in Latin America that led to land reclamation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco that established a nuclear free zone in all of Latin America and the many accounts of people working together to successfully resolve conflict (Mathews 2001).

The movement to build cultures of peace rests on the efforts of many previous movements that have sought to replace violence with non-violent justice-seeking behavior (see Boulding 2000). These include early Christian monastic settlements, the lay religious orders that operated at the same time as the crusades, and the Anabaptist communities that developed during the reformation and led to the initial success in Pennsylvania. These religiously based movements were supplemented when, during the Napoleonic wars, people developed the idea of the state as a moral community and peace as a citizen's issue. Their advocacy led states to accept the basic idea of arbitration, and the practice was so successful that there were 63 successful international arbitrations between 1890 and 1900, and the peaceful separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the Hague Peace Conference envisioned nation states as instruments of diplomacy that could not only abolish war, but also poverty and disease. Although the conference did not adequately deal with the issue of disarmament and neglected to face the problems of ethnic diversity, colonialism, and the power struggles that contributed to the two world wars that followed, it did lay the basis for the current United Nations. Meanwhile, the concept and practice of using nonviolent action to achieve justice for those without political power was developed by Gandhi and used in dozens of nonviolent campaigns for justice so that we now have a wide spectrum of new tools for negotiation and nonviolent action that may enable us to build cultures of peace.

Gradually, we are developing new norms and institutions that build cultures of peace. The social movements for women's rights, human rights, democracy, economic justice, and peace have led to the formation of dozens of peace research institutes and journals, and hundreds of peace education programs in universities throughout the world. We now have dozens of occupationally based groups, many national peace groups, unarmed peace teams working amidst civil strife, a number of regional organizations, and many nongovernmental organizations working for

world law and nuclear disarmament. Finally, we have thousands of people constantly struggling to create peace in the midst of civil strife and an increasing number of business executives who are gradually making changes in corporate practices that will promote more peaceful systems.

On the state and international levels, there is the quiet development of a new sort of transnational infrastructure for peace. There is an international community of diplomats working for UN reform in the face of resistance by the major powers. As Boulding (2000, p. 239) observes, “This incipient peace culture in the diplomatic corps of each state is there to be worked with in the demilitarization efforts of the peace-building sectors of the civil society.” Although the major powers are resistant, the middle powers are working for nuclear arm abolition and the control of small arms. And although it is hampered by major power vetoes, the United Nations is an autonomous force with departments for disarmament and arms regulation, peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs, complete documentation of international negotiations on arms control, a center in every member state, and international civil servants carrying UN passports—a glimpse of what an interstate culture of peace could be.

Coalitions of hundreds of NGOs have successfully pushed for the banning of landmines and the establishment of an international criminal court and are constantly working for the abolishment of nuclear weapons. They influence an emotional climate of hope that we can create the norms and institutions of a culture of peace. The question, of course, is whether the gradual increase in this culture can overcome the pressures towards maintaining a culture of war.

## **Organization of the Handbook**

This handbook is divided into three sections. The first addresses the challenge of building peaceful cultures from the perspective of the different social sciences. From anthropology, we learn about the characteristics of the peaceful cultures that currently exist. A cultural psychologist uses semiotics to discuss the mechanisms that may be necessary to intervene in the constant dynamical interplay between war and peace. An economist discusses our main economic perspectives and the political economy that may be required if we are to have peace in our global society. Two students of cultural change consider how we may be able to transform norms. A political scientist presents different theories of power and how we may have to regard power to attain a peaceful culture. A social psychologist discusses our current global situation, the constraints posed by our current conditions of violence, and how we can assess the extent to which our current nation-states are peaceful.

The second section contains chapters that examine the conceptual issues and empirical challenges involved in each of the eight bases for a culture of peace proposed by the UN General assembly (education, gender equality, tolerance, democracy, open communication, human rights, international security, and sustainable development). They ask what is really involved in peace education, how we can best measure gender



equality, and how we might promote tolerance. They inquire into how democracy is best conceived and assessed, the benefits and challenges of open communication, and what methods may help develop human rights when ethnic groups are in conflict. They examine the best ways for us to promote international security and what we must do if we are to have both development and sustainability.

The third section is practically oriented and deals with the methods we may use to build the bases. Some of these are general methods that may be applied in many different contexts. They include methods for nonviolent struggle and peace building, negotiation, dialogic techniques, and nonviolent ways for dealing with deviance, such as programs for restorative justice and prison reform, and achieving police oversight. Others are aimed at the specific levels with which we must work: personal transformation, developing more peaceful families, community development, community reconciliation, and societal reconciliation. A short final chapter relates these tools back to building the UN bases. We realize that the ideas presented here are mere beginnings, but we hope readers will find them thought provoking and useful in the task that lies ahead.

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**Section I**  
**Views from the Social Sciences**

# Chapter 1

## Learning from Extant Cultures of Peace

Douglas P. Fry, Bruce D. Bonta, and Karolina Baszarkiewicz

### Introduction

Boulding (1978, p. 93) once quipped, “Anything that exists is possible.” The anthropological literature documents the existence of peaceful societies from around the globe. This chapter focuses on what extant peaceful societies can teach us about creating and maintaining “cultures of peace.” First, we will consider “peace systems.” Peace systems are comprised of neighboring societies that do not wage war on each other. A comparison of peace systems from Brazil’s Upper Xingu River basin, India’s Nilgiri and Wynaad Plateaus, and the European Union (EU) suggests certain psychosocial features that help to prevent warfare and to promote cultures of peace within these peace systems. The cultures of peace elements with the most obvious relevance to peace systems include, for instance, social norms for peace education and socialization (including the promotion of values that explicitly shun intergroup violence), social cohesion and tolerance, inclusion of all groups in the system (human rights and equality values), a de-emphasis on security sought via military means, and in some cases, democratic participation, such as in the EU.

Second, we will consider some lessons for creating cultures of peace as derived from a study of internally peaceful societies. Several elements of the cultures of peace concept are germane to internally peaceful societies: societal norms favoring education and socialization for peace and the use of nonviolent dialogue and conflict resolution practices, valuing of women and nurturance, and the attainment of social cohesion via tolerance and understanding.

### Peace Systems

It is often assumed that all societies engage in warfare (Fry 2004, 2006). However, this is simply not the case. Numerous non-warring societies exist (Fry 2006, 2007). Some neighboring societies have formed peace systems, meaning that they do not make war on each other (and sometimes not with outsiders either). For example, in addition to the examples to be presented in this chapter, the aboriginal inhabitants of the central Malaysia Peninsula, the Inuit of Greenland, and the

Montagnais, Naskapi, and East Main Cree bands of the Labrador Peninsula maintain peace systems.

### *Brazil's Upper Xingu River Basin Tribes*

In the 1880s, the first European to visit Brazil's Upper Xingu River basin, the German explorer von den Steiner, found a cluster of tribes from four different language groups that comprised a peaceful social system (Gregor 1990). Correspondingly, Quain observed in the 1930s that these Brazilian peoples, although sometimes raided by outside tribes, did not wage war on each other (Murphy and Quain 1955). Gregor (1990, pp. 105–106), who has conducted fieldwork among these tribes over recent decades, summarizes:

What is striking about the Xinguanos is that they are peaceful. During the one hundred years over which we have records there is no evidence of warfare among the Xingu groups. To be sure there have been instances of witchcraft killings across tribal lines, and rare defensive reactions to assaults from the war-like tribes outside the Xingu basin. But there is no tradition of violence among Xingu communities.

Gregor (1990) has lived among the Mehinaku and the Yawalapití, visited most of the other Xingu tribes, and interviewed people from all of them. He concludes that the Xingu peace system rests on three pillars: intervillage trade, intermarriage, and ceremonial interconnections. The value system also plays an important role in preventing war.

Each tribe produces specialized items to trade with other groups (Gregor 1990; Murphy and Quain 1955; see also Fry 2006). The Wauja make pottery. The Kamayurá produce hardwood bows from *pau d'arco* trees that grow in their area. The Kalapalo and Kuikuru make highly valued shell necklaces and waistbands. The Yawalapití also create shell decorations. The Trumaí engage in salt production. Likewise, the Mehinaku make salt from water hyacinth plants, a trade specialty that requires a substantial labor input. Gregor (1990, pp. 111–112) emphasizes that:

Trade means trust, since items offered may not be reciprocated for several months or more. Trade means mutual appreciation, since craft objects, unlike our manufactures, are an extension of the self which the maker hopes will be admired. Trade is a social relationship that is valued in and of itself, and is a conscious reason for maintaining monopolies. As one of my informants explained to me: 'They have things that are really beautiful, and we have things that they like. And so we trade and that is good.'

Widespread intermarriage is a second contributor to peaceful, non-warring relations among upper Xingu peoples (Basso 1973; Fry 2006). The Yawalapití, for example, do not seek spouses from their own village, but instead marry among the Kamayurá, Kuikuru, Kalapalo, and Mehinaku. Among the Kuikuru, 30% of marriages are with persons from other tribes; among the Mehinaku, the figure is about 35%. One man expressed his intertribal identity by gesturing so as to divide his body down the middle, "This side...Mehinaku. That side is Waurá" (Gregor and Robarchek 1996, p. 173; NB: Waurá is an alternative spelling of Wauja). The presence

of relatives, trading partners, and friends in the other groups presents a strong disincentive against the waging of war among these interconnected tribes.

The third contributor to peace involves the ceremonial interdependencies that the Xingu tribes vigorously nourish. A ceremony to inaugurate chiefs and to mourn passed chiefs requires the participation of all the tribes. The ritual reinforces that all the tribes belong to a larger, peaceful social system. As one Xinguanos expresses (Gregor 1990, p. 113): “We don’t make war; we have festivals for the chiefs to which all of the villages come. We sing, dance, trade, and wrestle.”

Finally, a set of shared values promotes peace and discourages violence, including war. In the Xingu value orientation, peace is moral, whereas war and violence are immoral. A person gains prestige and respect through being tranquil and self-controlled. Social approval flows to persons who forsake aggression. Carneiro (1994, p. 208) reports that “the Kuikuru are strongly socialized from childhood to be amiable and to refrain from expressing anger. Indeed, fights among men in the village are unknown.” An acceptable, if not encouraged, Upper Xingu response to conflict is to move to another village. Furthermore, the warrior role among these tribes is neither valued nor rewarded (Basso 1973; Gregor and Robarchek 1996).

Although generally peaceful places, Xingu villages are not totally free of hostility and competition. Spouses sometimes express jealousy, thefts occur, and people are fearful of witchcraft. Among the Trumaí, a typical outlet for hostility is to deliver a public harangue. Rivalries also are expressed competitively, yet nonviolently, through wrestling matches between persons of the same or neighboring villages. To the Xingu, expressing their anger through wrestling allows it to subside. “When our bellies are ‘hot with anger’ we wrestle and the anger is gone” (Gregor and Robarchek 1996, p. 180).

Even though Xinguanos are against war and actively nurture their own peace system, they periodically have had to defend themselves from raiding by tribes who live outside the Xingu basin. Nonetheless, their antiwar values are clear. Murphy and Quain (1955, p. 15) point out that the Trumaí gain no prestige from war: “Warfare was an occasion for fear, and not an opportunity to enhance one’s status.” Ireland (1991, p. 58) explains that for the Wauja, violence and war are morally degrading:

Far from viewing physical aggression with awe and admiration, they see it as pathetic and a mark of failed leadership. The Wauja term for warrior or soldier, *peyeteki yekeho*, can be translated as ‘man whose greatest talent is losing his self control.’

In the Upper Xingu belief system, three categories of humans exist: peaceful peoples of the Xingu basin, wild and warlike Indians from beyond the Xingu area, and all non-Indians, or basically, the “whites.” The concept of wild Indian reinforces the antiwar value orientation of the Xingu people, and they use this stereotypical image as a point of contrast to what they see as their morally superior, peaceful, civilized way of life. The Wauja antiviolent and antiwar beliefs, for example, are reflected in the following myth recounted by Ireland (1991, p. 58) about how the three different kinds of humanity received their basic characters from the Sun.

The Sun offers a rifle to the ancestor of the Wauja, but the Wauja merely turns it over in his hands, not knowing how to use it. The Sun takes the rifle from the Wauja and offers it to the ancestor of the warlike Indians who live to the north of the Wauja. This Indian is also baffled by the rifle, and so the Sun takes it away again and this time hands it to the ancestor of the whiteman.

...Next the Sun passed around a gourd dipper from which each man was asked to drink. The ancestor of the Wauja approached, but found to his horror that the dipper was filled to the brim with blood. He refused to touch it, but when the warlike Indian was offered the dipper, he readily drank from it. When the Sun finally offered the dipper of blood to the whiteman, he drank it down greedily in great gulps.

That is why the whiteman and the warlike Indian tribes are so violent today; even in ancient times, they were thirsty for the taste of blood. To the Wauja, however, the Sun gave a dipper of manioc porridge. And that is why the Wauja drink manioc porridge today, and why they are not a brutal and violent people.

The Xingu peace system was already in place when first observed over 120 years ago, and since that time there have been no acts of war among these tribes. Institutionally, friendly peaceful interaction among the tribes in the Upper Xingu basin are created and recreated on a daily basis through exchange, kinship, ritual, and reiterated antiwar values. Xinguanos differentiate between their own civilized, peaceful nature and the violent natures of wild Indians and whites. For the Xinguanos, war and violence constitute uncivilized, immoral conduct, which they shun.

### *The Nilgiri and Wynaad Plateaus*

The peace systems on the Nilgiri and Wynaad Plateaus in southern India are not as well documented as the one in the Upper Xingu River valley, but they nevertheless suggest some additional ideas about conditions that might apply among societies that rarely if ever fight one another or go to war.

The two plateaus are really higher and lower portions of the same mountain system, located near the southern end of the Western Ghats. They are located at the northwestern corner of the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu on the borders of Kerala and Karnataka. The mountains are known in the literature as the Nilgiri Plateau, the Nilgiri-Wynaad Plateau, or the Blue Mountains. The massif can be divided into two physiographic regions: the Nilgiri Plateau itself, the higher area to the east; and the Nilgiri-Wynaad Plateau, a lower area to the northwest.

The societies living in the higher eastern area, referred to from here on simply as the Nilgiri—the Toda, the Kota, the Badaga, and the Kurumbas—have been well-described in numerous ethnographies dating back more than 100 years. The societies in the northwestern area, referred to from here on as the Wynaad—the Nayaka, Paniya, Chetti, Mullu Kurumba, and Betta Kurumba peoples—have received much less attention from ethnographers. The different societies of both areas speak distinct languages—Badaga, Toda, Kota, and so forth—that are affiliated with three of the four major Dravidian languages: Tamil, Kannada, and

Malayalam. Both areas of the massif have been peaceful for the past century, especially the Wynaad, which has a peace system comparable to the one in the Upper Xingu.

Hockings (1989, p. 365) contrasts the relative amity that has persisted among the societies in the Nilgiri with the social patterns of many mountain peoples in places such as the Caucasus, the sub-Himalaya, and the Hindu Kush, where violence and raiding have been common. Marauding was never a pattern in the Nilgiri, and the societies, he argues, “possessed no militia or weapons of war.” He maintains that the complex economic trading system among the societies, operating on a system of trust, was a factor in their peace system.

His earlier book on the Badagas (Hockings 1980) describes in much greater detail the trading and inter-society relationships of the Nilgiri peoples. Bird-David (1997) amplifies that description with additional information about the Wynaad societies, and she provides an effective comparison of the two regions. In the paragraphs that follow, the names and spellings of the different societies will follow Bird-David (1997), the most recent of the relevant works.

While the peoples of the Nilgiri may have had a relatively peaceful system, Bird-David and Hockings both describe the tensions and witchcraft killings that occurred there in the past, patterns reminiscent of the Upper Xingu as well. The Wynaad, in contrast, appears to have a history completely free of sorcery and witchcraft killings, as well as intertribal warfare. A comparison of the social, economic, and cultural structures of the Nilgiri and the Wynaad will indicate some of the factors that have contributed to the peace system of the latter.

### *The Nilgiri Plateau*

The Toda, Kota, Badaga, and Kurumbas may be relatively peaceful toward one another, but their relationships have been rigid, formal, separated, highly structured, and strictly stereotyped. The four societies inhabit quite distinct communities, each of which emphasizes its own unique economic patterns and social roles. Each society accentuates its uniqueness and differences from the others, although, in fact, there are multiple, overlapping, economic practices. The Kurumbas are primarily known as food gatherers in the forest, though they are also shifting agriculturalists, and they work as watchmen for the other groups on the Nilgiri.

Everyone thinks of the Badaga as farmers, though they also keep some livestock, primarily buffaloes. The Kota are known as musicians and artisans, but they, too, farm and keep some livestock. People think of the Toda as herders, though they also cultivate some farmland and gather foods in the forest. The important point is that the stereotypes the societies maintain about each other’s specializations provide the bases for complex, ritualized, intergroup exchange relationships.

These four Nilgiri societies live in distinctly separate locations, and their folk traditions confirm this long-time sense of separateness. They do trade with one another, though they base their economic exchange patterns on formalized gifting

arrangements. Hereditary relationships, passed down from fathers to sons, connect people with one another and form the foundations for the traditional exchange linkages. Through these relationships, the Kurumba trade their forest products, while the Kota trade utensils and craft ware; the Toda, their dairy products; and the Badaga, their grain. The peoples of the Nilgiri do not trade their produce through market transactions. In essence, the economic transactions occur between families that have already established formalized relationships rather than in random marketplace settings.

The four different societies organize their political systems in highly structured ways. The Kurumbas, for instance, have established elaborately structured political offices that are inherited in a patrilineal fashion, including, in each settlement, officials such as a priest, priest's helpers, an exorcist, sorcerer, diviner, village headman, a second headman, and two assistants.

The social rigidity and complexity of the Nilgiri tribes extends to their religious worlds. Each society has its own temples and celebrates its own festivals by itself. Their involvement in one another's ceremonies is performed only in ritualized fashions. Each Badaga community has a Kurumba watchman, a person who holds a hereditary, lifelong position. The duties of the watchman are to guard the community from supernatural dangers and to act as an assistant to the Badaga priest in ceremonial functions. For example, the Kurumba watchman sows the first furrows during a Badaga sowing festival.

People on the Nilgiri perceive the hunter-gatherer Kurumbas as potentially dangerous sorcerers. They can be animals as well as humans, people feel, and they exist outside Nilgiri societies as well as within them. Their neighbors associate them with sacredness and danger. Although the Badaga use them as assistants to their priests, they still believe the Kurumba can turn into animals or insects that may kill and eat people. Their powers allow them to start epidemics, but some of them are also known as capable healers. The Badagas, as late as the 1960s, described seeing Kurumbas turning into tigers—they saw such things with their own eyes—and as of 1980 they were still highly suspicious of them. People were afraid of the forest due to these dangers.

These fears in the past resulted in murders of Kurumbas—individuals and sometimes groups of people—who were suspected of sorcery. Official records throughout the nineteenth century recorded violent retributions against the Kurumbas and sometimes the Toda, who were also accused of witchcraft.

### *The Wynaad Plateau*

Only one of the five major societies living on the Wynaad, the Nayaka, has been studied extensively by an anthropologist, Bird-David. Another anthropologist who devoted many publications to South Asia, Fürer-Haimendorf, visited the Wynaad during the summer of 1948 and published his observations in 1952, whereas the anthropologist Misra (1972) reported briefly on one community there, the village of Erumad.



The distinctiveness, rigidity, sense of uniqueness, isolation, and formalized relationships of the Nilgiri contrast with the far more relaxed, flexible, and open style of the tribes on the Wynaad. Societies there tend to form indistinct communities that minimize their differences. The Nayaka, Paniya, Chetti, Mullu Kurumba, and Betta Kurumba communities generally accentuate their similarities—they tend to think of each other as cultivators and gatherers, though they do recognize their differences. The Mullu Kurumba are permanently settled plough cultivators, the Nayaka are a gathering and hunting society, the Betta Kurumba are primarily shifting, slash-and-burn farmers, and the Chetti are landowners and landlords. The Paniya work on the farms of others. All have additional economic pursuits. Fürer-Haimendorf (1952, p. 36) reported that the economic and social differences among the societies of the Wynaad “present a bewildering picture of variety and complexity.”

The Wynaad tribes are dispersed in flexible, multi-ethnic clusters, the different peoples mixing comfortably amongst one another without much sense of isolation. While the Mullu Kurumba are generally concentrated in the western Cherambod area of the Wynaad, the other groups—the Paniya, Nayaka, Betta Kurumba, and Chetti—are scattered throughout the plateau in substantially the same territory. According to Misra (1972), Erumad includes Mullu Kurumba, Betta Kurumba, Nayaka, Paniya, and Chetti people living in the same village. Folk tales in the Wynaad suggest that the integration of communities has been a long tradition in the region.

The people living in the Wynaad have traditionally engaged in marketplace exchanges with one another, in contrast to the formalized gifting patterns of the Nilgiri. The Nayaka, for example, provide a wide range of forest products—bamboo, firewood, honey, and spices—at the markets in exchange for the goods that they need, such as metal knives, clothes, rice, and tobacco. In Erumad, the Mullu Kurumba work for the Chetti in their fields, and the Nayaka work in the fields of the Mullu Kurumba and the Chetti.

The Nayaka—the hunting and gathering society of the Wynaad—have an egalitarian political structure with no overarching political or administrative position, much like many other foraging societies around the world. They do have shamans who mediate between the spirits and humanity, and other individuals who organize festivals occasionally, but otherwise they have no officials. These straightforward Nayaka structures differ significantly, of course, from the complexity of the Kurumba society.

The more relaxed, unstructured, peaceful attitudes existing on the Wynaad appear to prevail over a few communities of Kota, Badaga, and Toda that live there rather than on the Nilgiri. Perhaps not surprisingly, these outlier communities seem to have adopted the social milieu of their new location rather than the approaches of the higher plateau to the east. For instance, the Toda living in the Wynaad apparently maintain more relaxed relationships with the other peoples of the area than they do on the Nilgiri. A Toda will not, normally, sleep or eat in a Kota village, since the latter people eat flesh, but the small number of Toda in the Wynaad make an exception for the Kota village of Kulgadi. This pattern dates back to their mythological

figure Kwoten who, caught out in the area as evening approached, spent a good night in Kulgadi. Since then, the Todas will only visit that one Kota village (Rivers 1906). To give another example, a Badaga group that moved down to the Wynaad from the Nilgiri about 200 years ago—known as the Gaudas and numbering 951 people in 1980—have good relations with the Kurumbas in their area and do not view them as sorcerers.

Another contrast between the Wynaad and the Nilgiri is the way the Wynaad villages hold local festivals in their temples at which all the different peoples of the region celebrate together (Misra 1972). For instance, members of the five different tribes in Erumad celebrate the *Vilakku* (lamp) festival together in the local temple. While their perceptions of their relative social status will prompt them to process around the temple in proper order—the Chetti followed by the Mullu Kurumba, then the Betta Kurumba, the Nayaka, and finally the Paniya—the essential point is that they all attend and participate, in contrast to the Nilgiri tribes. It is reasonable to infer that the way the Wynaad tribes coordinate their rituals and celebrations may help to foster their intertribal harmony.

Still another contrast between the Nilgiri and the Wynaad are the respective perceptions and roles of their forest-dwelling, hunter-gather tribes. In the Nilgiri, the Kurumbas accept lifetime roles as watchmen for the Badaga, though only with a ceremonial purpose. In the Wynaad, the hunter-gatherers, the Nayaka, are employed as real watchmen—to watch for trespassers and predators. They are hired on a contract basis by the day, or perhaps for an entire season. Furthermore, the people of the Wynaad do not believe the Nayakas turn into animals, as the people of the Nilgiri believe the Kurumbas do, though some Wynaad people do think the Nayaka act like animals. After all, they see them sleeping without shelters in the forest, just like animals. But the peoples of the Wynaad are not afraid of them—they try to use the Nayaka knowledge of the forest to their own advantage. They may use their footpaths and they may turn to them for assistance with supernatural forces, since they appear to be powerful shamans. Individuals may also ask their help with forest medicines. Witchcraft killings, however, have not been part of their history, as they have been on the Nilgiri and in the Upper Xingu River Valley.

In sum, though the ethnographic literature about the Wynaad region is not nearly as full as that on the Nilgiri or the Upper Xingu, there are no reports of intertribal violence from the Wynaad during the period of British rule or since. Bird-David (1997) argues that, from this absence of recorded violence in the Wynaad, there have probably been very few if any intertribal murders or warfare in the region.

We can safely infer from this literature that a non-warring peace system, marred by witchcraft killings, may have existed on the Nilgiri Plateau as Hockings (1989) suggests, but a peace system without even witchcraft killings has prevailed on the Wynaad. Because the ethnographic literature on the Wynaad is thin, we can only speculate on the factors that have helped perpetuate this intertribal nonviolence.

It is not reasonable to attribute the lack of violence on either plateau, however, to the stabilizing effects of intertribal marriages. Such marriages—as occur in the Upper Xingu—are far less common in either the Nilgiri or the Wynaad due to the prohibitions of ritual purity and impurity among the different groups that are

quite comparable to the caste beliefs prevailing in most of traditional India. Clearly, the Wynaad peace system depends mostly on their extensive trading relations, augmented by their informal social and economic structures and the inclusiveness they display in their ritual and ceremonial lives. They do not stigmatize the very different group, the hunter-gatherers, as Other. But their beliefs in intertribal peacefulness have not been analyzed by competent scholars, so it is difficult to make further conclusions.

## *European Union*

The European Union (EU) provides an example of the deliberate creation of a peace system. In the wake of World War II, a generation of forward-thinking politicians, such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Konrad Adenauer, who had just experienced the horrors of war first-hand, conceptualized a new Europe operating as an interdependent system safe from the scourge of war. These “founding fathers of Europe” explicitly sought “to suppress the causes of war that led to a world conflagration” (Bellier and Wilson 2000, p. 15). In essence, they deliberately set themselves the ambitious goal of constructing a peace system for Europe.

The approach emphasized by the founding fathers was to make Europe economically integrated and systematically make its member countries economically *interdependent*. They envisioned a “spill-over effect” where economic interdependence would in turn lead to integration in other social realms. This indeed is what has happened over the last half century. In the legal realm, for instance, the member states of the EU are required to integrate EU laws into national legal procedures (Bellier 2000).

The European Parliament, European Commission, and European Court of Justice provide an overarching level of governance for the member states that includes new political, legislative, and judicial mechanisms for handling disputes and for facilitating coordinated approaches to shared concerns (Fry 2006, 2007). A common currency, the euro, has already replaced national currencies within many of the EU countries. The EU also has its own flag and anthem (Abeles 2000). Younger Europeans especially are taking on a new identity as “citizens of Europe” as well as citizens of particular countries. European integration continues. One observation is that social change of this magnitude cannot be expected to be completed overnight; in fact, the “two steps forward and one step back” saying has been applied to the process of European integration.

The promotion of peace is one crowning achievement of the EU. Bellier and Wilson (2000, p. 16) point out that “In the EU, the emphasis has been put on the means to reduce political divergence between the nation-state governments in order to bring peace and tolerance, guarantee a better future, and create the conditions for a sort of collective happiness.” A war between EU members has become unthinkable. “Peace is therefore the primary achievement of the process of European integration” notes Euro-Parliamentarian Jan-Willem Bertens (1994, p. 2).

A shift in values has been important in developing the EU peace system. War is no longer considered to be an option within the EU system. This is a huge change in orientation from the times when World War II ravaged Europe. Predominant values within the EU today emphasize human rights, tolerance, peace, cooperation, and solidarity. The trend, however, is to play down nationalism, not eliminate it. Thus the EU holds a viable, recent set of lessons for transforming cultures of war into cultures of peace.

## **Internally Peaceful Societies**

We now shift the focus from non-warring peace systems to internally peaceful societies. Such societies with extremely low levels of expressed physical aggression offer insights for developing a culture of peace. At least three aspects of a culture of peace described in UN documents are germane to internally peaceful societies. These would most centrally include societal norms favoring education and socialization for peace, valuing of women and nurturance, and the attainment of social cohesion via tolerance and understanding.

The members of a peaceful society rarely if ever engage in physical aggression, share a system of beliefs that eschews aggression, and promote harmonious, nonviolent interpersonal relations (Fry and Baszarkiewicz, 2008). Research within anthropology and related disciplines (e.g., Ross 1993; Sponsel 1996) underlines some general tendencies shared by peaceful societies. They are likely to be small communities with egalitarian social structures—including relatively high gender equality—that emphasize cooperation, generalized sharing, and decision-making through group consensus. Peaceful societies tend to have world views, values, attitudes, enculturation practices, and conflict resolution procedures that emphasize nonviolence. Norms in such societies emphasize cooperative approaches to dispute resolution.

## ***Education and Socialization for Peace***

Societal norms that encourage members of a particular society to see themselves as peaceful people along with norms that emphasize cooperation and the resolution of conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence are key aspects of peaceful culture in UN documents. Similar processes have been recognized in anthropological research as crucial for maintaining internal peacefulness. In peaceful societies, the belief systems that devalue physical aggression and/or promote harmonious relations are parts of the larger cultural cosmologies, and such world views are critical to the maintenance of peace. A nonviolent belief system may be the single most important variable for keeping the peace: “One fundamental fact emerges: The peacefulness of their conflict resolution is based, primarily, on their world-views of peacefulness—a complete rejection of violence” (Bonta 1996, p. 404).

The Semai belief system illustrates the point. The Semai of Malaysia live in small bands of up to 100 persons and sustain themselves through a combination of gardening, hunting, fishing, and gathering. Semai society is extremely egalitarian. A headman (occasionally a headwoman) has some moral authority over the members of the band, but this leader lacks any institutionalized power. Semai view the world as filled with dangers, most of which are beyond any human control. The Semai conceptualize human aspects of the world as split dichotomously between members of the band and all outsiders. In a hostile world filled with malevolence and danger, a person's security and nurturance can be derived only from others in the community. Thus, nurturance (expressed through both emotional and material support) and affiliation (maintaining harmonious interpersonal relationships within the band) are two primary values among the Semai:

Good and bad are defined primarily in terms of behaviors associated with these values, with goodness defined positively in terms of nurturance (helping, giving, sharing, feeding, and so on) and badness in terms of behaviors disruptive of affiliation (getting angry, quarreling, and fighting)" (Robarchek 1980, p. 53)

Thus, in this Semai belief system, aggression runs directly counter to community values and the images persons hold of themselves as cooperative and nonviolent. The belief systems of other peaceful peoples also contribute to non-violent social life.

### ***Valuing of Women and Nurturance***

Many peaceful societies have egalitarian values corresponding with a high degree of gender equality. For example, the Buid, Canadian Inuit, Chewong, Copper Eskimo, Ju'hoansi (also called !Kung), Mbuti, Piaroa, and Siriono, among others, tend to be highly egalitarian (nonhierarchical) and lack both centralized authority and mechanisms of superordinate social control. Peacefulness also can be found among sedentary cultivators and agriculturalists (such as the Amish, Fipa, Hutterites, Toraja, Tristan da Cunha Islanders, and La Paz Zapotec), but a foraging lifestyle, with its corresponding emphasis on egalitarianism, cooperation, and sharing, may be particularly conducive to peacefulness (Sponsel 1996).

The Zapotec community of La Paz in Mexico illustrates the pattern of gender egalitarianism often found within peaceful societies (Fry 2006). Women in La Paz are very close in their status to men. Mutual respect is expected within husband-wife relationships and between the sexes generally. Women regularly visit each other and go on errands upon their own discretion. During celebrations, women and men sit together on the chairs and talk with each other. In everyday life in La Paz, it is courteous and expected to greet members of the opposite sex and perhaps exchange a few words of conversation.

The women of La Paz have a long-standing tradition of making and selling pottery. For hundreds of years La Paz women have produced pottery for trade or sale with the result that they have a history of bringing goods and money into their

households. La Paz men value and are in awe of the women's pottery-producing skills, which are passed from mother to daughter.

Through socialization, children come to internalize their culture's core values, beliefs, and behavioral norms. They also learn the social values and beliefs that are more conducive to nonviolent behavior than to acts of physical aggression. Anthropological descriptions of socialization processes suggest that children growing up in peaceful social contexts seldom experience acts of physical aggression. This points us to the high value of nurturance and also to valuing children as members of the group in internally peaceful societies.

Nurturing treatment of children and warm and affectionate socialization techniques seem to be some of the key aspects of the socialization process in peaceful societies. This pattern correlates with low levels of conflict within societies, whereas harsh treatment of children correlates with a high level of conflict (Fry 2004, p. 79). Data from internally peaceful societies correspond with this overall cross-cultural pattern. For example, among La Paz Zapotec, parent-child relations are warm and nurturing, and child-beating is very rare (Fry 2006).

The most favored reaction to children's disobedience is to talk, tell, show, correct, and educate the children. La Paz parents choose positive verbal approaches to a child's misbehavior over physical punishment. In addition, children are not rewarded for engaging in aggression, but for respectful and nonviolent behavior. During their socialization process they internalize beliefs, values, and attitudes that contribute to the peacefulness of La Paz.

One line of evidence in support of this interpretation involves the behavior of young children in La Paz. Fry (2004, 2006) conducted systematic behavior observations on samples of 3- to 8-year-old children in order to record data on fighting and play fighting behavior (such as beats, slaps, kicks, and so on). The findings suggest an overall reluctance on the part of La Paz children to participate in play fighting and real fighting that appears to strengthen with age. Prevalent attitudes regarding what constitutes acceptable behavior, shared expectations about the nature of the citizenry, and overall images of the community's peacefulness are all elements of a child's learning environment. Through socialization, even by the 3- to 8-year-old age range, La Paz children have begun to develop internal controls against engaging in both play fighting and real fighting.

A similar pattern can be found among the Semai of Malaysia. Dentan (2004, p. 176) explains that "Semai adults do not expect, model, or condone violence, for example by beating, hitting, or spanking children. Traditionally, Semai avoided disrespecting or abusing children, thus offering the children no model for committing violence." In the enculturation processes, Semai children learn and adopt nonviolent attitudes and patterns of behavior in the natural course of growing up. In the Semai social learning environment, children see very few instances of aggression and learn the values, attitudes, and beliefs of their elders. For instance, Semai children, who themselves are not punished corporally, acquire the Semai belief that hitting a child may cause illness or death:

For developing children, the learning of aggressive behavior by observation and imitation is almost entirely precluded. The image of the world, of human goals, and of the means of

attaining them that is presented to Semai children simply does not include violence as a behavioral alternative” (Robarchek 1980, p. 114).

Another example of very gentle and nurturing treatment of children in an internally peaceful society comes from the Rotumans of the Pacific. The most effective way of teaching children is “shaming through ridicule” (Howard 2004, p. 41), but the process of socialization proceeds better by rewarding proper behavior than by punishing improper conduct. In sum, among the La Paz Zapotec, the Semai, and on Rotuma, children are nurtured and do not receive much physical punishment. This generalization also holds for many other peaceful societies.

### ***Social Cohesion: Tolerance and Understanding***

Many peaceful societies place respect, individual autonomy, and equality at the center of their belief system. An example of such an ethos is the Paliyan population of Southern India. In daily life, the Paliyan avoid competition, interpersonal comparisons, and the seeking of prestige. The Paliyan extend their injunction against violence to a prohibition of competition. They disapprove of any behavior that appears, to them, to hamper the autonomy of an individual, such as competition. They feel competition arises from rivalries and desires for superiority or control and leads to social disharmony threatening egalitarianism. The Paliyan are to a large extent self-sufficient and individualistic and also do not cooperate much. Members of this society deal with conflicts through avoidance and self-restraint rather than confrontation. If other methods fail, the parties to a dispute will separate (Gardner 2000). People may move away and form new settlements to avoid disputes. Normally the injured person or group feels the obligation to withdraw (Gardner 2000).

The Buid live in the highlands of Mindoro Island in the Philippines. They subsist primarily on shifting farming and trade with the outside world. Among the group, they avoid economic transactions that could possibly put one person in debt to another, and they do not tolerate economic relationships that place people in situations of competition. Cooperation is at the center of Buid social life. When the community is preparing to engage in cooperative agricultural tasks everyone will get together, facing the same direction, and each person will address the group and indicate the need for assistance. This way ensures that individuals do not address each other; instead, all comments are made to the group as a whole. By avoiding social interaction between symmetrical units such as individuals or families, the Buid minimize competition and possible confrontations (Gibson 1989).

If social conflict occurs, it is resolved by collective discussions, called *tutulans*, where community members assemble to hear grievances and resolve conflicts. For the Buid, physical violence is the product of boasting, quarreling, expression of emotions, and egotistical self-assertion, all of which have highly negative value. Among the Buid, “the socially approved response to aggression is avoidance or even flight” (Gibson 1989, p. 66). They emphasize their fear, their flight from danger, and place a negative value on concepts such as bravery or courage.

The La Paz Zapotec emphasize the core value of respect and proper parent and child roles (Fry 2004, 2006). La Pazian nonviolent thinking regarding child training is expressed by a father who explained that “One must explain to the child with love, with patience, so that he is educated more.” Some La Paz respondents also mentioned the importance of setting a good example for their children through their own behavior. The Zapotec of La Paz believe that children will learn naturally how to behave correctly, and La Paz children typically do obey adults. La Paz parents explain the consequences of misdeeds to children and convey both in words and in actions the ideals of respect and nonviolence. For example, one father said, “If my boy sees that I do not have respect for other persons, well, he thus acquires the same sentiment. But if I have respect for others, well, he imitates me. Above all, the father must make himself an example, by showing how to respect.”

The members of many peaceful societies utilize avoidance to prevent the escalation of conflict. Avoidance can be temporary or long-term. In the short-term, an individual can simply avoid a disputant, or in some cases, an angry person can remove himself or herself from the proximity of the entire group. Hollan’s (1997) descriptions of how Toraja remain emotionally “cool,” or under control, also portray a series of short-term avoidance techniques. Regarding longer-term avoidance, among the Ju/hoansi, for instance, individuals transfer into other bands when social tensions require such a solution. Among the peaceful Malapandaram, Birhor, and Paliyan peoples, communities can split apart in response to a conflict (Bonta 1996). A final type of avoidance involves movement of the entire group to avoid another group, an approach practiced by the Semai and Chewong.

## Conclusions

Extant peaceful societies demonstrate that the creation of non-warring peace systems is possible and that high levels of internal peacefulness within societies can be obtained. Some societies, such as the Semai of Malaysia, the Paliyan of India, or the Ifaluk of Micronesia, are both non-warring and internally peaceful.

There is no uniform formula for creating cultures of peace. However, an examination of both peace systems and internal peacefulness suggests the critical role of values in creating and maintaining a culture of peace. The EU is currently promoting peace, human rights, tolerance, and cooperation as core values within the community. The tribes of the Upper Xingu hold strong anti-violence and anti-war values. Peace is moral; war is immoral. Thus, based on the study of extant peaceful cultures, the culture of peace feature that calls for peace education and the socialization would seem to be a key element in augmenting peace.

Many of the internally peaceful societies hold egalitarian values and those that promote respect, tolerance, and understanding. This corresponds with the elements in the culture of peace paradigm that propose the replacement of hierarchical structures with equality values, understanding, tolerance, and human rights.



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## Chapter 2

# Political Economy of Peace

Ray L. Franklin

The globalization of the world's economies has accelerated the breaking up of traditional habitats without providing new ones. Even advanced industrial nations are experiencing de-industrialization without a clear sense of how to adapt to it. The uneven levels of development among the world's nations and regions and the changing roles that define the interplay between the private and public sector, between work and community—all of which are overcast by environmental hazards—require a coherent ideological perspective with a human face. Therein lies the task of the peacemakers and their endeavors to develop a culture involving nonviolent means to achieve goals based on sustainable development. Such development would focus on social needs that minimally embrace health, education, and human rights. More, of course, would follow once these minimum needs were satisfied. Neither nonviolent means nor goals based on social need can be universally established in a world wrought by war, threat of war, and the abusive uses of power by dominant nation-states. The most wrenching recent misuse of power is the US invasion of Iraq.

Following the United States' inability to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the stated purpose for the invasion in 2003, its goals shifted to developing democracy and state building. In a very short time, these multiple objectives were reduced to one: state building. But even that singular goal has turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. The reasons are the prevalence of internal strife, fragmentation, multiple insurgencies, and general ideological chaos. In Hobbesian terms, Iraq presently defines the condition of "Warre of everyone against every-one...It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body" (Hobbes 1651/1968, p. 42). One **rational** solution to such a degree of disorder is the achievement of safety and some modicum of civil peace by "whatever means and whatever allegiance" are possible (p. 21). If this seems too far fetched, it is worth noting that Thomas L. Friedman, a columnist for the *New York Times* who initially supported the invasion of Iraq, suggested that Iraq "has descended into such a Hobbesian state that even [the murderous] Saddam called on Iraqis from his prison cell to stop killing each other"(October 18, 2006, p. A23).

Although we are a long way from the seventeenth century when Hobbes did his thinking, there are significant parts of the world that would be better off if a strong

sovereign authority, even a tyrannical one, could be established. We are still living under the long shadow cast by Hobbes. Yet, for the most part, the Hobbesian solution to chaos—a strong sovereign—has been rejected by Western societies with one caveat: “Expediency” often dictates that tyranny be tolerated in non-Western and less developed countries that are pro-Western. Be that as it may, over a long stretch of history, Western democracies evolved and ultimately turned against the Hobbesian solution, often simplified and misconstrued, to protect society from being devoured by the “beast” in man. While retaining Hobbesian-like assumptions that human beings are innately selfish, egotistical, greedy, predatory, and power hungry—characteristics that predispose individuals to fear, if not devour, each other—Western democracies denounced dependence on the kind of sovereign state envisioned by Hobbes to achieve orderly and productive societies; yielding to such a state led to consequences that had to be avoided. Thus, although a global sovereign organization (to continue with Hobbesian reasoning) may be essential to resolve conflict between nation-states, few nation-states are willing to surrender their own individual sovereign interest in this age of global fears in order to achieve a larger peace and orderly world.

The barrier to the Hobbesian approach to resolving conflict, whether it is within or between states, is that few trust concentrated statist or super-ordinate political solutions. Such solutions, it is rhetorically argued (especially in the US), tend to be corrupt, inefficient, and unresponsive to individual differences and the protection of liberty. Although control and the regulation of uninhibited individual self-interest are viewed as necessary, an alternative to the tyranny of the state or the excessive centralized political supervision of individuals needed to be found.

In this chapter, I examine how the political economy traditions associated with Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes sought to solve the problem raised by Hobbes, albeit by different means. Addressing the reasons for the failure of these political economy traditions, especially with regard to ending violent conflict between nation-states as they functioned in international waters, leads to discussion of the quest for peaceful approaches to global hot spots. In depicting these traditions, I emphasize those aspects of their contributions that seem to be alive, at least rhetorically, among their most influential devotees.

## *Smithians*

The precapitalist era understood the difference between narrowly defined vested interests (e.g., the individual’s quest for good health) and those universal passions known “as greed, avarice, or love of lucre.” The former had rational solutions, but the latter could do havoc to civil existence if not checked (Hirschman 1977, pp. 40–41). In the eyes of contemporary economic conservatives, selfish attributes about human nature are as ancient as Adam and Eve. Individuals, it is suggested, not only are “acquisitive and grubby, interested in their own well-being, preferring

more rather than less... [but] they have been like that since the fiasco in the Garden of Eden” (Allen 1980, p. 21). However “ahistorical” and “acultural” such thinking is, the Hobbesian problem is set for Smithians to resolve by a different route.

Unlike Hobbes, Smith had no trust in monarchies, the governments of his time. To replace the overregulating nature of a mercantile system, Smith projected a vision in his major work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776/1973), of how self-interests and private property, harnessed by competition, could exist with minimum government. Smith relegated it to three functions: (1) the provision of national defense, (2) the provision of justice and civil government, in particular the “defense of the rich against the poor; or those who have some property against those who have none at all” (p. 674), and (3) the provision of those public works (e.g., roads, bridges, canals, harbors, and, to a lesser extent, education) that were necessary for the public good and too unprofitable to be undertaken by private businesses (pp. 681–682).

Once the above government configuration was put into place, the economy would presumably function like a self-regulating machine. Imaged after the mechanistic regularities in Newton’s universe, the economic universe also had iron laws and required no state intervention to keep it on course. Instead of the economy being a subset or instrument of the social order, the social order became, if not a complete subset of the economy, one that did not interfere with the workings of the market.

To overcome the scarcity and niggardliness of nature, the need was to enhance the productivity of labor by intensifying its division into monotonous routines. Although such routines were likely to make workers “stupid and ignorant...[and incapable of judging] the great and general interests of the country” (Smith 1776/1973, p. 734), the trade off was the expectation of finding a degree of material comfort at the end of the worker’s life. The division of labor is driven by the extent of the market. Developing a world market and world trade, along with each nation specializing in its comparative advantage, produces an interdependent world market system in which everyone materially benefits. Such a system was ultimately expected to breed order, democracy, and individual freedom. The assumption of complementary interdependencies guarantees a peaceful world.

Voracious business greed, it should be emphasized, was not a problem. It was, in fact, a virtue because it induced productive effort. Smith’s minimum state proved compatible with voracious greed for the simple reason that unmodified self-interest was made harmless by competition. Rigorous competition—that is, competition among large numbers of competing units in one form or another—denies individual businesses power to misuse. If no one has power to misuse, there is no need for a strong state to check its abuses. Therefore, individual actions motivated by evil intentions are channeled and checked by market forces; they aggregate into the social good by enhancing the wealth of nations. “Other regarding” considerations in market behavior or market “do-gooders” or socially responsible business executives should be viewed with skepticism. As Smith reminds us in his oft-quoted statement by conservatives: “Every individual...[in the market] intends only his

own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intentions” (Smith 1973, p. 423). It is not public regulation that checks individual greed or the individual’s contract with a sovereign state to acquire protection, but the practical mechanism of a competitive market, a *deus ex machina* capable turning self-interest into an unintended social virtue. The fear of statism is theoretically eliminated.

The separateness of the market from society, without intrusion of any social controls, represented a departure from all previous societal arrangements. Laissez-faire capitalism not only required that the primary role of government be limited to the efficient and fair enforcement of contracts, but it also implied a limited role for noncontractual organizations, for example, family, kinship networks, neighborhood associations, fraternal societies, and the more general binding cultural ties that sustain communal and national identities. Such limits meant that there would be no inhibition of individual freedom to enter into and exit from enterprises; no prevention to buying and selling in response to price changes; no obstacle in choosing to work or not to work in response to wages; and no limitations on the drive to accumulate or divest in response to profits (Polanyi 1944, p. 159). In the market’s ideal form, “people are colorless, odorless, and timeless, of no known nationality, age, race or sex” (Epstein 1995, p. 73). Insofar as the consequences of this impersonal and rational self-regulating machine were expected to coexist with moral communities sustained by motives opposite of that which drives markets, it represented, in Karl Polanyi’s phrase, a “stark utopia” (p. 3).

## *Marxians*

While Smith argued that the road to heaven was paved with evil intentions, Marx argued that the evil intentions of capitalists specifically—however rational they were in the pursuit of profit and more profit—aggregated to produce paradoxically both good and bad results: unprecedented affluence and unfathomable poverty. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1848/1998), Marx and Engels wax on the remarkable accomplishments of capitalism:

The bourgeoisies, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor. (pp. 40–41)

Just a few years earlier, Engels, in describing the conditions of the English working class, wrote:

A horde of ragged women and children [live] as filthy as the swine that thrive upon the garbage heaps... The race that lives in these ruinous cottages... must really have reached the lowest stage of humanity... the neglect to which the great mass of working men’s children are condemned... brings the enfeeblement of the whole race. (1845/1987, pp. 98, 132–33)

Exactly how such enfeebled workers became a few years later a rational agency capable of envisioning the need for international class solidarity is never explained.

In the course of the business system's expansion and consolidation into more monopolistic enterprises, pressured by organized labor and diminishing returns to capital, capitalists are forced to seek investment outlets in less developed countries where cheap labor can be exploited. With new international outlets, the system exports capital and consumer goods or develops new sites where cheap labor can be employed to produce goods that are shipped back to the home country. In the view of Marx and Engels, capitalism, in its penetration of the less developed regions of the world, led to

uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty...All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away...All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned...In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. (pp. 38–39)

For Marx economic progress resulted from scientific discoveries and the practical impulses of capitalism, driven by the profit motive, to use them. In the course of subduing nature through modern technologies, indigenous cultures and traditional societies are destroyed. However tragic, this was the inevitable price of material progress and the potential foundation of human progress. In one sense, Marx celebrates, along with Smith, the internationalization of capitalism's market with its penchant for expanding trade. But for Smith, free trade would evolve smoothly and gradually, increase productivity, enhance the wealth of nations, and presumably bring about a peaceful world order. Most contemporary conservative economists argue that open trade with less developed countries is the only route out of poverty for poor nations and the avoidance of tyrannical oppressive governments. Marx's endorsement of free trade involved the belief that free trade tended to "push the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point...[and] hasten the social revolution (1847/1982, p. 224). In the more generalized Marxian view, "ultimate" stagnation of mature industrial capitalist countries was expected to come when opportunities in the global hinterland dry up. In the hands of neo-Marxists, this was far from a peaceful process.

As competitive capital runs its course and evolves into monopoly capital, the needs for capital accumulation stretch beyond domestic markets at an accelerated rate. But other advanced industrial capitalist nations are driven to do so likewise. Since the state is guardian and legitimizer of individual capitalist systems—dominated by big corporations in conjunction with international financial institutions—the clash of the titans becomes inevitable. This appears to explain the major wars of the first half of the twentieth century. Following World War II, the US became the largest and dominant capitalist country. In this new assumed role, it was pressed to feed its appetites and protect its strategic needs throughout the world. This role was accomplished through imperialism and militarism. The spread of its military bases and the growth of military expenditures became predictable and rational insofar as they reflected the new interests of corporate capitalism. In the words of the neo-Marxists, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, American capital needs to control

foreign sources of supply and foreign markets enabling them to buy and sell on especially privileged terms, to shift orders from one subsidiary to another, to favor advantageous tax, labor and other policies...and for this they need allies and clients who are willing to adjust their laws and policies to the requirements of big business. (1960, p. 201)

But for a variety of reasons, the state's protection of international capital's outreach has limits: It may become too costly and economically destabilizing in the course of facing a third world backlash. At the end of the day, third world countries will rebel—the “barbarians” that ended Rome's empire will end ours. Escalating internal costs to hold our empire intact will become intolerable. Americans will then turn inward to cope with their xenophobic jingoism and corporate greed. At such a point, the American state will become either fascistic or dramatically democratic. If the latter should take place, the abundance, already the hallmark of capitalism's achievement, will become more widely distributed. Basic material needs will be met. Health and education will be provided to all on equal terms. And not least, more leisure will be established to develop the multiple talents that are inherently the potential of all individuals. A new social and work environment will create new lifestyles. The ultimate materializing of this utopian vision initially requires a Hobbesian solution—a confiscating centralized state that changes the role of property. Ultimately a benign planning apparatus is established to guide the whole society that exists in commodious harmony (Baran and Sweezy 1960, p. 367).

## *Keynesians*

However one might choose to categorize Keynes's political sentiments, he viewed himself a deviant with respect to theoretical conventions of his day. In pointing out the differences between classical economists and socialists, he noted what they shared: a belief in the “laws of economics.” The difference between the two is that the former thought the “laws” were true, while the latter thought they were intolerable (Skidelsky 1997, p. 275). Wit aside, Keynes and his followers rejected both orthodox *laissez-faire* economics and the radical redistributive and planning implications of left-wing socialism that involved the nationalization of industry. Keynes stood between the “anarchy” of pure capitalism and the authoritarianism associated with the collectivist state. While Smithians worked out the drama of how individual vice led to the social good and Marxians explained how the capitalists' drive to accumulate would end in capitalism's collapse, Keynes struck a third chord. When too many individuals seek to be rational for perfectly sensible reasons, the aggregate outcome may turn out to be irrational. Some simple examples: If everyone seeks to save more for a rainy day or their children's education, they spend less, businesses receive less, unsold goods increase, workers are laid off, general income declines, and people end up saving less; or, if too many people fear inflation and the rise in prices tomorrow, they purchase more today and cause price increases to accelerate tomorrow. The whole in many situations is different from the sum of individual parts. The logic of macroeconomics is born and cannot be derived simply from individuals maximizing market decisions.



Keynes was, as it is commonly pointed out, a depression economic theorist. His *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936) was aimed at rescuing capitalism from its general unemployment doldrums that, in classical economics, could not theoretically exist. His reasoning went somewhat as follows: If the state did not come to the rescue of capitalism in the great depression of the 1930s in a *form* that complemented the functioning of the market system, two possible undesirable alternative solutions might take place. In the first solution, a country might restrict its own import purchases and export its way out of the depression. Shifting the problem of unemployment to another country has its obvious dangers (Keynes 1936/1958, pp. 382–83). Such a solution would lead to accelerated strife and tensions among states that would retaliate through protectionism, patriotism, and warfare. The second possible solution was through a collectivist state and nationalized industries. Full employment in this solution might be achieved, but at the expense of efficiency and liberty.

Keynes rejected both of these alternatives. In the realm of public policymaking, Keynes had a strong “preference for discretion over fixed rules” (Skidelsky 1997, p. 269). His accomplishment was to show how state deficits and monetary policies could be used to stimulate growth and rescue the nation from permanent stagnation without threatening the business classes at home and abroad. In this way, it was possible to achieve an economic security that the state provided and the efficiency and freedom of choice that the market provided.

Although Keynes preferred sensible government spending programs to nonsensible ones, he understood that the latter might be the only politically feasible kind. In his words:

If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with bank notes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal mines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tryed principles of *laissez-faire* to dig the notes up again... there need be no more unemployment...It would indeed be more sensible to build houses and the like, but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing. (Keynes 1936/1958, p.158)

In the above way, the Keynesian state faced the unwanted strong statist solution by conceiving a benign state that could solve the kinds of problems that pushed nations into war or tyranny. To achieve such statecraft goals, Keynes had to persuade the public that his variety of state intervention would neither endanger private enterprise nor destroy liberty nor lead to war. He did not succeed in the 1930s. It was warfare deficits, not welfare ones, that ended the depression. And even these large warfare deficits did not prove the Keynesian case, since they were accompanied with price and wage controls, as well as rationing. The country had behind it a unifying ideology, constructed on the foundation of war and patriotism, which overcame the private interests that feared Keynesian-type intervention. But such unifying sources of legitimatising Keynesian statecraft cannot be sustained in peacetime.

Successful or not, the celebration of Keynes was continuous in the post-World War II period. The renowned Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson, usually a cautious economist when it comes to predicting too far into the future, celebrated the triumph of the Age of Keynes in 1973. In a reassuring tone, he stated:

I believe that the Marxists were right to worry about the sustainability of full employment [in the nineteenth century]. However, not a single mixed economy has had any problem these last 30 years with chronic insufficiency of purchasing power...or will the ancient scourge of intermittent unemployment reoccur in the century to come—1973–2073. (*New York Times*, May 14, 1973, p. C43)

Whether Marxists were right is not too relevant. The end of World War II was followed by the Cold War, which justified the rise of the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower expressed concern about in his 1956 farewell address. The typical economist, free market and Keynesian, views military build-ups that generate employment and lead to other kinds of problems as exogenous, as “simply external disturbances” (Schumpeter 1962, p. 46). The need to defend the country reflects political preferences that are outside rational considerations that characterize mainstream economic thinking. The phenomenon of *military Keynesianism* is not a recognizable category among Keynesians. Military spending is akin to Keynes’s treasury bills put into used bottles that are buried for the unemployed to find. This leads to one major critique of the whole Keynesian enterprise. Standard Keynesians are fixed on the level of public expenditures and not their composition. The bath water may be polluted, but if it rises to the appropriate level, the goal of full employment can be achieved. Keynesians do not consider how the character and quality of expenditures initiated by the government might shift the ideological direction of mass sentiments either away from or toward the public sector. The composition of fiscal expenditures affects attitudes toward taxes and public spending. Thus, there are always private corporate interests at work to undermine or diminish the effective and productive uses of government resources. Resources that cannot be profitably employed are left over for the government to handle. To the extent that the government then fails in its tasks, it proves that public initiatives are unworthy of support. Military preparedness to cope with foreign threats, imagined or otherwise, is the one sacred cow that enables the government to get support to supply contracts to private enterprises in every state of the union. Mining used bottles filled with treasury bills is not easily sold to the public as readily as military expenditures to protect our national security. Thus, when the Pentagon faces the global disorder of the world—marked by the hunger, disease, climate change, poverty, inequalities, resource nationalism, and rebellion that orbits around the Western core nation-states—our high-minded ruler’s knee-jerk reaction is to try to squelch the chaos by stealth tactics or direct force (Wright 2004, p. 125). Despite our excessive wealth—illustrated by the fact that at the end of the twentieth century, “the world’s three richest individuals (all of whom were Americans) had a combined wealth greater than that of the poorest 48 countries”—it would be hard to persuade Americans to spend the 40 billion dollars estimated by the UN to “provide clean water, sanitation and other basic needs for the poorest on earth” (p. 128). The most affluent industrial nation, with a state allegedly legitimized by checks and balances, has not eliminated the ways that the population is readily mobilized to support an overkill war machine to achieve reasonable employment levels. Of course, the National Security State is more than just an employment machine. Even when the nation is not threatened, a military-business-government complex has no

problem manufacturing an “enemy” to justify intervention far beyond our shores in the name of national interests. Such interests are simply defined by those who have the power to do so. The “war on terror” has become one such symbolic commodity and has been integrated into U.S. history. As George W. Bush reminded us: “In the Second World War, we learned there is no isolation from evil...that evil has returned [with 9/11]” (cited by Rachman, May 15, 2007, p. 11). There are no longer “reds under every bed” as presumed in the Cold War era; there are now only presumed terrorists.

## Common Denominators

The assumption of rational action requires rational actors. The central feature of each of the political economy perspectives—en route to overcoming the “jungle” out there—is the assumed prevalence of a heroic instrumental force to accomplish utopian goals. The Smithians rely on a rational business class, engulfed in competitive markets, to bring about continuously higher levels of domestic and international material well-being. Global economic interdependence is assumed to produce the political climate to insure a peaceful world. The Marxian working class—exploited and trapped in work sites dominated by the power of capital—is expected to consolidate its consciousness on a world scale to cope with an economy undermined by capitalist wars and third world revolutions. The outcome envisioned is the creation of an economy and a peaceful world community totally unlike the one dominated by a capitalist class. Finally, the Keynesian government—standing above the unchanged microeconomic competitive jungle glorified by Smithians for its alleged self-correcting capacities and critiqued by Marxians for the absence of such capacities—acquires the ability to execute rational fiscal and monetary policies capable of steering the economy along an uninterrupted growth path of greater affluence. Such affluence was expected to eliminate an addiction to money-making and induce a quest for more meaningful lives. Smithians, Marxians, and Keynesians share a mode of instrumental reasoning clothed in rational terms: rational self-interests, rational working class actions, and rational government policies. They all propose a means for overcoming barriers that prevent the social order from fulfilling its material needs and peaceful yearnings.

One conclusion derivable from the above similarities of the three political economy traditions is that they have much to say about that which is rational, orderly, and deterministic, yet they have little to say, in my view, about designing ways to protect the world from violence and war. One fundamental reason for this lacking is that people do not live by market rationality alone. Motives are multiple, contradictory, and embedded in institutions that are outside the economic sphere of exchange where rational behavior is assumed. Both economic conservatives and Keynesians believe that “dangerous human proclivities can be canalized into comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunity for money-making and private wealth [seeking]...It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than

over his fellow-citizens” (Keynes 1936/1958, p. 374). In more general terms, it has been argued that “capitalism itself could not possibly make for conquest and war: its spirit was rational, calculating, and therefore averse to risk-taking on the scale implicit in war-making and other heroic antics” (Hirschman 1977, p. 135). Although both these views share the Marxian faith in rational explanations, they contrast with the Marxian view that war is rational if it enhances capital expansion and profitability of enterprise. From this perspective, avoiding war requires working toward the end of the capitalist state and its economic ruling oligarchs.

The focus on enlarging the materiality of everyday life is the second shared view among the political economy schools that turned out to be illusory. Affluence, it was believed, would change people’s character, would make people more generous to distant others. In the late John Kenneth Galbraith’s 1958 edition of *The Affluent Society*, he argued that the utility to private accumulation was waning and further increases in productivity should be allocated to the public sector to help those left behind. He thought liberals who reflected his sentiments would accept this transfer of resources from the private to the public domain, from the rich to the poor. In Galbraith’s 1984 reissued edition of *The Affluent Society*, he critically admitted his error:

It was the unarticulated assumption of American liberals...that the newly affluent blue collar workers with middle income, [as well as other white collar and professional groups]...would in gratitude have political attitudes different from those of the older rich. And so, presumably would their more fortunate offspring. The liberals were wrong. (pp. xxvii–xxviii)

This view was not too different from Keynes’s hopes. After a long period of successful economic growth sustained by government policies that led to a high level of affluence, people would choose to live a more aesthetic way of life. Society would focus on leisure, beauty, and the art of living and turn its back on the love of money that was deemed as a “semi-pathological” propensity (Keynes 1963, pp. 367, 369). It seems that rationality, general affluence, and a benign polity cannot be assumed to eliminate the possibility of violence within communities and war and threat of war between nations, especially as we confront a new world of global uncertainties.

## Facing Globalization

In an article titled “Foreign Policy Values and Globalization,” a columnist for the *Financial Times* writes:

We are living at the beginning of a new era...the age of globalization...Little escapes it: religion, charity, friendships, sport...The logic of the [global] market is indiscriminate and recognizes neither borders nor citizenship...Solving the problem of international legitimacy will be the primary challenge for the twenty-first century. (Cooper, January 31, 2002, p. 15)

With such wide reaching implications, it should be of no surprise that globalization induces many fears. Professional economists, corporate CEOs, politicians, and global market advocates share concerns that short-run global instabilities will

breed reactions to free trade under the guise of protecting our national interests. President George W. Bush's 2006 state-of-the-union speech warned, in defense of free trade, that the "road of isolation and protectionism seems broad and inviting—yet it ends in danger and decline..." (*The Economist*, February 11, 2006, p. 27). Larry Summers (former U.S. Treasury Secretary), touting the virtues of free trade, worries that there is a growing recognition of the fact that the "vast global middle is not sharing the benefits of the current period of economic growth—and that its share of the pie may even be shrinking" (October 30, 2006, p. 11). George Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winning economist and former chief economist of the World Bank, believes that there can be a progressive response to globalization—"not by withdrawing behind protectionist borders and not by trying to enhance the well-being of our citizens at the expense of those abroad who are...poorer." The task is to reshape globalization; make it more democratic and "moderate its pace to give countries more time to cope" (April 17, 2006, p. 18). Peter Gray, professor of political economy at the London School of Economics, is less optimistic about reforming globalization and even doubts its permanence. As more countries develop, industrialize, and become interdependent, there is likely to be an environmental disaster "triggering a powerful ecological backlash. These developments, which form the [downsize] of globalization, will shape the future" (April 27, 2006, p. 23).

Along almost the opposite axis, some anti-capitalist protestors—focused on global justice and classified by an unfriendly observer as "anarchists and leftover Marxists"—demonstrated against the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank. These global institutions are viewed as representing imperialism spearheaded by the United States (Friedman, *New York Times*, July 20, 2001, p. A21). Other protestors, representing the trade union movement, sought job and wage protection to cope with off-shoring and the importation of cheap goods from abroad. A more orthodox Marxist, seeking to embrace the whole community of anti-globalists, put the problem as follows: "The [capitalist] system is the same, its logic is the same, and the need for workers of the world to unite has never been greater" (Tabb 1997, p. 29).

Turning to the core of liberal Keynesiansism, it should be recalled that Keynesians believed that the achievement of full employment enabled the state to navigate more freely in international waters, to negotiate differences on more mutually advantageous terms. War measures no longer were needed to solve the unrest associated with mass unemployment. As the Age of Keynes waned in the 1970s, discredited by the rise of new market fundamentalists who acquired ideological power and political representatives in the halls of government, globalization became the enemy of classical liberal Keynesians; it has eroded the effectiveness of the Keynesian state. In the fighting words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1997):

[Unmitigated global markets enfeeble] national powers of taxation and regulation, undercutting national management of interest and exchange rates, widening disparities of wealth both within and between nations, dragging down labor standards, degrading the environment, denying nations the shaping of their own economic destiny, accountable to no one... The power of [the national] government should be expanded...to end oppression, injustice and poverty. (pp. 7–8)

Several questions arise from Schlesinger's lamenting about growing inequalities and the stymie of national governmental power resulting from globalization. Would more economic equality and social justice at home enable our democratic impulses to work more diligently abroad? How do the peace advocates—who seek to solve global tensions by means other than the “threat system”—go about their task? How can they make a case that integrates moral imperatives and enlightened economic interests in the pursuit of peaceful alternatives? There are no easy answers. What seems clear is that the threat to exercise military muscle is likely to become increasingly ineffective.

## Developing a Peace Perspective

In order to meet the peace challenge derived from global disorder that has accelerated with the US debacle in Iraq, the American citizenry needs to acquire a new mindset to replace the paranoia that justifies US imperial outreach. The last gasp of a nation's imperial stretch is often the loudest; it appears that the US is in the process of becoming another historic example of the fall of a great imperial power. New geo-political centers (China, India, Japan, Southeast Asia, Russian, Europe, and the Middle East) are emerging, reassembling, and working to check the loose exercise of American muscle throughout the world (Layne 2006). In the course of this imperial retreat, Americans are likely to turn inward. There is a growing opportunity for the introduction of a new storyline, one that is capable of challenging the neo-conservative preventive war flagellations and its endorsement of socioreligious domestic demagoguery that has dominated the US landscape since the early 1980s. The task of the bearers of peace is to create a new prism through which to view American society.

The American cultural mix has many different and conflicting strands running through it that can be tapped to redirect the government's belligerent foreign policy strategies toward the emphasizing of human rights, social justice, and development aid appropriate to specific socioeconomic environments that are in a state of disarray. The success of the above changes presupposes changing the nation's domestic priorities. The bearers of peace must introduce an alternative dialogue capable of confronting the prevailing personal and cultural meanings employed to justify the everyday concerns that are legitimized by the existing power elites. This involves nurturing an ideology that resonates with individual values about right and wrong, just and unjust. In this spirit I suggest the following propositions with a brief rationale for each.

- The political economy of nominating and winning elections is all about money. There may be a number of reasons why approximately only 50% of eligible voters bother going to the polls, but one is certainly related to the sentiment that the selection of candidates is dominated by the very wealthy that both limits the agenda and the capacity to disseminate an alternative one in the public arena. It follows that eliminating the way electioneering is financed and reducing the

costs of publicizing issues will not only broaden the choices, but also change the quality of political engagement.

- There is need to overcome the sterile equality-inequality debate between conservatives and welfare-liberals. The conservatives are committed to the virtues of inequality of outcomes on the basis that inequality induces saving, investment, and technological change—all of which enhances economic growth and thereby raises, in the long run, the standard of material life for the whole population. Relative income differences between classes and the growing wealth gap between the top and bottom are of little importance compared to the rise in the absolute levels. Equal opportunity to become unequal is the inherent logic of conservative ideological rhetoric. Although the welfare-liberal position is more ambiguous, it is not fundamentally at odds with the conservative view. Welfare-liberals accept consequential inequalities in outcomes because such inequalities are necessary to the incentives that allegedly sustain growth and encourage productivity. Inequality is unacceptable if, in the process of a growing income pie, the least fortunate become worse off. In such circumstances, transfers (welfare payments or unemployment compensation) are acceptable. A modest progressive tax is also warranted. Since welfare-liberals are part of the growth mania that requires tax breaks for the investing class, equality is not deeply embedded in their ideological posturing. Their focus is much more about equal rights that are not linked to systemic changes in capitalism.
- The alternative to the conservative/liberal exchange involves changing public investment patterns in ways that equalize social environments (educational experiences from preschool through high school, neighborhood risk factors that affect teenage social development, universal health provisions, general maternity care, equalization of retraining opportunities in the event of job loss, etc.). Such investments should take place at various critical stages in the life cycle to insure their impact on long-run life chances. This *radical environmentalism* is an alternative to transfer payments, which sustain but do not transform individuals or groups. Although none of the changes under the rubric of environmental radicalism ensure equal outcomes, I believe that the inequalities will be less than alternative approaches. Radical environmentalism does assure that individuals will feel that they had equal circumstances to develop into empowered human beings.
- The edifice of mainline political economy reasoning is built on the idea of allocating scarce resources to realize individual wants. In this form, mainline economists appear to be morally neutral and avoid value judgments on what is wanted. The alternative is defining political economy in terms of the administration of resources to meet needs rather than wants; the former are more objective and associated with communal assessments; the latter involve yielding to “free” individual desires or preferences. Individuals do not always want what they need; they eat what they want, but do they need obesity and diabetes that is likely to follow? People may want faster and heavier cars, but do they need the pollution, accidents, and higher insurance costs that increase national income without adding to national well-being? Needs in all these cases are projected and assessed by sources outside the individual, for example, the engineer, the medical profession,

the scientist or ecologist, and public servants. While directing resources to meet needs has some authoritarian implications compared to catering to individual wants that are created and sustained by the industrial-advertising complex, much more educational and public space, like that given to the daily weather forecasters, is necessary to address the issues focused on societal needs.

- Using social indicators (maternal care, infant mortality rates, health, literacy, and education levels of achievement, etc.) is necessary for evaluating well-being rather than the growth in per capita gross national product.

While each of the above propositions requires elaboration and more justification, they constitute a critique of existing political economy views and, at the same time, an affirmative set of consistent alternative goals. Thus, the peacemakers have both domestic missions that fall within the boundaries of the nation-state and international ones. Both missions feed each other and fall under the culture of peace umbrella.

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# Chapter 3

## War in Peace: Cultural Regulation of the Construction-Destruction Dynamic

Jaan Valsiner

*And then I see my first bodies. Soldiers young and old, in Wehrmacht uniforms. Hanging from trees still bare along the road, from linden trees in the marketplace. With cardboard signs on their chests branding them as cowards and subversive elements. A boy my age—his hair, like mine, parted on the left—dangling next to a middle-aged officer of indeterminate rank or, rather, stripped of his rank by a court-martial. A procession of corpses we ride past with our deafening tank-track rattle. No thoughts, only images.*

Günter Grass (2007, p. 121)

### Introduction

War is a tragic carnival. An adolescent volunteer soldier, later to become a writer, gets exposed to signs of destruction of his own kind, aimed to keep him committed to destroying “the enemy,” rather than creating peace and understanding. He participates in a grandiose social drama where persons dressed in uniforms are expected to act in ways where the opposites of construction and destruction are uncomfortably close to each other. Not only are they close; they are interdependent.

The notion of unity of opposites is a necessary axiom for any cultural-psychological perspective (Boesch 1991; Rudolph 2006). Cultural psychology looks at the operation of signs, semiotic devices, within the mind of the person (Valsiner 2007). Culture is not an external “variable” that has “influences” upon persons. It is an inherent component of the psychological system of each person, as we operate with signs to make our lives meaningful.

### How Can Cultural Regulators Create Cultures of Peace?

Creating *cultures of peace* is possible through redundant construction of conditions, cultural regulatory devices that organize the relations between the opposites within the dynamic system. This needs to happen similarly at different levels: intra-personal

self-reflection, inter-personal communication, and construction of collectively used meanings in the relations of social organizations. Semiotic regulatory devices are catalysts; they make possible the happening (or not) of movement between construction and destruction; they maintain and temporarily reduce (or increase) the ambivalences in these relations. Cultural regulators are semiotic devices, signs in their different forms (symbolic, i.e., verbal, iconic, indexical), social action norms created for organizing conduct, and social representations that provide orientation to the understanding of the world. For example, in British (and other) societies:

...big-game hunters and fox-hunters alike commonly profess to ‘love’ the animals which they destroy; they react with outraged indignation if anyone suggests that their activities are cruel (Leach 2000).

The generalized meanings of *love* and *cruelty* are cultural regulators that make human actions meaningful. These regulators operate as a hierarchy of psychological tools within the person (Valsiner 2001, 2005) and are shared between them. Our surrounding environments are oversaturated with them (see Fig. 3.1).

Figure 3.1 illustrates our contemporary war on smoking. The mandatory warning labels on cigarette packages (“smoking kills,” etc.) can be encountered in hyper-saturated



**Fig. 3.1** Culturally saturated environment: cigarette stand with anti-smoking messages. Copyright by the author, reprinted by permission

concentration in stands like the one depicted here. These signs operate as external semiotic regulators, set to communicate the agenda of two social powers, public health systems and cigarette manufacturers, simultaneously. This ambivalence in the message —DO THIS (buy cigarettes), BUT DO NOT DO THIS (smoke) —creates an arena for meaning making. Such messages may strengthen the commitment to smoking (for the smokers, by creating the context of adventurous challenge), lead to outcry against smoking by the opponents of smoking, or neutralize the whole issue.

How do semiotic regulators function in the context of social actions that have immediate impact upon the well-being of another person? The semiotic devices are meanings we all carry with us and situate in ever new contexts. Milgram (1974) is known to demonstrate how the majority of participants in his experiment on “obedience to authority” protested the requirement to administer electric shocks to a person (confederate). The participants were met by claims that they must follow instructions, after which many of them *increased* the voltage of the shock. However, there were some persons who refused to carry out the task:

The subject is an attractive 31-year-old medical technician who works at the University Medical School. She had emigrated from Germany 5 years before and speaks with a thick German accent. On several occasions, when the learner complains, she turns to the experimenter coolly and inquires, “Shall I continue?” She promptly returns to her task when the experimenter asks her to do so (Milgram 1974, p. 84).

Up to this point in the record, the experiment is revealing the standard pattern of obedience to authority. This entails active inquiry into the task, followed by acceptance and continuation. Yet the picture changes:

At the administration of 210 volts, she turns to the experimenter, remarking firmly, “Well, I am sorry, I don’t think we should continue.”

- EXPERIMENTER: The experiment requires that you go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly.
- GRETCHEN: He has a heart condition. I am sorry. He told you that before.
- EXPERIMENTER: The shocks may be painful, but they are not dangerous.
- GRETCHEN: Well, I am sorry; I think when the shocks continue like this, they are dangerous. You ask him if he wants to get out. It is his free will.
- EXPERIMENTER: It is absolutely essential that we continue...
- GRETCHEN: I like you to ask him. We came here of our free will. If he wants to continue I’ll go ahead. He told you he had a heart condition. I am sorry. I do not want to be responsible for anything happening to him. I wouldn’t like it for me either.
- EXPERIMENTER: You have no other choice.
- GRETCHEN: I think we here are on our own free will. I don’t want to be responsible if he has a heart condition if anything happens to him. Please understand that.

She refuses to go further and the experiment is terminated (Milgram 1974, p. 85).

For Milgram, Gretchen showed the kind of conduct he would have “initially envisioned would be true for almost all subjects.” When seen micro genetically, however, we can observe the turn to semiotic regulators of the act to non-obey orders. These regulators, *free will* and *responsible* for Gretchen; *requires*, *not*

*dangerous, no choice and absolutely essential* for the Experimenter, provide generalized meaning coverage for the persons' acting in the given situation.

### Negotiating the Meaning of Action

How do such regulators operate at the level of macro-political actions to maintain non-violence and diffuse the possibilities of peace turning into war? If "internally peaceful" societies exist (see the chapter by Fry, Bonta and Baszarkiewicz in this volume), then these are characterized by a successful blocking of the transitions from peace to war state (see Fig. 3.2). Such blocking needs to occur redundantly, at all levels of social organization of the society. Cultural regulators themselves emerge as "side products" of the dynamic system involved and function as catalysts for the regulation of the dynamic system.

Any construction of such a regulatory system entails consideration about its own dynamics, with uncertainties as to its future. Woodrow Wilson explained his reluctance of bringing the U.S. into World War I in March 1917:

Once lead this people into war, and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and *the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life* (italics added). If there is any alternative, for God's sake let's take it (Hamilton and Herwig 2004, p.220).




Fig. 3.2 Loci of cultural regulators in the WAR ↔ PEACE dynamics

How can preserving of peace be organized? It can be accomplished by establishing a redundant hyper-control of the transition boundary that reduces the results of the subdominant but still existing component of war. Even while we dwell under a dominant manifest state of peace, we are in a latent way preparing for a war by suggesting to people acceptable trajectories of acting with guns (Capezza and Valsiner 2008). Inter-group prejudices cultivated during the peacetime can be transformed into elaborate images of an “enemy” when these are attributed to an out-group once a war commences (Sen’yavskaya 1999, 2006). In a similar manner, during a war, preparation for overcoming its dominance and moving towards peace is latently going on.\* This is supported by the meaning of respect\*\* that regulates the enactment of war atrocities between enemies:

War proper is an enterprise which entails approximately equivalent risk for both sides. He who kills may get killed himself. In war, as distinct from a rat hunt, the enemy are deserving of respect. Warfare is between men and other men, not men and beasts (Leach 2000, p. 351).

Nevertheless, the enemy as a collective opponent is usually seen in derogatory terms. Thus, the semiotic regulatory opposition ENEMY {despicable} <> SOLDIER {respectable} creates the ambivalence that allows for quick transitions between killing (the despicable enemy) and capturing alive the (respectable) human being in the enemy’s uniform. The opposites of constructive and destructive orientations feed forward into each other as explicated in the making of “non-lethal weapons.”\*\*\* The latter, considered to be non-lethal, include all the ambivalence between destruction and construction. The weapons temporarily debilitate the enemy, allowing for social control tasks to be pursued.

We are thus in a conundrum; no matter how much we may want peace, simply eliminating war would lead not to peace, but to new forms of violence:

Any nation which now, in the light of reason, seeks genuinely to abandon the use of war as an instrument of policy will need to discover alternative forms of valor. Yesterday’s hero, whatever his failings, had the moral virtues of a soldier; the new James Bond equivalent is a sadistic, sexually indiscriminate, man of violence (Leach 2000).

Social change entails the destruction of the previous social order while constructing a new one. More importantly, construction is the inevitable opposite part of destruction (and vice versa). They are dynamically related opposites. Thus, war and peace, which are states of the affairs of the relationship between social actors, are relative and

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\* See the description of the role of women in the transition from civil war to (somewhat civil) peace in Nicaragua (Bayard de Volo 2001).

\*\* This meaning of respect may change in history. Norbert Elias (1996, pp. 180) sets forth a hypothesis that the “bourgeoisified” nature of the (previously aristocratic) German military organization around World War I led to the escalation of military atrocities in World War II.

\*\*\* The development of weapons that do not kill but temporarily debilitate the opponent is an example of the adjustment of the social control interests of political institutions to the value orientations of societies where permanent elimination of the opponents has become unacceptable.

mutually linked constructs. These related constructs are co-genetic: one feeds forward into the other, the state of peacefulness feeds into its opposite (non-peacefulness or “state of war”), and the movement through that state feeds further into that of peacefulness (Herbst 1995).

The two parts of the dynamic process can maintain a “steady state” of one’s temporary dominance over the other, yet even that dominance is maintained through the real or imaginary possibility of the other. It is a dialogical system of an open kind. Thus, the issue of granting a stable state of dominance of one over the other, peace over war, is that of regulating the system. The construction of *cultures of peace* is the question; how can the steady state of peace be maintained without the enablement of the state of war? Such maintenance needs to take place both at the level of social organizations, which bring countries to war situations, and at the level of individual minds. The latter may lead organizations to war as the marching orders given by a king, president, or general are based on personal decisions taken in social roles. Yet at the same time the obeying of such orders by persons-to-be-soldiers (and their families) requires cultural-psychological explanation. It is more than ironic that families who have spent two decades raising their children agree to the fate of becoming parents of dead heroes (or martyrs).

### **“Blind Spots” in our Thinking: the Law of the Included Middle**

Figure 3.2 sets up the transition zone between WAR and PEACE: the middle ground of NOT-YET-WAR and NOT-YET-PEACE. A country that irregularly bombs targets in another country, but does not “declare a war” nor capture the other’s territorial resources operates in such zone of limbo. It is very similar to intermittent criminality in urban environments; robbing or stealing sometimes happens, but otherwise life goes on in its ordinary ways. Any exaggeration of that in the direction of local war situation leads to adjustment of such regular ways (Macek 2000). People maintain their quasi-ordinary ways of living under occasional sniper fire that may make crossing the street to fetch bread from the bakery potentially fatal. They may even be subjected to public education séances in the community by opposing forces in a guerilla struggle that suggest their “security” depends on the administrative control of the everyday environment\* (Green 2002).

Living under occupation, even without war actually happening there at the time, nevertheless sensitizes the ordinary persons, as such experience is:

... a permanent condition of “being in pain”: fortified structures, military posts, and roadblocks everywhere; buildings that bring back painful memories of humiliation,

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\*The semiotic function of our contemporary inconveniences in boarding airplanes under “heightened security” carry a similar mass sensitization function: having to take of one’s own shoes and drink one’s own water before the security check is a means of social obedience guidance that is suggested under the label “security.” The hope of deterring actual attackers through these measures is minimal, as the strategic planning of attacks finds other alleys.

interrogations, and beatings; curfews that imprison hundreds of thousands in their cramped homes every night from dusk to daybreak; soldiers patrolling the unlit streets, frightened by their own shadows; children blinded by rubber bullets; parents shamed and beaten in front of their families; soldiers urinating on fences, shooting the rooftop water tanks just for fun, chanting loud offensive slogans, pounding on fragile tin doors to frighten the children, confiscating papers, or dumping garbage in the middle of residential neighborhood; border guards kicking over a vegetable stand or closing borders at whim; bones broken; shootings and fatalities—a certain kind of madness. (Mbembe 2003, p. 39)

The creation of a near-war atmosphere through a complex of discrepant actions that fail to fit into the peacetime context is part of this third, intermediate state. In fact, if the dynamical system depicted in Fig. 3.2 were to become developmental,\*\* changes would happen within that third “zone” where the constructive and destructive processes are brought to a maximum intensity of ambivalence. Conversely, a war can be transformed from a clear state of affairs of warring into a state approaching peace in that transitory zone. The emergence of “spaces for peace” (Berliner and Ansarias, this volume) is a possible empirical example. Conversely, peaceful environments can become war zones (Lewin 1917). All these experiences refer to *transitions* in the general ways of being in the holistic meanings of the current state of affairs. Hence, the two states are of inseparable unity; each one is the context for the other. There would be no way of discussing the theme of *cultures of peace* if there were not the counterpart: *cultures of war*.

## Georg Simmel on Conflict

The unity of peace and war has been emphasized in the history of social sciences for a long time. Georg Simmel’s (1904) legacy provides us with sophisticated insights as he was looking at the social transitions in European societies before the twentieth century. Combining the notions of unity of opposing processes and structural differentiation of phenomena, Simmel focused on the functional role of war (and peace) in resolving tensions within the social system:

Conflict itself is the *resolution of the tension between the contraries*. That it eventuates in peace is only a single, specially obvious and evident, expression of the fact that *it is a conjunction of elements, an opposition, which belongs with the combination under one higher conception*. This conception is characterized by the *common contrast between both forms of relationship* (italics added) and the mere reciprocal indifference between elements (Simmel 1904, p. 490).

Hence, conflict (for Simmel it was the equivalent to war) is not a “problem,” but a resolution of some other problem. It is a means to an end. Our usual talk about “conflict *resolution*” is thus a *secondary resolution*: a resolution of the problem that

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\*\* Any developmental perspective necessarily requires the presence of the “third zone” between WHAT ALREADY IS and WHAT IS NOT YET. Aristotelian/Boolean two-valent logic with an axiomatic acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle is inapplicable in the case of development (Valsiner 2008). Hence, the focus here is the Law of Included Middle.



emerges from the primary resolution efforts. The move of a society into a state of war between countries, or between social factions within the country opposing one another, is thus a primary resolution strategy for a social tension, albeit one that gives rise to the need for a secondary resolution. Likewise, a move into a state of peace is the opposite primary tension resolution strategy (cf. Fig. 3.2). The conflict is a resolution for a tension and is then followed by overcoming of the tension created by the conflict by transforming it into a non-conflict state.

Minimal differentiation of the relation between united parts of the whole can escalate into a state of tension that becomes resolved by conflict. In contrast, elements of a social structure that are not related to one another, or are very different between one another, need not be in conflict. In the case of differentiation of a unified whole, the escalation of tension *within the whole* is crucial. In the case of relating to dissenters,

...the conflict arises from the disunion...The thought of the former consensus operates here so forcibly that the present antithesis is immeasurably sharper and more bitter than if no connection had ever existed. ...theoretical and religious dissent leads to reciprocal accusing of heresy in every ethical, personal, subjective, or objective respect, which would not be at all necessary if precisely similar differences occurred between strangers. Indeed, that a difference of *convictions* should at all run into hatred and struggle occurs as a rule only in case of essential and original equality of the parties. The sociologically very significant phenomenon of "respect for the enemy" is usually absent when hostility has arisen where there was earlier community (Simmel 1904, p. 519).

If Simmel was right, then we face a paradoxical situation. In peacetime our usual fascination of building socially homogeneous unities, such as a state (and promotion of *patriotism* to it), religious group (and its members *identification* with it), or a multi-state conglomerate, may be a first step towards the opposite. If such homogeneous social units are to be achieved, the stage is set for escalation of minor intra-group differences into a major separation of the whole into sub-groups and their oppositions. This leads to emergence of the need to use primary tension resolution strategies (i.e., conflict) in an effort to regulate the dynamics. It is often the case that wars emerge seemingly from "nowhere," and nations find themselves in mortal conflict seemingly overnight.

## From Peace to War and From War to Peace

The dynamic of transition between peace and war has an interesting asymmetry that did not escape from Simmel's watchful mind. The end of peace is:

...not distinguished by a special sociological situation, but rather out of some sort of real relationships within a peaceful condition, antagonism is developed immediately, if not at once in its most visible and energetic form. The case is different, however, in the reverse direction. Peace does not attach itself so immediately to struggle. *The termination of strife is a special undertaking which belongs neither in the one category nor in the other* (italics added), like the bridge which is of a different nature from that of either bank which it unites (Simmel, 1904, p. 800).

Here lies the core of the task of building “cultures of peace.” It is the building of a social and cultural-psychological structure, a dam or semi-permeable membrane rather than a bridge, at the intersection of the peaceful and warring temporary state of *the same* social system. These structures are social regulation mechanisms that may be considered aspects of “cultures of peace,” but are not parts of the peaceful state of a society. Rather they remain necessarily at a meta-level in relation to both *warring* and *peace-ing*<sup>\*\*\*</sup> states of any given society. Warring may be used as a means to create intra-group cooperation through exaggerating inter-group oppositions (Simmel 1904). In contrast, the societies described as internally peaceful (Fry, Bonta & Baszarkiewicz, this volume,) are characterized by an emphasis on intra-group cooperation, general sharing, and consensual decision making.

## Life and War

In what ways is readiness to go to war encoded into human lives at peacetime? Anthropological evidence provides rich information about the cultural ways of moving between constructive and destructive actions. Here we find the clearest evidence for mutual feed-forward processes of the two. The act of sacrifice—killing of a sacrificial animal or human—is an act of destruction (of life) that is set to be a means of construction of something else that is valued in the society. Who does the killing (and who does not), which living beings are to be killed (and which not), and what are the believed-in future outcomes of such acts are all culturally constructed realities within social practice of human living.\* The young male warriors of Maasai are culturally kept to be a liminal social class, as they are “both exemplarily human and distinctively non-human, even to the point of being symbolically identified with the wild beasts” (Arhem 1990, p. 23). As they carry their weapons, a spear and a short-bladed sword, in public, they are associated with killing (and are part of the “nature out there,” in the bush). They live for the greater part of their junior warriorhood in separate villages of their own, with restrictions on sexual relations and diet. They are *expected to break* the Maasai taboo against killing livestock for food, yet they are outside of the context of regular human habitats (“villages”).

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<sup>\*\*\*</sup>Note the interesting absence of action referential terms in these two states: WAR → WARRING is asymmetric to PEACE → “PEACE-ING” (which of course is a neologism here). Common sense considers peace a state and war a set of actions. In reality, both entail acting-within-environments, albeit with diametrically opposite results.

\*One does not need to consider complex sacrificial practices here; it is enough to look at our regular practices of presenting *cut* flowers to people we honor on the occasion of their constructive achievements of life-course transitions (birthdays, weddings, etc.). Cutting flowers is an act of destruction, but passes us by through the generalized meaning of beauty (of the cut flowers temporarily kept on “life line” in our vases), and the symbolic constructive relevance of the occasion for which the flowers are cut.

While being liminally close to “natural beasts,” the warriors are *simultaneously* constructed\*\* as “exemplarily human;” they typify the stated ideal goal of community and sharing. They mediate the “village” and “nature” domains that are necessary for living. Each taboo set up in a social setting is simultaneously generating the conditions under which it is to be broken. We need not go too far to find the same issue in Christianity’s commandments’ system: “You shall not kill!” taboo is immediately conditionalized except for when we tell you, in self defense, or if it’s an enemy, etc.

The liminality of persons who are connected with social others, yet may act destructively towards these others, creates an interesting problem when meanings are changed so that blocks that inhibit destruction become blocks to peace-promoting. In Nuer society, the killing of others (with spears) became substituted by the high technology of the AK-47. In the collective-cultural world of the Nuer (Hutchinson 1996, 2005), the gun has been a means and symbol of resistance to external (British and later Sudanese) government control, but not a means for killing members of their own society. Killing from a distance (by gun) was construed differently from killing at close range (by spear). The latter was the main way of settling conflicts inside of the Nuer society: creating a special “blood relation” between the killer and the killed, and triggering elaborate negotiations between the family clans of the two. The repercussions that killing brings upon the killer were formidable, requiring seclusion of the killer. The political groups waging war were not in contact with military units, for after each killing, the surviving soldier needed isolation. The British had to persuade the Nuer that the “government war” (fought by guns) is qualitatively different from the local conflicts (fought by spears), so that the cultural purification system of the latter did not apply to the former. Instead, killing by gun was presented not as killing by a human agent, but by “lightning;” the killer is not viewed as agentive and therefore not governed by purification needs (Hutchinson 1996). Thus, destruction is embedded in a historically created meaning system that necessarily undergoes transformation when the social life circumstances change.

## Cultural Psychology: Semiotic Regulation of Transitions

Peace involves the (temporary) absence of war. The category of absence of something (A vs. non-A) can be viewed in relative terms (Josephs, Valsiner, and Surgan 1999). In Fig. 3.3, it is the multi-valued nature of the transitions between the opposites that is relevant. The opposites are not two discrete states between which human meaning-makers “jump” (with appropriate consequences for conduct), but rather fuzzy fields from which the opposite of the currently dominant meaning grows. A state of peace can be transformed into that of war abruptly (e.g., a country announces “being at war” with another country) or through a long period of uncertainty where violence may be an everyday phenomenon, yet the

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\*\*It is the failure to understand the unity of opposites that has led Occidental sciences since Durkheim (after von den Steinen) to be puzzled by the Bororo claim “we are red parrots” (while simultaneously being human). The liminal status of the person in the culture<math>\leftrightarrow</math>nature tension may be universal (Valsiner 2007).




Fig. 3.3 The transitions of meaning WAR  $\leftrightarrow$  PEACE

understanding “this is war” need not result. Likewise, the sub-dominant movement to undermine the “war” and arrive at “peace” can be gradual. Making peace in areas of long inter-group warfare may take decades—involving continuity of generations—and fail (see the chapter by Bar-Tal in this volume). Prejudices can be carried over many generations, giving rise to different aggressive acts on all sides under some circumstances.

### Culture of Peace as a Semiotic Process

If a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups, and nations, then it is omnipresent in the social world. However, its constant presence is not that of a “thing,” a “trait,” or inherent characteristic of an invented entity we call “culture” (or society). Instead, it is a dynamic process of relating of opposites. The eternal

movement between war and peace is organized by semiotic regulators. Holy wars in defense of peace are of great antiquity (Leach 2000).

This dynamic feature of social processes has implications for any description of a state of “culture of peace.” Since the dynamics involved entail a unity of opposites, no specific static indicator of peace-as-is can “measure” peace. As reiterated in numerous contributions to this handbook, it is believed that a society, whose educational system leads men and women to use peaceful means to settle conflicts, is potentially ready for peace. Even so, wars happen under any system of governance. Encouraging democratic participation may be a noble goal, yet no guarantee that a democratic consensus would prevent the given country from going to war against another. As viewed in the present chapter, accepting the notion of *human rights* is surely an example of cultural regulators, yet these rights are not operating separately from other rights and duties set up by a social institution. Thus, it is not unusual that for the sake of defending or establishing somebody’s *rights*, persons are said to have the *duty* to sacrifice one’s life for the given social organization.

Likewise, *open communication* need not automatically lead to *tolerance*. For that to happen, there needs to be a meta-level value-sign that accepts both the openness of communication as a positive value and tolerance as a goal orientation. Otherwise, open communication may result in triggered violence—physical or verbal (e.g., “how can you say *that!!!*”). The socially preferable aims at creating a society based on equality may lead to their opposite, as Georg Simmel (1971) claimed and the history of communism has shown in practice. Last (but not least), no political agenda—be it by the United Nations, NATO, or any other political group or NGO—can create a general basis for a “culture of peace.” Politics and science are strange, yet sometimes willing, bedfellows. Solving the problem of how to describe and create cultures of peace is a task for understanding the dynamics of the processes that generate war. Here we confront very powerful semiotic regulators that link the acts of wartime violence with human existential basics:

In a mystical sense warfare, precisely at its most horrible moments, establishes a momentary bridge between this world and the other. Illogically, yet very fundamentally, the slaughter of the enemy and the slaughter of one’s own side are *both* felt to be ‘the supreme sacrifice’ ... (Leach 2000, p. 356).

Building cultures of peace thus entails finding a semiotic regulator—an antidote to the social representation of *supreme sacrifice*—and inserting it into the cultural domains of social institutions and individuals, expecting their internalization/externalization processes to escalate the blocking of the link to killing with sacrifice. On the grand theatre stage of human existence, cultures of peace can be built through creating signs that neutralize escalatory tendencies in the PEACE  $\leftrightarrow$  WAR dynamic system.

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# Chapter 4

## Culture Change: A Practical Method with a Theoretical Basis

Howard Richards and Joanna Swanger

### Introduction

A culture of peace can be defined, and has been defined in United Nations Resolution A/RES/52/13, as a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life. It follows that to move toward a culture of peace, or to strengthen those elements of a culture of peace that already exist, it is necessary to change human behavior, cognition, and emotion. This requires us to change social norms. A norm can be thought of as having three aspects: an observed regularity in human behavior, a standard humans use to think about and guide their behavior, and a standard humans use in criticizing one another's behavior. Norm violation frequently carries with it some form or other of embarrassment, shame, guilt, or punishment. "Norm" is thus a broad term, sometimes overlapping with or replacing "custom," "rule," or "convention." Sometimes it is the umbrella term embracing all three, and usually it also embraces "law" (in the sense in which a legal norm is a kind of social norm, not in the sense of a law of physics or chemistry). Some social scientists prefer terminologies that feature a logic of discursive and nondiscursive practices, relations, performances, codes, frames, routines, symbolic structures, or [in the case of Pierre Bourdieu (1972) and his followers] *habitus*.

Transformations from warlike and violent cultures to cultures that "reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation" (as the same UN definition of "culture of peace" continues) can be conceived as norm change. Examples can be drawn from the eight aspects of a culture of peace:

1. When people come to see themselves as peaceful people who resolve conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence, they change their norms by adopting or strengthening peaceful practices.
2. A culture of peace moves away from the norms of patriarchy and toward those of gender equality and nurturance.
3. It moves away from social disintegration toward norms that prescribe solidarity and the inclusion of all individuals and groups.
4. Democratic participation and respect for the right to advocate freely one's views become norms; they become regular, expected, and approved.

5. Where corruption and press control were the norm, norms change so that transparency, accountability, and open communication become the rule rather than the exception.
6. Respect for human rights becomes the normal practice. The government rules with and by legitimate authority—that is, with and by authority derived from the cultural strength of the norms, as distinct from exercising power based on the physical strength of the instruments of violence.
7. The government increasingly supports and participates in the international observance of juridical norms rather than competing for military power.
8. Norms change so that development is driven and measured less by narrow accounting norms of financial efficiency and more by norms of social efficiency that value equity and environmental sustainability.

Given that building cultures of peace is, largely if not entirely, a matter of changing norms, it remains to ask what can be learned from the social sciences concerning: how norms change, how they have changed in the past, how they can be expected to change in the future, and what actions those of us who aspire to be peace builders can take that will facilitate culture change in positive directions away from a culture of war and toward a culture of peace.

Since we are working for cultures of peace in the midst of a violent and unjust world, we are assuming that cultures can be deliberately improved—that they are not, at least not entirely, products of blind historical forces beyond human control. Further, since it is precisely culture that we seek to change, we are affirming that culture is an important determinant of human behavior; it is not mere frill or superstructure. It is not, as Vilfredo Pareto (1916/1936) would have it, a mere derivative, which is not to be counted by scientists when they measure the causes that produce social effects. Culture has consequences, and not all cultures are cultures of war. Those whose norms prescribe and generate violence can be changed. Therefore, another world is possible. Peace is possible.

Viewing a culture of peace as a realizable ideal already sidesteps ways of seeing history and social science that posit development as a modernization process. According to this view, “developing” countries are seen as treading a single inevitable path in a single inevitable direction, a path already trodden by “developed” countries. It is then the task of social science to map this path in order to guide the “developing” countries so that they can tread it faster. A culture of peace, glossed as having eight bases, is frankly a desired ideal; it expresses a consensus of the nations, as represented in the United Nations, concerning what humanity wants. A culture of peace is not inevitable, but it is desirable. To ask how cultures change, and how desired change can be facilitated, is to ask how ethical choice can have causal powers.\*

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\* Michel Foucault briefly and helpfully summarized much thinking that attempts to give a rational account of how cultures have changed in the past and how they can be expected to change in the future when he wrote of the contributions of linguistics to bringing to light a whole field of relations that formerly could not be taken into consideration by empiricism’s narrower focus on particular relations of causality (see Foucault in DAVIDSON, 1997, a discussion based on Michel Foucault, “Linguistique et sciences sociales,” published in 1969 in *Dits et écrits*, vol. I, pp. 823–24).



We must therefore locate the premises of the following practical guide by saying that they take a page from causal analysis and a page from linguistics. They follow the school of thought known as critical realism by ascribing causal powers to cultural meanings. Norms *are* causes. The cultural meanings the Brazilian educator PAULO FREIRE identifies as “themes” in a “thematic universe” have causal powers, guiding, orienting, and thus moving behavior. Instead of backing away from traditional causal analysis of phenomena in the light of contemporary linguistics, in the light of its analogues in structural and post-structural anthropology and LACANIAN psychoanalysis as well as Foucault’s work on the histories of discursive practices, critical realism expands causal analysis. Economics itself, and therefore those economic histories that portray the modernization of culture as a consequence of the globalization of the European world-system, is seen as a cultural process in which the norms presupposed by economic analysis (the laws governing property, contracts, and so on) drive events. Cultural norms are causes and not just consequences.

Taking as granted the premises just stated, we suggest that the study of the history of successful culture change movements and projects yields the maxim that success depends on grounding (see Glaser and Strauss 1967). It depends on how the new cultural form grows out of the old one. For example, Cuban feminists pressing for suffrage and other civil rights for women in the early Cuban republic (from 1902 into the 1920s) drew upon reverence for motherhood (a recognition that motherhood was culturally seen as women’s divine right) and argued that it was this role within the family that only women could play that justified women’s exercising political authority in Cuba alongside men (STONER 1991). The Cuban case is an exemplar of women’s suffrage movements throughout most of Latin America, where women used the cultural theme of women as moral guardians—particularly in their role as mothers—to argue that they had something unique to contribute to political discourse and special contributions to make toward achieving genuine democracy and peace (see Hahner, 1980; Lavrin 1995; Molyneux 2000; Pernet 2000). Thus, movements to establish norms prescribing a higher degree of equality of women made use of a positive value solidly rooted in the already existing norms. “Motherhood” is perhaps less attractive as an ideal to cultivate now than it was then, but that only confirms the point. Finding existing norms lending themselves to growth and transformation, which projects of culture change can nurture to create cultures of peace, is an empirical project. It is an inquiry into a historically given culture as it exists in a particular place and time.

Successful culture change, when it is accomplished by peaceful means, also tends to be consensus-seeking. When it is confrontational, especially when it posits what LEWIS COSER (1956) calls “absolute conflict,” in which the parties share no common normative framework within which dialogue is meaningful, change tends to be violent, frustrated, or both. Examples can be found in doctrines of class struggle that hold that there can be no common interests or common values uniting the owning class and the working class, which are found in some versions of Marxism, in some caricatures of Marxism by anti-Marxists, and in some followers of Nietzsche. *Realpolitik* provides other examples.

The achievements of the labor movement and of social democracies in Western Europe in the mid-twentieth century can be regarded, on the whole, as examples of consensus-seeking successful culture change. To be sure, some advances relied on rather confrontational methods, but on the whole participants in these movements avoided absolute conflict by appeal to norms of democracy, to norms derived from religious traditions, and to the ideals of the Enlightenment (GERSTLE 1989; MYRDAL 1953, 1960; TOMLINS 1985), which made it possible to seek consensus within normative frameworks shared by virtually all western Europeans at the time. Further, social democratic norms did not become hegemonic in Western Europe until the period of World War II and its aftermath when Keynesian economics became mainstream. Keynesianism taught that high wages, full employment, and social security were beneficial not only to workers, but also to society as a whole (BEVERIDGE 1944; KEYNES 1954). However, one should not regard the labor movement and the rise of welfare states as unqualified successes because for several decades now, the gains they achieved in the mid-twentieth century have gradually been undermined and eroded. We have dealt at length elsewhere with the debilitation of social democracy and its potential reinvigoration (RICHARDS and SWANGER 2006).

In the following pages we outline a somewhat systematic approach (“method”) to culture change. It provides a lens for viewing the data of history, but it is mostly a practical guide for organizing work to build cultures of peace. It is based not only on our studies, but also on our experience as participants in and/or evaluators of culture change movements and projects. The proposed method has three steps, which are to be understood as conceptual divisions useful for policy making and planning. They are not to be understood, at least not rigidly so, as temporal steps prescribing the sequential programming of projects. As a mnemonic device for the sake of clarity, a tag word identifies each step.

1. **THEMES:** We have already alluded to the first step, what PAULO FREIRE calls the codification of a thematic universe. In more simple terms, one begins by “researching the vocabulary of the groups with which one is working” (FREIRE 1969/2000, p. 49). The reason for using the more abstract term “theme” instead of the less abstract term “word” is that a theme may also be an image, a gesture, a type of clothing or way of wearing one’s hair, a musical refrain, and so on. A theme is a meaningful element in the culture of a milieu. Typically, it is a word or a phrase. FREIRE continues: “This research is carried out during informal encounters with the inhabitants of the area. One selects not only the words most weighted with existential meaning (and thus the greatest emotional content), but also typical sayings, as well as words and expressions linked to the experience of the groups in which the researcher participates” (p. 49). The themes can be recorded in a card file, or in a computer file, and can be classified in various ways. One useful classification is the following one:
  - (a) *Generative themes.* FREIRE initially identified generative words as those whose syllabic elements could be recombined to form new words and thus to generate a whole language. His initial project was promoting empowerment

and consciousness-raising through adult literacy programs. He found that 15 to 18 generative words were sufficient to present the basic phonemes of the Portuguese language. In generalizing FREIRE's approach to make it the first step in culture change, we think of generative themes as themes that lead toward a culture of peace. They are good starting points for dialogue and negotiation. An example of a generative theme with a great deal of potential might be "democracy" (see DEWEY 1916). Jorge Zuleta of the Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo de la Educacion (CIDE) of Santiago, Chile, has suggested that, as part of this step, the researcher also identify "generative persons": persons in the community who are already agents of cultural change (Zuleta, in personal conversations with Howard Richards).

Before continuing to elaborate a suggested way to classify themes, more must be said about the person Freire sometimes identifies as the "researcher," and sometimes calls the "educator being educated." That person might have any number of other names depending on the context, including, "volunteer," "facilitator," "teacher," "professional," "leader," "change agent," "cultural creative," "missionary," "cadre," and sometimes, following ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1971), "organic intellectual." An indispensable part of the codification of a thematic universe is reflection on the meaning within the milieu carried by the person doing the codifying. That meaning is sometimes called the person's "insertion." Whether a person is able to act in a given cultural setting as a facilitator of the emergence of a culture of peace depends largely on how that person is perceived by others; on whether that person is accepted or rejected, treated as an insider or as an outsider. Sometimes it is better to withdraw and to leave the work of culture change to people who have better "insertion," that is, to people who are more "organic" members of the community, deciding to make one's own contribution to building a culture of peace in some other way or in some other place, perhaps in a place where one has better credentials as an insider. For example, one of our students, who was not comfortable participating in many settings because people in many settings were not comfortable with him, had been a motorcycle enthusiast for many years (a "biker"). He proved to be adept at promoting culture change in motorcycle gangs. Insertion requires familiarity with the language and expectations of a given group, such as: lawyers, factory workers, the police, the transgender community, Lutherans, hip-hop artists, and folk musicians. Each of us is potentially an insider within a variety of cultures or subcultures, and gradual transformations within these can support the emergence of cultures of peace.

(b) *Invader themes.* Freire characterizes cultural invasion as anti-dialogical. A typical invader theme shuts off dialogue because it asserts the intellectual and social superiority of the speaker and disqualifies the listener. An example from the current US context is that in an effort to build on growing resistance to the US occupation of Iraq and to bring more people into the anti-war movement, left-leaning college students might engage a group of disillusioned Republicans. If the source of the opposition to the war for this latter group is that they feel they were lied to about the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and if the former group then tries to assert that such a lie is entirely consonant with a

history of US imperialism in which presidential administrations manipulate the electorate, then this theme of “U.S. imperialism” will constitute an “invader theme”: not only does it not resonate with the intended audience (in Freire’s terms, it “falls outside their thematic universe”), but it will also likely serve to alienate. In general, it is important to avoid invader themes and to promote culture change within the limits of a thematic universe people understand and in which they feel comfortable.

- (c) *Hinge themes.* Nonetheless, to move from a culture of war to a culture of peace, one must facilitate culture change, “comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable,” and not merely acquiesce in a low level of consciousness in which people accept existing symbolic structures, such as those WALTER WINK (1998) calls “the myth of redemptive violence,” as if they were inevitable and natural. The problem is similar to that presented in Piagetian educational psychology (PIAGET 1985) of finding the right balance between “assimilation” and “accommodation.” An invader theme too foreign to the milieu cannot be assimilated; it can serve to intimidate, but it cannot serve to elicit dialogue. Growth and transformation, on the other hand, require the “accommodation” of existing symbolic structures to new experiences that provoke a certain amount of disequilibrium. They require experimenting with new ideas and behaviors. A “hinge theme” is like a door hinge, permitting the door to open so that one can gain passage to another room. It connects the existing culture of the milieu with learning one or more of the elements of a culture of peace. An example of a hinge theme currently present in mainstream US culture is the high price of gasoline. It is a theme that is readily familiar in milieus where people customarily purchase gasoline, a topic even strangers feel free to discuss openly and at length. It can lead to dialogue in which people explore together the implications of an experience that requires accommodation. It can permit the “educator being educated” to import some “friendly invader themes” that are invited, metaphorically speaking, by the hinge theme, and are invited, literally speaking, by the participants in a conversation who express a willingness to learn about features of what BETTY REARDON (1985) calls the “war system” connected with the high price at the pump. The hinge theme permits the “educator being educated” to step out of her role as facilitator and to assume her role as resource person. Another example from current US culture is the phrase “support our troops.” This is an oft-repeated theme that people understand, and it allows connection to another theme: “bring them home.” The phrase “support our troops” can be transformative if it is translated into meaningful support for working people, those who actually *are* the troops, so that their economic security is not necessarily tied to war or preparations for war.† Or, one may stress the fact that support for troops,

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† Moves in the direction of this specific kind of transformation indeed happened following World War II when Western European nations and the United States passed legislation making securing full employment a duty of government. This was the fulfillment of a pledge made during World War II.

like support for fire fighters, means preventing wars and fires rather than starting them (see RITTER 2007).

- (d) “*Losable themes.*” Consciousness-raising workshops typically derive from the premise of “losable themes.” These are themes that lend themselves to cultural change through conversation. They are called “losable” because they tend to fall away and disappear whenever people have an opportunity to reflect on them consciously and to engage in dialogue with others about them. It is not necessary in such dialogues to provide background information beyond what people already know. “Losable themes” can often be presented as images, using a flip chart or a slideshow to show a group a picture and inviting them to comment on what they see. It is often not necessary or desirable to ask questions or to make suggestions about what to say about the image. For example, simply to be confronted with pictures of men changing diapers usually gives people the opportunity to articulate and thus challenge “losable themes” regarding sexism and patriarchy (e.g., the notion of “women’s work”). Clips from popular television shows and from commercials can generate conversation on losable themes regarding many elements of a culture of violence, which in turn lead to such elements of a culture of peace as nonviolence, inclusion, and solidarity. Indeed, television is a gold mine for culture change because the marketing research to determine what images captivate viewers has already been done by the sponsors who pay for it. It is also a gold mine because television exhibits so many “losable themes.” The very process of talking back to the tube in a group setting can be empowering. It can be an experience of democratic participation where the norm that everyone has a right to advocate one’s views freely is nurtured. Thus, both the processes and the products of television criticism can contribute to building cultures of peace.

We have drawn on Paulo Freire and his followers to illustrate some practical aspects of Step One, which we call, following Freire, the codification of a thematic universe. The general idea is to establish communication. It is to learn to speak the language of the milieu as an active participant in it who understands and is understood. Other methods can also be used to serve the purpose, including participant observation, ethnographic research using methods developed by cultural anthropologists (e.g., SPRADLEY and McCURDY 1980), focus groups, and cultural studies of what WILHELM DILTHEY (1923/1988) called a culture’s “objective spirit.” Dilthey reasoned that although one cannot get inside of other people’s heads, one can learn about what is in their heads by observing what goes into them (for example, updating Dilthey: the images broadcast by television programs with a mass audience, the themes of religious ceremonies many people participate in, or those of sporting events whose spectators fill stadiums).

2. **ENERGY:** Step Two postulates that culture change will not happen unless the move from old norms to new norms is fueled by energy of some kind or other. The distinction between Themes (Step One) and Energy (Step Two) is drawn from ANTHONY WILDEN’s suggestion that scientific explanations divide without

remainder into meaning explanations and energy explanations (WILDEN 1972).‡ The distinction corresponds to that made above between linguistics (meaning, themes) and causality (dynamics, functional dependence of  $y$  on  $x$ , impacts of factors on outcomes). It roughly corresponds to SAUSSURE'S (1966) distinction between synchronic and diachronic analysis, provided that one can assume that wherever there is a diachronic pattern of change, there is a pattern of causation that explains it.§

From a practical point of view, Step Two counsels that it is often wise for those who seek to build cultures of peace to pause from what they are doing, or thinking of doing, and consider whether there is sufficient public energy for the proposed plan of action. If there is no energy, there is not going to be any culture change. Would-be peacemakers are frequently in danger of pursuing private passions, or passions shared by small groups, that are unlikely to change society. The search for effective ways to build a culture of peace is to a large extent a search for cultural growth points that generate enthusiasm, participation, ongoing commitment, and resources to work with.

Asking about “energy” is a contemporary approach to the old question, “What is the motor of history?”—to which the answers are sometimes given, “class struggle,” or “will to power.” HANNAH ARENDT (1969, pp. 65–66) answers by arguing that historically, outrage against hypocrisy has been one of the strongest motives energizing political action.\*\* The point of connecting “energy” and “culture change” is a dual one. On the one hand, envisioning culture as a concept that names a vital force capable of changing the war system into a peace system affirms that norms have causal powers. Whatever else moves history, culture does; the basic normative frameworks that organize human action can be thought of as cultural structures. On the other hand, in response to the further question of what changes cultural norms, using the very general term “energy” leads to an approach that is comprehensive and open-minded. In a given situation, the answer to the question what is driving history and what might fuel culture change, the best answer is often, “We don’t know.” It may be economic self-interest, fear of an impending ecological catastrophe, ethnic identity, or deep-seated anger produced

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‡ For discussion of the human brain structures bolstering this use of the concept of energy, see TURNER (1983) and MACLEAN (1990).

§ Although with Wilden we lump the sort of science that relies on statistical analysis of datasets into the broad category of energy explanations, along with Wilden and appropriately cautious statisticians, we regard statistical tests of significance as at most suggestive indicators of causal relationships or the lack of them. In general we are not persuaded by Humean or Kantian accounts of causality. We are persuaded by ROM HARRE and other critical realists who attribute the production of effects to causal powers that the collective labor known as “science” has gradually achieved insight into. Like Harre, we do not believe it is helpful to speak of a “scientific method” as anything different from the history of what people called scientists have done and achieved (BHASKAR 1986; BUNGE 1963; HARRE and MADDEN 1975; KUHN 1970).

\*\* For a review of theories about economic, political, military, and religious forces that have been said to move the process of historical change, see GIDDENS (1987).

by real or perceived past wrongs. What combination of energies is potentially available to support moving toward the norms of a culture of peace is always something to investigate, although not naively, as if history had not happened and as if a number of insightful theories concerning why it has happened as it has happened were not already in the world's libraries.

Naming the energies at work in a given historical (cultural) situation and judging their strength is harder than codifying themes. A theme is a social convention. It is like a token that passes from hand to hand and has the same easily recognizable significance no matter what hand it is in. Collecting the themes of a milieu and classifying them is like learning a language. Gaining insight into the energetic forces that drive behavior is different; it requires voyaging into the physical realities that underlie and surround culture, with the aid of whatever scientific tools one can muster. Two plus two is sure to be four because conventional cultural structures say so. But two cups of water and two cups of alcohol do not add up to four cups of liquid. Finding out what they do add up to requires venturing into the risky area where common sense might be wrong, and in the last analysis, any prediction might be wrong. Energy is in the risky area.

An example regarding political ads on television may help to show how the idea of "energy" applies to peace building. Culture change is to a considerable extent participation in politics. This involves trying to win elections. This, in turn, is to a considerable extent a matter of spending money on television spot announcements. Three questions immediately arise: (1) Is it possible to move people with money to contribute to paying for the ads? (2) Is it possible to move the political (cultural) institutions to grant access to television with little or no money? (3) Will the ads move the voters?

All three questions came up in the Chilean plebiscite of 1988 when the voters were asked to cast either a "Yes" vote to continue the Pinochet dictatorship or a "No" vote for democracy. Supporters of the dictatorship controlled virtually all the media, but the cultural norms defining a fair election (supported by international public opinion) were strong enough that the "No" supporters got the same amount of time on national TV as the "Yes" supporters (15 minutes) each evening on the days just prior to the election. The question for the "No" supporters became: What to broadcast in their 15 minutes? The pro-democracy cadres were for the most part victims who had been tortured and/or driven into exile and who had lost friends and relatives who had been killed or who had simply disappeared. For understandable reasons, they tended to harbor bitterness and anger, in spite of their best efforts to recover from trauma. For equally understandable reasons, they tended to project their own feelings and to assume that they were widely shared. Studies done by pro-democracy sociologists and psychologists, however, showed that the bulk of undecided voters had negative emotional reactions to bitter and angry messages (TULCHIN and VARAS 1991). At the level of energy, anger and fear were all too commonly felt during the dictatorship, and a definitive rupture from themes connecting to these energies was needed. The "No" campaign realized that cheerful messages were needed to move undecided voters into the "No" camp. The image they chose for the campaign poster was a rainbow ending in the word "No." The

rainbow symbolized the light that would come after the storm of dictatorship they had collectively survived; it was meant to remind Chileans that the popular sectors had organized to respond to basic needs under the most constrained and dangerous circumstances imaginable and that they did indeed have the resources needed to build a better society after the dictatorship ended. The song used to accompany the “No” ad spots and reiterated in many other venues was “*Chile, la alegría ya viene*” (“Chile, Happiness is On Its Way”).

“Energy” is about determining feasibility. It is about planning deliberate culture change in order to transform the cultures of violence that have grown up over a relatively *longue durée* into cultures of peace in a relatively *courte durée*. The primary emotions fueling human behavior cannot be expected, on the whole, to be much different in the future than they have been in the past. One hopes that increasing intelligence, applied in the concrete circumstances of a given time and place, will make it possible to direct them better toward constructive ends. Concerning any given culture change project, it is necessary to ask whether there are potential resources potentially available to carry it out. Step Two lumps together the question whether the proposed project will attract public support with the question of whether donors and decision makers will support it with funds and authorization.

At least three cautions need to be observed in asking whether a proposed project for building a culture of peace has energy behind it. One caution calls for resisting the temptation to let energy-talk slide into the assumption that human life is more exciting and emotional than it really is. The attitudes and behaviors that constitute and cement into place the war system are to a large extent the dull plodding routines of everyday practice. Every day people follow customary norms and make customary calculations in socially constructed realities they regard as natural realities; every day many of the standard customs people routinely follow are part and parcel of a war system. One must avoid sliding into the assumption that changing the psychodynamics of human personalities away from what ERICH FROMM (1973) calls necrophilia (love of death) and toward love of life will in itself change the myth of redemptive violence into a collective belief that as peaceful people we resolve conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence. One must avoid sliding into the assumption that such a psychodynamic change in the flow of human energies will in itself change the cold logic of capital accumulation into a warm logic of democratic solidarity. Norms must change. Routines must change. Conventional attitudes and behaviors must change (Cox 1986).

A second caution is that efforts to gain insight into the forces at work in human history, or in some bounded segment of it, should not lead one to underestimate the weight of the reasons many people have for embracing principled nonviolence and for believing that in the long run the most effective way to change culture is to be a faithful witness to an ideal.

A third caution counsels avoiding, as Betty Reardon has been known to say, mistaking what is doable for what is worth doing. If one finds that one’s projects are funded, that they draw large crowds, and that participants rate one’s workshops as excellent when filling out evaluation forms; if one finds that one is tapping huge reservoirs of latent energy and mobilizing vast resources; then one may be tempted



to not ask whether one is contributing to building a culture of peace. The eminently doable may not be worth doing because it is not changing the basic cultural structures that need to be changed.

3. **TRANSFORMATION:** The word “transformation” speaks of a change of form, an extant form transmuting into a new one. It is useful to regard thinking about possible and impossible transformations as a step in thinking about how to promote the eight elements of a culture of peace.

The idea of transformation serves as a reminder that a change from one norm to another requires an existing cultural theme as a point of departure. For example, when Martin Luther proclaimed the priesthood of all believers, he transformed an existing normative concept, priesthood. He enlarged its domain. Similarly, when IMMANUEL KANT declared in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) that every rational being has a dignity (*Würde*) beyond price, thus defining a concept of human dignity that plays major roles today in UN documents and other authoritative texts, he transformed a set of norms that already existed: those defining the dignity of a dignitary, a person of rank. Like Luther, Kant transformed a hierarchical concept into a democratic one.

Thinking about transformation as a step in planning projects to facilitate cultural change also serves as a reminder that not every cultural change is possible. The possible new norms are transformations of existing norms. Examples of poorly planned cultural change efforts are the attempts to decree the equality of women in Afghanistan in the 1990s and the more recent attempt to impose democracy on Iraq by military force. (We omit discussion of other motives for the Iraq war.) Gender equality and democracy may be possible in Afghanistan and Iraq, but if they are possible—as attitudes and behaviors engrained in the culture of the people and not merely as submissions to edicts—they will be possible because the existing cultures contain growth points that make such cultural changes understandable and attractive because they contain established norms that lend themselves to being transformed. A positive example of facilitating cultural change by building on existing cultural resources is provided by JAWAHARLAL NEHRU’s advocacy of democracy in India. In touring India before independence, speaking in over a thousand towns and villages, he referred to democracy as *panchayat raj*. People could understand and participate in the transformation of colonial India into the kind of modern social democracy Nehru advocated by thinking of the latter in terms of the *panchayat*, the traditional village council (NEHRU 1965, p.481).

Let it be remembered that “norm” was defined at the beginning of this chapter as three things at once: an observed regularity in human behavior, a standard humans use to think about and guide their behavior, and a standard humans use in criticizing one another’s behavior. Seeing norms as this definition proposes implies that a transformation toward new norms will produce new regularities in human behavior, new standards humans used to think about and guide behavior, and new standards for criticizing one another’s behavior. It follows that promoting cultural change by peaceful means requires eliciting the active, conscious participation of the people whose culture is changing. The very identity of people’s selves and communities is

at stake. The change process must be dialogue, not monologue, not only for ethical reasons, but also because only through dialogue and other processes that engage the inner person is it possible to change the way people think about and guide their own behavior and to change the standards applied in the social relationships in which mutual criticism occurs. Cultural change is necessarily personal change.

Facilitating change in attitudes and behaviors is one of the areas in which contemporary psychology draws on ancient and non-Western wisdom. Journaling, for example, is a practice recommended in many self-development courses and workshops; it is also an ancient spiritual practice.<sup>††</sup> The same can be said of meditation, of the interpretation of dreams, retreats, the attachment of a novice to a *guru* as a spiritual guide, and many other practices that are both contemporary and ancient. It is also ancient wisdom that values change by doing, not only by talking—a principle put to work in contemporary experiential education. The most effective forms of cultural transformation are often those that harness long-standing wisdom, reshaping it as needed to meet the requirements of a given historical moment.

In conclusion, even the most virulent cultures of war present possibilities for the kind of culture change that can engender transformation toward sustainable peace, although even understanding what those possibilities might be is no facile process. The process of peace building, which is a process of changing norms, requires dedication to the long, slow, and arduous work of engaging in dialogue, taking cultural inventories of the operative thematic universes, finding the hinge themes, and tapping the energies that move people to action.

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<sup>††</sup> Athanasius, for example, writes, “Let us each take note of and write down the actions and movements of our souls as though to make them mutually known to one another” (ATHANASIUS quoted in FOUCAULT, 1997, p. 234). The quote is from *Vita Antoni*, written between 356 and 362.

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# Chapter 5

## The Paradigm Challenge of Political Science: Delegitimizing the Recourse to Violence

Ralph Summy

*“We shall require a new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive...Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.”*

Albert Einstein

*“(Our era) is not at all the age of violence; it’s the age of the awareness of violence...what really characterizes our time is not so much that there is so much violence...but that we are challenged, possibly as never before, to deal with it.”*

Jacques Ellul

### Introduction

Political science is about power, how we exercise power in our relations with others. All relationships involve power, but political science is only concerned with the public ‘other.’ One of the many theoretical problems the discipline has not resolved (and probably never will to everyone’s satisfaction) is where to draw the line between the murky area of the public and the private. But that aside, a more pressing problem, directly affecting people’s immediate lives, is how political scientists and all political actors perceive power.

The prevailing view leans towards a model that calls for dominating the other party in a conflict so as to maximize the gains for ‘our side’ and minimize those for the other party, ‘the opponent.’ If a goal is strongly desired, or an ontological need is at stake, the ultimate sanction of physical force will be applied, irrespective of any proclaimed reluctance to use violence. This approach to conflict is said to be imposed because ‘the opponent’ has also perceived the conflict in terms of needing to dominate the ‘opponent,’ no matter what it takes. Failure to respond in kind will ensure that ‘our side’ becomes the loser in a win/lose outcome. To act outside the orthodoxy of ‘power over’ is a sure recipe for disaster. Or is this the case? Is the political world locked into this system of ultimately using ‘power over,’ or can conflict be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties? Is such a concept too ‘idealistic,’ not related to the way the real world operates?

While most political scientists and politicians aim to conduct politics without resorting to overt physical violence—and to even minimizing structural and cultural violence—they perceive the necessity to exercise authority, legal or otherwise, in achieving their political goals. By gaining authority and influence, political actors have the ‘power to’ resolve conflictual issues in their favor. At the apex of this authority/influence syndrome are the rulers of a territory. Authority refers to the acquired acceptance that provides the ‘power to’ determine, order, or control a political outcome. Influence means the ‘power to’ exert action by invisible or insensible means.

In the West, the holders of authority and influence, with few exceptions, espouse a credo of liberal democracy and rule of law at the national level and international law and universal human rights at the extra-national level. When the resolve or ‘power to’ achieve these goals is lacking or the attempt to enforce rights is challenged, the resisters at the bottom of the political pyramid are inclined to rise up by resorting to the ‘power over’ model. This is not too surprising, given the fact that the resisters usually lack the power of legal authority and the structural resources that accompany authority.

Are there, then, other paradigms of power that can match or surpass the models of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’? Would a nonviolent power model be a realistic approach to overcoming a denial of rights and needs? The most stringent test comes when an extremely vicious power holder unleashes unrestrained violence against an opponent who, for whatever reason, decides to meet the aggression with the asymmetrical response of nonviolence. In effect, can ‘soft power’ effectively counter ‘hard power’? Is the nonviolent advocate’s belief in the efficacy, morality, and long-term beneficial consequences of nonviolence justified? Can the mind-set of the ruthless exponent of ‘power over’ (which the holder of legalized authority will resort to when ‘power to’ is gravely challenged) ever be transformed by a change in culture? Or does one even need a mind-set change for nonviolence to be effective? This chapter will undertake a brief theoretical and empirical examination of these questions within the framework of four power models: (1) the domination or ‘power over’ model, (2) the authority or ‘power to’ model, (3) the Sharpian or ‘power from’ and ‘power with’ model, and (4) the Gandhian or ‘power from within,’ the integrative power model.

## **The ‘Power Over’ Model**

The theoretical underpinnings of this model have a long history that extends into the thinking of contemporary mainline political scientists and politicians. In a perceptive book that argues the case for constructing a nonkilling political science, Paige (2002, pp. 3–6) points out that humans are currently following a tradition of killing (the most extreme form of ‘power over’) that was theoretically justified as far back as the dawn of recorded history. Both Plato and Aristotle subscribed to the view that lethal violence was a given of political life. When vital interests were at

stake, any ruler, irrespective of what type of government was represented, had been expected to resolve the conflict by using or threatening military force. One of the three major classes in Plato's *Republic* was the auxiliaries who were assigned the task of defending the Republic by force of arms. Aristotle was not averse to basing his ideal society's prosperity on the violence of slavery. Indeed, he wrote in *Politics* about those who deserved to be enslaved. They had lost on the field of bloody conflict.

The concept of 'aggressive defensive warfare' did not originate in the collective mind of the contemporary neo-conservatives. It has a long and ignominious history that dates back well over 2,000 years ago. The Romans, for instance, justified their pre-emptive attack on Carthage on the grounds that otherwise Carthage would have the military advantage of first striking them.

The birth of Christianity and its adoption four centuries later by Constantine I—whose conversion came from a dream in which he said Christ appeared telling him to carry the sign of the cross into battle against his arch rival for the position of Emperor—laid the foundation for the known world's most powerful empire to add the dimension of religious fervor to its concept of war. When Constantine won the battle and in due course became Emperor, he declared Christianity to be the state religion.

Although the religion's crucified founder had preached a revolutionary gospel of pacifism, his teachings were now vitiated and incorporated into the power elite thinking of Roman society. Officialdom needed to find a formula that would encompass the message of Christianity's Sermon on the Mount and still accommodate the state's predilection for war-making. Leading church philosophers, such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, came to the rescue by producing criteria that indicated whether a particular war was appropriate. These criteria were known as *jus ad bellum*; they spelled out the justice or injustice of a war. Another set of criteria was also developed—called *jus in bello* or justice in a war—that imposed restraints on how a war was to be conducted. Together, these two limitations on certain aspects of war-making came to be known as the 'Just War Doctrine.' This modest attempt to contain the worst abuses of warfare (i.e., to civilize the more extreme practices of 'power over') has usually been ignored or circumvented by specious argument, so that the slaughter has largely continued unabated. Indeed, modern technology has greatly raised the casualty figures, and in contemporary warfare it has been the non-combatants who have topped the casualty lists.

Many of today's political leaders who profess strong Christian beliefs can be found wanting when it comes to implementing principles of the Just War Doctrine. Following a well-established political tradition, they opt for *Realpolitik* over any suggestion of ethical idealism. At the extreme edge of the ideology, their 'hard realism' entails spreading democracy by aggressive military means and illiberal practices that are so far to the right that they clash with the more established and recognized thinking of the *Realpolitik* school. Their brand of gung ho militancy, for example, has incurred the criticism of orthodox realists like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others of their ilk.

The well-established and dominant school of *Realpolitik* thinkers and actors traces the core of its ideas back to the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527).

He advised that when operating in the public arena the Prince should first refrain from violence while acting with “the cunning of the fox,” but if that approach to conflict resolution should fail, he should be prepared to strike mercilessly with the “bestial fury of the lion” (Machiavelli 2007, pp. 129–130). While the morality of “cooperative idealism” could be a powerful weapon in the armory of the Prince, its virtue was basically reduced to a political maneuver. Morality should be evaluated on the basis of the utility it served in the power equation that was the only key to success. The cardinal principle to bear in mind was that violence was omnipresent and even desirable as it could be used to effectively advance one’s interests.

The English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), carried forward this tradition of *Realpolitik*. Violence was not only ubiquitous, but necessary for good government. The nature of human beings was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” “Life was a war of all against all...man as a wolf to other men.” Power, therefore, had to be ceded to a strong sovereign leader (like Oliver Cromwell) whose monopoly of armed force could prevail over the society of “wolves.” As history confirms, “covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1962, p. 129).

The Hobbesian outlook of humans as little better than beasts in need of strong controls ironically accompanied the emergence of republicanism in the following centuries. Whether it was a Committee of Citizens in charge, or a system of monarch and parliamentarians working in tandem, the unwritten rule of governance called for the exercise of ‘power over.’ The sovereignty of the State was sacrosanct. It possessed the two defining powers of a ruler’s sovereignty: the power to tax and the power to make war. To challenge those actions constituted rebellion or revolution. The rise of republicanism, and later the forces of representative democracy, enabled a new class to replace the aristocracy and church as the holders of ‘power over.’ While there was more fluidity of movement within the rising bourgeoisie, its method of government still ultimately depended on the power premises handed down by Machiavelli and Hobbes. This was seldom stipulated.

Many theorists refined and adopted the mainline political theory to the new circumstances they saw unfolding. The Italian elitist school of Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), and Robert Michels (1876–1936) theorized that an ineradicable destiny existed for human society in the division between a ruling minority and a ruled majority. Whenever an insurgency movement wrested control of government, an inner circle of leaders eventually gained ascendancy and became the new elite. It exercised ‘power over’ the society irrespective of whether the formal system of government was autocratic or democratic or somewhere in between. As Pareto (cited in Lyttelton 1973, pp. 72–75) declared, history consisted of an ongoing “circulation of elites.” According to Michels (1915), despite the best intentions of an organization’s idealistic personnel, in time they tended to abandon their founding principles and initial goals in favor of preserving and promoting their own power positions. At work was an “iron law of oligarchy” that ensured the exercise of ‘power over.’

All of the above figures, from Machiavelli on down, have registered a formidable impact on the discipline of political science, but probably none more so than the



German political sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). He asserted that politics, if it has any pretence at being rational and responsible, must dissociate itself from ethical illusions, including those proclaimed in the *Sermon on the Mount*. His pronouncement:

For while it is a consequence of the unworldly ethic of love to say: ‘resist not evil with force,’ the politician is governed by the contrary maxim, namely, ‘You shall resist evil with force, for if you do not, you are responsible for the spread of evil’ (1994, p. 358).

Weber issued a strong warning to his students in a 1919 essay entitled *The Profession and Vocation of Politics* about entering politics with notions of upholding moral principles. Speaking of the inevitability of violence and the diabolical nature of politics, he cautioned, “Anyone seeking to save his own soul and the soul of others does not take the path of politics...for politics has quite different tasks, namely those which can only be achieved by force” (Weber 1978).

Anyone who gets involved with politics, which is to say with the means of power and violence, is making a pact with diabolical powers, and that it does not hold true of his actions that only good can come of good and only evil from evil, but rather the opposite is often the case. Anyone who fails to see this is indeed a child in political matters (p. 223).

Weber portrayed with striking clarity the concept of power and the role of the state as ‘power over.’ Power manifests “the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons” (Bendix 1966, p. 290), and “a state is a human community that successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1994, p. 311). Strong leadership, which means the preparedness to use force, secures the welfare of the community—a view that differs little from the stark message of Hobbes, except that Weber acknowledged the possibility of the individual behaving morally. The unshakable supporter of *Realpolitik* surprisingly concluded his hard-line exegesis to the students with a ray of hope that life might just be a bit more benign.

It is of course entirely correct and a fact confirmed by all historical experience, that what is possible would never have been achieved if, in this world, people had not repeatedly reached for the impossible (Weber 1994, p. 369).

So maybe the impossible is possible, and that includes dispensing with ‘power over’ and conducting political relations within more cooperative and compassionate paradigms.

Not so says the major school of *Realpolitik* that has dominated the political landscape since the end of World War II. With only slight modifications during the past 60 years, the school of *Realpolitik*’s basic tenets have remained intact as carried forward from the above theorists and developed further by the doyen of modern realism, University of Chicago professor of international relations, Hans Morgenthau. His comprehensive tome, *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, while initially defining orthodox political thought for the Cold War, has remained influential up to the present day. Morgenthau (1960) traced the failure of the interwar years to prevent World War II to the unwarranted faith of the status quo conservatives in the assurances of the dictators and the liberal internationalists to the effectiveness of the League of Nations. He contended it was “contrary to logic

and politically unfeasible” to think that sovereignty could be divided between an international organization and the nation-state. He averred:

Far from expressing a theoretical truth or reflecting the actuality of political experience, the advice to give up “a part of national sovereignty” for the sake of the preservation of peace is tantamount to the advice to close one’s eyes and dream that one can eat one’s cake and have it, too (p. 326).

Today’s realists argue that the Cold War only ended with the demise of the Soviet Union when Ronald Reagan’s arms build-up drove the Soviet Union into penury, and Gorbachev was forced into a series of tactical blunders.

A model somewhat more benign than the domination one—in which political science and political leaders are caught up in a cycle of ongoing violence—calls on the use of ‘power to.’ It resorts to the authority of legal institutions and the rule of law generally, together with peaceful traditions and the charisma of political leadership, to resolve conflict.

## **The ‘Power To’ Model**

This model and the two that follow are predicated on the empirical fact that the overwhelming majority of people are nonviolent in their personal and societal relationships. To some extent they may behave this way because any form of violence (overt or covert) is legally or socially dissuaded. Punitive threats—as realists repeatedly stress—keep people in check. But people, it can also be argued, find it rewarding to cooperate and enjoy interacting positively with their fellow human beings. Whatever the motivation, they generally do act nonviolently.

It is only in the collective sphere of the public domain, particularly in the international affairs of the nation-state, that the populace is occasionally prepared to concede ‘power over’ to the ruler, including the ultimate legal sanction of violence. In defending a society’s security and welfare from outsiders, the right to kill is seldom questioned. And when another country’s defensive acts are perceived as offensive acts, they constitute a justification for launching an open attack. Caught up in a ‘security dilemma,’ the constituents of a country who have been following a ‘power to’ model and granted authority to the ruler on the basis of eliminating violence find themselves willingly succumbing to the idea of using violence against another country in order to maintain their security against the perceived threat. And a cycle of violence is triggered.

Thus, even though a ruler may be expected to preserve the peace at the intra-state level with the restraints of ‘power to,’ at the inter-state level the ruler is legitimately permitted to engage in the most extreme form of ‘power over.’ How to replace this double standard and its cycle of ongoing violence with universal non-violence is the challenge that confronts contemporary global society. Although the problem dates back many millennia, its solution has become imperative in today’s world of high-tech weaponry and delivery systems and the unchecked spread of

small arms. Not only does the world face repeated outbreaks of genocide, but at risk is ultimately the survival of the human species.

A general definition of ‘power to,’ acceptable to most people, would condense into something like the following: *a constructive approach to the exercise of power that aims to create new humane possibilities without domination.* A common feature of the model is the granting of authority by the citizenry to a few of their members to rule on their behalf. Such authority could even reside in an unelected ruler who enjoys popular support, and therefore does not feel obliged to exercise ‘power over.’ The structure of the political system is monolithic in that power flows downward from the ruler to the ruled. However, since the authority is voluntarily ceded to the ruler, he is not compelled to exercise ‘power over’ his constituency, but can use his ‘power to’ to serve their needs.

Although an autocracy can operate within the realm of a just system of policy-making and lawmaking, it generally falls upon liberals and democratic socialists to reify the basic caring, compassionate, and cooperative values that underlie the ‘power to’ model. They are the ones that tend to look at nonviolent ways to resolve conflict, to serve the needs of the disadvantaged through government and NGOs, and to honor in deeds the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.

For Americans and many other English-speaking peoples, the ‘power to’ model’s theoretical origins were chiefly formulated in the writings of John Locke (1632–1704). Important contributions also came from the later works of a group of radical dissenters: Richard Price (1721–1791), John Wilkes (1727–1797), Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), and Thomas Paine (1737–1809). Locke (1970) allocated ‘power to’ or authority to the ruler, but with the important proviso that through a social contract the ruler was committed to guarantee the people their civil liberties and natural rights of “life, liberty, and property.” If the ruler reverted to the old ‘power over’ ways and failed to fulfill the contract’s terms, Locke indicated the populace were entitled to rise up and overthrow his despotic rule by force of arms if need be. Although in this case the violence would be exercised from the ‘bottom up’ to counter violence emanating from the ‘top down,’ it demonstrates the long-standing tendency to link radical change with violence. Whoever musters the greater resources of men and arms, and possesses the greater strategic and tactical skills, triumphs in a win/lose outcome.

The famous American historian Carl L. Becker (1958) maintains that in drafting the American *Declaration of Independence*, Thomas Jefferson copied Locke. The trilogy of rights remained the same, except that Jefferson substituted the inalienable right of ‘the pursuit of Happiness’ for the right of ‘property’. He fully confirmed Locke’s position by proclaiming in the *Declaration*

that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government... (that) shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

The right to revolt was unambiguously inscribed in the *Declaration*. It was again stated further along in the following passage:

But when a long train of abuses and usurpations...evinces a design to reduce them (that is, the people) under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

The ultimate form of the “new Guards” rested on the ‘power over’ of superior violence. It may not have been explicitly spelled out as such, but the actions of Americans, past and present, confirm a predilection to use violence as the way “to provide...for their future security”. One specific linkage of Locke’s revolutionary doctrine of excessive ‘power over’ appeared some 15 years after the *Declaration* in the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights. This is the provision that grants “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” While non-Americans may have difficulty in understanding the need for such a provision in a constitution, its purpose was to ensure that people could rise up against any tyrant, like King George III, who attempted to deny them their rights. Ironically, little do many Americans realize that most of the resistance against British rule was conducted nonviolently without any need for guns (Conser, McCarthy, Toscano, and Sharp 1986). The ‘power to’ exponent is inclined to approach conflict on the premise that human beings possess the capacity to modify *significantly* their physical and social environment. The key word is ‘significantly’ because it means that people have the power to create a far more harmonious and just world. They are not condemned to suffer various forms of domination. Indeed, they not only *can*, but *have* created a better world.

Such a position is diametrically opposed to the biologically determinist view of human nature expounded by the realist school. Although Morgenthau (1960) stated what he empirically observed to be self-evident and therefore truthful that “the drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men (sic)” (p. 326), the subscribers of the ‘power to’ model do not see themselves trapped in a need to dominate and use violence that inevitably culminates in organized killing called war. In most (but not all) situations people can choose to refrain from violence. When confronted with repression, they usually hold the initiative in deciding whether to grant their consent or withhold it from the government. If they opt for resistance, they are not completely ‘driven’ by their inbuilt nature to use violence, but typically feel free to choose whatever form of political action they consider most efficacious.

They can argue that for most of *Homo sapiens*’ existence, which has been traced back to about 150,000 BCE, nonviolence appears to have been a salient feature of inter-human activity. The species lived in small groups that roamed the land, survived by hunting and gathering food, and settled conflicts without violence. This style of living prevailed for about 140,000 years and only began to disappear around 10,000 years ago in the Middle East, 9,000 years ago in Southeast Asia, and 5,000 years ago in Central America. In its place came the domestication of nature that occurred in agricultural and pastoral settlements, and the emergence of a ruling class, with its dependence on the use of ‘power over.’ From the very beginning, the species felt it was required to adapt to the ‘power to’ model in order to survive and evolve. The transition to a vertically structured society, sustained by violence in its many forms, occurred through a process of bio-cultural rather than genetic evolution.

There is one major problem with the ‘power-to’ model: Rulers are inclined to abuse their privileged position and serve themselves at the expense of the ruled. In other words, they lapse into the ‘power over’ mode. And, as noted above, even when it is operating as it should, it is usually confined to the governmental levels of nation-state and below where the rule of law is accepted and can be readily enforced. At the international level the disorder of anarchy (‘power over’) reigns unless tempered by shrewd diplomacy and respect for the dignity of every human being. The destructive power at our disposal means we must turn to, as Martin Luther King (1968) notes, “an idea whose time has come...Together we must learn to live as brothers or together we will be forced to perish as fools” (pp. 169, 171). The power formulae requiring our serious consideration lie in the next two models of nonviolence.

### ***Power From/With Model of Pragmatic Nonviolence***

This model has gained prominence from the writings of Gene Sharp. The Sharpian model of power aims to conduct successful campaigns against all manner of opponents without incurring the use of violence. Nonviolence is seen as not only a morally superior form of political action, but one that can claim a proven record of successes. It achieves its objective with fewer casualties, lower financial costs and more democratic methods. Its goals are more apt to be met, and its outcomes to set the stage for a more peaceful future than when people turn to the model of ‘power over.’

The focus of Sharp’s model is on perfecting nonviolence as a technique or political tool, and not on elevating it to a way of life or philosophy. Since the topic of nonviolence is considered in another chapter, the Sharpian arguments are set out in adumbrated form (see Sharp 1973, 2005).

The fundamental concept underlying nonviolent struggle involves the power structure that applies to every society. Contrary to popular thinking, power does not flow downward from the apex of a pyramid to the base (monolithic system). Power is widely distributed (pluralistic system), so that it flows upward from the base. Without any exceptions (autocracy, oligarchy, or democracy), this structure means that every ruler’s power ultimately depends on the obedience, consent, and/or cooperation of the person/persons over whom the power is exercised. If consent is withdrawn—if people refuse to follow orders and obey laws—then the ruler topples from his/her perch and ceases to rule. If there are no subjects to order about, no ruler... Power is not intrinsic to the ruler. The ruler’s basic structural vulnerability enables the subjects to effect policy changes and, in extreme circumstances, bring about the downfall of the ruler’s regime.

Change may occur in different ways. It may happen because the ruler has recognized the validity of the protesters’ case. However, change is more likely to occur because the ruler makes the assessment that accommodation is wiser than expending more effort and resources on a prolonged counter campaign. It happens, though, that in most campaigns, nonviolent activists’ opponents have been coerced against their will into accepting demands, or the withdrawal of consent is so comprehensive it brings about the disintegration of the regime.

There are sources of power that the ruler can call on to counter people's ability to withdraw consent. These sources include authority (which in Weber's terms takes the form of charismatic, traditional, or institutional), human resources (loyal advisers, administrators, police, military officers, etc.), skills and knowledge (capabilities of the human resources), material resources (extent to which ruler controls property, infrastructure, natural resources, etc.), intangible factors (habits and attitudes within the society), and sanctions (force that can be mustered when subjects disobey).

There are reasons why people are inclined to obey. Sharp lists seven: (1) habit of doing things a certain way which can go back generations; (2) moral and legal obligation to obey as a good citizen; (3) self interest of financial gain, prestige, power, etc., in working with the regime; (4) psychological identification with ruler where people see the regime and its leader as an extension of themselves; (5) zones of indifference where people may disagree in one area, but approve of what the ruler is doing in others, and as a result will 'accept the bad with the good;' (6) subjects' lack of self-confidence means they are prepared to accept status quo; (7) fear of punitive sanctions that can cost them anything from their life or job, to social standing.

In conducting a campaign, the grand strategy should be directed at increasing the opponent's dependency and the activists' independence. The former is achieved by reducing the effectiveness of the power resources at the opponent's command—taking 'power from.' At the same time the activists should strive to strengthen their independence—their 'power with' supporters. They do this by withdrawing their collective consent and focusing on building up the self-sufficiency of the internal movement.

To increase the opponent's dependency, one must discover the weak links in the sources of power and apply pressure by either acting directly on these sources or indirectly through third parties. In many cases a direct withdrawal of consent would have no effect on the ruler. Rulers do not need the protesters' support. Knowing this, the protesters appeal with nonviolent methods to a third party whose withdrawal of support from the originally targeted party does have a successful effect. On the other hand, it may be that the third party has no clout with the first party, but it can trigger the support of a fourth party that does have influence. These targeted parties may respond positively to a nonviolent action because their own interests are threatened or their moral indignation is aroused.

The other part of the equation for successful nonviolent action is to strengthen the independence of the protesters, to increase their 'power with.' This can be done by following procedures that can help to enhance a group's power.\* If the activists

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\*One checklist of ten such procedures uses the letter 'S' to facilitate recollection. It includes: Maintaining group **solidarity**; keeping **spirits** high; showing the **supervision** of quality leadership; using **slogans/symbols** to convey message; calling on **song** and the other muses to create new dimensions of the cause; understanding the **science** of nonviolent political action; formulating a viable **strategy** and tactics from the science; developing and managing **self-service** projects such as parallel institutions; writing a **script** that accurately reflects the demands of the protesters and is clearly communicated to the opponent; learning the practical **skills** necessary to respond non-violently to provocations of the ruler's functionaries and other non-sympathizers.

are able to consolidate the factors that enable their independence and are able to exploit their opponent's vulnerability, they stand a good chance of achieving *success*. Unfortunately, as Sharp has often pointed out, movements arise with a momentum of their own, and the leadership is apt to proceed in an *ad hoc* fashion, ignorant of the strategic possibilities at their disposal. Nonetheless, many successful nonviolent campaigns have been waged without pre-knowledge of the systematic finer points. The campaigns number in the thousands and have been recorded extensively in a literature that is growing by leaps and bounds. It refutes the popular notion that nonviolence is only effective in democratic countries, as some of the most notable campaigns have been conducted against extremely ruthless opponents (Summy 1994).

A number of social scientists have critiqued the Sharpian model. For example, Martin (1989) argues that Sharp discounts the importance of structures and systems—such as capitalism, patriarchy, statism, bureaucracy, and technology—that have power dynamics of their own, creating ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ that divide the oppressed and undermine the straight-forward ruler/ruled dichotomy. Others argue that for the repressed to gain unity of purpose and sustain a commitment of nonviolence, they may first not only have to liberate themselves from a series of structural impediments, but also overcome deeply rooted cultural, even sub-conscious factors.

This does not mean that the Sharpian dichotomy, which allows for the good news of human agency, is lacking validity. It only indicates that the neat division between ruler and ruled needs to also take into account the complex series of ongoing social forces acting within that dual relationship.

### ***‘Power Within’ Model of Principled Nonviolence***

The fourth and final model draws on and expresses the ‘power within’ of the individual and the group. It is multidimensional and extends onto the terrain of the other models, but it is guided by the overriding principle of acting nonviolently in one's personal life and in all the realms of politics. Thus, nonviolence is more than a technique; it is a way of life, a philosophical commitment that permeates every aspect of one's being (spiritual, mental, and emotional).

Unlike the preceding Sharpian model, which concentrates on overcoming perceived existing injustices, the adherent of principled nonviolence—in addition to removing current social iniquities—sees the need to try to prevent them from arising in the first place. The undertaking is similar to that of the professional fireman. One is trained and ready to respond to the fire alarm, but also devotes time to showing people how they can reduce the likelihood of ever having to sound the alarm. Another metaphor is that of the doctor. A doctor can deal principally with curing the ills of the patient or can undertake a holistic approach that strives to keep the patient continually healthy. The aim is to treat the healthy patient so as to head off a medical breakdown before it occurs.

The characteristics of the 'power within' model are exemplified in the philosophies of Gandhi, King and Tutu, three titans of nonviolence (Borrewes 1996). Although they approached principled nonviolence from different analytic frameworks and faced different challenges in the campaigns they led, they all preached the same message of self-sacrifice, compassion, love, welfare of the other, inclusiveness, collaboration, convergence of means and ends, diversity, pursuit of knowledge, community, and identity. These qualities were nurtured at all levels of human intercourse: in the struggle with self, interpersonal relations, the relations between nations, and in the reaching for a spirit beyond.

Gandhi referred to nonviolence as *satyagraha*, the exercising of truth (*satya*) force (*graha*). With the 'power within' that resides in every human being, we are able to strive for Truth in all areas of human endeavor. However, because our capacities as human beings are limited, we can never know Absolute Truth or God. All we can do is try to move in that direction.

The discipline imposed on the self at the intra level is extremely demanding, and the pursuit of relative truth at the other levels of human interaction can call for the sacrifice of one's life rather than that of the opponent. Gandhi never shirked from the possibility of his own death. He was prepared to fast to death on a number of occasions, and he refused the protection of armed guards. But inviting self sacrifice has not featured on the agenda of every exemplar of integrative power. Individuals can practice and encourage principled nonviolence without making such supreme demands on themselves and their close followers.

An example is provided by Nobel laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999). His nonviolence speaks of the life force generated in relationships. He refers to the word *ubuntu*, which in the Nguni group of languages signifies "the very essence of being human." A person with *ubuntu* imparts compassion and generosity, gentleness and hospitality, and the ability to share, because it "means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours" (pp. 34, 35). I am because you are. A person becomes a person through other persons. When the process breaks down badly, as it did in South Africa during the days of *apartheid*, the healing after the conflict could only take place when the parties accepted reconciliation and restorative justice as the means of overcoming festering resentment, retribution, and revenge. In heading the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Tutu was able to put into practice a basic core of his belief system.

The speeches and writings of Martin Luther King Jr. (1963) refer to the many sacrifices that the African-Americans will have to make in order to gain their rightful place in a white society, but those sacrifices, in the main, do not feature loss of life. While the nonviolent struggle for equality and justice in the face of entrenched racism inevitably raised the prospect of fatal casualties, those most at risk were the civil rights leadership. Indeed, he predicted his own death on the eve of the assassination. For his most committed followers he also sounded a fateful note, proclaiming that, "If a man hasn't discovered something that he will die for, he isn't fit to live" (1968, p. 181).

King's goal was not the God of Absolute Truth. Behind the daily struggles for civil rights, what spurred King and his close supporters was the journey along the



pathway to the “Beloved Community” or “Kingdom of God.” Its destination was the defining motif of King’s life and thought. He observed:

Although man’s moral pilgrimage may never reach a destination point on earth, his never-ceasing strivings may bring him ever closer to the city of righteousness. And though the Kingdom of God may remain not yet as a universal reality in history, in the present it may exist in such isolated forms as in judgment, in personal devotion, and in some group life (1963, p. 83).

Central to the “Beloved Community” was the concept of love from which flowed human brotherhood/sisterhood and justice. Collectively, they constituted the practices to pursue *en route* to the ideal human society, because, as with Gandhi, the means were ends in the making. Love, as the fountainhead, took the form of three ancient Greek words: *eros*, *philia*, and *agape*. The first pertained to the aesthetic, romantic, and sexual love between two people; the second to the reciprocal and affectionate love that existed among siblings and friends; but the third (*agape*) generated the energy of nonviolence that built the “Beloved Community.” Student civil rights leader, Diane Nash (1990), even proposed that the word “nonviolence” should be discarded in favor of “agapic energy...with truth and love as the basis” (quoted in Ingram 1990, pp. 214–215).

King’s *agape* (and Nash’s) embodied understanding and redemptive goodwill for all human beings. He described it as “an overflowing love that seeks nothing in return...the love of God operating in the human heart” (1970, p. 88). It is an unconditional love without depending on the contingent characteristics of others. One does not know the ‘other’ personally, but is expressing love towards a fellow human being. With *agape* the confinement to “my house” gives way to the reality of “our world house,” demanding that we recognize

...all life is interrelated. All men are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied into a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly. I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be, and you can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be. This is the interrelated structure of reality (1963, p. 70).

The words that express the foundations of integrative power may vary, but the meaning remains the same for all three leaders and those who share their paradigm of how power should be exercised and for what purposes.

Transforming high ideals into efficacious action represents the ultimate challenge. Is the template of integrative power effective in building and maintaining structures and in generating a culture that eschews—or at least significantly minimizes—all types of violence? Is radical change possible by nonviolent means? The answer to both questions appears to be a ‘yes,’ but with strong reservations about making excessive claims. While enormous, the task is not impossible. As Kenneth Boulding, one of the founders of modern peace research, liked to remind listeners of his cardinal law: Whatever has happened once cannot be considered impossible; it can subsequently be repeated. His optimism, however, should be tempered with the knowledge that Gandhi and his successors, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, failed to extend beyond a few communities the constructive program designed to bring *satyagraha* to fulfillment. And in the case of King, once

the major struggle of civil rights had been largely won, the movement began to wane and with it the prospect of realizing the “Beloved Community.”

With regard to the first question about preventing outbreaks of violence, certainly much can be accomplished if resources are deployed into reducing poverty and income/wealth disparities, improving health conditions, raising general educational standards, teaching peace studies and conflict resolution skills, protecting the biosphere, increasing the financial and political support for the United Nations, erasing past humiliations, and encouraging greater political participation among the populace. At the same time resources need to be withdrawn from the armament industry, the small-arms trade abolished with strict policing, the tax holes enjoyed by multinationals closed, and an international tax that is channeled to the UN imposed on all currency exchanges.

Curbing the armament industry and armament trade arguably poses the most urgent problem for all the power models to the left of the ‘power over’ mindset. The amount of money spent by Western countries on armaments stands out as a double curse. First, and most significantly, humans are stockpiling for future violence, and second, they are shunting huge sums of money into a negative project when it is desperately needed for a wide range of positive purposes. During the last 100 years, the casualties of wars and war-related causes have numbered in the hundreds of millions. This is before counting ‘democides’ (states killing their own people), homicides, and suicides. And yet the sale of guns and armaments is allowed to continue by governments and is even openly sponsored by them. The following figures speak for themselves:

Worldwide military spending reached \$1.2 trillion in 2006, the eighth consecutive annual rise, which is now reaching the level of annual spending during the Cold War. The US was responsible for 46% of the total or \$528.7 billion. After the US the next biggest spender at 5% was the UK, followed in order by France, China, Japan, Germany, Russia, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and India (Sipri 2006). With the exception of India, all of the top ten spenders came from Western countries or the government of a country in the US camp. For the US in 2005, its military outlay (\$534 billion) amounted to 19 times what it spent on overseas development assistance (much of which was used by developing countries to purchase goods from US corporations) (OECD 2005). The US expenditure on the Iraq war has soared past the 500 billion mark (Baldwin 2007). That is more than the amount the UK’s Stern Review estimated it would cost the entire world to stop runaway climate change at \$444 billion per year (1% of global GDP) (Stern Report 2007). And yet the comparison only becomes more tragic. According to Nobel Prize-winning economist and former senior economist at the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz (2008), the reported cost of the Iraq war has been underestimated by a factor of six. He maintains that the true cost of the war, which should also take into account collateral expenses such as the medical and welfare bills of US military servicemen, comes to the staggering sum of approximately 3 trillion dollars.

The huge sums spent on weapons and other preparations for war, along with the sale of arms to developing countries and strategic allies, is almost a sure guarantee that conflicts in the immediate future will not be solved nonviolently on the basis

of equity and justice. Therefore, to arrest the almost certain prospect of continuing and greater bloodshed, 'new thinking' and action are urgently needed.

The answer to the second question concerning the possibility of radical change by nonviolent means does have a promising record, as the Sharpian model has demonstrated. The number of successful nonviolent campaigns has risen sharply after the Gandhi-led movement for independence in India. The literature on the subject has multiplied, and the relevance of nonviolence is gaining recognition among social scientists.

A problem that confronts the exponent of 'integrative power' is that most of the successful nonviolent campaigns have resulted from the ability to coerce the opponent or disintegrate his regime. Very few of Gandhi's campaigns, for instance, effected change through persuasion, his preferred mechanism. The British Viceroy came to terms with the movement most reluctantly. They were the targets of 'power over' methods. Gandhi's fasts were successful, because, if he died, the British feared a wide-scale uprising beyond their ability to control. When questioned about his reliance on coercive nonviolence, Gandhi insisted he was not forcing the British on policy matters, but merely using the device to open dialogue on unresolved issues.

Gandhi and most 'power within' advocates do not endorse the tactic of nonviolent activists deliberately provoking an opponent to respond violently in order to gain the sympathy of the non-committed public—a process described by Sharp (2005, pp. 405–408) as "political jiu-jitsu," where the effectiveness of the violence rebounds negatively against its instigator.

What becomes apparent the more one investigates the Gandhian and other categories of dispensing power is that people adopt varying positions along a continuum running between the pure types. No one is purely this or that. Nevertheless, in order to understand the assumptions that underlie a person's general position—and the tensions and dilemmas that can arise in devising strategies and tactics therefrom—the theoretical categories are useful.

## Conclusion

There are two closing points to stress. The first follows on from the concluding remark of the last section. As mentioned, the four power models that have been presented are pure types, but in the murky real world of agonizing political choice—where a range of likely political outcomes has to be carefully weighed, if one is to act responsibly—the power paradigm may take on a more heterogeneous configuration. Constantly changing circumstances and evolving value and policy preferences will affect decision making, so that the position of a political actor at any one moment will appear somewhere on a line running from the Gandhian, to the Sharpian, to the authority/influence, to the domination model. However, if people wander too far from their home base, they can expose themselves to the criticism of inconsistency or apostasy. They can also be left with a psychological feeling of rootlessness.

As already noted, classification systems contribute to our analytical understanding of complex social phenomena. Setting up models of how we exercise power puts in sharp relief the nature of the barrier erected between many political scientists and politicians on the one hand and peace researchers and activists on the other. If the barrier is ever to be lowered, dialogue must be directed at the crux of the division — that is, on how power can be used most effectively for the benefit of humankind on various planes of social interaction. When someone, for instance, talks about the need to enter into negotiations from a position of strength in order to maximize benefits in ‘our’ favor, the red light of ‘power over’ should go on, and a discussion about other ways of exercising power introduced. A world without killing and one that practices nonviolence individually and collectively will never be realized until humankind jettisons the ‘power over’ model. The good news is that the alternative path has already been started by Gandhi, Sharp, and many others.

Thus, the radical change is underway. That is the second point to be stressed in this conclusion. There are many historical examples of humans bringing about radical change through their determination and courage. If William Wilberforce and his fellow campaigners were able to triumph over the ‘impossibility’ of abolishing the slave trade 200 years ago, later followed by slavery itself, who can gainsay today that war and other forms of violence cannot be abolished. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, a mindset prevailed that chattel slavery was ‘natural’ to the behavior of humankind. It was immutable; it had existed throughout the recorded history of humankind. Yet by the twentieth century, it continued in only a few remote communities. In similar fashion, there is no logical reason why *Realpolitik* cannot be consigned to the dustbin of history.

Other inhumane practices that have been abolished include human sacrifice to appease the gods and dueling to avenge a slight to one’s honor. Progress has also been made (though to a lesser degree) in abolishing capital punishment. According to Amnesty International (cited in Paige, p. 43), 73 countries and territories by the beginning of the twenty-first century no longer legally sentenced people to death.

Overcoming the impossible can become a commonplace activity. Who would have imagined less than a hundred years ago that an International Bill of Human Rights—comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols—would acquire the status of enforceable international law, and that people would be tried and convicted for crimes against humanity? The introduction of an international code of human rights, capable of overriding state sovereignty, arguably represents the most extraordinary achievement of the past century. In the same way, a changing world, along with rational analysis and a concerted campaign, may be the three factors that transform the thinking of political scientists and political actors to abandon *Realpolitik* in favor of a nonviolent power paradigm.

With military spending out of control, arms transfers unchecked, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posing an ever more dangerous threat, and the lethality of weapon capability increasing at an exponential rate, the time has arrived

for a radical change. A ‘U’ turn in the way we think about and utilize power has become not only desirable, but absolutely necessary.

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# Chapter 6

## Assessing the Peacefulness of Cultures

Joseph de Rivera

### Introduction

If the world order is to move away from its present chaotic and violent condition, building cultures of peace warrants the highest priority. This is a difficult task, and establishing new machinery for resolving conflict is not easy, yet evidence suggests that some of our contemporary societies are developing relatively peaceful cultures. Certainly we can assess the extent to which different peoples have been able to employ nonviolent means to resolve conflict within themselves and with others.

By assessing the relative peacefulness of different cultures, we can set standards for what is possible, detect trouble spots, possibly encourage some healthy competition, and have a way of evaluating the effects of social movements and government policies. It may also provide a background for the assessment of peace operations that aim at transforming a society from a culture of war to one that deals with its problems with nonviolent means (Schumacher 2007). However, assessing the peacefulness of cultures requires us to say what we mean by both peacefulness and culture, and both concepts are more complex than one might imagine.

In the English language, peacefulness may simply imply the opposite of violence; we can assess such “negative peace” with measures of homicide, rape, and war. We might also consider the extent to which nations spend money on their military, make military threats, or imprison their own people. However, violence is not always so evident. Gandhi remarked that the worst form of violence was poverty, and certainly poverty, like war, injures people by subjecting them to disease, malnutrition, and a general restriction of the human potential. Often such poverty is masked by oppressive societal structures that maintain the dominance of elites. GALTUNG (1969) argues that such indirect violence is masked if we simply focus on direct violence. Rather, we should assess a “positive peace” that should include longevity, equality, and other indicators of justice. Further, in Chinese the characters for peace imply harmony; in Hebrew, *shalom* is connected to *shalem*, signifying well-being or “wholeness” (in the sense in which we might speak of a whole rather than broken pot or a whole rather than a broken people). Such terms suggest a peacefulness that is active and strong as well as positive. Ideally, we should assess peacefulness in this fullest sense. ANDERSON (2004) suggests that we should use both objective and

subjective measures of harmony, as well as indicators of violence, and assess peacefulness on global and personal as well as on cultural levels.

The concept of culture is problematic in a number of different ways. First, although we generally think of culture as characteristic of an ethnic group or people, we may also speak of the culture of an organization, a region, or a nation. Any of these may be relatively peaceful or violent. To some extent these cultures are always being changed by both internal forces and the circumstance with which the culture must cope. Local cultures are influenced by the wider cultures in which they are embedded, and we may even speak of a global culture that influences all people to some degree no matter how much they attempt to isolate themselves from it. Hence, we must specify what sort of culture we are assessing and what cultures of that type are being influenced by the cultures that impinge upon it.

Second, to some extent we may want to distinguish between a people's culture and the way people are behaving in particular circumstances. Thus, it is certainly possible to speak of the Nepalese or Cambodians as having relatively peaceful cultures in spite of the civil war that erupted in Nepal and the genocide that occurred in Cambodia. Certainly the cultures were not violent in the sense that the Aztec culture was, or in the sense of current US culture; one could argue that circumstances created a situation that temporarily shattered the social system and permitted systemic violence in spite of an essentially peaceful culture. On the other hand, it could be argued that although people in Nepal and Cambodia may have been socialized to treat each other with respect, there was underlying corruption and inequality that created fault lines that were revealed when external circumstances impinged. The problem of distinguishing between temporary political systems and deeper cultural institutions presents difficult problems for assessment. We want to focus on culture, but it seems unwise to attribute all aspects of peacefulness and violence to culture when some aspects may pertain to the current political situation and emotional climate.

Third, although there is agreement that culture involves attitudes, values, and ways of behaving that support nonviolent conflict resolution and addressing the underlying roots of conflict, there is a gap between these cultural norms and the bases that are posited to underlie such cultural norms. One *presumes* that peace education, gender equality, democracy, open communications, human rights, tolerance, sustainable economic development, and international security are bases for a culture of peace, but we cannot be sure without empirical data. What sort of peace education and democracy are required? How can we have open communication create transparency without fostering intolerance and violence? What are the best ways to promote gender equality without devaluing parenting, and ought we to add the valuing and nourishing of children to our list of bases, since it is the one base for which we have the most empirical evidence? Ideally, we should be measuring the cultural norms separately from the bases, and to some extent we shall see that this is possible. However, at this time we lack much normative data and have better measurements for the bases. Hence, our current assessments rely more on putative bases or indirect reflections of culture rather than on direct evidence of nonviolent conflict resolution.

## Assessing National Cultures of Peace

### *Assessing the Bases*

Fortunately, we have objective measures that may be used to assess at least some aspects of each of the eight bases for culture of peace. Consider the currently available indicators shown in Table 6.1. They are presented as a template that can be used to assess each of the bases we presume indicate a contemporary culture of peace. More detailed consideration may be found in the chapters in the next section of the handbook, each of which focuses on a particular base.

**Table 6.1** Template for assessing a national culture of peace

Aspect of culture and UN area of action	Objective measures available	Needed measures
<b>Societal norms</b>		
1. Peace education: To what extent are people educated (or socialized) to see themselves as a peaceful people with norms that emphasize cooperation and the resolution of conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence?	Percent GDP devoted to education*	Number of peace education programs per capita Normative data Ratio of nonviolent to violent TV programs
2. Valuing of women and nurturance: To what extent are the voices of women as important as those of men, and to what extent are children and nurturance valued?	Percent of seats in legislature held by women (UN gender empowerment includes other measures)	Availability of maternity/paternity leave, daycare programs Ratio affectionate/harsh socialization practices
3. Societal cohesion and tolerance: To what extent do understanding, tolerance, solidarity, and mutual obligation form the basis of a cohesive society (rather than the image of a common enemy or a rigid set of norms?)	Number of refugees admitted (minus refugees generated or displaced within the nation) relative to total population	Number of national celebrations in which different ethnic groups participate Patriotism/nationalism ratio
<b>State structures achieve political stability by</b>		
4. Democratic participation: To what extent is there democratic participation, with a civic society that enables freedom of advocacy so that personal needs can be met?	Vanhanen Democratization Index (number contested elections × participation in elections)	Number of NGOs relative to population
5. Open communication: To what extent is there open communication with transparency and accountability, rather than press control and corruption?	Freedom House’s Press Freedom Ratings (Corruption scores by Transparency International are also available)	Publicly debated issues (e.g., war in Iraq, gay marriage) minus undebated issues (e.g., military budget, drug legalization). Nonviolent/violent TV programs

(continued)



**Table 6.1** (continued)

Aspect of culture and UN area of action	Objective measures available	Needed measures
6. Human rights and the inclusion of all groups: To what extent are human rights ensured by a government that includes all groups and has enough authority to insure these rights are maintained?	Inverse of Gibney’s political terror ratings of Amnesty International data	Measure of group inclusion
<b>Environmental characteristics</b>		
7. International security: To what extent does the society encourage international security rather than compete for power and sell arms?	Military expenditure as a percent of GDP Use of military threats (Arms sales/foreign aid also available)	Number of vetoes of Security Council Resolutions Percent of population imprisoned (available for only some nations)
8. Equitable and sustainable development: To what extent is there equitable and sustainable development so that needs are met in ways that are in harmony with the environment?	GDP per capita; life expectancy; adult literacy Gini inequality index and Homicide rate	A composite of current measure of recycling, waste generation, and environmental degradation

*Note.* \*Currently, there are no measures of the extent to which nonviolent education is being taught in different societies. Although there are many instances of classes in conflict resolution, programs to teach principles of negotiation and mediation, and trainings for the practice of nonviolence, we lack counts of such programs or any systematic comparisons of school curricula. There also do not appear to be any comparative studies of the cooperative, nonviolent norms that theoretically should be produced by such teachings.

One study obtained the measures in Table 6.1 from 74 nations, correlated the measures to see the extent to which they were interrelated, and examined the matrix of correlations to see if the data could be explained by a small set of underlying factors (DE RIVERA 2004a). If all the measures were highly related, we would find a single factor or basis for a culture of peace and could present a single figure reflecting a society’s peacefulness. However, the analysis revealed four factors. Thus, in our current nation-state system we might say that there are four dimensions to the bases for a culture of peace. It is instructive to note what these are. The first might be termed “Liberal Development” because it involves measures for “liberal” press freedom, democracy, human rights, and gender equality, and the measures for “development” as indicated by per capita GDP, life expectancy, and literacy. Yet, important as this factor is, it is unrelated to the factor we may label Violent Inequality because it involves variables such as the Gini index of economic inequality and homicide rate. And, neither of these dimensions is related to State Use of Violent Means as measured by military expenditures as a percent of GDP and the use of military threats (a measure also highly related to the percent of population imprisoned). Finally, the analysis revealed a “Nurturance” factor involving the amount of GDP spent on education, the measure of tolerance for refugees and, to a lesser but significant extent, the percent of women in parliament and human rights organizations.

This analysis suggests that liberal development (including democracy) may be a necessary basis for a culture of peace, but it is by no means a sufficient basis. There are a number of reasons why this is so. First, development often requires competition, and this is apt to create large inequalities and internal violence unless a government devotes resources to aid those who begin with fewer resources or lack the skills or will to compete in the market. Second, there is evidently nothing in liberal development per se that prevents the development and use of state violence against other nations and internal populations. Third, although liberal development involves a degree of human rights, it evidently does not necessarily involve a concern for the refugees of other nations. Thus, although all eight bases may be required for a culture of peace to exist fully, they do not necessarily cohere.

This analysis may be criticized from two completely different perspectives:

From a “conservative” point of view, it may be argued that the military expenditures and use of force by nations who score highly on state violence may actually be a cause of relative peace because it holds unscrupulous dictators and criminals in check. From this perspective, the peacefulness of the smaller nations rests on the security provided by the mighty. Personally, I find this argument to reflect a current culture of war and to serve as an excuse for the dominance of the larger, more powerful nations.

From a “radical” point of view, it may be argued that all nation-states are based on a monopoly of violence and that the current nation-state system reflects a global culture of war. From this perspective, no nation can really have a culture of peace, and an analysis suggesting otherwise actually supports the current culture of violence. Personally, I believe this argument ignores the fact that some sort of police forces appear necessary, and power struggles need to be adjudicated. Hence, I prefer to regard our current nation-states as flawed attempts to create cultures of peace and to note that some are relatively successful. Thus, in the cited analysis, a number of nations scored an above-average peacefulness on all four dimensions (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland) and may be usefully contrasted with China, Russia, the US, and numerous nations in the grips of civil war.

In any case, most can agree that some of the current nations are more peaceful than others. A recent study has used a mix of objective measures and measures based on subjective expert opinion to index the overall peacefulness of 134 nations (weighted 60% on measures related to internal violence and 40% on measures of external violence; see [www.visionofhumanity.com](http://www.visionofhumanity.com)). These overall scores may be predicted by the factor scores based on the objective scores reported in the de Rivera study. The multiple correlation is 0.83 with each of the first three factors entering the equation with almost equal weights. Although the overall scores provided are useful for some purposes, they require an arbitrary weighting of variables and do not allow us to see how nations may be peaceful along different dimensions, but not others. For example, although the US and Turkey have about the same score on the measure of overall violence, the US scores well in regards to liberal development, but quite poorly in state violence and about average in violent inequality and nurturance, whereas Turkey scores below average on liberal development and nurturance, but has less violent inequality and less state violence against other nations.

Although the importance of such bases may be granted, it may be objected that we are failing to measure the most important aspects of a culture of peace. Ideally, we would have measures of whether conflicts are resolved peacefully to the benefit of both parties, whether underlying sources of conflict were being addressed, and the extent to which we have harmony among people who care for one another rather than simply cooperation out of individualistic motives or group conformity.

Of course, when we wish to assess the bases of culture in a particular country rather than compare it with others, it is best to use all eight bases of the template presented in Table 6.1. In using such a template, it might be objected that objective measures may obscure important considerations such as heterogeneity of population, percentage of minorities, and the degree to which there are employment opportunities. However, these considerations can always be noted. Indeed, they often provide the basis for an adequate analysis of the nation's situation and an understanding of the particular challenges it faces. Quantitative measures provide a useful standard for analysis and, in his seminal study of war, RICHARDSON (1960) notes that simple counting is the best antiseptic for prejudice. The use of such measures also leads us to consider whether we should assess on an absolute or relative scale.

As an example, let us use the template to consider the extent to which the US has the bases for a culture of peace. The figures are shown in Table 6.2. To assist our assessment, the table also gives the values for Spain (which has suffered relatively little violence in the last 30 years) and Colombia (where there has been a high amount of violence within the society). The values may be compared to the mean and range of score for 74 nations for which there are available data. Most values are based on data published by the UN in 2002. See de Rivera (2004a) for specifics.

It may be noted that the US has high relative values on the available indicators for press freedom, human rights, GDP, literacy, and life expectancy. It approaches maximum scores on these measures, although it does not have the highest absolute values for any. It is about average on the amount spent on education, number of women in the legislature, the number of refugees it accepts, the extent of its inequality, and number of homicides. However, on several of these indicators, its scores are lower than Spain's, and it is evident that there is considerable room for improving these bases for a culture of peace. In all cases one may look at the half-full or half-empty glass and what one sees (and has) often depends on social class. Thus, in regards to peace education, people are socialized to form orderly lines, take turns, and obey local and national laws. However, they are also led to believe in a punitive social justice system and encouraged to disregard international law. Most troubling is its high scores on military expenditures and threats. The only nations with higher scores are China and Israel. These defects may be related to another, relatively low (32 percentile) score on the democracy index. This reflects the lack of contested elections because of high campaign costs and could probably be improved by publicly financing elections.

The template has also been used to assess the culture of peace in Spain (MORALES and LEAL 2004) and in Brazil (MILANI and BRANCO 2004). The former

**Table 6.2** Values of indicators for some different nations

Base	Measure	U.S value	Spain value	Colombia value	Mean and range of values for 74 nations
Peace Education	Percent GDP devoted to education	5.4	5.0	4.1	4.9 1.4 – 8.3
Valuing of women and nurturance	Percent of seats in legislature held by women	13.8	18.0	12.2	15.4 0.5 – 42.7
Societal cohesion and tolerance	Number of refugees admitted (minus those generated or displaced within the nation) relative to total pop.	1.79	0.18	-12.7	1.9 38.1 – 72.8
Democratic participation	Vanhanen Democratization Index (number contested elections × participation in elections)	17.7	39.2	16.5	22.4 0 – 42.8
Open Communication	Freedom House's Press Freedom Ratings	88	80	41	63.8 18 – 96
Human rights and inclusion of all groups	Inverse of Gibney's political terror ratings of Amnesty's data	45	50	11	36.4 11 – 50
International security	Military expenditure	3.1	1.3	2.3	2.2 0 – 9.5
Equitable development	Use of Military threats	60	6	4	13.1 0 – 81
	GDP per capita	34,142	19,472	6,248	12,782 1,022 – 50,061
	Life expectancy	76.8 99	78.1 97.4	70.7 91.2	71.7 43.5 – 80 89.5 40.1 – 99.7
Equitable development	Adult literacy				
	Gini inequality index	40.8	32.5	57.1	37.6 21.7 – 60.7
	Homicide rate	9	1.6	78.6	10.8 0.7 – 78.6

case is instructive in showing how each base can be assessed by using the multiple statistics available in developed countries. For example, MORALES and LEAL (2004) assess open communication by the rate of books and leaflets, titles in the daily press, rate of internet availability, annually issued books, number of libraries per 10,000 inhabitants, visits to web pages of the daily press, number of TV sets, radios, daily papers per 1,000, number of media under state control, number under private enterprise control, rate of citizen participation in radio and daily press, rate of TV time devoted to information and culture per total broadcast time. The latter case shows how the template can be used to assess the situation in economically

underdeveloped nations. MILANI and BRANCO (2004) show how the statistics available from Brazil can be supplemented by qualitative description of the nation's circumstances.

### *Assessing Attitudes and Values*

It is remarkable how little attention has been given to how we might we assess the attitudes, values, and ways of behaving that support nonviolent conflict resolution and address underlying roots of conflict. Although a number of studies have compared values in different nations, they have not focused on the values that might support conflict resolution. However, recent studies have begun to examine the relationship between values and the bases for a culture of peace. Do the subjective values held by a nation's people relate to objective measures that reflect a society's basis for a culture of peace? BASABE and VALENCIA (2007) have reported correlating each of the four dimensions with the sets of values described by HOFSTEDE (2001) and SCHWARTZ (1994). As might be expected, a nation's scores on Liberal Democracy are positively correlated (+0.57) with the extent to which its people value individualism (HOFSTEDE) and (+0.50) intellectual autonomy (SCHWARTZ). The scores also evidence strong significant negative correlations with Hofstede's measures of power-distance (-0.62) and Schwartz's measures of hierarchy (-0.69). It is important to note that none of these values significantly relate to the extent of a nation's Violent Inequality or State Use of Violence. Thus, these bases appear unrelated to valuing autonomy or hierarchy, and nothing about these values per se necessarily fosters or hinders violence. However, national scores on both violent inequality and state use of violence (measured completely by objective indicators) show significant negative correlations (-0.38, and -0.59, respectively) with the extent to which a nation's people value Harmony (as measured by Schwartz). This suggests that it may be highly desirable to cultivate harmony values and that this may be done without sacrificing liberal development.

Although Nurturance is not strongly related to values, it is significantly related (+0.52) to the extent to which positive emotion are reported. By contrast, Liberal Democracy is negatively related (-0.44) to the extent to which negative emotions are reported.

BASABE and VALENCIA (2007) and DIENER and TOV (2007) also examine correlations between national scores on the four peace factors and national scores on beliefs and attitudes from world value survey data (INGLEHART et al. 2004). The data show that:

1. Liberal Democracy is positively associated with people trusting others and negatively related with willingness to fight for country, racial intolerance, confidence in the armed forces, and endorsement of army rule.
2. Violent Inequality is negatively associated with people trusting others and positively related to endorsement of army rule and endorsement of autocracy.
3. Violent Means is positively related to confidence in the armed forces.

Of course, we do not know if there are causal relations, but the data are certainly consistent with the idea that the bases are related to important attitudes.

DIENER and TOV (2007) also examine the relationship between individual well-being and peaceful attitudes. They use hierarchical data analysis to investigate the effect that national level peace factors have on the relationship between an individual's subjective well-being and attitudes relevant for peace. Although the average person in nations with Liberal Democracy has greater well-being and less willingness to fight for his or her nation, there is a positive correlation within nations. The extent of a nation's Liberal Democracy moderates how strongly an individual's subjective well-being relates to the individual's support for democracy, autocracy, and racial intolerance so that the higher the national score, the larger the individual relationship. When Liberal Development is low, there is little relationship; as it increases, greater well-being correlates more positively with support for democracy and more negatively with support for autocracy and racial intolerance. Likewise, national scores on Violent Inequality moderate the relationship between subjective well-being and confidence in parliament and the civil service. As a nation's Violent Inequality decreases, happy people are more apt to have confidence in their government.

These results clearly suggest the importance of studying the relationships between attitudes, values, and the bases for cultures of peace. Although the world value survey asks dozens of questions, it fails to ask about attitudes towards violence and the nonviolent resolution of conflict. It is difficult to understand why the committee that governs a survey of world values ignores violence and peacefulness. One hopes they will remedy this omission in future surveys.

### *Assessing Ways of Being*

If studies on relevant values and attitudes are scarce, comparative studies on contemporary ways of being are almost nonexistent. Although there are a few measures of individual attitudes towards nonviolence (see MAYTON et al. 2002), there do not appear to be any measures of the ways of behaving (norms) that support nonviolent conflict resolution. A culture is not the sum of individual attitudes and opinions. Rather, it involves a set of social norms about ways of behaving. As FOGARTY (2000) points out, these norms are opinions about how people think *others* believe people ought to behave. One preliminary investigation (DE RIVERA 2004b) that attempted to formulate such norms contrasted personal attitudes and social norms towards nonviolence in the three nations whose objective data are presented above in Table 6.2. Thus, we may compare some norms in Spain, which has suffered relatively little violence in the last 30 years; Colombia, where there has been a high amount of violence within the society; and the US, where there has been a high degree of violence directed against other nations.

Respondents from different regions were given a sheet of paper that asked for their personal opinion on 12 items about "the way things should be" (1 indicated complete disagreement, 5 complete agreement). They then were asked to turn the

page over and report how they thought most others in their fellow country would respond to the items. Personal attitudes towards violence were significantly related to both nation and gender. The Spanish sample reported higher degrees of nonviolent attitudes than the Colombians, and the Colombians a higher degree than the US sample. Women had more nonviolent attitudes in all three countries. All comparisons between nations and between genders were significant at the 0.001 level with no significant interaction.

However, these personal attitudes towards violence had little to do with estimates of social norms. The correlation between the personal attitude scale and a social norms scale was only +0.21, and when the 12 individual items were examined, the correlations between personal opinions and estimates of social norms were usually low (none exceeded +0.26) and often insignificant. There were no significant differences between genders. When personal attitude was compared with the estimated social norm for the 12 items, it was found that a majority of those sampled believed that the social norm was more violent than their own attitude. This was true in 34 of the 36 possible comparisons; the differences were often large and were statistically significant in all countries.

The complexity of the organization of desirable social norms is illustrated by an examination of individual items. Table 6.3 shows how Spanish respondents reported significantly less violent norms for items 1, 3, 5, and 9, but that respondents from the US reported significantly less violence on item 11, and more desirable norms for items 2, 6, 8, and 12.

Often, the normative data appear to coincide with the objective measures reported in Table 6.2. For instance, the normative violence against criminals (suggested by questions 1 and 3) relates to higher homicide rates and economic inequality; the right to preemptively attack (question 9) relates to the amount spent on the military and the use of international threats; the greater personal kindness reflected in higher values for questions 6, 8, and lower values on question 11 relates to refugee acceptance, human rights, education expenditures, and per capita GDP.

**Table 6.3** National difference for social norms on individual items

Item	Spain	US	Colombia
1. Should give death penalty for murder	3.00***	3.48	3.54
3. All right to injure thief	3.39***	3.62***	4.04***
5. Use power to protect national interests	3.12	3.50	3.94***
9. National right to preemptively attack	2.98***	3.70	3.46
2. Should teach conflict resolution	2.68***	3.62	3.47
6. Majority of spouses treat each other kindly	2.99	3.33***	2.51
8. Willing to take care of a needy child	2.29	2.61**	1.96
11. Sometimes children need to be whipped	2.64*	2.25***	3.07
12. Willing to pay more taxes to help poor	1.36***	2.17	1.94

Significantly different from both other nations at

\* < 0.05,

\*\* < 0.01,

\*\*\* < 0.001

However, it should be noted that it is difficult to word normative questions in ways that can be generalized. Thus, the “national interest” of question 5 probably refers to preventing internal civil war for Colombians, but to international terrorism for those from the US. And it is not clear if the lower willingness to increase taxes for poverty relief in Spain (question 12) or the lesser desire to teach conflict resolution (question 2) reflect less caring for others or the fact that there is less inequality and violence. Although there is undoubtedly more of a norm against personal violence in Costa Rica than the US, data from both wealthy and poor neighborhoods show there is less personal security in Costa Rica—probably because the poorer economic situation results in greater police corruptibility (MAHONEY and PINEDO 2007)

Although the study is not definitive, it clearly shows that we should distinguish between personal attitudes and social norms. Since people tend to conform to norms, the latter may be better indicators for a culture of peace. The data suggest that although we may speak of a unitary attitude towards nonviolence at the personal level, we may not be able to do so at the societal level. Social norms appear to involve different dimensions of violence so that norms about helping others may not be related to norms inhibiting violence within the nation, and both these may have little to do with norms regarding violence towards other nations. Although the cited study asked about what most people felt *should* be, it would also be useful to ask about common practices in dealing with different sorts of conflicts. When are norms about taking turns, compromising, cooperating, or obeying laws abrogated?

### *Assessing Emotional Climates*

Although emotions are not mentioned in the UN’s description of a culture of peace, it seems clear that cultural peacefulness or violence will influence and be influenced by the emotional climate of a society. By emotional climate, we mean the collective emotions that characterize a society at any given point in its history—for example, the climate of fear created by the military junta in Argentina or cultivated by Pinochet in Chile. A description of different conceptualizations and methods of measurement may be found in de RIVERA and PÁEZ (2007). When the emotional climate of the peaceful Norwegian culture (above average on all four dimensions of peace) is contrasted with the more violent US culture (well below average on one dimension) and the culture in India (below average on three of the dimensions), the differences in emotional climate are clear. Norway significantly evidences more social trust and unity than the US, and the US more than India. Likewise, Norway has a climate with less social anger and fear than the US, and the US less than India (DE RIVERA, KURRIEN, and OLSEN 2007). Of course, we humans are responsible for creating the contexts in which emotional climates arise, and some evidence suggests that we can influence local climates in a positive direction that contributes to a culture of peace (BAR-TAL, HALPERIN, and de Rivera 2007).



## *Assessment of Local Communities*

We may also create indicators to assess the extent to which there is a culture of peace in our local communities. Some possibilities are shown in Table 6.4. In practice, different communities may want to use other indicators and bring community members together to ask them how they would like to assess the extent to which they have a culture of peace. Such a procedure is an excellent way of helping to create more of a culture of peace in towns, cities, and campuses.

**Table 6.4** Template for assessing local culture of peace

Aspect of culture and UN area of action	Objective measures
<b>Societal norms</b>	
1. Peace education: To what extent are people educated (or socialized) to see themselves as a peaceful people with norms that emphasize cooperation and the resolution of conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence?	Do local middle and high schools have peer mediation and anti-bullying programs? How many pages of history texts are devoted to cooperative enterprises as opposed to wars? What is the ratio of mediators to lawyers in the local phone directory? Are sports played nonviolently?
2. Valuing of women and nurturance: To what extent are the voices of women as important as those of men, and to what extent are children and nurturance valued? Is there time for parents to be with children and to train them in resolving conflicts?	Are women well represented in local government? Is quality day care affordable? Are schools well funded so that arts, music and sports are available?
3. Societal cohesion and tolerance: To what extent do understanding, tolerance, solidarity, and mutual obligation form the basis of a cohesive society (rather than the image of a common enemy or a rigid set of norms?). Are there ways to make our interdependence clear?	Are there parades and celebrations that include different groups and foster reconciliation? What is the ratio between % voting in the richest and poorest wards? What is the homicide rate? Are restorative justice programs available?
<b>State structures achieve political stability by</b>	
4. Democratic participation: To what extent is there democratic participation, with a civic society that enables freedom of advocacy so that personal needs can be met?	What percentage of residents over 18 are registered to vote? How many local elections are contested and what percentage vote? Do people feel they have a voice in deciding local issues?
5. Open communication: To what extent is there open communication with transparency and accountability, rather than press control and corruption?	Is there a local paper? Are all letters to the editor published? Is there a local radio and TV station? Are local media owned by different people? Are creative arts publicly available? Do they relate rather than constrict?

(continued)

**Table 6.4** (continued)

Aspect of culture and UN area of action	Objective measures
6. Human rights and the inclusion of all groups: To what extent are human rights ensured by a government that includes all groups and has enough authority to insure these rights are maintained?	Is the police force controlled by the city council? To what extent do people from all social classes trust the local police? Is there access to a human-rights organization?
<b>Environmental characteristics</b>	
7. Security: To what extent does the society rely on unarmed police and encourage international security?	Is community policing emphasized? Are some police unarmed? To what extent does the local economy involve commercial trade rather than military contracts?
8. Equitable and sustainable development: To what extent is there equitable and sustainable development so that needs are met in ways that are in harmony with the environment?	What % of energy is from sustainable sources? Are there local farmer markets? Are natural spaces (fields, streams) available? What is the Gini inequality index?

## Some Conclusions

Reflecting upon the results of our attempt to assess cultures of peace suggests a number of conclusions:

1. The UN concept of a culture of peace centers on the idea of transforming violent competition into cooperation for shared goals. Since national data show that State Use of Violent Means is not related to Liberal Development or to Violent Inequality, we may want to differentiate the arenas in which conflicts must be managed. We may want to note how conflicts between government and people, between haves and have-nots, between different groups within a society, and between societies may each be settled in different ways. Nonviolence, both as objectively measured and normatively assessed, may be held as a dominant value in one arena but not in another, so that cultures are not necessarily uniformly peaceful or violent. Nonviolent solutions to the conflict between government and people may involve economic development, democracy, open communication, and human rights, but this may not result in nonviolent solutions to the conflict between rich and poor or conflicts with other nations.

One aspect of this complexity is that the cultures of nation-states are intertwined in an evolving global economy and culture. GALTUNG (1971) has pointed out that the interests of elites in different nations are often more closely linked with one another than with the interests of the majority within their own nation, and the disharmony between elite and non-elite interests is relatively less in a central dominating nation than in the peripheral nations subjected to the domination. These facts suggest that a future global culture of peace may

require an increased awareness of how all peoples are interrelated. We may want to develop ways to assess the extent to which both elites and peoples evidence an awareness of global needs, a concern for the welfare of others who are not part of their own nation and interest group, and a willingness to act on behalf of global interests.

2. The fact that some nations are above average on all four factors suggests that the idea of creating cultures of peace should not be dismissed as unrealistic and that we may be able to learn from the policies adapted by above average nations. For example, we noted how the competition involved in liberal development inevitably results in an increase in inequality. Norway has mitigated this problem by taxing incomes enough to provide college education for all who desire it and educating and encouraging everyone to vote (MILNER 2001). Hence, there are very few class distinctions, and the ratio between the richest and lowest 20% is only 4 to 1 (compared with a 9 to 1 ratio in the US and a 20 to 1 ratio in Colombia). Different ethnic groups are predisposed to in-group favoritism and prejudice, and people have a commitment to different belief systems that make it difficult to achieve global solidarity. Yet, Canada has managed to maintain a peaceful state in spite of severe ethnic strain, in part by separating ethnic and state identity. GOTTLIEB (1993) has argued that in a number of situations, it may be possible to separate ethnic and state identities and legal systems so that conflicts can be isolated and contained by state identity.
3. The focus on liberalism and development with its attendant focus on the values of independence and equality has distracted attention from an examination of violent inequality and state use of violence. These equally important factors are not related to a people valuing individuality, autonomy, or an absence of hierarchy, but to a ranking of harmony as an important value. Since the factors are orthogonal, it may well be possible to cultivate a value for harmony without reducing the impetus for liberal development. This would help achieve more peaceful cultures.
4. Assessing the different bases for a culture of peace in a given nation allows us to define problem areas and suggest what might help a particular nation attain a more peaceful culture. In the case of the US, it seems clear that state violence—reflected in both a violent foreign policy and a high incidence of imprisonment—is a central concern. The war in Iraq is but one manifestation of a military-industrial complex that has persisted for over 50 years. Perhaps the best path to changing this aspect of US culture would be to work on the relative weakness of a different base—that of democracy. Since many elections are not contested because of high costs, it would seem fairly easy to improve this base by having publicly financed elections. In the case of any nation, an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of its bases should suggest foci for action.
5. Although this chapter has concentrated on national cultures, it would seem that cultures of peace could be promoted on college campuses and in towns and cities by encouraging communities to use a template to assess the degree to which a culture of peace exists and could be encouraged.

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**Section II**  
**Building the Eight Bases**  
**for a Culture of Peace**

# Chapter 1

## Peace Education: Its Nature, Nurture and the Challenges It Faces

Gavriel Salomon

### Introduction

The culture of peace envisioned by the United Nations calls on people to be educated (or socialized) to see themselves as a peaceful people with norms that emphasize cooperation and the resolution of conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence.

This can be achieved

...when citizens of the world understand global problems, have the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, live by international standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural diversity, and respect the Earth and each other. Such learning can only be achieved with systematic education for peace.” (Hague Appeal for Peace Global Campaign for Peace Education, 1999).

More specifically, people are to be educated (or socialized) to see themselves as a peaceful people with norms that emphasize cooperation and the resolution of conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence.

The UN call for peace education suggests that education in general is important for the establishment of a culture of peace and that specific sorts of peace education may be of particular importance. These include the expectation that children, from an early age, should benefit from education about the values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life that can enable them to resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and nondiscrimination (53/243, Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace).

These goals are both universal and very general, as they are intended to apply to a wide range of social and political contexts from countries as diverse as Kosovo and Canada, Sri Lanka and Peru, Cyprus and France. This generality needs to be examined in light of two limitations: First, it glosses over profoundly different kinds of peace education. Second, it implicitly assumes that education for human dignity and human rights, democracy, and nonviolence translates into situational-specific, context-appropriate behaviors and actions.

As for the diversity of peace education programs, one can speak of at least three **major** classes of programs. One class consists of programs designed to change the way specific groups in conflict relate to each other, demystifying the adversary’s images and attempting to understand its culture, point of view, and humanity

(e.g., *Education for Mutual Understanding* in Northern Ireland; Smith 1995). A second class consists of programs designed to provide general knowledge about conflicts, causes of oppression, and war; to cultivate general attitudes about peace and nonviolence; and to arouse awareness of the suffering caused by war (e.g., *Facing History and Ourselves*; Strom 1994). A case in point is the program at Teachers College, Columbia University—peace education that attempts to prepare students for active and responsible citizenship by developing their critical thinking, inquiry, and reflective skills (<http://www.tc.columbia.edu/PeaceEd/>). A third class consists of programs designed to cultivate nonviolent behaviors and conflict resolution skills of individuals (e.g., *Conflict Resolution Education*; Jones and Kmita 2000). In reality, of course, most programs are likely to be mixtures of these three classes emphasizing one or another aspect.

While the first class pertains to relations with a real, threatening collective enemy, the second class attempts to cultivate general dispositions that are not directed toward any particular adversary. And while the third class focuses on actual interpersonal behaviors and skills, the other two classes deal with knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions that pertain to other groups, not individuals. Other kinds of programs focus on human rights, democracy, gender issues, and the development of peaceful classroom practices and climate (e.g., Johnson and Johnson 2005). Still other peace education programs, mainly in developing countries, are concerned with issues of poverty, human rights, development, and literacy (Harris, in press).

Turning now to the second limitation, there is reason to question the assumption that the cultivation of *general* peace-oriented cognitions and dispositions translate into actual *specific* situation-appropriate behaviors when strong competing motivations and negative emotions are involved. It is one thing to believe in the right to have different and dissenting views; it is another to tolerate the views of somebody who is truly hated and feared. An important observation and finding from various fields of scholarship suggests that general knowledge, values, attitudes, and beliefs often fail to guide behavior in many specific situations, particularly situations that involve competing interests and motivations. Despite having positive values, bystanders did not intervene when Kitty Genovese was screaming for help while being tortured and finally murdered in their backyard (Darley and Latane 1968). Nor did many otherwise humane individuals refrain from obeying authority, actually “killing” a partner in a psychological experiment when they were told, “It is important for science that you continue the experiment” (Milgram 1963).

The same is often true on a collective level. We find vivid descriptions of people’s actions that deviate from their cherished values and principles and often actually negate them. In his book about the rise of Nazi Germany, Haffner (2000) describes how his colleagues, all intelligent and well-educated graduates of law schools, gradually succumb to Nazi propaganda and become active supporters of its ideology. Ionesco, in his play *Rhinoceros*, describes how a whole city—ordinary, well-educated citizens—gradually turns into a wild mob of allegorical Rhinoceri. Barbara Tuchman (1985), in her book *The March of Folly*, presents case after case of leaders who act in total contradiction to their principles and best interests.

It appears that general knowledge, abstract values, and overriding beliefs and attitudes often do not guide actual behavior when one faces competing motivations and strong negative emotions. If peace education is to be effective, it must be context-specific so that the changes it leads to are appropriately situated. The goals and practices of peace education differ according to the particular sociopolitical contexts in which intergroup relations take place. Quite clearly, peace education in, say, Kosovo between Kosovars and Serbs would be very different from peace education in Canada between its French- and the English-speaking parts. Peace education in apartheid South Africa would be very different from peace education there after 1990.

Given the wide range of approaches, definitions, and practices of peace education (e.g., Harris, in press), I wish to distinguish between three prototypes of sociopolitical contexts: The context of intergroup positive and peaceful relations, as in Sweden (Hakvoort, in press); the context of intergroup tensions, as in France (Van der Valk 2003); and the context of outright conflict between ethnic, religious, national, or tribal groups, as not too long ago in Northern Ireland or currently in Sri Lanka (e.g., Gunawardana, 2003). Three major factors distinguish peace education in these three kinds of context (Salomon 2002): (1) In the presence of real intergroup tension, and even more so in the context of violent conflict, peace education pertains to the relationships between collectives, not individuals; (2) in the case of violent conflict between collectives, peace education aims at changing specific ways of relating to a very particular, threatening, and often hated and feared adversary rather than cultivating general dispositions toward peace; and (3) in the context of violent conflict, the goal is to cause lasting changes of minds and hearts pertaining to collectives rather than develop particular skills of interpersonal conflict resolution. After all, the conflict is not between individuals who have to be skilled in settling a dispute. Governments and politicians are the ones who resolve the conflict, not schoolchildren.

## **Intractable Conflicts**

In this chapter I focus on peace education in the context of violent conflicts and, in particular, the context of intractable conflict. There are two reasons for choosing to focus on peace education in this context, while acknowledging that it is not the only context in which peace education takes place. First, peace education, as initially conceptualized, was designed for where actual conflicts take place. As described by Harris (in press), the initial impetus for peace education was the contexts of World Wars I and II and the Cold War. Also, the UN call for a culture of peace had contexts of conflict in mind, hence, the 1998 UN call to reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups, and nations. Other kinds of peace education, such as education for interpersonal conflict resolution, human rights, environmental protection, gender issues (e.g., Brocke-Utne 1985), and the like, are descendents of the initial conception of peace education as it pertains to relations among adversaries in conflict (Harris and Morrison 2003).



The second reason to focus on peace education in the context of intractable conflict is that this kind of peace education is not only the forerunner of its other offspring, it is also the prototype of peace education in the sense that peace education programs in other contexts can be informed and inspired by it. This need not be the case in the opposite direction. For example, interpersonal conflict resolution programs, of the kind described by Jones and Kmita (2000), can make good use of the kind of procedures that emanate from the contact hypothesis, procedures that were initially designed for the interaction of groups in conflict (e.g., Brown and Hewstone 2005; Schofield and Eurich-Fulcer 2001). Similarly, the cultivation of empathy with the adversary, a crucial component in peace education in the context of conflicts, can be usefully employed also in more tranquil contexts where the goal is to cultivate concern for remote victims of violence (Staub 1996).

There are a number of attributes that characterize intractable conflicts and distinguish them from other situations of tension, disagreement, and rivalry. The most outstanding attribute is that intractable conflicts *are* intractable, protracted, refusing to reach resolution. Barash (1994) in his carefully entitled book, *Beloved Enemies*, explains among other things why some conflicts remain intractable: There are many secondary benefits to the continuation of the conflict, not least among them public support of the government, social cohesion in the face of external threat, and a sense of collective mission and purpose to sustain the conflict. Other attributes include the salience of the conflict in the lives of the societies involved, the involvement of strong negative feelings, such as fear and hatred, the sense of victimhood that each side feels, and the tendency to dehumanize the other side and to delegitimize its collective narrative, history, experiences, suffering, and beliefs (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 1998; Coleman 2003; Staub 2007).

## **The Main Goals of Peace Education in the Context of Intractable Conflict**

The last two attributes mentioned above, delegitimization and dehumanization, serve as the linchpin of the whole of the psychological system (as distinguished from the political and the tangible aspects; see Azar 1990) of the relations between the conflicting sides. When the other side is seen as victimizing perpetrators (and thus relieving “our side” from all responsibilities), as unworthy of trust, and as a threatening menace, it is delegitimized and dehumanized, which justifies aggression against it (Kriesberg 1993; Staub 2007). And it is seen as such because its history is one of aggression, its belief system about itself and about the conflict is biased and derailed (Bar-Tal 2000), and its collective sense of identity is questioned (“They are not a separate nation of Palestinians, but just Arabs;” “They are not really Rwandans”). In fact, as Utterwulge (1999) argues with respect to the massacre in Rwanda in the 1990s, the sense of a group’s collective identity being threatened is often the real cause of conflict and war. Other attributes of intractable conflicts emanate from the dehumanization and delegitimization of the other side to the conflict.

Delegitimization and dehumanization are the key to understanding what peace education in the context of intractable context is supposed to be about: *It is about learning to legitimize collective narrative of the other side and to humanize it.* These, then, are the ultimate goals of peace education in such a context (Salomon 2004). Three additional classes of goals emanate from this ultimate goal: (1) acknowledgement by each side of its “contribution” to the conflict; (2) the development of both cognitive and emotional empathy for the other side; and (3) the cultivation of more positive attitudes toward the other side and more positive attitudes toward peace.

### ***Acknowledgement***

Each side in a conflict wants to see the other side acknowledge its “contribution” to the conflict. The Phillipinos and the Koreans expect the Japanese, even today, 60 years after WWII ended, to acknowledge the violence they inflicted on them. Likewise, Maoz (2000) finds that Palestinian teachers, who are supposed to jointly plan curricular units with Israeli-Jewish teachers, evade the assigned task while demanding that the latter acknowledge their hostile acts of 40 years earlier. Each side becomes entrenched in its defenses, refusing to acknowledge its role in the conflict. As long as each side sees itself as having a monopoly over victimhood, blaming the other side for all the horrors of the conflict, thus shedding all responsibility for its own part in the conflict, mutual understanding and a reduction of the delegitimization of the other side cannot take place. In addition, self- disclosure and acknowledgement pave the way for mutual acceptance (Turner, Hewstone, and Voci 2007).

### ***Empathy***

One needs to know the other side’s collective narrative and be able to step into the shoes of the other side—both cognitively and emotionally—to allow its humanization (e.g., Weingarten 2003). Empathy is likely to increase individuals’ perception that they share with the others a common humanity and density and leads to more positive attitudes toward them (Stephan and Finlay 1999).

Greater empathy may include the ability to imagine the feelings and experiences of the other side and thus lead to the perception of similarity with it, ascribing to it the same positive traits attributed to the self. This in turn may lead to more positive evaluation of the other side. Empathizing with the other side can reduce prejudice (Dovidio et al. 2004). Empathy may also encourage situational as opposed to dispositional attributions of “their” aggressive actions and a corresponding willingness to forgive their actions. Indeed, forgiveness is another important outcome when examining intergroup tensions, which has been empirically linked to contact (Hewstone et al. 2006).

## *Attitudes*

Developing positive attitudes includes also a reduction of negative stereotypes and of prejudices that guide one's way of perceiving the other side. The change of attitudes can be a result of direct and purposeful actions, such as intergroup dialogue and contact (e.g., Pettigrew 1998) or as an indirect result of joint actions designed to attain common goals, such as winning soccer matches by binational teams.

Seen together, these goals are likely to affect a group's sense of collective identity from a monolithic identity of good (us) versus bad (them) to a more complex and diverse one that leaves room for the acceptance of one's own aggression and for the other side's perspective (Bar-On 2002) as well as more humane way of perceiving the other side (Weinstein and Halpern 2004). Other conceptions of peace education are in agreement with the one presented here. Halabi and Sonnenschein (2004), speaking about a context where a minority group perceives itself to be oppressed, emphasize the need to reinforce its collective sense of identity as a major goal of peace education (and hence, peace education needs to consist of a dialogue between identities). Johnson and Johnson (2005) mention the establishment of a superordinate sense of identity that unifies diverse groups (and thus peace education ought to take place in the context of cooperative learning in school). Such goals fit well into the conceptual structure sketched out above.

## **What Research Tells Us**

The conceptual framework of goals for peace education presented above is quite general and abstract and thus suffers from the same limitations that apply to the UN's conception of peace education. This is where empirical research can be of great help. Not only can it show us what works and what does not, with whom and under what conditions, but it can also help us concretize and specify the goals of peace education. It can help us translate the general and undifferentiated goals into more specific ones and point to their limitations.

However, peace education is accompanied by insufficient research and evaluation. In fact, one can liken the scholarly state of the art of peace education today to that of medicine 200 years ago: Much activity based on lots of good intentions, unchecked assumptions, and partly naive beliefs with little scholarship to either guide or accompany it (Nevo and Brem 2002). Nevertheless, the relatively little research that does accompany peace education suggests that despite numerous obstacles, peace education [e.g., Bargal and Bar (1992), Maoz, (2004)], as well as conflict resolution (Jones and Kmita 2000), anti-violence and bullying programs (e.g., Eslea and Smith 1998), and education for human rights (Osler and Starkey 1994), and for democracy (Chaffe, Morduchowicz, and Galperin 1997) work at some basic level.

Although the research reported below was carried out in the relatively limited context of the intractable conflict between Israel and Palestine, the principles and

distinctions that can be discerned from it are relevant to peace education in other places and contexts as well. In this respect, the research can be taken as a fair and instructive representation of research on peace education in general.

- (1) *Different groups enter peace education with different perceptions and expectations*: One of the characteristics of intractable conflicts is the profound inequality between the conflicting sides. In most, if not all cases of conflict, one side is militarily, economically, or socially stronger than the other; one side constitutes the majority (e.g., the Protestants in Northern Ireland), one side dominates over the other (e.g., Israel/Palestine), one side feels discriminated by the other side (e.g., Blacks in the US), or one side is marginalized by the other (e.g., immigrants in many European countries). Very often, dominance, discrimination, and marginalization go hand in hand. Little wonder therefore that in light of such inequalities, the conflicting sides come to peace education with different, even opposing perceptions and expectations. Thus, Biton and Salomon (2006) found that while Israelis entered a year-long peace education program perceiving “peace” to mean the cessation of violence, Palestinians perceived “peace” to mean independence and liberty. Similarly, Maoz (2000) found that whereas Israeli teachers working with Palestinian colleagues on a new common curriculum were future-oriented, the Palestinians wanted first to have their past suffering acknowledged by the Israelis. Acknowledgements of past wrongdoings turn out to be a major concern for the weaker side of the conflict, as manifested, for example, by the Armenian expectations of the Turks. As we shall see below, differences in initial perceptions and expectations shape later reactions to the process of peace education and to its outcomes.
- (2) *Different groups react differently to the process of peace education*: A common implicit assumption is that if the process of peace education is identical for members of all groups in a conflict, its outcomes ought to be uniform as well. The UN conception of peace education does not make room for differential outcomes, nor does the conception presented above. Yet, the groups that enter peace education with different perceptions and expectations also react to it differentially. Bar-Natan, Rosen, and Salomon (in press) found that while interpersonal friendships among Jewish and Palestinian peace education participants contribute to the legitimization of the Palestinian narrative by Jewish youngsters, it does not function the same way for the Palestinians. Instead, friendships that develop during peace education dialogue encounters affect the Palestinians’ adherence to their own narrative. Similarly, Husseisi (unpublished) finds that while participation in a year-long peace education program strengthens among the Jews the relationship between adherence to their own narrative and legitimization of the Palestinian narrative, Arabs’ participation in the program only strengthens their adherence to their own narrative, but does not affect at all their legitimization of the Jewish narrative. Findings of this kind are not unique to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Wagner, Hewstone, and Machleit (1989) found that contacts between German and Turkish youth positively affected the attitudes of the Germans, but not of the Turks.

Such findings should not surprise us. The weak side in the conflict must defend its collective narrative and identity in the face of the threatening narrative of the stronger, oppressive side (e.g., Ethier and Deaux 1994). Legitimizing the point of view of the side that is considered to be the oppressor means, psychologically speaking, siding with it or yielding to it, which of course is out of the question. It follows that the prescribed ultimate goal for peace education—legitimization of the other side’s narrative—cannot apply to the same extent to all sides concerned. It may be an important goal, but not a realistically tenable one. One ought to aim at good enough peace education (following Ross 2000), not to try the impossible.

(3) *Strongly held attitudes are not likely to be changed*: Peace education programs are attempting to change attitudes and ways of perceiving the “other side’s” peace and violence. But not all attitudes are born alike and not all of them can be changed by peace education to the same extent. This observation may seem trivial, but it is not: Which attitudes are more susceptible to the influence of peace education and which ones are not? A distinction can be made between attitudes and “convictions” (Abelson 1988). The latter are attitudes or beliefs that are particularly strongly held. They are, if you will, central to one’s system of attitudes and beliefs; they are held with much ego involvement and accompanied by strong feelings. Most importantly, they are quite resistant to change (Krosnick and Petty 1995). Rosen and Salomon (in press) assembled a list of statements taken from the collective narrative of the Israeli Jews and of the Palestinians and had university students of both nationalities rank order for perceived centrality each group’s respective items. For the Jews, items related to the Jewish right for a homeland following the Holocaust topped the list; for the Palestinians the list was headed by items that pertained to their right for their homeland and the right of refugees to return to it. In both cases, items pertaining to trust of the other side ranked lowest. Using items for this list as a base to measure attitude change, it was found that, as expected, attitudes pertaining to the more central narrative-based items did not change as a consequence of participation in a year-long peace education program, while those at the end of the list did.

These findings do not suggest that centrally held attitudes cannot be changed by peace education, but they do suggest that changing them is exceedingly difficult and rare. Whether changes in more peripheral attitudes can lead to changes in the more central ones is still an open-ended question.

(4) *That which can be changed by peace education can be changed back as easily by external forces*: Not many evaluations of peace education programs measure their impact beyond the “morning after” effect. When measured immediately after the conclusion of a program, its effects are found to be positive. The picture is often different when long-term effects are measured. A consistent finding leads to the observation that while relatively short-term intensive, dialogue-based peace education encounters can change attitudes, these changes tend to erode and return to their pre-program level in a short while (Bar-Natan et al., in press).

This issue often comes up when a discrepancy is observed between the relative ease with which measured attitudes are changed through peace education programs and the speed with which they tend to erode (Rosen and Salomon, in press). Such findings should not surprise us. That which peace education attempts to do in contexts of conflict is to an extent a subversive activity (Bar-Tal 2002), challenging the commonly held, dominant collective narrative and trying to establish a new, more accepting and tolerant one. A battle thus ensues between the strong, dominant narrative widely held by society at large and the newly born one, held by but a few. Little wonder that its chances of surviving in the face of the collectively held narrative are not very good. The changed attitudes and beliefs can easily return to their pre-program state.

(5) *The effects of peace education need reinforcement lest they become eroded:*

The observation that the effects of peace education can quite easily be reversed implies that the challenge facing peace education is not just how to effect change, but how to *sustain* it. Interestingly, little research on sustaining change of the kind peace education attempts to attain is available. Yet, the observed short half-life of the effects of peace education implies that reinforcement to withstand the eroding effects of the dominant collective narrative and the ongoing sociopolitical events is needed. An old yet relevant social psychological procedure is forced compliance, whereby peace education graduates are to publicly present the adversary's perspective and defend it. This procedure is based on dissonance theory that argues that the experienced incongruity between the views expressed through this procedure and the ones adhered to causes the latter to change in line with the former (e.g., Aronson 1988). Findings clearly supported this view: Application of this procedure led to the restoration of the changes and sustained them for a longer time (Rosen and Salomon, in press).

It is important to note that the finding that forced compliance can restore the initially changed attitudes and perceptions and sustain them does not apply to everybody. As pointed out above, groups react differently to peace education, and this is no exception. The applied procedure of forced compliance did not restore the changes among the Palestinians. Is it because they are the minority, delegitimizing the majority? Or is it because their collectively held narrative is so well entrenched that the changed attitudes and perceptions cannot resist it except for a short while as long as the effects of peace education are still fresh? The findings that participation in peace education, particularly the development of friendships with the adversary strengthening the Palestinians' adherence to their own narrative, tend to support the second interpretation.

(6) *Meeting the conditions of the contact hypothesis is useful:* Most of the peace education programs—whether police meeting immigrant youth in Belgium (Leman 2002) or German youth meeting Turks (Wagner, Hewstone and Machleit 1989)—entail some kind of direct contact between members of the groups in conflict. It is assumed that contact serves to change the dynamics of relations by invoking reexamination of the way one comes to perceive the other and relate to them.

One can speak of a continuum with two poles representing two contrasting subgroups of approaches to the contact: (1) contacts that promote co-existence, tolerance, mutual understanding, and reduced stereotypes through working for common goals and the facilitation of joint undertakings and interpersonal relations and (2) programs that emphasize the reinforcement of identities, particularly that of the minority, through the confrontation of contrasting collective narratives, to achieve the strengthening of each group's collective identity and the mutual legitimization of the conflicting groups (e.g., Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004; Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2005). Quite clearly, it is the former—the interpersonal approach—that tries to promote the attainment of common goals that follows most closely the contact hypothesis. However, since contact is involved also in the confrontational approach, the conditions prescribed for effective contact apply also there.

Pettigrew (1998) provided a list of conditions that appear to be necessary for the contact between groups to yield positive attitudinal and related changes. These conditions are having a common goal, equal status, intergroup cooperation, and support of authorities, the law, or custom. Conditions of this kind were supported by numerous studies in a variety of contexts. However, as pointed out by Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux (2005), the list of conditions to be met grew out of proportion, creating a deep gap between what can be met under laboratory conditions versus that which can be met under real-life conditions in the field. In real life, meeting the required conditions may be far more difficult. For example, can the severe real-life, daily inequality experienced between groups in conflict be kept out of the meeting room when the groups meet during peace education?

Yet, real-life situations may provide opportunities that with only some planning meet most of the important conditions. These situations prove that it is worth the effort to try to meet these conditions. A case in point are binational clubs that meet regularly not to discuss the conflict, identity, or attitudes, but to attain some common goal (unrelated to the conflict) perceived by the participants to overshadow the conflict-related cleavages (e.g., binational music bands or soccer clubs). Zuabi (2008) studied such binational Jewish/Arab clubs over time and compared the changes in attitude, stereotyping, social distance, and mutual legitimization that they underwent with those of unibinational clubs. It needs to be said that the youngsters joining the clubs do it for the sake of playing soccer, not for the sake of meeting members of the rival national group. However, the strong motivation to play well and win matches, reinforced and supported by parents, makes the participants invest much effort in attaining the common goal, which for them is of utmost importance—thus becoming interdependent in ways that make national differences quite irrelevant. All four of Pettigrew's (1998) conditions are met by the binational, but not the unibinational, clubs. No wonder attitudes and other perceptions of the binational club members become significantly more positive toward members of the "other side." These changes take place mainly during the first year of playing together and become sustained through the continuation of activity during subsequent years.

## The Conception of Peace Education Revisited

The conception I presented above, positioning the mutual legitimization of the “other side’s” collective narrative as the ultimate goal of peace education, and having acknowledgment, empathy, and attitude as its subgoals, requires that we revisit it in light of the research reported. Two open-ended issues emerge from that research: (1) One issue pertains to the fact that the impact of peace education is in the eyes of the participating parties; does this then call for a differential approach to peace education? (2) The second issue pertains to the competition between the political and the educational-psychological aspects of the social context: Given a social context of ongoing belligerence (as well as contexts of antidemocratic tendencies and poor human rights, where programs are most needed), programs designed to combat these seem to stand a poor chance of success. The programs can be reinforced to increase the durability of their effects, but do the attained attitudinal and perceptual changes make a difference in the face of ongoing belligerence?

As for the first issue, the research clearly suggests that the parties in conflict expect other things from peace education and react to it in different, even opposite ways: Contact increases legitimization of the other side for some, but increases adherence to one’s own narrative for others (Bar-Natan et al., in press). Similarly, while the interpersonal approach appeals to the stronger side of the conflict, the weaker side benefits more from the confrontational approach (Suleiman 2002). Does this then mean that the different sides to the conflict should participate in different kinds of peace education? To an extent, the answer may be a positive one. However, a more effective approach is the mixed-model one: Some elements of a peace education program may be uniform to allow, for example, contact between participants, while other elements may be separate. Relatedly, a mixture of interpersonal and confrontational elements may be more beneficial than orthodox adherence to one or the other. Perhaps most importantly, even if a program is uniform in its surface appearance, it should not be taken to be uniform in the way it is experienced. Its apparent uniformity may conceal a group’s “stubborn particularities” (Cherry 1995 cited by Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2005) and thus differential outcomes should be expected.

The second issue poses more serious doubts about peace education in general and the conceptions presented here in particular. What if, despite widespread peace education, the conflict, tension, and belligerence persist? Conflicts stand on two metaphorical legs: the political, tangible leg of conflicting interests of borders and languages, governments and control, independence and liberty, human rights and resources, and the psychological leg of emotions and attributions, beliefs, and collective memories. The two aspects interact and feed each other: Political moves reinforce psychological attributions, and psychological beliefs, anchored as they are in collective narratives, interpret the political moves in particular (usually biased) ways (Kriesberg 1993). Peace education addresses of course only the psychological aspect of the conflict. But can psychological progress without a parallel political progress be effective?



Peace education, negating directly or indirectly the collective narrative of a society in conflict, its ethos of war (Bar-Tal 2002), may thus require that a number of basic societal conditions are met. If they are not, peace education can become an exercise in futility limited to a small number of eccentric peace supporters without any ripple effect to the wider society. Bar-Tal, Rosen, and Nets-Zehngut (in press) mention a number of such necessary conditions—societal support for a peace process and ripeness for reconciliation—that are not prevalent while the conflict persists. In the absence of such support and ripeness, peace education that addresses goals of the kind mentioned above cannot succeed. It operates in a context of a culture of war that can easily nullify the effects of even a well-reasoned and well-executed peace education program. Indeed, as research shows, the effects of peace education are easily erased by that culture of war.

One possible way around this difficulty is what Bar-Tal and his associates suggest: Move away from direct peace education and employ an indirect approach. Lustig (2002) used such an approach when, rather than teaching youngsters about their adversary or its collective narrative, he taught them about a remote, though similar, conflict. Learning about that other conflict allowed the students to examine the conflict in which their own society was involved without becoming defensive, thus becoming able to step into the shoes of their adversary.

Another way of indirect peace education shifts attention to the cultivation of more general abilities and dispositions, such as critical thinking and tolerance. However, this takes us back to the issue dealt with earlier: Will such general abilities and dispositions actually apply in real conflict situations when raw emotions and competing motivations are experienced? An alternative implication is that peace education, as conceptualized here, ought to be carried out on a dual track: As both a school-wide outreach, as indeed is done in most schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Danesh 2006), as well as a society-wide outreach that includes parents, businesses, corporations, the media, and the average person on the street.

In other words, peace education can neither be a process limited to a segregated segment of society such as schoolchildren nor rely solely on the cultivation of general skills and dispositions; it must take both avenues. Peace education in general, and in contexts of conflict in particular, is too precious to give up. No society in conflict can afford the luxury of not having a policy of peace education.

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# Chapter 2

## Gender Equality and a Culture of Peace

Carolyn M. Stephenson

### Introduction

Gender equality is both one of the eight domains of the United Nations Program of Action on a Culture of Peace, and also an important component of each of the others. It is both an important goal on its own, in terms of justice for women, and an important contribution to the promotion of peace. This chapter looks at gender equality in both of those contexts, as an important human rights goal for women, and as a framework for looking at the whole conceptualization of the Culture of Peace.

### Gender Equality and Justice for Women

While the norms of gender equality have developed both in individual states and in the international system, the realization of gender equality remains far behind in most states. The first wave of the women's movement in the 1800s eventually led to women's suffrage, but it did not lead to full gender equality, nor did it lead in the short term to increases in other forms of equality and justice, as some had hoped and some had feared. Norms of gender equality were further strengthened when, in 1945, the preamble to the United Nations Charter reaffirmed a faith in "the equal rights of men and women," with Chap. 1 stating as one of the purposes of the UN "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...." Women's equality, later gender equality, continued to be important as part of the basic human rights approaches within the UN, from the initial 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the proclamation that "women's rights are human rights" in the context of the UN's 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women. The interweaving of women's social movements for equality and efforts in the United Nations has been an important part of the changing norms of gender equality.

Women's political participation, in the various forms of voting and standing for election, was not realized until almost the start of the twentieth century. Most

countries recognized women's rights during the next century, but it often took many years for the actual election of a woman to parliament. By 2003, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) data showed that only in 37 of 175 countries did the percentage of women in the lower or single house of parliament exceed 20%, with only 11 exceeding 30%. As of 31 December 2007, the IPU reported that the percentage of women in both houses combined was 17.7%. In some countries, women's right to vote and stand for election has not yet been recognized, and in some, there is not a parliament at all.

Gender inequality also continues in economic structures and activity. Only in the service sector does female employment usually exceed male, with the reverse being the case in agriculture and industry. For countries for which data are available, the highest estimated ratio of female to male earned income is roughly 70%, with only four countries meeting or exceeding that level in 2003, based on data from the International Labor Organization (Human Development Report, 2003). While female work time exceeds male in most countries, much of female work time remains in non-market activities, such as care of children in the home, and thus is not counted. Women's ability to crack the glass ceiling of entry into upper levels of business management remains low.

Gender equality in the social and cultural spheres has also not been realized. Stereotyping of men as strong and as warriors (with the two being seen as related), and as participants in the public sphere, and women as more suited to the domestic sphere, as guardians of children, the home, and culture, continues despite the numbers of women who enter the political and economic spheres. In education, while the adult literacy rates of women begin to approach those of men in developed countries, this remains less true in the less developed countries. Ratios of women to men in primary education are roughly equal in terms of net primary enrollment only in countries with the highest levels of human development, while ratios in net secondary enrollment and, even more so, in net tertiary enrollment, remain considerably lower in most countries (UNDP, 2003). Only in life expectancy does gender inequality operate in the opposite direction, with men dying earlier than women. As a culture of peace is a necessary part of the development of peaceful societies, so a culture of gender equality is an essential underpinning to the development of gender equality.

## **The Contribution of Women to Cultures of Peace**

While gender equality is essential as a part of the guarantee of basic human rights, it has also been stated, as in the United Nations 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (paragraph 23), that women's "full participation in decision-making, conflict prevention and resolution and all other peace initiatives is essential to the realization of lasting peace." Women have been proportionally less involved in war and more involved in peace movements than men. They appear to be consistently more opposed to the use of force and violence than men. Even their conceptualizations

of peace and security appear to be different than those predominantly accepted by men. The question, of course, is why, and whether this difference will continue as women's equality with men is progressively achieved.

### ***Theories of Gender Difference in Decision-making, Conflict, Communication, and Negotiation***

Many early male political theorists argued that women were essentially different from men, and that these differences, usually seen as derived from biological differences, made them unfit for citizenship. One of the first liberal feminist arguments in favor of women's participation in decision-making was to counter the argument of inferiority by arguing instead that women were simply the same as men. Other feminists and some—both male and female—peace researchers argued that women were indeed different from men and that these differences made women superior rather than inferior to men in their capacity for decision-making, peace-making, and conflict resolution. While there is some evidence of differences in the majority of women's attitudes and decision-making styles, there is no evidence that women are *essentially* different from men with respect to conflict and conflict resolution, if by essential it is meant that observed differences are permanent or rooted in the *essence* of different biologies. The predominant view today is that the significant differences in men's and women's roles, behaviors, attitudes, and styles result from the different social constructions of male and female identities that vary historically, spatially, and culturally. Thus, the term gender is used to indicate differentiation in men's and women's socially constructed and expected identities and behaviors rather than biological or innate differences between the sexes.

There are, however, enough significant differences in women's and men's observed behavior and understandings of behavior that one might argue that there are "gender cultures." A review of research from a variety of disciplines suggests the following gender cultures (see Table 2.1).

The patterns summarized in this table run through a whole series of studies, but it is not clear whether the differences they describe are simply stereotypes of men and women, simply perceived differences, or actual systematic differences between them.

One of the earliest and most widely discussed pieces of research came from the discipline of psychology. Carol Gilligan (1982) reexamined classical theories on the development of moral reasoning, by looking at the responses of young women and girls instead of just young men and boys, and made it clear that women had different standards of morality, based on relationships, than male standards based on rights. She concluded that women were not inferior in their development of moral reasoning, but spoke "in a different voice."

Work on possible differences in men's and women's communications styles is generally acknowledged to have begun with Robin Lakoff (1975), a linguist, who

**Table 2.1** Gender Cultures

Women	Men
Preference for harmony	Preference for confrontation
Be part of group	Run group
Collectivist	Individualist
Preference for outsider	Preference for authority
We = we + they	We = we vs. they
Personal relations key	Task key
Self-demeaning	Self-enhancing
Undervalue own interest	Overvalue own interest
Money = autonomy/security	Money = power
Knowledge = experiential	Knowledge = authority-based
Language indirect	Language direct
Speeches as collaborative talk	Speech as turn-taking
Interruption = collaboration	Interruption = domination

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concluded that women both are and have to be more polite than men. Many communications studies investigate and find differences in such factors as self-disclosure, emotional expression, interruption, compliments, apologies, tag questions, the use of humor and storytelling, and the ways in which stereotypical “masculine” and “feminine” speech is viewed by different groups of listeners (Shimanoff 1994).

Differences in women’s approaches to leadership and negotiation have been investigated. Deborah Kolb and G. Coolidge (1988) concluded that there were significant differences in the ways men and women frame and conduct negotiations. They noted four themes in women’s negotiating: a relational view of others, an embedded view of agency, an understanding of control through empowerment, and problem-solving through dialogue. Even the prescriptive and integrative “win-win” model of negotiation, they claimed, does not allow women’s voices to be heard, as it reduces empathetic understanding of the other’s interests to a technical problem, unlike the more basic emotional connectedness Gilligan found was natural in women’s narratives. Birgit Brock-Utne (1989) noted that women demand more contextual information as they negotiate, leading to their poor performance in laboratory games, which supply little context. Sheila Heen (1996) found differences in the process of male and female control groups with respect to emotional expression, use of personal experience, and degree of hierarchy. On the other hand, Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown (1975) found that individual interpersonal orientation rather than gender explains differences in style and effectiveness. Watson (1994) found that power is a better predictor than gender.

### ***Empirical Work on Gender, Aggression, War, and Violence***

The most consistent result in research on gender differences is that women as a whole are more opposed to the use of force and violence than are men. Women were overwhelmingly involved in peace, disarmament, and anti-slavery movements



in the 1840s at the rise of the women's suffrage movement, and again in the second wave of feminism during the 1970s, this time in civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. They continue to be in the forefront of movements for peace during armed conflicts and in the post-conflict peace-building stage around the world.

The preponderance of research on aggression suggests that human beings react to frustration either aggressively or cooperatively depending on how they have been socialized. Anthropologists studying aggression, war, and peace in different cultures have found that, in most societies, the socialization of men has been clearly more toward the aggressive use of power than has the socialization of women. Margaret Mead (1935) argued that characteristics that we treat as male and female are not fundamental differences between the sexes, but are primarily due to the difference in cultural socialization. On the one hand, cross-cultural studies of children consistently show higher levels of aggression among boys than girls (Best and Williams 1997). On the other hand, political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) points out that women have played roles that are more generally peaceful than warlike, as the stereotype maintains, but that women are also found in a wide variety of roles from organizers and members of peace movements to soldiers and violent revolutionaries. She and many others point out that women form a part of a war system by reproducing and mothering the sons who go to war, encouraging them in the love of country and sacrifice to violence that enables them to be trained as soldiers. Ruddick (1989) argues that "maternal thinking" may explain the differential involvement of women and men in war. Elshtain, as well as Judy Stiehm (1983) earlier, argues that when women accept the role of the protected and defended, they give over power to the male protector, thus solidifying the disparities between the peaceful roles of women and violent roles of men. Cynthia Enloe (1993) argues that, "Militarization relies on distinct notions about masculinity, notions ... legitimized by women as well as men" (p. 2). She notes that women's participation in the military has not changed the masculinized culture of the military. Yet warfare has been one of the few occupations almost exclusively planned and carried out by men and not women. Interestingly, the signatories of the Seville Statement on Violence (Adams 1989), who argued that war is not based in human biology, could not agree on the implications of the fact that men, and not women, are those who primarily fight wars.

There has been extensive research on gender and public opinion and especially on the "gender gap" in voting. While early women voters did not appear to vote differently than men, gender gap has been widely noted since the late 1970s. "Gender gap" appears to have widened as a critical mass of women enters both the workplace and political life. "Gender gap" appears to be more obvious on issues of war and peace and international cooperation. The first Gulf War brought this out, with 53 % of men, but only 37% of women responding that the US should take military action if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by the deadline, according to a NY Times/CBS poll of early December 1990. However, the breakdown by race showed even greater disparity. Different polls before and during the Gulf War yielded different figures, but all showed gender gap. Nancy Gallagher (1993, especially p. 29, on Gulf War polls) further explores these differences. Carol Bacchi (1986) also discusses

gender gap in polling in the roughly 40 years since World War II. The classic early look at gender gap was Bella Abzug and Mim Kelber's review (1984) of years of polls showing that the deepest division between men and women is over issues of war and peace. A Gallup Poll of July 20–23 1995 (Newport 1995) showed that while overall US retroactive support for the bombing of Hiroshima had declined significantly since 1945, that there was considerable gender difference, with 74% of men, but only 45% of women approving. Lamare (1989) found that gender gap on nuclear issues in New Zealand appeared to widen with the political mobilization of women. Togeby (1994) also concluded that gender gap in foreign policy attitudes in Denmark was associated with both left-wing mobilization of women and the revitalization of traditional "female" values. Other polls have shown women to be consistently more anti-military action and spending, as well as pro-United Nations.

Eichenberg (2003) notes that both theoretical and empirical research "emphasizes that it is the differential acceptance (or toleration) of violence in social conflicts that most divides men and women" (p. 125). He adds that "across the 486 surveys for all of the ten historical episodes the gender difference in support for the use of military force (58 percent of men vs. 48 percent of women) is highly significant statistically." Based on examination of this research on US consideration or use of military force from August 1990 to March 2003, Eichenberg concludes that "on average—women are generally less supportive of the use of military force for any purpose, involving any type of military action, in every historical episode" (p. 137).

It appears that states in which there are higher levels of gender equality are both less likely to initiate war and less likely to experience intrastate armed conflict. In research conducted on the period 1960–2001, Caprioli (2003, 2005) finds that gender inequality is a good predictor of interstate and intrastate armed conflict. She finds this to be particularly true when gender equality is measured in terms of participation in the labor force. Melander (2005a) reports similar results for changes in the level of intrastate conflict, when gender equality is measured as the ratio of female to male higher education attainment and the rate of female representation in parliament. While both also examine the role of female leadership of the state, this factor does not appear to be significant. Melander (2005b) has also examined the relationship of gender equality, measured by the same indicators, to state human rights abuse, and finds that higher female participation in parliament is a good predictor of lower personal integrity rights abuse. Other research suggests that a minimum critical mass is necessary for the effect of gender equality in parliaments to have an impact. Whether quotas are an appropriate way to achieve this critical mass is hotly debated (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

## **The Movement toward Gender Equality**

The movement toward gender equality has involved the actions of social movements, states, and the United Nations. In the first wave of the women's movement, when Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton returned from the 1940 London

Anti-Slavery Conference, unable to gain access because they were women, and initiated the 1848 Seneca Falls Conference, women banded together, along with some men, to gain the vote and the ability to have an influence on the abolition of slavery, abolition of alcohol, and other peace and social justice issues. There was division in this early movement over whether to focus on getting the vote for women or on the broader social justice issues and structures of society, with the movement eventually narrowing to focus first on women suffrage. The norms put forth in this movement eventually resulted in legislated rule changes. States began to introduce the rights for women to vote and to stand for office, with New Zealand being the first in 1893 to grant full voting rights to women, followed in the early 1900s by most Western and Eastern European states, in the mid-1900s by most Latin American and some Asian states, and shortly after that by most African states as they became independent. While the rules changed on the political participation of women in most states, the norms of social and economic equality, important in their own right as well as providing the underlying structural conditions to realize the actual political participation of women, remained far behind.

A second wave in the women's movement began in the 1970s, fueled again by women's concerns for broader peace and social justice issues. Women, finding themselves again relegated to marginal positions in the movements for civil rights and against the Vietnam War, generated a new wave of the movement for women's rights. This time the movement would be even more internationalized than the first wave, and the United Nations would play a major role.

### ***Gender Equality and the United Nations***

The goal of women's equality was recognized at the very beginning of the United Nations, when the Charter included references to the equality of men and women. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1947. The United Nations General Assembly declared 1975 as International Women's Year, holding the first of four major conferences on women in Mexico City, with the theme of equality, development, and peace. Out of this came the UN Decade for Women 1976–1985 and in 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Stephenson 2005).

Gradually, there came to be a realization that working for the rights of women could not succeed without examining the gender implications of all policies. Development aid did not lift all boats equally, often resulting in a decline, rather than an improvement, in the status of women. Thus, there came to be a specific focus on women in development (WID), to ensure that development improved the equality of women with men (Winslow 1995). Over the course of time, the UN and others shifted to focus on the linkage of gender and development (GAD), looking at underlying structures rather than trying to improve the status of women in isolation.

By the time of the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, the international system had come to recognize that gender is a significant factor in development, in education, in health, in democracy, and in peace and conflict matters. In the Beijing Declaration, governments committed themselves to implementing the Platform for Action, and (in paragraph 38) ensuring that a gender perspective was reflected in all their policies and programs.

Mainstreaming a gender perspective, rather than simply adding women, became a guideline for the United Nations and for many other international organizations. In 1997 ECOSOC defined the concept of mainstreaming:

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area. It is a tool for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

Most recently, there have been focused efforts in the United Nations on the relationship of women to a culture of peace. Two objectives specified in the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action are to: "increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed conflict" (Strategic Objective E.1) and "promote women's contributions to fostering a culture of peace" (Strategic Objective E.4). A number of activities have focused on the accomplishment of these goals. UNESCO initiated a program on Women and a Culture of Peace in 1996 and, with the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), produced a book *Towards a Women's Agenda for a Culture of Peace* in 1999, which advanced women's conceptualizations of peace (Breines, Gierycz, and Reardon 1999). Most importantly, on 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on women and armed conflict, which argued both for the protection of women in armed conflict and for their inclusion in peace negotiations. No longer were women to be seen simply as needing special protection, but as making important contributions to peace.

## **Gender Equality and the UN Culture of Peace**

While equality between men and women is specifically delineated as one of the eight domains of the UN's Culture of Peace, in actuality gender equality is an integral part of each of the other domains as well. Gender equality is highly correlated with success in the other domains. One sees considerable linkage among the 12 critical areas of concern identified in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action and the eight domains of the Culture of Peace. Among the critical areas of concern are: the burden of poverty on women, unequal access to education and health care, violence against women, the effects of armed conflict on women, inequality between men and women in power and decision-making, the human rights of women, stereotyping

of women, and inequality in access to resources and the management of natural resources (para. 44). The achievement of cultures of peace is dependent on the integrated achievement of all of its parts, and movement toward gender equality, especially in the 12 critical areas of concern, can be an important factor in the achievement of the other parts. We will examine the relationship of gender equality to each of the other domains of the UN Culture of Peace in turn.

### ***Culture of Peace Through Education***

Inequalities and inadequacies in access to education and training are critical areas of concern noted in the Beijing Platform. The education of women is essential especially for democratic participation, as well as for each of the other domains of the culture of peace. With respect to sustainable development, women's basic literacy is positively related to decreases in fertility rates, and this in turn to environmental sustainability. Women's access to higher education, including education in science and technology, structures their ability to participate fully in decision-making. In every region except for North America, Western Europe, and Central Africa, boys' enrollment in primary school exceeds that of girls. While the Arab states and North Africa, and South and West Asia, reduced the gender gap in primary enrollment in the 1990s, those regions, along with sub-Saharan Africa, still have male-female ratios that are estimated to be considerably above other regions (UNESCO 2000).

Many peace researchers argue that education alone is not adequate to advance cultures of peace, and that peace education is what makes a difference. Peace education would advance values that include peace, justice, and human rights. It has been argued that these values are more consistent with gender and other forms of equality.

### ***Sustainable Economic and Social Development***

There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between sustainable economic and social development and gender equality. This domain of the Culture of Peace combines the importance of traditional economic development, as well as social or human development, and the concern with protection of the environment. The nature of the relationship between environment and development came under debate with the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, the conference that put environment on the UN agenda. The North-South conflict over whether the South had the right to destroy their environment in the course of development, as the North had done, resulted in the Brundtland Commission's 1987 popularization of the term "sustainable development." Sustainable development, defined by the Commission as "development that meets

the needs of the present while not compromising the rights of future generations.” Incorporated the view that, if development did not pay attention to environmental protection, it would not be sustainable (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). We will examine both the development side and the environment side of this conceptualization.

First, it is clear that many of the measures of economic as well as social and human development are highly correlated with gender equality. Women’s access to credit and other resources appears to increase their economic contribution. Women’s basic literacy improves the chances of child immunization and reduces under-five child mortality. Two measures of gender empowerment, female education, and lifetime exposure to employment, appear to increase the probability of contraceptive use, reducing family size, which in turn seems to improve child survival rates, especially for girl children. While the relationships are complex, improvements in gender equality appear to lead to improvements in health and well-being both at the level of the family and that of the society (Kabeer 1999). Research also suggests that in societies where there are more than 30% of female legislators, there is a greater emphasis on social and human development concerns such as health and education. Gender equality also appears to be positively related to many of the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2000, including especially the reduction of infant and maternal mortality.

Second, there are also linkages between women and the environment. Women, in many societies, are the drawers of water and the hewers of wood; their approaches to consumption are key in determining environmental sustainability. There are clear links between gender and land distribution, biodiversity, and water management (UNEP 2004). The Women’s Environment and Development Organization, today one of the primary women’s NGOs, was founded in 1991 to link and to show the connections between the gender and environmental concerns. The Green Belt Movement was founded in 1977 by Kenyan Wangari Maathai, who received the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize for her work in the intersection of the issues of democracy, environmental protection and restoration, human rights, and especially women’s rights.

### ***Respect for All Human Rights***

While there is nothing new in the notion that women’s rights are human rights, this became more obvious at the time of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. The equal access to civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights is clear under international law, and the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979 made this even clearer. There are two further ways, however, in which the violation of women’s rights relates to cultures of peace. First, the abuse of human rights is one of the basic underlying root causes of armed conflict, and cultural stereotypes and practices that restrict women’s rights and allow violence against

women may well be early precursors of armed conflict. Moreover, an increase in media denigration of women, discriminatory laws, rape and sexual violence can be seen as early warning indicators of a society's more imminent descent into armed conflict.

### *Equality Between Women and Men*

The equality of men and women has been a goal affirmed by the United Nations from its start. The integrated nature of the relationships between gender equality, education, overall human rights, development, the environment, democracy, and peace has been shown to be key to the achievement of each of these goals. One of the methods of achieving gender equality has been gender mainstreaming, as discussed above. The development of measures of gender equality has been an important part of this.

Because sex and gender have been closely interrelated, sex is often a good indicator of gender for many research purposes. Even indicators by sex were not widely available until recently. In the 1994 edition of the Human Development Report, there was discussion of the need to pay attention to gender issues, and a gender-disparity-adjusted version of the Human Development Index (HDI) was introduced for 43 countries. The Human Development Index itself was an attempt to get away from the purely economic indicators of development and included, in addition to GNP per capita, measures of education and health. In the 1995 edition, two significant new indicators were included that allow us to measure overall gender impacts on human development. While the HDI measures the average achievement of a country in basic human capabilities, the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) imposes a penalty for inequality on the HDI, thus adjusting the HDI downwards for gender inequality. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) examines whether women and men are able to participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making. The GDI became available in 1995 for 130 countries and the GEM for 116. While other gender-related indices (such as female vs. male school enrollment and literacy, female as a percent of male participation rates in professions and government, death rates by sex, etc.) continue to be available and important, this was the first time one could look at women's access to resources and their status and power in the society overall. Thus, gender increasingly becomes a variable one can measure in connection with other variables, including conflict.

Overcoming the cultural factors that allow gender discrimination and violence against women is also important. Changing the structural economic and political conditions that allow or encourage gender inequality can be facilitated by changing the stereotypes of men and women, and among those that most relate to cultures of peace are the stereotypes of masculinity as warlike and strong and femininity as peaceful and weak. Feminist conceptualizations of men and women have begun to separate conceptualizations of strength from those of violence.

### ***Democratic Participation***

By definition, democracy cannot exclude the participation of half of a population. Thus, one might make the argument that societies that exclude the participation of gender and racial groups, as did the United States at its time of origin, cannot be considered democratic. This may well be the most fundamental relationship between gender equality and a culture of peace. The democratic peace hypothesis may well predict that democracies do not go to war against each other, and are less-war prone in general, but the definition of democracy is key here. In addition, it is not only the legal status of women's suffrage and right to hold office, but also the underlying structural conditions that facilitate or inhibit the ability to carry out those rights that matter. Women suffer poverty, refugee status, and other disadvantages at a rate greater than that of men. They receive less education. Without changing the structural conditions that facilitate women's equal participation in democracy, we cannot have full democratic participation, and fuller democratic participation is associated with cultures of peace and with peace itself.

### ***Understanding, Tolerance, and Solidarity***

A culture of understanding, tolerance, and solidarity underlies a culture of peace. Stereotyping of any group as inferior is not consistent with this. As discussed above, research on gender reveals significant differences in women's styles in such matters. While this may simply be due to the fact that any group with less power may tend to be more understanding and tolerant, it represents what is at least currently another possible contribution of women to a culture of peace.

### ***Participatory Communication and the Free Flow of Information and Knowledge***

Another critical area of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action is the stereotyping of women and inequality in women's access to and participation in all communication systems, especially in the media. Denigration of women in the media is a serious step away from understanding, tolerance, and solidarity. The stereotyping of women is common in most societies. Women's equal participation in media is almost unheard of, and may well account for media emphasis on force and violence, and its fascination with crime and war. Given the importance of media in democracy, improvement of gender equality in media is critical.



## *International Peace and Security*

The Beijing Platform for Action argues that women's absence from decision-making related to peace, security, and conflict resolution hinders the achievement of the goals of equality, development, and peace (United Nations, 1995, paragraphs 23, 134, 181). It states that: "The equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (para. 134). One of the changes conducive to promoting a culture of peace would be changes in the basic conceptualization of peace, security, and power.

Women appear to have different attitudes toward war and peace and international security than men, and even to define peace and security differently. Participants in the *Expert Group Meeting on Political Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution: the Impact of Gender Difference* argued that:

a broad range of research and experience over several decades indicates that most women appear to have somewhat different definitions of peace, security, and sovereignty than most men. In general, women's approaches to violence, conflict and the resolution of conflict appear to be somewhat different than those of men in positions of decision-making in peace and security matters (para. 29).

Peace researchers have shown that women's conceptions of security tend to fall more at the human security end of the spectrum than the nation-state collective security end of the spectrum. Boulding (1976) chronicles the missing history of women, a history which she finds considerably more peaceful than that of men.

Underlying women's definitions of security appears to be a preference for a different definition of power. While many men tend to see power as power *over*, women have more often conceived of power as power *with*, capability rather than domination, the ability to construct rather than the ability to destroy. This entails a conception of political power in which power is seen as rooted in society rather than in its leaders, a bottom-up rather than top-down conception of power. This has been true both of women who see themselves as feminists and those who do not. Hannah Arendt (1969) is but one of the earliest and most insightful, identifying violence as the absence of power rather than the presence of it.

In 2006 the Nobel Women's Initiative, established by 6 of the 12 women winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, argued for a different definition of peace:

We believe peace is much more than the absence of armed conflict. Peace is the commitment to equality and justice; a democratic world free of physical, economic, cultural, political, religious, sexual and environmental violence and the constant threat of these forms of violence against women—indeed against all of humanity.

While this definition is not unique to women, having been put forth by Johan Galtung in the field of peace studies as early as 1969, in his distinction between negative and positive peace, and even earlier by Martin Luther King, it is one that appears to be more widely shared among women than among men.

## Conclusion

Gender equality continues to be an important goal in its own right, as well as within the context of developing cultures of peace. In the context of the Culture of Peace, however, gender equality plays a significant role in focusing our attention on the importance of “emancipatory politics” (Giddens 1991) that recognizes that any form of exclusion or marginalization is unacceptable in political as well as moral terms. A focus on gender equality encourages us to examine broader conceptualizations of peace and security that incorporate justice for all. Since the interdependence of men and women is obvious in terms of its necessity for human survival, a focus on gender equality helps us focus on the importance of interdependence overall, and on concepts of power that prioritize cooperative and consensual methods over coercive and violent ones.

Work on gender equality and, in particular, on the furtherance of women’s rights, continues to be essential. Since women “hold up half the sky,” the achievement of equality for women will by definition be an important advance in overall equality. Increasing women’s participation in political and economic decision-making will, by definition, increase democratic participation—and increasing democratic participation has been shown to increase peace. But if women, in the process of achieving equality, cease to recognize the continued importance of including the many others excluded, whether in terms of race, ethnicity, income, education, religion, or any other constructed category, then gender equality is not likely to contribute to cultures of peace. Gender inequality is only the most obvious of the various inequalities that must be continuously overcome to develop and maintain cultures of peace.

A focus on gender equality also helps us to recognize the necessity for an integrated approach to developing cultures of peace. It helps us focus on all the levels of peace and on their interrelatedness. The notion of the continuum of violence that runs from domestic violence in the family and the community, through punitive systems of justice that, at their worst, legitimize the death penalty, to the culture of war that continues to dominate a significant portion of international relations discourse and practice, is highlighted by many feminists, and helps us recognize the interconnectedness of legitimizing violence at any level. As Kenneth Boulding (1978) also recognized, there is a continuum between stable war, unstable war, unstable peace, and stable peace, and the movement toward the peace end of the continuum entails continuous and consistent action in all domains of life. The achievement and maintenance of cultures of peace and, hopefully, a global culture of peace that will encourage a diversity of other cultural values, can be furthered substantially by increasing gender equality.

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# Chapter 3

## Social Cohesion and Tolerance for Group Differences

Johanna K. Vollhardt, Katya Migacheva, and Linda R. Tropp

### Introduction

Issues of tolerance, understanding, solidarity, and social cohesion represent a key foundation for building cultures of peace (United Nations 1999). Tolerance and understanding ensure that perceived differences in group membership, values, or lifestyle do not result in discrimination and violence (Vogt 1997), whereas social cohesion and solidarity connote a sense of enhanced unity, democracy, and civic participation (Moody and White 2003; Putnam 2000).

Though often discussed together, there is a potential antagonism involving the societal consequences of tolerance and social cohesion. Specifically, social cohesion is often achieved and strengthened through destructive means, such as by developing an external enemy or creating an internal scapegoat. Attempts to promote social cohesion can therefore result in decreased tolerance for differences within a society and even lead to the exclusion of groups who do not represent the internal standard or who are depicted as the internal enemy. Thus, the main question of this chapter is: How can social cohesion be achieved in a way that it is not exclusive and destructive, but rather inclusive and constructive (see Valsiner, this volume), thereby effectively contributing to a culture of peace?

Potential answers to this question will differ depending on the nature of the societal context. Nation-building in postconflict societies and countries divided by civil war is often challenged with economic hardships, security concerns, or power struggles between groups (Winter and Cava 2006). These forms of instability must be addressed as efforts are taken to achieve social cohesion in such societies. For the purpose of the present chapter, we will focus our analysis on tolerance and social cohesion in the context of structural inequality and intergroup relations in more stable societies. From a social-psychological perspective, we propose that the solution for achieving social cohesion in relatively stable societies may lie in shifting processes of social categorization toward the perception of a superordinate identity between members of different groups. At the same time, we propose that tolerance for group differences must also be emphasized to ensure that social cohesion contributes to cultures of peace within societies as well as to global cultures of peace between societies.

## **Building Social Cohesion and Cultures of Peace: A Double-Edged Sword**

In social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and economics, the topic of social cohesion has received much research attention, which has amounted to a range of different conceptualizations (Friedkin 2004) and close associations with related concepts such as “solidarity” (Moody and White 2003) and “social capital” (Helly et al. 2003). Although a unified definition is lacking, what is shared by all definitions is the idea that social cohesion refers to the “connectedness” of a society (White 2003, p. 55), or, put simply, “the glue that binds people together” (Lavis and Stoddart 2003, p. 122).

Accordingly, social cohesion involves multiple levels of analysis, including subjective, microlevel phenomena associated with the psychology of individuals and more objective, macrolevel dimensions of communities and societies. However, the subjective perception of cohesion is distinct from objective, structural characteristics of a group (Bollen and Hoyle 1990). Psychological research on social cohesion has typically examined individuals’ subjective orientations toward their social groups, such as group members’ sense of belonging, the strength of their identification, and the perceived attractiveness of their group (see Friedkin 2004). By contrast, structural aspects of social cohesion have been the focus of much research in sociology, particularly that examining social networks. This work tends to operationalize social cohesion in terms of a group’s connectedness as evidenced through existing friendship ties and networks (Moody and White 2003) and through other objective indicators of interdependence among group members, such as cooperation (Stanley 2003) and civic participation (Putnam 2000).

Both subjective and objective dimensions are needed not only to characterize social cohesion, but also to explain its outcomes and consequences. Thus, rather than examining these components separately, we agree with Friedkin (2004) that a more useful approach to the study of social cohesion would involve interactions between the micro- and macrolevels of analysis. Only the interplay between individuals’ orientations toward their group and the structural conditions surrounding their experiences as group members can provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of social cohesion.

### ***How Social Cohesion Contributes to Peace***

Moreover, incorporating both micro- and macrolevels of analysis helps us to understand how social cohesion contributes to developing cultures of peace. Many of the individual and structural consequences of social cohesion are linked to peace in a positive feedback loop, such that each can help to promote the other. For example, it has been argued that social cohesion is linked to economic growth (Dayton-Johnson 2003) and at the same time eases the resolution of distributional conflicts,

thereby reducing the likelihood that conflict over resources would occur in the first place (Osberg 2003). Similarly, through processes such as enhanced cooperation, reciprocity, and perceived solidarity, social cohesion is typically linked to a more equitable distribution of social and economic resources, including more positive health outcomes (Lavis and Stoddart 2003). Increased equality contributes to more peaceful relations within a society (Stanley 2003), illustrated in findings such as that social cohesion is associated with decreased violence and a reduced risk of societal conflict (Osberg 2003). Thus, a positive cycle may develop wherein greater degrees of social cohesion would foster cooperation, reduce tension, and promote economic growth, which may in turn serve to reinforce social cohesion (Osberg 2003).

As such, these examples illustrate that social cohesion can contribute both to the diminution of conflict and violence (i.e., “negative” peace) and to the promotion of equality and social justice (i.e., “positive” peace; see Galtung 1969). Nevertheless, the described phenomena do not specify who is included in the group that benefits from cohesiveness and how the boundaries of cohesive groups are defined. Moreover, even when social cohesion is achieved *within* a society, it does not necessarily contribute to peace *between* societies and nations; in fact, it may even be detrimental to the development of such peace. Therefore, more careful consideration is needed regarding the potentially negative consequences of social cohesion as we pursue attempts to promote cultures of peace both within societies and between nations.

### ***Negative Consequences of Social Cohesion for Peace***

In particular, two potential limitations of social cohesion for promoting cultures of peace have been identified in the social science research literature. One is the tendency for social cohesion within a society to increase in the context of external conflict (Simmel 1955; Stein 1976). For example, external conflict is especially likely to enhance cohesion within a society when power is already centralized within a group and political elites are sufficiently united (Coser 1956). Instrumentalizing a common enemy or perceived external threat is then often used by politicians to unite citizens more and strengthen the social cohesion that is necessary to gain support for war or other violence against other groups (see Pettigrew 2003).

A second limitation concerns how social cohesion may inhibit the promotion of peace within a society. Especially in times of conflict, social cohesion is often achieved by decreasing tolerance for differences across segments of society, including “the silencing of divergent opinions, increases in adherence to group symbols, and intolerance for out-groups and dissenters” (Kunovich and Hodson 1999, p. 648). Social cohesion can then take on extreme forms and result in destructive social movements that have negative consequences for both relations between nations and within a society (Helly et al. 2003).

In sum, social cohesion is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can contribute to the promotion of peace and more equal distributions of resources in society. On the other hand, social cohesion is often reinforced through external

conflict and based on reduced tolerance for group differences. It is therefore crucial to examine social cohesion more closely in terms of group processes studied in social-psychological research and particularly concerning how social identities are constructed and maintained within a given society.

## **Social Identity and Social Cohesion**

A large body of research from the social identity tradition (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1987) has investigated these processes and laid the basis for our understanding of how people construe their group memberships and how these construals influence attitudes and behavior towards others. Central to social categorization theory is the assumption that people perceive themselves and others as belonging to social groups and base part of their self-concept on group memberships (Turner 1987). Social categorization leads individuals to perceive greater similarities to members of the own group, while differences to other social groups are exaggerated. On this basis, people are evaluated and treated differently depending on their group membership, with a tendency to favor ingroup over outgroup members (Tajfel 1978). Thus, social identity is an important antecedent of social cohesion, which emerges when individuals identify as members of a particular group and feel an attraction to members of this group (Hogg 1992).

Attraction to fellow group members has been identified as a central affective process leading to social cohesion (Hogg 1992), which can encourage positive outcomes such as cooperative efforts to work for the common good of the group (see Friedkin 2004). It is important to note that this attraction is depersonalized, such that it is not based on unique characteristics of the people involved, but rather on how well people represent the group (Hogg et al. 1995). Thus, ingroup members who are more similar to the prototype of the group are generally liked more (Hogg et al. 1995), whereas ingroup members who deviate from the ingroup norm are generally liked less (Abrams et al. 2000).

The tendency for social cohesion to enhance rejection of deviants can also have important consequences for relations with other groups. Although ingroup favoritism does not necessarily result in outgroup derogation (Brewer 1999), positive attitudes toward the ingroup may become a fertile ground for antagonism toward outgroups under certain conditions (Mummendey et al. 2001). For example, when a strong attachment to the ingroup is coupled with a glorified belief in the ingroup's superiority (Roccas et al. 2006), then ingroup favoritism tends to predict outgroup derogation (Mummendey et al. 2001).<sup>\*</sup> Similarly, such strong forms of

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<sup>\*</sup>In the literature, a conceptual distinction has been made between constructive and destructive forms of attachment to one's national ingroup. The constructive and positive form of national identification, which does not predict negative outgroup attitudes, has been referred to as "patriotism" (KOSTERMAN and FESHBACH 1989). In contrast, strong ingroup attachment, which also entails the belief that the national ingroup is superior and should dominate over other groups, has been contrasted with patriotism and referred to as "nationalism" (KOSTERMAN and FESHBACH 1989) or "ingroup glorification" (ROCCAS et al. 2006).



identification as nationalism have been associated with advocacy for war against other nations (Van Evera 1994) and with decreased guilt regarding the ingroup's perpetration of intergroup violence in the context of ethnic conflict (Roccas et al. 2006). Likewise, nationalism has been shown to increase the rejection of perceived outgroups within nations, above all racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups (Mummendey et al. 2001).

Thus, by encouraging people to value and support their ingroup, social cohesion can carry a significant risk of devaluing and even harming other groups, both between and within societies (see Dovidio et al. 1998). However, one possible solution to these potentially negative consequences grows from decades of social-psychological research showing that superordinate group categorizations can be used to promote inclusion and social cohesion within pluralistic societies.

### ***Will Superordinate Identity Achieve Social Cohesion in Pluralistic Societies?***

Social-psychological research has placed a significant emphasis on the role of inclusiveness in decreasing prejudice, toward the broader goals of promoting tolerance for and cohesion among diverse groups in society (Gaertner et al. 1994). The Common Ingroup Identity Model, proposed by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000), suggests that members of different groups can be induced to perceive themselves as part of one superordinate group (e.g., a nation), rather than as members of multiple, distinct groups (e.g., ethnic groups within a nation). Through this process, the salience of original group boundaries may be reduced, at the same time as members of different groups begin to perceive themselves and others as part of a more inclusive superordinate group. By virtue of being included in the same superordinate group, outgroup members then become beneficiaries of positive attitudes and behaviors typically reserved for ingroup members, such as increased prosocial behavior, a more equal distribution of resources, and more favorable attribution patterns (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). In sum, based on this body of research, it may be proposed that enhancing a sense of shared group membership within a superordinate category should increase social cohesion in pluralistic societies.

### ***Risking Social Conflict by Creating Superordinate Identities***

However, despite this potential to resolve social conflict, imposing superordinate identities potentially can create new sources of conflict in diverse societies. Specifically, when individuals find themselves in highly inclusive, superordinate groups, a motivation to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the original ingroup from other groups included in the superordinate category may be activated (Brewer 1991). Thus, rather than promoting cohesion, expectations that people would

relinquish identities associated with distinct subgroups (e.g., ethnic identity) within the inclusive category (e.g., national identity) may provoke defensive reactions that arouse intergroup tensions. For example, people are often more likely to favor their own subgroups and derogate other subgroups when only the superordinate category is made salient and subgroup differences are not acknowledged (Crisp et al. 2006). This effect is particularly pronounced among those who identify strongly with their subgroup. However, this response can be alleviated by simultaneously highlighting the salience of subgroup memberships and the superordinate category (Crisp et al. 2006; Hornsey and Hogg 2000).

Another danger in emphasizing superordinate identities is that the prototype of the inclusive category may be construed to apply primarily to the dominant, majority group and may be less inclusive of minority subgroups (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). For example, recent studies suggest that Asian American, African American, and Hispanic American faces are rated as less “American” than European American faces are (Cheryan and Monin 2005). Similarly, on the implicit level, these minority subgroups are less closely associated with the superordinate national category “American” than are European Americans (Devos and Banaji 2005).

In diverse societies, such tendencies counteract opportunities for minority groups to contribute equally to the shaping of superordinate identities as a means to social cohesion (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). Minority group members are often keenly aware that they are not equally included by majority group members in the superordinate category, even when they identify with it (Barlow et al. 2000). Thus, minority group members might feel pressured to give up their cultural values and customs in order to feel more accepted within the superordinate category (see Berry 1984).<sup>†</sup>

In contrast, a pluralistic notion of intergroup relations that values diversity within the broadly construed superordinate category can promote a sense of inclusion among minority and majority groups (see Jones et al. 2000). A growing body of evidence indicates that those who have more inclusive representations of superordinate groups exhibit lower degrees of intergroup bias than those who have less inclusive representations (Gaertner et al. 1994). This research suggests that a common ingroup identity is only likely to enhance social cohesion effectively when subgroup identities are acknowledged and valued within a superordinate entity. As such, social cohesion in pluralistic societies requires not only the toleration of minority groups through their inclusion in a superordinate category, but also tolerance for divergent values, lifestyles, and norms that are linked to different subgroup identities within this superordinate category (see Helly et al. 2003; Stanley 2003).

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<sup>†</sup> However, it is crucial to include minorities not just superficially. Research on “tokenism” shows that the (numerically) minimal inclusion of minority group members in organizations and institutions in fact inhibits collective action aimed at long-term structural change (WRIGHT et al. 1990). Thus, mere tokenism may actually be detrimental to social justice and cultures of peace.

## **Tolerance for Subgroup Differences and Its Importance for Social Cohesion**

Generally, tolerance is based on the perception of differences and diversity with which individuals are concerned (Vogt 1997). Many definitions of the concept center around negative attitudes in regard to these differences, using tolerance only to describe reactions towards groups that are otherwise disliked (e.g., Mondak and Sanders 2003). For example, Vogt (1997) defines tolerance as “intentional self-restraint in the face of something one dislikes, objects to, finds threatening, or otherwise has a negative attitude toward—usually in order to maintain a social or political group or to promote harmony in a group” (p. 3). Due to its negative connotation, many have rejected the concept as antiquated and argue that we need to move beyond it (see discussion in Vogt 1997). However, more positive definitions and a “warmer grade of tolerance” (Allport 1954, p. 425) may include the right to express diverse opinions and lifestyles (Corbett 1982) and an appreciation of diversity and group differences (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

### ***Tolerance for Subgroup Differences***

A social-psychological approach that incorporates this conceptualization of tolerance is the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone and Brown 1986). This model highlights the importance of groups emphasizing their mutual distinctiveness and subgroup identities within the superordinate category, specifying that these processes should occur in contexts of cooperative interdependence. Interdependence implies that each group contributes equally to the realization of superordinate goals (Sherif et al. 1954), thereby providing them with separate but complementary roles. Rather than trying to eliminate status differences, it is proposed that strengths of each group should be recognized with equal value (Hewstone and Brown 1986).

In many respects, the MIDM optimally addresses the problems discussed above. First, since diversity is recognized as a benefit and social value, subgroup identities are valued within the superordinate category (Jones et al. 2000). This avoids the identity threat that may arise from pressures to assimilate to a common prototype, which may be implied in the recategorization process of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Hewstone and Brown 1986). Moreover, the need to distinguish oneself positively from other groups (Brewer 1991) can be realized in the MIDM by highlighting the strengths of each group. In sum, with its emphasis on preserving subgroup identities and minimizing distinctiveness threat, the MIDM shares its assumptions with the multiculturalism perspective and is also in line with integrationist approaches towards social cohesion (Berry 1984; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

In these pluralistic approaches, tolerance entails that not just one group is perceived as the prototype of the superordinate identity. Thus, a social-psychological approach to assessing tolerance for diversity suggests looking at how the prototype of the superordinate identity is construed (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). If this prototype does not include a particular, specific image of a group or a strict set of norms, tolerance of differences becomes more likely. In other words, a *broad* prototype means that more variance around norms will be tolerated. In addition, a *complex* prototype endorses diverse, even opposing mores, as part of the superordinate category. Examples of these trends involve tolerance for religious differences (see Putnam 2007), in that variability in religious background is more accepted in present-day American society (i.e., broad prototype) and members of different religious groups are free to engage in a wide range of religious practices (i.e., complex prototype). In sum, tolerance for difference is maximized when differences in group norms are not among the defining criteria of the prototype, when its scope is broad enough to include diverse sets of norms, and when the prototype embraces various practices and traditions (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Ultimately, these criteria imply that diversity in opinions, values, and lifestyles is accepted and established as a positive norm in cohesive societies (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Stanley 2003). However, even when diversity is valued, commonalities in values and norms are also necessary (Annan 1999) in order to prevent societal fragmentation or anomie. Such shared values, which may also include a focus on diversity and/or the protection of minority rights, may be communicated through national constitutions (see Toggenburg 2004), as well as in international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Annan 1999).

At the same time, diversity within a society may lead people to become less trusting and more inclined to withdraw from collective life than people in more homogenous societies (Putnam 2007). However, as Putnam (2007) also argues, the challenges that diversity brings to social cohesion involve short-term risks, whereas the long-term benefits of diversity become more apparent as tolerance for differences increases and shared identities are strengthened. He proposes that these positive trends may be achieved by creating "...more opportunities for meaningful interaction across ethnic lines where Americans (new and old) work, learn, recreate, and live" (Putnam 2007, p. 164). In line with this view, research on intergroup contact shows that forging close, meaningful cross-group relationships predicts significant reductions in intergroup prejudice and a greater willingness to trust across group boundaries (Pettigrew 1997; Tropp, 2008). Moreover, these positive effects may even occur in the context of intractable conflict. For example, among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, contact with outgroup members predicted a greater willingness to forgive and trust the outgroup, even among those who had personally suffered due to the conflict (Hewstone et al. 2006).

In sum, social science research on superordinate identities suggests that tolerance, understood as an appreciation of intergroup differences, is essential in shaping a cohesive, pluralistic society. Moreover, this research suggests that the acknowledgement and inclusion of subgroup differences within superordinate

categories and the development of meaningful relationships across group boundaries can propel a form of social cohesion that contributes to building cultures of peace while minimizing the risk of new conflict.

## **Situating Research on Social Identity and Social Cohesion in Context**

Important policy implications can be derived from research indicating the strengths and obstacles associated with using superordinate categories in our attempts to create social cohesion in diverse societies. Potential applications of this work requires careful consideration of the political, economic, and historical context, as these factors will necessarily influence the ways in which superordinate and subgroup identities affect social cohesion (Hogg 1992). Nonetheless, the research described above suggests a number of basic principles that should be taken into account as we attempt to promote social cohesion through the use of superordinate categories.

First, it is crucial that we remain aware of power and status differences between groups when we rely on inclusive, superordinate categories in pluralistic societies. For example, whether intentional or unintentional, the majority group might be inclined to play a dominant role in defining norms, values, and standards for the superordinate category (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999), which could provoke negative and counterproductive effects for both minority and majority group members (Stanley 2003). However, this tendency can be counteracted by carefully examining policies for potential bias and by ensuring the inclusion of perspectives of minority representatives (see Jones et al. 2000). Thus, potential pitfalls associated with group differences in power and status can be curbed by the explicit acknowledgment and integration of subgroup differences (see Hornsey and Hogg 2000; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Moreover, to be effective and contribute to social cohesion and peace, use of the superordinate category must be accepted by all groups in society. For example, differential evaluation of the superordinate Yugoslav identity by members of majority and minority groups is believed to be one of the reasons for its failure in this region (Seculic et al. 1994), as minorities (Croats in Bosnia and Serbia, or Serbs in Croatia) tended to identify more with the superordinate Yugoslav identity than did the majorities (e.g., Serbs living in Serbia). Conversely, depending on how superordinate categories are defined, members of minority groups (e.g., racial minorities in the US) may be less inclined to identify with the superordinate category (e.g., "American") than members of the majority (e.g., White Americans; see Sidanius et al. 1997). Such tendencies are likely to be influenced by the perceived instrumental value of an inclusive category (Seculic et al. 1994), which can vary substantially depending on the contexts and histories of relations between the groups involved. Hence, when designing policies aimed at creating a superordinate category, careful attention must be paid to potential differences in the perceived value it may have for members of different status groups.

Relatedly, superordinate identities created through coercion will not likely contribute to social cohesion and peace, such as when they are imposed in dictatorships or by authoritarian regimes (Stanley 2003). Many cases in recent history have demonstrated the failure and overt rejection of such attempts. Examples include former Communist countries such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which attempted to unite multiple ethnic groups under a superordinate category and later experienced separationist movements and increased ethnic conflicts (Seculic et al. 1994).

Ethnopolitical conflicts such as these create new challenges for the construction of inclusive, superordinate categories with which people can identify. One such challenge involves unstable economic conditions and security concerns that result in high levels of stress and uncertainty in contexts of conflict. It has been suggested that a high need for certainty and reduced cognitive complexity may explain why identities are defined more narrowly when individuals or social groups are under economic, political, or military pressure (Brewer and Pierce 2005; see also Gay 2006; Webster et al. 1997).

Political and educational systems must therefore create a social climate that is inclusive and cultivates tolerant forms of social cohesion (see de Rivera and Paez 2007; de Rivera, this volume) in which subgroup differences are acknowledged and diversity becomes the norm. For instance, although the population of Mauritius consists of several ethnic groups (with an Indian majority, followed by Creoles and Chinese), nationhood is defined by the belief of achieving unity through diversity so that no single culture is considered to be dominant in Mauritian society (Ng-Tseung 2006). Similarly, the success of the European Union as a superordinate identity has relied on the fact that it did not try to replace national identities, but rather complemented them (Lacata 2003). This is institutionalized and symbolized, for example, in the shared currency (Euro), for which variations of coins are produced with a national symbol of each country that can be used in any other EU country, and in passports that have both the name and emblem of the respective country as well as the words "European Union" in the national language (see also Fry and Bonte, this volume). Clearly, the precise application and success of such measures will depend on the context in question, and strategies to promote social cohesion and tolerance are necessarily shaped by economic, political, and educational conditions of any given context (see Kimmel, this volume; Salomon, this volume). However, some examples of successful policies that reinforce the perception of an inclusive superordinate identity are the institutionalized use of multiple languages in a country, as in the cases of Canada or Switzerland; the official observance of religious holidays from all confessions, as has been implemented in India; or the legalization of dual citizenship, as has been debated in Germany in recent years.

Last but not least, it is important to use positive, constructive policies as a basis for social cohesion (see Valsiner, this volume). For example, rather than striving to enhance social cohesion through destructive actions ranging from excluding certain groups within societies to instigating violence between nations, social policies that emphasize mutual care and responsibility may instead become the basis for social cohesion (e.g., Canada's health-care system). Such constructive policies can promote a positive definition of the national identity and create a shared sense of

social security, solidarity, and equality among all citizens, which is conducive to the development of social cohesion (see White 2003).

## Conclusion

Social cohesion is generally viewed as an important basis of a peaceful society. However, definitions and conceptualizations of social cohesion must take into account who is included in the cohesive group, how much diversity is tolerated within this group, and whether the positive effects of social cohesion are achieved at the expense of destructive consequences for other groups. We believe it is only through a positive, constructive conceptualization that social cohesion will contribute effectively and sustainably to peace.

Fostering the perception of a superordinate identity between members of society can be an effective way to overcome some of the challenges that diversity poses to the achievement of social cohesion. However, when the superordinate category is defined primarily by the dominant group and does not take into account differences between groups in society, it may have detrimental and counterproductive effects for both minority and majority groups. In order to avoid the risk of new conflict and achieve social cohesion, it is therefore necessary to acknowledge and integrate subgroup identities in the construction of the superordinate identity.

Of course, these identity processes are not the only factors that are important to take into account as we work to enhance social cohesion. Especially in postconflict societies and war-torn regions, structural concerns such as the lack of security, struggle for power, and economic problems are essential to address. Nevertheless, social identity processes will also influence the distribution of scarce resources and power. Thus, it is crucial to consider both structural factors and social-psychological processes as they jointly influence social cohesion.

In conclusion, social cohesion is essential for cultures of peace, but only when it is inclusive of various groups and accompanied by tolerance of differences within society. Furthermore, it should be based on constructive goals that denote caring and social welfare rather than on destructive or exclusive means. The immense challenge is that tolerance and inclusiveness are not only the ultimate goal, but also that a minimal amount is necessary in order to start building social cohesion in diverse societies. However, when social cohesion is achieved in a constructive, inclusive, and tolerant manner, this may be one of the most promising and effective means to stabilize cultures of peace within and between societies.

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# Chapter 4

## Democratic Participation

Michael Kisielewski and Timothy F. LeDoux

### Introduction

This chapter identifies and discusses key elements associated with lasting, vibrant democracy—one of the eight bases vital to fostering a culture of peace across multiple levels of societal organization. Although the mere *existence* of democratic decision-making systems is not sufficient for a culture of peace to emerge or to flourish, a democratic decision-making system is far more likely to thrive within—and thereby strengthen—a culture of peace. Thus, democratic participation is an integral element that acts collectively with the seven other bases discussed in this section.

The myriad of structures, institutions, processes, and actors critical to successful democratic participation is a central—but not the exclusive—focus of this chapter. Equally important are the examples of past and extant/emerging peace cultures with institutions for participatory democratic rule. Through its theoretical underpinnings, examples, and practical analyses, this chapter presents a framework for democratic participation in a culture of peace.

### Democratic Participation within a Culture of Peace

As discussed throughout this handbook, a people's shared tendency to reject physical violence or other combative or confrontational means (e.g., fear tactics based on the threat of harm or retaliation) of resolving conflicts or disputes is a defining characteristic of a culture of peace. Such conflicts include those between governments, between a government and its people, and among and between segments of the very people who constitute a society. Nevertheless, why *bona fide* democratic participation is critical to fostering or perpetuating a peace culture merits explanation. Just as Montiel and Wessells (2001) posit that the emergence of civil peace during or following processes of democratization is not self-explanatory, the relationship of democracy to a culture of peace is not necessarily self-evident.

Why is democratic participation an enabler of peace cultures? Answering that question begins with recognizing that culturally embedded violence in societies with histories of autocratic or nondemocratic rule oftentimes originates with a collective

psychological tolerance for the violent practices institutionalized throughout a society's higher levels of political organization. Those might include literal acts of violence by state-level actors—such as mass killings and the violation of human rights—or “structural violence” (Galtung 1996), in which smaller ruling classes of elites harbor the majority of wealth and decision-making power, thereby keeping the populace disenfranchised and disconnected from major political and economic decision-making processes. In his studies of societal violence, Galtung (1996; also see Goodhand 1999) found that when literal or structural violence prevail throughout an entire system of governance, they become psychologically embedded within peoples across a society's diverse cultures. In turn, their acceptance of such forms of (or passivity over) violence reinforces the prevailing culture of violence originating from above.

In a system of robust participatory democratic governance, pluralities are more likely to be empowered in decision-making processes, of which many have significant implications for their society. One of the most pronounced examples is that of deciding whether or not to enter into or declare war. Democratic participation affords the members of society an authoritative voice in contemplating factors that otherwise might dissuade them from supporting belligerent actions such as hastily entering into war and, simultaneously, nurturing within them a better understanding of nonviolence in conflict resolution. Participation has been enshrined in international human rights law since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (for further discussion on human rights as one of the eight bases for fostering a culture of peace, please see Chap. VI), to the extent that “[h]uman rights violations hamper the popular (or democratic) participation” (McChesney 2000, p. 22) of those seeking equitable representation. As McChesney (2000) argues, some of the most egregious mistakes in political decision-making occur when “participatory rights” are denied to the masses and local knowledge and opinions are ignored or marginalized by a society's most powerful leaders. Greater empowerment of pluralities through democratic decision-making processes compels members of society to confront the range of consequences associated with supporting or rejecting an action such as entering into war. In turn, political leaders and authorities are held more accountable for their decisions (Hermann and Kegley, Jr. 1995).

Mass participation is central to sustaining vibrant democracies, but the question remains as to why widespread participation would correspond with a society's rejection of violent means of action in resolving conflict or disputes. What suggests that societies whose decision-making processes are inclusive of mass participation will prefer peaceful actions and not exercise a democratic right to pursue war? The answer begins with the individual as a political actor. Masses that are highly disenfranchised are predisposed to feelings of ambivalence or complacency over their leaders' decisions to pursue war or violence (Schedler 2002). However, when confronted with the range of outcomes that might result from resorting to those actions in solving (or attempting to solve) conflict, people who are highly enabled to exercise their democratic rights are more likely to weigh and process the consequences of belligerence. Those include, for example, the possibility that they or their children could be conscripted into military service (thereby facing the risk of death),

the expectation to “kill or be killed,” or the countless atrocities (by all warring factions) that commonly occur when violent means for conflict resolution are used. Regardless of how a political system is structured or organized, widespread democratic participation at all levels of societal organization—whether in societies with more direct forms of democracy or more representative-driven forms—underscores the heavily dubious claim that human nature gravitates toward violent means of conflict resolution (Christie et al. 2001).

Although societal transformations—particularly away from cultural violence—can be slowed by the inherent rigidity in traditional practices or customs developed over time (Galtung 1996), a culture that has embraced or constructed participatory democratic structures and processes is less likely to resort to belligerence or violence for resolving conflict. In a study of democratization and civil peace among nation-states, spanning 1816 to 1992, Hegre et al. (2001) concluded that during regime changes from autocratic rule to democratic rule, it is not until a “durable democracy” (p. 33) has been forged that a lasting civil peace is possible. Although the authors were studying the tendency of states to gravitate either toward civil war or civil peace during regime changes, they found that the likelihood of civil war ensuing was markedly low when states “democratize[d] as much as possible” (p. 44).

### *The Centrality of Participation*

Participation is perhaps the most critical element in sustaining healthy democratic rule. Without participation, a democracy exists only in name. At the least, a system of democratic governance requires the mass participation in decision-making processes of individuals who have assumed an identity *as members of a greater polity*. That must encompass groups of individuals who have been (or are at risk of being) marginalized, underrepresented, or disconnected from the political system (Fung and Wright 2003). Realizing such a system is by no means a simple or swift task. For example, societies with newly-emerging systems of democratic governance must overcome the challenges of incorporating into their political processes previously excluded groups, such as factions based on religious beliefs or political ideologies suppressed by former regimes, people geographically removed from major urban areas where political power is concentrated, or multiple ethnic groups and women who traditionally lacked a voice in decision-making processes (Pridham 2000).

Democracy and its relationship to cultures of peace cannot be viewed unidimensionally. The composition and level of participation in a democracy not only are shaped by people’s culture, traditions, and history, but also by a myriad of factors at an individual level. It often is taken for granted that the simple act of participation is shaped and influenced by many social, psychological, economic, and institutional factors.

Socioeconomic conditions affect acts of direct participation, such as voting, by not only providing individuals with the resource to participate, but also by shaping the environments that socialize individuals to a greater sense of civic duty, a greater sense of efficacy in participation, and a closer adherence to democratic norms

(Flanigan and Zingale 1998). For example, education reinforces civic norms and allegiances to a political system. Through the process of political socialization, the political culture of a society is transmitted from one generation to the next, which in turn influences change in the political culture. In essence, social, educational, and financial attributes provide individuals with the resources to participate in politics. Those with limited personal resources—little education, low income, or no employment—are less likely to participate than individuals with more resources or those whose social environments encourage and enforce participation.

Political participation also is significantly influenced by individuals' psychological orientations—their beliefs, attitudes, and values—as well as by their social connectedness (Aldrich and Simon 1986; Conway 2000). People choose to participate or abstain on the basis of fundamental attitudes toward life. Those attitudes, which provide an impetus for various forms of participation, are a function of socioeconomic background, civic orientation developed during childhood, and socialization during adolescence. In addition, interpersonal, community, and general social ties provide a substantial proportion of an individual's motivation to participate, because those ties can provide external encouragement and pressure to participate as well as an enhanced sense of purpose (Putnam 2000).

It is imperative to view socioeconomic, psychological, institutional, and other contextual variables as part of larger historical, political, and cultural processes occurring at levels such as the nation-state. Alone, those variables are not impediments to or promoters of participation: They are reflections of larger structural elements within a society, such as the unequal distribution of resources and racial or ethnic segregation.

It also is crucial to remember that acts of participation and nonparticipation are shaped by institutional arrangements forged by a long history of ongoing political conflict. In turn, that conflict is motivated by the recognition that who participates and who does not has consequences for the polity (Kleppner 1982; Piven and Cloward 2000). The end product of those political battles has been a series of electoral laws, registration requirements, and institutions designed to enfranchise and disenfranchise particular groups of people based on class, ethnicity, race, and gender. It never can be forgotten that *participation is about power*. By controlling who participates and who does not, economic and political elites can determine how laws, public policies, and institutions are implemented.

## **Democracy and Democratic Participation: Fundamental Elements of a Democratic Society**

Although democracy is not a monolith occurring strictly in one form, there exist some basic elements familiar to democratic societies—or particular elements that are highly important to the structure of successful democracies. In its most elementary form, a democratic government or system of governance is constructed and ruled by the very people who constitute a society that, in turn, is based firmly on the rule of law. Substantial direct participation by popular choice is requisite, and

leaders are not insulated or isolated from those whom they are expected to represent or serve (Barber 2003; Kisielewski and LeDoux 2002). Also, a framework must exist for individuals' *democratic rights*—essentially those born from civil and political rights (McChesney 2000). They include, for example, voting rights, the right to compete for political office, the right to express dissenting views, and the right to contest election results (Fishkin 1997; Katz 1997). Not only must elections occur periodically, but they also must be free and fair. Equally important, norms must emerge that form the basis of structures that provide for the accountability of leadership (e.g., the recall of elected officials or of ruling-party governments). A vibrant democracy maintains its legitimacy when widespread corruption among political leaders is *preventable and prevented* (Warren 2004). Successful democratic societies are accountable to themselves and are not defined by a single political personality, as is common in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Moreover, in participatory democracies recognize the rights of all groups within society and provide mechanisms for their voices to be heard.

In a peace culture, there are substantial organic origins to a people's embracing of *bona fide* democracy. Similar to the structures and institutions that arise during a transition from one type of rule such as authoritarianism to that of democratic governance (Gourevitch 1978), the elements underlying a culture of peace simply cannot be superimposed upon a society by an external entity or actors (di Palma 1990)—as from one nation-state to another or from one group of indigenous peoples to a neighboring group. A societal culture, its prevailing norms, and personal history shape the institutions that arise within it. However, it *is* possible for societies and cultures to “learn” from their exchanges and experiences with other societies or entities. Those include, for example, international institutions, states, or tribal groups (Martin and Simmons 1998).

The extent to which robust democracy with lasting institutions and processes has taken root throughout the world depends on factors such as level of societal organization. For example, governments that consist of a one-party state, that lack a separation of church and state, or whose civil society is weak face the challenge of establishing a thriving democracy at the national level. Nevertheless, democratic procedures at the level of the nation-state might be tenuous at best, whereas at other levels of societal organization they might be robust. Thus, although a nation-state might fail to meet the conditions of a peace culture, there might well exist smaller units of societal organization—such as townships or villages—in which a culture of peace is pervasive. That might seem paradoxical, yet it is quite possible, as demonstrated in the following discussion of village-level democracy in rural China.

### ***Enhancing Participation within Democratic Societies***

This section examines the processes, procedures, structures, and other elements that can enrich participatory democratic systems and their perceived legitimacy. In many instances, those elements are requisite for a particular society—such as a vast nation-state with a large population and multiple levels of bureaucratic administration.

Because variants of democracy exist to accommodate the needs of an emerging or established democratic society, it is important to remember that the following are *malleable* elements.

In democratic societies with multiple divisions of governance (e.g., among a legislative, executive, and judicial branch), an equal separation of powers ensures a system of checks and balances upon each branch of government, and, therefore, equality among those branches (O'Toole, Jr. 1987). Equally important is the provision that the judiciary will be independent and free of undue influence from lawmakers or executive officeholders (Padovano et al. 2003), *particularly* for governance at that level. As Chua (2004) argues, the existence of a democratic political system alone does not preclude that groups such as ethnic minorities who possess greater financial assets than the majority will suffer persecution or even violence at the will of popularly elected lawmakers or executives—especially if those lawmakers are engaged in unchecked, corrupt activities with other political elites or even with influential civilians. Granted, Chua's argument extends far beyond one of "tyranny of the majority"—but it nevertheless underscores the importance of an independent judicial body for the purpose of protecting fundamental human rights.

Given the crucial nature of participation to democratic societies, undue barriers to partaking in political life—such as constraints on voting—must be prevented or removed. In many nation-states, measures to encourage electoral participation already are taking root. For example, several state-level governments have declared major election days to be national holidays so as to encourage the largest possible turnout among voters by removing obstacles such as work hours or other schedule conflicts associated with the typical working day (Wattenberg 2002). In other instances, the elimination of historically entrenched voter registration requirements, such as literacy or the implementation of election-day registration (e.g., as a means to avoid disenfranchisement), have been used to lessen the difficulties of partaking in political life.

Still other structures and institutional designs encourage participation. The efficacy of those elements depends upon the evolution of each political system, and they must be embraced with careful consideration of a society's particular needs: what might work in one system might not be appropriate or as effective in another. Those include, for example, the type of electoral system. Electoral systems are the sets of procedures that determine how people are elected to office. Those procedures include how the ballot is structured, how people cast their votes, how those votes are counted, and how the winners are decided. Many different electoral systems exist. Because the same votes in different systems can produce different results, the selection of an electoral system has a powerful impact on governance and its representation. One such example is the implementation of instant runoff voting (IRV)—a process designed to address the concerns raised when a candidate (running in a pluralistic or "winner takes all" electoral system) wins an election without securing a simple majority of the votes cast. With IRV, candidates are "ranked" preferentially by voters so that if no candidate initially receives a majority of votes, a process continues whereby a candidate who then receives a majority of the votes



cast for the “number one” position is declared the winner (Brams and Fishburn 2005). In the countries of Ireland and Australia, where IRV has been implemented, Farrell and McAllister (2004) have demonstrated that voters’ level of satisfaction with elected officials *and* with the institution of democracy is substantially higher than that of 28 other European and non-European nations to which they were compared. A statistically robust comparative index was developed by the authors, with a high level of correlation (at 0.32) between the degree of satisfaction with the elected candidate and, as stated above, with democracy as an institution (Farrell and McAllister 2004).

Cultures and societies the world over are diverse in size, history, and traditions. Thus, there are core considerations for implementing the various elements associated with enhancing a participatory democratic system. For example, many tribal societies already have in place a tradition of electing village decision makers or representatives through free and fair processes. However, it is not uncommon for their judicial bodies to consist of those tribe members who are of age to participate in the political process (see, for example, Benedict 2004). In that respect, such societies are small enough that judicial precedents are set by all—or, in a similar vein—trials or judgment processes, and decisions are entrusted to all of one’s peers. Although one might question the independence of such a judiciary, if such a practice has been embedded in the customs of a tribal society that conducts free and fair elections of its leaders—and if the judicial *process* itself is conducted equitably—then that society probably is democratic.

## State of Democracy and Democratization Globally

Perhaps the most comprehensive, widely used reference for assessing democratization at the level of the *nation-state* is Vanhanen’s index for “measuring democracy.” Vanhanen’s index integrates the elements of electoral *competition* and *participation* to develop three distinct measures—electoral competition, degree of participation, and index of democratization—among 187 countries between 1810 and 1998 (Vanhanen 2000). Nations that meet the minimum value for a quantitatively determined range for each measure qualify as democracies. Vanhanen makes a limited number of quantitative comparisons (and finds some similarities) between his data and well-known indices developed by *Freedom House* (Freedom House 1999) and the *Polity98 Project* democracy ratings (Gurr and Jagers 1999). Vanhanen’s data *suggest* that as of 1998, about 68% of the nations included in his dataset constituted democracies. His index also depicts a dramatic surge in the percentage of democracies from the late 1970s through 1998. Despite the robustness of his data and comparative analyses, Vanhanen’s measure of the extent to which democratization has occurred among nation-states across the globe is not exhaustive: it captures but one aspect of democracy. It does not, for example, account for variables such as civil and political freedoms within countries. Thus, the index provides a framework for understanding global trends in democratization

at the level of the nation-state, but it leaves many more elements of democracy and democratization open for exploration.

## Variants of Democratic Systems

Whereas democracy is a *form* of government created and ruled by the people, there is no “one size fits all” model for a democratic *system*. That distinction is crucial, given the oft-misguided assumption (and prevailing belief throughout much of the academic and policy communities) that democracy and democratic systems must meet the criteria for what constitutes a *Western liberal democracy* (Freedom House 2007; Huntington 1991), which, in itself, is not strictly uniform (e.g., Western nations such as the US follow a tradition of political pluralism, in contrast to Great Britain, which rests upon a parliamentary system). That assumption neglects the primacy of norms and normative ideas embedded throughout the diversity of world cultures (Fierlbeck 1998; Florini 1996). Although some basic, fundamental elements exist that constitute a democratic system (see above), many underlying characteristics of democratic societies can and do differ. One of the most pronounced examples is that of the relationship between a capitalist economy and a democratic society. Many scholars (see, for example, di Palma 1990; Huntington 1991; Schumpeter 1942) have argued for decades that democracy flourishes most when a capitalist economic system permeates a society. In contrast, others have argued that a capitalist economy and democratic participation are not codependent (see, for example, Barber 2003). Some important examples are furnished by the Iroquois League and the growth of village-level democratic elections in contemporary China.

## The Iroquois League: Over Three Centuries of Democracy and the Absence of War

Consisting of five (and, subsequently, a sixth) tribal nations of Native Americans in the northeastern US, the Iroquois League was formed in approximately 1450 following a history of “violent conflict” (Crawford 1994, p. 345) among its members. Two widely noted and related elements of the Iroquois League that typify a peace culture include: (1) the types of institutions and norms that emerged during and after its formation and (2) the participatory democratic processes and principles to which its member nations adhered and by which they functioned (Foster 1985).

Much of what is understood about the Iroquois League and its members has been verified through analyses of several oral history accounts passed between generations. That the Iroquois League members constructed a robust participatory democratic system rarely has been disputed. In fact, the institutions that anchored the League itself were encoded in a quasi-constitution known as the Great Law of

Peace (Tooker 1978). In addition to its provisions for ensuring that the principles and procedures codified in it were sustained through oral tradition, the Great Law of Peace included among its tenets the objective for the Iroquois League “to achieve general peace and to keep unity and order among the five [member] nations” (Crawford 1994, p. 355). As for the procedural mechanisms established within the League, each member nation—as well as the League administration itself—functioned democratically. Broadly, the League was comprised of a Great Council, to which member nations sent popularly elected representatives (sachems) who eschewed wealth and whose economic status was *lower* than that of the common person [Colden 1904/1747 (cited in Crawford 1994)]. Sachems were responsible for deliberating at the level of League governance, but processes and procedures were instituted such that those who failed to represent the popular will—or who abrogated their responsibilities—were subject to removal from office and subsequent replacement (Colden 1904/1747). Similarly, “hereditary chiefs” were selected (and, thus, subject to removal) by female heads of household until the Seven Years War commenced (Danvers 2001, p. 197).

As a large, complex institution, the Iroquois League represented a confederation of tribal nations that collectively ensured the security of its members such that violent conflict between them was delegitimized and a peace was maintained for over three centuries. Crawford (1994) has argued that the Iroquois League—in contrast to the Concert of Europe—was a much stronger entity with respect to its ability to ensure collective security. Moreover, Crawford has observed that “the Iroquois League exemplifies Immanuel Kant’s idea of a system for perpetual peace. [M]embers were inclined, because they were democracies, to use negotiation and consultation to resolve disputes” (p. 346). That has led her to conclude that the Iroquois League was a strong exemplar of Kant’s notion of a “*league of peace*” (p. 347). In contrast to the degree of efficacy of the Concert of Europe, the high level of efficacy of the Iroquois League—as a collective of peaceful societies capable of ensuring security and prosperity among its members—is a reminder that fostering a peace culture is not dependent upon a Eurocentric model or view of what is requisite to attain such a culture. Although it has been substantiated that peacefulness *within* each of the Iroquois League’s tribal nations varied—that is, some of the nations intrinsically did not constitute a culture of peace—the League as a whole embodied a peace culture.

### **China: Participatory Democratic Elections at the Village Level**

The national government of the People’s Republic of China has been the subject of progressively greater global scrutiny over its human rights record. Documented repression of individuals on the basis of such attributes as religion and sex continues to be of tremendous concern (Amnesty International 2007). Nevertheless, China’s experience with democratic elections throughout *villages* underscores the possibility that peace cultures can exist at one level of societal organization in a larger structure of governance that has eschewed nonviolent means of resolving

conflict—in this case, within its national borders. Put simply, a culture of peace can exist even when the larger society of which it is a part does not necessarily constitute such a culture. Conversely, a collectivity or confederation of societies acting together to promote a lasting peace between each other can represent a culture of peace, even if certain members of that collectivity do not constitute *bona fide* peace cultures, as exemplified by the history of the Iroquois League.

The origins of village-level elections in China date back to the early 1980s, when *ad hoc* processes for electing local leaders in two of the country's Guangxi counties—Yishan and Luocheng—began to emerge (Wang 1997). Those processes were initiated by local elders and civic-minded villagers concerned about the deterioration of their social fabric—largely as a result of decisions at the national level that affected their ability to avoid unmanageable conflicts due to mandated changes in such practices as local food production—and, thus, possible infringements upon their economic, social, and cultural rights. Over time, those processes matured, and procedures for conducting elections became formally encoded such that village elections on a three-year schedule now are (generally) *required* (O'Brien and Li 2000). Despite China's lengthy history of one-party, totalitarian rule, government officials (e.g., cadres) responsible for village affairs gradually accepted the newly emerging electoral practices as effective ways to manage local problems. Such officials from the lower rungs of party leadership progressively began to demonstrate support for the new practices, gradually introducing them to higher authorities in Beijing. Over time, well-respected elders and other civically engaged local peoples had constructed and implemented a basic framework for an electoral process whereby representatives in a system of self-government through so-called villagers' committees would be selected (O'Brien and Li 2000; Wang 1997).

The birth of villagers' committees hardly represented a swift or immediate transition to the ruling party's acceptance of unchecked, popular self-government below the level of Chinese townships. To the contrary, significant reservations were expressed by top Communist Party officials over the extent to which villagers' committees might gravitate toward self-governance beyond the reach of the Party's directives and mandates (Kelliher 1997). Nevertheless, by the late 1980s—after substantial, passionate debate and disagreement among Party officials—the National People's Congress informally permitted the enactment of an experimental Organic Law on Villagers Committees. In 1988, that law officially entered into force (Standing Committee of The National People's Congress Organic Law 1988). A decade later—following further debate and substantial procedural developments in village-level electoral processes—the Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People's Republic of China was adopted and then enacted by President Hu Jintao (Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress 1998).

Since the enactment of the Organic Law of 1998, how has village-level democratic participation in China evolved, and have the elements of a culture of peace begun to emerge among those villages with significant experiences in electing representatives? As of 2002, approximately 80% of Chinese villages included villager committees, although the extent to which those committees were established through fair and competitive means is not known (Chen 2005). However, a 2003 study by Li on

Chinese villagers' sense of political efficacy following democratic electoral participation suggests that a process of peace through participation might well be underway. Li's two-stage survey of 400 villagers representing 20 villages in the T county of the Jiangxi Province—conducted before and after free and fair elections in 1999 (see Li 2003 for more complete details concerning the methodological approach and statistical accuracy of the study's measures)—found that those surveyed generally felt that their participation in the electoral process had increased their ability to effect political change, specifically relative to their sense of efficacy *prior* to those elections.

The implications of greater political efficacy are such that more robust democratic participation at the grassroots level can elevate village leaders' degree of political accountability, thereby encouraging them to “challenge overbearing village party secretaries and abusive township governments” (Li 2003, pp. 652–653). That is particularly true if voter turnout rates are high and if villagers believe that they can hold officials to greater accountability by selecting different candidates during subsequent elections, demanding recalls immediately after questionable elections, or even seeking the direct removal of specific officials from office. Those processes and procedures are far more consistent with nonviolent means for seeking redress of citizens' grievances—as opposed to direct confrontation with local leaders and officials.

In essence, under a national regime associated with repression of dissenting individuals, Chinese villagers vied for a grassroots participatory democratic system to address their socioeconomic grievances, in contrast to violent uprisings, destruction of common property as a form of demonstration against the national government, or other combative means to seek political change. That is not a dubious claim: although it would be erroneous to assume that local people in China are well positioned to resort to those means in light of the consequences they might face as a result of such actions (Chen 2005), the lesson here is that they have been assembling a structured, procedure-based, and nonviolent system for addressing grievances and for attempting to represent their interests without succumbing to complacency or ambivalence. As Shi (1999) has noted, “Democratically committed midlevel officials may accelerate the wheels of history...and peasants are important forces driving electoral reform in China—a finding that challenges the widely accepted myth that peasants are the obstacles to democracy” (p. 411).

## Conclusion

The birth of a peace culture is not necessarily confined to one level of societal organization. Nor must a culture of peace originate at one level of societal organization and then spread or “flow” strictly in one direction, as, for example, from the local level directly to the national. Rather, there might be a somewhat paradoxical nature with the emergence and existence of a culture of peace. That is, a culture of peace can exist within a larger society, even if that society as a whole does not constitute a peace culture. Conversely, a collective of separate societies can legitimize

nonviolence in resolving conflict *between* its members, even when the prevailing norms *within* those societies are not necessarily indicative of peace cultures. In that respect, the relationship of democratic participation to fostering peace cultures reveals itself, as demonstrated in the case studies discussed above.

Democratic participation is an enabler and a strong component of fostering peace cultures—albeit not the exclusive, necessary element. Participatory democratic systems and peace cultures share a common trait in that they cannot be transferred to or imposed upon a society. Moreover, vibrant, successful democratic systems—though requiring mass participation as a cornerstone—assume multiple forms and vary in institutions. They do not conform to a single, predetermined model. Yet, fostering peace cultures vis-à-vis democratic participation faces tremendous challenges—challenges that are underpinned by societal institutions oftentimes rife with structures designed to disenfranchise particular elements of a population—as well as multiple forms of inequality between segments of society which, ultimately, are powerful enough to suppress the have-nots or the underrepresented.

Robust democracy brings members of a society more closely into contact with social and political decision-making processes, thereby enabling individuals to confront and understand the implications of supporting choices that eschew peaceful means of conflict resolution. It empowers individuals in such a way that they become less removed from the realities that—once cognitively processed, allow them to “uncover” a tendency toward nonviolent means of resolving conflict.

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# Chapter 5

## Open Communication

Shira Loewenberg

### Introduction

The United Nations *Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace* (1999) calls for “actions to support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge.” It asks nations and individuals to: “(a) Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a culture of peace; (b) ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication; (c) make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a culture of peace...; (d) promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making; (e) take measures to address the issue of violence in the media ... and (f) increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies, including the Internet.”

Of course these actions are subject to a wide range of interpretation. Defining these actions more precisely is surely a contentious and political issue, and the action areas are phrased to encompass multiple perspectives and positions to allow for consensus.

In a democratic context, open communication embraces the free-flowing interactions and information exchanges between individuals; among individuals and institutions and organizations; between these institutions and organizations and the state; and between the state and its citizenry. Open communication is thus viewed in terms of transparency and accountability of a state and its institutions to its people in a system that includes everyone and everything—individual citizens, politicians, teachers, artists, parents, scientists, civil society, universities, and government—that intersects in a functioning (or dysfunctional) society. Open communication allows for a state and its citizens to engage in a reciprocal dialogue, both as information producers and listeners—a crucial component of peace and stability (see Von Kaltenborn-Strachau 2008).

As such, the media occupies a primary role in enabling a culture of peace—by providing accurate, reliable, and balanced information to allow the public to make well informed decisions and the state to be responsive to citizens’ needs; by serving as a watchdog over leaders and government, keeping them accountable to the people; by ensuring that human rights are upheld, and that abuses are exposed; and by

supporting and enabling civil society. This chapter will discuss open communication in this framework of the public sphere, with particular emphasis on the role of the media in promoting and sustaining a culture of peace.\*

## General Transparency in Governance

Information is integral to democracy. Where there is no open access to information, there cannot be an informed citizenry. The ability of citizens to monitor and hold their government accountable rests on their ability to gain information and comment upon government decisions and actions. “By enabling public scrutiny, laws guaranteeing access to information and freedom of expression serve as safeguards against government abuse, subversion of the democratic process, and the squandering of public assets” (Open Society Justice Initiative 2006). Without free access to information, and without the resulting transparency, governments have the tendency to be or become secretive and corrupt. As an anti-corruption tool, the right to information about the activities of governments, international organizations, and private corporations is critical.

Transparency International (2006) analyzes various aspects of corruption, including access to information. Its corruption measurement tools include the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Global Corruption Barometer. Transparency International reports that by 2006, 68 countries around the world had adopted access to information laws, an increase from only 12 countries that had such laws in 1990.

In a similar vein, the Justice Initiative, a project of the Open Society Institute, has developed a set of basic principles and an Access to Information Monitoring Tool to evaluate the implementation of information laws, elucidating the right to information internationally and regionally, and opposing government efforts to inappropriately limit access. The principles listed represent evolving international standards on how governments should respect access to information in legislation and implementation (Open Society Justice Initiative 2006):

1. Access to information is a right of everyone.
2. Access is the rule—secrecy is the exception.
3. The right applies to all public bodies.
4. Making requests should be simple, speedy, and free.
5. Officials have a duty to assist requestors.
6. Refusals must be justified.
7. The public interest takes precedence over secrecy.
8. Everyone has the right to appeal an adverse decision.

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\* The notion of the public sphere is adapted from the philosopher Jurgen Habermas’ usage of the term and refers to the arena where individuals engage in discussions about matters of common interest in an environment conducive to free expression. Habermas discusses the public sphere as the definitive institution of democracy (see WARREN 1995).

9. Public bodies should proactively publish core information.
10. The right should be guaranteed by an independent body.

While blame for obstructing access to information is regularly thrust upon public officials, and is often well-placed, it should be noted that public officials frequently are uninformed of new information laws and untrained in information management. Ministries may not have appointed information officers, and officials frequently have neither training nor experience in open communication, nor the time and inclination to be responsive to information requests that they in all likelihood regard as a nuisance, not as a matter of a public right and law. Training in information access, the law, and its value to government and public discourse is critical for public officials in order for such situations to be remedied.

Legislating access to information is only part of the solution to engendering an engaged citizenry and a responsive government and institutions that are not prone to corruption. Factors other than political will hinder open access to information. Open communication is a participatory process. A culture of open information needs to be learned. Even where access to information laws exist, it may take time for the public to put those laws to use. Citizens and civil society must exercise their right to information by raising awareness of the right and its value to the public sphere and democratic governance, filing requests for information, monitoring responsiveness, and by litigating when necessary (see Kacaoglu et al. 2006).

Government, the media, and civil society organizations have a critical role to play in educating the public on their right to access information and the ways in which they can exercise this right. There are a number of areas where corruption risks are high, and where access to information can have a demonstrable positive impact on citizens' lives—fund allocation for social services, public health and education, and the awarding of government contracts are but a few examples. With international and national advocacy, training, and awareness, citizens can learn of the benefits of utilizing public information to improve governance and accountability, and public officials can be urged to cooperate and engage citizenry in a transparent and participatory governance system.

## Press Freedom

The media plays a central role in the public sphere as the primary vehicle of information exchange. The media provides exposure, analysis and commentary on events, decisions, and actions of government and civil society, and thus function as the “fourth estate” in a liberal democratic system, exposing abuses of state authority and protecting the rights of citizens. The United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948, Article 19) and *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1976, Article 19) include freedom of information among fundamental human rights.

Although access to information legislation is critical to transparent and open communication, other factors, too, are vital to efficient communication exchanges

in the public sphere. Just as legislation may be used to open information access, authorities may also invoke the law to close information channels and outlets down, or to intimidate and imprison journalists. Without meaningful legislation to protect media actors, including journalists, editors, publishers, producers, and Internet bloggers, they may be subject to intimidation, harassment, physical violence, censorship, and on occasion even death.

Censorship need not be overt, but can function effectively simply through pressure, real and threatened. By broadening the legal definitions of libel and slander, for example, to include criticism of public officials, many regimes silence critical debate, exposure of corruption, and elements of opposition (The Economist 2008b). What many would consider legitimate dissent is sometimes defined as a crime by the state, and in this way control of information by state authority is maintained. Where the law is abused to suppress open communication, it may be argued that there is no culture of peace. Yet what accounts for abuse and legitimacy of this freedom is the source of great controversy, for it is also argued that restrictions on open communication ensure a culture of peace. When national security is threatened, for example, the necessity for and the government's authority to control information are often invoked.

Authoritarian regimes exert both overt and subversive control over all media outlets. Even the Internet, although it has emerged as a powerful tool evading state censorship and as a vital source of news and information in restricted media environments, has proven not to be outside the limits of state control. China, Iran, and Burma/Myanmar are examples of countries where the government has devoted substantial resources to Internet monitoring and blocking of access in order to maintain exclusive control over information the public may receive.\*\* In extreme cases, such as in Nepal in 2005 and in Burma/Myanmar in 2007, the Internet along with cellular phone service was shut down by the government (Human Rights News 2005).

Media outlets must not be under the exclusive purview of the government or governing authority, nor of a single ethnic or religious group or political party; the media must demonstrate their independence, impartiality, accuracy, and reliability in providing information to the public, and relaying public concerns and critiques back to the government. The increasing consolidation of media ownership is an additional factor causing concern among advocates of free and independent media. With media consolidation, the prevalence of a single perspective and agenda across a spectrum of media voices lends itself to the pervasiveness of misinformation and common public misconceptions, such as, in the United States, the relating of Saddam Hussein to the events of 11 September 2001 in the public mind. Freedom of the press is a crucial element of open communication, a vibrant part of the public sphere, a critical window to the actions of government and institutions, and thus a vital component of a transparent and responsive democratic society.

Freedom House, in its annual *Freedom of the Press Survey*, examines and ranks the degree of freedom in every country in the world, analyzing events and developments in three general categories: the legal environment, political influences on

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\*\* For a detailed examination of Chinese government control of the Internet, see GOLDSMITH and WU (2006, 87–104).

reporting and access to information, and economic pressures on content and the dissemination of news (Karlekar 2007). The last few years have shown an overall decline in global press freedom. Freedom House explains this decline by pointing to several trends:

1. *Reaction against democracy.* The media has been a primary target, along with civil society organizations, of a movement to eliminate or neutralize all prospective sources of political opposition in countries as varied as Russia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Legislation is frequently invoked—media outlets are taken over by the state or by forces allied with the political leadership; license renewals are denied; journalists are arrested or fined for libel or defamation.
2. *Political turmoil.* Political unrest or civil war has had a negative impact on press freedom. In countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, political upheaval has intensified polarization and threatened the independence of the media.
3. *Violence against journalists.* In countries across the globe, including Russia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines, state and non-state actors have engaged in physical violence against journalists and even murder. A culture of impunity in most of these countries makes punishment of those responsible unlikely.
4. *Legislation prohibiting blasphemy, hate speech, insult, and threats to national security.* Governments have increasingly turned to legislation in their efforts to punish the press for political criticism and for provocation and incitement when commenting on subjects such as religion or ethnicity, or for endangering national security. In the Middle East, this has been a long-standing obstacle to media freedom. It is occurring with greater frequency in parts of Asia and Africa and some countries of the former Soviet Union (adapted from Karlekar 2007).

Western Europe ranks the highest in press freedom worldwide. However, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 prompted many in the West to question the limits of this freedom. Van Gogh was stabbed and shot to death in Amsterdam after having received death threats over the broadcast on Dutch television of his controversial film addressing a culture of violence against women in Islamic societies. The film's screenplay writer, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, then a member of the Dutch parliament, received death threats as well.

In 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* printed a cartoon depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad wearing a bomb as a turban with a lit fuse. The publication sparked global protests and violent demonstrations by Muslims across the world, with Danish embassies attacked in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon and closed in Indonesia and Pakistan, and with dozens of people dying in riots in Nigeria, Libya, and Pakistan.\* These examples illustrate that the notion that there should be no (or few) limits on freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press

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\* BBC News (2008). Following the arrest of three people for a plot to murder the cartoonist in February 2008, a number of Danish newspapers, *Jyllands-Posten*, *Politiken*, *Berlingske Tidende*, and *Ekstra Bladet*, as well as several papers in other parts of Europe, reprinted the cartoon. The reprint is, according to those that published it, not a provocation, but a test of the limits of—and an expression of support for—freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Guardian 2008).

is not without controversy. Based on the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, the United States has notably permissive laws relating to freedom of speech, with court opinion upholding the presumption that the less the government is involved in regulating the content of speech, the less likely it will be to interfere with the free flow of ideas (see Goldsmith & Wu 2006).

For example, in the United States, white supremacist groups and Holocaust deniers may publicize their ideology and activities without government interference, as long as they do not cross the line into the overt and direct promotion of violence. In countries such as Germany and France, however, where Holocaust denial is a crime, such speech is not protected under laws protecting freedom of expression and is, in fact, illegal.

The thin line of what constitutes justifiable free speech and what threatens public order and security is one that many states differ on in law and implementation. Most human rights organizations and journalist advocacy groups and associations—Article 19, Committee to Protect Journalists, International Federation of Journalists among them—defend the right to free expression and free press, with only extreme examples such as the role of Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines in the 1994 Rwandan genocide comprising a notable exception where suppression of the freedom may be justified as a humanitarian intervention. It is the gray area around this line, a blur that widens and narrows according the state and situation in question, that is the contested area. Are there circumstances where controls on media development and information content are justified? Are there environments where restrictions on the media are appropriate? And if so, who should decide what is permissible and what is not?

There is compelling evidence indicating a positive relationship between exposure to media violence and aggressive behavior in children and adults (Eron et al. 1996; Huesmann et al. 2003). Media violence appears to promote violence by modeling violent behavior, weakening inhibitions, desensitizing, and lessening empathy for victims (see Berry et al. 1999). Yet there is no consensus on how media violence can be reduced.

Significant also to the controversy over the seminal role of information in a culture of peace is the debate over how rapidly communication should become pluralistic and free in countries transitioning from autocratic rule to democracy or just emerging from violent conflict or war. In such fragile environments, the dilemma over freedom of expression and the role of an independent media in developing and sustaining a democratic system takes on international proportions. The external actors—wealthy nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank and others—frequently disagree over what sort of media system should be (re-)built, what legal and institutional controls over the media should be imposed, and what content regulation should be implemented and under whose authority. The issues elicit strong views. One must ask whether media freedom always serves the cause of peace or whether it is sometimes justified to place limits on this freedom to achieve the national objectives of peace, reconstruction, and economic development. Is censorship ever appropriate?

While some argue that an independent and pluralistic media must be established as soon as possible after the end of hostilities, encouraging an open market of ideas and economic growth, others insist that it takes a post-conflict society or a transitioning society some time to be able to manage a free and open media system: “In the aftermath of social upheaval, the crucial short-term issue is not how to promote freedom of speech but rather how controls on expressing dissent should be exercised” (Allen & Stremlau 2005, 2).

The latter view holds that a rapid privatization of media outlets and liberalization of information content in fragile and post-conflict states require a strong institutional framework to be successful. Without state mechanisms of control (legal, judicial) and without institutions (civil society) to exert influence and maintain professional standards of journalism, there is great danger in pushing media and information freedom too rapidly for the society to manage without resorting to divisiveness, inflammatory content and, ultimately, to violence. Too fast a transition in media liberalization may threaten a fragile nascent democracy; the nation’s development must advance on multiple fronts at once (see Allen & Stremlau 2005). As the examples of Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, among others, show,\*\* liberalization of the media is often accompanied by unforeseen and undesired results—sectarianism, propaganda, incendiary content, and hate speech. The failure of the media, while not the sole factor responsible, may be a significant component contributing to the (re-)emergence of violent conflict.

Thus, when a society is in a delicate transitional phase, some form of media control and censorship may be desirable. Strategies for dealing with media systems and media content in such sensitive environments must take into account the long view of how best to lay the foundations for an enduring culture of peace.

## Peace Journalism

Media is a vital part of a system of open communication, for it is not only the primary vehicle of information between the state, institutions, and citizenry, but also the producer, examiner, elucidator, analyzer, and disseminator of information in both directions. That the media fulfills these roles is paramount to the sustainability of a democracy. The media enable the accurate understanding by all parties of events, decisions, motivations, and actions. It is therefore extremely important for the media—and particularly the news media—to retain an unbiased, impartial, and balanced approach to reporting, with an emphasis on accuracy and

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\*\* Iraq provides a recent example of what initially was hailed as a flourishing media landscape, with hundreds of newspapers and several satellite channels emerging from the five state-owned dailies and one satellite channel operating under Ba’athist rule. Just after the 2003 Iraq war, the new media outlets tended to promote national unity, but by 2005, with the adoption of the Iraqi Constitution and elections of a permanent Iraqi Assembly, a new trend emerged—the ethno-sectarian divisions of politics became prevalent in the media. For a detailed examination of Iraqi media and its implications for the future of Iraq, see AL-MARASHI (2007).

reliability. These elements are considered the basis for standard professional journalism.

There are some who contend that the news media is conflict driven. The saying “if it bleeds, it leads” is used to describe journalists’ propensity for stories of violent conflict over those that invoke or support peace. In reaction to the alleged natural disposition of the media towards violence has emerged the concept of “peace journalism.” Peace journalism is premised on the idea that just as the media is used as a tool for war, so may it also be used as an effective tool for peace. Rather than promoting division, the media can advocate for strategies of conflict resolution, dialogue, cross-conflict understanding, and reconciliation. It encompasses not only the news media (though that is its primary focus), but also seeks to impact and utilize other genres including entertainment programs, music, street theater, billboards, and storytelling.

The media are indeed subject to abuse by power and special interests promoting violence as the only alternative to settling disputes. Governments readying for war exploit state-controlled media to prepare the public—physically and psychologically—for the advent of military action and violence. Private media, too, may become vehicles for promoting one ethnic, religious, political, or social group over another. Historical mythologies are revived and relayed by the media, enforcing the notion that century-old events have led inevitably to the current moment of fated conflict; lies and disinformation become the norm (Bickler et al. 2004). Unification on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, tribe, language, class, and ideology are promoted through the media, becoming the all-defining criteria for group identity, with the “other” portrayed as an enemy to be feared, loathed, and even extinguished. Media are repeatedly employed to provoke and incite violence, to engender hopelessness and inevitability, and to undermine efforts to bring peace through non-violent means.

Examples of the use and abuse of the media in the last decades abound, with Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines in Rwanda being the most egregious contemporary example of a media actor—an ostensibly independent local radio station, though with very close ties to the government—playing an instrumental role in inciting the population to violence against moderate Hutu and Tutsi civilians and providing instructions to drive a genocide (Des Forges 2002). Other examples include Nazi Germany where the media contributed to the dehumanization of Jews; the former Yugoslavia where media campaigns contributed to the violent and lethal breakup of the country; and in Iraq and the region today, where the airwaves, satellite television, print publications, and the Internet are used to promote sectarian divisions and violence. Proponents of free expression irrespective of the environment and circumstances should therefore give thorough consideration to the psychology of hate (Sternberg 2005).

The tenets of professional journalism may be sufficient to meet some of the goals of peace journalism. Several media organizations, such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, have begun to formulate ways in which journalists may uphold their professional standards while contributing to the resolution of conflict without overtly becoming actors in the conflict or advocating for any particular position. As noted by Bickler et al. (2004), some elements of good journalism that coincide with the goals of peace journalism include: (a) identifying, understanding, and explaining the roots of conflict and the underlying interests that maintain it;



(b) reporting events accurately and fairly, working against manipulation and disinformation; (c) providing balanced information from a variety of sources; (d) educating the public by offering fair representation on divisive issues; and (e) creating a space for discussion and debate of the issues.

Peace journalism, however, goes beyond the traditional definitions of disengaged journalism. “It is designed to have an intended outcome: a reduction of conflict among citizens” (Howard 2002, 9). It refutes the notion that journalists are mere observers reporting the facts, and calls upon their ethical and responsible engagement in the issues. Given that journalists wittingly or unwittingly report from a specific perspective—one reflecting their own personal and cultural values—and thereby confer a bias in their reporting, they should do so in a manner that consciously and responsibly repudiates violence and promotes peace.

Johan Galtung, one of the early scholars to question the impact of the news media on conflict, contrasts peace journalism with conventional news coverage of conflict, referred to as war journalism, by comparing attributes of each:

Peace/Conflict Journalism	War/Violence Journalism
1. Peace/conflict oriented	1. War/violence oriented
2. Truth oriented	2. Propaganda oriented
3. People oriented	3. Elite oriented
4. Solution oriented	4. Victory oriented*

Peace journalism advises the incorporation of a number of techniques and approaches to reporting that position the report itself and the journalist who produces it as ethical agents of change, transforming conflict by shifting attitudes, and providing information within the framework of conflict resolution. Howard (2004, 15) advises: “A conflict sensitive journalist applies conflict analysis and searches for new voices and new ideas about the conflict ... takes no sides, but is engaged in the search for solutions.”

Several elements further explicate what qualities peace journalism emphasizes to journalists in their news reporting and how it differentiates itself from standard news journalism (see Bickler et al. 2004; Howard 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005).

1. *Avoid simplifying the conflict into antagonisms between two opposing sides.* Investigate and report on all the players and the manifold root causes of the conflict to convey it in its complexity.
2. *Provide multiple perspectives.* Seek out voices other than the officials, leaders, and elites. Report from the perspectives of ordinary people affected by and affecting the conflict, correcting misperceptions and humanizing issues.
3. *Seek common ground.* Avoid focusing on issues that divide, but rather report on shared goals and concerns.
4. *Do not focus on the suffering and fear of one group only.* Address all parties’ suffering as equally newsworthy.

\* For details on these categories, see table in MCGOLDRICK and LYNCH (2000, 29).

5. *Use extreme care in choice of words, avoiding emotional or imprecise expressions.* Words have precise meanings and should be used appropriately.\*\*
6. *Investigate peace ideas wherever they come from.* Do not wait for leaders to put forth solutions. Consider as newsworthy ideas suggested by grassroots organizations and other non-elites. Challenge leaders with alternative (and even marginalized) ideas for peace and inform the public of their response.

The idea of having the media play an advocacy role, even for good intentions, is anathema to many media professionals, as expressed by the view that “[o]ur job as reporters is only to be witnesses to the truth. There cannot of course be a single absolute truth—anyone who has ever interviewed two observers of the same incident know that there is no perfect account—but once we step away from pursuing the truth, then we are lost in an area of moral relativism which threatens the whole business of reporting” (Loyn 2003). Positioning journalists in the role of direct actors rather than neutral observers is viewed as a violation of core professional principles by many. Objectivity must remain integral to the reporting process, objectors to peace journalism contend, even if only as an ideal. The audience must be assured there is no other agenda in reporting. “Propaganda for peace is still propaganda” (Bickler et al. 2004, 168).

## New Communication Technologies

New communication technologies are transforming the ways people interact and approach information throughout the world, revolutionizing notions of borders and communities. At the forefront today are the Internet and mobile telephones, each with global impact and showing great promise as tools to effectively contribute towards creating and sustaining a culture of peace. Yet, though they have greater facility than traditional media in evading official control, the scope of these new technologies is not limitless as they are still subject to censorship, blocking, and abuse.

The impact of these new communication technologies is being demonstrated daily. In August and September 2007, images and witness accounts of peaceful street demonstrations by Buddhist monks in Burma/Myanmar were broadcast around the world via the Internet. Armed with mobile phones and having access to web-linked computers, bloggers and citizen journalists provided images and descriptions of the protests and of the first days of the ruling military junta’s violent suppression. It took several days for the regime to react to the international exposure, but on 29 September 2007, it shut down Internet access inside the country and stopped the majority of mobile phone service, effectively severing contact with the outside world.

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\*\* HOWARD (2004, 16) notes: “Assassination is the murder of a head of state and no-one else. Massacre is the deliberate killing of innocent, unarmed civilians. Soldiers and policemen are not massacred... Avoid using words like terrorist, extremist, or fanatic. These words take sides; make the other side seem impossible to negotiate with.”

The role of new communication technologies in the first days of the “saffron revolution” has been acclaimed as achieving an unprecedented global exposure and understanding of the crisis in Burma/Myanmar, of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military regime, and the political and social realities of living in a highly controlled state. The 2007 demonstrations are frequently contrasted with the 1988 student-led democratic protests in Burma/Myanmar when, without the benefit of Internet and cellular telephone technologies, international awareness of the pro-democracy demonstrations, in which 3,000 students and other civilians were killed by the regime’s violent response, was negligible.

All over the world, websites, chat rooms, and social networking sites are means of communication and social and political activism. Many organizations use technology and the Internet to connect and mobilize citizens to political action. Politicians host blogs, and YouTube participates in American presidential candidate debates. Facebook, a social networking website, was used to organize the largest demonstration in Colombia’s history on 4 February 2008. More than one million people in Colombia and smaller groups in cities around world gathered in protest against the FARC guerrillas (The Economist 2008a).

Blogs have in the past decade gained in importance and become increasingly recognized as legitimate news sources, at times breaking news to the public with traditional media following. Used for personal expression, allowing on-line diaries to be shared with an infinite number of potential readers; in the service of special interest—corporate and political—for outreach, advertising, and opinion making; or for editorializing and critiquing political and other news events and the media itself, blogs and their bloggers exemplify the participatory communication called for by a culture of peace.

These examples show the positive impact of new technologies on social organization, freedom of expression, open communication, and human rights in promoting a culture of peace. It must also be noted that, as with traditional communication outlets—press, radio, television—these new technologies are also subject to abuse. Incendiary content is widespread on the Internet; in some environments, as in Iraq and the region, the Internet is used as a potent tool by sectarian factions to recruit and incite violence. In Kenya, following the December 2007 presidential elections, text messages were used to inspire fear, spread rumors, and provoke violence among Kenya’s tribes, exacerbating tensions and fueling deadly conflict (Quist-Arcton 2008; Baldauf 2008; Khaleej Times Online 2008).

Because of the importance of these new technologies in engendering open communication, and thus in empowering citizenry, they are subject to tight control by some state governments and authorities. As China has grown economically and opened to the world, it has rapidly adopted the Internet, allowing its citizens access to information from across the globe. Yet, despite the open border promise of the Internet, China has managed to keep close control over information by using both familiar and new tools of information regulation, including legislation, monitoring, site blocking, censorship, harassment, intimidation, and incarceration (see Goldsmith & Wu 2006).

The real and potential impact of new communication technologies on freedom of information is constantly in flux. As new technologies continue to develop and change the ways in which individuals, organizations, and systems exchange information, they are likely to open new forums for dialogue and communication as well as raising new issues of control versus freedom.

## Conclusion

A culture of peace relies on numerous social and institutional attributes, behaviors, principles, and ideals, each supporting and enabling the other. Open communication is crucial to the emergence and sustainability of a culture of peace, allowing citizens to make their voices heard by the state, and the state to listen to their needs and to be responsive. Viewed in the framework of the public sphere, open communication among state, citizen, and civil society is what allows a culture of peace to develop and to flourish. It allows citizens access to information, thus empowering them with knowledge to become effective participants in the political process and to realize their human rights: "It is a right that acts as an instrument to allow citizens access to fulfill other cultural, economic and social rights such as the right to education, to food, to work, to self determination" (Transparency International 2006b). As indicated by Von Kaltenborn-Stachau (2008), open communication permits civil society to organize and reflect public opinion and to coalesce attention and activism on specific issues. It enables the state and its institutions to be transparent and to deliberate and create policies that are reflective of public opinion and responsive to needs.

The media is a critical player in the public sphere, and an integral component of open communication. The strengths and limitations of traditional media outlets as effective participants in a system of open communication are continually and throughout the world being tested by governments, corporations, political actors, grassroots organizations, and individuals, utilizing a number of tools in efforts to liberalize or restrict information access and control over content. New communication technologies have already made an impact on the nature and substance of information and its exchange within nations and across borders, cultures, and civilizations. While the precise definitions and qualities of its components continue to be debated, there is broad consensus that open communication is integral to a culture of peace.

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# Chapter 6

## Human Rights and Peacebuilding

Ernesto Anasarias and Peter Berliner

### Introduction

We begin this chapter by describing the principles of human rights and relating them to the promotion of a culture of peace. After discussing how war interferes with human rights, we show how people were able to further human rights by creating a *space for peace* in the midst of a war in the Philippines. We examine the history of this endeavor and how the connection between human rights and peace is reflected in the remarkable grassroots document that declared the establishment of the space. In the concluding section we reflect upon how mental health and human rights may be promoted through civil society activities at the local level, governmental legislation, and institutional practices. Psychologists committed to human rights need to work with human rights defenders in the struggle against state torture and mass murder (e.g., Martin Baro Foundation). However, our focus here is on how people may build spaces for peace that promote human rights.

### A Culture of Peace and Basic Human Rights

Respect for human rights is one of the bases of a culture of peace. In fact, a culture of peace may be understood as a particular organization of society and local communities that is basically informed by human rights, as the concept was described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nickel (2006) describes how these rights can be divided into six categories: *security rights* that protect people against murder, massacre, torture, and rape; *due process rights* that protect against abuses of the legal system; *liberty rights* that protect freedoms in belief, expression, association, assembly, and movement; *political rights* that protect the liberty to participate in politics; *equality rights* that guarantee equal citizenship and nondiscrimination; and *social rights* that require provision of education to all children and protections against severe poverty and starvation.

Such rights are both a mutually shared set of values that may be protected by the state and a set of rules securing the individual from arbitrary persecution and suppression from the state. There has been some criticism of the Human Rights

Declarations' focus on the rights of the individual. In the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the rights of groups and peoples are also included, and there is a section on individual duties. Article 28 states that, "Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance." This article shows how rights are considered to be mutual at the community level. Even though a person cannot lose her/his basic rights, the practice of human rights involves a way of treating other people. Human rights are, at the community level, inherent to the practice of everyday life. At this level, respect for and the practice of human rights merge, as one cannot respect human rights without practicing them. The practice may be measured in behavioral terms.

The template for assessing cultures of peace (see Chap. 7) suggests measures that can be used to compare the degree to which different nations enjoy human rights. Thus, Gibney's political terror scale (based on the behavior reported in the annual reports issued by Amnesty International) may be used to estimate due process, political, and equality rights, and Freedom House ratings may be used to index political rights. Although we lack equivalent measures for security rights and social rights, these may be estimated by using questionnaires that assess the degree of security, insecurity, and social trust in a nation's emotional climate.

The template should ideally include an assessment of civil, political, and social rights (de Rivera 2004). The social rights are the so-called *welfare* rights, which include the right to work, to organize trade unions, to receive medical care, to education, to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, to have a safe childhood and family life, and to life in a sustainable and safe environment. A consideration of such rights is often omitted from the (otherwise estimable) reports issued by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. In the Declaration on a Culture of Peace, the social rights perspective has been taken to the forefront by a direct focus on the elimination of poverty.

The implementation and maintenance of human rights for all citizens in a given country are in the UN declaration on human rights; the conventions and covenants are seen as a responsibility of the state authorities. This is reflected in the process of signing and ratifying the declaration, the conventions and the covenants, and the fact that the state authority has to report back to the UN on the current situation of human rights. For example, there is recent awareness of the lack of fulfillment of Article 27 in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that no child should live in poverty. The state must secure that no child is restricted in its development because of absolute or relative poverty.

This perspective entails a top-down responsibility of the state. Yet, in some cases this responsibility is not taken by the state. In these cases we often see human rights groups and activists putting pressure on the state to make it meet its obligations regarding human rights. For instance, during the Estrada presidency in the Philippines, human rights activists believed that the judicial and political systems were ineffective, and some groups initiated nonviolent activities to promote human rights. These activities included the dissemination of knowledge on human rights through various means, such as theatre, performances, and rallying (Macapagal and



Nario-Galace 2003). The aim was to pressure the state to secure basic civil rights for the citizens.

Sometimes, we see still another type of social movement aiming to promote human rights. Although this type of movement may be initiated by religious groups and leaders, it is a bottom-up approach because its central idea is that human rights is a way of behaving towards fellow human beings at the local level. This kind of movement can be understood as a vulnerable groups' own response to adversities, warfare, and violations of human rights. In many cases the living conditions may be worsened by ongoing warfare, insecurity, and internal displacement. This was certainly true in the case we shall examine: the Space for Peace Movement in Mindanao. Layson (2005), a leading figure in the movement, describes the integrative religious focus of the movement and states that its objectives are to promote socio-economic, political, cultural, and religious rights of everybody and to denounce human rights violations. The rights also include military personnel and rebels as the Space for Peace Movement encourages the belief that there is:

Basic goodness in the heart of every individual. We relate with the military, rebels and local government officials based on a dialogical attitude and not on confrontational and adversarial approach...It is a grassroots initiative and a collaborative effort of all stakeholders (Layson 2005, p. 2).

This type of human rights promotion is far more focused on social rights than on civil rights and peacebuilding, as closely linked to the recovery process of the society and the local communities. Peacebuilding based on the respect for equal rights for everyone and non-aggressive conflict resolutions is considered a means of risk reduction, i.e., prevention of future outbursts of violence and war. Thus, there is a marked emphasis on economic growth, educational opportunities, and decrease of aggression and insecurity. The promotion of civil rights at the local level is seen as embedded in a protective social fabric able to protect vulnerable individuals and groups from human rights violations. In the Space for Peace, the communities have organized groups of volunteers for reporting human rights violations back to the local authorities. This is seen as an alternative strategy in cases where the state will not – or is not able to – secure basic human rights for everyone.

## **War Impinges on Human Rights**

Wars today are often directed against poor segments of the population by terrorizing people through massacres, genocide, torture, and other forms of violent oppression, including sexual exploitation, kidnapping, and execution of local leaders or randomly picked people. Since World War II, more than 170 wars have affected an alarming number of countries, most of them developing countries, where war has taken a great toll on already scarce resources. Millions of people have been killed or injured or have lost family members and homes. Millions have been forced to leave their homes, seeking asylum in other part of their country or in a foreign country.

These wars result in vast breaches of basic human rights. They are fostered by a culture of war and promote aggression in attitudes and behavior. In most cases, before, during, and after the war, groups of local people — often supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — seek to create a set of values and practices conducive to peaceful coexistence through nonviolent conflict resolution aiming to reduce the alarming levels of violence, abuse, and exploitation emergent in the communities. The negative impact of war, low-intensity warfare, and other forms of organized violence has been described as social trauma consisting of distrust in others; fear of violence (revenge, robbery, sexual assault); lack of confidence in local leaders; violent responses to even minor conflicts; violence against women and children; lack or scarcity of schools, hospitals, law enforcement and infrastructure; aggravated poverty; and destruction of farmland and other means of livelihood.

To prevent this self-perpetuating culture of suffering and war from being seen as the only solution, groups of local people supported by NGOs try to advocate basic human rights in the affected communities and in the society at large. This endeavor may be quite dangerous for the promoters of human rights, as has been documented in a number of reports (e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2006). Threats, intimidation, murder, and torture are used as means to silence the defenders of human rights—defenders that include poor women organizing reading classes using easy-to-read pamphlets on civil and social human rights, local priests, volunteers at the community level, highly positioned people in the judicial system, and spokespersons for oppressed groups requesting equal human rights for all groups in the nation.

When the struggle for implementing the principles of human rights in a society or community is combined with the promotion of a culture of peace, the challenge is to put its own fundamental principles into practice. Hence, it “must be different from most of the great social movements of the past in at least one very important aspect. It must not create enemy images and must be essentially nonpartisan and open to working with everyone” (Adams 2000).

The responsibility to behave in concurrence with the civil and social human rights is also a clear guidance for human rights organizations working together with the people impacted by organized violence (and also for humanitarian aid organizations within disaster response).

## **Peace and Human Rights in the Mindanao**

Mindanao, the southernmost large island in the Philippines, is inhabited by three broad segments of people. These segments are referred to as the “tri-people” of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago: namely the Lumads, the Moro, and the Christians. Sometimes the term “Mindanawon” is preferred, as it emphasizes the existence of the different groups of people who have to share Mindanao as well as the ideal of their equality and their unity as the basis of their identity. Indigenous

peoples are referred to as *Lumads*, Muslims are referred to as *Moros* (and include different groups of indigenous people who converted to Islam), and *Christians* are often referred to as settlers as they were the latest group to settle in Mindanao. Mindanao is home to 18 Lumad tribes, 13 Moro tribes, and 64 settler groups (Rodil 2003).

Some parts of Mindanao have for decades been subjected to recurrent internal armed conflict between national military forces and the locally based MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front, formed in 1968) and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, formed in 1977), which strive for a higher degree of independence for the area. The intensity of the conflict was at its highest in the 1970s and during the military campaigns in 2000 and 2003. Fragile peace talks and ceasefires have been established in the periods between the wars, and a new ceasefire was agreed upon in 2004. The recurrent wars and the organized violence by the fighting parties have led to widespread suffering, deprivation, and a continuous violation of basic human rights in the affected communities.

In 2000, more than 1 million people were affected by the total war policy declared by the government against the MILF. In February 2003, armed conflict broke out again. This time the fighting lasted four months and produced more than 450,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), who sought refuge in mosques, churches, schools, and vacant lots in the town centers.

The poverty rate is 63% in Mindanao and 34% nationwide in the Philippines; life expectancy for women (in years) is 59 years in Mindanao and 72 years nationwide; enrollment in primary education is 82% in Mindanao and 96% nationwide; enrollment in secondary education is 39% in Mindanao and 72% nationwide; 42% of children in Mindanao had their schooling and education disrupted due to armed conflict.

In this situation, the local people in one of the most war-affected areas of Mindanao decided to leave the evacuation centers and move back to their farmlands. They decided to counteract the dominant description of them as powerless victims, relying on other people's support as they counted the length of days in evacuation centers. Repeated calls for the hostilities to stop so that the civilians could go on with their lives had been unheeded. After four months of waiting since the military offensives began on 11 February 2003, the evacuees decided to change the situation; they decided it was time to go home. They named the new approach, *Bakwit Power: The People's Exodus to Peace*. A bakwit is an evacuee.

On 24–26 June, evacuees, both young and old, marched from different evacuation centers in Pikit, Pagalungan, and Pagagawan and gathered in the town of Pagalungan. They reiterated their call for the government and the MILF to declare an immediate ceasefire and resume peace negotiations. Approximately 8,000 evacuees staged a protest that has come to be known as *Suara Kalilintad*, meaning "voices for peace."

Carrying placards bearing calls for peace, the bakwits lined one side of the Davao-Cotabato highway, forming a line that stretched for nearly seven miles. In Pagalungan, the protesters handed a manifesto to the local government.

The highway stand-ins peacefully continued for the next few days. Pockets of “silent protest” by the evacuees in nearby areas sustained the call for a bilateral ceasefire and the return for the government and the MILF to the negotiating table. That there were no violent incidents during the protest activities showed the ability of the evacuees to organize a peaceful conduct of the mass action.

*Bakwit Power* was the collective action by people who had experienced evacuations repeatedly for as long as they could remember. Their decision to assert peace and rehabilitation gained the support of NGOs, local government officials, Barangay leaders, civil society, and solidarity networks in Manila and Mindanao.

The protests helped hasten moves toward the cessation of hostilities, and on 19 July 2003, the government and the MILF declared a bilateral ceasefire and moved towards the resumption of the peace process. The manifesto of the evacuees stated that:

*We have ultimately placed our lives and safety in the hands of the merciful and ever-protective God, our Allah, or Magbabaya. But we realize that the conflict in Mindanao that has made us evacuees can be settled peacefully through negotiations and political settlement. We therefore dedicate Bakwit Power to this continuing search for the end of the conflict in Mindanao.*

In 2005, one of the participants of the movement explained the background:

*We moved back to our land and declared it a Space for Peace. We were Lumads, Muslims and Christians. We realized that the war was not our war. We were invited into narratives of war, saying that the reason for the conflict was religion or related to ethnicity – but these narratives were not ours. We were encouraged into thinking in racist ways ... we said thank you very much—but no. We have our own stories of living together for a century without hate and violence.*

On 29 November 2004, a declaration was signed by more than 5,000 inhabitants of the seven Barangays (villages), which established the Space for Peace. The declaration was named *GiNaPaLaDTaka* (from the first two letters in the name of each Barangay) *Space for Peace and Children as Zones of Peace*.

Before, during, and after the signing of the spaces for peace declaration, a whiff of euphoria pervaded the air as festive parades, songs, dances, performances, and food marked the declaration that led to the gathering of at least 500 Muslims, Christians, and Lumad people in the area and beyond it. In an expression of support to the initiative, representatives from civil society groups, international humanitarian and non-government organizations, the United Nations, an international ceasefire monitoring team, a Roman Catholic archbishop, church groups, as well as evacuees from adjacent areas came down to the Takepan High School yard. A chorus of applause echoed across the schoolyard at the strife-torn community of Takepan as government and MILF emissaries signed and raised together a large facsimile of the declaration.

But reaching this goal was the result of a long process starting in 2000 when the first initiatives were taken for creating a space for peace and putting an end to the fighting. To understand how this process wove human rights into a culture of peace, we consider its history.

## The History of the Space for Peace

The Space for Peace initiative began as an idea that started in the village of Nalapaan. It was severely devastated when army soldiers and MILF fighters fought for control over a portion of the highway following the government's "total war" campaign in Mindanao in May 2000. The MILF had declared an "all out jihad" in response to the military offensives. Instantly, many parts of Mindanao had been turned into combat zones.

A number of humanitarian organizations arrived to offer support to the beleaguered evacuees. The NGO *Tabang Mindanao* asked Immaculate Conception Parish (ICP), which was working side by side with the municipal social workers in providing emergency assistance to displaced civilians, to collaborate on the idea of helping the evacuees to return back to their villages and start a rehabilitation program.

The violence had turned Nalapaan into a virtual "ghost village" — the civilians were gone, their empty houses were laid to ruin, and farms were left unattended. In just four weeks, tall grasses choked the entire village. Prior to the war, the village was populated by 352 families (1,818 people). The villagers had a diverse ethnic and cultural background: 60% Maguindanaons, 30% settlers (mostly Bisaya), and 10% Manobos. The villagers went to different evacuation centers when the fighting started. They were among the more than 42,000 residents of Pikit — almost two-thirds of its population of 69,000 population — driven to mass exodus.

Reeling from deprivation in evacuation centers, about 200 families tried to return to Nalapaan. But one week later, about 40 Maguindanaon families returned to the evacuation center. They complained of strange-looking men with long hair roaming around their village bearing rifles. The evacuees said they already lost their houses, personal belongings, farm animals, and livelihood. They said that they did not want to lose their lives, as well. They stated that they were prepared to die of hunger in the evacuation center rather than perish in a gruesome way.

After several weeks of providing food rations to evacuees, government assistance started to dwindle. The idea of going back to their village was now taken up by the Maguindanaon evacuees themselves. Kagawad Kadtong Andik, a Nalapaan village official, said that they would rather take their fate in their own land than spend days of indignity at the evacuation center.

The resolve of the bakwits struck a chord among the humanitarian agencies and religious leaders who were helping them. On 29 July 2000, religious leaders and NGO leaders decided to support a rehabilitation and community-building plan for Nalapaan. They did this because the "tri-people" composition of the community could provide a model for the social healing, collective empowerment, and participatory development they considered building blocks for peacebuilding at the grass-roots level.

Tabang Mindanao proposed that Nalapaan be developed as a "peace sanctuary," but the residents preferred to call their area a "Space for Peace." The term implied that the peace the civilians were trying to obtain was fragile and might be only temporary considering that the MILF and the government had not yet agreed to

cease hostilities permanently. The residents also acknowledged that it would be impossible to make their community “combatant-free” because it would antagonize the soldiers who had established detachments near the highway. It could also be misconstrued by the MILF as a ploy to restrict their movements. At most, what the civilians aspired for was to make Nalapaan a “combat-free” geographical space so that the residents could return and start the rebuilding of their community. This was supported by the NGOs and the religious leaders. The process gave rise to the slogan “*give peace a space.*”

The evacuees had started to return to their village by then. They accepted the rehabilitation and community-building plan. However, they were worried about the military detachments and the presence of soldiers in the school in Nalapaan. They complained of some soldiers from the 38th Infantry Battalion firing their guns at night, and they were apprehensive that MILF fighters might engage the military once more and put them in the crossfire.

To address these problems, a delegation from Nalapaan had a meeting with high-ranking military members. They discussed military detachments in civilian communities, indiscriminate firing, roadblocks, and the security of civilians. The meeting was successful. The military assured them of the following: a pull-out of soldiers from schools and their return to their original detachments; no more indiscriminate firing; roadblocks along the highway would be dismantled; and soldiers from 40th IB would replace members of the 37th IB. The military authorities, in turn, asked the Barangay officials to talk with the MILF forces operating in their area and asked them not to display their firearms in public and to refrain from harassing people at military checkpoints.

A similar meeting was arranged with the MILF to lobby for the recognition of Nalapaan as a Space for Peace. MILF raised certain conditions, including allowing MILF troops passing through Nalapaan not to be challenged by the military. Rather, the residents should report the matter to the community task force, which then should report to MILF for proper action. In September, the military and MILF made a formal commitment of approving Nalapaan as a Space for Peace.

When the conditions had been met, the work for rebuilding Nalapaan went into full swing. Committees were formed consisting of local residents, ICP staff, and NGO partners to implement various components of the rehabilitation plan. A negotiating team was established to reconcile conflicts that could affect the civilian security.

From the time that the rehabilitation programs started, the villagers started to rebuild mosques, *bentana* (place of worship of the Manobos), and chapels. They repaired houses and schools, as well. By the end of 2000, most of the evacuees had returned. In just five months, the residents and their supporters were able to build 13 new houses and repair the dwellings of 142 families. Eighty-three hectares of wetlands had been cultivated and planted with corn and palay (rice).

The Space for Peace in Nalapaan was inaugurated on 1 February 2001. Around that time, the parties in conflict had agreed to declare a ceasefire and resume the stalled peace negotiations. But the durability of the Space for Peace was brought to test when the government launched a major military offensive against the MILF on 11 February 2003. More than 3,000 soldiers from three military divisions stabbed

into 15 villages in the Pikit. Clashes broke out between government forces and fighters of the MILF. Military OV-10 airplanes dropped bombs and shells from artillery that rained on suspected rebel positions. The fighting was one of the fiercest in Pikit. Civilians were caught in the crossfire as their communities were turned into war zones: one-third of the 69,000 people of Pikit were displaced.

The fighting lasted for about five months. Most of the residents in Nalapaan stayed in the village and noticed that both military and the MILF refrained from shooting within the borders of the Space for Peace. The community assigned responsible persons to obtain information from reliable sources in order to assess the security situation. They also designated people to signal to the civilians if it was time for them to execute an orderly evacuation. The elders were prepared to negotiate with the MILF forces or Army troopers to ensure respect for the Space for Peace in case the combatants showed up in the community. The Maguindanaons elders were tasked to talk to the Moro fighters, while the Christians were expected to talk with the government soldiers.

After the offensive, six neighboring communities — Panicupan, Takepan, Dalengaoen, Kalacakan, Lagundi, and Ginatilan — started to join the Space for Peace. In support of this, the ICP, NGOs, and the seven communities established a council for peace, which had ongoing negotiations with ranking MILF officials as well as the base commanders of the government armed forces. This process led to the members of the council for peace formulating the previously mentioned declaration of the Space for Peace. In the following days, more than 5,000 people from the area signed it in November 2004.

## **The Declaration of the Space for Peace**

The declaration was not a comprehensive peace agreement, but it bound government and MILF forces to avoid armed confrontations in any part of the seven-village Space for Peace. The text is a very remarkable document as it states a number of important transformations as seen from the perspective of people living in the war-torn area. We present it in its entirety and analyze its discourse to clarify the transformations involved:

We are Muslim, Lumad and Christian inhabitants of Barangays Ginatilan, Nalapaan, Panicupan, Lagunde, Dalengaoen, Takepan and Kalacakan, collectively known as the GiNaPaLaDTaka in the municipality of Pikit, Cotabato in Mindanao.

We delight in recalling that in early times, we had known a vibrant and peaceful way of life together despite the differences in our being Muslim, Christian and Lumad. Before the war in the '70s, we lived in peace and thrived jointly amidst simplicity. We worked in the fields even at night, and we owned and raised many animals. We had bountiful harvests and our children were able to go to school. Even though the prices of farm products were low, the prices of local commodities were also cheap.

Despite our poverty, we helped each other. We shared our food together, especially during the “kanduli” of the Muslims, the Christian feasts, and the “samayann” of the

Lumads. We lived in harmony during times prosperity as well as in lean times. We did not have disputes over land. We trusted one another. Muslims slept in the homes of their Christian friends and the Christians in the homes of their Muslim friends. This can be gleaned from the number of Muslim-Christian inter-marriages, which have generated many families up to this day. In short, our relationship was strong and beautiful.

But this harmonious relationship was broken along with the destruction of our properties. This happened following the breakout of one war after another in Mindanao in the '70s paving way for the rise of the Ilaga, Blackshirt, Barracuda, MIM movements, and the declaration of Martial Law along with rising cases of redo, ambushes, and armed conflicts, the most recent of which took place in 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2003.

The upsurge in ambushes, redo, hold-up, and the dumping of dead human bodies along the National Highway, and the daily broadcast of bad news over local radio stations, sowed fear among us and gave a bad reputation to our place. This fuelled negative feelings and increasingly affected the mutual trust formerly enjoyed by everyone. Soon, we lost the lively and joyful atmosphere of our place.

We lost our possessions including our farm animals; they were stolen during the war. The remaining ones were eventually sold at cheap prices. Most of our houses were razed to the ground while bullets and bombs flattened other houses. To escape the war, we were separated from one another as we fled and evacuated to different places. We abandoned our farms and lost our sources of sustenance.

Many of us were also wounded and killed by bullets. Many more fell ill and children who were the most vulnerable died in evacuation centers. Most of our children were unable to go to school anymore. At night, most of us could not sleep well because of fear and suspicion. Guns proliferated. Even the first Barangays, which were earlier declared as spaces for peace, were tainted with doubts. The war succeeded in erecting an invisible wall which alienated communities and tribes.

Every family suffered after the war. There was no income because there were no jobs and capital. Skyrocketing prices of consumer goods and commodities aggravated the plight of the people, not to mention the onset of natural calamities like droughts and flash floods. Life was very hard as we struggled to rebuild our lives from the scratch. Cases of salvaging and extra-judicial killings continued. There was no security and certainty to our life and livelihoods.

As our response to the aforementioned situation and to strengthen the Peace Process and to restore the prosperity and peace we once enjoyed as a tri-people in our communities, we hereby DECLARE our Barangays as GiNaPaLaDTaKa SPACE FOR PEACE and Children as Zones of Peace.

We dream of a life where there will be no more oppressors and oppressed. We aspire to restore our trust towards one another. We seek to rebuild our community life where love reigns, and where there is forgiveness and recognition of mistakes. We strive to build our community on good moral principles where one is faithful to one's religion and culture.

With this DECLARATION, we appeal and seek the respect and support of all concerned parties including the armed groups and organizations in Mindanao, whether his be the MILF, AFP, local police forces, Cagwu, CVO, MNLF, "Balikbayan," including the civilians as well as the leaders of our local and national government. We likewise call on various agencies of government and non-government organizations, the media practitioners, religious groups, school administrators, and students, and other sectors of society, to support and stand with us in this DECLARATION.

Beginning today and in the years to come, we hope that the Space for Peace and Children as Zones of Peace will expand to other barangays of Pikit and Mindanao. We yearn for the eventual eradication of war, ambushes, massacres, redo, kidnappings, hold-ups, rapes, stealing, and other violent and oppressive acts trampling upon the human rights of people. We pray for the genuine peace to rule our land.

With the blessings of Allah/Magbabaya/God, we hope that this endeavor will bear fruit for the good of all, today, and in the next generation of tri-peoples in Mindanao.



The declaration stressed that the spaces for peace is a community response to more than three decades of continuing violence, displacement, armed confrontations, and criminality. These events, according to the declaration, had alienated communities and tribes, fomented fear, fanned distrust, triggered intercommunity and clan conflicts, perpetuated poverty, unleashed human rights violations, and broken what was once strong and constructive relationships among people.

Typically, the situation in Pikit is descriptive of a complex emergency that had been a focus of separate and varying levels of humanitarian interventions, particularly relief assistance, rehabilitation, social protection, and psychosocial programs. Distinctly however, the establishment of the Space for Peace somehow created a ground for the strife-torn communities to move away from the receiving end of humanitarian intervention and actively articulate their views as they come face-to-face with trusted representatives of the main actors and institutions fomenting armed conflicts. On another level, the initiative also established a nexus or a common mechanism for varying humanitarian institutions and programs to intersect and find their appropriate place and relevance in consonance with the declaration's articulated vision of building communities founded on good moral principle and openness.

In the declaration, we find a description of the culture of peace and the impact of the war. The description of the culture of peace is two-fold as one part is a description of the situation before the outbreak of the war and another part describes the current re-establishment of peace in the community.

In the document, the culture of peace refers to tolerance to different religious faiths and faithfulness to ones' own belief. The overarching concepts here are tolerance and meaningfulness through commitment to one's religious faith on the spiritual dimension. On the discursive dimension, there is a poignant emphasis on the active participation and the responsibility of all concerned parties. On the social interaction level, the objectives are to restore trust and to be guided by good moral principles in the interaction between people. This morality should enhance love and forgiveness, that is, produce an integrative community. In particular, it is stated that the peace means the cessation of violence as the violence ravages basic human rights. Furthermore, the peace depends on certain forms of livelihood and infrastructure. These encompass access to the farmland and the use of farm animals, access to consumer goods, houses and other properties, income, job, and education and training. On the physical level, peacebuilding involves safety from diseases and availability of medical care.

The war situation involves fear, negative feelings and aggression, lack of trust, and a loss of the previous lively situation and joyful atmosphere. These social and emotional aspects are linked to economic, infrastructural, and service deficits. The situation can be described as a combination of lack of control, no social support in general, aggression and violence, and lack of supportive and integrative social structures.

The peace, both before the war and as an objective in the peacebuilding, is described as a state of being in control, getting and providing social support, trust, and shared participation — guided by a sense of being responsible for the outcome of the actual situation. In the document, it is iterated that this social organization depends on a particular arrangement of the economic and infrastructural environment.

In the declaration, peacebuilding includes: (1) tolerance, (2) active participation, (3) responsibility of all parties, (4) mutual trust, (5) the moral principles of caring and forgiveness, (6) human rights, and (7) farmlands, income, and schools.

The Declaration as a whole is based on the idea of human rights. Some examples will show how the peacebuilding process is based on civil rights as well as social rights.

The tolerance for different religious faiths and practices is a core issue in the text, but this is more than just tolerance. Rather, it is also an endeavor to protect other people's right to practice their religion. This resounds in Article 18 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change her/his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest her/his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

The right to have a trade and a sustainable livelihood is also essential to the Declaration of the Space for Peace. Through the narrative of the declaration it is shown how violations of human rights include displacement, destruction of possessions and livestock, as well as, separation from social support systems. In the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the very first articles state:

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Children's rights were severely violated during the war. This is crucial to the narrative of the Declaration of the Space for Peace. Children lacked protection and had no access to services such as schools and education. This very idea violates several articles in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 2.2 declares that, "State's parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members."

In this way the declaration of the Space for Peace is based upon human rights, and peacebuilding is seen as closely interlinked with the promotion of human rights. Human rights violations are both caused by the conflict and fuel further aggression and violence. The local communities in the Space for Peace coalition decided to establish civil society structures capable of securing a minimum standard of respect for human rights as a starting point in the recovery process during and after the war.

The Space for Peace declaration holds values that are supportive of the factors preventing violations of human rights and a culture of war. It emphasizes tolerance

towards the different groups; it is stated that they form one community in which people have equal rights and responsibilities. It denounces the militant groups as a result of the warfare and an ideology of militarization, and it states that everybody can be actively involved in the peacebuilding. It makes it clear that interaction in the Space for Peace should be guided by moral principles that pave the way for mutual trust and forgiveness.

Based on decades of experience in living in an area with recurrent wars and low-intensity warfare, the declaration describes the negative impact of the organized violence. Furthermore, the declaration includes the economic, infrastructural, and institutional dimensions necessary to prevent the violence from expanding. To have a certain level of living conditions — a livelihood — and to be able to provide children and youth with schooling and education are described as prerequisites for peacebuilding. The declaration emphasizes that peacebuilding and respect for human rights are intrinsically interlinked.

Founded in these principles, the Space for Peace council has organized: (1) *Peace camps* for young people — the aim of the camps is to reduce cultural bias amongst participants; (2) *schools for peace*, which teach respect for human rights to children by telling about their common history of living together in peace; (3) *community planning*, where various community members of different religious and ethnic groups work together; (4) *education* on how to document events in the conflicts and human rights violations; (5) *economic support*, given to cooperatives or community livelihood associations, which comprise people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds; and (6) *advocacy* aiming to raise concerns at the regional and national level (Anasarias et al. 2007; Berliner and Mikkelsen 2006).

## Peacebuilding, Human Rights, and Welfare

The Space for Peace promotes respect for human rights as a core part of peacebuilding. The results achieved in the process stem from a dialogue among the civil society in the local community, the civil society organizations in the area (in this case religious organizations), NGOs, the leaders of the military, and the MILF. That the military and the MILF engage in dialogue shows that the civilian population is not seen as the main target and that the leaders in conflict are somewhat supportive of a peaceful resolution. Although the Philippines are high on the Political Terror Index, it is still lower than countries such as Guatemala and Colombia. During the civil war in Guatemala, the target of killings was mainly unarmed Mayan civilians — more than 200,000 deaths and 50,000 disappearances (Rehmi 1999; Anckermann et al. 2005). During the civil war in Guatemala, the state supplied firearms to more as 800,000 civilians in the civilian defense patrols. This dissemination, combined with high levels of crime and violence, caused an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, even after the cessation of the civil war. Presently, the level of impunity is very high, and there are recent examples of killings of human rights defenders.

Amnesty International's 2006 report on human rights in the Philippines states that there is a high level of extrajudicial executions and imprisonment of people because of their political opinions or affiliation with a human rights organization. However, government and military officials declare that there is no state policy that allows for extrajudicial executions and no secret "death squads." The government of the Philippines points to the international human rights treaties the Philippines has ratified; the government asserts that protecting human rights is ensured through national laws and institutions, including both an independent judiciary and a Commission on Human Rights. This means that there is no overt acceptance of violations of human rights.

There have been reports of severe violations of human rights during the periods of war in Mindanao. The Space for Peace movement has managed to combine promotion of human rights and peacebuilding. By doing that it has fostered a shared sense of understanding, tolerance, solidarity, and mutual obligation involving the state (represented by the military and the governor of Mindanao), the rebels (MILF), religious leaders, local and international NGOs, civil society organizations at the local level, and the people living in the area. This requires an ongoing process of negotiation with the involved parties as well as an incessant process of reinforcing the discourse of peace through conflict reconciliation at the local level, as this prevents a discourse of segregation along religious or ethnic categories. The process of keeping the Space for Peace functioning involves an open debate about values, a highly organized civil society, and the support of people in need. As we have seen, the peacebuilding and peace maintaining process is a promotion of both civil and social rights for everybody. One of the Moro community leaders in the peace process, Mr. Abidin, said:

The space for peace reinforces the Muslims' view that as long as the culture and faith of everyone is respected, there will be peace. There should be an acknowledgement of the historical injustice done to the Bangsamoro, and it should be corrected. Here in Ginapalad Ta Ka, people are being given a lot of trainings and seminars to transform our minds towards a perspective of peace that we so long desired. However, unless the government will demonstrate respect and prevent the oppression of the Moro people, then there will be no justice and there will be no peace. Perhaps, the government should also undertake seminars on peace!

This view suggests that the strengthening of multicultural communities does not in any way undermine the Bangsamoro's aspiration for a free homeland. Peacebuilding at the grassroots level is not seen as a contradictory response to their struggle to arrive at a political settlement of the issues behind the armed conflict. Rather, it is viewed as a part of the many possible tracks in the building of a more appropriate and responsive social fabric in the conflict-affected areas in the historical and sociocultural context of Mindanao. The effort to make the local community function in ways that promotes and maintain understanding, tolerance, solidarity, and mutual obligation implies an unbroken struggle to practice human rights along the lines depicted in the Declaration of the Space for Peace. The struggle also implies practicing this understanding in the negotiations with the larger network of stakeholders, including the state, in a way that conveys democratic participation and openness.

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# Chapter 7

## International Security

Natalie J. Goldring

*“Though force can protect in emergency, only justice, fairness, consideration and cooperation can finally lead men to the dawn of eternal peace.” General Dwight D. Eisenhower*

### Introduction and Background

This chapter addresses global security as a building block for a culture of peace.\* Unfortunately, the current world situation may more accurately be described as global *insecurity*. International treaties are threatened by non-adherence and selective adherence, elections in many countries are anything but “free and fair,” and wars are being fought over resources, borders, and ethnicity, among other causes (Freedom House 2007). The US government continues to prosecute a “global war on terrorism,” seemingly unaware that fighting a war over a concept is unlikely to be a successful undertaking. It will be impossible to build a global culture of peace without relative stability on the international front.

At the same time, however, the HUMAN SECURITY GROUP, now at Simon Fraser University, points out that there is good news. According to the 2005 Human Security Report, in 1992, 50 conflicts involving at least one government were underway around the world. By 2003, there were 29 such conflicts. There were similar reductions in the total number of conflicts worldwide. Between 2002 and 2005, the period covered in the 2006 brief updating this work, there was little change with respect to the number of conflicts that involved a government. However, there was a large drop in the number of conflicts for which a state was not one of the parties at war, dropping from 34 in 2002 to 25 in 2005.\*\*

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\*The intended author of this chapter was Dr. Randall Caroline (“Randy”) Forsberg, an extraordinary champion of peace. I write in her memory.

\*\*The primary database used for this research was developed by analysts at Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). It defines a conflict as having 25 or more battle-related deaths, and reserves the word “war” for those disputes with 1,000 or more deaths per year.

This chapter addresses the current context for global security, as well as related opportunities for building a culture of peace. In so doing, it also addresses some of the barriers to achieving that objective. Several questions frame the discussion and analysis in this chapter:

- What current challenges and opportunities face those who seek to increase international security and enhance its role in the creation of a culture of peace?
- To what extent do these challenges and opportunities differ for various types of weapons?
- What can nation-states, regional organizations, and the United Nations do to overcome barriers to progress?
- What are the most important next steps in seeking a culture of peace?

A critical aspect of dealing with the transitions between cultures of war and cultures of peace is coming to terms with the issue of the persistence of conflict. As a framing concept, I accept RANDY FORSBERG's (1997) argument that while conflict is endemic, war need not necessarily be a permanent feature of international relations.

### ***Dimensions of International Security that Promote or Inhibit Construction of a Culture of Peace***

International security has multiple roles in improving or inhibiting the prospects for a culture of peace. The UNITED NATIONS resolution establishing a Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (A/RES/53/243) points out that such a culture must be based on numerous factors, including commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, promotion of human rights, meeting developmental and environmental needs, and providing equal opportunity for all members of society. Viewing international security in this broader context highlights some of the ways in which decreased international security is associated with difficulty in achieving other bases for a culture of peace, such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development, and gender equality.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan initiated a high-level panel on "Threats, Challenges, and Change," which identified six clusters of threats: "war between States; violence within States, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation; nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime" (UN Executive Summary 2004, p. 5). Examining the converse of these threats suggests several potential paths toward solutions: conflict prevention, including early warning and preventive diplomacy; peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and peacemaking; and disarmament and non-proliferation, including the full range of weapons from small arms and light weapons to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

It is not possible to deal with all of these threats and opportunities in a single chapter. Instead, the chapter presents selected case studies of key issues, focusing

primarily on a range of weapons systems.\* The case studies suggest both challenges and opportunities for those pursuing a culture of peace.

## **The Current State of International Security: Challenges and Opportunities**

This chapter accepts an inclusive definition of international or global security, including political, military, economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Using an inclusive definition is necessary in order to fully evaluate the relationship between international security and a culture of peace.

To evaluate challenges and opportunities in seeking to establish a culture of peace, it is first necessary to establish the “state of play”—the current situation with respect to critical cases. This section presents information on conventional weapons (small arms and light weapons, and major conventional weapons) as well as nuclear weapons, as examples of the current state of international security.

### ***Should Small Arms and Light Weapons Be the Primary Focus?***

In terms of the number of current deaths attributable to particular weapons, the carnage is being caused largely by small arms and light weapons. This chapter uses the generally accepted UN definitions, with small arms including weapons such as revolvers, pistols, and rifles, and with light weapons including weapons such as heavy machine guns, portable anti-aircraft systems, and portable anti-tank weapons.\*\* According to the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), approximately 1,000 people are dying each day because of small arms and light weapons (IANSA, 2006). This death toll has helped increase public concern with these weapons. From the perspective of lives lost, small arms and light weapons are a

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\* A core framing assumption of this chapter is that complex problems tend to require complex solutions. Although the issue of automobile safety is outside the realm of international security, it is an excellent example of a successful complex social program. Over the last 30 years, the fatality rate has fallen massively. To accomplish this, policy makers tried many changes, not just one—they protected the integrity of the passenger compartment, improved seat belt use, required installation of air bags in new cars, improved highway grading, and utilized reflectorized paint, among many other measures. See: ROBERT B. NOLAND, “Traffic fatalities and injuries: The effect of changes in infrastructure and other trends,” *Accident Analysis & Prevention*, Volume 35, Issue 4, July 2003, pp. 599–611. Indirect measures such as addressing the risks of driving under the influence of alcohol also have had significant effects. It is reasonable to expect that the problems associated with creating a culture of peace will also require a multifaceted approach.

\*\* See: United Nations, “Report of the open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons, in a timely and reliable manner.” A/60/88, 27 June 2005.



critical barrier to achieving a culture of peace. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called small arms and light weapons “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion” (ROBINSON 2006). The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) has made a similar argument.

From the perspective of *potential* damage, there is arguably a continuum from small arms to light weapons to major conventional weapons such as tanks, combat aircraft, and artillery, extending on to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The place of radiological weapons on this spectrum is less clear, as their effects are quite variable. However, there are risks in grouping together multiple categories of weapons. The Bush administration, for example, has frequently used “weapons of mass destruction” or “WMD” as a blanket term, blurring the distinctions between chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This conflates weapons with vastly different effects and risks public confusion. These weapons do not have the same effects and should not be grouped together. Accepting the argument put forward by former Secretary-General Annan or the International Action Network on Small Arms would further blur these effects.

Regardless of the descriptive terms chosen, it is critical to keep in mind the potential damage the other weapons could cause, even though small arms and light weapons take the day-to-day toll now. The explosion of a single nuclear weapon could kill many more people than the enormous death toll already caused by small arms and light weapons.\*

Although this chapter accepts the argument that it is important to take a broader view than one limited only to small arms and light weapons, these weapons still inflict tremendous harm on a daily basis. Accordingly, the next section considers the current situation with respect to controlling small arms and light weapons.

### ***Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons***

Unfortunately, the international community’s attempts to control small arms and light weapons have had mixed success. The United Nations 2006 Small Arms Review Conference ended without agreement on either a final statement or a plan to move forward. Fortunately, sympathetic governments and non-governmental organizations have devised plans to move forward. In the absence of a final document from the 2006 Review Conference, they have also argued that the processes established in the 2001 Program of Action remain in force. In December 2007, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 62/47, which authorized the continuation of the biennial meetings of states that had previously been held in 2003 and 2005.

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\*The Federation of American Scientists has created a Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator, which can be used to model the destructive effects of weapons as small as one kiloton: <http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=367>.

In summer 2007, the Canadian government hosted a meeting in Geneva to discuss the current status of attempts to control transfers of small arms and light weapons, principles for controlling transfers, and ways forward. More than 100 countries participated in this effort, as did non-governmental organizations and international organizations. The intent was to focus on ways to continue to implement the UN Program of Action on Small Arms, in advance of the next planned Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms in summer 2008.

Trying to increase the focus on civilian weapons is one source of problems; in particular, there are huge barriers to doing this effectively in the United States. According to the 2007 edition of the Small Arms Survey (SAS), the United States has less than five percent of the world population, but has an estimated 270 million of the 650 million weapons currently in civilian hands worldwide (SAS 2007, p. 39). In other words, nearly half of the civilian weapons in the world are estimated to be in the United States. But the United States is not the only problem; the Small Arms Survey estimates that roughly 75 percent of small arms worldwide are in civilian, not government, hands (SAS 2007, p. 43).

According to the 2007 edition of the Small Arms Survey, the top suppliers of small arms and light weapons were the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Belgium, and China. The United States, Germany, and China are also regularly among the top suppliers of major conventional weapons (SAS 2007, p. 74). According to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), the global trade in small arms and light weapons is approximately \$2 billion per year, but the researchers at the Small Arms Survey estimate that the actual number is roughly double that figure.

The Small Arms Survey highlights numerous problems with transfers of small arms and light weapons. Among these are the large numbers of states—at least 60—that have been documented as making “irresponsible transfers” in recent years (SAS 2007, p. 74). These are transfers that governments authorize and may not be illegal, but reflect poor judgment with respect to the human rights records of the recipients, the likely uses of the weapons, or related factors (SAS 2007, p. 74). The Small Arms Survey (2007, p. 2) also estimates that 60–80 percent of all military rifles, assault rifles, and carbines—“weapons most frequently used in modern conflict”—are manufactured by producers who acquired the technology from others, further increasing the risk of diversion and retransfer. Although an estimated 500,000 firearms are destroyed each year, at least 8 million new weapons are being produced each year, creating a daunting prospect.

### ***Landmines and Cluster Munitions***

Efforts to control landmines and cluster munitions have largely been separate from more general campaigns on small arms and light weapons. Advocates of controls on both sets of weapons have followed similar paths in terms of their general

approach, as well as their specific focus on humanitarian concerns and on the indiscriminate nature of the weapons.

One key advantage for those seeking controls on landmines and on cluster munitions is that neither set of weapons has a tradition of private ownership. This is in sharp contrast with small arms, for which some countries have a strong tradition of treating gun ownership as an individual right.

## *Landmines*

Officially formed in 1992, THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES (ICBL) took a well-defined and relatively narrow approach to disarmament, focusing primarily on anti-personnel landmines. The ICBL had a great deal of success in highlighting humanitarian concerns, including the extensive damage done by anti-personnel landmines long after conflicts end. These landmines are often in poorly marked minefields, requiring civilians to risk their lives in order to use or even travel through mine-affected areas. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines has documented roughly 6,000 casualties in 2006 from landmines and unexploded or abandoned munitions. It cautions, however, that this figure is likely to be much lower than the actual number of casualties; data are incomplete in virtually all of the countries for which casualties were reported. Even so, the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines has been highly successful. More than 150 countries are now parties to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (commonly known as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty). According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, only two states—Russia and Myanmar/Burma—used landmines in 2007, and there is virtually no current trade in the weapons. More than three-quarters of the countries that previously produced landmines have stopped producing them.

Unfortunately, according to the 2007 edition of the Landmine Monitor, the list of countries that have been unwilling to give up production includes China, Russia, and the United States, as well as Myanmar/Burma, Cuba, India, Iran, Nepal, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam. According to the ICBL, China holds approximately 110 million of the 160 million antipersonnel landmines believed to be stockpiled by those that are not parties to the treaty. Russia reportedly has more than 25 million landmines, and the United States has more than 10 million (LANDMINE MONITOR 2007).

## *Cluster Munitions*

The cluster munitions process has made tremendous progress in a remarkably short period of time. Forty-nine states participated at the first meeting in Oslo in February 2007. Virtually all of these countries (46) joined in the final declaration, which supported

a treaty prohibiting the “use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” (OSLO DECLARATION 2007).

Just a few months later, 67 governments attended the May 2007 conference in Lima, Peru. More than twice as many countries were represented at the next meeting in Vienna in December 2007. The last scheduled meeting in the preparatory process took place in February 2008 in Wellington, New Zealand (GOFF 2008). Eighty-two countries signed the declaration resulting from this meeting, affirming their support for the prohibition on cluster munitions that had been proposed at the Oslo meeting. In May 2008, more than 100 countries adopted the Cluster Munitions Convention in Dublin, Ireland. Countries will be able to sign on to the convention beginning in December 2008 in Oslo, Norway. The principal remaining issue is whether key supplier countries will sign and ratify the treaty.

### *The Global Trade in Major Conventional Weapons*

Although the global arms trade as measured in monetary value has declined since the end of the Cold War, it still contributes to global instability. Of the five dimensions mentioned in the introduction to this section, all have been adversely affected by the arms trade. Political, economic, and military factors tend to dominate analyses of the trade, although it also has had adverse social and environmental effects.

However, assessments of the importance of the global arms trade vary widely, depending in large part on whether the trade is evaluated in terms of its monetary value or in terms of its effects. From a strictly economic perspective, the global arms trade represents a modest fraction of global economic activity. However, its effects are disproportionate to its absolute size.

Those who favor control tend to have multiple objectives that overlap in important ways with preconditions for a culture of peace. These include:

- preventing crime, or reducing its effects
- protecting human rights
- enforcing international humanitarian law
- safeguarding civilians in wartime
- avoiding excessively injurious weapons
- avoiding excessive and destabilizing accumulations of weapons
- stopping, or at least reducing, the killing

Despite long-standing efforts to control the global trade in weapons, there are strong countervailing pressures to maintain or even increase this trade. Pressure comes from military contractors, who profit from these sales; from governments, who seek to curry favor with recipients and secure their cooperation; and from non-state actors, who seek to defend themselves and/or attack hostile governments. There are considerable differences in the nature and structure of the trade, both

between and within regions. In some cases, the trade consists entirely or nearly entirely of small arms and light weapons; in others, it includes those weapons, as well as more advanced and larger weapons such as combat aircraft and tanks.

### ***Nuclear Weapons Must be Included in Efforts to Achieve a Culture of Peace***

Although nuclear weapons are not included in the original documents on a culture of peace, it is difficult to imagine creating a culture of peace without dealing with them. The threat from nuclear weapons remains severe. According to *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (2006), current inventories number roughly 27,000 weapons, with virtually all of these weapons in the inventories of the United States or Russia. While inventories have decreased by more than half from the 1986 peak of more than 70,000 nuclear weapons, the continued existence of such large quantities of nuclear weapons is still a significant barrier to achieving a culture of peace.

The United Nations Security Council has the legal authority to deal with nuclear weapons and proliferation issues. However, it has been hindered by the failure of the five original nuclear states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) to meet their disarmament commitments under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, the Bush administration has been attempting to move in precisely the opposite direction, proposing development and deployment of new nuclear weapons. Their own failure to meet disarmament commitments severely limits these countries' credibility when attempting to convince others to forego nuclear weapons.

These challenges are increased as a result of events outside the so-called "Perm Five" (e.g., CIRINCIONE 2002). India, Pakistan, and Israel all remain outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India and Pakistan acknowledge that they have nuclear weapons. Successive Israeli governments refuse to admit that Israel has nuclear weapons, despite the expert consensus that this is the case. North Korea has apparently tested a nuclear weapon. The Iranian government claims that its pursuit of nuclear capabilities is only for power generation, but many observers are unconvinced.\*\* Important questions remain with respect to Syria's intentions and North Korea's possible aid for Syria. In addition, more than three dozen countries have at least some nuclear capability; 44 states are listed in the annexes to the COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (1996) as having at least nuclear research capacity.\*

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\*\*The INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY has frequently challenged Iranian assertions about its nuclear program. For additional information, see: <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml>.

\*The treaty text is available at [http://www.ctbto.org/treaty/treaty\\_text.pdf](http://www.ctbto.org/treaty/treaty_text.pdf)

Taken together, these challenges suggest that the non-proliferation regime is threatened. For example, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan all have the capacity to build nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time, likely weeks to months. They could decide to pursue nuclear weapons in response to North Korean deployments. Similarly, Saudi Arabia might feel pressure to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does so. Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is a huge barrier to achieving a culture of peace, even though nuclear weapons are not specifically mentioned in the core UN documents dealing with a culture of peace. For example, the 1999 General Assembly Resolution setting out the Program of Action for a Culture of Peace mentioned general and complete disarmament once; it never specifically mentioned nuclear weapons (UN 1999).

## **Improving the Future Prospects for International Security and a Culture of Peace**

Various policy approaches are likely to be needed to increase international security and improve the prospects for a culture of peace. This section provides two examples of efforts that may improve these prospects, as a type of proof of concept. The first, a proposed arms trade treaty, brings together diverse threads of work on restraining international flows of small arms, light weapons, and major conventional weapons. It creates clear connections between these weapons and key components of a culture of peace, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

The second example deals with the role of education and training in improving the prospects for international security. It provides an overview and preliminary assessment of efforts to enhance disarmament and non-proliferation education.

### ***Arms Trade Treaty***

In recent years, advocates of increased control over conventional weapons have developed principles for a global arms trade treaty. Proposed core concepts include linking international humanitarian law and human rights, setting global standards for arms transfers, and making it more difficult to undermine national laws (e.g., CONTROL ARMS 2007).

An Arms Trade Treaty also faces many challenges, however. The first UN Group of Governmental Experts on this topic first met in February 2008. General Assembly resolution 61/89 authorized the Experts Group and charged the group with evaluating the “feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive,

legally binding instrument...” The Experts Group has not received a mandate to draft a treaty. In addition, there is significant opposition. Although the United States was the only country to vote against the resolution, Russia and China were among the 21 countries abstaining. Ironically, the United States, Russia, and China are included in the Group of Governmental Experts. If the panel uses consensus decision-making, as frequently occurs in the United Nations, any individual country will be able to block progress.

The United Nations could have an important role on this issue. However, some informal consultations are already taking place outside the UN. If progress within the United Nations stalls, proponents may choose to move away from the UN process, as has previously occurred with landmines and cluster munitions.

### *Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education*

The role of education in improving the chances for a culture of peace has long been recognized. General Assembly Resolution 53/243 passed in 1999. It established the Program of Action on a Culture of Peace and prominently featured education efforts, including promoting eight sets of actions designed to “foster a culture of peace through education.” Recent UN efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation education hold great promise in this regard.

The recent initiative started in early 2000, when the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters proposed a new focus on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The General Assembly approved formation of an Experts Group to examine the proposal in fall 2000. The group began its work in early 2001 and reported back to the Secretary General in fall 2002. This group had remarkable participation from educators, activists, and analysts, who were regular participants in the groups’ meetings, briefed panel members, wrote background papers, and helped structure the final report and its recommendations. It was an extremely unusual and constructive collaboration between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations.

The panel’s recommendations covered an impressive range of short-, medium-, and long-term proposals. Its recommendations included proposals that could be implemented with existing resources as well as recommendations that would require additional funding (A/57/124).

In the 5 years since the panel submitted its report, the results have been mixed. Perhaps the most valuable accomplishment thus far is that the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation education has become fully integrated into the UN agenda, with regular reports and resolutions dealing with implementing the panel’s recommendations. Sadly, the recommendations requiring more than minimal political will or financial resources have generally not been implemented. Financial constraints and the UN reliance on consensus before new programs proceed seem to have been the principal barriers to progress. Despite its limited results in some areas, the United Nations has a critical role in the creation of a culture of peace.

## **Next Steps: The UN's Role in Creating a Culture of Peace**

The United Nations has important strengths and weaknesses with respect to its role in helping to create a culture of peace. This section summarizes some key factors in each area.

### ***The UN's Primary Strengths Lie with Its People and Its Moral Authority***

As an institution, the United Nations has the power to convene its 192 members, including virtually every country on the planet. It provides a truly global forum for consideration of key issues, with global legitimacy, and considerable moral authority. It provides an opportunity for governments and civil society representatives to work together on efforts to reduce the likelihood and costs of conflict. In addition, UN staff members have impressive expertise on these issues. They are dedicated to making a difference and open to new approaches. They regularly put their lives on the line, through missions such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and conflict prevention.

### ***The UN's Primary Weaknesses Are In Process Issues***

One key weakness at the UN is the frequency with which application of the principle of consensus produces "least common denominator" policies. Single countries such as the United States have blocked consensus on key issues and have bullied other countries. In addition, the process can be ponderous, with frequently lengthy negotiations just to set agendas. The pace provides incentives for advocates to go outside the UN in order to make progress, as was the case with the landmines treaty. From an institutional perspective, the UN Security Council is not representative of the world's economic power. The fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council hold veto power further distorts the process. Unfortunately, the United Nations also has some substantive weaknesses. For example, the difficulty of dealing with small arms and light weapons is increased because of the divisions between legal and illegal weapons, military vs. civilian weapons, gun cultures in some states, and the right to self-defense. Last, but certainly not least, lack of funding is a constant barrier to progress.

## **Reasons for Optimism**

Despite the obstacles cited above, there are still reasons for optimism. In fact, many international security initiatives that could improve the prospects for a culture of peace are already underway. For the trade in conventional weapons (large and



small), the Arms Trade Treaty is perhaps the most promising approach, though it is still being developed. A new global norm that takes into account the long- and short-run benefits and costs of the weapons trade could help dissuade governments from undertaking ill-conceived transfers. This would require activity at the local, national, regional, and global levels.

For nuclear weapons, there is significant interest in preventing further deterioration of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. One step that would likely be received well by the international community is for the United States to halt design and construction of new nuclear weapons. Political, diplomatic, and economic incentives may all help limit the further spread of nuclear weapons. But unless the original nuclear powers are willing to make significant cuts in their arsenals, few approaches are likely to be taken seriously.

Another example of work that could produce substantive change is the effort initiated by Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Saul Mendlovitz, and the late Randall (Randy) Forsberg. They have set out a detailed plan to move toward a world in which war would be increasingly rare. Their plan deals with a wide range of issues, including prevention of internal and interstate conflict, terrorism, and phased conventional and nuclear disarmament. It argues convincingly that military force should be a last resort, rather than an early policy tool. With continuing leadership from Ambassador Dean and Saul Mendlovitz, more than 20 organizations have now joined a coalition to implement the plan (Global Action to Prevent War 2003).

Public involvement in these issues continues to be critically important. Civil society efforts have been key in advocating bans on cluster munitions and landmines, controls over small arms and light weapons, and nuclear disarmament. Individuals and non-governmental organizations have frequently led these efforts, demanding responses from sometimes reluctant governments. In addition, when obstructionist governments have blocked their progress within international institutions, these advocates have found ways to develop new processes for policy formulation and implementation. These efforts require the sort of individual empowerment advocated by Macy (1983).

Admittedly, the current US government is a key impediment to progress on many of these fronts. It has blocked progress at the United Nations on controlling transfers of small arms and light weapons. It has also undermined efforts to control landmines and cluster munitions. It has attempted to convince other countries not to develop or test nuclear weapons while proposing to develop new nuclear weapons for its own forces.

On the whole, there are prospects for international security as a building block for a culture of peace, but they are mixed. As documented in this chapter, numerous groups are pursuing approaches intended to decrease violence, reduce the likelihood of war, and limit the consequences if war occurs. If the next US administration shares these views, the prospects for significant change are likely to increase markedly.

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# Chapter 8

## Sustainable Development

Úrsula Oswald Spring

### Introduction

Sustainable development requires a widened understanding of security, including human, gender, and environmental security (HUGE) concerns.\* This ‘HUGE’ effort should be undertaken by millions of organized citizens who seek a balance with the natural environment for the benefit of future generations. One contribution to this goal of building a sustainable culture of peace is the Earth Charter’s integration of concerns for a future peaceful and sustainable world. At the conclusion of this chapter we shall return to this measure, which opens a space for concrete actions from the global to the local level. Such actions are oriented at mitigating present environmental destruction and creating synergies for a ‘HUGE’ peace-building that will strengthen the harmonious relationship between humankind and nature.

This chapter addresses the following questions: (1) Which strategies, policies, and measures of sustainable development can contribute to a durable culture of peace? (2) How can these strategies, policies, and measures influence values, change behavior, and pave new avenues for conflict prevention and peace-building by negotiating a model of development that decreases pollution and environmental threats? (3) What are the key issues that have to be changed to improve cooperation and surmount the historical gaps among colonized nations and colonizers? (4) How can regressive globalization be overcome and a lasting cooperation developed that is able to reduce social, cultural, and economic gaps without further damaging the fragile equilibrium of Earth?

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\*The HUGE concept is based on the sustainable culture of peace, but goes a step further by including widened security concerns. This concept complements the top-down policy approach on human security (UNDP 1994) by extending the traditional scope of security (*widening*), the actors (also including bottom-up perspectives), the referent objects and institutions (*deepening*), and the sectors (*sectorialization*) of security concepts. Since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, the dangers posed by Global Environmental Change (GEC)—due to anthropogenically induced production and consumption patterns—for the survival of humankind and for global and human security were added to the international political and security agenda. Thus, a “*horizontal widening*: from national military security to five dimensions (political, military, economic; social, environmental); *vertical deepening*: from ‘state’ to ‘human’ and ‘gender’ security as well as from ‘national’ upward to ‘regional’, ‘global’ and downward to ‘societal’ and ‘local’ security; *sectorialization*: to energy, food, health, water and livelihood security” is included (OSWALD/BRAUCH 2008).

We begin by reviewing the complexities of the concepts used and how sustainability can be measured. Then we shall link sustainable development to culture and to peace. A particular emphasis is given to the ongoing global environmental change (GEC) and the exposure of the social vulnerability of marginal groups, women, children, and elderly during disaster situations. Our third section explores the limits and potential of sustainable peace and sustainable culture. Finally, we shall analyze how the concept of sustainable development can be deepened so that it involves the concept of a sustainable culture of peace and enables us to move from unsustainable development to a sustainable culture of peace.

## **Conceptual Review**

### ***Development***

“Development” is mostly understood as economical, technological, and cultural progress from a self-sufficient rural society to a complex and global urban network. It is used synonymously for modernization. It implies improvements and positive changes for a better future. It is based on the biological understanding of evolution where animals, plants, and humans have passed through slow and successive stages from a lower to a higher stage of organization. It suggests that all higher forms of life were developed by uniform laws of evolution from lower forms to more complex ones through permanent change and adaptation. This notion implies significant steps or changes and is a basis for concepts in many social sciences. For example, in psychology, Jean Piaget developed the successive stage of intelligence of the child through the acquisition of new abilities and learning. In sociology, development is retaken as a process where society passes from primitive stages of organization to more complex ones, with higher levels of social differentiation, specific skills, and tasks for precise social classes. In political science, society and ruling classes developed systems of government with social contracts, norms, and laws that permitted agreements based on a consensus, to deal with conflicts in a nonviolent way.

Accordingly, most development theories analyze how a society is changing and how social and economic improvement can best be achieved. Among multiple approaches, NUSSBAUM and SEN (1993) developed a conceptual framework related to capability. This was taken up by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Human Development Index (HDI) was created. In 2004, the UN consolidated a social index including variables related to age, (reproductive) health, education and literacy, human settlements and housing, water supply and sanitation, economic activities, income, labor, and unemployment. After the Earth Summit Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UN implemented a sustainability index, which was further integrated in 2004 by BROWN et al.. Today, it has been adapted by different countries to meet their local ecosystem needs. These theories share a vision of improvement through modernization. Several reference works have identified

development with modernization, where modern ways, ideas, or styles are accepted, imitated, or adopted. However, as noted by THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA:

Modernization is a continuous and open-ended process... Modernization seems to have two main phases...it carries the institutions and values of society along with it, in what is generally regarded as a progressive, upward movement. Beyond some point, however, modernization begins to breed discontent on an increasing scale. This is due in part to rising expectations provoked by the early successes and dynamism of modern society. Groups tend to make escalating demands on the community, and these demands become increasingly difficult to meet, but the present system is unable to create jobs and well-being for all (<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9108734/modernization>).

Whatever the level of development under these parameters, necessary 'backward' regions and 'peripheral' groups always exist. This is a persistent source of strain and conflict in modern societies. Such a condition is not confined to the internal development of individual states. It can be seen on a global scale, as modernization extends outward from its original Western base to take in the whole world. The existence of unevenly and unequally developed nations introduces a fundamental element of instability into the world system of states.

The first critical approach to this vision of modernization theories is characterized in the emerged development of Latin America's 'dependency theory' (DOS SANTOS 1978). Various authors have argued that underdevelopment is part of the progress of some small elites and of some dominant countries. They applied the Marxist concept of 'surplus value' to an understanding of center-periphery relations, whereby colonies, and later transnational enterprises and local elites, improve their wealth at the expense of southern countries and poor people. They take the resources destined for the well-being of the poor as their own profit. Structural violence and later structural imperialism were used. This theory suggests that most people in the world are excluded from a real modernization process and continue to live in precarious conditions in urban slums or in poor rural areas.

The dream of modernization and development turned into daily survival strategies (OSWALD 1991). Accordingly, underdevelopment as the opposite pole of development and modernization can be understood not only as the internal income gap within southern countries, but also as increasingly within industrialized nations (REMENYI 2004). Thus, we can speak of the 'development process of underdevelopment.' In the center of these critical observations is a failed policy for overcoming existing gaps. This policy is further reinforced by the present globalization process, which has fostered an abuse of weak groups creating greater disparity through a process of exclusion (STIGLITZ 2002). This process is also described as *regressive globalization* (KALDOR et al. 2003) or *globalization of organized violence* (HELD and MC GREW 2007). SANTOS DE MORAIS (2002), a Brazilian sociologist, decided to overcome the negative effects of joblessness for landless peasants and marginal slum dwellers by creating chains of micro-businesses that met local necessities by creating dignified jobs. This type of social organization, an "economy of solidarity," is being created in Brazil, areas of Latin America, Asia and Africa. It offers millions of dignified labor opportunities within a framework of cooperative social organizations.

## *Sustainability*

Five decades of development have not alleviated poverty. Today more than 800 million persons go hungry to bed (mostly small children), 3 billion lack sanitary installations, and 1.2 billion lack water inside their houses. By contrast, only one fifth of the world's society owns more than 80% of wealth, commodities, consumer goods, financial savings, and national investments (UNDP 2006). This concentration of wealth and economic power has created a society of consumption and waste in industrialized countries.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), the direct outcomes of climate change are temperature increase, sea level rise, more hydro-meteorological disasters with a higher intensity and destruction, desertification and soil erosion, biodiversity and ecosystem loss, and extreme temperatures (heat waves, cold spills). Biodiversity is seriously threatened, water scarcity and pollution is increasing local and regional conflicts, and deforestation and biomass loss avoids mitigation processes.

Confronted with these anthropogenic changes, hundreds of definitions of sustainability have emerged, including economic, environmental, social, and cultural variables. Following the Earth Summit, the resulting document, Agenda 21, asked that governments develop national indicators for sustainability. The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has developed 50 core indicators of sustainability that are able to cover relevant assessments in most countries (see Table 8.1).

Sustainable development is a broad scientific concept with many and often conflicting meanings. It tries to combine the economic growth of postmodern capitalism with environmental and social concerns. The outcomes are different in the North and the South, between men and women, and poor and rich. As a policy goal, it tries to avoid further resource depletion and environmental destruction, without affecting the existing economic dynamics. As a policy strategy, through the Agenda 21, it creates instruments of policy measurements, able to mitigate the negative outcomes of the present consumerist society. Nevertheless, the dominant development strategies, promoted by governments, multilateral organizations, and private businesses, not only affect the economy of the poorest and the social wellbeing of billions of people, but also threaten the environment by polluting natural resources and creating scarcity. The result is a historical and irreversible change, defined by several researchers (CRUTZEN and STOERMER 2000) as the move from the Holocene period to the Anthropocene period, where the human specie is changing in relation to the planet Earth. Conscious about these new threats, the UN Bundtland Commission (1987) defined sustainable development as a crucial element of the future of humanity and its livelihood: "Development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs" (p. 5).

This simple definition includes the improvement of present generations, especially poor and marginal or socially vulnerable groups, but simultaneously cares for future generations, giving them the option to decide their own future and livelihood needs. However, in practice, this understanding of "sustainable development" still

**Table 8.1** Fifty UN indicators for sustainable development (2007)

Theme	Sub-theme	Indicator
Atmosphere (9)	Climate change	Emissions of greenhouse gases
	Ozone layer depletion	Consumption of ozone-depleting substances
	Air quality	Ambient concentration of air pollutants in urban areas
Land (10)	Agriculture (14)	Arable and permanent crop land area
		Use of fertilizers
		Use of agricultural pesticides
	Forests (11)	Forest area as a percent of land area
	Desertification (12)	Wood harvesting intensity
Oceans, seas and coasts (17)	Coastal zone	Land affected by desertification
		Area of urban formal and informal settlements
	Fisheries	Algae concentration in coastal waters
Fresh water (18)	Water quantity	Percent of total population living in coastal areas
		Annual catch by major species
	Water quality	Annual withdrawal of ground and surface water as a percent of total available water
Biodiversity (15)	Ecosystem	BOD in water bodies
		Concentration of faecal coliform in freshwater
	Species	Area of selected key ecosystems
		Protected area as a % of total area
		Abundance of selected key species

refers to continuous growth and life improvement for the highly privileged in consumerist nations, where the notion prevails that there are no inherent “limits to growth” on a planet of finite natural resources and limited ecological resilience (DALBY 2006). Further, the technological development of a cornucopian behavior creates multiple risks in society (BECK 2007), where the claims of self-interested personal behavior often add the “last straw that breaks the camel’s back.”

Looking behind the past 6 decades of discussion on development and 2 decades on sustainable development, none of the critics of modernization have taken into account the process of peace-keeping or conflict resolution related to scarce or polluted resources threatened by an increasing world population (BÄCHLER 1999; BRAUCH 2008; DALBY 2006). Few definitions analyze the underlying cultural factors and the ability to change behavior and attitudes based on core values of many civilizations (OSWALD 2001, 2008).

### *Culture*

Culture includes immaterial elements that can best be understood as a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors. Materially, it expresses ways of living: working tools, art, buildings, etc., which members of a society develop and



represent in their immanent world (e.g., ARIZPE 2004). Through language, painting, arts, and literature, these social achievements are transmitted to the next generation through social representations, where learning processes are crucial. This complex definition of culture includes symbolic representations—learned norms and roles—which are socially grounded through identity processes. They represent an organized and structured systematic pattern of roles, norms and social understanding. One of the most important cultural achievements needed for a civilization to survive involves learning how to integrate with nature so one can use its resources for food, housing, ceremonies, and rituals, without destroying them. Another crucial achievement involves mechanisms of nonviolent conflict resolution and how to deal with people who infringe on social norms and rules.

### *Peace*

The concept of peace has evolved from a negative understanding of peace as ‘absence of war or other hostilities’ to a positive understanding of peace as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from threat.’ GALTUNG (2007) developed this understanding of freedom from physical, structural, and cultural violence. However, it is imperative to add another dimension: freedom from ‘gender violence,’ as it is the most common form of violence worldwide, often taken for granted, and a predecessor of war (REARDON 1985). A positive peace understanding also implies nonviolent conflict resolution (GANDHI 1996; AMEGLIO 2007). Conflicts are motors of human life; however, when they are resolved violently, they create hostilities, war, death, and destruction. Therefore, peace-building implies negotiation and mediation processes to end hostilities and find a win-win situation for those in dispute. Finally, a culture of peace reflects an inner peaceful mindset and an external behavior open to resolving emerging controversies.

### *Sustainable Peace*

As we confront environmental destruction, war and violence, the concept of ‘sustainable peace’ has evolved and has been systematically developed within several United Nations organizations and governments. PECK (1998) has defined sustainable peace as:

Sustainable development (which) involves the institutionalization of participatory processes in order to provide civil and political rights to all peoples. The building blocks of sustainable peace and security are well-functioning local, state, regional and international systems of governance, which are responsive to basic human needs (p.45).

Sustainable peace has also been linked to *preventive diplomacy*, a term developed by Dag Hammarskjöld and now used in different governmental discourses and practices in international relations. It tries to avoid the escalation of conflicts

preventively, before they turn into violence and spread. This is a practice developed in the longstanding mandarin system of Chinese rulers. However, in spite of this conceptual progress in linking development with environmental peace and culture, most official discourses are still rhetoric and oriented towards short-term goals. We can only address the threats from global environment changes and regressive globalization, with its crude and aggressive outcomes, by considering future generations and long-term concerns. If we do not, we will have a continuation of practices creating privileges within the family (patriarchy), abusing nature (growth without limits, GEC), creating social gaps (colonialism, capitalism and regressive globalization), and homogenizing cultures (Eurocentrism and consumerist ideology: PREISWERK 1984). Therefore, a different paradigm and social behavior is required to overcome the present threats and risks in a coherent way, where time is scarce and the more frequent and serious disasters affect the most socially vulnerable groups.

## **Culture, Development and Peace**

Sustainable development is related to culture and peace. This is patently obvious when we consider ongoing global environmental changes (GEC) and the social vulnerability that is exposed during disaster situations, which particularly affect marginal groups, women, children and elderly.

### ***Sustainable Culture of Risk***

After discussing the relationship between culture and environmental behavior, and how elites are avoiding the fundamental problems of our present society, this section proposes that we should focus on ways that lie between the still dominant discussion of top-down considerations and institution building and an emphasis on participative policy with its bottom-up concerns. In the latter, the expertise of citizens (LARRAIN 2005) is involved in the reinforcement of norms and laws. Such an approach enables us to better understand both the upcoming risks of GEC and the issues raised by gender inequalities (SHIVA 1988). These are diverse and rational concerns, and the expertise of those most affected is essential for creating and consolidating a sustainable culture of development.

The ongoing process of GEC makes us realize the limitations of science that have created a *fata morgana*, an illusion, in the framework of a cornucopian model of unlimited resources in the world. Addressing risk entails how both technological improvements and political models of development can reduce existing threats. These threats are exacerbated by new scientific goals controlled by multinational enterprises (genetics, cloning, nanotechnology, etc.), where private gain dominates over ethical thinking and common well-being. There is no doubt that the present

models of modernity have led society to question the former consensus of progress at the hand of science and technology. Modernization is getting more reflexive, losing naivety, and increasing awareness about the negative effects of technological processes. The division between a modern world and an underdeveloped South is exposing the adverse social effects of the current economic model. Reinforced by GEC, increasing worldwide unemployment and threats to health and the environment that are caused by the increase of genetically modified organisms are dividing societies and creating opposition between the poor and the rich, an opposition where uncritical science cannot offer much hope.

## **Peace Culture**

Peace culture must surmount multiple obstacles within the existing model of an economy of resource exploitation, pollution, consumption, and waste, a model that is preventing a sustainable development. Politicians maintain the traditional way of thinking and acting, in spite of the fact that a paradigmatic shift is required. Although regionally differentiated due to the process of regressive globalization, these obstacles represent a global threat. The gap between northern and southern realities is increasing. More than 90% of children today are born in poor countries, frequently in urban slums without any life expectations (LASONEN 2003). They are easy victims of illnesses, and in their struggle to survive, some may be influenced by fanatical ideologies that hinder the adoption of the values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes.

As written in UNESCO (1995), “In practice, the key to a culture of peace is the transformation of violent competition into cooperation for shared goals...It may be understood as the managing of conflict through the sharing processes of development” (p. 16). This type of peace culture is not a static process that can be permanently achieved. It requires continual dynamic negotiation among groups and interests, and over time, the focus and priorities will change. All these unstable conditions oblige humans to continually renegotiate, and it is this process of struggling for agreement that is a culture of peace.

## ***Threats and Risks***

The early twenty-first century is a risk epoch with manifold global and local threats. Decision making and technology are creating risks for the present world society, including long-term risks for future generations and ecosystems. These include the risks involved in genetically modified organisms, cloning, terrorism, financial crises and climate-induced disasters. BECK (2007) compares these global risks with the

destructive capacity of wars. The fact that risks are not equally distributed, either geographically or socially, gives the mass media—who report almost instantly about these disasters—a possibility to become a fourth political power beyond any democratic control. On the one hand, they could contribute to an increase in the awareness of the people who are confronted with these new risks. On the other hand, they could promote fears that replace positive thinking and permeate action. Threats and fears from unknown risks are the new global concerns as vulnerable societies behave and adapt to these tense situations. In searching for greater security, people may accept new laws and restrictions that reduce their individual and collective rights and ultimately increase their risk by creating new legal and political vulnerability. Concerns about threats are also used by politicians to gain votes, as with the negative campaigns during the reelections of President Bush in the USA (2004) and the election of President Calderon in Mexico (2006).

In daily life, simple threats are socially securitized: car accidents are covered by insurance, a fire is extinguished by firemen, and illness is cured by doctors in hospitals. But which solutions exist to cope with an atomic accident (e.g., Chernobyl, Ukraine), a chemical disaster (e.g., Bhopal, India; San Juanico, Mexico) or a future genetic challenge? Confronted with these new and often diffuse insecurities, frequently related to GEC, people have two options: either to psychologically collapse and seek refuge in drugs, alcohol, or depression or to face the possibilities of mayor disasters and focus on prevention, adaptation and resilience (GECHS and BIRKMAN 2006).

To complicate matters, the injustice involved in facing these threats is often difficult to perceive. Family structures, schools, work places, and clubs are organized to subsume gender, social classes, and ethnic gaps into daily life, establishing 'habitus' (BOURDIEU 1990). The development of such socially created habitus avoids the understanding of gender and other types of vulnerability so that interest groups can organize. Religions in East and West strongly reinforce power gaps through religious identity patterns and supernatural beliefs. In the short run traditional religious beliefs relieve anxiety in people, but they hinder collective consciousness-raising and an integral social organization. As Bourdieu explains, all these processes are socially structured, highly dynamic, and often contradictory. The ruling classes try to maintain the status quo through the creation of ideological hegemony.

## ***Vulnerability***

Vulnerability is broadly understood as being exposed to socio-economic, natural, political, and cultural disasters. Normally, it is associated with poverty, marginalization, and ignorance, but it should also be related to the fact that women die more numerously during hazards (ARIYABANDU and FONSECA, 2008). UN/ISDR (2004) defines vulnerability as "the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards." Security dynamics, including social vulnerability

considerations, can be oriented to threats to individual identities and social representations, where not only physical survival is in danger, but also cultural survival. Diverse factors such as illiteracy, gender, unemployment, class, and indigenous conditions reinforce the existing difficulties. When faced with a hazard these groups are more apt to lose their lives and livelihood. Thus, scientific analyses have shifted from hazard impact to the assessment of social vulnerability and to coping strategies and resilience-building. Hazard impact relates to the coordination of all resources and capabilities existing within a community or organization for reducing the existing risks or effects of a disaster. Resilience-building involves drawing upon the experience of former catastrophes to learn and to avoid repeating previous mistakes. It empowers people for self-organization when they are confronted with new threats and risks. Such prevention and coping strategies are also used in conflict management through negotiation and mediation, and also in conflict prevention.

## **How Sustainable Peace Can Reinforce Sustainable Culture**

### ***Limitations***

The framework for sustainable peace is a complex process that includes an integral hermeneutic analysis of nature and its interrelation with human behavior. By establishing a complex matrix of analysis of these interrelations one can slowly begin to prioritize the nonviolent behavior of the transactions between humans, and from this model of mutual respect establish also a sustainable relationship with nature.

The present system of occidental cornucopian behavior and unrestricted economic growth limits this postulate and affects natural resources. Sustainability requires environmental conservation and the mitigation and restoration of damaged ecosystems, whereas the present model of globalization is based on profit maximization and individual accumulation of financial capital. A sustainable peace forms part of a sustainable culture, which includes diversity, co-existence, negotiation and respect for humans concerning the decision-making process related to natural resources. It combines all kinds of capitals: financial, social, political, natural and cultural capital. Normally, market forces prevent such an integral approach and create conflicts and environmental degradation; the technological and economic outcomes of this cornucopian model create new risks and threats (BRAUCH 2005).

Climate change is the most visible threat for humanity. There are also important global environmental changes involving biodiversity loss, deforestation, desertification, erosion, water scarcity and pollution, urbanization with slum development, new illnesses, and epidemiological changes. The concept of sustainability addresses the root causes of this environmental destruction and resource exploitation (DALBY 2006). As 82% of those who died in disasters and 87% of the economic losses in 2006 were related to hydro-meteorological disasters, negative outcomes can basically be controlled by reducing the emissions of gases related to GEC and produced by a fossil oil-hungry productive system (IPCC 2007). Unfortunately, these disasters

occur more frequently in the tropics and primarily affect poor people, due to their precarious life conditions, lack of safe shelters, and preventive risk management. Hence, there is less motivation and support in the West to take responsibility for past and present emissions. Since the industrial revolution, greenhouse gases have been caused primarily by industrialized countries. Although the increasing industrialization in the South will significantly increase in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in the coming decades, a basic principle of justice obliges industrialized countries to acknowledge their historical role and responsibility by supporting poor countries with technical and financial tools to effectively deal with hazards and threats, the goal of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, highly developed countries are also ethically obliged to reduce wasteful use of fossil fuels by increasing energy efficiency and by employing alternative energy sources and cleaning up the pollution and destruction of the planet.

### ***Potential***

Traditional societies generally in China, India, and Asia, but also indigenous societies in Africa and Latin America, used to have a holistic relationship with nature. Throughout the millennia they developed sustainable systems of management of food production and technology that respected nature. Their beliefs and rituals for earth as mother and water as goddess are examples of this sacred behavior. People in the Occident (Western countries) developed a single male god model that had as a basic understanding the exploitation and submission of nature for human needs. The Occident has to learn from the Orient how to respect and care about nature and to deal with conflicts peacefully. The Orient also has to return to its traditional roots of a careful relationship with nature, without ravages and destruction, and with a long-term sustainable behavior. This transformative learning can occur in both formal and non-formal educational settings that are oriented to change the core causes of environmental destruction. The process involves shifting power relations, the understanding of gender and behaviors that create violence and destruction. They allow a healthy and longstanding relationship with Mother Earth for everybody.

The potential of a sustainable peace and sustainable culture can be expressed by the concept of HUGE: Human, Gender, and Environmental (OSWALD 2001, 2007, 2008). Such a concept contributes analytically (as a scientific tool) and brings new concerns to the policy agenda (as a policy tool for action by social movements, governments, and international organizations). The HUGE concept relies on a widened gender concept—not focusing on the narrow male-female relationship, but including all socially vulnerable and powerless groups. It reorients ‘human security’ to defeat discrimination through specific governmental policies, institution-building, legal reinforcements, and the abolition of patriarchal behavior. At the same time, it stimulates the political and social participation of women, youth, disabled people, and elders. A multicultural world additionally promotes political and cultural diversity that can be oriented to nonviolent conflict resolution processes, which reinforce peace-building in conflict-prone regions and promote preventive nonviolent behavior.

The neoliberal understanding of free and equal access to world markets with trade distortions and international agreements increases regional and social inequities, but also handicaps the environment. Therefore, sustainable peace efforts must include horizontal interchanges of experiences, fair trade and the consolidation of an economy of solidarity with regional integration and chains of micro-businesses. They can be reinforced through identity building at the personal level and by understanding the processes of social representations that would be able to avoid the creation of stereotypes, racism and discrimination. Consequently, HUGO also explores social, environmental, human, cultural, and identity concerns, understanding the role of solidarity, resilience-consolidation, peace-building, and equity in an increasingly insecure and risky world.

## **From Unsustainable Development to Sustainable Cultures of Peace**

The unsustainable development that began with the Industrial Revolution has produced an abuse of natural resources, particularly the overuse of fossil hydrocarbons. Inducing GEC and facing greater and more frequent disasters, government and people have instrumented coping strategies to reduce the negative impacts of climate change and resource scarcity. However, the sustainability approach within a global program of peace culture is attacked by multiple critics and specific interests who seek to maintain the status quo and the selective enrichment of a small number of elite. The outcome shows that human, gender and environmental threats are growing. Thus, the goal of a sustainable culture of peace must be to increase peace in an integral way by negotiating and mitigating conflicts and avoiding processes and behaviors that could increase the existing disequilibrium and destruction (RICHARDS 1999).

These new developments challenge the state-centered security system based on national sovereignty that is still the focus of the UN, Security Council and its charter (BRAUCH 2007). The defy is issued by people who seek to change the narrow military and homeland security notions of threats to the state. They pose an alternative to the typical “survival dilemma” facing most affected, poor, and marginalized people where migration and becoming refugees are the only possible outcomes for the highly vulnerable other than staying at home and facing death due to hunger and thirst (BRAUCH 2008).

### ***Complexities***

The strategies, policies, and measures of sustainable development needed for a durable culture of peace are highly complex. They include strategies for controlling human factors that have been instrumental in pollution and the increasing scarcity

of natural resources, policies that will lead to more equal access to scarce resources including bottom-up as well as top-down negotiation processes.

Sustainable strategies, policies, and structures of development must influence values, change behavior, and pave new avenues for conflict prevention and peace-building by contributing to a model of development where pollution and threats to the environment and humankind are mitigated. In a period of great uncertainty due to GEC, both global and local efforts have to be based on a global culture of peace. Without abilities for sharing, reducing, recycling, and assuming historical responsibility for past and present emissions, the world environmental situation will get worse. As there is only one planet, the unpredictable global, regional and local effects will not only seriously affect the most vulnerable countries and social groups, but also the highly industrialized nations and both their prosperous and poor citizens (e.g., Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans). Pollution is one of the most democratic features in that it affects all citizens. Only the prevention and mitigation at both global and local levels will reduce the stress for the Earth so that the quality of life and livelihood are granted.

The creation of more viable systems of internal and international security is undoubtedly related to equitable and sustainable development. During the 1990s the world leaders of the G-7 missed the historical opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to reconvert military industries into civil and environmental ones. A part of the peace dividend could have been used to develop renewable energy sources and to exploit the huge untapped sustainable energy sources, thus reducing greenhouse emissions, as well as recycling processes to avoid waste and to overcome poverty and discrimination. Hopefully, the newly perceived threats posed by GEC will unite the world leaders, pressured by their citizens, to change the priorities of power struggles and arms sales and instead create a sustainable livelihood for all.

What are the key issues that have to be changed to improve cooperation and to surmount the historical gaps among colonized nations and colonizers?

### ***Key Issues of Sustainable Development***

The key issues for sustainable development are listed in the indexes at the global and national level (see Table 8.1). But isolated action cannot integrate them. We need the combined forces of human cooperation, science and technology, and traditional behavior to be able to surmount the historical gaps between both colonized nations and their previous colonizers. Beside technical improvement, a major change of mentality is needed, and this is precisely the deeper meaning of a culture of sustainable peace. Different societies have shown that they are able to deal with contradiction by promoting cohesion and tolerance in a non-violent way. A capitalism that is based on competition, violent destruction of the other and patriarchal hierarchical structures must be challenged by a cooperative model of equity, where respect for diversity and different ideas will foster new models of world governance



and democratic participation. A key element in this transformation process is being played by the mass media. Only an open communication interested not in short-term profit, but in transparency and accountability for globally agreed processes can overthrow despotic controls and corruption. An integral respect for human, social, and community rights can open the for using traditional techniques of resource management that overcome an over reliance on a concept of private property that implicitly relies on competition and accumulation. Finally, there is an issue that is related to the socially vulnerable who often lack “voice” and power. Gender empowerment and political participation may challenge the present ideology of *Homo sapiens* and shift the focus to a *Homo donans* or a gift economy (VAUGHAN 1997). These approaches will once again put human needs and environmental concerns in the center of the discussion by improving caring for the most vulnerable where a sustainable environment is a key solution for the future quality of life.

### ***Limits and Potential of Sustainable Peace and Culture***

To overcome the current regressive globalization process and develop a lasting cooperation among all nations that reduces social, cultural, and economic gaps, without damaging the fragile equilibrium of the earth, we must change the dynamic of our planet. Ethical behavior is crucial at the global level. This goal cannot be achieved without increasing the harmony within ourselves, with our fellow human beings, and in our relationship with nature. Therefore, new agreements among a nonviolent sustainable peace culture and the proper body, the family, the community, the region, the nation, and the planet Earth are indispensable. This emerging energy may transform the new threats and challenges by bringing humanity with its cultural diversity into a different learning process, where no dominant civilization is imposing its ideology, but all civilizations are jointly achieving the vision of a human, gender, and environmental (HUGE) security perspective by learning from improving the livelihood for all human beings, especially for the most marginal people. These global and personal commitments have been expressed not only in the sustainable culture of peace, but also in the Earth Charter.

Confronted with higher risks, greater insecurities, scarce and polluted resources, and increasing disasters, peace researchers, environmentalists, indigenous women’s movements, and minorities have joined efforts in the EARTH CHARTER. It contains a declaration of fundamental values and principles for building a just, sustainable, and peaceful global society in the twenty-first century that is able to account for the most vulnerable groups that have nothing, suggesting a change of the present culture of dilapidation and consumerism. \*\*

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\*\*One of the main goals to achieve such a peace culture is sustainable development and the related concept of sustainable peace (SALINAS and OSWALD 2003). This goal has encouraged the cooperation of multiple researchers, activists and politicians.

The Earth Charter used modern communication systems to create a large global consultation process, which was endorsed by thousands of organizations and millions of individuals. It was launched on 29 June 2000 in The Peace Palace, Hague, The Netherlands. It argues that environmental policy and care are substantial elements of a peaceful world. Within a framework of a sustainable peace, the Earth Charter inspires a sense of global interdependence and shared responsibility for the future well-being of humanity. In this sense it represents hope by calling for global partnership, collaboration, and nonviolent conflict resolution. As a sustainable peace culture, the Earth Charter proposes an ethical vision for environmental protection, human rights, equitable human development, and peace-building, which are all interdependent and indivisible elements of a holistic framework. A 'HUGE' Earth Charter offers an ethical basis for efforts to promote peaceful respect for humans and nature, which are locally consolidated by sustainable actions and beliefs. These local processes are inserted in a global understanding creating a 'global' (local within an ongoing globalization process) concern for solidarity and compromise for equity and care of nature that are the bases of a sustainable peace culture (BOULDING 2000).

*We stand at a critical moment in Earth's history, a time when humanity must choose its future. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent and fragile, the future at once holds great peril and great promise. To move forward we must recognize that in the midst of a magnificent diversity of cultures and life forms we are one human family and one Earth community with a common destiny. We must join together to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace. Towards this end, it is imperative that we, the peoples of Earth, declare our responsibility to one another, to the greater community of life, and to future generations (EARTH CHARTER, 2000).*

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**Section III**  
**Tools for Building Cultures of Peace**  
**General Methods**

# Chapter 1

## Nonviolent Action, Trust and Building a Culture of Peace

Michelle Cromwell and William B. Vogele

### Introduction

Building and sustaining cultures of peace does not mean eliminating conflict. Rather, conflict is to be expected. Sharp, even profound, disagreements among groups are almost inevitable in any social setting. These disagreements may be or become deeply divisive and threaten to split the community on moral or political grounds. The challenge for building a culture of peace, therefore, becomes how such contention is expressed and managed. This involves building institutions that are authoritative and legitimate and altering behavioral repertoires among community members so that conflicts can be waged short of violence. This chapter argues that nonviolent action, as a method of making contention, makes three important contributions to building and sustaining a culture of peace. First, nonviolent means of struggle promote social norms that eschew violence, even without any kind of overarching commitment to pacifism. Second, nonviolent struggle helps to build trust among individuals and groups, even when they find themselves in contention. Third, the structural requirements for effective nonviolent action diffuse power throughout society—effectively empowering groups who might otherwise be excluded, broadening democratic participation, and valuing inter-group communication.

The repertoire of nonviolent methods for contentious action has important consequences for each of these approaches to building peaceful communities. It does this by virtue of the characteristics of engaging in nonviolent action as well as by the behavioral consequences of its practice. In addition, it promotes institutions that are responsive to community interests and needs, reflect norms of social justice, and are generally effective in their actions. Such institutions will have deeper legitimacy and consequently will be able to act with greater authority. Of vital importance, these institutions will also be perceived as legitimate venues for conflict resolution and for contention.

The methods by which conflict and societal contention are engaged are crucial. Even when institutions are generally effective and legitimate, they may be flawed or new circumstances arise that change needs. Indeed, Guidry and Sawyer (2003, p. 273) argue that “the politics of claiming space in the public sphere... is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for democracy.” Thus, building and sustaining

a culture of peace and peaceful communities depend on behavioral repertoires of action among community members that allow conflict to be waged short of violence.

We develop our argument in three stages. First, we briefly review the challenges to peace drawing on concepts of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Second, we suggest the importance of building social trust, and thereby social norms, favoring dialogue, tolerance, and mutual obligation. Third, we suggest how the characteristics of nonviolent methods of engaging in conflict can contribute to trust building. Nonviolent struggle also can alter the structural distribution of power in a community in ways that help build and sustain a culture of peace.

## **Violence and Norms of Contentious Behavior**

Violent strategies of engaging in conflict are fraught with many problems. One of the main problems is that violence frames conflict in terms of zero sum gains. This is exemplified by parties using tactics that unleash powerful and destructive forces on each other (Rubin et al. 1994, p. 47). Violence emphasizes winners and losers. This makes it difficult for parties to work towards constructive ends, and it greatly diminishes the ability to identify shared interests and thus to develop solutions with mutual benefits. Violent strategies usually employ tactics that are inherently destructive (Kriesberg 1998), such as:

- Eliminating an opponent by direct violent means
- Driving out the affective component from interacting parties by the use of brute force, thus leaving parties devoid of affect or a moral compass
- Creating polarities around the conflict issues and forcing onlookers to judge who is either good or evil
- Creating and maintaining centralized power with ultimate decision-making power

Destructive struggles increase the severity of contentious tactics and have more negative consequences. These struggles are typified by higher levels of direct violence and produce a greater number of casualties. Notably, destructive struggles render great losses to either contending party (Kriesberg 1998, pp. 151–152). The levels of direct violence are also exacerbated because of the types of mechanisms each side employs. Kriesberg (1998) points out that mechanisms that have the propensity to magnify violence include demonizing the other on a national and global scale, a marked commitment to continuing the struggle, and perpetuating the need for revenge. These mechanisms are evident in many well-publicized contemporary conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, or the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The use of violence in contentious situations thus demands an alternative repertoire that permits conflicts to be addressed in constructive ways. One of the overarching

goals of this chapter is to explore strategies and tactics that address conflict constructively and lend to creating a culture of peace in communities. A positive peace orientation that sets the framework for this volume necessitates interaction that essentially is devoid of violence and yet also understands the existence of conflicts. Positive peace actions create sites and opportunities for conflicts to unfold in a transformative manner among the participants. To facilitate the transformation of conflicts, the members of society should be conscious of the various forms of violence; in order to negate something, one must be able to identify it successfully. This is essential so that the more insidious types of violence do not go unnoticed and therefore unregulated.

In *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Johan Galtung defines peace as “the absence of violence in every form” (1996, p. 9). To that end he also points out that violence occurs in three modalities. The first modality is direct violence. Direct violence is manifested in various forms of intentional bodily harm, including killing, maiming, siege, and any other form of force to the body that causes harm and poses an affront to basic human needs.

The second modality of violence is structural violence. Galtung argues that this form of violence results from the presence of social structures whose cornerstones are exploitation and repression (1996, p. 198). Structural violence is manifested in acts that enable some actors in society to benefit from unequal exchange and the plight of the disadvantaged. Structural violence can be seen in social structures such as politics, education, religion, and media.

Many analysts note that oppression and violent social structures make violence prevention and peace-building difficult because the sources of violence and oppression are not readily identified. Authors writing from the perspective of the political left, such as Gil (1996), argue that capitalist modes of production are intrinsically violent in so far as they rest on relationships of unequal exchange. Other authors point to social institutions like patriarchy as embodying violence and oppression (Atack 2006; Burrowes 1996; Martin 1989).

Significantly, many of these structures of violence perpetuate themselves by becoming part of a society’s cultural assumptions (Atack 2006). Galtung refers to this as a third mode of violence: cultural violence, which “makes direct and structural violence appear and feel right—or at least not wrong” (1996, p. 196). Thus, acts perpetuated as a result of structural or direct violence are seen as normal. Since these acts are seen as normal, engaging in them carries no negative sanctions or punishment. They become a part of society’s social fabric, become legitimized, and thus are rendered acceptable. Galtung argues that one means by which this occurs is by “changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least yellow/ acceptable.” An example is that of war versus homicide. “Murder on behalf of one’s country is right but on behalf of oneself, wrong” (1996, pp. 196–197).

Unraveling violence to build a peaceful community demands structural and cultural transformation, not simply the absence of the use of force. In the next section we briefly explore the elements of trust before turning to the capacity of non-violent action to facilitate these transformations.



## Trust

Trust, of course, is a social relationship. It occurs between individuals, between an individual and a group, and potentially between groups. Fundamentally, it begins with the experiences of direct interactions. In this section we examine how interaction creates social norms that favor dialogue, cooperation, and reciprocity.

Blasé and Blasé (1994, p. 18) define trust as a concept that “is built very slowly and in small increments, is established more by deeds than by words, and is sustained by openness in interpersonal relations.” Trust is, therefore, highly context dependent (Seligman 1997). Engaging in trust-building enables parties in communities to realize beneficial gains as opposed to falling into social traps. Social traps “refer to situations in society that contain traps formally like a fish trap, where men or organizations or whole societies get themselves started in some direction or some set of relationships that later prove to be unpleasant or lethal and that they see no easy way to back out of or to avoid” (Platt 1973, p. 641). The conflict itself becomes an element in the collective identity (Northrup 1997).

In *Trust*, Francis Fukuyama (1995) argues that social benefits such as cooperation and capacity-building arise from trust. Indeed, trust cannot be achieved by individual actors acting alone, but must be done as a societal venture (p. 23). Trust is thus related to Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity.” Actors in the community are seen as depending on trust to survive. From this perspective, trust has a functional component and acts as the cement of society, which holds its members together by organic solidarity. Within the community, members are expected to adhere to the norms and values that promote organic solidarity. These expectations also feed back to constitute one of the foundations on which shared norms are built (Coleman 1990; Hardin 2002). Without trust, people resort to evaluating transaction costs, which have to be achieved by coercive means or systems of formal rules and regulations (Fukuyama 1995, p. 31).

Bernard Williams similarly defines trust as a function of “thick relationships” (1988, p. 21). The nexus between the thick relationship and trust lies in the possibility that persons have the level of interaction that would help to create some familiarity. In the context of a thick relationship, people are familiar with each other and can be said to know each other and have some type of relationship. Interaction enables parties to have a deeper knowledge of each other. This type of relationship appears to give persons, even in the realm of interethnic tensions, some knowledge of the limits of the other person’s capacity to be trusted. Trust is not possible where there is no such relationship (Williams 1988). This implies that if people do not know each other and establish some type of relationship, trust will not and cannot be a part of the equation.

In addition, in a thick relationship the trusting actor offers incentives to maintain contacts. The interacting parties have an expectation of an ongoing relationship that enables each party to gain knowledge of the other’s reputation. In this instance, the trusted actor is aware of the trusting party’s strategic willingness to make reciprocal moves, acting upon that knowledge to take cooperative actions that can lead to mutual benefit.

The key to promoting cooperation is to ensure that interaction can occur over and over, so that each may recall how the other behaved in past positive interactions

(Axelrod 1984; Hardin 1982; Williams 1988). It is necessary to arrange opportunities for parties involved in societal tensions to meet and be able to recognize each other as human. Positive interaction also can be an opportunity for each party to recognize the other as a potential alliance and to demonstrate the intention to reciprocate.

Axelrod (1984, p. 126) argues that “[m]utual cooperation can be made stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the present.” This can be done in two ways. The first is making the interactions more durable. Having interactions for extended periods necessitates that interacting parties make the commitment to have contact. Because the parties make the commitment to interact, there is no alternative but to continue the interaction because the commitment acts as the driving force. Kelman (1997) and others have emphasized the importance of meaningful and regular engagement in “problem-solving workshops” among influential actors on opposing sides of intractable conflicts. The purpose is to create a sustained interaction among people who would otherwise remain separated.

In addition, creating a dynamic that permits mutually beneficial reciprocation requires one party to take a risk. Osgood (1966) proposed that gradual initiatives can and should be taken to begin to unwind escalating tensions. He suggested that a series of small but meaningful initiatives can signal the willingness to reverse direction. Similarly, Axelrod’s exploration of the evolution of cooperation determined that a strategy that was initially cooperative and then reciprocated the opponent’s action had the potential for significant mutual gains. Significantly, many of the diplomatic gains that lead to the end of the Cold War displayed just such dynamics (Vogele 1994), and such tactics are often built into formal confidence-building measures.

Finally, Xavier de Souza Briggs (1998, p. 186) argues that the more people connect, the more they trust each other. This is in keeping with one of the theories of social capital that argues that when people connect more, they trust more. It further argues that people also become better off collectively and individually because of the strong collective aspect of social capital (Briggs 1988, pp. 186–189).

Social solidarity, the emergence of mutually beneficial cooperation based on strategic reciprocity, and dense networks of connections provide the foundation for a peaceful community. None of these features, however, eliminates conflict. The repertoire of nonviolent action provides a fulcrum to address structural, as well as cultural, violence. In particular, nonviolent action, when broadly embedded in a community as the primary repertoire of responses to conflict when institutions are insufficient, facilitates the creation of trust. The next section provides a brief overview of nonviolent methods of conflict and discusses how the persistence and use of these techniques contributes to building peaceful communities.

## **Nonviolent Action**

Nonviolent action is behavior used in a situation of conflict that is outside of the ordinary institutional channels, asserts a public claim, and imposes no physical harm on people (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, p. 4). This definition distinguishes our discussion from institutionalized procedures for expressing and resolving conflict,

such as courts, elections, or formal bargaining as well as from violence; it also places it in a broad category of contentious politics (McAdam and Tarrow 2000).

There is some debate about whether acts of property destruction are legitimately considered nonviolent methods. Property damage itself may or may not be nonviolent, as we would logically distinguish between sabotage of a building and defacing the same building with graffiti. Using the restrictive focus of action that imposes no direct and physical harm to people, acts such as the symbolic or actual sabotage would be nonviolent if no one was injured. Damaging conscription records with blood or pounding missile nosecones with hammers, as well as public defacement with graffiti would all qualify as nonviolent methods. The moral obligation of all acts remains to consider the effects on those who choose not to participate. Therefore, suffering imposed on nonparticipants as a consequence of the destruction of infrastructure, for example, may be questionable.

Nonviolent action is often associated with protest, but it is broader than protest in its social uses: It can be a means to employ power in any situation. One of Gene Sharp's foundational contributions to understanding the power and potential of nonviolent action was his structured description of clusters of methods and his effort to document the applications of these methods. Any student of nonviolent action can recognize a large number of methods, including protest demonstrations, refusals to work, political noncooperation, economic and social boycotts, the creation of "alternative" sources of information, and even parallel social and political structures (Sharp, 1973).

Methods of nonviolent action may be acts of protest undertaken by individuals or groups. The acts may be small and largely symbolic, such as the practice by Norwegian resisters to Nazi occupation in World War II of wearing a paperclip on their lapel or the use of orange ribbons in the 2004 Ukrainian "orange revolution." Although the Norwegian example carried real dangers in the context of the German occupation, such acts are often simple and easily undertaken. More substantial protest involves a range of activities including demonstrations, artwork, and speeches. These methods are more public and generally involve many more people; they have a massive and popular character and represent the mobilization of significant portions of society.

Noncooperation imposes costs upon both the actor and the target, and thus is generally not undertaken lightly on a significant scale. Labor strikes offer the obvious example of noncooperation in an economic relationship. However, strikes can be overtly political, such as when public employees refuse to work. Parkman (1990) also developed the idea of "civic strikes" as a mode of noncooperation in Latin America involving professional classes and students as well as public employees. Noncooperation can also involve tax refusals, economic boycotts, civil disobedience, and even mutiny of military forces. These methods wield power more assertively. They also rely on substantial support to be effective.

One of the important characteristics of nonviolent methods of struggle is the flexibility with which it can be employed and adapted to local needs and circumstances. This is crucial to trust-building, which, as we have seen, is strongly context dependent. Significantly, nonviolent action appears to have far greater room for

innovation than does violence. The potential power of nonviolent action is implied by the fact that it is neither historically nor culturally bounded. It is also clear that nonviolent actions and methods can diffuse across cultures (Chabot 2000). As communications become increasingly globalized through the internet and mobile telephony, cross-cultural learning is likely to accelerate.

Examined empirically, methods of nonviolent action are simultaneously universal and culturally specific. Methods of nonviolent action can be identified from ancient times to the present and in many societies. The universality of nonviolent action supports the contention that it provides a repertoire of behaviors in conflicts that are meaningful and effective. This illustrates that they are also rooted in politically and culturally specific settings. One method, protest demonstrations, for example, appears in different contexts with its own particular cultural referents in each.

African-American demonstrators during the American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960 often gathered at churches, wore their best clothes, and were led by clergy. These cultural referents connected the movement to the Christian values that were broadly held by much of American society in the 1950s. They also provided symbols of respect—not only for their own leaders and for themselves, but for the opposition. To dress up was to act properly in a way that showed respect for yourself and for others.

In 1989, Czech opponents to the Communist Party government gathered nightly in Wenceslas Square in Prague. The square itself was symbolic of the long cultural identity of the Czech people, extending well before rule of the Communist Party. In addition, meeting in the public square reclaimed the public space from the ruling authorities, thereby denying them their claim to be legitimate arbiters of the public good.

During the 1980s, a popular movement arose in Chile seeking the end of rule by General Augusto Pinochet (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, pp. 279–302). The particular focus of action was a plebiscite called by the government to seek to renew their claim to rule. Opposition political parties gathered strength to defeat this plebiscite. A crucial aspect of the challenge to Pinochet's military rule was the demonstrations of women in the streets of Santiago. In these movements, women marched with pots and pans, banging them and making a raucous noise. The pans symbolized the women's domestic role in Chilean society; the noise they made in the streets challenged the silence that military rule had imposed on Chilean citizens.

Sharp also has developed a theoretical understanding of nonviolent action in the context of social power. He argues that nonviolent methods of engaging in conflict are rooted in the idea that all forms of social control and governance require some degree of compliance and cooperation. Nonviolence challenges the assumption that consent is automatic or unproblematic.

Even when a group or government employs violent coercion to prevail, the success of those methods depends on compliance on various levels (Sharp 1973, 2005). First, those responsible for carrying out the acts of coercion must be willing to use force. Consider the case of the social institutions to which most societies assign the

legal (and often legitimate) use of force and violence—police and military forces. Although the personnel of civil police and the military are trained so that they are capable of using violence against others, they are also often trained in the limitations of violence. Well-trained and effective policing seeks to accomplish the tasks of social control with the minimal use of violence. In many nations, explicit laws have been developed to hold police personnel accountable for their use of deadly force. Local police forces maintain internal investigative bodies to self-police the limits on violence. Similarly, military forces are willing to kill their opponents, but they also do not kill indiscriminately—otherwise they would be a mob, not an army.

More generally, social control depends on the tacit and active acceptance of that control. In everyday life, acquiescence to the norms of social control is often automatic. As Galtung has argued, this acquiescence can reproduce patterns of domination and cultural violence, but acts of resistance and noncooperation can also exist simultaneously. Scott's (1985) study of peasant resistance in rural Malaysia examines the ways in which resistance and compliance coexist.

Not all theorists of nonviolent action agree with Sharp's emphasis on consent as the basis for power. Many argue that Sharp's focus on consent overlooks or minimizes the structural conditions that organize relationships of power (Atack 2000; Burrowes 1996; Martin 1989). Martin suggests that the ruler-ruled dichotomy is an oversimplification. For example, in many circumstances individuals are both superiors and subordinates to others in bureaucratic, social, and industrial organizations. Burrowes argues that the structural positions of elites may give them significant power that does not depend on the consent of oppressed groups. Finally, cultural relationships give power social meaning that is far more complex, whether it is based on gender, class, or ethnicity (Atack 1996, p. 174).

Despite these differences, these two ideas about nonviolent action—that it is a broad and flexible repertoire of behavior by which people can engage in conflict and that it is a form of social power—provide insight into the potential for building peaceful communities. We can examine how the uses of nonviolent action have behavioral consequences that lead to the transformation of conflict, subvert cultural violence, and contribute to building trust. In addition, the characteristics of engaging in nonviolent action also work against structural violence, support the development of democracy, and promote respect for human rights.

### ***Social Consequences of Nonviolent Action***

Nonviolent methods of contentious action support the creation and maintenance of a culture of peace by affecting both the behavior of the actors and the structure of their interactions. Behaviorally, nonviolent action supports the crucial process of building norms and trust among members of a society or community. Structurally, nonviolent methods diffuse power throughout society, leading to stronger empowerment among local communities and by individuals, and ultimately supporting democratic institutions.

When individuals and groups engage in conflict using nonviolent methods, they reinforce several of the requirements for trust building. At the most basic level, trust is incompatible with a condition of physical fear. The normative framework of nonviolent action may or may not involve a principled commitment to pacifism. But deliberate refusal of nonviolent activists to impose physical harm on their opponents takes physical fear out of the calculation. Opponents or targets of nonviolent action may be threatened in important ways—by the loss of their authority, of their livelihood or of power—but they do not fear for their physical safety.

Removing the fear of physical harm also mitigates the perceived threats to individual and collective identity that can generate conflict and violence. Northrup (1997, p. 240) argues that “[w]hen a conflict between parties involves threats to core aspects of identity the conflict is likely to become intractable.” She cites several consequences of violence and threat that prolong and exacerbate conflicts, including the “socialization of children into conflict-preserving attitudes” and an overall acceptance that violence is justified. Examinations of ethnic conflicts similarly point to the power of threats to a collective sense of self to motivate defensive aggression (Montville 1997).

Nonviolent action mitigates those kinds of threats by stopping short of physical aggression. The power or behavior of an individual or group may be challenged by nonviolent action, but neither the individual nor the collective identity is threatened. Nonviolent methods do not depend on an assumption that the other party in a conflict is fundamentally evil and therefore should be eliminated; they do not attribute characteristics to an opponent that are demeaning or demonizing. Thus, they reverse the dynamic of escalation by subverting the ability of the opponent to attribute dangerous aggression to the nonviolent activists.

In the framework of reciprocity and cooperation outlined above, nonviolent action retains the potential for continuing interactions among the activists and, crucially, between opponents in a conflict. Thus, they retain and support the possibility for mutual gain. Nonviolent action does not ignore the goal of victory in a conflict. Europe’s nonviolent revolutionaries since 1989 have sought and often achieved goals of regime change. But the goal of success is neither domination nor destruction. Therefore, the potential to seek mutual gain between the parties is increased.

The experience of common action also nurtures trust. Individuals are empowered by even small acts, such as symbolic displays, that assert their membership in a larger group. People also begin to build social capital when their participation is more direct, public, and repeated. Consider the previous example of the Chilean women’s protest. Was it trust or something else that enabled the women in Chile to venture into the streets, where their safety was not guaranteed, to hit their pots? One can argue that it was an aspect of trust that enabled them to take such a risk to achieve their desires versus what they feared. Participation in even more intentional actions, such as organizing actions or taking a public stand, develops shared interdependence among the actors.

Careful training and preparation among the activists precede many nonviolent methods, especially acts of civil disobedience. Preparation has two purposes. First,

it deliberately aims to build trust and solidarity among the activists. Second, it aims to reinforce the normative commitment to nonviolence—the commitment to refrain from taking a violent reaction even to aggression. Thus, the nonviolent activists are engaged in the foundational elements for building trust not only among themselves, but also across the gap of conflict. Northrup (1997, p. 241) suggests that the “process of nonviolent action can in itself become a source of identity transformation,” shifting from collective identities defined by conflict to ones that recognize mutual relationships. She cites the way that civil rights actions in the United States altered the perceptions of many white Americans and forced them to acknowledge the depths and consequences of racism in their society.

### ***Building Democratic Societies***

Nonviolent methods of action in conflicts also challenge the structural forms of power. We have seen this in the remarkable successes where nonviolence has toppled dictators, transformed regimes, or resisted oppression. Many scholars have come to see nonviolent action as capable of wielding considerable power and have analyzed its strategic application and implications (Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Sharp 1973, 2005). The pragmatic and strategic analysis of nonviolent struggle seeks to alter the ways in which social opponents prosecute their conflicts within an existing social system. Theorists of strategic nonviolence provide parallel conceptions to military and political struggles, focusing on such elements as the need to formulate objectives, assess the balance of power, train, and deploy tactical measures, and make ongoing adjustments (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, pp. 21–53; Sharp 2005, pp. 469–490). Strategic analysis of nonviolent struggle does not explicitly seek to overturn the structural and cultural conditions of violence, but it does so implicitly by vastly diminishing the social importance of violent struggle. To the extent that formal institutions of violence are replaced by institutions of strategic nonviolence, society becomes less militarized.

Significantly, the strategic application of nonviolent action also carries implications for politics and social power in general. Almost all forms of social violence are accompanied by centralized power dynamics. Max Weber famously defined the state as the social institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Centralized power dynamics create a power differential that is imbalanced between the ruler and the ruled or between privileged and subordinate social groups. The party holding the power usually achieves this level of power by the use of threats, force, or coercion (Boulding 1989). Nonviolent action reverses the dynamics of concentrated power by diffusing power throughout society. Participants learn to organize independently of formal authority. They may become proficient communicators using independent and even novel media. They may even become strategic thinkers who can imagine campaigns that stretch over time and apply techniques developed in one setting to new situations.

Martin (1993) and Burrowes (1996) each argue that nonviolence is more than simply a pragmatic strategy that can be integrated into existing social structures, especially existing military defense structures. For example, both suggest that nonviolent social defense is inherently revolutionary because it is rooted in the concept of true popular empowerment. It is problematic to expect the governing elites to provide the population with the tools that would lead to regime change. Martin (1993) also links nonviolent defense with broad social change agendas, such as feminism and environmental sustainability. Nonviolent struggle, systematically organized, therefore stands in opposition to many forms of structural violence, which by definition deny full voice and participation to some groups.

In the *Three Faces of Power*, Boulding (1989) argues that power achieved by force or threat is equivalent to destructive power because of its use of contentious tactics. By contrast, acting in concert and using power that enables all members of society to have a stake in its claim to power are transformative and much more useful to inculcating societies of peace. This type of power is referred to as integrative power (Boulding 1989). To achieve levels of shared power through nonviolence, one of the useful constructive strategies is trust-building. It is also the basis for democracy and human rights.

Nonviolent action contributes to democracy by providing a wide variety of social groups and actors with a repertoire of behaviors through which they can bring their voice to the public square. These actions do not require greatly specialized knowledge, and they engage people in collective action. Thus, they are available to all members of the community at almost any moment; they do not depend on cycles or rules of procedure that may have been established by others. In the age of increasingly sophisticated and rapid global communications, nonviolent activists can rapidly learn of and learn from the experiences of others. Hélène Michaud (2005), for example, reported on a “festival of activism” that brought together young activists from Europe and Central Asia, all of whom were engaged in their local struggles for democracy and human rights.

Equally importantly, nonviolent action provides a mechanism for wielding power when institutional structures are inadequate, even in democratic societies. Several scholars have noted that nonviolent expressions of conflict that take place outside of regular institutions are quite common in democracies (Guidry and Sawyer 2003; Jenkins and Bond 2001). Nonviolent action is the necessary corrective to institutions of power, even in democracies.

We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that many of the successful applications of nonviolent struggles that have transformed regimes have not been followed by the sustained growth of democratic attitudes, institutions, or the end of structural violence. Gandhi’s deep disappointment in the violence of partition following his successful campaigns against British rule is a well-known example. More recently, revolutions in eastern and central Europe have led to problematic results in the Ukraine and Serbia. Similarly, some of the dramatic challenges to oppression have secured only momentary victories, as in the Ruhr in 1923, El Salvador in 1944, or the Philippines in 1986. Notably, the primary literature on strategic nonviolence does not focus on the post-conflict context—and that may be its weakness.



We conclude this portion of our discussion on a somewhat cautious note, arguing that nonviolent struggle has demonstrated the capacity to uproot oppression, to change politics, and to transform hearts and minds of activists and observers. As a tool for moving toward the building of cultures of peace, it is essential. It also has the potential for offering tools to sustain peace cultures as they emerge.

## Conclusions

UNESCO's framework for establishing and sustaining cultures of peace articulates a set of values that embrace societal norms of conflict resolution and tolerance as well as structural conditions of democracy, inclusiveness, and respect for human rights. David Adams, one of the persons instrumental in drawing up the framework during the UN International Decade for the Culture of Peace in 2000, argues that communities need to be more proactive and less reactive in matters of peace building. He notes that individual activists are often angered by injustice when an event occurs, but that this anger disappears when the memory of the event has subsided. Adams thus argues that we need a sustained opposition to injustice and any acts of violence that threaten the culture of peace:

To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire (Adams 2002, p. 28).

Nonviolence, trust, capacity-building, and other endeavors that work towards the realization of a culture of peace should seek international solidarity and unity; otherwise, they risk becoming temporary influences in the course of history waxing and waning in response to events of violence. We have argued that social commitments to nonviolent action contribute positively to these goals. Most especially, the social consequences of broad respect for, and development of, the repertoire of nonviolent action promotes the evolution of trust and reciprocity.

The dynamic of nonviolent action always leaves the door open for social compromise, even on issues that sharply divide communities, for the simple reason that these forms of contention never seek to eliminate the contending party. Nonviolent actions can produce great pressure upon an opponent. As Sharp and others have clearly documented, they are even capable of toppling governments—for example, in Russia in 1905, in El Salvador in 1944, in Poland and central Europe in 1989, and in Serbia in 2000. Some of these successes have been followed by sustained commitments to democracy, although in others the fruits of victory were short-lived. Nevertheless the successes demonstrated the power potential of nonviolent struggle (Ackerman and Duvall 2000).

The capacity to build trust and tolerance also is crucial to the preservation of human rights and democratic governance. When people engage in nonviolent action as their mode of contention, they experience a social engagement that requires them to have trust in each other to a greater degree than ordinary political

acts, such as voting. Nonviolent action only succeeds through conscious acts of cooperation, reciprocity, and collaboration. Furthermore, nonviolent action preserves a boundary whereby the opponent is never dehumanized—and thus always remains a potential partner in the ongoing community.

Incorporating greater education and study of nonviolent action throughout school curricula, as well as through serious commitment within political circles, would be important steps to take in the process of building peaceful communities. These steps require that we set out to teach peace in a purposive manner based on practice, reflection and theory—a praxis. Peace praxis is “a peace process that deals with conflict integratively” (Boulding 1989, p. 140). Boulding sees peace as an activity and not just an arbitrary state of mind; peace is an active process similar to an art, a craft, or a skill (Boulding 1989, p. 146). The challenge to peace educators is to acknowledge that peace is an activity as well as that we need to be committed to building the skills to do the activity. One analogy that can make the concept more concrete is by comparing it to the art of self-defense. Many families focus on having their children learn martial arts so that they can gain skills such as discipline and the ability to fight off an attacker. Similarly, peace education should be seen as a craft that teaches participants sets of skills to be used on a daily basis as well as in times of attack or tension.

Support for peace through trust and nonviolent action is promoted by a declaration of acceptance by actors at the macro level who are seen as powerful stakeholders. These declarations can be powerful precommitments that serve to enforce the intentions of people involved in creating a “culture of peace.” The long-term goal of this venture is to create a new civic culture, a space where strangers meet and share resources to create sustainable relationships for long-term social development.

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# Chapter 2

## Negotiation and the Shadow of Law

Steve Nisenbaum

### Introduction

In this chapter we will consider negotiation as a form of conflict resolution and how its procedures often need to be understood against a background of law. The goal of peace between conflicting, and sometimes warring, opponents may be so elusive to achieve and so precariously fragile to sustain that often the only prospect for success appears to be for the contending faction with greater power to simply dominate the other as when a nation uses military force to impose an outcome, without concern for grave consequences. However, even in such dire cases, peace through negotiation can sometimes be made viable. Negotiation for peace is a process of communication invoked for the singular purpose of reaching a specifiable agreement to abate conflict among determined parties with noncongruent perceptions of needs, goals, positions, or other diverging valued interests.

In the service of creating a binding outcome to resolve differences among disputants, negotiation is—whether or not explicitly stated to be doing so—really implementing the universal intrinsic psychological yearning among civilized beings for a “just world,” where ordered and sensible outcomes emerge with the least sacrifice of lives and precious resources. Sometimes negotiating is a prelude to, or one step in a process of, settlement to minimize cost and delays in a courtroom legal adjudication. In litigation, judges listening to ardent lawyer advocates are delegated the duty to wisely appreciate the partisan considerations and then enact and achieve this mythological motive. As a substitute to actual consensus-building themselves, the parties accept instead a rational application of legitimized formal rules by a presumed impartial who is the delegated decision maker, after a symbolic duel of competing evidence and logic enacted in a courtroom arena. Settlement negotiations between parties and their lawyers for a proposed stipulated outcome is an acceptable shortcut adjunct for the sake of efficiency. Indeed, all commerce and life exchanges are transactions made possible because the parties believe their own “meeting of the minds” (the law’s metaphor for agreement) will be seen fair enough to be sanctioned by law and therefore enforceable, if need be, by resort to a courtroom theater and spectators.

But for the everyday transactions of domestic affairs, all of the negotiations—from buying a car to landlord-tenant disputes and divorce proceedings—take place in a

familiar context that we take for granted. Such context may be missing in ethnopolitical group strife in underdeveloped nations. Gradually building that context, veritably a culture for peaceful resolution of differences, is the international cornerstone goal to make possible resort to negotiating to achieve global peace, and an alternative to power-based solutions. Some of that cultural context-building has emerged through international customs and agreements regulating trade, transportation, and the entire array of interdependencies in our “global village,” as evidenced by the fact that mail gets delivered, ships pass on the right, and pilots on international flights must all speak English. In the twentieth century, for the first time since the grand ambition of the Roman Empire—humankind’s previous most impressive historic effort to do so—important forums for legal adjudication have aspired to finally create a true World Order Under Law. The dawning of the League of Nations after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919–20 was, of course, inspired by the catastrophic realities of modern warfare. Its successor, the United Nations in 1945, valiantly revived the noble dream. Indeed, the UN Charter itself provided for the first International Court of Justice and, at long last, under its auspices an International Criminal Court with the power to try individual war criminals.

A culture for peace through negotiation is therefore gradually emerging, now propelled forward by the planetary possibilities of new electronic technologies, clamor for natural resource exploitation and interpenetrating markets for manufacture and distribution, and the sobering realities of managing global environmental implications of the tiny planet.

Negotiation is a group planning and problem-solving enterprise. But in foreign policy, to negotiate peace is rarely analogous to *teamwork* in which there is such sharing of identity and goals that concerted effort to optimize performance simply involves the group maintenance tasks of recruitment, leadership, setting agenda, operational planning, task-delegation, motivation, access to resources and utilization, performance efficiency and evaluation, reward distribution, and so forth. Teams and various task forces, committees, focus groups, and planning boards frequently employ negotiation, but often with such important underlying shared assumptions and collaborative spirit that the competitive elements are relatively bounded and subordinated.

Conducting negotiations involving passionately held, even “sacred” or ultimate “survival” concerns is different, encompassing a continuum of styles. One extreme pole is classic hard-nosed *realpolitik* bargaining, involving parties who regard each other as immutably adversarial, lacking trust or good will, deeply mutually suspicious, driven in opposite directions, and relying on confrontational posturing, maneuvering, leveraging, manipulating, impression management, bringing external pressure to bear, inducing stress, demanding capitulation, and skeptically regarding evidence to the contrary. Winning and losing are throughout the assayable elements for each and every “offer” or “concession,” and a summative result is absolute, black-and-white without shades of gray. If one party has the means and willingness to use superior force, true negotiating to achieve a mutually embraced peaceful resolution may depend upon inducements through outside pressure, costs, and politics of values.

At the other extreme would be a more truly dialogical process, but for that there must be a modicum of mutual trust and regard, or else sufficient guarantees or

guarantors of safety in the outcomes. Often this dialectic will require opportunities to test evidence and time for prudent consideration of possibilities and political preparation before commitment is made to an irrevocable deal entailing actual foreclosure of options.

In this brief overview, we shall begin by examining the mechanics of “classic” (*realpolitik*) positional negotiation, and contrasting it with the more benign “interest-based” paradigm and interactive trust building methods. Then we will consider the role played by law and some “shadows” in negotiating peace among warring factions.

## Contrasting Methods

### *Classic “Positional” Negotiation: The Mechanics*

To depict the mindset for classic power-based negotiation that typifies traditional world diplomacy, we will borrow here from the handy training curriculum of Roger Dawson, “The Secrets of Power Negotiating” (1995). Similar training curricula and courses are a standard fare of schools of business, law, and diplomacy. Many have tantalizing and catchy subtitles. For example, Dawson promised, “You Can Get Anything You Want.” The ring is as familiar as the myriad motivational courses for personal success by Tony Robbins, or the latest personal or executive “coaching” craze, a fad which has swept the ranks of traditional psychotherapy in favor of a more athletic trainer (i.e., coach) lingo, such as that just released by Harvard Medical School psychologist Jeffrey Brown, “The Competitive Edge: How to Win Every Time You Compete” (2008). Coaching is conceived as training for a competition to “win” against a challenging opponent in order to enhance unilateral (not mutual) reward expectations. Brown, for example, identified seven crucial principles that will guide you to “victory.”

This is not simply amusing, but instead should be alarming, because the very terminology is rhetorical. The language serves a political purpose that supplies mythic imagery from the realm of warfare. The tenor of the rhetoric about an attitude and techniques to be employed encourages striving in a manner for which the literal meaning is paradoxical to the presumed ends of cooperative problem-solving for mutual benefit, rather than the choice of either winning or losing. Such “gameface” imagery frames and instills a gladiatorial paradigmatic thinking of classical style negotiators that supplies a momentum of its own often antithetical to, and even preclusive of, actually achieving peace by trustfully resolving differences. Of course, this is essentially the same presumptuously self-assured rhetoric as that of politicians rallying followers in the name of patriotism to battle in the first place. The elliptical meaning breeds a dangerous stance in which stirred passion is prioritized even more than peace.

What is this mindset and process? Dawson reminds us that classic positional negotiation is an all-consuming headset. That is, it is first assumed you are negotiating all the

time because everything you want is owned or controlled by someone else with predictable intentions. The three critical factors in every negotiation are commoditized as power, information, and time. The “win/win” secret is that power in negotiation is to tactically complicate and defy expectations, rather than narrowing down to a basic issue (e.g., peace). Assume people want different things, and cost is not always paramount. All sides are “under pressure,” and as negotiator it is imperative that you yourself mustn’t be intimidated. Every negotiation starts from information about your opponent’s goals. This is gathered from questions and research (sometimes from others who have dealt with the other side or from infiltration and espionage) analyzed in regard to your own stated negotiating position and your secret objectives and bottom line.

There are eight sources of power in classic negotiation: title, reward, punisher, reverent, charismatic, expert, situational, and informational. Professional diplomat negotiators have personality styles, too, that vary in emotional expressiveness and assertiveness, and of course the stylistic variables can be mastered to further goals of deception, intimidation, and control. Everything from body language to position at a table therefore is studied for its psychological symbolic impact, so your presentation must be calculated.

Usually, to facilitate a successful negotiated resolution, it is helpful for both sides (or all sides, if multiple parties will have a veto power) to feel accomplishment, fairly treated, secure, and open to future negotiation. Nevertheless, famous sleight-of-hand gambits are as plentiful as in chess. Typically, these are seductively descriptive titled tools of the clever negotiator’s sly trade: e.g., the nibble; the hot potato; the appeal to higher authority; the set-aside to avoid impasse; the arbitrated deadlock; the good guy/bad guy routine; the felt, felt, found formula; the dumb is smart/smart is dumb ploy; the flinch; the wise; the printed word technique; the ceremoniously withdrawn offer; the fait accompli; the funny money ploy; the red herring; the puppy dog pretense; the reluctant buyer/seller pretense; the want-it-all bid or demand; and other posturing bluffs. Certain power principles guide play: e.g., never say “yes” to an initial offer; never be first to name a price; remember the “call girl” tenet (the value of services diminishes rapidly after performance); remember “walkaway” power; exaggerate any concession you make and get a counter-concession; make offers low but flexible; write the contract yourself; never split the difference; most concessions are at the end, so don’t leave details till later; be secretive about time pressures; note sudden changes; read body language of the other negotiator; and listen for clues in language (e.g., statements that mean the opposite; throwaways preceding major announcements; legitimizing symbolic language; justifiers; deceptions; trial balloons).

### ***Mechanics of “Interest-Based” Negotiation***

Prof. Roger Fisher here at the Harvard Negotiation Project of Harvard Law School (HLS) in 1981 penned (in fairly vernacular rather than academic prose) an influential little book, *Getting to YES*, that has become a negotiation bestseller with over 2 million copies and translations in over 20 languages.

Fisher and his cohorts, Prof. William Ury, Director of the HLS Negotiation Network, and Prof. Bruce Patton, Director of Vantage Partners, recoiled from bargaining over “positions” in favor of focusing on “interests.” Fisher suggested that if attention is focused on positions rather than the underlying concerns of the parties, agreement is less likely and the ongoing relationship will be endangered. Instead, the greatest emphasis should be placed on separating the relationship from the substance and promoting mutual understanding of perceptions, values, and emotions. The most powerful interests are basic human needs for security (economic well being), guidance (sense of belonging), wisdom (recognition), and power (control over one’s life). The approach disdains touchy-feely as much as “dirty tricks” and power tactics, though. It emphasizes fair standards and objective criteria for measuring outcomes, principles and exercises meant to creatively problem solve (e.g., multiple right solutions; taking on the other party’s problem as your own; brainstorming to separate inventing from deciding; option generation; variety of expert lenses; differential strength of agreement; identifying and creating shared interests; amicable and principled techniques; minimizing burdens; “no deal” may be a superior outcome). Fisher and his protégé Prof. Dan Shapiro recently modified and amplified the message with a sequel entitled *Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate* (2005). They were concerned that *Getting to YES* did not fully address the messiness of emotional dynamics in the bargaining process, focusing instead too narrowly on rational decision-making. This time they focused on the significance of the five key “core concerns” believed most critical to productive negotiations: appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role.

Illustrations in *Beyond Reason* involve actual case examples from the Harvard Negotiation Project’s vast fund of international negotiation experience, and that of savvy colleagues in their shop. For example, Jamil Mahuad used the interest-based approach when, as President of Ecuador, he negotiated resolution of an explosive border dispute with Peru in the late 1990s. Roger Fisher also discusses his dialogue with the head of Iran’s Islamic Republican Party when the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in 1979, and in the apartheid negotiations in South Africa. The “one text” approach, which focuses bargaining agenda on a single narrative, was famously used by President Jimmy Carter in 1978 shuttling between Menachem Begin and Anwar Al Sadat in secrecy to produce the Camp David Accords for an Israeli-Egyptian Peace. The HLS Program on Negotiation has produced many other practical guides to pitch their premises, as well, such as Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen’s *Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most* (1999) and William Ury’s *Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People* (1993).

### ***Mediation and Pre-Negotiation Mechanics: Interactive Problem-Solving Workshops***

Mediation is facilitated negotiation. The format in mediation is that a neutral third party encourages voluntary resolution of a dispute among negotiating parties by helpful intervention techniques of well-timed, skillful persuasion, logic, brainstorming,



and suggestion to enhance joint problem-solving and productive communication. Introducing a respected third-party facilitator who is agreeable to all may overcome polarizing Us-Them binary thinking, overpowering (blame, humiliation, intimidation) strategies, and rigidifying postures. A trusted third party as a sort of “observing ego” can sometimes supply objectivity to discern nuances of complexity and possibility, highlight virtues of sharing information, recognize shared interests, contribute face-saving validation, and reinforce sense of security. Each party retains unilateral prerogative to voluntarily assent to or reject any proposed conclusive agreement before it becomes binding. Under these conditions, a different style of relationship and communication may ensue. It can be an opportunity reflecting Einstein’s famous adage that problems cannot be solved by the same consciousness that created them; instead a new improvisational way of analogically encountering them must emerge, freed from the confines of the traditional causal assumptions and linear reasoning.

Interest-based negotiations sometimes require a degree of trust that is lacking in intractable conflicts and require preliminary trust-building work. As an alternative premise to *realpolitik*, Kelman (1986, 1996, 2006) has argued that, besides institutional structures or strategic tactics, what truly is needed is systematic preparation of an incubatory vocabulary and culture for negotiating peace. The Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR)\* and similar initiatives have created problem-solving workshops to promote techniques of mediation and pre-mediation to build critically needed trust. PICAR program affiliates were involved in a variety of continuing research projects in three main categories:

1. Evaluation of the effectiveness of conflict resolution interventions in protracted conflicts and comparative study of different conflict resolution models;
2. The role of different theoretical variables such as collective identity, power asymmetry, leadership, religion, resource distribution, the teaching of history, decision-making structures, issue framing, perspective taking, developmental capacities, and forgiveness in the generation, perpetuation, and resolution of conflict; and
3. The interface between conflict resolution efforts and human rights activities, as well as the more traditional governmental activities of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

PICAR-propelled projects spanned the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and urban settings within the United States. The best known example, using the approach called “interactive problem solving,” was the Joint Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations, established early in 1994, from among key leaders who had been meeting periodically for private, unofficial discussions. Another example was PICAR’s Sri Lanka project meeting between influential members of the two political parties from the Sinhalese community, convened in the Maldives in December 1999, supported by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The goal was to try to foster consensus between the two parties on how to resolve the 17-year war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

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\*Later honorifically redesignated the Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

The “interactive problem solving” methodology employed is to conduct a 1 1/2 -day seminar under the auspices of the WCFIA (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs) Fellows Program, focusing on the theory and practice of interactive problem-solving as an unofficial approach to conflict analysis and resolution. Politically engaged and intellectually influential leaders are brought together for the drafting and review of joint concept papers, facilitated by a panel of social scientists knowledgeable about international and intercommunal conflict, group process, and the region. PICAR members are involved in teaching, curriculum development, and training activities, both locally and internationally. The intensive workshops in which these discussions take place are designed to enable the parties to explore each other’s perspective and, through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict. The ultimate goal is to transfer the insights and ideas gained from these interactions into the public debate and decision-making processes in the respective communities.

This shift from *realpolitik* strategies to the FISHER and KELMAN premises has spawned a whole field of “collaborative” models, with emphasis placed on negotiation techniques and strategies to overcome tendencies toward “competitive” bargaining in favor of trust and mutual gain collaborative problem-solving. For example, Ellen Raider published an influential manual *A Guide to International Negotiation* (1987), which has been developed with SUSAN COLEMAN into Coleman Raider workshops with their signature AEIOU (Attacking, Evading, Informing, Opening, Utilizing) analytic formulation (1992, 2000).

### ***Negotiation in Pursuit of Peace: Threading a Needle or Treasure Hunt?***

At the onset of any negotiation, often there is the seeming paradox that the parties presume their agendas are indeed irreconcilable. The parties may truly believe that, which is a presumption one hopes to show rebuttable. Or, for strategic advantage in bargaining or other political purposes, the parties may feel they must appear to be unwavering. Demonstrating the strength of that conviction may actually be a publicly nondisclosable ruse to fortify the need later to “sell” to skeptics the bargained advantages and protect the negotiating representatives from being viewed as “sell-outs.”

Successful negotiation is defined by its outcomes, and the perceptions of success are in the eyes of each beholder. Implicitly, then, though the process involves communication and joint reciprocal action, there are potentially myriad styles of attitude and behavior that might appear to afford the prospect of accomplishment. Negotiating for peace as the paramount objective, however, has a couple of not explicit implications.

First, in some classic “win-lose” peace negotiation models, “respectful communication” and “improved relationships” are at best incidental ultimate byproducts only. The key point, after all, may simply be cessation of warfare. Therefore, such collateral concerns are entirely dispensable at the bargaining table, if need be, unless

these can be clearly expected to contribute to a goal of consolidation of the bargained for principal outcome of tractable (i.e., requiring continual preventive maintenance rather than self-perpetuating or “perpetual”) peace. The *real* objective is *sustainable peace that can be captured in a serviceable agreement with articulable terms able to provide sufficient nonambiguity of meaning and promise of enforceability to actually create security of lasting peace* for some foreseeable period.

In other words, negotiation may or may not also produce byproducts that will be an avenue toward other noble ends, such as lasting attitudinal change (i.e., promoting mutual understanding, enhanced respect, and reciprocity), trustworthy safety and security, more equitable allocation of rewards and burdens, or better enforcement of human rights. In some cases, the broader purposes are indeed seen as an ultimate goal, but the immediate objective is simply a codicil embodying a genuine shared understanding, an agreement, between the parties that is realistically likely to achieve a measurable decrease in justifiable, predatory, and retaliatory aggression. Roger Fisher has famously referred to the bottom-line nature of the process of negotiation as simply “getting to ‘Yes.’” But you may get to “Yes” without the collateral goals being achieved now or possibly ever. Will that be acceptable?

Second, hard-nosed negotiation to achieve peace can be an alternative to *imposed* or coerced nonaggression. However, such negotiation, just like militarily power-imposed outcomes to achieve peace, may make *no idealistic or moral value* assumptions about the results other than the singular outcome of “peace.” It is not simply dialogue to improve communication or even necessarily to change attitudes and feelings, no matter how well-intentioned, deliberate, and promising that may sound. Of course, such dialogue might be an objective of the negotiation, but only if it could be an avenue to perpetuating successful cessation of hostility. But negotiation per se is simply a bottom-line pragmatic process as transparently tangible as the tort law adage *res ipsa loquitur*: “the thing speaks for itself.” It exists and works, or it does not, and that is all there is to it. Peace may be achieved at the expense of change, and, as noted below, that will *not* necessarily be viewed as *progress* if enough of the conditions originally felt repressive continue to exist residually, even after hostilities are suspended or suppressed.

## Law

Much negotiation takes place against an often unappreciated legal framework. We begin by considering some legal premises, and then discuss the situation of international law, concluding with a discussion of the legal context in which how negotiations occur.

### *Legal Premises*

In domestic legal systems, the cornerstone of all law of obligation is: (1) offer and acceptance (i.e., contractual) or else (2) delict (i.e., wrongful act) by (a) disturbing the public peace and decorum (i.e., criminal) or by (b) violating a duty owed to

another resulting in compensable injury (i.e., tortious). For contract of trade and commerce, what is required beyond that is signification of agreement or delivery of some consideration; intention to be bound; defined terms and performance; sanctions for misrepresentation, mistake, duress, or incompetency; and remedies for performance failures, disputes, or other claimed insufficiencies. For delicts, whether violations of lawful order or of lawful duties owed, the corresponding consequence in every non-autocratic legal system is public adjudication to determine the nature and extent of the violation and then the imposition of penalties and sanctions under a theory of retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation for crimes, or else injury compensation under private law for wrongful acts.

Analogous to domestic laws for a well-ordered society is the regulation of inter-societal strife. In the arena of intersocietal strife, the origin of problems posed giving cause to action corresponds, roughly speaking, to the same societal laws of obligation. That is to say, on the world scale, too, the strife involves some form of disruption in mutual reciprocal obligations by means of a disappointment, a perceived exploitation, an injurious violation, or a challenge to authority and good will.

Resolution and restoration of amicable coexistence depends upon ignoring or tolerating the incursion, or else eliminating the source of past and potential ongoing violations, and holding accountable the individual aggressor and/or the society which permitted the wrongdoer or which represents and protects him. The purpose is actual or symbolic retributive justice, expressed spite, or deterrence against future wrongs.

### ***World Order Law***

Peaceable relations may be premised primarily on power of lawful authority, and/or the occupation of a subjugated country by a towering military presence, as in the empiric *Pax Romana*, or by sheer autocratic arbitrariness and dictatorial coercion. The world has not yet evolved a superordinate planetary system of worldwide law, conceived by a single legislative authority and subject to a supreme court of justice and invincible enforcement apparatus. But globalization (in commerce, manufacturing and agricultural marketing and distribution, finance, communications, transportation) continues to accelerate. In the absence of a World Order law and policing function, there exists instead a fluid tacit “law of nations,” which is really merely the implied authority of aspirational longings for peace broadly, supported by exhortatory language from dozens of pacts and treaties, sometimes overlapping and clashing, but presumably to be construed as interconnected. These documents include invocations to halt catastrophic global and regional threats to World Order. They purport to assert the primacy of peace and to regard as violations of an implicit World Order the local corrosions and breakdowns at the interstices of settled calm where take place endless explosions, unspeakable atrocities, and endemic violence. As a result, negotiating for peace is not a unitary and monolithic process within a centralized apparatus. It is a collection of parallel ventures in scattered locations. At times, these have significance for—and therefore get the passing attention of—larger powers, simply due to concerns

for accessibility to resource exploitation, marketing, humanitarian considerations, or for internal political consumption on a world stage political theater.

One obvious limitation is that this kind of World Order presumes that the obligations flow between governments of nations, but the salience of “nation states” is not immutable or unequivocal. In conjunction with remarkable advanced technologies in communication, transportation, finance and industry, Saul (2005) has argued that globalization came into being with the economic and political crises of the 1970s, including the destruction of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the raising of tariffs, the failure of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations in 1973, deregulation, privatization, and the emergence of the transnational corporations, like virtual states. The influence of the “nation state” was eclipsed by forces outside effective governmental regulation and local control. Furthermore, threats to World Order since World War II increasingly have reflected, not declared wars between “nations,” but instead intractable conflicts (e.g., Northern Ireland, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia), insurgencies, and ethnopolitical clashes where negotiating peace must include parties and interests with no legally recognized authority or easily definable followers and not boundaried by rules and customs of nation states for conduct of diplomacy and warfare, treatment of prisoners of war, status of refugees, or governance responsibilities.

### *Negotiating in the Shadow of Law*

In diplomacy, negotiating during conflagration is often clandestine. The negotiators may be shadowy figures doing things behind closed doors. But in another sense, also, “shadow” is an apt metaphor in negotiating peace. That is, for peace as in all negotiation there is the preliminary condition whether or not it takes place in the “shadow of the law” or some compelling alternative (e.g., military might), and also what “shadow” will a concluded agreement (or failure to achieve one) cast on future options (Mnookin, Cooter & Marks, 1982).

Some human endeavors don’t pertain to interests governed by rule of law’s power of enforcement, so resolving differences may be based on pure volitional choices or perhaps simple ability to impose one’s will. However, many matters involve regulated transactions or commodities valued and protected by force of law, so that negotiating a resolution is an alternative to what may likely happen otherwise under the rule of law. To use a mundane example, divorcing parents or disputing commercial traders know that the courts of law can make a decision if they do not come to agreement. This understanding means that they are “negotiating in the shadow of the law” to the extent that they recognize what alternatives happen otherwise. Taking cognizance of negotiating in the “shadow of the law” may greatly impact the respective operating assumptions and even the impetus to come to agreement rather than relegate settlement of a dispute to the process of litigation. Often, that is a major consideration, because litigation is slow, expensive, tiresome, and varies in predictability of outcome or enforceability, perhaps for both parties. Therefore, the parties may have incentives to reach a negotiated solution because in this way they retain more control over the outcomes and variables and will better ensure an outcome which they know meets their satisfaction, because they shaped it.

Understanding the “shadow,” or context, in which negotiating peace takes place is critical. In academic parlance this is referred to as the *batna* and the *watna*: the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” and the “worst alternative to a negotiated agreement.” Unlike private transactions within a society under the protection of the laws and courts, peace negotiations often occur between nations or with unrecognized parties, such as terrorist organizations or insurrectional rebels, and there can be far less clarity about the existence and implications of a superordinate set of laws and mechanisms for enforcement—or even what may be the authority of a party to negotiate for or to conclude an agreement.

It is astonishing to the naïve just how ambiguous world law is. Without a unified lawmaking, governing agency, and authoritative judiciary with wide discretion and available means to regulate matters, set conditions, and enforce terms, the alternatives for the context in negotiating peace may actually not be a monolithic rule of law casting a shadow, but instead a multiplicity of poorly coordinated organizations, a pastiche of historical precedents, bi- or multi-lateral treaties whether or not well-crafted for the matter at hand, and separate local national entities lacking clear jurisdictional reach and will for enforcement. Doubt whether something can and will be enforced automatically breeds the skeptic’s question: “by you and whose army?”

What “law” is there to cast a shadow anyway? Countries declare commitment to the United Nations Charter, whose principles are further elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Vienna Declaration (1994). Adherence in compliance to humanitarian goals is also required for a country once it has adopted certain international and regional conventions, such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), The U. N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the Geneva Red Cross Conventions (1949) and the Additional Protocols (1977). Protection to persons not taking active part in the conflict, and to its victims, is guaranteed by the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951). Other bilateral and multilateral treaties may also have applicable provisions, but that is still far short of a universal governance framework. Again, these are binding, if at all, only on “nation state” subscribers, which leaves so many insurgencies and intractable conflicts outside their purview, anyway.

Nascent steps are being taken to better demarcate matters with multinational significance, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, treaties on Atomic Energy, and other esoteric concerns. But “world law” in regard to peace negotiations remains fragmented, disparate, loosely demarcated, murky, and lacking defined means of enforcement, at least in the absence of a treaty and terms respected between national governments. To grasp the complexity, simply consult the University of Minnesota’s Human Rights Library website to view the hundreds of United Nations and related organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, commissions, congresses, parliaments, courts, treaties, declarations, and other instruments, with over 30,000 links to websites in 160 countries.

The language of noble aspirational goals is a cheap and unobjectionable basis for consensus about something. But these declarations require the “will” of nations to recognize disturbance as a matter of sufficient concern to enforce. Truthfully, for

combatants there is also incentive to gain advantage by force before any intervention from outside takes place.

In other words, unlike civil and criminal law of a nation, peace negotiations in world affairs often do not truly take place “in the shadow of the law,” per se, meaning at least a unified world law, adjudication, and enforcement. Instead, besides the “shadow” of the rule of law, there is a collage of external forces casting shadows over peace deliberations, including the availability and propensity for use of brute force as an obvious alternative. Unfortunately, brute force as an option may be temptingly riddled with fantasies of incalculable (because merely speculative) expected gains without quantifiable costs, and therefore difficult to disprove.

Another “shadow” that inevitably comes to bear on the process of negotiating peace is the shadow of an outcome achieved. Resolving something, even if only on paper and still to be tested in practice, or failure to achieve a sought resolution, also casts a shadow on future options and bargaining positions. In fact, the intention of the peace process is to create a shadow, often in the form of a mutually agreed upon pact, which will be binding and effective in controlling future actions and decisions. The path and approach may constrain welcome possibilities as well as confine problems and threats. The road not chosen, in Robert Frost’s poetic imagery, also has untold opportunities as well as perils. Of course, crafting the terms of an agreement to enhance current and future merits, to minimize disadvantages, and to permit useful flexibility in application without encouraging subversive evasion is a skilled art, often not a science.

## Conclusion

The virtue of negotiating is its design to reach a workable agreement for something tangible enough to prompt a significant reduction in, or even substantially a cessation of, acts of hostility and aggression, even when inflicting harm itself appears to be one such valued interest for either or both sides. Peace can be a mirage if there is not consensus about the virtue and benefits of change, and then resistance may feel worth the sacrifice of warfare to some despite what would seem to be unacceptable costs. But fortunately the desire for peace is indelible in the human spirit, and it continues to operate in the face of such intransigence as a powerful incentive to induce yet another effort to negotiate a resolution. Ambivalence in the face of ambiguity is understandable, so ulterior motives may vary among those who appear to be allied. Sometimes the doubts, differences, and internal dissensions are finessed by claiming a superordinate future goal that is easily embraced in theory and serves a mobilizing and unifying purpose only because it is abstract and untestable. But mediation and persistence in negotiation thereby often afford the opportunity eventually to expose the crevices and shake the solidarity of warmongers so that fear can be supplanted by reason and reflection.

Generating preliminary agreement on the rules and process for a negotiation also actually creates momentum and engenders trust that will be constructive. It visibly demonstrates that the antagonists can cooperate and succeed if they surrender the

inclination to be deliberately obstructive by arbitrary insistence, nuisance objections, symbolic protests, unskillful gestures, or inadvertent antagonizing that promotes distrust. Furthermore, this suggests the real potential eventually to also cooperate in mechanisms for enforcement despite no tradition of demonstrated and actually tested reliability.

Negotiation is inherently susceptible to forces extrinsic to the actual dialoguing participants at the bargaining table. However, this often cuts both ways. That is, obviously the actual needs and commitments of those absent must be inferred or represented. But that also may create opportunities for progress and momentum toward peace not otherwise feasible. The absence of skeptics and dissenters may preclude obstructions, or deflect attention, or conveniently camouflage dangers otherwise posing obstacles too ponderous, distracting, polarizing, or opposition-fomenting.

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# Chapter 3

## Deliberate Dialogue

Meenakshi Chakraverti

### Introduction

The previous chapter focused on negotiation as a process for constructively resolving conflict. Unlike negotiation, which attempts to reach an agreement between parties with different interests, or debate, which is usually aimed at convincing an audience, dialogue attempts to build better communication, relationships, and understanding between persons or groups who are stuck in a repetitive conflict system. In such cases, the practice of deliberate dialogue may be used to establish a foundation for negotiated agreements or to develop respectful communication and possibilities for socially constructive coexistence despite passionate differences.

Deliberate dialogue may be called for when the communication that people are engaging in holds them back from their best and most important purposes. These could be contexts in which the “stuck” and unproductive communication is overt and loud or environments in which there are significant silences between groups. Dialogue is also potentially effective in situations of grave conflict or post-conflict, where years of violent conflict have generated what we might call a “culture of war” that rationalizes sharp survival behavior, partisanship, and mistrust.

Dialogue may also be very helpful in cases where there is international involvement around social change, whether in the frame of economic development, public health, governance, and so on. In such contexts and interactions, there are cross-cultural issues, as well as asymmetries in economic power and “education.” These can lead to assumptions and conclusions that sidestep opportunities for the change to become more rather than less (self-) conceived, generated, and managed by the people whose societies are facing the huge challenges that call for change.

Deliberate dialogue will have a very limited effect if there is no significant interest within the groups that are being brought together or if they feel that their purposes are better met, at that point in time, by some other process. This chapter provides an overview of the major theoretical foundations for the field, the common practices used to facilitate dialogue, and some examples of how dialogue fosters cultures of peace.

## Theoretical Foundations

Dialogue is a word used both loosely and in highly specific ways. Loosely, it is used to describe a conversation or some communication that is somewhat constructive. As such, a series of meetings between a government and indigenous groups on a controversial infrastructure project might be called dialogue, regardless of the structures and intentions of the different meetings, thus including negotiations, intimate conversations, panel discussions, formal speeches, and town-hall-style meetings as “dialogue.” We are not using dialogue in this loose way. Rather we are using dialogue to describe a conversation that has one or the other and often both of two core characteristics:\*

- “Non-polarized discourse” that allows the emergence of new and more inclusive perspectives. This discourse can allow the emergence of agreement and often is an effective precursor to negotiation and other decision-focused processes.
- “A dialogic way of being with [others]” (Hyde and Bineham 2005, p. 597) or “[Dialogue is] a particular kind or quality of communication that happens when the people involved are present to each other as persons—as unique, reflective, choosing, valuing, thinking-and-feeling beings” (Zediker and Stewart 2005, p. 586). This kind of communication allows for deeper mutual inquiry and learning and often lays the basis for better relationships and understanding.

### *Non-Polarized Discourse*

This core aspect or characteristic represents a meeting of minds, of words, and ideas. David Bohm wrote an influential philosophical view of this perspective (1996) and described dialogue as a process in which “people are making something *in common*, i.e., creating something new together” (p. 2). From this perspective, dialogue enables collective thinking, collaboration, and what Bohm calls “collective intelligence.” Dialogue as non-polarized discourse often leads to the finding of common ground and can lay the foundation for collaborative problem-solving and action.

This aspect or perspective has been emphasized particularly in organizational development, pertaining to large private and public sector organizations where collective creativity and effective collaboration are sought. For example, this perspective is emphasized in the work of Dialogos International, which is based on the thinking of scholar-practitioners like David Bohm and William Isaacs. It is also important in international development and post-conflict contexts. Thus, after a broad survey of UNDP personnel, Mark Gerzon reported that: ‘The critical quality of dialogue lies in that participants come together in a safe space to understand each other’s viewpoint in order to develop new options to address a commonly identified problem’ (Pruitt and Thomas 2007, pp. 19–20).

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\*These also correspond to what Hyde and Bineham (2005) call dialogue<sub>1</sub> and dialogue<sub>2</sub>.

## *A Dialogic Way of Being with Others*

Articulations of the second core aspect of dialogue often refer to Martin Buber as an influential source. Buber points out that we may relate to others as means for our own ends or as ends in themselves. In his best-known work, *I and Thou*, Buber contrasts the connection of *I* to an *It* with the relation of *I* to *Thou*: “As experience, the world belongs to the primary word *I-It*. The primary word *I-Thou* establishes the world of relation” (1958, p. 6). This aspect of dialogue and communication highlights relationality and the dynamic tension between giving and receiving in communication. The emphasis on relationality means that giving and receiving—or speaking and listening, if communication is verbal—is not between autonomous, though reactive, beings, but between persons-in-relation, for whom each act of giving and receiving is reflectively shaped by the acts of the other. Zediker and Stewart (2005) write about the tension between “letting the other happen to me” and “holding my own ground.” In dialogue, they say,

*both ends of the continuum are transformed by their inter-relation. So the other happens to me while and as I hold my own ground, and as a result, she happens to me in relation to my own position. In addition, I hold my own ground in her presence as she is happening to me. (p. 589)*

This view of dialogue, which prioritizes relationality, has been developed extensively by scholars and practitioners who examine or work with open conflict or silences based on deeply held identity or core-value differences (e.g., Elbow 1986; Gurevitch 1989). These two primary aspects of dialogue are not exclusive aspects, and any constructive communication will have some degree of each. As practitioners, we may design processes that invite more of one or the other in response to the needs and purposes that participants express to us.

Before we leave this brief section on theory, two further sources of current dialogue theory and practice bear mentioning. Dialogue theory and practice have been deeply influenced by the approach of David Cooperrider (2005), who introduced a framework he termed “appreciative inquiry.” This approach uses inquiry to elicit and “grow” strengths and resourcefulness, rather than deficits and problems.

Neuroscience is a rather different source of theoretical support and confirmation. Recent neuroscience has generated influential new thinking about the neuropsychology of relationships. Most significantly, neuroscience is increasingly confirming that communication, as experienced emotionally and physically, generates brain activity and stimulates and sustains the physical re-building and activating of neurons in the brain that hold the “heart” of feeling and experience of relationship (Becker 2007; Lewis, Amini, and Lannon 2001; Siegel and Hartzell 2004). Dialogue and other process practitioners, including negotiation, problem-solving, and organizational development practitioners, are beginning to draw on neuro-psychology to better understand how to address sensitive and “hot-button” issues, and process needs in long-term conflict or post-conflict situations.

## From Theory to Practice

In the previous section, we briefly reviewed a range of theoretical perspectives on dialogue. As trainers and facilitators, we look for and use practical ways to invite dialogical engagement among participants. The field of organizational development has offered one schematic that many find helpful. This is the “ladder of inference” of Chris Argyris (1990; Senge 1990). Very simply, the ladder of inference offers a simple graphic for the complex sociopsychological filtering, editing, and narrowing of data in the rapid movements each of us makes from experience to conclusion. The dialogue process then is designed to draw participants down the ladder from conclusions back to experience and “data” in mutual inquiry and reflection.

The ladder graphic and elements in the theoretical frameworks reviewed above suggest a few key design and facilitation requirements for dialogue that most, if not all, practitioners will address. In outline, these are:

- Creating a safe enough space for the dissonance that deep listening and dialogue invites;
- Inviting the most basic possible of experience data, in many cases personal experience;
- Allowing space and time for reflection;
- Ensuring that the dialogue is among the participants and responds to their needs and purposes, rather than between the participants and facilitators and/or framed in a primary way by facilitator/external purposes;
- Allowing people to experience each other as people, including an intellectual “meeting of minds,” emotional connection, and nonverbal or physical modeling of a dialogic way of “being with” each other.

There is a large and growing field of practitioners and organizations that formulate these requirements in their particular ways, and each will fashion specific practices and sequences to meet these requirements. Design and facilitation can range from the intentionally extremely loose practices of Bohmian dialogue to highly structured design that allows light facilitation. Experienced practitioners will build responsiveness and flexibility into their structured design and facilitation. The list of references and the brief list of additional resources that follows it provide some starting points for readers who want to explore the range of practical frameworks, design methodologies, and practices. In this essay, in the interest of space and to allow some depth in coverage, we focus on the design methodology and practices of the Public Conversations Project, which is the home organization of the author. Many of our practices will have analogs in the approaches of other practitioners and organizations.

## The Public Conversations Project

The Public Conversations Project (PCP) has become an influential organization shaped by the theoretical traditions mentioned above and itself shaping the further development of the field. PCP was founded by four family therapists and one nontherapist who drew

from the theoretical traditions mentioned above and added theory and practice from family therapy—primarily systems approaches and narrative therapy.

Our fundamental premise in our design, preparation, and facilitation work is: *Every conversational structure invites some kinds of speaking and listening and discourages other kinds.*

Thus, we ask ourselves:

- What is a given conversational arrangement likely to restrain?
- What is a given conversational arrangement likely to bring forward?

Our objectives are to avoid re-enactment of the “old” conversation and invite participants into a “new” conversation on the questions of deepest significance to them relating to the issue that divides them.

The deliberate dialogue process begins with an expressed interest by a key party or influential observer. For example, a recent dialogue project in Burundi, funded by the United States Institute of Peace, was initiated by Burundian trainer-facilitators who sought additional experience and skills in designing and facilitating conversations on sensitive topics. We do not assume that this interest means that there is indeed a match between the needs and conditions of the situation and what a process of deliberate dialogue might offer. We interview knowledgeable members of each “side” to see whether there is indeed interest in exploring/engaging in a process that would allow each participant to:

- speak about what lies at the heart of the matter for her/him;
- listen for what s/he does not understand, rather than what s/he disagrees with;
- inquire rather than rebut.

We explain that this process aims at new, more constructive understanding and relationships rather than an agreement or solution, though it often lays the basis for a sustainable problem-solving or solution-focused process.

This initial stage is already a dialogue process, characterized by a learning stance, genuine inquiry, open speaking about the process and objectives of dialogue, and invitation of inquiry in response. If we find that there is indeed some interest among the most concerned groups, we also begin asking about who might be potential participants, what purposes might be attractive to such participants, and what kinds of questions we could ask participants in order to get best prepared for design and facilitation. We then go through a process of recruiting participants, again following a format of mutual inquiry and clarity about the objectives and process of dialogue.

Once a participant list has been finalized, we interview each participant about her/his purposes, hopes, and concerns about the dialogue, as well as suggestions s/he might have for creating an environment in which s/he would feel safe enough to listen and speak openly. These interviews build a relationship between facilitators and participants and prepare both for the dialogue process. Participants find themselves clarifying their expectations and responsibility for the process.

Facilitators draw on the participant input to design the process, using participant language and concerns to shape communication agreements (sometimes called “ground rules”) and to decide on the format, sequencing, pacing, and timing of questions

and phases of conversation. Participant input on the shape and language of the “old” conversation helps facilitators design questions that will not trigger the familiar, stuck patterns of the old conversation, and, in the course of the dialogue process itself, it also helps facilitators recognize what is “new” about the conversation.

Communication agreements that are well-crafted, clarified with, and assented to by each participant often provide the strongest scaffolding for open listening and speaking. This was noted enthusiastically by our Burundian colleagues who found that dialogue participants called each other on violations of the communication agreements they themselves had established, thus maintaining a structure and process that allowed each person to speak and invited each person to listen on the basis of their own agreements and purposes for the dialogue. While agreements often include common meeting ground rules like no interruptions and sharing speaking time equitably, we find that basing agreements on participant input, using participant/community language where possible, and inviting participants to clarify/modify the agreements at the beginning of the meeting—before substantive conversation—allows these agreements to be a scaffolding of *their* process rather than rules of *our* process. This helps ensure that the process is not facilitator-centric.

There is often a tendency for participants to view facilitators as a kind of arbiter whose approbation needs to be won. In addition, in terms of process, the common format of moderated discussions, including moderated problem-solving, may be mimicked by participants and facilitators, leading to participants speaking to and through the facilitators in a hub-and-spoke fashion. Since dialogue is communication among the participants, we seek to design a process that will place communication in the interaction of the participant circle. The careful process of eliciting and using participant input, as well as building participant responsibility from the earliest stages, helps create a frame in which the facilitators can lightly hold a structure and process that participants have helped build by giving their input, that they have assented to in the course of the pre- and early phases of the actual meeting, and that serve their own purposes and hopes as they have clarified these to themselves and the facilitators.

There is one communication agreement that we recommend to the point of requirement, and that is the agreement we parsimoniously name the “pass agreement.” With the pass agreement, each participant agrees to pass if s/he does not wish to speak or respond to any question, without feeling any obligation to explain her/himself, and to allow every other participant the same ability to pass. The intention of this agreement is to formalize the dynamic choice-making that dialogue offers participants. They choose to come to the dialogue, with some core purposes held in common with the other participants; they choose what kinds of communication agreements will serve their purposes for the dialogue; and then, in the dialogue itself, they choose when to speak. This agreement is also a cornerstone for the safety that participants need in dialogue. With this agreement, they know that they do not need to speak until they are ready and with this as a public agreement, their silence will not immediately be interpreted in a polarized and polarizing way.

This agreement has been questioned in contexts where some voices are routinely quiet, for example, in places where gender, age, or class/caste hierarchies have tended to build patterns of dominant voices and quietness. Some of our Burundian

colleagues were concerned that this agreement would give an easy excuse to quiet people to remain silent. Our experience is that this effect is not common for several reasons. First, people come to our dialogues with important intentions and purposes that they have clarified for/to themselves and they have understood that the process will be a dialogue (*their* dialogue), rather than a meeting with standard communication patterns. Secondly, there is usually a communication agreement around equal speaking that we have found participants want and take very seriously. In the USIP-funded Burundian dialogues, usually quiet voices used this latter agreement to get their time to speak and found themselves heard! Thirdly, we use questions and speaking formats that invite speaking, without forcing or requiring it. And finally, we have found that allowing quiet people to choose when to speak lets them *choose* when to speak, which is experienced as empowering rather than silencing.

Communication agreements are the most obvious scaffolding for a dialogue process, but we would not leave the burden of the process on these agreements alone. Our intention would be to craft questions and use formats of speaking, including issues of sequencing, timing, and pace that would invite dialogic listening, speaking, and inquiry, rather than violations of the communication agreements. Questions are crafted by the facilitator in a way that invites speaking to other participants and the sequenced structures of speaking and listening leave facilitators a quiet role, apart from occasionally, as necessary, reminding the group about their communication agreements and transitioning the group from one phase of the structured conversation to another.

Another process objective we hope to serve primarily through the questions we craft and ask is bringing people down the ladder of inference to speaking about and listening to the basic data of experience rather than well-filtered, edited conclusions. In early stages of a dialogue, this often involves asking people to speak about personal experiences. In a mainstream US context, this usually means speaking about personal experience as an individual “I,” and often there is a communication agreement around this speaking “for oneself, and not for others.” This has sometimes raised concerns when participants come from cultures that emphasize collective identities, both place-based and linguistic as well as kin-based and multigenerational. We have learned from colleagues and our own experience to craft agreements or questions that acknowledge the particular shape of social personhood from which participants might speak. In cross-cultural contexts, the discussion of such agreements, or questions that focus attention on how a “self” speaks and who a “self” is, can itself be a deep mutual learning experience for dialogue participants.

Coming down the ladder of inference requires listening, speaking, inquiry, and *reflection*. We build reflection into the process in two ways. We allow time for reflection through the timing and pacing of speaking and listening. For example, we encourage pauses between speakers, time to think after questions are posed, and time to think before participants can pose their questions. We craft questions that invite reflection before speaking and reflection in listening rather than tapping into set knee-jerk patterns. For example, we would not ask, “What do you see as the problem?” but might ask, “Could you speak about a personal experience that would help other participants understand how you have come to your views on the issues that are the focus of this dialogue?”

In the range of design approaches, we tend to be among the more structured. We tend to be most structured early on in the dialogue process because our intention for those early stages is to avoid falling into the “old” conversation and to invite a “new” conversation that veers away from the dead-ends of polarized debate, while remaining centered on what is most important to the participants. Structure also enables us to be quiet facilitators. In later stages of dialogue, we often find that less structure and facilitation are needed and our role may be whittled down to space-holders, pillars of what anthropologists might call a “liminal” (Turner 1970) space in which the patterns of regular life and communication are suspended.

So far, we have described a general, chronological process and focused on designed structure. Within a broad frame like the one described above, however, we draw on multiple processes as they might be needed to respond to the expressed and evolving purposes of participants. While many of our dialogues involve small groups (6–12) of leaders, there are contexts in which involving larger groups (15–100) may be necessary. We adapt processes and draw on a wide range of practices, always anchoring ourselves with participant purposes and the questions:

- What is a given conversational arrangement likely to restrain?
- What is a given conversational arrangement likely to bring forward?

We are often asked about facilitation challenges and what we do if the “old” conversation explodes (or “silences”) into the room. Our experience is that if we have done our preparatory work well and if the designed and facilitated process reflects the purposes and input of participants, we have few facilitation challenges from the old conversation. When there are violations of communication agreements, participants may refer to the agreements themselves or we may remind them of the agreements. If there is repeated violation of an agreement, we may ask for a review of that agreement and see if some modification may be needed.

A common facilitation challenge is a tendency for speaking (or the conversation as a whole) to lose focus. Once more we would refer back to the common purposes that participants had expressed and clarified, and relate those purposes to process and topic choices and time. In some cases, participants recognize that their purposes require returning to a tighter focus; in other cases they and we find that their evolving purposes are well served by a looser conversation. Most importantly, while we enter the meeting with a design based on participant input and purposes, we know that one of our core roles as facilitators is not to enforce the living out of that particular design, but rather to be sensitive and adaptive to the rhythm and needs of *this* purposeful conversation among increasingly inter-related participants.

Repeatedly, we are asked and ask ourselves about cross-cultural applicability. As we have worked with different communities in the US and internationally, we have found that a few key practices help in the translation and transformation of practices in cross-cultural and other-cultural contexts. Our core practice of inquiring—always holding a stance of active learning—is key to cross-cultural effectiveness. In addition, however, we find it essential to partner with bilingual/bicultural colleagues who have significant local credibility, whether their official role is co-trainer, representative of a host organization, or interpreter. In work that we have



done in Ethiopia, our sophisticatedly bicultural interpreters and several bilingual colleagues who taught communication in Addis Ababa played this role. In Burundi, this role was played by an American colleague who was fluent in French and had worked in Burundi for about 8 years. Further, several of our Burundian colleagues were multilingual and already very conversant with Western process terminology and often offered transformative analogs in Burundian practices or Kirundi idioms, where “transformative” means that the discussion of the concept/practice and its analog generated an active new concept/practice that was not simply a translation.

We have learned that while people may find our practices different from their normal practices (as, indeed, do mainstream participants in the US), if the intention makes sense to them, the practice is adoptable. Thus, dialogue practices involving hospitality and commensality were easily adapted to Burundian norms. We found that Burundian dialogue participants easily saw the usefulness of unfamiliar practices like nonhierarchical communication agreements, timed speaking, go-round formats, and so on.

While all societies have spaces and processes for relationship-building and collective thinking—that we recognize and, indeed, try to learn from—I have followed a Western (European-American) trajectory in this account of dialogue theory and practice, since that is where we at PCP are culturally based. It is from that base that many international dialogue practitioners work with non-European/non-US societies. From some views (e.g., Nader 1990). This kind of dialogue work may be considered a form of pacification, taking the power of protest and sharp, confrontational advocacy away from structurally weaker groups. This critique raises a real question and challenge.

One part of this challenge may be addressed by explicitly indicating that dialogue is only one process in a very wide repertoire of processes available for social change. For example, in some areas we may acknowledge that dialogue is less needed than increased knowledge of public interest law and increased capacity for effective advocacy.

The other part of this challenge arises when there is an asymmetry in being practitioners from the wealthy, industrially developed US (or from relatively wealthy and powerful communities within the US), who interact and work with colleagues and participants in less wealthy, less powerful, and more fragile countries (or less wealthy, less powerful, and more fragile communities in the US). This asymmetry leads to the pernicious paradox of bringing a deeply respectful and empowering process to a context in which very significant initiative and decision-making power stick to the relatively privileged outside practitioners. Mutual inquiry and transparency can greatly address, but not entirely remove this deeply structural challenge.

Finally, when dialogue work is occurring between a group that is generally considered higher power and a group that is generally considered lower power, practitioners have noticed a recurrent asymmetry in purposes and expectations (Behling 2004; Rouhana and Korper 1997). While the higher power group is happy to achieve “better understanding,” with each group recognizing that the other is not malevolent, the lower power group wants greater understanding to lead to real social *change*. If this asymmetry is not explored and purposes are not deeply clarified in the preparatory phases, there is a danger that dialogue practitioners will leave common purposes

defined as a very simple version of “understanding,” and the process they design and facilitate may privilege the purposes of one group over the other.

The closing stage of dialogue is the threshold before the crossing from the “liminal,” separate space of dialogue back to regular life. At this threshold the participant is invited both to reflect on the meeting and to look forward to how her/his purposes and learning may be taken back into an environment in which most have not had the opportunity to deliberately and deeply dialogue with the “others.”

Conflict resolution practitioners repeatedly find that when people return from an encounter in which they have shifted their way of relating to their adversaries and to the issues that lie between them and their adversaries, they are faced with the choice to be “different,” with all the challenges that brings, or to revert to the dominant and stuck conflict understanding of their group. This indicates one of the limitations of dialogue, even when dialogue groups are large. Rarely can dialogue reach large proportions of a population. As such, if the conflict situation (whether overt, or involving silences) extends across a large system and population, dialogue practitioners need to view their work as part of a larger flow of processes and work with participants to explicitly interface the process and benefits of dialogue with the dynamics and developments of other processes.

## Some Examples of Dialogue Fostering Cultures of Peace

In the mid to late 1990s, a dialogue facilitator and a mediator together designed and facilitated multiple meetings among key stakeholders—the timber industry, environmental organizations, local government officials, and community groups—of the northern forests of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York. Several participants reported the benefits of the facilitated dialogues. Comments included:

- “I learned to listen. I learned to wait my turn. I know that new friendships were formed, one with someone I previously perceived as the enemy.”
- “I learned that there are two specific areas in forestry where I can work with others. These were new areas of opportunity that I was unaware of.”

(Herzig and McGonagill 1999, p. 2)

In the spring of 1997, the facilitators received a note from a participant, “reporting that the two half-day dialogues [they had] convened had contributed to collaborative processes through which the environmental community and representatives of the forest products industry ‘hammered out’ joint recommendations on ‘heavy cutting’ in the state” (Herzig and McGonagill 1999 p. 8).

In this multisession, multiparticipant (including small and large groups) dialogue on forestry, the environment, and land use, participants with fundamentally differing values regarding natural ecology and economic security/activity found common ground and opportunities to work together.

In the very different context of Boston, Massachusetts, in 2001, six leaders of advocacy organizations, three from each side of the issue of legalized access to abortion, wrote about their experience of 5 1/2 years of dialogue.

These conversations revealed a deep divide. We saw that our differences on abortion reflect two worldviews that are irreconcilable. If this is true, then why do we continue to meet?

First, because when we face our opponent, we see her dignity and goodness. Embracing this apparent contradiction stretches us spiritually...

We continue because we are stretched intellectually, as well. This has been a rare opportunity to engage in sustained, candid conversations about serious moral disagreements... We hope, too, that we have become wiser and more effective leaders...

Since that first fear-filled meeting, we have experienced a paradox. While learning to treat each other with dignity and respect, we all have become firmer in our views about abortion.

We hope this account of our experience will encourage people everywhere to consider engaging in dialogues about abortion and other protracted disputes. In this world of polarizing conflicts, we have glimpsed a new possibility: a way in which people can disagree frankly and passionately, become clearer in heart and mind about their activism, and, at the same time, contribute to a more civil and compassionate society (Fowler et al. 2001, pp. F1–F3).

In the case of this long-term dialogue between pro-life and pro-choice leaders in Massachusetts, an environment of general security and social trust allowed these women, who shared many similarities (in culture, education, economic well-being, and so on), but differed on a fundamental aspect of their worldviews, to find deep intellectual and emotional connection and relationship. Their experience of dialogue has influenced their own advocacy and the advocacy of others in the US, as they have sought to retain passion and commitment without inviting social rupture by relying on demonization of the other side.

We have mentioned the USIP-funded Burundi dialogue project in earlier paragraphs. In March and April 2007, 18 Burundian master trainers and 3 American trainer-facilitators worked to adapt U.S.-based dialogue frameworks and practices for use in rural settings in Burundi. They began with a workshop in which the PCP approach to dialogue was introduced, discussed, and experienced through exercises and simulations. At the end of the workshop, one of the Burundian master trainers, an experienced and sophisticated trainer-facilitator in the practices of negotiation and joint problem-solving, commented: “This workshop fulfilled my expectations, all the more because in my conception, all dialogue that does not culminate in solutions was considered equivalent to failure. Now, [I understand that] a dialogue is a process, a stage complete in itself.” (Workshop evaluation). This was a powerful endorsement of dialogue for mutual understanding, trust, and relationship-building from a person who had successfully introduced joint problem-solving tools in contexts where practical solutions and joint action were and continue to be urgently needed.

The Burundian facilitators went on to adapt, design, and facilitate six pilot dialogues in six different interior sites of Burundi. At one of the sites, a participant commented at the end of the first session:

Here is what I reflected on during the night: if ever this group were all of Burundian society, Burundi would be a paradise because we have dialogued without equivocation and each person about what s/he cares about deeply. But since Burundian society is constituted by many individuals, we cannot guarantee this paradise because Burundi is large and we are a small group. We have made a pact of reconciliation. Others who pretend to be reconciled without having done a dialogue like this deceive each other. People greet each other with hypocrisy mixed with a spirit of revenge. Extend this dialogue across Burundi so that the benefits of this dialogue can spread like a drop of oil. (Facilitator report)

The Burundi work took place because the Burundian trainer-facilitators felt that while problem-solving techniques helped resolve small, immediate disputes, there remained a groundswell of unspoken words that left the society more vulnerable to the inevitable socioeconomic conflicts of a developing country that is grappling with building new systems of governance and meeting the material needs of a population, while reintegrating returning refugees, displaced persons, and released prisoners. They quoted a Burundian proverb: “If you hide that you hate someone, s/he will hide that s/he knows it.” This proverb echoes what we have found about “secrecy relationships” (Roth 1993) in situations where conflict is not overt, but deep differences are discussed in small groups, with mists of secrecy and assumptions among them. Dialogue helps dissipate the assumptions and mistrust.

In Burundi, our colleagues and their dialogue participants confirmed that the structured process that invited and supported equal speaking and respectful listening allowed an engagement that was rare and constructive, even moving. However, they also pointed out that their lives and needs are not compartmentalized. They echoed questions we have heard from colleagues and participants in the US and have asked ourselves. How can dialogue process be better integrated into regular life so that it does not compete for time with much-needed income generation activities? How can the dialogue process be extended so that positive effects are revisited and renewed in little and big ways to build a higher standard of social trust and more conflict resilience in the community? As dialogue practitioners increasingly work in contexts that face multidimensional challenges, this question becomes an urgent question about the scope and shape of dialogue practice in relation to other social process and activities.

The experiences of common ground, inquiry, relationship, and reconciliation described above reveal some of the promise of deliberate dialogue for fostering and sustaining cultures of peace as conceptualized by the UN. In particular, deliberate dialogue supports open communication, understanding, and social cohesion as core elements of cultures of peace.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, this handbook was motivated by a UN call for building “cultures of peace.” A culture of peace is not a stultified culture without conflict, but rather a culture in which a dialectic between social processes (including conflict) and social relationships/organization (including difference), productively fosters possibilities for the meeting of human economic, intellectual, and emotional needs. Deliberate dialogue helps build and sustain such a culture by generating better communication, understanding, and relationships, thus laying and maintaining the foundation for collaborative and sustainable problem-solving and coexistence.

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## **Websites**

### ***Alliance for Peacebuilding***

<http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/>

### ***The Conflict Resolution Information Source***

<http://www.crinfo.org/>

### ***National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation***

<http://www.thataway.org/>

# Chapter 4

## Restorative Justice and Prison Reform

Barb Toews

### Introduction

Crime happens everywhere. No country is immune to its occurrence or impacts. In response, many countries turn to incarceration in order to do justice. But is this approach consistent with a culture of peace? Due to the global prevalence of crime and incarceration, a culture of peace requires processes through which to promote justice and to address the harms caused by crime and violence that reflect the values and tenets of peaceful cultures. This chapter proposes restorative justice as a philosophy and set of practices through which to do justice in a culture of peace and as a way to reform prison so that it is more consistent with that culture.

According to United Nations data, the world experienced an increase in crime in recent decades, growing from 2,300 reported crimes per 100,000 people in 1980 to 3,000 in 2000. The distribution of this increase is not consistent across regions and crimes. While Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a significant increase in crime, the United States and parts of the European Union experienced a reduction. Developing countries report lower levels of crime, but experience a higher proportion of violent crimes compared to property crimes. Developing and middle-income countries, especially those that have experienced civil conflict or political transition, experience higher homicide and robbery rates than developed countries. Although the United States surpasses the average global homicide rate, the EU falls below the average (Shaw et al. 2003).

Incarceration is one of the most common responses to this crime problem. By the end of 2005, the US alone incarcerated approximately 2.2 million men and women in federal, state, and county prisons and jails (Harrison and Beck 2006). One out of every 136 US citizens is currently in a correctional facility (The Sentencing Project 2006b). Imprisoning at a rate of 750 per 100,000 people, the US is the world leader in incarcerating its citizens. French Guiana and Russia, incarcerating at rates of 630 and 628, respectively, hold second and third place. Other countries with high rates include England/Wales (148), Australia (126), China (119), and Canada (107) (International Center for Prison Studies).

This mass incarceration within the US has occurred at significant social cost, including the disenfranchisement of disadvantaged communities, the disruption of

family relationships and social networks, and creation of economic disadvantage (Mauer 2006; Patillo et al. 2004; The Sentencing Project 2006a). Given that jails and prisons are disproportionately filled with those who are poor, undereducated, underemployed, and African American (Bonczar 2003; Golembeski and Fullilove 2005; Harrison and Beck 2006), whole segments of society are being removed from community participation.

The intentions behind incarceration are many—punishment and revenge, communication of societal norms and expectations for behavior, concern for victim rights, community safety, and a desire for prisoners to become productive community members upon release. However, confinement does little to promote accountability, encourage the healing of victims, or promote community bonds. Further, imprisonment comes at a personal and psychological cost for those who are incarcerated (Liebling and Maruna 2005). The prison environment breeds disempowerment, survival mentalities, and violence. Many men and women leave prison without having dealt with their crimes, explored their personal issues, or developed tools to build healthy relationships. The individual and social costs of incarceration require cultures of peace to explore the nature of prison.

This chapter explores a possible path to justice and prison reform, a path that is consistent with a culture of peace. It presents restorative justice as a philosophy that offers a set of questions, values, and assumptions that guide the creation of environments for those who commit violence. After a presentation of the general approach and practices of restorative justice, the concept of “restorative space” is offered as a framework through which to promote accountability and personal transformation among offenders without inflicting the individual and social harms of current prisons. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how restorative space and cultures of peace are interdependent and how restorative justice informs peace-building efforts.

## **Criminal and Restorative Justice**

Consider the sport of boxing. The sport is defined by series of blows: “you hit me, so I hit you back.” Coaches instruct the boxers on how to fight. A referee determines the winner and loser. No matter who wins, both boxers leave the ring bloody and bruised. This image serves as metaphor for the criminal justice system.\* Zehr (2002) suggests that the criminal justice system is focused on three concerns: (1) identifying who broke the law, (2) determining the offender’s guilt, and (3) assigning the appropriate degree of punishment. These questions lay out a system that, like boxing, is intended to mete out tit-for-tat justice: “You hurt us so we will hurt you.” Punishment,

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\*The metaphor for a boxing ring to analyze the criminal justice system originates in the American Correctional Association video series entitled *Understanding the Criminal Justice System* (1996). I treat the metaphor differently than in the video.



and thus the offender, is the focus. Victims are excluded. They have little, if any, role in the justice process. The harms they experienced and their needs for healing are rarely taken into account. While the system is focused on offenders, the court system requires them to defend their behavior rather than giving them the opportunity to understand the consequences of their actions or to be accountable for them. No matter who “wins” at justice, few victims or offenders leave satisfied with their experiences or feeling that the harms are addressed. Their supporters and the wider community are also neglected during the justice process.

By contrast, restorative justice is an approach to criminal justice that addresses the needs of justice participants—victims, offenders, their communities of care, and the broader community—in the aftermath of crime. Rather than determining blame and punishing the offender, restorative justice inquires about the ways in which all involved parties have been impacted or harmed by the crime, what those individuals say their needs are, and the appropriate persons and processes to meet those needs (Zehr 2002). By actively involving all those impacted by crime, restorative justice seeks to respect and restore each as individuals, repair broken relationships, and contribute to the common good (Toews 2006). Pranis et al. (2003) describe restorative justice as about “getting well” after harm, quite different from a criminal justice system focused on “getting even.”

A healing justice requires an approach that starts with different questions, values, and assumptions than our current justice system. Rather than placing focus on the broken law, restorative justice is concerned with how people and relationships have been hurt or broken as a result of the crime. It then seeks ways to meet the needs of those harmed, actively involving them in the process. While specific needs vary across individuals, people share common needs in the aftermath of crime and violence—relationship, safety, empowerment, accountability, a chance to tell one’s story and express emotions, personal growth, information, and meaning (Toews 2006). Values, such as accountability, inclusion, participation, respect, mutuality, and care guide the restorative justice process and frame restorative assumptions about human nature. For instance, restorative justice assumes that people are relational, of equal worth, able to speak to their experiences, and capable of healing and transformation (Hartman et al. 2007; Pranis 2007; Toews 2006). Pranis (2007) likens restorative justice to “a state of healthy balance” in which “all parties feel equal, respected, valued in their individual uniqueness, able to exercise constructive control in their lives and able to take responsibility for their actions” (p. 66).

Restorative justice practices often involve bringing victims and offenders together in face-to-face meetings. A recent report suggests that there are more than 300 victim-offender mediation programs in the US, with another 1,000 in Europe (Nugent et al. 2004), in addition to many other types of victim-offender dialogue programs that operate throughout the world. There is substantial variation across these many programs: they may differ in the cases they accept (e.g., property, non-violent or violent crime), who makes referrals (e.g., offender or victim directly, police, probation officers, judges), when referrals are made (e.g., at point of arrest, pre-adjudication, sentencing, post-sentencing), age of offender (e.g., juvenile or adult), who facilitates the dialogue (e.g., police or community volunteer), and

whether participation serves as a diversion for the offender or as complement to the criminal justice system. Additionally, there is variation in the goals of the dialogue (e.g., restitution, understanding, or something else determined by victim and offender), who participates (e.g., victim and offender only or a wider circle of support people and people impacted by the crime), and process (e.g., victim or offender speaks first, directive or nondirective facilitation, scripted or nonscripted facilitation). This variation creates a rich framework in which to design programs and processes to meet both individual and community needs.

Some of these processes are distinguished by different names. For instance, family group conferencing typically refers to those processes specifically designed to engage offender family members as key participants in the encounter and often allow for private family time during the dialogue. Circles refer to processes that intentionally use circle seating arrangements to communicate and encourage values such as interconnectedness and respect. They typically involve larger numbers of people and are “kept” by a circle keeper who uses a talking piece to facilitate dialogue, encouraging participants to listen and speak according to circle values. Unlike mediators or facilitators, keepers also participate in the dialogue itself. Increasingly, the term “conferencing” is used as a term to refer to victim-offender encounters in general.

There is promising research that suggests the potential of victim-offender encounters. A recent review found that victim-offender encounters reduce recidivism, increase both victim and offender satisfaction with the justice system, and reduce victims’ desire for revenge and the presence of trauma symptoms. The data also suggest that restorative encounters or court-ordered restitution reduced recidivism for violent crimes more than non-violent and did so more successfully than prison for adults and as well as prison for juveniles (Sherman and Strang 2007). Victim-specific analysis of an Australian experiment using reintegrative shaming and conferencing finds that victims who participate in the victim-offender conference experience greater emotional reparation than those who participate in court proceedings. Victims who participated experienced reduced feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety and increased feelings of dignity, self-respect, self-confidence, and closure following the conference (Strang 2002). Nonexperimental designs also suggest that other victim-offender encounter processes are successful in reducing offending (Bradshaw and Roseborough 2005; Nugent et al. 2004; Rodriguez 2007; Umbreit et al. 2003). Umbreit et al. (2003) report high levels of participant satisfaction—including for violent crimes—and perceptions of fairness as well as a high percentage of restitution completion.

Evidence also exists about the use and possibilities of processes consistent with restorative justice within civil society. Family group conferencing and family group decision-making are used in child and family welfare circumstances to promote family strengths and increase family involvement in decision-making (Pennell 2006; Roche 2006). Restorative practices and policies within the school setting strive to respond to bullying, deal with disruptive classroom behaviours, and create peaceful schools environments (Morrison 2007; Stutzman et al. 2005). Restorative processes also serve to respond to the harm and violence of societies in civil conflicts. Reparation

processes used to respond to gross human rights violations show consistency with restorative justice in that they create public space for the acknowledgement of violence and the apology for harm, restitution and compensation, rehabilitation, and the reassurances against future harm (Cunneen 2001). Truth commissions contain restorative elements such as the involvement of victims, offenders, and the community in order to achieve accountability and restoration. Commissions also look forward to building a better future in addition to repairing the past (Llewellyn 2007). Community governance processes, such as South Africa's Community Peace Program and its peace committees, address both criminal and social conflicts using processes similar to restorative justice (Roche 2006). Each of these examples demonstrates that the application of restorative justice extends beyond the criminal justice arena.

Although victim-offender dialogue and other processes that bring victims and offenders into contact with each other have received the greatest attention, restorative justice is a more embracing philosophy. Victim-offender dialogue is just one way to practice that philosophy. One of the challenges in applying restorative justice is assisting each victim in determining their needs and assisting offenders to be accountable. This process of healing and accountability may not include an encounter.

## **Restorative Justice, Prison Reform, and Restorative Space**

New Zealand offers the most concrete outcomes about the impact of restorative justice on incarceration rates. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act in 1989 introduced the widespread use of family group conferencing for young offenders. Research suggests a reduction in prison use in the 10 years following the legislation enactment. Researchers attribute this reduction to three factors: fewer number of youth charged in youth court, fewer youth transferred to adult court for sentencing, and the increased number of youth being dealt with in the community (Maxwell and Morris 2006).

Braithwaite's (2002) theory of responsive regulation offers a way to consider how restorative justice could be used as a possible diversion from incarceration. Braithwaite explains that in the field of corporate regulation, companies negotiate before they litigate. Punitive strategies are only employed if corporations cannot find their own solutions. He further contends that this very process legitimizes future punitive strategies because people make the choice to follow that course of action. Within a responsive regulation system, people for whom prison may be an option could be given a restorative option first. If the restorative justice approach, be it a victim-offender encounter or another application, does not create a solution that attends to everyone's needs, a more punitive approach follows. This punitive approach may eventually become prison.

Restorative justice as a philosophy and as a practice is being directly applied in a variety of ways in prison settings. These practices include dialogue programs for victims of violent crime and their perpetrators (Umbreit et al. 2003), circles used with

prisoners and staff (Pranis et al. 2003; Thalhuber and Thompson 2007), and group dialogue processes that bring offenders, victims, and the community together for conversation about different justice-related issues (Blackard 2004; Centre for Justice and Reconciliation 2007). Equally important to those restorative practices, though outside the aims of this chapter, are programs offered by victim service providers to attend to victims' needs post-sentencing and during the offenders' period of incarceration.<sup>†</sup>

Empirical research regarding prison-based restorative justice practices is limited. Practitioners' experiences, including my own, suggest that such interventions have a profound effect on the attitudes and actions of incarcerated individuals. This impact realizes itself in prisoners' willingness to be accountable for their crimes and their commitment to work on their personal issues as well as to approach relationships in a more constructive way. These impacts suggest that prison-based practices could be provided more frequently and in greater numbers, as well as researched for their effectiveness.

Van Ness (2007) characterizes some prison-based practices as being concerned with transforming the prison environment. According to him, these programs "create an environment in which the prisoner's entire self may be transformed" (p. 317). Yet, Hagemann (2003) suggests that because it is "the whole person who is punished and devalued" (p. 232) in prison, restorative practices are in conflict with the prison environment. Can restorative programs effectively operate in prison? Is it enough to do prison-based restorative practices or should restorative justice also challenge the nature of prison? As a set of questions, values, and assumptions, the restorative justice philosophy calls for transformation of the prison environment. That transformation is greater than the sum of any number of restorative practices. Rather, transformation requires an environmental overhaul to "restorative space."

Incarcerated men have envisioned restorative space as a "do no harm" room in which they could let their guard down, admit what they did, and take responsibility (Toews 2006). The men symbolically furnished the room with such features as a large window with a mountain view, doors, telephones, music, plants, children, ethics books, and comfortable furniture. This room may seem ordinary, like a living room. To these men, however, the room is extraordinary in what it symbolizes about the atmosphere needed to face their crimes. They need safety, communication, comfort, care, and hope. Yet restorative space is not one in which we simply do no further harm to offenders, as one might assume from the room name. It is space in which we actively work to promote the well-being<sup>‡</sup> of offenders, within the context of assisting them to take responsibility for their actions.

Restorative spaces are these environments of healing and getting well. No longer solely focused on punishment, this type of space serves as a restorative culture that

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<sup>†</sup>For information about such programs, visit the websites for the Pennsylvania Office of the Victim Advocate ([www.pbpp.state.pa.us/ova](http://www.pbpp.state.pa.us/ova)) and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Office of Victim Services ([www.drc.state.oh.us/web/victim.htm](http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/victim.htm)).

<sup>‡</sup>See Pranis (2007) for her discussion of the need to actively promote well-being, not simply do no further harm. Her discussion refers to restorative justice generally.

actively encourages offenders to be accountable for their crimes, take steps on their own personal journeys, and build or maintain healthy and strong interpersonal and community relationships. According to restorative justice theory, such cultures will bring out the best in offenders and make it possible for them to do the justice work required of them.

This vision for restorative space is not new. From historical times through the present and across disciplines, there have been arguments that promote types of restorative space for offenders. From ancient times until the 1600s, holy places offered asylum, shelter, and sanctuary to offenders of all kinds under the condition that they reconcile their actions with the people they hurt. In one such British monastery, the offender was treated as a guest, eating with the canon, while she or he dealt with the crime. If amends were not made by the end of the first month, the individual then ate in the kitchen. In the rare instance that amends were not reached at the end of the third month, offenders became laborers at the monastery or were assisted in leaving for another safe place. Offenders were provided with safety and room and board, with the expectation of accountability and repair. Offenders were penalized only if they did not fulfill their obligations, but that penalty still provided safety, relationships, and access to basic needs (Bianchi 1994).

Criminologists and others working with prisoners suggest alternate ways of doing prison that take a step in the direction of restorative space. Cullen et al. (2001) introduce a framework for a “virtuous prison,” the goal of which is to instill virtues in offenders and equip them with the skills to act on those virtues. All aspects of prison life, from how prisoners use their time to the role of correctional officers, are directed toward learning and living what are essentially restorative values. Those who work in prison-based therapeutic communities argue that when offenders are immersed in alternative, consistent, and nonviolent environments, they will learn accountability and empathy, commit to their recovery, and increase their ability to live nonviolent and productive lives in the community (Lee and Gilligan 2005). They contend that prison-based therapeutic communities “enable people who are deeply damaged and damaging to recover, or to gain for the first time, their humanity” (p. 154). Liebling and Arnold’s research (2004) on the moral performance of prison argues for the humane treatment of prisoners and a humane prison community guided by values. This research, involving prison staff and prisoners, discovered that the two groups hold the same set of values, including respect, humanity, relationships, support, trust, belonging, and safety. Virtuous prisons, therapeutic communities, and morally performing prisons highlight ways in which restorative values can be introduced into space for offenders, even if only within the existing structure of prison.

The social work and trauma healing fields also offer important contributions to the idea of restorative space. Winnicott (1960b, 1956, 1967) argues that people need safe space, or a “holding environment,” from the moment of birth if they are to develop into whole and functioning adults. He contends that individuals who commit antisocial and criminal acts are calling out for the lost experience of being held. The appropriate response is the holding environment, a therapeutic environment in which growth and change can occur. This environment is characterized

by such features as consistency, reliability, psychological and external safety, validation, strength, play, and physical support. Winnicott's theory of a holding environment incorporates the paradox of separation while in relationship with others, an important feature of restorative space to be discussed later (Applegate and Bonovitz 1995).

Trauma healing theories and practices offer a way to respond to traumatic harms that stem from both victimization and offending. In one prison-based class, 13 incarcerated men had experienced more than 300 crimes among them, many of which were violent crimes committed directly against them or their loved ones. Prior victimization is not an excuse for offending, yet it often represents unresolved harms that may contribute to offending behavior. This victimization may need to be healed to reduce the likelihood of future violence as well as be healed simply for that individual's well-being.

Emerging research in the area of perpetration-induced traumatic stress (PITS) suggests that those who commit violence experience trauma symptoms as a result of participating in the violent act (Grossman 1995; MacNair 2002). They, in essence, harm themselves by their own actions. The occurrence of PITS has been documented in soldiers (Grossman 1995; MacNair 2002) as well as murderers, abortion doctors, and executioners (MacNair 2002). In order to face the violence they inflicted on another human, offenders may need to face the harm they inflicted on themselves.

If offenders have experienced trauma as victims or as perpetrators, then trauma healing approaches may benefit them. Work with violent offenders using a trauma healing model (Botcharova 2001) demonstrates that trauma healing resonates with offenders, both with their experiences as victims and as offenders. The trauma healing approach suggests that personal growth is also a goal of trauma treatment. This growth occurs through such experiences as empowerment and self-determination, psychological, physical, and relational safety, storytelling and meaning-making, mourning, and reconnection with self and the world (Bloom 1997; Good Sider 2006; Herman 1997). Words like "sanctuary" (Bloom 1997) and "refuge" (Herman 1997) characterize the environment in which this healing journey takes place.

Each of these disciplines and directions offers insight into restorative space and the environmental features necessary for offenders to be accountable for their actions while also committing to their own healing journey and restorative relationships. The prison reform proposed here is best imagined with the metaphors of sanctuary and refuge. I contend that through restorative, values-based environments, people who commit crimes and violence will be called back to live out the values themselves, including being accountable for their actions. Instead of hammering in values (Elliott 2007), these spaces nurture values by surrounding individuals with them and providing opportunities to express and practice them in daily life. The environmental characteristics implied by these images are radically different than those that come to mind with the idea of 'prison.' My preliminary framework for restorative space includes the following six interrelated characteristics: (1) defines space by restorative values; (2) provides for safety; (3) focuses on accountability; (4) supports

personal transformation; (5) embeds the offender within relationships; (6) demonstrates concern for well-being.

### ***Defines Space by Restorative Values***

Restorative values are evidenced in all aspects of the environment, from goals, structures, and policies to job descriptions to the daily routines of those within the space—and even to the design and architecture of the physical space. This values-based definition requires organizational restructuring consistent with restorative principles (Edgar and Newell 2006).

### ***Provides for Safety***

Restorative space creates a safe environment necessary for offenders to face themselves and their crimes. Accountability and personal transformation require physical, psychological, emotional, and relational safety.

### ***Focuses on Accountability***

Like values, accountability permeates all aspects of restorative space. Programs encourage, if not expect, offenders to understand the impact of their crimes and take active steps to repair the harm all those impacted by the crime. Individuals, structures, and practices clearly respect those impacted by the crime and actively solicit, from victims especially, information about the needs and obligations to which the offender is accountable. Thus, the community has an avenue through which to denounce the criminal act and communicate norms and expectations for future behavior. This focus on accountability extends to staff and prisoner relationships in that each shares responsibility for the health and order of the space.

### ***Supports Personal Transformation***

Restorative space seeks to attend holistically to offenders' physical, psychological, emotional, spiritual, and social needs as a path toward personal transformation and meaning. This process of "becoming the person I am meant to be," as some prisoners define it, includes opportunities for offenders to speak to their personal experiences and emotions regarding not only their offending, but also personal experiences

with victimization. In order to respond to the unique needs and experiences of offenders, restorative spaces are flexible and individualized.

### ***Embeds Offender within Relationship***

Restorative spaces actively seek to meet the need for relationships by keeping people embedded in relationships, providing opportunities to maintain, build, repair, and strengthen relationships, and equipping people with the tools to do so. These efforts seek to reduce the physical and psychological isolation and social and familial distance that currently characterizes the prison experience. The relational component is paradoxical. At times, the best relationship is one in which there is separation in order to provide for safety and well-being. Restorative space allows for this separation, while ensuring that the offenders remain in relationship with others with whom it is safe to do so. In response to research suggesting that an interaction with nature reduces violence (Kuo and Sullivan 2001) and recidivism (Pinderhughes 2001), restorative space incorporates natural elements into its design.

### ***Demonstrates Concern for Well-Being***

Restorative spaces are concerned with the care (Elliott 2007), quality of life (Liebling and Arnold 2004), and standards of living (Cullen et al. 2001) of those who live and work within them. Elliott (2007) argues that, because caring is required for relationship, it is also essential for accountability and healing. Drawing on education theory, Elliott argues offenders will learn to care for others by living in environments in which they are cared for. Staff in such environments are no longer “keepers and program-deliverers” (p. 205); they are caregivers.

Restorative space attempts to implement restorative values and principles as an environmental or cultural framework, arguing that such space creates the conditions in which offenders will be more likely to understand the impact of their crimes and community expectations while taking responsibility for their actions and working toward personal transformation. This concept is not proposed as a specific restorative justice practice nor does it require any particular practice to occur within it. Restorative space practice and the length of its use depend on the individual offender and those impacted by his or her crime. For example, the nature of restorative space for someone who is psychologically incapable of showing empathy or demonstrating accountability will differ from that of an individual who wishes to take responsibility for his or her actions and rebuild relationships. One individual may never be able to leave the physical space, while another may spend only a short time there. Each of these spaces, though different, is grounded on the restorative tenets identified above. Many questions remain about how to create restorative space. This is particularly so for psychopaths who may pose serious risks to community



and be resistant, if not incapable, of responding to restorative efforts for accountability and personal healing. These questions do not negate the possibility of restorative space for such individuals. Instead, they illuminate important considerations in the design of that space so that it remains restorative even if that individual is there permanently. At the very minimum, restorative space offers a way toward a more humane correctional environment for those who pose serious risk to others.

Viewing restorative space from a responsive regulation perspective, one may see restorative space as the first step in a series of increasingly punitive options. If not successful in encouraging the offender's accountability and personal transformation, restorative space may be followed by increasingly restrictive spaces. Even if prison as we know it today would be a mechanism of last resort, it must not abandon consideration of an offender's humanity or basic human rights. I have approached my argument for restorative space from the perspective of the needs and obligations of offenders. However, it may also benefit victims. As offenders do their own healing work and are supported in taking responsibility for their crimes, victims may experience greater opportunities to meet their own needs for accountability from offenders as well as information and safety. However, victims may conceive restorative space somewhat differently. Hence, continued development of the concept requires viewing and understanding restorative space from the victim's perspective.

## **Restorative Justice as a Culture of Peace**

The presentation of restorative space as an environmental framework suggests that restorative justice goes beyond victim-offender dialogues and criminal justice. Restorative justice is a path to justice more generally. It challenges how we live as a community, respond to noncriminal conflicts, and deal with issues of social justice and injustice.

The metaphor of a web may be used to explore the meaning of restorative justice. When physically created to connect people, webs illustrate the importance of the relationships that guide civil society as well as symbolize restorative values and assumptions. The strands of the web break, however, when impacted by violent or unpeaceful values, actions, and institutions. This violence may be crime, but it may also be, for instance, social injustices such as racism, economic and educational disparity, family conflict, and isolation. Justice requires rebuilding the web back to wholeness, no matter the source of its destruction. The web brings to life the idea that criminal and social justice are intertwined and cannot be separated from each other (Braithwaite 2006).

Restorative justice has the potential to influence all areas of society. With its focus on harm, accountability, and healing, the philosophy and its practices seek to transform individuals, relationships, and societies so that all are whole, strong, healthy, and nonviolent. As such, it may be viewed as an essential aspect of a culture of peace, providing a framework with which to respond to a variety of personal, interpersonal, societal, and institutional forms of conflicts or violence. Practices can attend to individual needs, such as crisis intervention, advocacy, or support, in

addition to accountability. Applications can build bridges between the community, victims, and offenders, address causes of violence, or respond to social injustices. Processes can also be used to transform systems and institutions by incorporating restorative justice into institutional mission, policy, and practice. The philosophy informs the environments in which we work, play, and live, striving to make each life-giving and safe for all. Doing restorative justice can be as simple, or as difficult, as how we live our daily lives.

Restorative space for offenders is most likely to reach its full potential within a society that lives by a culture of peace. The US reliance on incarceration and the demographics of those it incarcerates are related to the social, economic, and racial disparity and discrimination within US social institutions. To change who, when, how, and why we incarcerate depends on examining those larger social structures. The criminal and social realms cannot be separated. The journey toward a culture of peace and restorative prison reform occurs on the same path.

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# Chapter 5

## Police Oversight

Eduardo I. Diaz

### Introduction

Those living in cultures of peace should feel secure, and in current urban environments this security depends on adequate police protection (Mahoney and Pinedo 2007). Yet police may be involved in oppression, and a good, fair, noncorrupt police force depends on adequate civilian control. This is best achieved when the independent civilian oversight of law enforcement provides a way to address the violence experienced by those most likely to be subject to police action. Such independent oversight of policing is a growing worldwide movement aimed at addressing police involvement in both direct and structural violence. Psychologists and others with an interest in building cultures of peace may want to become involved in this field of police oversight and with those that monitor police behavior in local communities, for there is little doubt that civilian oversight of law enforcement would benefit from more contact with those who have studied peace, conflict, and violence.

After presenting a general overview of the different models used to provide oversight, this chapter presents the description of the model used in Miami-Dade County. This progressive accountability process uses a type of restorative justice model as an alternative to more expensive adversarial and retributive models of independent oversight of policing. Even though the police oversight agency involved lacks subpoena authority, this model of external community fact-finding and dispute resolution has resulted in changes in policy and practice by the Miami-Dade Police Department. The chapter concludes with a description of international organizations in the field of oversight. Links to relevant resources and organizations are also provided for further information.

### The Problem

Police have an essential role in maintaining order and have been granted extraordinary power to detain, question, and arrest people. This power to deprive someone of liberty is shared with others within a “police culture” that is sometimes described as being

“like family.” That sense of family differs among departments depending, in part, on the level of institutional safeguards and the degree to which leadership is progressive. The same dynamics involved in masking the secrets of family violence are also found in police culture, and these make it difficult for some officers to report the observed wrongdoing of fellow members of their family. Quinn (2005) writes of his personal experience in law enforcement concerning this “police code of silence.” These dynamics limit the usefulness of most attempts, simply to use peer accountability.

### ***Peer Accountability***

The most prevalent mechanism utilized to hold police officers accountable involves specialized “internal affairs” units. These are usually staffed by supervisory-level personnel whose task involves conducting investigations of alleged wrongdoing by fellow police officers. Most police chiefs are satisfied with having just this mechanism, but critics suggest that it is subject to political interference and that objectivity may be compromised when a friend or politically connected colleague is the subject of investigation.

Another available mechanism is a kind of peer accountability that emerged from the work of Toch et al. (1975). They developed an intervention by working with Oakland police officers who were “violence-experienced.” They determined that the best way to achieve control over unacceptable police violence is to have peer review panels that review all arrest reports, tally deployed violence, and work with those officers who exceed a predefined number of incidents. Such officers are helped to understand their behavior and to create alternative approaches to handling the situations that provoked their violence. When their incidents decrease, they themselves are enlisted to become members of the panel. Toch and Grant (2005) review related research that suggests this is still a viable mechanism. Unfortunately, the practice was discontinued in Oakland, allegedly due to budgetary constraints that limited overtime expenses paid to the peer review panel members.

Peer accountability has limited usefulness, and there is no doubt that excessive use of force by police is a problem that requires careful management, if community trust of the police is to be maximized. Geller and Toch (1996) thoroughly cover the topic of police violence. Harris (2005) reviews contemporary progressive police work and advocates for community-focused preventive policing. It is a fact that police power is sometimes misused and that police officers sometimes cover up another’s wrongdoing, and this forms the basis to add another accountability mechanism: external and independent oversight of policing.

Chevigny (1995) argues for both internal and external accountability:

The control of official violence presents a dilemma. If the monitoring influence comes from outside the police, it tends to rouse the opposition of police managers as well as rank and file; without some cooperation from within, then, it is nearly impossible for the outsiders to investigate, and any policy recommendations they make are liable to be ignored. On the other hand, if the control is exclusively internal, it tends to become socialized to existing mores in the department and to be ineffective; this effect is especially strong in the US...Real accountability will have to combine internal and external controls (p. 267).

## *Different Models for Police Oversight*

Thorough reviews of the many different models of police oversight and the relevant implementation issues are provided by Goldsmith and Lewis (2000), Walker (2001), and Cintrón Perino (2006). Most agencies conform to one of two generic models: the Citizen Review Board and the Police Auditor model. The former involves local community volunteers making findings and recommendations regarding complaints based on reviews of internal affairs investigations. It is what citizen activists usually call for when there is a crisis based on perceived injustice. The latter relies on independent investigations, or reviews of police investigations, by civilian oversight professionals (sometimes called independent monitor, auditor, or ombudsman). Both models may focus on policy reform as well as complaint disposition. Hybrids that combine features of both models are common.\* Most researchers in this field agree that there is no one-size-fits-all solution and no single “best practices” model. These are political structures that depend on what the law allows in a particular jurisdiction and on the local political will to mandate authority. There has been no systematic comparative research done to help answer which model is the best. This is an area ripe for systematic evaluation and research.

Many employed in the police oversight field have had little exposure to psychological expertise and conflict-management-skills training. Relevant peace psychology and conflict resolution issues are thoroughly covered by Christie et al. (2001) and Deutsch and Coleman (2000). What follows are observations from an applied peace psychology perspective and direct experience in the field.

Most psychologists have little understanding of the history of policing and its evolution as a profession towards community-oriented practices, where citizens and police form partnerships to maximize public safety and perception of security. There are many opportunities to translate information from psychological research to nonacademics involved in civilian oversight of law enforcement. Most people who take action and make complaints against the police will value psychological information delivered in simple, street-level language. They are usually engaged in a power imbalanced relationship and greatly appreciate explanations of the behavioral variables that influence what people do.

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\*Examples of Police Auditor agencies include: the Office of the Independent Police Auditor, San Jose, California; the Boise Community Ombudsman, Idaho; the Office of Independent Monitor, Denver, Colorado. Examples of Review Boards include: the Police Advisory Commission, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Minneapolis Police Civilian Review Authority, Minnesota; the Knoxville Police Advisory and Review Committee, Tennessee; the Oakland Citizens’ Police Review Board, California. Hybrids include: the Office of Police Complaints, Washington D.C.; the Police Review Commission, Berkeley, California; the Office of the Police Monitor, Austin, Texas; the Citizen Complaint Review Board, New York, New York. There are also a variety of agencies that are uniquely configured: the Office of Citizen Complaints, San Francisco, California; the Office of Independent Review, Los Angeles, California. (See [www.nacole.org](http://www.nacole.org) for more examples).

## ***Public Trust and Restorative Justice***

Although field practices are influenced by situational variables unique to each community, there are core issues common among the different police oversight agencies. Independence from the police department being monitored is very important to elicit gains in public trust. Although most agencies emphasize accountability and employ legalistic procedures that conform to an adversarial process model, building cultures of peace is likely better facilitated by employing a model that uses restorative justice.

Zehr (1990), in seminal work that has contributed to justice system reforms, contrasts restorative justice with retributive justice. The former involves engagement of victims and community participation with government and the offender, striving to restore relationships to a nonoffending status. The latter pays little attention to victims or community participation and is dominated by government action to punish offenders.

What follows is a description of the process used at Miami-Dade County's Independent Review Panel (IRP), one that conforms to a restorative justice model and that focuses on improving relationships as well as institutional policy and practice.

### **Miami-Dade County's Independent Review Panel**

In the Miami-Dade County IRP process (see [www.miamidade.gov/irp](http://www.miamidade.gov/irp)), the nine panel members are community volunteers who hold public hearings addressing serious complaints against local government employees or departments. Designed to maximize perceptions of impartiality, the panel does not serve as either the agent of the complainant or the police department. The panel's primary client is the broader community it represents by carrying out the mandate to do "external community fact-finding and dispute resolution."

The panel selection process limits political interference and maximizes community involvement. Five members are appointed by the Board of County Commissioners (BCC), based on three nominations each from ordinance-designated community organizations. These organizations include the League of Women Voters, Bar Association, Community Action Agency, Community Relations Board, and the Miami-Dade County Association of Chiefs of Police. The other four are appointed at large, by serving panel members, taking into consideration gender and ethnocultural balance.

Selection of the agency head is a critical variable in police oversight. The person selected must be respected by police leaders, trusted by community-based organization leaders, and known to be credible. A reputation of integrity and fairness is essential. The person must not avoid difficult and controversial cases or bend to political pressure. Proven leadership and experience overcoming adversity



is a must in this business; criticism from the parties in conflict is to be expected and can be very harsh.<sup>†</sup>

Together, the nine volunteer panel members and the staff perform an ombudsman function for the county. Complainants are served in that they are given an opportunity to be heard and to document their story of what happened. Staff members are trained to listen very carefully and to acknowledge feelings of victimization, in a nondirective manner, and then to help the complainant articulate their complaint. This helps complainants focus their own words on allegations less likely to be ignored or misinterpreted by police investigators.

Many of the complainants come from minority communities that are underrepresented in positions of power. Institutional racism is evident in the overrepresentation of African Americans in jails and prisons. It is important to note that the front end of this overrepresentation is at the level of the initial police encounter. It is this structural violence that has been addressed by the panel in a series of reports addressing racial profiling.

Police actions stem from both collaborative Community-Oriented Policing (COP) strategies and more aggressive Enhanced Enforcement Initiatives (EEI), which aim to address high-crime neighborhoods and targeted crimes, such as robbery or drug dealing. Wealthy neighborhoods tend to have less dense populations than poorer areas and rarely are subjected to aggressive arrest focused initiatives. Poorer, densely populated neighborhoods offer more opportunities to arrest people efficiently and that is in part why the front end of the system is overrepresented by minorities. Politicians want to be seen as tough on crime, and it is relatively easy to arrest wrongdoers who are poor. Police officials have resource limitations and, even without consciously biased premeditation, they tend to deploy their resources to get the most arrests possible.

Those working to build cultures of peace can help address this structural violence by establishing relationships with police professionals and political decision makers. Those involved in police oversight find many opportunities to engage in conflict assessment, interventions, teaching, and consultation.

It is a challenge to help police officers reframe successful outcomes to reflect enhanced community perception of safety and security rather than the number of arrests. Communities want protection from violent crimes—but with justice. Perceived injustice, perpetrated during aggressive police actions, undermines the COP strategies valued by progressive communities.

Culturally sensitive staff work is an essential element of the IRP process. Every complaint screening decision is based on input from a diverse committee, usually of three members, that can view a complaint through a minimum of three “lenses,”

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<sup>†</sup>The current IRP Executive Director was appointed by the Chief Judge of Florida’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit. This is part of what gives the office its independence from the county’s administration. Due to a 2006 change in the enabling Ordinance, the next Executive Director will be appointed by the BCC, from a ballot of three nominees submitted by the panel.

given gender and ethnocultural differences. Total objectivity is accepted as an illusion, and power imbalances are temporarily set aside to discourage “group think.”

Complaints judged by consensus to be serious are placed on a progressive accountability track that involves three levels of scrutiny. An internal affairs investigation by the police is followed by a mediated fact-finding and dispute resolution committee meeting and then a public hearing where the panel finalizes its findings and recommendations. The panel has an advisory function and simultaneously sends reports to the BCC, mayor, county manager, and department director.

The emphasis is on mining serious complaints for ideas that would result in better police service to the community. The IRP is improvement-focused and not punishment- or discipline-focused. While it may recommend employee discipline, the police department retains that authority. Less serious complaints are informally addressed, mediated by IRP staff, or referred to departments for whatever action they deem appropriate.

### ***Multiple Clients Served***

The police department is served by the process in a variety of ways. The expectation that internal affairs investigations are going to be read by external community panel members has an early behavioral impact. Police investigators know from experience that professional panel staff go over finalized investigations thoroughly and are quick to point out procedural errors or questionable actions. The quality of investigatory work products is enhanced by the external monitoring. The police department is also served by the external oversight because it sends a message to the community that it has nothing to hide.

Local governments that implement external police oversight are served as exemplifying good governance. Politicians tend to like being perceived as champions of transparency and protectors of human rights. Unfortunately, they also relish the support of powerful police unions—the source of much of the resistance to civilian oversight of policing.

From a psychological perspective, the legalistic minutiae involved in police complaint processes are behaviorally archaic. These processes are driven by recorded eyewitness testimony. Psychological research on learning and memory has much to contribute to help those involved take into account biased decision-making and weaknesses in eyewitness accounts. Most complaints that are not sustained derive from conflicting statements of what occurred and the absence of an “independent witness.” Family members and close friends are not considered independent witnesses.

### ***Complaint Disposition Language***

“Not sustained” dispositions reflect the fact that insufficient evidence was presented to determine what actually occurred. It must be carefully explained to

the complainant that while it does not mean the panel is agreeing with the testimony of the subject officer, the uncertainty or doubt is documented in the officer's file. This can be useful to track the frequency of complaints against individual officers: After trend analysis, police administrators may enhance supervision or, in extreme cases, may employ undercover "integrity testing" to see if corrupt behavior is readily elicited. This is where an officer suspected of corruption is exposed to a manipulated opportunity to offend, to see if they succumb to the temptation.

"Sustained" complaints are generated when the preponderance of the evidence points to a credibility judgment in favor of the complainant. "Exonerated" complaints are those where the credible evidence favors the officer testimony that the action taken fell within current police department policy. This kind of terminology is legalistic and very unsatisfying to most complainants.

Professional police departments usually have very large manuals that document policy as to what is acceptable practice. Unfortunately, some policies look great on paper, but not so good in the field. Poor practice leads to poor quality arrests. Progressive police departments employ early warning systems to monitor officer complaints so that a number of complaints, within a designated period of time, trigger additional administrative vigilance that may culminate in disciplinary action or additional training.

## Process Stages

In the multi-stage IRP process, when the completed internal affairs investigation is received, the staff reads it carefully and sends it to the complainant to determine their satisfaction with the investigatory work product. If the complainant is satisfied, the panel closes the complaint at this first stage. If dissatisfied, the complainant may opt for the second stage: a face-to-face encounter between the complainant and the internal affairs representative, usually the complaint investigator. Ideally, the officer that is the subject of the complaint would participate in this and subsequent stages, but most do not. Unfortunately, the police union discourages subject officer participation, and this lessens the potential of the restorative process.

This meeting is mediated and chaired by one of the nine panel members, who take turns in chairing the cases that come to this stage. The staff is very involved, and this is where behavioral issues can be discussed in a constructive give and take. How does the stress response impact officer decision-making? Why do people experience the same event and recall differences in what happened? Who is telling the truth? What behaviors are likely to escalate to destructive conflict? These are but a sample of questions that can be addressed at this stage. At times the complainants are satisfied by what they learn in this encounter. Most choose to attend the last stage, the full panel meeting public hearing.

The IRP public hearings are scheduled monthly, and they allow for a transparent airing of the issues and an opportunity to finalize panel findings and recommendations. Panel members review the committee report generated as a consequence

of the stage-two meeting, and they give both sides another chance to be heard. These meetings are advertised in the county's calendar, and the media is routinely notified of what is on the agenda.

Media relations is an important part of the job. Positive press is a cost-effective community outreach tool, yet negative press sells more newspapers. Most professional journalists respect what is said in "off the record" conversations, but experience dictates that not everyone can be trusted. Relationships must be cultivated and nurtured with respect. At the IRP, the press is welcomed, and the Executive Director and the Panel Chair are designated spokespeople for media contacts. The absence of media coverage may be a sign of credibility fatigue associated with community perception that the police oversight agency is ineffective.

Evaluation of police oversight efficiency and effectiveness is problematic because measures of conflict party satisfaction are not usually appropriate. In the IRP model, it is not intended that the panel satisfy either the police department or the complainant: Both parties are subject to accountability and are advised up front that the process is to benefit the greater good of the community.

The desired outcome of an effective police oversight agency is change in police department policy and practice. That kind of change is usually gradual and occurs in small steps not revealed in dramatic performance measures.

An example of gradual change is evident in the arena of racial profiling. The IRP has been addressing it since 1999, when it received two complaints involving questionable traffic stops, alleging they were racially motivated. In both cases, the police internal affairs investigators invited the complainants to sign complaint withdrawal forms. Concerns about the police complaint withdrawal procedures were addressed in an IRP public hearing, resulting in panel recommendations calling for tape recording of subsequent complaint withdrawals. The police department adopted the recommendation, and now every complaint withdrawal must be carefully documented to insure the complainant fully understands the impact of the action.

That same year, at the request of a member of Congress and a county commissioner, the IRP queried all police departments in Miami-Dade County about their policies and held a series of community meetings addressing racial profiling. A preliminary staff report documented that most departments had no policy statement specific to the subject, and the community meetings resulted in credible testimony that people were experiencing the phenomenon. The perception of injustice was duly noted, and the panel published 30 findings and 7 recommendations in December 1999.

The Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) responded immediately, writing a specific policy statement to address "enforcement profiling" that was disseminated the following month. The BCC passed a resolution prohibiting racial profiling on October 3, 2000, and the IRP published outreach posters addressing this action with a strong antiracism message. The BCC also commissioned a major study that was completed in November 2004, but not made public until May 2005. This study was conducted by the Alpert Group, and it documented disparities in how racial minority

members were treated by police officers after being stopped.<sup>‡</sup> The IRP is committed to remaining vigilant about this issue.

Harris (2002) documents the practice of racial profiling and shows it to be a national concern. Fridell et al. (2001), then working for the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), published an aid for progressive police departments addressing biased-based policing. However, data collection to help document that racial profiling exists is not as needed today as it was in 1999. Currently, the trend is to accept that police officers, like the rest of us, are not immune from bias. Rather than spending money on more traffic stop studies, it is recommended that funds be spent on training to help prevent biased- based policing.

There are excellent resources for this investment in training. The Museum of Tolerance has developed a sophisticated interactive video teaching aid called *Tools for Tolerance for Law Enforcement* (available at [www.toolsfortolerance.com](http://www.toolsfortolerance.com)), and organizations like the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) are available to help police departments. PARC publishes many relevant articles ([www.parc.info](http://www.parc.info)) and offers a free newsletter that highlights developments in police accountability.

## Resistance to Civilian Oversight

In South Florida, the most powerful union is the Police Benevolent Association (PBA). Most people who run for political office are asked if they support the granting of subpoena power to the IRP. If the answer is no, then the PBA may support their campaign. If yes, then they are assured that the 6,000 plus member union would oppose them. “Us-versus-them” tactics are employed to create an enemy image of the external oversight agency. Union arguments against civilian oversight stem, in part, from the belief that only sworn police officers can understand why an officer does something; civilians do not have proper training to judge them.

Police oversight practitioners must be careful to not fall into the “us-versus-them” mentality when addressing police unions. The unions have done wonderful charity

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<sup>‡</sup>Miami-Dade County resolution 1090-00, prohibiting racial profiling and providing for establishment of procedures related thereto, is available at: [http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/racial\\_profiling.asp](http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/racial_profiling.asp). The Alpert Group was headed by Dr. Geoffrey P. Alpert, then Director of Research at the College of Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. His team of researchers included Dr. Christopher Cooper, Dr. Roger Dunham, Dr. Karen Parker, Dr. Alex Piquero, Dr. Mike Smith, Dr. Samuel Walker, and Dr. George Wilson. The IRP Executive Director served on the Racial Profiling Advisory Board (RPAB) formed at the beginning of the study (February 2001) to assist the researchers by providing community input and to help disseminate findings. It was the vehicle employed to insure that the *Miami-Dade Police Department Racial Profiling Study* findings were appropriately aired. The complete study and the final June 2006 RPAB report are available for review at the IRP website.

work and great things for the benefit of their membership and that is the basis for their power. They are a special interest group that, in Florida, employs very effective legislative lobbyists who continually try to strengthen the “Law Enforcement Bill of Rights.” That is the law that determines the police complaint investigatory process each departmental internal affairs unit must follow to impose effectively disciplinary action. It also restricts the investigatory role of any external oversight entity. That is why the IRP is currently structured as a review model.

States differ in what kind of police oversight is allowed. Some, like California, severely restrict what can be made public about police officer discipline. Florida is known to have a “government in the sunshine law,” a public records statute that gives police oversight agencies access to completed internal affairs investigations. This allows the IRP to review publicly investigatory statements taken from witness officers and civilians, as well as any discipline applied to subject officers. At this time, transparency is effectively facilitated in Florida and restricted in California.

Critics of independent police oversight argue that tax dollars are not well spent by having multiple levels of police accountability mechanisms. Auditors may focus on number of complaints and cost per complaint, an unfortunate measure frequently used by oversight adversaries to document waste of taxpayers’ dollars. This diverts attention from achievement of qualitative community information, outreach, and process goals. Complaints are important sources of information, but it is counterproductive to make them the primary outcome variable. Oversight adversaries will criticize any campaign to increase the number of complaints received as a deliberate effort to make the police look bad. The oversight agency does not need quantity to impact policy and practice. One serious incident would suffice to justify the need for external police oversight. An example is found in the IRP report regarding police actions associated with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) demonstrations.<sup>§</sup>

Fear of riots, which had occurred in other communities hosting trade organization deliberations, led South Florida police agencies to prepare for the worst, including even weapons of mass destruction. For several days, downtown Miami was a scene of multiple security barricades set up by police. Protesters, most of them law-abiding labor union members opposed to the FTAA, were not allowed to march as planned; some were subjected to tear gas, pepper spray, baton strikes, and “less lethal” munitions. Many demonstrators objected to intimidating shows of force, and some were arrested unjustly. Most arrests resulted in no prosecution or dropped charges.

The IRP carefully reviewed available police department after-action reports and held a series of public hearings to address demonstrator complaints. The public hearings focused on four areas:

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<sup>§</sup>(p. 17) This incident occurred when downtown Miami was turned into a barricaded fortress to host the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial, November 18–21, 2003. The FTAA Report may be accessed at: [http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/Library/FTAA\\_Report\\_09\\_20\\_04.pdf](http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/Library/FTAA_Report_09_20_04.pdf)

- (1) police training, organization, and deployment,
- (2) use of force,
- (3) prisoner processing, and
- (4) labor community concerns.

Reynardus (2004) reported what the IRP found:

It is important to note that the vast majority of MDPD officers acted honorably, commendably and with considerable restraint. The IRP commends those police departments and police officers who wisely limited their use of force to situations where all alternatives had been exhausted. It is also important to note that the vast majority of demonstrators acted honorably, commendably and with considerable restraint. The IRP commends those protestors who wisely limited their actions to peacefully expressing their views. There is the honor of preserving those values which we cherish.

The members of the Independent Review Panel strongly condemn and deplore the unrestrained and disproportionate use of force by various police departments in Miami during the FTAA. Most importantly, we extend our heartfelt apologies to the visitors who came to our city to peaceably voice their concerns, but who were met with closed fists instead of open arms. Nationally televised images of police violence against non-violent protesters stained our community. For a brief period in time, it appeared as if Miami was a “police state.” Civil rights were trampled, and the socio-political values we hold most dear were undermined. The right of every citizen to publicly proclaim their approval or disapproval for the actions of their elected leaders in a peaceful manner lies at the heart of what it means to be an American. The curtailment of that right is the first step from freedom towards bondage. (pp. 1–2)

Statements like this provide evidence to the community that the oversight agency is not going to cover up police wrongdoing. They are also available to the media and others who are also engaged in police accountability, such as judiciary bodies hearing arguments from civil suits. Progressive police departments would be well served to review the whole of such reports to learn lessons and proactively avoid actions likely to be unacceptable to reasonable people.

Police oversight agencies are constantly being judged for credibility, and reports are a critical tool. To survive, they must inform the community of findings in a manner that is measured, balanced, and fair. The relationships between the oversight agency and the police department can be tense at times, but the community perception that no cover up will be tolerated is essential.

Proactively, IRP staff is prepared to help any department prevent complaints by offering training. In addition, any community group that wants to know what to do to take constructive conflict action can avail itself of its services. The IRP is committed to help improve police community relations.

## **National and International Organizations**

The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) holds a yearly conference that offers training to paid staff and volunteer board members engaged in this work. Their website ([www.nacole.org](http://www.nacole.org)) shows 138 mapped agencies and offers the opportunity to join the NACOLE police oversight Listserv. This Listserv documents developments across the country and

demonstrates the scope of relevant issues as well as the differences in the political will of communities that may be encountered by those implementing external police oversight.

The NACOLE Mission Statement reads: “NACOLE is a national association of oversight organizations and practitioners that seeks to enhance fair and professional law enforcement responsive to community needs.” NACOLE values include: transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for diversity, constructive engagement, collaboration, creativity, vision, and competence.

The Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (CACOLE) ([www.cacole.ca](http://www.cacole.ca)) also holds yearly conferences. Most provinces in Canada have some form of civilian oversight of law enforcement, some organized at the provincial level rather than at the municipal level. A positive relation between police and the public is their common goal, although structures vary from province to province.

One of the biggest challenges facing the police oversight community is how to help police reform movements in developing countries. Bayley (2001) has written a useful guide suggesting what to do and not do, suggesting that democratic policing shares the following qualities:

1. Police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citizens and private groups.
2. Police must be accountable to the law rather than to the government.
3. Police must protect human rights, especially those that are required for the sort of unfettered political activity that is the hallmark of democracy.
4. Police should be transparent in their activities.

These are admirable qualities, not always found even in developed countries. In places like the State of Guerrero, Mexico, where the leading cause of death is homicide, drug trafficking fuels part of the economy, and police officers are poorly paid, the probability of corruption is elevated, and the implementation of transparency is much more difficult. Police jobs there are not held in high esteem, and recruitment of high quality candidates is problematic. This Mexican example is not unique. Anywhere, a police culture of professionalism takes time, highly effective leadership, exposure to appropriate training, and a living wage large enough to help inhibit temptation to accept bribes.\*\*

The International Network for the Independent Oversight of Policing (INIOP) is to be launched formally in 2008 by a steering group of international experts who seek to avoid errors made by an earlier body, the International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE). INIOP will have a “one country,

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\*\* A unique conference of local human rights activists, academics, government officials and international police oversight experts was held in Chilpancingo, Mexico, August 30-September 1, 2007. It resulted in frank discussions of the realities found in poor areas, like the Montaña region of the State of Guerrero.



one vote” business process and is being designed to be respectful of ethnocultural diversity and to be mindful of vestiges of colonialism and superpower dominance (see [www.iniop.org](http://www.iniop.org) and the Appendix).

In conclusion, independent civilian oversight of law enforcement agencies has been described as a mechanism to address local direct and structural violence. National and international developments indicate a movement with employment opportunities for psychologists interested in applications of peace with justice. A progressive accountability process, a type of restorative justice model, was presented as an alternative to more expensive retributive models of police accountability. External community fact-finding and dispute resolution can facilitate constructive changes in police department policy and practice.

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## Appendix

### *International Police Oversight Agencies*

International police oversight agencies are much more likely than U.S. agencies to be familiar with United Nations standards. Articles 6 and 7 of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires there to be an investigation independent of the alleged perpetrators in relation to torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, and deaths at the hand of the state.

At the United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network, one can find the *Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice* (see [www.uncjin.org/Standards/standards.html](http://www.uncjin.org/Standards/standards.html)). At the same website, one can read the *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* and *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*.

European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) is the European Union's organization of national police monitoring and inspection bodies, as well as anti-corruption agencies. ([www.epac.at](http://www.epac.at)). Twenty-seven countries are represented as members; three others hold observer status.

The strongest police oversight agency, with authority to conduct independent external investigations, is the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland ([www.policeombudsman.org](http://www.policeombudsman.org)). England and Wales are served by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC; [www.ipcc.gov.uk](http://www.ipcc.gov.uk)), and the Republic of Ireland by the Garda Ombudsman Commission, which is empowered to directly and independently investigate complaints against members of the Garda Síochána, the national police.

The African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) is a recent development, and they have held conferences in Nigeria and Kenya. It is coordinated by Tommy Tshabalala ([ttommy@icd.gov.za](mailto:ttommy@icd.gov.za)), Director of Investigations of South Africa's Independent Complaints Directorate ([www.icd.gov.za](http://www.icd.gov.za)). The University of Cape Town website includes a link to *The police that we want: A handbook for oversight of police in South Africa* (see [www.policeaccountability.co.za](http://www.policeaccountability.co.za)) (Bruce and Nield 2005).

A report on *Police Accountability in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania* is available at the website of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI; see [www.humanrightsinitiative.org](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org)). Nigeria's Police Service Commission is described at [www.psc.gov.ng](http://www.psc.gov.ng), and Namibia's Ombudsman can be reached at [ombudsman@ombudsman.org.na](mailto:ombudsman@ombudsman.org.na). To read about the Police Accountability and Effectiveness in Eastern Africa Conference, go to [www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/ea/ea.htm](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/ea/ea.htm).

In Latin America, the Ombudsman model ("Defensor del Pueblo") is the most common. The Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsman (FIO) makes it easy to find the national ombudsman and local officials charged with police oversight at their website, [www.portalfio.org](http://www.portalfio.org).

The newest development is in Mexico, in the State of Guerrero, La Montaña region. Three founding NGOs are creating a Civilian Police Oversight Office in Tlapa. They are the Institute for Security and Democracy ([www.insyde.org.mx](http://www.insyde.org.mx)), Fundar ([www.fundar.org.mx](http://www.fundar.org.mx)), and Tlachinollan ([www.tlachinollan.org](http://www.tlachinollan.org)).

In Australia and New Zealand, some of the best known agencies include the New South Wales Ombudsman's Office ([www.nswombudsman.nsw.gov.au](http://www.nswombudsman.nsw.gov.au)), the Police Integrity Commission ([www.pic.nsw.gov.au](http://www.pic.nsw.gov.au)), the Queensland Criminal and Misconduct Commission ([www.cmc.qld.gov.au](http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au)), and the Commonwealth Ombudsman ([www.ombudsman.gov.au](http://www.ombudsman.gov.au)). New Zealand has the Police Complaints Authority ([www.pca.govt.nz](http://www.pca.govt.nz)).

Police oversight is being implemented in new ways by Altus, a global alliance working to improve public safety and justice from a multicultural perspective. ([www.altus.org](http://www.altus.org)). Members include the Center for Studies on Public Safety in Santiago, Chile; the Center for Studies on Public Security and Citizenship in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; the Center for Law Enforcement Education of Nigeria (CLEEN) Foundation in Lagos, Nigeria; the Institute for Development and Communication in Chandigarh, India; the Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation in Moscow, Russia; and the Vera Institute of Justice in New York. Associate members include the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSI) and Penal Reform International (PRI).

Altus exists to provide global perspectives on issues of police accountability, public safety, and justice. They have projects looking at the quality of police oversight, promoting effective control of policing and advancing justice. Beginning in 2006, they initiated the Altus Global Alliance Police Station Visitors Week, where civil society groups assess quality of service at local police stations employing a special kit to guide the visit. The kit includes 20 standard questions and is available on the Altus website. The questions are directed at assessment of community orientation, physical condition, transparency and accountability, equal treatment of the public, and detention conditions. In 2006, 471 police stations were visited in 23 countries. The same protocol is used simultaneously around the world and aimed at improving police accountability to those they serve. This is a new and innovative form of external community police oversight.

## **Methods Aimed at Specific Levels**

# Chapter 6

## Personal Transformations Needed for Cultures of Peace

Abelardo Brenes

### Introduction

A culture of peace has been defined as a particular set of "...values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life..." (General Assembly resolution A/RES/53/243). This definition raises some interrelated questions that are addressed by this chapter:

- What sort of personal transformations are required to build cultures of peace?
- Why is personal transformation important for building cultures of peace?
- Is there, in effect, a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life for building cultures of peace that have cross-cultural validity?
- If so, what are they and what rationales and methods can be identified that demonstrate efficacy and provide hope?

### Cultures of Peace and Models of Personhood

Given that the United Nation's definition of a culture of peace uses Western psychological constructs, it makes sense to begin this inquiry with a discussion of relevant concepts and theories from Western psychology. However, we must bear in mind that a fundamental component of any culture is its conceptualization of human nature and its implicit or explicit model of 'personhood,' by which we mean what and how a culture normatively expects a person to be.

In this vein, various authors have attempted to characterize the hegemonic normative models of personhood that characterize the globalized phase of capitalist expansion we live in, the understanding of which is of crucial relevance to an international endeavor to foster cultures of peace. Cushman (1990), for example, believes that "...cultural conceptualizations and configurations of self are formed by the economies and politics of their respective eras" (p. 599). He suggests that after World War II an 'empty self' configuration has become predominant in the United States and has provided a psychological substratum for the global expansion of capitalism in the post World War II era in which this country has had a very strong economic, political, and cultural influence.

Giddens (1991) links contemporary personhood issues with political processes by distinguishing between ‘emancipatory politics’ on the one hand, as concerned with “liberating individuals and groups from constraints which adversely affect their life chances” (p. 210), and ‘life politics’ on the other, which assumes that the freedom to choose a lifestyle is correlated with the degree of emancipation. Whereas ‘emancipatory politics’ are driven by a dynamic of ‘freedom from,’ ‘life politics’ are driven by a dynamic of ‘freedom to.’ He considers that “all issues of life politics involve questions of rights and obligations” (p. 226). The crucial issue is whether the conflict between these two dynamics follows a violent or peaceful course.

Following this perspective, we will argue that our current historical challenge in fostering cultures of peace is to forge life politics whose central core values are the promotion of universal emancipation through a substitution of our reliance on *powers of dominance* in seeking security and development for *powers of love, compassion, and tolerance*. Furthermore, responsible life choices require a minimum of *internal freedom* or *critical autonomy* (Doyal and Gough 1991) to liberate ourselves from fears, attachments, and compulsions that lead to egoistic life politics and inhibit our potentials to create aspirations for a better world and the willingness and skills to make them real.

Such a notion of liberation is of particular importance to achieve one of the most challenging goals of the United Nation’s framework for a culture of peace, meeting the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations. Oskamp (2000), echoing many other writers concerned with the environmental crisis we are facing, points out that this will entail promoting “voluntary simplicity as an overall, committed lifestyle” (p. 505). The cultural and psychological barriers to making such a shift are, however, formidable (Brenes and Winter 2001) and will require breaking down barriers of moral exclusion (Opatow 2001) to foster genuine dialogue to reach consensus on fundamental questions such as ‘how much is enough?’ for human well-being and flourishing (Durning 1992).

The majority populations of the planet, who struggle to survive, defend their habitats and cultural heritages, and emerge from poverty and other forms of exclusion, have much to offer the rest of us in terms of learning how to be happy by living simply (Latouche 1993). Moreover, it is becoming clear that current market democracies do not provide substantial human happiness. Lane (2000), for example, after examining multiple evidence of the state of happiness in such societies, concludes that “...there is a kind of famine of warm interpersonal relations, of easy-to-reach neighbors, of encircling, inclusive memberships, and of solid family life” (p. 9). This is the kind of life experience that most marginalized peoples have to offer, as Escobar and Jeong (1999) clearly describe:

Resistance to globalization is located in informal sectors comprised of independent commodity production, family support networks, reproduction of community resources, and other types of economic practices of impoverished regions... (p. 227).

Seen in this light, creating possibilities of genuine human dialogue on what could be normative models of personhood that a given society decides to promote through economic, political, social, and cultural policies is a substantial dimension of an effective policy for promoting cultures of peace.

## Peace and/or Security?

In 2005 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a *Midterm Global Review of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, 2001—2010* (formex General Assembly, 2005 B). A civil society report was also issued that same year by the *Foundation for a Culture of Peace* (2005). Whereas the former is a generally positive listing of actions, in contrast, the latter report is very critical towards the lack of accomplishments by governments and U.N. organizations. An example is a statement in the latter report: “It is generally agreed that there is a remarkable ‘scarcity and difficulty of access to resources for the promotion of the culture of peace, in comparison with the immense expenses for the promotion of war and violence’” (p. 10).

Given that it is not the scope of this chapter to address the macro level, it will be assumed that in effect the U.N.’s culture of peace policies have failed. Why? A hypothetical explanation is the predominance of the security paradigm in U.N. policy. Particularly after 9/11 and the domestic and international “War on Terrorism” policy of the U.S. government and its allies, ‘peace’ and ‘culture of peace’ seem to have become subsumed by this paradigm. Concerned by the consequences of these policies, the *American Psychological Association* created a *Task Force on the Psychological Effects of Efforts to Prevent Terrorism*. The introduction to the volume produced for this task force states that “...the ‘war on terror’ has affected the emotions, beliefs, and behaviors of the American public in ways typical of situations characterized by uncertainty, extreme stress, and fear” (Kimmel 2006, p. xvi). Under such conditions, human beings and societies are being motivated by security, and the challenge is therefore how to break out of the vicious cycles of paranoia to envision and create cultures of integral peace.

A definition of peace proposed by Anderson (2004) is a useful starting point for inquiring what psychology may tell us about how it may be possible to go beyond the security paradigm to promote cultures of peace:

“Peace is a condition in which individuals, families, groups, communities, and/or nations experience low levels of violence and engage in mutually harmonious relationships” (p. 105).

This definition has two main dimensions. The first dimension, ‘non-violence,’ gives meaning to ‘negative peace.’ The second dimension is ‘harmony,’ “...which refers to the degree that individuals, families, groups, communities, or nations are engaged in mutually harmonious relationships” (Anderson 2004, p. 106). Anderson sees this in accord with the conventional notion of ‘positive peace.’ Looked at from a subjective point of view, it can be argued that ‘non-violence’ is psychologically very closely related to ‘security,’ which in turn entails overcoming states of fear. Moreover, ‘positive peace’ can be interpreted as closely related semantically to ‘harmony’ and suggests the fostering of trusting human relationships that promote happiness and flourishing.

The study of emotions as motivational activation systems provides useful insights into the psychological dynamics of and between these two core dimensions of an integral concept of peace. Zautra (2003) has conducted an extensive literature

analysis on emotion, motivation, and stress and presents a model of two emotion activation systems: negative affective dynamics and positive affective dynamics. His study points to extensive neuropsychological evidence that humans have these two relatively independent systems, which are also a part of our evolutionary heritage. On this latter point, Buss (2000) points out "...that people have evolved an array of psychological mechanisms that are 'designed' to cause subjective distress under some circumstances..." (p. 17) and "...desires whose fulfillment brings deep joy..." (p. 21).

Negative affective dynamics, according to Zautra (2003, pp. 17–34), are motivated by reduction of aversive states; they direct avoidance, retreat, and defensive behavior; are characterized by emotions of fear, anxiety, and anger; by cognitions that are pessimistic and worrisome; by hopes of freedom from fear; and an end-state that provides security and safety. Notice that the phrase 'freedom from fear' is one of the conceptual components of the United Nations human security paradigm. The other components are 'freedom from want' and 'freedom to live in dignity' (United Nations General Assembly 2005 A).

Positive affective dynamics, as explained by Zautra (2003, pp. 17–34), motivate humans to promote positive states through approach behaviors and goal pursuits. They are characterized by emotions of interest, excitement, and joy; cognitions of optimism and hope; and end states that are experienced as happiness and fulfillment.

Zautra contends that a healthy individual has a rich emotional life in which both of these activation systems function effectively and relatively independently. He does not see negative and positive emotions and motivations as contrary poles on a single continuum, but as dynamics that fulfill complementary adaptive functions. This implies that people can sometimes deal effectively with negative circumstances, but this does not necessarily entail they are unhappy and not flourishing. Undoubtedly, this is one of the key components of the concept of 'resilience,' which is often present in peoples struggling for social and environmental emancipation and justice. Likewise, it is common to experience positive affective states yet have to deal with difficult circumstances. If emotions and affect are considered as information about our interactions in the world, negative ones "...inform us that some corrective or evasive action needs to be taken...[whereas] positive affect often informs us that we are indeed already headed in the right direction" (Zautra 2003, p. 122). However, under conditions of stress, particularly those in which there is threat, the two systems become less differentiated, and usually the negative activation system is dominant. This is explainable by the fact that this system has its basis in survival.

If these complementary hypotheses are valid, they can help explain why under certain situations, such as the current predominance of the security paradigm and realist rationales in foreign relations policy, it is possible for the elites of aggressive nation states to convince their citizenry into believing that they are threatened victims. They can then wage 'war for increased freedom and democracy,' when the real motives of the governing elites are often control of strategic resources and domination of other societies.

Policies and actions to promote positive affect and human flourishing are possibly one of the main keys to liberating ourselves individually and collectively from the



straitjacket of social paranoia. Fredrickson and Losada (2005) present a ‘broaden—and—build theory’ “...which asserts that positive emotions are evolved psychological adaptations that increased human ancestors’ odds of survival and reproduction” (p. 679). Although the benefits of broadened thought-action emerge over time and positive affects may be transient, the personal resources gained can be durable. Moreover, the theory contends that optimum mental health requires high ratios of positive to negative affect. In an empirical study they found that a generative and resilient dynamics of human flourishing is characterized by a ratio of 2.9.

The construct of ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) (see Diener 2000) is also relevant to this discussion. Using both individual and average SWB data from 51 countries, Diener and Tov (2007) argue that SWB is not only a by-product of peace, but also a crucial element in sustaining peace over time. Thus, they state, “In that regard, SWB may be a critical base for a culture of peace” (p.438). In a related study that analyzes the socio-structural and subjective correlates of a culture of peace with data from 74 countries, Basabe and Valencia (2007) show that the greater the value a people place on harmony, the less the internal violence that exists in the nation and the less the state uses violence.

## Values, Virtues, and Character Strengths

In this section, we will review some literature that can help identify paths and methods for moving-out of the vicious circles created by the security paradigm, through the empowerment of the harmonious joy dimension of peace on personal and collective levels. We will begin with some considerations about the relationship between emotions, values, virtues, and character strengths.

As Fowers (2005) convincingly argues, using the constructs of virtues and character is part and parcel of a broader paradigm shift in psychology towards the scientific study of what is positive in humans. Positive psychology may be defined as “...an umbrella term for the study of positive emotions, positive character traits, and enabling institutions” (Seligman et al. 2005, p. 410). Fowers traces the roots of ‘character’ to Aristotle’s concept of *eudaimonia* as designating the ultimate good for humans. For him, character refers to the overall quality and value of a person’s life (p. 9). He argues that an ethics based on virtues provides a solid foundation to integrate personal freedom with responsibility and states “... a proper recognition of what is good naturally inspires a desire to act in the service of that good” (Fowers 2005, p. 45). In other words, one can willingly fulfill one’s duties towards oneself, others, and the broader community of life because one sees it as essential to one’s nature and life direction to do so. Fowers provides extensive evidence that living with a sense of ‘integrity,’ that is, in congruence with one’s core benevolent virtues and character strengths, is highly correlated with flourishing, optimizing health, and relating as a member of thriving communities.

There may be virtues and character strengths that are especially relevant to generating cultures of peace and that have cross-cultural validity. Rohan and Zanna

(2003) consider that Schwartz's cross-cultural research on values and the resultant scheme, following a motivation approach, represents the "'state of the art' in values theory" (p. 464). Schwartz's theory (2007) assumes that values reflect desirable trans-situational motivational goals that are required to satisfy three universal human requirements: "needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups" (p. 1). Used in this way, his concept of 'value' is similar to 'virtue' (Peterson and Seligman 2004).

The values in Schwartz's scheme are structurally related in two orthogonal dimensions: self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and openness to change vs. conservation. They are presented in a circular structure that has been constructed on the basis of factorial analysis of data from multiple cross-cultural studies. The self enhancement dimension is more strongly defined by the power and achievement values, while the self-transcendence dimension is strongly defined by the universalism and benevolence values. Security, conformity, and tradition define the conservation pole, while the self-direction and stimulation values define the openness to change dimension. This structure has proven to have high predictive validity in relation to variables such as age influences, gender, and education.

The model assumes that values in opposition reflect tensions and conflicts that individuals and groups confront in orienting their action in given situations. It is interesting to note that in this scheme 'security' and 'benevolence' are not opposite, but rather orthogonal; moreover, 'harmony' is subsumed as a trait of 'security.' This can imply that balancing the non-violence and harmony dimensions of the integral peace concept is not as difficult as one might have assumed. On the other hand, self-enhancement and self-transcendence are polar opposites. Does this imply that one of the most difficult challenges for fostering cultures of peace at the personal level is balancing these two poles and, more importantly, identifying rationales that promote universalism and benevolence?

Earlier the statement was made that our current historical challenge to foster cultures of peace is to forge life politics whose central core values are the promotion of universal emancipation. This is driven by a dynamic of 'freedom from fear, want, and indignity' (emancipatory agenda) in dialectical relation with a dynamic of 'freedom to choose' a life with the greatest possible happiness and meaning. Usually this kind of dialectic refers to the 'external freedom' dimension, for example, access to satisfiers of human needs and opportunities to develop and exercise one's powers socially. Thus, if there is validity to Cushman's (1990) claim that in the globalized phase of capitalism there is an hegemonic model of personhood that is 'empty' of meaningful relationships with human communities and the greater community of life, a self that produces and consumes compulsively seeking momentary pleasures, but is trapped in the hedonic treadmills that the commodified economies provide, then the greater challenge and vision of possibilities are for a more integral process of liberation. This entails processes that provide a foundation for constructive resolution of the external dialectic of 'freedom from'/'freedom to' through development of internal freedom to resist the seduction of the consumer society by living harmonious, integral, balanced, and happy lives.

## Buddhist Science of Mind

There are various cultural traditions and indigenous psychologies throughout the world, both religious and secular, which contain rationales for promoting self-transcendence through benevolence and universalism. We shall examine Buddhist science of mind as one such tradition, distinguishing between Buddhism as a religion and as a science of mind. This entails that its main tenets and recommendations for human flourishing be based on experience and open to scrutiny. Wallace and Shapiro (2006) note that Buddhism is considered the most psychological of all spiritual traditions. As to cross-cultural dialogue, this 2,500-year-old Eastern tradition has recently become very influential in the West, and its claims to offer methods for overcoming the roots of human suffering and cultivate states of high mental and affective well-being have been studied extensively by researchers following Western scientific canons and standards.

The Four Noble Truths represent the foundation of Buddhism. They provide a method for recognizing (a) the existence and nature of suffering; (b) its causes; (c) end-states that can be achieved, both in overcoming afflictions and achieving states of happiness through cultivating certain virtues and mental states; and (d) appropriate paths and methods.

The first Noble Truth, recognizing what is suffering and understanding its nature, is fundamental for an integral liberation as discussed above. The research tradition on subjective well-being discussed earlier has been fundamentally an enterprise of Western psychology. It is not surprising that it has concluded that the hedonic treadmill and the transient nature of most sources of happiness are commonplace in globalized Western culture. Buddhist psychology posits that seeking states of pleasure, satisfaction, and happiness by depending on external stimuli is motivated by suffering in the first place, and therefore phenomena such as the hedonic effect will of course manifest. Authentic happiness, on the other hand, is posed as a state of well-being that is not dependent on external attachments. Ricard (2003) states beautifully this vision of happiness:

*Sukha* is the state of lasting well-being that manifests itself when we have freed ourselves of mental blindness and afflictive emotions. It is also the wisdom that allows us to see the world as it is, without veils or distortions. It is, finally, the joy of moving toward inner freedom and the loving-kindness that radiates towards others (p. 25).

As Suh (2000) has pointed out, subjective well-being studies also reflect a given culture's understanding of the relationship between individual and collective well-being. In Western cultures, when individuals are asked if they are happy and satisfied with their lives, not only do they reflect on the kinds of satisfactions that their cultural repertoire provides, but also find it meaningful to refer to the individual self in reflecting on such questions.

Western Positive Psychology is also developing valuable approaches and methods to explore and promote states of happiness and well-being. In Seligman's influential book (2002), happiness is a convergence of satisfaction about the past, the future, the present, and the fostering of positive character. The emphasis, however, is on the happiness of the individual as an independent being. In Eastern collectivist

cultures, on the other hand, well-being and harmony are personally and collectively conjoint.

Buddhist science of mind is sophisticated, and there are many traditions and methods within it. Wallace and Shapiro (2006) attempt to synthesize Buddhism and discuss its relationship with Western psychology in a manner that is relevant to the present discussion. Central to their original approach is the idea of cultivating four interdependent kinds of mental balance: conative, attentional, cognitive, and affective. An unbalanced mental state in each of these domains can be characterized as being in deficit, hyperactive, or dysfunctional. Conative balance is considered the basis of the others, given that it refers to one's volitions and intentions. Attentional balance is characterized as simultaneous states of relaxation, attentional stability, and vividness. Cognitive balance entails accurate apprehension of reality—both inner and outer—and being calmly present with experience as it arises from moment to moment. Finally, affective balance is seen as resulting from the other three balances and characterized by freedom from excessive emotional vacillation, apathy, and inappropriate emotion.

Similarly to Zautra's (2003) insistence on the importance of developing regulation skills to deal with negative emotional dynamics and promote positive ones, Buddhism also has methods for both goals:

Buddhism treats affective imbalances with many specific methods for countering such mental afflictions as craving, hostility, delusion, arrogance, and envy. In addition, Buddhism presents a system of meditative practices designed to counter affective imbalance by cultivating the qualities of (a) loving-kindness, (b) compassion, (c) empathetic joy, and (d) equanimity" (Wallace and Shapiro 2006, p. 698).

We stated earlier that one of the main challenges for personal transformations for generating cultures of peace is to find ways of balancing self-enhancement with self-transcendence through models of personhood in which self-enhancement takes on new meanings by joyously participating in promoting universal well-being. This is precisely what these meditative practices are intended for. Coming from the Buddhist Mahayana tradition, the Dalai Lama has been continuously insisting on the need for all humans to develop universal responsibility. He believes that all humans are radically the same in not wanting to suffer and wanting to be happy, and that there are analogous subjective states in many other living beings. To him "...a genuine sense of responsibility can result only if we develop compassion. Only a spontaneous feeling of empathy for others can really motivate us to act on their behalf" (Dalai Lama 2002, p.6).

To achieve this, let us consider the mental practices for cultivating the four positive mental states quoted from Wallace and Shapiro (2006). The first one, loving-kindness, is the intention that the being on whom one focuses enjoys well-being and happiness. This motivation is intended to counter one of the roots of suffering, craving. The second, compassion, is the motivation for beings not to suffer. Empathetic joy is a rejoicing in the achievements of oneself and others, particularly in living virtuously. Finally, equanimity refers to an impartial mind, which directs these other three types of intentions equally towards all. Wallace (1999) recommends that in adapting these methods to Western mindsets, the meditation for cultivating well-being, overcoming suffering, and joy related to achievements in

personal development can initially be directed toward oneself and gradually extend out from close relationships to eventually reach-out to all living beings. Particular techniques are used to apply these meditations towards persons one sees as an adversary or enemy. Their common feature is to consider anger and related emotional states as another root cause of suffering and to realize that an ‘enemy’ is a mental construction, and it is, therefore, possible to recondition one’s mind to include such a person in one’s circle of benevolence and compassion.

Batchelor (1983) sees the relevance of cultivating equanimity within the context of what he calls ‘authentic being-with-others’ and explains three traditional Buddhist methods for cultivating equanimity: (a) seeing the equality of others in not wanting to suffer and wanting to be happy—including beings to whom one is attached, neutral others, and one’s enemies; (b) meditating on the ‘equality of self and others;’ and (c) ‘exchanging oneself with others.’ The second of these is particularly relevant to the question of how it may be possible to counter the egocentric tendencies that are characteristic of global capitalism’s craving, competitive, compulsive, and often violent model of personhood. The meditation on the ‘equality of self and others’ is a central exercise in what we have described above as ‘internal freedom.’ One reflects on how biased one usually is in wanting the rest of humanity—on another level the whole community of life and the Earth systems that sustain it—to provide to oneself well-being, non-suffering, and security, and often all kinds of pleasures and satisfactions. The focus then shifts to the realization that there are countless other beings who want exactly the same thing and that it is therefore morally correct to ask what is more reasonable: to continue living egocentrically or to participate in fostering alleviation of suffering and happiness for all beings. Buddhism assumes that moral consciousness and altruism are part of human nature and that we have the sensitive capacities to also directly experience this greater sense of well-being and happiness that is a collective aspiration. Moreover, it poses that such a motivation will unleash one’s potential to flourish towards a life of authentic meaning and happiness. Zautra (2003, p. 236) makes a similar point in his concept of ‘emotional community’:

To live compassionately, however, we need to move away from the purely agentic forms of relating with others that are promoted so heavily in our culture and allow ourselves to also embrace communal concerns.

Is it possible to agree on a global covenant, founded on values such as those of the United Nations culture of peace paradigm and based on a normative model of personhood that incorporates constructs and ways of relating such as those considered so far? It will now be argued that the *Earth Charter* initiative offers precisely this.

## **The Earth Charter**

As explained by the Earth Charter Initiative (2002), the *Earth Charter* is an ethical document designed to guide human actions for sustainable development. The need for such a document was originally stated by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987.

The Earth Charter is the product of a decade long, worldwide, cross-cultural conversation about common goals and shared values. The drafting of the Earth Charter has involved the most open and participatory consultation process ever conducted in connection with an international document. Thousands of individuals and hundreds of organizations from all regions of the world, different cultures, and diverse sectors of society have participated. The Charter has been shaped by both experts and representatives of grassroots communities. It is a people's treaty that sets forth an important expression of the hopes and aspirations of the emerging global civil society (p. 6).

In 2003, the *General Conference* of UNESCO adopted the *Charter* as one of the main framework documents to guide the *United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development* (2005–2014). Discussion will focus on some of its relevant principles related to personal transformation.

The Earth Charter's inclusive ethical vision recognizes that environmental protection and sustainability, human rights, equitable human development, and peace are interdependent and indivisible. It can be used for at least four interrelated educational and broader action objectives:<sup>8</sup>

- (1) *Consciousness-raising*—The first educational challenge is to motivate people to act in more environmentally and socially responsible ways. Here the Earth Charter can be used to help raise people's consciousness about the massive environmental, social, and economic problems facing the world, their interdependencies, and the overarching need to live with a sense of global responsibility;
- (2) *Personal development*—Consciousness-raising needs to be manifested in life goals based on values and principles such as those of *The Earth Charter*. This can entail developing an awareness of our legitimate needs and satisfiers to lead a healthy and dignified life as a basis for the fulfilment of one's mission. It also implies cultivating those virtues and character strengths consistent with a sustainable way of living, as well as the knowledge, competencies, and skills for an ethics of universal responsibility.
- (3) *Application of values and principles*—The main body of the Earth Charter is action orientated and functions as a guide to more sustainable ways of living. The Charter can serve as a framework for people to critically compare their reality with their ideals. This kind of analysis in turn provides the basis for identifying action goals for bringing about positive transformations.
- (4) *Call for action*—The Earth Charter concludes with a call for action through, among other things, new partnerships between civil society, business, and government at all levels. The educational challenge here is to help foster a culture and networks for collaboration aimed at promoting justice, sustainability, and peace, consistent with the Charter's values.

The *Charter* has three sections: a Preamble, its body of 16 main ethical principles and norms, and 53 complimentary principles, and an epilogue. Its overall rationale follows a method similar to Buddhism's Four Noble Truths, recognizing that:

- We live in a critical time in the history of the Planet.
- We are a single human family and Earth community with a common destiny.
- Dominant patterns of production and consumption are devastating.

- The benefits of development are not equitable.
- We have a choice to risk the destruction of ourselves and the diversity of life or to unite to create a global sustainable society.
- Therefore, we need fundamental changes in our values, institutions and ways of life.
- Once basic needs are met, human development is about being more.
- We need to live with an ethics of universal responsibility, guided by
- The principle of differentiated responsibility.

The challenges discussed earlier in relation to life politics are reflected in the principle of ‘differentiated responsibility’: “Affirm that with increased freedom, knowledge, and power come increased responsibility to promote the common good” (principle 2.b). The path to foster the willingness to take this on within an overall consciousness of universal responsibility is expressed in principle 2: “*Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion, and love.*” Notice the similarity of this principle with Buddhism’s approach to personal transformation. Finally, the vision of peace expressed in principle 16f. is very inspiring and congruent with the integral definition of peace that we have followed in this chapter.

*16f. Recognize that peace is the wholeness created by right relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all are a part.*

Brenes-Castro (2004) has developed an *Integral Model of Peace Education* using these principles to construct peaceful models of personhood in non-formal and formal educational contexts. UNESCO and Earth Charter International (2007) have recently published a book with case studies from 17 countries of good practices using the *Charter* in non-formal and formal contexts. Approximately one third of these include the personal transformation dimension. The text of the *Charter* is available at: [http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/2000/10/the\\_earth\\_charter.html](http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/2000/10/the_earth_charter.html). A varied collection of essays (Corcoran et al. 2005) that explains the relevance, philosophical underpinnings, and varied approaches to using the *Charter* is also available on-line for the reader interested in further pursuing this approach to personal transformation for peace.

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Objectives 1, 3, and 4 were agreed upon in the discussion forum of the Earth Charter Education Advisory committee held in 2001 (see Mackey 2001). Objective 2 is an additional one proposed by the author of this chapter.

# Chapter 7

## Achieving Peace in the Family

Sandra T. Azar, Megan C. Goslin, and Yuko Okado

### Introduction

*Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home—so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.* (Eleanor Roosevelt, “In Our Hands,” a 1958 speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as cited in OHCHR, 2003, p. 4).

Eleanor Roosevelt’s quote argues for the local origins of lofty global goals. We, too, will argue that the attainment of peace begins with one of the smallest building blocks of society: the family. Families, ideally, are havens of security for their members. They model key assumptions about appropriate patterns of interpersonal behavior (e.g., respecting others; protection of the vulnerable; sex roles) and promote societal actions reflecting these assumptions (e.g., Sweden granting children legal rights). They also foster the development of capacities such as perspective-taking, negotiation, and reflective and flexible thinking. These key assumptions and specific capacities are required within leaders and citizens to actualize a “culture of peace.”

Although families can foster peace-promoting attributes, they can also be the learning ground for hatred, prejudice, and violence. Across the globe, violence characterizes many families’ lives. Intimate partner violence (IPV), elder abuse, and child abuse are all too common. One in four women is affected by IPV (e.g., US, 22%; Canada, 29%; South Africa, 25%), with even higher rates in some countries (e.g., Papua New Guinea, 67%; Bangladesh, 47%; Ethiopia, 45%) (Abrahams and Jewkes 2005). Estimates also suggest that 4–6% of the elderly experience abuse or neglect in the home (WHO 2002). In addition, child abuse is common. Internationally, up to 80–98% of children encounter physical punishment at home, with a third receiving “severe physical punishment resulting from the use of implements” (UNGA 2006, p. 9). Also, the World Health Organization estimated that 150 million

girls and 73 million boys under 18 experienced some form of sexual violence in 2002 (as cited in UNGA 2006). If families are children's first "classroom" for learning, violence is too often being taught.

Producing a culture of peace therefore requires strengthening families' ability to model and promote peaceful interactions and prevent violence. We will first highlight the ways family interactions can foster or impede peace. With this base, we will then sample family-level prevention efforts. Some are government efforts to change societal norms (top-down approaches), whereas others target individual families (bottom-up approaches), by reducing conflict and increasing cooperation, negotiation, and tolerance. By highlighting both types of approaches, we want to acknowledge that changes within the family may not be sufficient to produce cultures of peace. Forces within societies can thwart even the most effective familial efforts. In addition, although the family-based approaches we highlight are promising, most have been implemented in developed countries. Given that familial relationships may operate differently in different cultures, we caution that adaptations may be needed with our examples as starting points.

## **The Role of the Family in the Socialization of Peace and Violence**

The family has been shown to socialize belief systems and skills necessary for the attainment of a culture of peace (e.g., cognitive processes, social skills) (for integrating theories, see Azar 2003; Azar et al. 2007; Crittenden 2006). Research has focused on direct instruction, use of rewards and punishment, modeling, the transmission of beliefs and appraisal styles, and cognitive processes such as problem-solving. Contextual factors (e.g., adversity, stress, support) also have also been shown to influence the family's capacity to accomplish this task well. This work is the foundation for the interventions we discuss later.

### ***The Family and Socialization of Peace Capacities***

Families *create interpersonal contexts* that promote children's acquisition of social understanding (e.g., interpreting others' social behaviors and motives), which plays a fundamental role in both their immediate behaviors and their long-term aggressive and moral patterns. Parents' narration of their own thoughts and direct questions helps children learn to identify others' thoughts and feelings and foster the ability to be reflective (e.g., theory of mind development; Carpendale and Lewis 2004) and to build interpersonal problem solving capacities (Azar et al. 2007). Families thus shape children's interpersonal responses through *direct socialization efforts*, such as verbal instruction, feedback, and use of rewards and punishments. For example, parental responses (e.g., giving specific instructions to older siblings when caring for younger

siblings) lead to greater child interpersonal sensitivity (Howe and Rinaldi 2004) and better problem-solving (Rueter and Conger 1998).

Responses are also indirectly acquired through *modeling* (Bandura 1973). The way parents model working together and managing conflict influences the scripts that children develop for interpersonal behavior. When conflict is expressed calmly and resolved successfully, children are better prepared to handle conflict (Grych 2005). Failures here have been linked with child externalizing problems (e.g., aggression; rule breaking) in the US (Emery 1999) and China (McHale et al. 2000). When conflict includes physical aggression, violence can become part of the norms for family transactions. For example, IPV couples describe it as “normative” behavior or even as a sign of love (Abraham and Jewkes 2005), and IPV and child abuse coexist at a high rate within families (Wolfe et al. 1985). Exposure to IPV and child abuse in the home has been linked to perpetration of violence in adulthood (e.g., in South Africa, Abrahams and Jewkes 2005).

Families can also socialize beliefs that devalue others by gender, race, ethnicity, or age, fostering attitudes associated with risk of violence. Men who engage in IPV subscribe to extremely devaluing beliefs about women (Azar and Makin-Byrd 2007), which may be transmitted to their offspring. Similarly, parents at risk for child abuse have been shown to have unrealistic expectations of children and have negative biases toward them and others (Azar et al. 1984; Miller and Azar 1996). Evidence exists for the intergenerational transmission of such biases (Azar 1990), and they may prime the use of aggressive responses.

In addition, families can transmit their group’s history in ways that create perceptions of other groups as morally deficient (e.g., having gained wealth, power, or influence dishonestly) and heighten the perceptions of persistent threat that are linked to war, genocide, ethnopolitical conflict, and hate crimes (Staub 2005). Ideas about group marginalization develop early (age 6 to 10 years in stigmatized ethnic groups; Killen and McKown 2005). In adults, perceptions of being “wronged” are associated with anger (Wickless and Kirsch 1988) and are characteristic of maritally violent men (perception of hostile intent) (Fincham et al. 1997). Again, intergenerational transmission of such perceptions can occur and is seen as increasing the risk of ethnopolitical conflict and war.

### ***The Influence of Context on Family Peace Promotion Capacities***

The family’s state of adversity as well as other elements of their context can affect the risk of violence. Environmental conditions (e.g., economic resources, neighborhood quality) impact of perpetrator violence over and above intra-individual factors (Sampson et al. 2005). For example, family and community level economic disadvantage has been shown to predict couple marital warmth and quality of interaction as well as child abuse levels (Cutrona et al. 2003; Pelton 1985). It also impacts parental cognitions. Lower SES adults see their social world as more hostile and less friendly compared to higher SES ones (Gallo et al. 2006). Mothers

living below the poverty line are more likely to blame external forces for their children's use of aggression, and their children give similar reasons for their aggression (Diriwachter and Azar 2002). These cognitive tendencies may reflect stressors such as social conflict and class-based discrimination. Experiencing racial discrimination is linked to higher physiological and psychological stress and avoidant rather than problem-focused coping (Barnes and Lightsey 2005). Both could make negotiating conflicts more difficult and reduce parents' capacity to model peace-promoting strategies.

Support from relatives or neighbors may also play a role in modifying families' cognitions regarding violence and the socialization they provide. Directly, social support can act as a social control to violence (e.g., providing restorative feedback as family conflict escalates). Indirectly, instrumental help (e.g., instructions, increased manpower) provided to families can reduce stress so that socialization tasks can be carried out more effectively. Abusive parents tend to be more isolated than others, and child abuse is concentrated in neighborhoods characterized by "social drain" (places with greater ambivalence towards neighbors and lower levels of support; Garbarino and Sherman 1980). These findings call for improving social support at the neighborhood level, particularly for poor families.

Support for children may be especially important during times of societal upheaval. Extended family often step in to parent children at those times (e.g., war). For example, kin care increased dramatically with the drug epidemic in the US in the 1990s (Azar and Hill 2006). The resulting households were marked by poverty and mental and physical health problems, which drained them of resources necessary to carry out their socialization role. In addition, because they are "kin," society may expect family to shoulder the care-giving role without assistance. In situations where genocide has occurred, intergenerational hatred may be transmitted by surviving kin when parents are victims. Support to kin during such conflicts and/or for those caring for orphaned children living in chronically challenging environments may be especially important in peace promotion.

In summary, interactions within the family, beliefs that they instill in their members, and contexts in which families exist impact the fostering of socialization capacities that promote a culture of peace. This discussion highlights crucial targets for family-level interventions to reduce violence.

## **Building Cultures of Peace through Families**

Two types of interventions promote peace within families: (1) "top-down" ones aimed at supporting family functioning and changing societal views about acceptable family behavior through statutes, social agents/institutions, and community-based interventions, and (2) "bottom-up" ones that target individual families' capacities for promoting peace and reducing violence. The latter build more directly on the foundation of knowledge described above. However, we see the former as crucial in creating contexts where family-based interventions will be

accepted, as they indicate that a society has begun to acknowledge the rights of vulnerable members and the need for the state to take a role in their protection. Once this occurs, the implementation of family-based interventions typically can flourish. Globally, top-down approaches are the first to emerge (Doron et al. 2004) and are used more often, with bottom-up approaches being more common in developed countries.

### *Top-Down Approaches*

Families rely on the structures around them in order to function. Society plays a role both in providing basic resources they need and in defining their roles and how they operate. In line with this, the global dialogue regarding reducing violence against women, elders, and children within the family has included a call for an emphasis on human rights within any given society (e.g., Ireland: Reilly 2007). The United Nations has framed its discussions on violence prevention and peace building within such a human rights agenda. It defines human rights as “those rights which are essential to live as human beings—basic standards without which people cannot survive and develop in dignity” (UNICEF n.d.). The United Nations has passed the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, arguing that governments need to address family violence as a human rights issue (e.g., in the US, IPV is punishable under civil rights law; Walker 1999). The need for a human rights emphasis is especially tangible when governance at the state level breaks down and violence increases (e.g., rape of female enemies after wars as “the spoils of war,” Walker 1999).

This approach argues for top-down efforts at empowerment of family members and provision of basic needs as essential elements of peace building for families. Laws can provide supports for parenting, couple functioning, and the economic health of communities and reduce harm to women and children. Thus, laws directed at families to support their functioning and to reduce violence, as well as the actions of societal agents, neighborhood networks, and the media, all can play a role in allowing a culture of peace to be actualized.

*Laws.* In many cultures where civil laws exist, governments have begun to intervene in family life. Laws governing power and those providing economic supports and services to families typically emerge first. Examples include women’s property and voting rights, loosening of divorce laws, and child welfare supports. Statutes that govern parenting (e.g., mandatory child school attendance and immunizations, child support laws, child abuse laws), couple practices (e.g., IPV laws), and the treatment of elders (e.g., elder abuse laws) follow. These changes signal an eroding of “sacrosanct” legal boundaries around the family and can act to change parenting behavior and roles within the family (e.g., erode the designating of men as sole decision-makers; Zelizer 1985) and reduce violence. For example, in Kerhala, India, female property ownership was linked to the level of their report

of IPV (e.g., 7% for those who owned property versus 49% for those who did not; Grown et al. 2005).

*Societal agents.* Passing laws is not enough. Key societal agents (e.g., the police, social services systems) must be charged with implementing them, sometimes independently of family wishes (e.g., mandatory arrests of IPV perpetrators; forced removal of children from abusive homes; orders of protection; visitation centers to ensure safety in high-conflict divorces). Procedures also ensure that rights are upheld consistently. For example, parental rights laws guaranteeing access to children cannot be used as a chance to commit violence toward mothers.

In the US, data indicate that such laws and procedures may lower rates of violence within the family (e.g., child abuse, Johnson 2002; IPV, Dugan et al. 2003). Programs have been added to meet the needs of victims of IPV (e.g., legal advocacy programs for battered women, hotlines). Urban areas with greater such alternatives typically have been shown to have lower rates of IPV homicide (Dugan et al. 2003). For example, policies mandating arrests when a protection order is violated are associated with fewer homicides for unmarried partners. However, prevention strategies that fail to limit partner exposure are associated with an increased risk of violence (Dugan et al. 2003). Thus, careful implementation of laws is needed to ensure that they promote peace within families.

*Neighborhood based and self help efforts to promote peace within families.* Neighborhoods, both proximal (e.g., the street where a family resides) and imagined (e.g., a church community), can provide norms and models of behavior for families (Garbarino et al. 1998). Neighborhood programs target families in their natural settings and use naturally occurring networks to produce change. For example, if a community initiates a neighborhood watch program, a message is sent that violence and deviance are not tolerated, creating an environment more conducive to peace. As noted above, perceptions of neighborhood support have been linked with the promotion of more peaceful family actions (Garbarino and Sherman 1980).

In the US, the use of neighborhood-based interventions grew in the 1980s and 1990s to stem urban violence (Garbarino et al. 1998). Battered women's shelters began to be developed with mixed results (e.g., some studies found that 25 to 50% of women returned to their violent homes, Strube 1988; this is less likely for higher SES women). Better outcomes were found when shelters were combined with other services (Berk 1986).

Neighborhood-based efforts to reduce or prevent child abuse have also targeted areas where child deaths were high. One such program, the North Lawndale Family Support Initiative, engaged key community leaders to develop intervention plans and solicit participation (as cited in Garbarino et al. 1998). Community needs assessments, public awareness campaigns, and life-skills training with parents were also offered. Other such programs were aimed at increasing social support to parents. Neighborhood support workers were used to help foster problem-solving, networking, parenting, help-seeking, and support-giving skills. Fantuzzo, Weiss and Coolahan (1998) describe such a program within Head Start. Researchers and community members (CPS, community-based agencies, schools, parents) worked together to increase recruitment of high-risk parents and provide mutual support.

International work has also attempted to empower parents and advance inter-group coexistence. Zelniker and Hert-Lazarowitz (2005) describe an Israeli program that targeted parent-child interactions within schools to promote parents' facilitation of children's literacy and to empower them to "advance coexistence and inter-group relations" in a mixed Jewish-Arab city in Israel (Acre). Arab and Jewish teachers and parents participated in workshops together to address coexistence issues. Parent-to-parent interactions were changed through expressive activities (e.g., singing, dancing, sharing experiences of past and present coexistence, building shared visions of future inter-group relations and education in Acre), and parents were encouraged to model actions of peaceful coexistence for their children. Difficult topics (e.g., inequitable distribution of resources and discriminative policies) were also discussed. Participants were shown to be more involved in schools and feel more competent to promote coexistence, suggesting that community-based family efforts have a role in peace promotion.

*Media and other sources of parental values.* Media, another top-down approach, can be used to reduce beliefs leading to family violence and to promote positive parenting and couple practices. For instance, as part of the Triple P program described later, television episodes and leaflets on parent and child behavior were developed. An Australian study found that exposure to such materials decreased disruptive child behavior and increased the sense of competence in parents (Sanders et al. 2000). Thus, this top-down approach can act in part as a "socializer" that sets the stage for subsequent family-level work.

In summary, such society-level efforts directed at families may be the first step in a larger process of change. These may be followed by efforts to target individual families that are described next.

### ***Bottom-Up Approaches***

Within the family, times of transition provide good opportunities to promote peaceful interactions and prevent the development of aggressive or violent patterns. Thus, we will focus on universal programs directed at stressful transitions where nonpeaceful behaviors may arise.

*Transition to marriage.* Interventions targeting marital relationships at their formation have been shown to increase relationship stability and satisfaction and, most importantly, lower rates of aggression (Halford et al. 2003). Cognitive-behavioral programs target communication patterns and negative emotions (key to reducing marital distress and divorce) as well as positive aspects of the relationship (e.g., fun, support, friendship, commitment, forgiveness, sexual and sensual connection) (key to marital health and personal satisfaction). For example, Markman and his colleagues (2006) have developed the PREP program, where couples are given tools to address negative interactions (e.g., time out, active listening, problem-solving, de-escalating strategies). These programs can be taught in a variety of settings by a variety of providers (e.g., clergy, community leaders), and the skills



can be maintained over time (Markman and Halford 2005). Programs of this type have occurred across the globe (e.g., Australia, Asia, Norway: Markman and Halford 2005). Efforts earlier in the forming of romantic relationship patterns have also occurred (e.g., targeting gender stereotypes and positive male/female relationships in youth; Wolfe et al. 2003).

*Divorce education programs.* Another point of transition is divorce, a period often marked by conflict and, in some cases, aggression (e.g., increased rates of homicide and domestic violence rates, Stolzenberg and D'Alessio 2007). Couples need assistance in maintaining peaceful behaviors as they negotiate this change.

Programs have targeted the legal process (e.g., divorce mediation), the child (e.g., Children of Divorce Intervention Project, Pedro-Carroll and Cowen 1985), and the parent or family unit (e.g., Children of Divorce Parenting Intervention, Wolchik et al. 1993; Children in the Middle, Arbutnot and Gordon 1996; Parenting Through Change Program, Martinez and Forgatch 2001). Here we focus on mediation and parenting programs aimed at reducing conflict.

Mediation, which stresses negotiation of a fair settlement and empowerment, keeps divorce decision making out of an adversarial setting and attempts to reduce the "blaming" process and related conflict. Divorce mediation has shown beneficial effects compared with traditional litigation, such as lower levels of postdivorce litigation, higher rates of pretrial agreements, greater joint custody arrangements, greater satisfaction with the process, and better coparenting (e.g., discussion of problems, mutual parental involvement for child-rearing decisions) at 12-year follow-up (Emery et al. 2005).

Divorce education programs for separating couples are legally mandated or offered on a voluntary basis, although most are limited in scope, and their impact has not been evaluated (Goodman et al. 2004). Grych (2005) argues that such programs should involve training in appropriate conflict expression and management (with an emphasis on avoiding triangulating or causing children to feel torn by their loyalty to both parents) and parenting strategies to manage difficult child behaviors. These elements fit well with the values of a culture of peace. A few such programs have been evaluated, showing positive effects. For example, participants of the Children of Divorce Parenting Intervention (Wolchik et al. 1993) showed better relationships with children, more effective discipline, fewer negative divorce events, and lower child aggression compared to controls. Participants of the Parenting through Change Program showed a smaller increase in child noncompliance and coercive parenting as compared to controls (Martinez and Forgatch 2001). Finally, evaluation of Children in the Middle found that ex-partners were less likely to relitigate and reported better communication, less conflict, and fewer triangulating behaviors (Arbutnot and Gordon 1996).

*Transition to parenthood.* Prevention programs targeting the transition to parenthood have been shown to reduce child abuse and child aggression. The need for support, instruction, and resource linkage among new parents is best met by personalized outreach strategies such as home visitation. The Family-Nurse Partnership program (Olds et al. 1998) targets first-time parents at risk

for child abuse (e.g., teens, single, or low-income parents). Notably, parents' strengths and abilities rather than deficits are the focus (an empowerment strategy linked earlier to lower rates of IPV). Parents are taught skills to meet their own and their newborns' needs and are also encouraged to build alliances with family for support during times of stress. Relative to controls, participants showed better understanding of child health and development, their own development, and self-efficacy. This program has been disseminated throughout the US and Canada. Encouragingly, a 15-year follow-up with 324 mothers and 315 of their firstborn adolescents showed reduced child maltreatment and child criminal behavior (Olds et al. 1998).

Other efforts have targeted parental expectancies, misattributions, and problem-solving deficits associated with child abuse, showing reductions in child maltreatment and injuries (Azar 1989; Azar et al. 2005). Bugental and her colleagues (2002) targeted maternal appraisals and problem-solving as an enhancement to an existing, nationally disseminated home visitor parenting program with high-risk mothers, Healthy Start. The enhanced program showed significantly lower levels of child abuse and spanking compared to the standard one and controls (e.g., 4% vs. 23% and 26% for abuse; 18% vs. 42% for spanking).

Coparenting relationships have also been targeted. The Family Foundations Program, a universal prevention program, helps couples entering parenthood. It trains them in problem-solving, effective communication, and child development. Parents are encouraged to work as a team to achieve calm communication (e.g., modeling cooling down in the face of stress and solving problems effectively). Initial results with 169 first-time parent couples found higher levels of supportive behaviors, lower maternal depression and anxiety, and lower father distress in the parent-child relationship at child age 6 months, compared to controls (Feinberg and Kan, 2008). Follow-up at child age 1 year showed significantly better coparenting, parenting, and problem-solving for participants compared to controls (Feinberg et al., under review). This approach remains to be tested in societies where couple relationships are more hierarchical and where extended family plays a strong coparenting role.

*Transition to school.* School programs aimed at improving child outcomes (e.g., Head Start) may also reduce abuse risk by including parenting elements. Reynolds and Robertson (2003), for example, examined the Chicago Child-Parent Center, designed not only to enhance child outcomes, but also to provide supports to low SES parents (e.g., community activities for parents, parenting skills, vocational help). Participating children showed lower rates of court petitions for child maltreatment by age 17 than those in regular kindergartens (5% vs. 10.5%).

*Multilevel universal prevention.* Triple P Parenting (Sanders 1999) is a multi-level parenting and family support system to promote harmony and reduce parent-child conflict, thereby creating safe, nurturing family environments. Intervention is normalized at multiple ecological levels. Some are universal (e.g., media campaigns, primary care consultations) and some target at-risk families (e.g., intensive parent training). This widely disseminated program has been shown to increase positive parenting and parental efficacy and decrease distress, negative attributions

for child misbehavior, risk of abuse, and unrealistic expectations of children (Sanders et al. 2004).

In summary, efforts at peace directed at families in large systems are underway. Some programs appear promising, but careful evaluations and cross-cultural adaptations are needed.

## **Future Directions: The Application of Approaches Globally**

We have highlighted in our review approaches to promoting peace within the family that have shown effectiveness in changing core behavioral and cognitive factors that have been linked either to violence or more peaceful interactions. These approaches, often directed at points of transition and stress, are very promising as ways to promote cultures of peace. At the same time, we have argued that families cannot accomplish the task alone, and top-down approaches must also be used, providing both empowerment of members and support to their functioning. In tandem, these two approaches may allow a context where achieving peace within the family can be actualized.

Before ending, we want to caution that the knowledge base we have reviewed is not without limitations. Cultural adaptations may be necessary if wide dissemination of programs is to occur (i.e., going beyond just translating protocols into another language; Kreuter et al. 2003). Moreover, although some programs have been implemented and evaluated in contexts marked by stress (points of transitions, high crime urban settings), they have not been examined in contexts characterized by complete community upheaval and basic subsistence deprivation (e.g., war conditions). These strategies are being attempted in such settings (e.g., families in refugee camps and in post-war communities), but have yet to be evaluated. It must be noted that prevention efforts can also produce iatrogenic effects, as observed in health programs (e.g., encouraging condom use with women to prevent AIDS resulted in IPV, Amaro 1995). Perceived program relevance to a given group also needs attention (e.g., in the Israeli school program described earlier, motivation for program engagement was higher among Arab parents who would benefit more from more equitably distributed resources). Acculturation level may also be important if immigrants are targeted. For instance, data from health programs suggest that language-based materials containing culturally relevant motivators for participation are more effective for less acculturated groups in a culture (Marín et al. 1990). Including indigenous staff or community members in planning of programs is crucial (e.g., the Lawnsdale program). Finally, strategies addressing a group's values and beliefs are needed (e.g., challenging of the use of misinterpreted Biblical prescriptions such as "spare the rod, spoil the child" (Peterson, Gables, Doyle & Ewigman, 1997). Other aspects of implementation also need consideration (e.g., involvement of the target population; matching services to community needs; "buy in" from community leaders; Garbarino et al. 1998). With attention to these issues as the programs we described are implemented and adapted, achieving peace within the family may become a reality.

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# **Chapter 8**

## **Participatory Approaches to Community Change: Building Cooperation through Dialogue and Negotiation Using Participatory Rural Appraisal**

**Barbara Thomas-Slayter**

### **The Challenge**

Participatory methodologies that take as their starting point a commitment to social and economic justice, as well as empowerment, are central to meeting the challenge of peace building. People-centered or transformative participation focuses on issues of power and control. It is concerned about the nature of a community and not simply the technical and managerial aspects of organizations and participation in them. From this perspective, participation is about power and particularly about an increase in the power of the disadvantaged. It requires a capacity to identify those who are weaker and disenfranchised within a community and to empower them through shared knowledge and experience.

Participatory approaches to social change have numerous roots in the social movements and transformative theories of the 1960s and 1970s. Among its sources is a community mental health meeting in May 1965 known as the Swampscott Conference on the Education of Psychologists for Community Mental Health. From this conference emerged the field of community psychology, now a flourishing subset of the American Psychological Association. Community psychology has shed its exclusive mental health image to focus on social issues, social institutions, and other settings that influence groups and organizations. The goal is to optimize the well-being of communities and individuals with innovative and alternative interventions designed in collaboration with affected community members and with other related disciplines inside and outside of psychology (Duffy and Wong 2000, p. 8). In fact, many community psychologists attempt to translate social science knowledge into social change, developing methods of intervention in social systems that fight social problems directly. Although it is difficult to obtain agreement on the part of community psychologists to a single definition of the field, one of its main tenets is the principle of participation by ordinary people in the decisions of various social systems that affect them (Murrell 1973, p. 14). Herein is a critical connection between participatory methodologies such as PRA and the broad field of community psychology.



This chapter explores the premises, structure, and objectives of Participatory Rural Appraisal, an approach to community transformation and problem-solving that utilizes many of the insights and findings of community psychology. PRA's objectives are to strengthen communities, raise awareness, provide opportunity for assuring "voice," encourage accountability and transparency, empower through dialogue and negotiation, and mobilize people and resources to meet goals defined by the community. PRA derives formally from a methodology known as Rapid Rural Appraisal first promoted by Robert Chambers of Sussex University in the 1970s in numerous publications and by Gordon Conway, most recently president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Originally fostered for use in developing countries, both PRA and RRA have numerous linkages with the substance and goals of community psychology.

The relevance of PRA to rural communities in developing countries is unquestionable. Half the world's population lives in rural areas, and these communities have a highly disproportionate share of the world's poverty. In fact, 75% of extreme poverty the world over is found in rural areas, a figure that runs counter to common perceptions about growing urbanization and urban poverty (IFAD 2001). While PRA's focus has been rural, the techniques are readily adapted for use in urban communities. It also provides a strategy for redressing resource and well-being imbalances between rural and urban communities, perhaps thus helping to stem the flows of impoverished people from rural communities searching for new opportunities and especially employment in urban settings.

In this chapter, we draw on specific illustrative material from communities in several countries to demonstrate how this approach addresses issues, solves problems, and mobilizes around development objectives through transformative community dialogue and cooperation. Evidence suggests that the use of the PRA methodology contributes to a culture of peace by directly addressing five of the eight elements of a Culture of Peace set forth in UN Resolution A/RES/52/13. As will become evident, PRA values women's voices as well as men's and establishes specific tools for "locating" those voices. It formulates procedures for encouraging democratic participation in decision-making, thereby strengthening elements of civil society. PRA fosters open communication and transparency in decision-making processes and accountability to the community as a whole. It offers mechanisms for including all groups and assuring that all have rights and voice. Its success can be measured concretely by assessing indicators of impact, capacity building, equity, and sustainability in programs and projects introduced to the community.

Here, then, is the potential for PRA. Whether or not it lives up to its potential in any given situation depends upon the skill and effectiveness of the organizers and the commitment of the community to the process. Its effectiveness may also depend upon strategic skills in navigating the shoals of conflict with national elites who may perceive such community activism as threatening.

For over 25 years, Clark University's Department for International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE) has been involved in strengthening a culture of peace by education and training in participatory methodologies, specifically PRA, to address issues of development and social change in local communities.

IDCE has used PRA in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations and universities in many countries, among them Kenya, India, the Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Senegal, and the US. Its objectives are widely shared by our host organizations, such as the Kenyan Government's National Environment Secretariat, Nepal's Institute for Integrated Development Studies, or Senegal's Institute for Environmental Sciences at Cheikh Anta Diop University. At the heart of our collaborative approach to participatory community change are the assumptions that ordinary people are capable of critical reflection and analysis, that their knowledge is relevant, and that there are advantages to collective inquiry and collective action. The approach uses a set of tools that encourages dynamic discussion, dialogue, negotiation, and transparency. There is evidence that these attributes are essential elements of peace building.

The following sections clarify critical terms, identify a range of participatory approaches to community empowerment, explore the PRA methodology, describe two illustrations of PRA's usefulness in building cooperation through dialogue and negotiation, and summarize the connections among PRA, community empowerment, and peace building.

## **Terms Central to Participatory Methodologies**

### ***Defining Empowerment***

Empowerment may be defined as generating or building capacities to exercise control over one's life. Empowerment can take place individually or collectively. It requires knowledge of existing and potential possibilities as well as knowledge about how to obtain the resources needed to achieve a goal. Individuals, through their experiences and through consciousness-raising and training, can analyze their personal situations and their positions within the immediate community. They can also learn how to mobilize their resources for change. Individual and group empowerment may be closely intertwined. In economic, social, and political terms, empowerment brings about measurable changes in who holds power and how it is exercised. A significant measure of empowerment is the knowledge members of a community have about mobilizing their own resources for their own vision of peaceful change. Empowerment is central to the process of building an equitable and sustainable future because it is directly linked to both social and economic equity and to resource access and use.

Addressing and transforming inequitable relations is a complex matter. One of the ways disadvantaged groups can build capacities and collective strength is through organizing. While there is a residual strength in the numbers of the disadvantaged, they often do not realize the collective power they can have if they act in unison. A community organizing process can help groups to articulate a common vision and then work toward it. Small successes can lead to larger ones, and groups

can begin to build up resources. This is not a one-time activity; it is a process that evolves as participants reflect on and extract lessons from their experiences. It is their common action and a growing consciousness of their worth and value that empowers them.

Empowerment through organizing, education, and training can lead to more widespread participation in decision-making processes that shape power structures and determine access to resources. Empowerment envisions a relationship of equals. As disadvantaged groups gain confidence, knowledge, voice, and abilities, they may begin to regard themselves as active partners with other sectors of society. Over time they may be able to command respect for and acknowledgement of their concerns at negotiating tables. All of this, of course, is not without risk of confrontation with those who do not wish to give up privileged positions. The intent, however, is empowerment through negotiation and dialogue based on growing capacities and strength.

### *Defining Poverty*

Understanding the linkages among peace, poverty, and participation is central to this analysis. To start with a conceptualization of poverty, we draw on Kabeer's (1991) notion of poverty as both state and process. Defining poverty as a situation in which resources are insufficient to meet basic needs, the *state* of poverty focuses on shortfalls in needs satisfaction, while the *process* of poverty is concerned with the causes and mechanisms of the generation and transmission of poverty. Resources are distributed in a society through a complex system of entitlements that are in turn shaped by the social relations and practices governing possession, distribution, and use in that society. Impoverishment occurs because of a deterioration in the value of the two main parameters—endowments and exchange entitlements—which constitute the basis of household or individual claims to the social product (Kabeer 1991; Sen 1990). We are concerned with the social relations that shape these entitlements. Participatory approaches to decision-making specifically foster methods of dialogue and negotiation to resolve disagreements over allocation of endowments and entitlements.

Peace building requires that all households, including poor households, be seen as part of the solution—not merely part of the problem—for addressing concerns, improving capacities for managing resources, and diminishing vulnerabilities. These objectives can more readily be achieved by broadly engaging households within a community in voicing their claims and concerns and by increasing their capabilities for participating in local institutions and managing resources. Gaining such participation requires enabling institutions. Such institutions may vary greatly, but democratic decentralization of decision-making, through approaches such as PRA, is one way to increase the participation of local people in community decision-making and management. With attention to voice, accountability, and transparency, both efficiency and equity should be increased. Thus, PRA is one approach to participatory development and social change that can help build a culture of peace.

## *Defining Participation*

Participation in development and community change is broadly understood as active involvement of people in making decisions about the implementation of processes, programs, and projects that affect them. The term “participation” is a catch-all concept that sometimes disguises and confuses more than it clarifies and reveals. “Passive participation” is one-way communication of information from a sponsoring agency to members of the community. This kind of participation is easily manipulated by local leaders to build patronage, and it tends to promote dependence rather than self-reliance. “Reactive participation” is usually controlled by the external development agent. There may be donations of labor, money, or other resources, but the initiative lies with the outside party, and there are rarely ongoing forms of community organization. Over time the activity dissipates. Active or full participation arises within a community. Community members themselves are the agents of change, though they may act in concert with outside sources of funds, technical expertise, or other resources. The advantages of this form of participation are that leadership and initiative are based within local communities and that grassroots organizations often arise through general community mobilization.

There is no doubt that the term “participation” covers a wide variety of activities; over the decades, participatory methodologies have been employed carefully by some and abused by others. In actuality, participation can be used for purposes of transforming a present system or for simply maintaining the status quo. The next section provides an overview of participatory methodologies as they have been used, particularly in developing countries, over the past half century.

## **A Brief Overview of Participatory Approaches to Community Empowerment in Developing Countries**

Notable in the post-World War II period have been three approaches to participation: (a) people’s organizations and cooperatives; (b) community development or *animation rurale*; and (c) guided participation in large-scale projects. The first category contains a wide range of people’s activities, including welfare agencies, membership organizations, and cooperatives. Relief and welfare organizations arise out of a long history of assistance to victims of war, drought, or other disasters. The aim is to supply relief and welfare goods and activities, and the only participation required is that of the needy in receipt of benefits.

Cooperatives are found throughout much of the world as a means to pool members’ economic resources for their collective benefit. They vary widely in structure and purpose and include such activities as marketing associations, credit unions, consumer societies, or producer coops. While they are formed with intention of mobilizing the potentials of collective power, they often have strong top-down sponsorship by the state rather than local recognition of the benefits of collective

action. Membership organizations include a wide range of local associations and sometimes larger federations, formed around specific tasks such as a water users' association; around the needs or interests of a particular group, such as a tenants' union or an ethnic or women's or youth association; or around multiple tasks, such as a neighborhood association.

Community development and *animation rurale* are two types of programs in which the state has promoted participation by local residents in development activities. Emerging from colonial roots in many parts of the world, community development and the French *animation rurale* are approaches whereby local communities are organized to address problems of development with limited capital assistance and outside expertise.

A third general approach to participation seeks to include people in the planning and implementation of development projects that are usually externally initiated, funded, and ultimately controlled, creating a working relationship between development authorities and a rural population (Bergdall 1993). While these efforts cover a wide range, from essentially community-centered to largely government-centered approaches to popular participation, ultimately it is the professional planners who determine levels of people's participation in these arrangements.

In recent decades, these approaches to participation and community change have been the target of serious criticism, as their shortcomings have become increasingly evident. Usually such approaches have been top down and unsustainable. Data have been taken out of the community; planning and project design have been external to the community. Critics of these approaches have emphasized that participation should include involvement in decision-making processes, implementation, sharing in the benefits, and evaluation. Perhaps the most obvious criticism of the traditional approaches to participation concerns the ease with which they become manipulative or even coercive. At best they may help to develop local capacities and lead to local responsibility for a project that is based on local wishes. At worst, they satisfy bureaucratic imperatives, keep local people in a passive subordinate position, and cause dissatisfaction and frustration over implementation of participatory approaches to community change.

The people-centered critique of these traditional methods of participation casts a broad net, focusing on issues of power and control as noted above in the discussion of empowerment. Paolo Freire's (1970) work showed how processes of conscientization led to people's awareness of the structural causes of poverty and helped build consensus and action based on individual creativity and knowledge. E. F. Schumacher (1973) offered alternative approaches to organizing community life and livelihoods; the Cornell University Rural Development Committee pioneered both theoretical and empirical research in an effort to understand participation, local organizations, and local institutional development (Cohen and Uphoff 1977). Korten (1980) conceptualized the "learning process approach," Korten and Klass (1984) put forth a people-centered as opposed to a production-centered approach, and Robert Chambers and other colleagues at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the UK have written for over two decades on ways to put rural people first (Chambers 1983, 1997).

For people's organizations, community organizers, and facilitators alike, the major challenges are to empower without being paternalistic, to enable without being top-down, to eliminate structural constraints along with patterns of passivity, to find realistic options, and to organize practical action. These are all elements of a culture of peace. A number of models arising in different parts of the world illustrate people-centered approaches to transformation and social change. They are variations on a theme and include not only Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), but also Participatory Action Research (PAR) with its three elements of research, education, and socio-political action. A well-known example of PAR is the Community Information and Planning System (CIPS), developed in the Philippines by the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas. Another model is Training for Transformation (TFT), which originated in Zimbabwe and focuses on the links between development and education for liberating people from all that oppresses them. The participatory methodology known as PALM, Participation and Learning Methods, is associated with MYRADA, an Indian NGO; Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) is an approach developed by the Canadian Coody Institute. Appreciative Inquiry (AI), founded by D. L. Cooperrider of Case Western Reserve (Cooperrider and Whitney 2005) emphasizes assets and capabilities in determining organizational development and strategies, as opposed to problem-solving. Policy Analysis for Participatory Poverty Alleviation (PAPPA) is an outgrowth of efforts at Clark University to link PRA with technical and statistical data analysis. As indicated, the participatory methodologies have their origins in various corners of the world, but they share a common objective to move individuals and their communities toward critical discovery, self-awareness, organization, and action. These are all elements not only of social change and development, but also of a peace-building process.

## **The PRA methodology: Definition, Assumptions, Objectives, Indicators of Success, and Steps**

### *A Definition*

PRA provides an organizational structure that focuses and systematizes grassroots participation. It is a methodology for bringing together the local community, technical staff, and extension officers in order to gathering spatial, historical, social, institutional, and technical data using participatory rapid appraisal techniques and to make decisions about changes desired by and for the local community. Several elements are important. First, data-gathering involves local people in order to make the process open, transparent, and ultimately accountable to people across the community. Second, the task-oriented and visual nature of the PRA enables local people to see and to comment on the data being collected. The process is interactive and tangible. Third, decisions are fully vetted through tools such as pairwise ranking, and the process for reaching closure and determining actions

is fully transparent. The PRA methodology encourages local communities to develop linkages among actors and groups at different scales through coalitions, alliance building, and networking. Such linkage and partnerships constitute a bridge between external opportunities and local initiatives, providing several advantages to the local community and to policy makers. The linkages and partnerships that emerge from the PRA methodologies, along with the inclusiveness and transparency within the community, can help overcome a variety of problems arising from suspicion, even contestation, that plague many communities.

PRA uses multi-sectoral teams to join with village leaders and designated members to create village action plans. The plan becomes the basis for development and social change projects in the community, and it enables local institutions, governmental units, and nongovernmental organizations to cooperate in their implementation. Thus, creating the plan is a systematic yet semi-structured activity carried out in a local community by a multidisciplinary team. It is a transparent process that is fully vetted by and ultimately endorsed by the community.

### ***Objectives***

The objectives of PRA are:

- 1) to strengthen communities by increasing their problem-solving capacities, their organization of productive resources and access to outside resources, and their organizational capabilities in managing their programs and projects;
- 2) to raise the consciousness of local people about their capabilities and rights and to provide opportunity for assuring 'voice' not just of local elites and leaders, but of a broad cross-section of the community;
- 3) to mobilize the community in ways defined by the community in order to address needs and priorities identified by community members;
- 4) to encourage accountability and transparency on the part of leaders and administrators to the broad public; and
- 5) to empower local communities in ways that enable community members to address their problems with newfound capacities for dialogue, to deal with conflict and disagreements, to compromise, and to reach solutions that will provide equitable benefits.

### ***Assumptions***

PRA rests on several important assumptions. First, ordinary people are capable of critical reflection and analysis. They know their own communities, and their knowledge is relevant to policy and project planning. Second, there are advantages to collective inquiry. The process is quite different from that of individual interviews

or questionnaires. It involves group dynamics, often in focus group discussions, and it provides an opportunity for participating in exchanges that reveal the underlying dynamics of power relations and the resource base within a community. Third, villages have resources, but they need to be mobilized. These resources may be in the form of knowledge, labor potential, or natural resources. Without a focal point, without organization and management, without information-sharing, they may not be brought to bear on the problem or need at hand. PRA assumes that local residents have a good working knowledge of their ecological and development needs, but do not necessarily have the means to make all this information systematic or to mobilize their communities to take action to solve problems. Fourth, development projects and programs are more effective if people are engaged through organizations. Specifically, communities need committed local leadership and effective rural institutions. Fifth, the local community is the building block for sustainable rural production. That is, rural communities form the active foundation for addressing natural resource degradation, increasing food production, and a range of other development problems. Outside resources are available, but need to be defined and linked to village priorities. PRA serves as an excellent tool to bring together, on the one hand, development needs defined by community groups and, on the other, the resources and technical skills of government, donor agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. In so doing, it integrates local, perhaps traditional, skills and external technical knowledge in the development process.

### *Measures of Success*

Underlying the participatory and inclusive decision-making processes of PRA and the resulting activities are three categories of indicators that measure success: impact indicators, process indicators, and sustainability indicators (Thomas-Slayter and Sodikoff 2003).

Impact indicators have both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Productivity can be measured in terms of increased output per given unit of land, inputs, labor, or period of time. Improved productivity may also be a matter of decreased labor time for the same output, and it can be determined by measuring income. For welfare, it is possible to select those indicators most relevant in any given situation, for example, health, educational opportunity, improved housing, or better sanitation. Equity as a measure will reveal how broadly based the improvements in welfare and productivity are. Analyzing equity requires consideration of social groups and suggests that the contextual analysis (as part of the primary data gathering exercises) is an important component of building indicators.

There are four process indicators that can be useful in determining the effectiveness of PRA in meeting its objectives. They include capacity building on the part of individuals or a local group or community. What new skills have been acquired; what local knowledge has been identified and used; what institutions have been



strengthened? Organizational skills suggest the development of group capabilities in identifying problems, prioritizing solutions, implementing a program, dealing with conflict, consensus building, negotiation, and problem-solving. The emergence of local leadership committed to these goals and able to mobilize and organize local groups is another important indicator of success in strengthening processes of decision-making. Finally, partnerships can strengthen efforts to bring about social change or to build a culture of peace by linking the various stakeholders in a common effort.

Sustainability indicators are essential for determining not only the viability of an activity or project at the moment an evaluation is being prepared, but also its longevity and influence. Sustainability indicators include replicability. Can others readily undertake a similar activity? Can the project or program spread on the basis of its own merits without an outside organizer or initiative? Another sustainability indicator is the presence of local ownership. If local people find an activity useful and are prepared to assume responsibility for assuring its continuation, local ownership has been achieved and so has a new level of local empowerment. Cost-effectiveness is an essential part of sustainability. If a project is not cost effective—in the broadest sense of the term, including all levels of effort required of local people to sustain it—then it is unlikely to be supported by local residents. Measures of cost-effectiveness include a comparison of costs with community resources, the ratio of net benefits to costs, and per-unit costs. Environmental sustainability is an essential element of sustainability. If the activity has, on balance, a negative impact on the environment, it may bring short-term benefits, but is not sustainable in the long term. Many activities have both positive and negative effects on the environment, and these must be weighed in each situation.

### *Steps in Setting Up and Carrying out a PRA*

Participatory Rural Appraisal has eight steps (NES 1990):

1. Site selection, approval and support from local officials: The sites may be selected as part of an ongoing program. In other situations, a local district or community may ask for a PRA on the basis of information received or opportunity to observe the impact in a nearby community.
2. Team selection and composition: The team usually numbers six to eight, with expertise varying according to the community and the data that need to be collected. For example, perhaps it would include a forester, a water engineer, or a public health expert depending on the particular problems the community is addressing. The team would be intersectoral and inter-agency and would have, in addition to the six to eight, members from the community.
3. Preliminary visits to discuss and launch the PRA: These visits would focus on explanations of the PRA methodology, what it will and will not do, what is expected from the community, what is expected from the sponsoring agency. It would also focus on the nature of the community and how it defines itself.
4. Data collection: This process includes spatial, time-related, social and technical data focusing on the problems of the community. Data collection involves triangulation

(a diversity of sources that focus on similar issues) in order to assure that the data collected with one methodology is confirmed with another technique. The approach draws on the Chambers' philosophy of 'optimal ignorance,' collecting only that information that is required to meet the needs of the community and the PRA, not information for the sake of information. It also uses unconventional, informal, and semi-structured means for data collection in order to involve people who would not normally provide information in a questionnaire or survey sample. It makes extensive use of group discussions and of visual instruments. Finally, the PRA involves an open agenda, not a preset plan that the team wants to impose on the community.

5. **Synthesis and analysis:** The team, including community members, analyzes the data collected in order to be able to present it at an open community meeting. The team focuses on problems, their status and magnitude, their causes, and the opportunities to resolve the problem that a local group or local institutions can initiate. It also makes certain that all the data required for decision-making have been collected before the information is taken to a public meeting. Sometimes this involves additional information, such as clarifying suitable sites for accessing water or obtaining new information on appropriate tree species.
6. **Setting problems in priority order and exploring opportunities to resolve them:** The community-at-large in a public meeting discusses and ranks the problems, using tools such as pairwise ranking. (A range of tools used in the PRA approach is found in the PRA Handbook listed in the bibliography under National Environment Secretariat, Government of Kenya.) Sometimes it is necessary to subdivide the meetings by neighborhood, by age, by gender, or by other criteria or various combinations of attributes in order to assure that all voices are heard.
7. **Ranking opportunities by priority and feasibility and preparing a plan:** Once the problems have been determined and ranked, the next step is to consider the various ways to address them. It is here that different interests defined by gender, class, age, and other characteristics may divide a community quite deeply. For example, all may agree that access to water is a problem. However, do individual community members wish to address it by improvement of specific springs, by a new dam, by improved bench terracing, by construction of household water tanks, or some other mechanism? Open discussion, structured opportunities for hearing all voices, and the pairwise ranking tool are valuable to this process.
8. **Adoption and implementation of the plan:** Once there is agreement on the plan and the activities to be undertaken, structures are put into place to carry out the work and evaluate the results. These responsibilities are assumed by community members in coordination with government staff and cooperating NGOs.

## **Two Illustrations of PRA at Work**

The process of building partnerships among local groups, as well as between local groups and external agencies, links micro activities and macro structures; it also helps to transcend individual agendas, turf struggles, and entrenched roles. The dialogue enables groups to identify effective approaches to local development and

resource management and broadens their capacity for flexible, innovative action. It is useful to consider two specific examples drawn from the work of Clark University and host institutions.

### *Jeded, Somalia*

Jeded\* is a village of nomadic households located in northeastern Somalia. Founded in the early 1950s because of a new well and good grazing, Jeded is an important watering point and provisioning station for a large nomadic community. In 1994, with support from the German Aid Agency (GTZ) and in collaboration with the Bari Regional Council and several Somali NGOs, the people of Jeded determined to undertake a planning exercise in the form of a Participatory Rural Appraisal and to develop a Community Action Plan.

During the course of the PRA, a dispute began to simmer as a result of the ranking exercise.† By previous agreement, about 100 men and women sat together to work out the details of the ranking of village problems. Yet some of the older men felt uneasy—perhaps even annoyed—that women were participating on equal terms with the men to make decisions about Jeded’s future. Three men even walked out of the ranking session as a protest against women participating in village decision-making. The PRA team had a problem. It was becoming increasingly clear that ignoring the tension would lead to a total collapse of the PRA process and principles. Yet to take on the dispute could lead to unfortunate and perhaps even disastrous confrontations between and among men, women, and the PRA team. No one would emerge as a beneficiary from such a dispute.

On one hand, the team wanted to respect traditions and procedures within the village. There was no government, which meant that the elders were the only formal structure through which to work. Thus, respect for the elders’ position was quite important. On the other hand, the PRA team had been meeting regularly with Jeded’s women and had gathered fundamentally important information about their views of problems, causes, and possible solutions. Further, the very basis of PRA’s rationale is that one of the necessary prerequisites for sustainable resource use is equity in resource access.

The PRA team leaders chose a third option, namely to begin a process of enabling each group to “walk in the others’ shoes.” In meetings with small numbers of elders and also with key women leaders of the village, they launched a process of

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\*The case of Jeded, Somalia, is drawn from Ford et al. (1994). The specific vignette about Jeded was prepared by Barbara Thomas-Slayter for inclusion as a conflict resolution tool in *Power, Process and Participation, Tools for Change* (pp. 79–81).

†There are many excellent books of tools for working with local communities. Detailed explanations of many tools are found in B. Thomas-Slayter et al., *A manual for socio-economic and gender analysis* and Slocum et al., *Power, process and participation*. Several other books on tools for community change relevant to this discussion are found in the bibliography.

reflection on the viewpoints of others involved in the PRA and on ways to facilitate working arrangements among members of the community and the PRA team. The PRA team raised questions about needs, interests, and perceptions of all parties and proposed a series of task forces as well as a PRA Steering Committee. Task forces would focus on specific project activities and include interested people from different groups in the village. The Steering Committee would include three members each from Jeded's three major groupings: elders, women, and the young adults (youth). The cluster of task forces would replicate the problems identified in the ranking with some very sensitive sorting out of responsibilities. Their duties would parallel, as closely as possible, the priorities that each village group had identified. Once these clarifications and divisions of labor were assigned, tensions began to dissolve. The men felt comfortable that they had been consulted and that the structure of the Steering Committee was consistent with village traditions. The women were pleased as the arrangement gave them a formal role in the Steering Committee and specific responsibilities in human health, income generation, and shared duties in water. Even before the formal village meeting to discuss the proposed structure, elders, women, and youth were all indicating broad satisfaction with the arrangements.

### *Pwani, Kenya*

During a Participatory Rural Appraisal exercise in Pwani<sup>‡</sup>, residents identified water, fuelwood supply, lack of family planning services, low crop yields, livestock disease, transgression of the park boundary, poor road conditions, inadequate health care facilities, insufficient employment opportunities, and lack of a secondary school as the primary problems in their community. Across class, gender, and age lines, water scarcity was regarded as the most pressing problem. However, people experienced and ranked problems differently. These differences, the power structures, the presence of outsiders, and the local decision-making process all affected what finally became the PRA Community Action Plan.

Among the wealthier households, construction of a dam was the priority solution for the widely shared water problem. Initially, the PRA's community plan gave top priority to dam rehabilitation. This decision implied a diversion of self-help group resources away from home water tanks and toward the dam as community infrastructure. The choice to give first priority to the dam was forged from the convergence of men in general as cattle owners, wealthy or influential women who already had water tanks, and very poor women with little or no chance of building a home water tank through group efforts. The community members who would

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<sup>‡</sup>This discussion of the PRA and decision-making in Pwani, Kenya, by Dianne Rocheleau is found in Slocum et al., *Power, Process and Participation, Tools for Change* (pp. 227–228). It is based on a longer study entitled "People, property, poverty, and parks: A story of men, women, water, and trees at Pwani" by D. Rocheleau, K. Schofield-Leca, and N. Mbuti in *Gender, environment and development in Kenya*, edited by B. Thomas-Slayter and D. Rocheleau (1995, pp. 133–160).

have placed home tanks as the first priority were women who did not yet have household tanks, but hoped to build them with group assistance in the near future.

Throughout the PRA problem-identifying process, women raised the issue of fuelwood scarcity, but men tended to accord it low priority. Women generally favored setting fuelwood as the second priority after water. The men, however, talked about roads and markets. In a PRA discussion, the relationship of fuelwood and gender issues was clearly demonstrated. The discussion took place in a church with officials, outsiders, the combined presence of women and men, and a high proportion of wealthy and influential community members. This mixing of groups produced a struggle over the meaning of women's work, women's resources, and women's voices in public affairs relating to resource management. By the end of the meeting, decision makers had disregarded fuelwood needs and had listed a secondary school, roads, a hospital, and improved agriculture as the priorities. The hospital was derived from women's complaints about the lack of family planning services. "Family planning" was renamed "hospital" by the men.

The next day, community leaders and residents asked the PRA team and officials to let them meet alone to resolve the confusion of the previous day. After the meeting, community leaders announced that roads and a hospital were beyond the community's resources. They further noted that there is more to trees than fuel, such as timber, fodder, food, medicine, and increased soil fertility. Thus was born the "tree planting and tree protection" priority rather than the fuelwood problem with a fuelwood solution.

In spite of a consensus on water as the most significant problem, distinctly different interests were reflected in choice of options for addressing it. These differences demonstrated the importance of assuring adequate representation of different groups, by gender and class, in the overall community meetings. Alternatively, it may be more effective to determine priorities of distinct interest groups in separate sessions and to use a community-wide forum to negotiate just solutions acceptable to all parties. In any case, it is essential to determine the nature of the various interests groups; the relative number of people in each group; and the kinds of interests at stake.

## **Communities and Building a Culture of Peace**

PRA provides a way to collect and evaluate local data, to consider local priorities and aspirations, and to examine potential actions on the part of the community. It offers possibilities for strengthening cooperation in identifying, planning, and implementing programs and projects that will increase equitable and sustainable development. It is based on open communication, transparency, and participation. It values all voices within a community and provides a structure whereby all may be heard. Its purpose is to tackle the root causes of local problems in ways that are sustainable and lead to increased well-being, equity, productivity, capacity, and empowerment.

Are there critiques of PRA and other participatory methods? Of course, there are many. Does it always function effectively and according to the model presented? Certainly it does not. Participatory approaches may not deal adequately with various forms of stratification. They may be used to legitimize the agendas of others. The term PRA itself is sometimes used loosely, making it difficult to distinguish among those processes that are managed effectively and those that are not. PRAs can generate a lot of qualitative information that can be difficult to assimilate. They can raise false expectations that can quickly lead to PRA fatigue. There are numerous sources of these and other criticisms of participatory approaches to social change (Aune 2003; Duffy and Wong 2000; Leurs 2003; Slocum et al. 1995; Thomas-Slayter et al. 1995).

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that empowerment through effective participation can provide real opportunities for peaceful change. Successes that groups experience in identifying, planning, and executing activities enable community members to realize their own capacities to respond to community concerns. The process of working together to solve their problems becomes the means toward discovering what is necessary to mobilize resources and realize aspirations. Local ownership of programs and projects helps assure economic, environmental, and social sustainability. Thus, in strengthening local capacities and such attributes as increased voice, transparency, and accountability, Participatory Rural Appraisal contributes to a culture of peace.

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# Chapter 9

## Community Reconciliation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction for Peace

Michael Wessells

### Introduction

Contemporary armed conflicts are no longer fought on well-defined battlefields, but in and around communities (Machel 2001; Wessells 1998), which are targeted directly or subjected to terror tactics such as suicide bombings. As a result, communities suffer enormous physical damage, including losses of homes, schools, livelihoods, health facilities, and other infrastructure.

Although this damage transforms the physical landscape, war prompts an even greater transformation of social relations, creating a full-blown culture of war. At the societal level, war strengthens institutions such as armies and ministries of defense, heightens military spending, and creates an environment in which war propaganda and enemy images flourish. At the community level, war and violence become normalized and woven into the fabric of daily life. Not uncommonly, communities organize militias in hopes of protecting villagers against attacks, and markets and places of worship may become sites for recruitment. In addition, the mass displacement and hardships of war shatter communities, reducing people to a state of desperate competition over necessities such as food, water, and shelter. As social cohesion plummets and norms of law and order and other social controls weaken, the doors open ever wider to spreading violence and lawlessness.

The burdens of this social transformation fall disproportionately on children, who are defined under international law as people under 18 years of age and who typically comprise half the population in war-torn countries. Owing to the physical deprivations and hardships, war causes soaring mortality rates for children under five years of age. In many armed conflicts, particularly protracted ones that last a decade or more, children may grow up with war as a constant part of their daily lives and have no reference point for conceptualizing peace. Having observed adults using violence as a means of handling conflict, children tend to see violence as appropriate and even glamorous. Indeed, for children who feel powerless and have been deprived of reliable access to food, water, and security, the opportunity to wear a uniform and wield a gun carries a heady power and the opportunity to “be someone” (Brett and Specht 2004). Also, wars enable the brutal exploitation of



children. In recent wars in Africa, large numbers of children were forcibly recruited through abduction. In this manner, they became part of the approximately 250,000 children who are believed to be in armed forces or groups at any particular moment and who have become an essential part of the global war system (Machel 2001; Wessells 2006).

To break this war system and to convert a culture of war into a culture of peace is no small feat; it requires careful attention to community reconciliation and peacebuilding. Although the signing of a ceasefire often elicits much joy, many communities continue to live in what can only be regarded as a culture of war. Not uncommonly, the death toll increases following the cessation of conflict as disease, crime, and lack of access to basic services exact a heavy toll (Collier et al. 2003). Violence after the accord may be widespread owing to crime and banditry, much of which is perpetrated by former soldiers who retain their military identities and see no way of meeting their needs through lawful activity in civilian life. Often, the breakdown of social controls, including the low capacity of the police and judicial systems, enables gender-based violence to occur on a wide scale. Amidst these difficulties, local communities may feel disconnected from wider, societal processes of building a culture of peace. As one elder in Sierra Leone said, “I was hungry before the war. I was hungry during the war. And now I am still hungry...” A significant challenge, then, is to build a culture of peace at community level following armed conflict and all the physical and social destruction it has wrought.

A key component of building a culture of peace following armed conflict is the reintegration of children and youth who have been soldiers. The reintegration of young people is a societal obligation enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, yet it is also a high priority from a peacebuilding perspective. Without having a place in civilian life, youth may return to the gun, becoming mercenaries abroad or continuing cycles of violence in their own societies (Human Rights Watch 2005; Wessells 2006). At the village level, powerful fears of returning child soldiers can impede reintegration, and there may be reprisal attacks on people who are viewed as enemies or traitors. These fears, tensions, and attacks at the community level can derail peace processes and pose significant challenges to building a culture of peace. However, it is important to avoid focusing in too singular a manner on formerly recruited young people. Since all young people in war zones have suffered, and those who have been displaced also need to be reintegrated, it is important to support all war-affected young people (Machel 2001). Also, excessive focus on one particular group can spark jealousies that divide rather than reconcile community members with each other.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine diverse methods of community reconciliation and peacebuilding following armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Recognizing that the study of community reconciliation is still in its formative stages and is dominated by Western approaches, I will present brief case studies from relatively non-Westernized contexts. Three case studies from Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, respectively, emphasize reconciling formerly recruited young people, defined as people under 25 years of age, with communities in rural areas. The focus on young people is appropriate since they are increasingly influential

political actors and fighters, yet they often receive little attention in post-conflict environments (Sommers 2005; Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2001). They often face significant challenges of reconciliation with communities, who may regard them as perpetrators. The focus on rural areas is valuable. Being far from the central government, they can be likely places of operation for spoilers or people who, frustrated by the poor performance of the government, take up arms to overthrow it. Although the case studies emphasize the importance of community empowerment and reliance on local cultural understandings and practices, they will also point out the value of constructive partnerships between Western psychology and local practices.

### **Angola: Cultural Approaches to Community Reconciliation**

The Angolan wars began in 1961 as a liberation struggle from Portugal. Following liberation in 1975, several groups struggled for power. The primary struggle was between the socialist government and UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which received extensive backing from the US and South Africa during the Cold War years as part of the effort to contain communism (Minter 1994). Although a durable ceasefire was achieved in 2002 following the killing of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, there were enormous needs for peacebuilding, reestablishing security and the rule of law, and meeting basic needs.

Following intensive fighting in the early 1990s, an interim peace accord was signed in 1994. A high priority was for community reconciliation that would enable formerly recruited children to transition into civilian life. At that time, reintegration efforts typically focused on meeting basic necessities and on helping young people to earn a livelihood. Community reconciliation was typically not viewed as part of the reintegration process, and even when it was, the thinking reflected mostly Western ideas. In the context of rural Angola, where traditions ran strong, Western approaches, which emphasize material processes (contact, communication, conciliation activities, etc.) that improve social relationships, had limited currency.

An essential first step, one that required taking an anthropological perspective, was to understand how local people and the formerly recruited young people themselves understood the problem. To achieve this perspective, the staff of Christian Children's Fund (CCF)/Angola used ethnographic methods to map the local understandings of the situation of formerly recruited young people and to gain a window on the subjective understandings of the children and youth themselves. Interestingly, both the young and villagers viewed the main barriers to reintegration as spiritual in nature. For example, one 14-year-old boy who had been recruited said he was unable to sleep and was unfit for normal life as a civilian. Although his combination of nightmares and social avoidance fit the general pattern of post-traumatic stress disorder (Green et al. 2003), he viewed his problem in spiritual terms, saying "I cannot sleep at night because the spirit of the man I killed comes to me and asks 'Why did you do this to me?'" Queried further, the boy said he feared the angry

spirit of the man he had killed and believed the spirit could harm him and anyone he came into contact with, including family and community members.

Local villagers agreed with the boy's understanding. According to the *soba* (traditional chief) of the boy's village, the living have an obligation to honor the ancestors by performing traditions. One of these traditions is to have an appropriate local healer conduct a cleansing ritual for soldiers who have killed people and are haunted by angry spirits. To fail to conduct such a ritual is to place the boy, his family, and the village at risk of harm caused by the angry spirits. For both the boy and the *soba*, then, the problem is neither individual nor material, but collective and spiritual. Because the problem is spiritual, local people believe that it needs to be addressed by the conduct of a purification ritual that will cleanse the boy of his spiritual impurities and relieve the community of their fears (Wessells and Monteiro 2001).

Undergirding these beliefs is the worldview that events in the visible world are caused by events in the invisible world of the ancestors. Ordinarily, the ancestors protect the living. Yet when they are not honored through the practice of traditions, the ancestors may remove their protection or cause direct harm. According to one elder, "The ancestral spirits can help you, but they can also harm you...if they feel neglected they can punish people by provoking illness or can even cause death" (Honwana 1998, p. 21).

Viewing spiritual reconciliation as a necessary component of the reintegration of former boy soldiers, CCF/Angola worked extensively in the period 1996–1998 with communities and traditional healers, who identified which children needed to be cleansed and who then conducted the appropriate cleansing rituals. The focus was on boy soldiers because it was thought at the time of the project that there were few girls who had been recruited, an assumption that turned out to be fallacious (Stavrou 2005).

The rituals were not isolated events, but were preceded by a period of fasting, adherence to a special diet, and moral tutelage by the healers. When a healer believed a boy was ready to be cleansed, he announced the ceremony to the village, prompting their attendance. The rituals varied across regions, yet had numerous features in common. Typically, the healer demarcated a safe space by burning around its perimeter sacred herbs believed to ward off angry spirits. Inside the safe space, the healers unclothed and ritually bathed the former soldier, using special soaps and herbs to expunge the evil spirits. This external washing was often accompanied by fumigation in which the former soldier sat with a blanket over his head, breathing the vapor of selected herbs to expunge bad spirits. Also, the healer usually made an offering in the form of a sacrificed animal or money to the angry spirits as a means of reconciliation. At the end of the ceremony, the healer announced the boy's purity and transition. In one area, the healer invited the boy to step across the threshold, out of the safe space, announcing as the boy stepped that "This boy's life as a soldier has now ended—he is now a civilian and can join with us as he wishes." In another area, the healer had the boy bury his military uniform and weapons, announcing as he did so that the boy was no longer a soldier, but a civilian.

In both these cases and 20 others that the CCF team had documented, the boy reported that following the ritual, he felt able to participate with his family and community without any fear of angry spirits (Wessells and Monteiro 2004). Although these cases involved boys, cleansing rituals have also been shown to support the reintegration of formerly recruited girls in countries such as Sierra Leone (Wessells 2006). Similarly, community members indicated that they no longer feared the formerly recruited boys since the rituals had purged the bad spirits and reestablished spiritual harmony with the ancestors. Whether this approach to reconciliation is more impactful than others remains a subject for future research. Still, this preliminary evidence suggests that spiritual reconciliation plays an important role in enabling good relations with the community and aiding reintegration (Honwana 2006; Wessells 2006).

The importance of spiritual reconciliation as part of communal peacebuilding in Angola has also been visible in the return home of displaced people, who comprised nearly one-third of the population at the height of the conflict. A significant challenge to resettlement following war years and in some cases decades of displacement was people's fear of angry spirits that had not been honored through the conduct of appropriate burial rites. For example, Kuito, the capital city of Bie Province, had been the site of house-to-house fighting in which large numbers of people had been killed, but had not received the funeral rites or *obito* owing to displacement and the presence of snipers. When people returned to Kuito following the war, they expressed strong fear that they would be attacked by angry spirits, leading many people to avoid going out at night. Also, many people believed that additional violence would erupt because the spirits of the people who had not been buried properly were angry. In rural areas, people believed that even the war itself had had spiritual causes, making it important to address these concerns. The situation was fragile since tensions already existed between long-term residents and returnees, and the occurrence of any fighting could escalate rapidly in the absence of law and order.

An enigma was how to conduct the local burial rituals, which required having the bodies. Most bodies were unavailable, and it was unlikely that an exhumations process would uncover all the bodies that required proper burial. Lacking guidance and established procedures on how to handle this situation, the local healers convened a meeting of healers. Fortunately, they agreed that a combination of exhumations and mass burial rituals would make it possible to reestablish spiritual harmony with the ancestors. First, exhumations around people's homes enabled the recovery of the remains of many unburied people, some of whom were identified using forensic methods. Next, in the presence of the residents and returnees, the healers conducted a mass burial rite for all those who had died there during the war. Afterwards, residents and returnees reported having less fear. As tensions relaxed, people became eager to meet and help each other even at night, and norms of neighborliness returned.

This case study yields valuable insights regarding reconciliation theory and praxis. For one thing, Western conceptualizations of reconciliation, which emphasize the importance of improving social relationships among the living, are inherently limited

and context-bound. The Angolan case illustrates that reconciliation is a cultural construct, the meaning of which is grounded in the local context. For most rural Angolans, the social and the spiritual are inextricably interconnected, and the spiritual domain is the dominant causal force behind human behavior. To give due attention to spiritual approaches and local means of reconciliation, it is valuable to pay attention to indigenous psychologies and local understandings (Kim and Park 2007; Moghaddam et al. 2007). Indeed, being open to different cultural constructions of reconciliation and culture of peace is an important part of building peace in a highly diverse world. To overlook or marginalize local understandings and practices risks making psychology a tool of neo-colonialism in which Western approaches are privileged while local, indigenous approaches are portrayed as inferior (Dawes and Cairns 1998; Wessells 1999).

With regard to praxis, an important issue is sustainability. Too often, externally driven approaches come to an abrupt end when the funding for them has dried up. Although the problem is often seen as lack of long-term funding, the deeper issue is that the externally imposed approaches may have little basis in the local culture and social norms. For these and other reasons, local beliefs and practices regarding reconciliation warrant careful attention and use in peacebuilding programs, provided that they do not violate international human rights standards and the humanitarian imperative of Do No Harm.

## **Sierra Leone: A Superordinate Goals Approach**

The recent war in Sierra Leone began as a spillover from the war in neighboring Liberia and ran from 1991 until May 2001. Animated in no small part by a struggle to control areas rich in resources such as timber and diamonds (Richards 1996), the war was notorious for its bloodiness, including the amputation of civilians' limbs by machete-wielding soldiers, some of whom were children. The war displaced large numbers of people, devastated infrastructure, and left in its wake a population that had the shortest life expectancy of any UN member state.

The war created powerful needs for community reconciliation in two complementary respects. Intercommunally, the war had forced neighboring villages into a harsh competition to meet survival needs, such as those for food, water, and shelter. In place of former intervillage activities and attitudes that "my neighbors are my friends," the war created a spirit of distrust and isolation that was inimical to civil society. Intracommunally, villagers harbored deep fears about what would happen when the soldiers returned home. Particularly feared were the members of the former rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who had committed many war-time atrocities and who were often seen as bloodthirsty predators and troublemakers. Even parents feared that their formerly recruited sons and daughters, many of whom engaged in unruly behavior and abused alcohol and other substances, might kill them. Community people doubted that former RUF members, including children, were capable of being contributing citizens. These fears

and doubts, coupled with concerns about reprisal attacks against the former RUF members, created the need to reconcile returning former soldiers with community members. Also, some adults feared that the intergroup fighting during the war between the RUF and the village militias that had sprung up to oppose the RUF would be played out in the villages. Indeed, in the Northern Province, former child soldiers who had fought on opposing sides were returning to the villages, and few plans were in place to reduce intergroup tensions. In this respect, there was a strong need to reconcile members of formerly opposed groups with each other.

To address this situation, CCF/Sierra Leone used a superordinate goals approach aimed at defusing tensions and building positive intergroup relations through cooperation on a shared goals (Deutsch 2000; Sherif et al. 1961). The work focused on the Northern Province since this region had been the RUF stronghold at the end of the war, experienced ongoing intergroup and intercommunal tensions, and had significant numbers of formerly recruited children returning home. CCF focused on the well-being of young people because this was within their agency mandate of supporting children's healthy development and protection. Also, although some programs had been set up in the region to support the reintegration of adult former soldiers, there were relatively few supports for children. The initial focus was on formerly recruited boys since they posed the greatest threat to security, yet in other projects, the focus was on the reintegration of formerly recruited girls (Wessells 2006). CCF worked through staff who were Sierra Leonean and understood the local language, culture, and situation.

To enable cooperation between villages, CCF staff facilitated community dialogues in which four or five neighboring villages each elected representatives through a democratic process to participate in discussions as one community. This strategy was designed to reduce intervillage tensions and to build a spirit of unity. In all, CCF worked with 26 communities in hopes of reaching a relatively large number of children and helping to rebuild the torn social fabric in the North. These community dialogues, locally called "sensitization dialogues," emphasized that Sierra Leoneans are one people who had been together before the war and who were capable of becoming a united people again following the war. The resulting narrative of community unity helped lay the foundation for subsequent planning dialogues.

In the planning discussions, community members identified the main needs of children in the area, generated ideas for community projects to support the children, and then selected one community project as the highest priority for supporting young people. The communities selected diverse projects according to their context. Typical community projects involved rebuilding a school, building a health post, or repairing a bridge that improved access to markets, thereby boosting family income.

Following the communal planning of the projects, the next step was to implement them through cooperation on elements of design, site selection and preparation, materials procurement, and construction. In this process, CCF staff again played a facilitative role and also purchased the necessary local construction materials. However, it was the community members who were to build the structures. The strategy was to compose the work teams of formerly recruited youth, including youth from different sides if multiple groups were present, and village youth who

had not been part of the armed forces or groups. This cooperation aimed both to reduce the tensions between former soldiers and to build positive relations between formerly recruited youth and the village youth, many of whom had been attacked by soldiers during the war.

To prepare for the cooperative construction, CCF staff worked to build the empathy that hostile conflict demolishes (White 1984). In the absence of empathy, it is very difficult in post-conflict environments to build positive relations between neighbors and different subgroups in the community (Halpern and Weinstein 2004). To increase empathy with formerly recruited young people, whom most community members regarded as perpetrators who had attacked harmless civilians, but who themselves had not suffered, CCF staff emphasized that all children and young people had suffered. In fact, many young people had been abducted by the RUF and forced to commit horrible acts. Themes of collective suffering gained salience as different community members, including youth and children, told how they and their families had suffered during the war. This communalization of suffering not only stimulated empathy, but also built a sense of unity.

For the youth who comprised the work teams, CCF staff and elders conducted a two-day workshop that emphasized unity, how the war was past and how old stereotypes no longer applied, and the need to move together into a brighter future. Also, village elders and healers worked together with CCF staff to rekindle traditional proverbs, songs, and dances that built a spirit of reconciliation. They also established ground rules, such as no name-calling or use of language, gestures, or songs that would humiliate or anger others. Willingness to abide by these rules was a prerequisite for participation in the work teams.

Following the workshop, the work teams composed of village youth and formerly recruited children and youth built the designed projects. Each worker received for his 20 days of labor the local equivalent of \$27 USD, which was sufficient to purchase necessities such as food and clothing. As the building took place, youth received vocational counseling about which sources of livelihood they might want to pursue. Selected youth subsequently participated in a stream of vocational training and income generating activities supported by caring artisans who taught their skills and provided mentoring over the following year as the youth worked and repaid their loans.

Extensive interviews indicated that the project had positive effects in regard to intervillage unity and reconciliation. In focus group discussions, elders said that before the project, they had distrusted people from neighboring villages. By the end of the project, however, they said that relations had improved significantly, and they now enjoyed planning, working with, and visiting their neighbors in surrounding villages. Importantly, they also spoke of increased understanding of how the war had affected everyone and of the role of the villages in building peace. Some adults commented that before the project, they had not understood the linkages between what happened in their own village and the wider peace process. The project had illuminated the linkages.

Marked improvements were also visible concerning the relations among young people and also among young people and their communities. Formerly recruited children and youth who had fought on opposing sides said that through working

together on the construction projects, they learned that their former enemies were not demons, but were human beings who had suffered during the war and who had potential to be good citizens. Youth who had not been recruited also showed a reduction of enemy stereotypes and dehumanizing images, saying that as a result of the cooperative projects and the preparatory workshop, they saw the formerly recruited young people in a new light and were willing to live alongside them. Furthermore, community members said that having watched the young people build the structures and contribute actively to community improvement, they no longer feared the formerly recruited young people or regarded them as troublemakers. As one elder stated, “Before, we saw them as wild animals. Now we accept them—they are part of our community.”

These achievements contrasted starkly with the dire predictions many leaders and humanitarians made at the time the ceasefire was signed. With regard to formerly recruited young people, many had predicted “they can never go home,” implying that they would become a Lost Generation and a source of recurrent cycles of violence. In fact, some people, such as those regarded as having committed particularly horrendous atrocities, did not return to their villages. To this day, the streets of Freetown, the capital city, contain significant numbers of formerly recruited young people who chose not to return. This, however, was a small minority, as the overwhelming majority of formerly recruited young people did return and find a place in civilian life. This outcome testifies to the strong capacity people have for reconciliation at the grassroots level. That it is owing to a combination of Western and local methods points to the value of drawing on diverse cultural orientations and approaches in building cultures of peace.

## **Liberia: Forgiveness Festivals**

Liberia, Sierra Leone’s neighbor to the east, was devastated by two bloody internal wars between 1989 and 2003. Many of the fighters and other soldiers in the wars were young people, some of whom had been abducted and others who sought revenge for wrongdoings against them and their family members or saw life inside an armed group as their best option out of a set of bad options. Once in the armed groups, many young people were plied with drugs and given so-called traditional charms or rituals believed locally to make them bulletproof (Human Rights Watch 2004). Following the conflict, communities feared the young people, who, as had occurred in Sierra Leone, were regarded as dangerous troublemakers and as possible kindling for additional fighting.

The need for community reconciliation stemmed not only from the precarious situation of formerly recruited children and youth, but also from the profound disintegration of communities in Liberia. Over a decade of war and displacement, coupled with the desperate competition for resources, the pitting of different factions against each other, and a long history of privileging some local groups over others, produced a situation so low in social cohesion as to question the appropriateness of



the term ‘community’ (Richards et al. 2005). Under such circumstances, an essential component of community reconciliation is to forge or renew basic social bonds among people to rekindle the spirit of community as well as to reduce tensions between groups such as villagers and returning young people who had previously been in armed groups or forces.

To address this situation, CCF/Liberia worked through local leaders and other influential people to organize Forgiveness Festivals in numerous counties. The festivals, which typically ran for a full day, celebrated peace by means of song and dance; provided organized games that promoted teamwork and group cohesion; and offered community dramas that illustrated themes of peace and reconciliation. Often they included speeches in which formerly recruited young people—girls as well as boys—apologized publicly and asked the community to forgive them for what had happened during the war. Overall, however, the festivals were as much about improving relations and moving past the war as about forgiveness per se. In many cases, they were preceded by peace dialogues facilitated by CCF’s Liberian staff. Although the festivals were designed to be fun, they carried the serious message that it is time to put war behind and to move forward in peace.

In Bong County, where there had been longstanding conflict between the Galai and Powai communities of Panta Kpaai District, leaders and elders of each community participated in mediated dialogues about the war and the importance of building peace and unity. A subsequently convened Forgiveness Festival drew nearly 300 people, including elders, town chiefs, school principals, women’s groups, and youth. Many youth made peace-oriented statements on behalf of their community. Throughout the day, young people participated in football and kickball matches and in cultural performances. At the end of the day, young people conducted a community drama that featured themes of peace and reconciliation.

In interviews conducted with diverse people in this event, participants said that this event had improved relations and brought hope for peace between these two communities, which had not talked in the preceding 15 years. Also, the formerly recruited young people said they felt accepted, and this view resonated with those of adults in the communities. The festivals were followed by additional workshops on peace, which helped to continue the process of peacebuilding and intercommunal reconciliation. Those workshops, in turn, were followed by cooperative, community reconstruction projects such as those developed in Sierra Leone. Although the festivals were only a first step, they laid the foundation for the longer term process of peacebuilding.

## **Conclusion**

The brief interventions on reconciliation described here are best regarded as initial steps that need to be complemented with diverse activities and supports that engender long-term reconciliation. These wider community supports include the institutionalization of nonviolent means of handling conflict at all levels of community

life; the reduction of discrimination and oppression; the strengthening of systems for social, restorative and procedural justice; the reestablishment of law and order; the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure; the distribution of local power and resources in equitable ways that promote positive relationships; and the establishment of strong linkages with effective systems of governance, including at levels higher than the community level. This list, which could easily be extended, serves as a reminder of the limits of any single intervention.

By the same token, the interventions described above yield several valuable lessons. First, cultural practices are an essential part of community reconciliation and a useful complement to Western approaches. Cultural practices enable communities to construct meaningful narratives, whether expressed in songs, dances, stories, or dramas, about their circumstances and the value of peace. Following armed conflict, the rekindling of cultural practices such as cleansing rituals or the use of traditional songs helps to communalize pain and build continuity between a painful past, the difficult present, and the future. Through cultural practices, people express their collective identity and their hopes as well as their pain. By orienting the practices toward peacebuilding, the practices become avenues for restructuring collective identities and narratives in ways that promote unity, harmony, and peace.

Second, community reconciliation requires a systems approach. At the individual level, specific individuals such as formerly recruited young people need to be made acceptable to the community. Equally important are elements that address interpersonal, intergroup, and intercommunity aspects of reconciliation. In the postwar contexts discussed above, it is essential to rebuild basic social bonds between neighbors, improve intracommunity relations between formerly hostile subgroups, and build a wider sense of community that interconnects neighboring villages. As the case of Sierra Leone illustrated, these tasks can often be achieved through the use of methods that promote empathy and cooperation across the lines of conflict. Beyond these levels, it is crucial to establish effective linkages between communities and elements of the macrosystem, such as the provincial or district government, a functioning economy and political system, and inclusive structures of a central government that promotes social justice and avoids militarism. This systems approach, which connects the macrosystem of the society with the microsystem of communities, is valuable in constructing the civil society in which peace can take root.

The third lesson is that young people have a vital role to play in building peace. The case studies indicate that although young people often become warriors, they can also be agents of reconciliation. Even following very difficult life experiences, many young people exhibit resilience and defy images such as “damaged goods” or “scarred for life.” Given the proper supports, young people have the capacity to transition out of the bowels of the war system and develop means of supporting peacebuilding in their communities (Barber et al. 2006; Wessells 2006). Because young people are increasingly influential political actors, it is essential to bring them out of the margins of the post-conflict setting and to engage their prodigious energies as agents of peace. Helping young people to become agents of peace is one of the best means of breaking intergenerational cycles of violence and enabling the transformation of a culture of war into a culture of peace.

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# Chapter 10

## Reconciliation as a Foundation of Culture of Peace

Daniel Bar-Tal

### Introduction

One of the most important challenges facing the international community is the peaceful resolution of numerous harsh and violent conflicts. The challenge is posed on two levels. The first involves the temporary management of the conflict; it usually involves negotiation, meditation and arbitration, and rests on leaders and elites, although it still requires support by the general population. The second, deeper, level involves reconciliation. This requires change in the societal repertoire shared by society members. The repertoire that feeds the conflict must evolve into a new repertoire that can serve as a basis for a culture of peace<sup>1</sup>. This latter challenge is of great importance because it both lays the foundations for successful conflict resolution and at the same time prepares the society members to live in lasting peace.

This chapter elaborates on the nature of reconciliation as a foundation of a culture of peace. It begins by describing the nature of a culture of conflict, then elaborates on the nature of the reconciliation needed for a culture of peace, and finally describes the needed process of achieving reconciliation.

### Nature of Culture of Conflict

Although some degree of conflict is an inseparable aspect of most intergroup relationships, this chapter focuses on those continuous severe conflicts that require reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2000a). Many of these are of an intractable\* nature. Of special importance for the maintenance and continuation of these types of conflicts is the evolvment of a culture of conflict that is dominated by societal

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<sup>1</sup> Culture denotes historically accumulated symbols which are created to communicate a particular meaning about all what is experienced in life of a particular society (Geertz, 1993)

\* Intractable conflicts are characterized as lasting at least 25 years, over goals that are perceived as existential, being violent, perceived as unsolvable and of zero sum nature, preoccupying greatly society members, with parties involved investing much in their continuation (see Bar-Tal 2007; Kriesberg 1998).

beliefs, collective memories, and an ethos of conflict and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal 2007). A collective memory of conflict evolves to describe the "history" of the conflict to society members (Wertsch 2002). Ethos of conflict provides dominant orientation to a society at present and directs it for the future (Bar-Tal 2000b).\*\* These narratives are selective, biased and distorted as their major function is to satisfy societal needs rather than provide an objective account of reality. They therefore justify the position of the society in conflict, portray it in very positive light and as the victim of the conflict, and delegitimize the opponent.

In addition to societal beliefs imbedded in these narratives, the socio-psychological repertoire in situations of intractable conflicts includes collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal et al. 2007). The most notable is the collective orientation of fear, but they may also be dominated by hatred and anger (e.g., Petersen 2002).

Since all the members of society are involved actively or passively, directly or indirectly with the conflict, the described repertoire is widely shared, especially during its intractable stage. This repertoire is expressed in the major societal channels of communications, appears to be dominant in public discourse, is expressed in institutional ceremonies and eventually permeates into cultural products such as books, plays, and films. Moreover, it is often used for justification and explanation of decisions, policies and courses of actions taken by leaders. Finally, it is expressed in the educational system, and this imparts the repertoire to young generations. By adulthood many members share very similar societal beliefs, attitudes, values and emotions about the conflict, and this serves as a prism through which they interpret experience and process new information. All this occurs in selective, biased and distorted ways that allow maintenance of the dominant repertoire and avoid alternative information that could provide a basis for conflict resolution and reconciliation. The repertoire serves as a foundation for the evolved culture of conflict, and control mechanisms ensure that the repertoire developed in conflict will not change (Bar-Tal 2007).

Although at least some aspects of intractable conflicts may be managed by groups finding ways to resolve the contradiction between their goals, it soon becomes clear that such management is only the first formal step in a peace process. The societal

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\*\*In an earlier work, it was proposed that the challenges of the intractable conflict lead to the development of eight themes of societal beliefs that comprise ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b). They include: Societal beliefs about the justness of own goals, which first of all outline the goals in conflict, indicate their crucial importance and provide their explanations and rationales. Societal beliefs about security refer to the importance of personal safety and national survival, and outline the conditions for their achievement. Societal beliefs of positive collective self image concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values and behavior to one's own society. Societal beliefs of own victimization concerning self-presentation as a victim, especially in the context of the intractable conflict. Societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent concern beliefs that deny the adversary's humanity. Societal beliefs of patriotism generate attachment to the country and society by propagating loyalty, love, care and sacrifice. Societal beliefs of unity refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable conflict in order to unite the forces in the face of the external threat. Finally, societal beliefs of peace refer to peace as the ultimate desire of the society.

process of reconciliation requires changes in the socio-psychological repertoire of the culture of conflict that fed the intractable conflict and served as a barrier to the peace process. This repertoire does not change overnight, even when the groups' leaders resolve the conflict peacefully and sign a peace agreement. The reconciliation process is a long one and does not take place unintentionally, but requires reciprocal planning and active efforts that can overcome obstacles and facilitate its solidification.

## Nature of Reconciliation

There is a consensus that reconciliation involves the formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between societies and that this requires extensive changes in the socio-psychological repertoire of group members in both societies (Ackermann 1994; Arnson 1999; Asmal et al. 1997; Bar-Siman-Tov 2004; Bar-Tal 2000a; Gardner Feldman 1999; Krepon and Sevak 1995; Lederach 1997; Norval 1999; Rothstein 1999; Wilmer 1998)<sup>2</sup>. It has become evident that even when a formal peace agreement is reached, it may fall far short of establishing genuine peaceful relations between former adversaries (e.g., Knox and Quirk 2000; Lederach 1997; Simpson 1997; Wilmer 1998). Formal conflict resolution sometimes abides only with the leaders who negotiated an agreement, or in the narrow strata around them, or among only a small part of the society. In these cases, the majority of society members may not accept the negotiated compromises, or even if they do, they may still hold the world view that has fueled the conflict. As a result, formal resolutions of conflicts can be unstable—they may collapse, as in the case of Angola, or may turn into a cold peace as in the case of the Israeli-Egyptian relations. In these and similar cases, hopes of turning the conflictive relations of the past into peaceful societal relations has not materialized because the reconciliation process either never actually started, was stalled or has progressed very slowly. Even when a peace process includes the creation of structural economical and political mechanisms and institutions to form interdependence, linkages and affinity, it does not guarantee lasting peaceful relations because it does not necessarily induce a deep change in the public's psychological repertoire (Arnson 1999; Lederach 1997, 1998; Wilmer 1998). A recent study by Long and Brecke (2003) that analyzed different intergroup conflicts provides unequivocal evidence that reconciliation is a necessary process to stabilize peaceful relations.

*The essence of reconciliation involves socio-psychological processes consisting of changes of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions by the majority of society members* (Kelman 1999; Lederach 1997; Shonholtz 1998; Wilmer 1998). In fact, it is necessary that these changes begin in a pre-agreement phase in order to facilitate the peaceful resolution of the conflict and its support by the society

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<sup>2</sup>Although the chapter focuses mainly on the analysis of reconciliation in society, it should be unequivocally assumed that the process has to be reciprocal and take place in the two societies that were engaged in intractable conflict and then both try to establish lasting peace.

members. It is by its nature gradual, reciprocal and voluntary. The fundamental requirement is that the psychological basis will penetrate deep into the societal fabric so as to be shared by the majority of the members of both societies (Asmal et al. 1997; Bar-Tal 2000b; Lederach 1997; Staub 2006). Only such change guarantees an initial successful conflict resolution and a later solidification of the peaceful relations between rival groups: a stable foundation that is rooted in the psyche of the people. The initiation of such change depends on such factors as the level of violence, the realization that continuation of the conflict will cause to great costs, the degree of support for the peace process in both societies, especially among their leaders, and support from the international community.

## General Nature of Reconciliation

While most researchers agree on the importance of the psychological component in reconciliation, they are vague or disagree about its nature. Most have recognized the importance of creating a common psychological framework in order to promote the process of reconciliation (Asmal et al. 1997; Hayes 1998; Hayner 1999; Kopstein, 1997; Kriesberg, 1998b; Lederach 1997; Volkan 1998; Weiner, 1998; Whittaker 1999). They realize that during the conflict the rival parties had different views about the conflict, about each other and about their relationship. They know that to ensure reconciliation these different views have to adjust dramatically. What then is the nature of the common psychological framework that is required?

There is not doubt that the first condition for reconciliation is legitimization and humanization of the rival. This recognition allows viewing the rival as a legitimate partner in peace and deserving of humane treatment. In addition, reconciliation requires viewing the conflict as solvable and recognizing that both sides have legitimate contentions, goals and needs that must be satisfied in order to establish peaceful relations.

On the general level, a number of definitional specifications have been proposed by different writers. For example, Marrow (1999) pointed out that reconciliation “is reestablishment of friendship that can inspire sufficient trust across the traditional split” (p. 132). In emphasizing trust, he asserts that the basic thrust of reconciliation is to be sensitive to other’s needs, the principal question being not what *they* have to do, but what *we* have to do to promote the reconciliation process. Lederach (1997) focuses mainly on intra-societal reconciliation and posits four elements of it that can be extended also to inter-societal conflicts: *truth*, which requires open revelation of the past, including admission, acknowledgment and transparency; *mercy*, which requires acceptance, forgiveness, compassion and healing for building new relations; *justice*, which requires rectification, restitution, compensation and social restructuring; and *peace*, which underscores common future, cooperation, coordination, well being, harmony, respect, institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution and security for all the parties. This view is similar to Long and Brecke’s (2003) model, which suggests that reconciliation is based on truth telling



about the harm done by both parties, forgiveness, which requires new view of both parties, giving up retribution and full justice, and building new positive relationships. Rather than “mercy,” Kriesberg (2004) uses the concept of *regard* (which includes a mutual recognition of the humanity and identity of the societies), and rather than “peace,” he stresses a *security* that ensures that both societies are safe from physical harm. Kelman (1999) presents elaborated components of reconciliation in what he calls a “positive peace.” In this view, reconciliation consists of the following components: (1) solution of the conflict, which satisfies the fundamental needs of the parties and fulfills their national aspiration, (2) mutual acceptance and respect of the other group’s life and welfare, (3) development of sense of security and dignity for each group, (4) establishment of patterns of cooperative interactions in different spheres, and (5) institutionalization of conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g., Bar-Siman-Tov 2004). In a later paper, he defines reconciliation as “the development of working trust, the transformation of the relationship toward a partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness, and an agreement that addresses both parties’ basic needs” (Kelman 2004, p. 119). In his view reconciliation requires change of identity via a process of internalization.

As the process of reconciliation proceeds, there is wide agreement that the successful outcome requires the formation of a new common outlook on the past. It is suggested that once there is a shared and acknowledged perception of the past, both parties take a significant step towards achieving reconciliation. Reconciliation implies that both parties not just get to know, but truly acknowledge what happened in the past (Asmal et al. 1997; Gardner Feldman 1999; Hayes 1998; Hayner 1999; Norval 1999). This acknowledgement implies recognizing that there are two narratives of the conflict (Hayner 1999; Norval 1999; Salomon 2004). This is an important factor, because the collective memories of each party’s own past underpin the continuation of the conflict and obstruct peacemaking (Bar-Tal 2007). Reconciliation necessitates changing these societal beliefs about the past by learning about the rival group’s collective memory and admitting one’s own past misdeeds and responsibility for the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict. Through the process of negotiation about collective memories, in which one’s own past is critically revised and synchronized with that of the other group, a new narrative emerges (Asmal et al. 1997; Hayes 1998).

Often, however, preoccupation with the past requires more than a new narrative. During the conflict both parties accumulate many grievances. Years of violence leave deep scars of anger, grief, a sense of victimhood and a will for revenge. These grievances must not only be known, but also truly acknowledged by the rival society (Asmal et al. 1997; Norval 1999; Wilmer 1998). Some researchers have gone even further by asserting that collective acknowledgement of the past is not enough and that reconciliation must ultimately lead to a collective healing and forgiveness for the adversary’s misdeeds (Hayner 1999; Shriver 1995; Staub 2000).

Reconciliation, in this view, consists of restoration and healing. It allows the emergence of a common frame of reference that permits and encourages societies to acknowledge the past, confess former wrongs, relive the experiences under safe conditions, mourn the losses, validate the experienced pain and grief, receive empathy

and support, and restore broken relationships (Long and Brecke 2003; Minow 1998; Montville 1993; Staub 2000). It creates a space where forgiveness can be offered and accepted. The element of forgiveness as an outcome of reconciliation is of special importance in cases of unequal responsibility, when one party is attributed with responsibility for the outbreak, and/or maintenance of the conflict, and/or for misdeeds done during the conflict (e.g., Auerbach 2004). It symbolizes psychological departing from the past to new peaceful relations (Norval 1999). It requires a decision to learn new aspects about one's own group, to open a new perspective on the rival group and to develop a vision of the future that allows new positive relations with the perpetrator. In many cases, forgiveness may be required by both groups, for both may have been involved in extensive harm-doing. For some, forgiveness makes reconciliation possible (Staub 2000); for others, it is a necessary step that is not always possible and not sufficient. In Auerbach's (2004) view, the success of forgiveness depends on the compatibility of the religious-cultural context, importance of the interests promoted through this move, the power of the perpetrator, status of leaders who are supposed to ask for forgiveness, authenticity of the request and the length of time that passed since the harmful acts took place.

It should be noted that some seriously question whether forgiveness and healing are possible or necessary aspects of reconciliation (Gardner Feldman 1999; Hayes 1998). Although they agree that a collective reconstruction of the past is a necessary element in any reconciliation process, they wonder if this can lead to healing and forgiveness. Especially in severely divided societies, like South Africa and Northern Ireland, this may be a very hard, if not impossible, objective to obtain. Hayes (1998), for example, argued that, "Reconciliation is not about the (individualism of) forgiveness of the dreadful and vile acts committed in the name of apartheid, but how all of us are going to act to build a new society (p. 33)."

In my view, reconciliation consists of: mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust and positive attitudes, as well as sensitivity and consideration of other party's needs and interests. All these elements apply both to situations in which the two groups build peaceful relations in two separate political entities (states) and to situations in which the two rival groups continue to live in one political entity.

Recently, I have elaborated on the type of cognitive and affective changes that seem necessary for reconciliation. In regards to cognitive foundations, I suggested that reconciliation requires changes in the following societal beliefs that were formed during the conflict:

- (1) Societal beliefs about one's own group's goals need to change from beliefs about the justness of goals that underlay the conflict (Bloomfield et al. 2003) to beliefs that present new goals for the society that allow compromise and therefore lead to peaceful conflict resolution and peaceful relations.
- (2) Societal beliefs about the rival group and the images of the adversary group must change so that its members can be legitimized, personalized, equalized and differentiated (Kaufman 2006; Kelman 1999). Recently, Janoff-Bulman and

Werther (in press) introduced the concept of respect as a necessary condition for reconciliation, defining it as recognition and acknowledgement that the rival group has the equal right to shape their own destinies.

- (3) Societal beliefs about the relationship with the past opponent need to be modified. Reconciliation requires the formation of new societal beliefs about the relations between the two rival groups that emphasize the importance of cooperation and friendly relationships (Gardner Feldman 1999; Krepon and Sevak 1995).
- (4) Societal beliefs about the history of the conflict require a change from the collective memories that were dominating the engaged societies during the conflict. It is necessary to revise these narratives that fueled the conflict into an outlook on the past that is synchronized with that of the former rival (Borer 2006; Salomon 2004).
- (5) Societal beliefs about peace must include the formation of new beliefs that describe the multidimensional nature of peace, specify the conditions and mechanisms for its achievement (for example, negotiation with the rival and compromises), realistically outline the benefits and costs of achieving it, connote the meaning of living in peace, and emphasize the conditions for its maintenance.

These themes constitute the foundations of the *ethos of peace* as an opposite societal infrastructure to the ethos of conflict. They begin to evolve when societies embark on the road of peace, but it takes a long time for them to penetrate the societal fabric and become the ethos that underlies peace culture.

Reconciliation also requires construction of general positive affects and specific emotions about peaceful relations with the past opponent. Nadler and Schnabel (in press) suggest this process is central and identify it as socio-emotional reconciliation. In their opinion, this involves the removal of emotional and identity-related barriers through the successful completion of an apology-forgiveness cycle. Positive affects should accompany the new beliefs and indicate good feelings that the parties have towards each other and towards their new relations. I believe reconciliation requires a change in the collective emotional orientations of fear, anger and hatred, which often dominate societies in intractable conflict. Instead, it is necessary to develop an emotional orientation of hope that reflects the desire for the positive goal of maintaining peaceful and cooperative relations with the other party. This emotional orientation indicates a positive outlook for the future and expectations of pleasant events, without violence and hostilities (Bar-Tal et al. 2007; Kaufman 2006; Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006; Snyder 2000; Worchel and Coutant in press).

In essence, the evolvement and solidification of the cognitive and affective changes constitute a new psychological repertoire that indicates the emergence of a culture of peace. Such a culture goes beyond acts and processes of reconciliation that focus on the repertoire of society members. It is the ultimate safeguard that the peace process is routinized deeply into the fabric, institutions and channels of communication of the society.

## Culture of Peace

For reconciliation to develop into a peace culture, the former enemies must develop cooperative relations with one another and manage their inevitable conflicts constructively<sup>3</sup>. Woven into the framework of a culture of peace are values of justice, respect of human rights, sensitivity, acceptance and respect for cultural differences, values and practices conducive to nonviolent conflict resolution, and above all recognition of the superiority and importance of peace as a value and practice. From a psychological perspective, this requires the following bases:

*Mutual Knowledge.* Past rivals should acquire knowledge about each other. The scope of knowledge should be wide, covering various domains, such as the cultural, religious, societal, political, geographical or historical. Knowledge is essential for the development of peace culture since ignorance and distorted or selective information are often the causes of hostility, prejudice and hatred. Mutual knowledge facilitates the development of acquaintanceship, recognition and respect.

*Mutual Acceptance.* Both sides should accept each other on both the personal and national levels. It means mutual inclusion, legitimization and humanization. Mutual acceptance is a condition for developing cooperative and friendly relations. Building and maintaining trustful relations is the key aspect in mutual acceptance. It serves as a basis for establishing secure existence in the very wide meaning for each group, which is a necessary condition for stabilizing peace.

*Mutual Understanding.* Beyond knowing and accepting, both sides should understand each other by developing empathy and sensitivity to each other's needs, values, traditions, and experiences. Such an understanding prevents many conflicts because both sides realize that their relationship is governed by mixed motives so that conflict may cause both sides to lose and in peace both sides can gain.

*Respect for Differences and Focus on Commonalities.* Peace culture both respects pluralism and differences, and stresses commonalities and constructs common goals. All parties have to look for commonalities as well as identify and respect differences. This respect provides the assurance necessary for the secure existence of each party's identity, a condition for peaceful co-existence. Each group has to be able to fulfill its own needs, including its needs to hold its collective identity.

*Development of Cooperative Relations.* The development of cooperative relations applies especially to the structural and concrete side of peace culture. The cooperation has unlimited scope as it can be part of economic, political, cultural, military, educational and environmental relations. Of special importance are military and security cooperative mechanisms that guard peaceful relations and prevent misperceptions and misunderstandings.

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<sup>3</sup>Peace culture is usually viewed in a wide form as extending beyond the specific relations between the former rivals to general perspective on intergroup relations. It is "a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevents conflicts by tackling their roots causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations" (UN Resolutions A/RES/52/13). In the present chapter I limit its nature to particular intergroup relations for the sake of the conception.

*Valuing Peace.* It is essential that peace be a supreme value. All parties should view peace as a desirable and important value, and as a super-ordinate goal. It should be viewed in concrete and relevant terms, that is, as a realistic and achievable goal. Moreover, it is necessary to establish a common moral as well as utilitarian ground for maintaining peace and imparting this to new generations.

*Mechanisms for Maintaining Peace.* The culture of peace places great emphasis on mechanisms that allow for the maintenance of peace. This requires the development of various kinds of institutions, organizations, cooperative exchanges, etc., which intend to solidify and crystallize peaceful relations. Moreover, the development of culture requires building new narratives, symbols and rituals that explain, maintain, justify and even glorify peace. Of special importance is establishing continuous peace education that can socialize the younger generation into the culture of peace. Mass media has a role and a mission in maintaining peace, as well as, various cultural channels, such as literature, films or theatrical plays.

These bases must be developed because peace is not only a political process, but also a way of life reflected in the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals and nations alike. Like any other culture, peace culture includes abstract and concrete expressions and products, such as symbols, myths, language, collective memories, values and goals. The symbols consists of such tangible and non-tangible elements as artifacts, constructions, art works, scripts, habits, rules, concepts, narratives, myths or knowledge related to a group and to other categories. These evolve as a product of lasting and meaningful experiences. Eventually, when the process is successful, the culture of peace is shared by society members who were previously involved in conflict and provides meaning about the reality of the society and the world in general. It supplies the rules for practices that serve as a safeguard of peace. When society members, at least the great majority, internalize the values, beliefs, attitudes and practices of culture of peace, it is possible to characterize the society as peaceful, and its collective identity is imprinted by this characteristic.

## **Process of Reconciliation**

The bases outlined above can be developed by the coordinated efforts of the parties that were engaged in intractable conflict and/or via process of self collective healing through which each party heals itself independently of the other party (Bloomfield et al. 2003; Long and Brecke 2003; Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal 2007). In view of the psychological dynamics that dominated years of intractable conflict, reconciliation usually requires mobilization of the masses in support of the new peaceful relations with the past enemy. This complex process requires a defined policy, planned initiatives and wide variety of activities that can convince society members of the necessity, utility, value and feasibility of the peace process (Bloomfield et al. 2003).

The reconciliation process begins when the parties in conflict start to change their beliefs, attitudes, goals, motivations and emotions about the conflict, and each

other's future relations. Such changes usually begin before the initial resolution to the conflict and can pave the way to a peaceful resolution. In turn, peaceful resolutions of aspects of the conflict and the initiation of measures to establish formal relations serve as a crucial catalyst for subsequent psychological changes. The reconciliation process is an informal one that lasts for a very long time and does not have a formal beginning or end. It is not a linear process of continuous change in the direction of peaceful relations, but one of regressions and progresses.

One must note that reconciliation demands reciprocity. It cannot evolve only on one side when the other side still cultivates a culture of conflict. There must be some level of synchronization, and although there is no need for complete equalization in any stage of the process, for a long time there cannot be a considerable gap between the two groups in their reconciliation attempts. Both sides have to move along a path with clear confidence-building acts that mutually reinforce the process of peacemaking and serve as building blocks for moving to the next stages. This is a cyclic process of peacebuilding, which is antithetical to the process of the vicious cycle of violence described by Bar-Tal (2007).

The process of psychological change almost never begins with a large-scale change by the majority of society members. Rather, it begins with a small minority and continues with a slow process of unfreezing and changing beliefs and attitudes. This minority is often at first perceived by the majority as traitorous, and a long process of persuasion has to occur before psychological change encompasses the majority. Social psychology has devoted much effort to studying this process of minority influence, but this is beyond the scope of the present chapter (e.g., Moscovici et al. 1985).

It is important to recognize that for reconciliation to be effective, it must always proceed from top-down and bottom-up simultaneously. While psychological changes in leaders greatly influence many members of society, the involvement of a mass movement that embraces psychological change has an effect on the position of the leaders. In the long process of reconciliation, both processes usually take place (Kaufman 2006). Leaders are of crucial importance because they negotiate the initial peaceful resolution of the conflict and are in the position to lead the reconciliation process, especially when they are committed to the process and have good and trusting relations between them (e.g., Begin and Sadat in the Israeli–Egyptian case or Mandela and De Clark in South Africa; see Bargal and Sivan 2004). A peaceful resolution of the immediate conflict is a necessary condition for a succeeding reconciliation. Moreover, the resolution has to be satisfactory to both parties in the conflict, who must perceive that it has fulfilled their basic needs and addressed their fundamental aspirations (Pratto and Glasford in press; Kelman 1999).

However, it is important to note that especially in democratic societies there must be significant mass support for conflict resolution and eventual reconciliation. In all societies, the success of the reconciliation process depends on convincing the masses to change their psychological repertoire from supporting the conflict to favoring the emergence of peaceful relations and reconciliation. This process cannot occur as a result of commands and orders, nor can it merely be relayed in statements and speeches. Rather it must be reflected in continuous formal acts that

symbolically communicate to the society the change in the relationship with the past rival. Thus, the reconciliation process requires policies that aim at changing the psychological repertoire of society members (Ackerman 1994; Gardner Feldman 1999; Kelman 1999; Ross 2004; Shonholtz 1998). It depends on the activism and strength of those who support it and requires the involvement of individuals, groups and organizations in persuading hesitating and opposing group members of the importance of reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2000b; Gardner Feldman 1999).

The mobilization of the masses for the psychological change is also performed by middle-level leaders, prominent figures in ethnic, religious, economic academic, intellectual and humanitarian circles (Lederach 1997). In this process, elites play a very important role in initiating and implementing policies of reconciliation and reconstruction (Ackermann 1994). The elites include those individuals who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements. At the grassroots level, local leaders, businessmen, community developers, local health officials and educators can play an important role. But the persuasion process within a society is not enough. Of special importance in promoting reconciliation are “people to people” activities that bring together “ordinary society members” from both sides to meet and/or work together on various projects that all aim at solidifying the reconciliation (Gawerc 2006).

A number of methods that promote and facilitate reconciliation have been proposed (Kelman 2004; Kriesberg 2004). These acts must be institutionalized and widened to encompass many society members, institutions and organizations (Kelman 1999; Norval 1999). Some of them can begin before formal conflict resolution; others require reciprocation and can occur only after official relations have opened up.

Methods that can take place before signing the conflict agreement include:

*Using the mass media* to transmit information to a wide public about the new peaceful goals, the past rival group, one’s own group, about the developing relations and so on (Norval 1999).

*Non-governmental organizations* spreading the message about the importance of constructing peaceful relations, helping establish cooperative and friendly relations with the past adversary, or providing economic assistance to the society members and thereby showing that peaceful relations have important benefits (e.g., Aall 1996).

*Peace education* provides pupils with knowledge that is in line with the principles of reconciliation (for example, about the other group, about the course of the conflict, about future peaceful relations, about the nature of peace, about conflict resolution, etc.; see Asmal et al. 1997; Bar-Tal et al. in press, 1993; Reardon 1988).

*Publicizing meetings between representatives* of both groups to legitimize the peace process and personalize former rivals.

Methods that take place after formal conflict resolution include:

*Joint projects* of different kinds that can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites and professionals, as well as grass roots (Ackermann 1994).

*Tourism* to indicate that some psychological barriers to social relations have successfully been removed and provide an opportunity to learn about the past rival's readiness to form peaceful relations; *cultural exchanges* provide the opportunity to learn about the past opponent in human cultural perspectives.

*Writing a common history* can shed new light on the past of the groups and provide a basis for the eventual evolvement of new collective memory that is compatible with reconciliation (Willis 1965).

*Truth and reconciliation commissions* deal with the past by revealing the truth to the people and to serve as a mechanism of perpetuating justice (Asmal et al. 1997; Kaye 1997).

*Apology* as a way of accepting responsibility for the misdeeds carried out during the conflict and to appeal to the victim for forgiveness is an acknowledgment of the past injustices (Asmal et al. 1997; Cohen 2004; Gardner Feldman 1999; Handl 1997; Norval 1999).

*Public trials* of particular individuals charged for violation of human rights and crimes against humanity may enhance a sense of justice that facilitates the reconciliation process.

*Payment of reparations* may take place when one or both sides accept responsibility for the misdeeds performed during the conflict and are willing to compensate the victims. This indicates an admission of guilt and regret by the perpetrator, while the victims' acceptance of the reparations signals a readiness to forgive.

These different methods can involve different sectors and layers of the society. No single method is best; what is required is a combination. The use of the particular methods depends on many different factors, such as the nature of the conflict, the type of misdeeds perpetrated during it, the extent to which one side or both sides were responsible for its outbreak and the misdeeds committed, the history of relations between the groups, the culture of the groups involved, the availability of economic resources, the involvement of the international community and so on. These acts must be institutionalized and widened to encompass many society members, institutions and organizations in order to eventually evolve into a culture of peace.

## Conclusion

Years of study of conflict resolution have shown that peaceful resolution of a conflict does not guarantee lasting peaceful relations. Parties may negotiate an agreement of conflict resolution, but often this only concerns the negotiating leaders and is not relevant to the group members. In such cases, conflict can erupt again. To cement peaceful relations between the rival sides to an intractable conflict, reconciliation is necessary. Such reconciliation is in essence a psychological endeavor achieved through psychological processes. It is a foundation to the emergence of a culture of peace, which is the best guarantee of stable peaceful relations. This entails a major societal transformation. New norms, values, opinions, symbols, narratives, ceremonies and cultural products have to emerge.



Such a change requires a large accumulation of new experiences that can induce change in the psychological repertoire, transmitting a new message of peace and a new image of the former enemy. These experiences do not come about by themselves. People must create them, act upon them and disseminate their meaning. That is, people have to perform acts that provide the new experiences, such as peaceful gestures, meetings, joint projects, exchanges and so on. These acts supply the information that enables group members to look at their world differently. It is necessary to form a supportive climate that indicates to all society members that new reality evolves, free of threats, dangers and fears. This is a major undertaking for the society. Just as in times of conflict when society was mobilized for waging a violent struggle with much resolution and sacrifice, the time of reconciliation process requires determination and efforts to persuade the opposition, as well as rivals, of the genuine importance of the reconciliation and its benefits.

Individuals and groups always rally sooner and more easily to the banner of fear, dehumanization, hostility and hate than to the banner of trust, cooperation and respect of the other. But it is the latter that provides hope for a better life, and it is the duty of humanity to enable groups to follow the path of reconciliation that can lead to a culture of peace.

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# Chapter 11

## Using the Tools to Build the UN Bases

Joseph de Rivera

### Introduction

The chapters in this third section are not only important in their own right; they are ways to help construct the eight UN bases for a culture of peace. Hence, it is worth noting how each of these ten “method” chapters relates to the UN bases and how the chapters on each of the bases are necessarily interconnected to with one another peace.

### Relating Methods and Bases

1. Nonviolent struggle, its strategy and techniques, seems crucial for establishing the bases of democracy and international security. Cromwell and Vogeles show how nonviolent action helps establish a norm for nonviolence and supports the cooperative trust and the diffusion of power that are needed for democracy to function. On the one hand, nonviolent actions can be used to overthrow repressive systems so that a greater proportion of the world’s people can live under democratic systems (Sharp 2002). On the other, they can be used within democracies to achieve important reforms. Thus, in the United States they are being used to close down institutions that offer repressive military training, and they could potentially be used to overcome the reluctance to establish positive institutions, such as a department of peace. Further, nonviolent struggle is crucial in the global quest for the economic justice essential for the base of sustainable development. As True (1997) observes, nonviolence is globalization from below.

The chapter on democratic participation shows how citizen participation is essential for a culture of peace. Since this participation involves power, it is often restricted by those in power, and these restrictions must be contested with nonviolent struggle and measures that facilitate participation. When a relatively democratic government exists, there are a number of ways that can be used to enhance participation. Kisielewski and LeDoux observe that one way that both bolsters participation and the satisfaction of those who vote is the use of instant run off elections. They also point out how democracy may exist at one level of

society, but not at another, and that the power of those elected must be balanced by means (such as an independent judiciary) that insure a division of power.

The chapter on international security shows that security can be improved with bans on cluster bombs and landmines, controls over transfers of small arms, and a ban on nuclear weapons, but that this will only occur if citizens demand responses from reluctant governments. Goldring notes that the US government has obstructed the UN's progress and that citizen advocacy may require the sort of individual empowerment advocated by Macy (1983). It may well require citizens to become involved in nonviolent struggle.

2. Negotiation, as opposed to dominance, is a central concept for cultures of peace and an awareness of the different sorts of negotiation is a crucial aspect for the base of peace education as well as for the functioning of democracy. Nisenbaum points out that to fully realize the potential uses of negotiation, it is important to understand the possibility of building trust by pre-negotiation workshops and how much negotiation functions in a context of law.

There are many different sorts of peace education that are needed, and the chapter in the handbook focuses on the education required when there is inter-group conflict. Although we have only begun to create this sort of peace education, Salomon observes that learning is facilitated when people begin by studying a conflict that is similar, but removed from the one in which they are personally embroiled. They can then begin to realize that there are universal dynamics that can be applied to their own conflict, and this appears to afford a degree of freedom that allows them to see their opponents in a different light.

Boulding (2000) argues that a general education that promotes peace is closely related to open participatory communication and the free flow of information. Certainly powerful central authorities need to listen to those who are relatively powerless and have to cope with concrete situations that are removed from the view of those in power. She points out that community education could be used to teach the reality of our interdependence, peace education could study how peaceful societies manage conflict, and we could all learn from a history that deals with the struggle between those who want peace and those who want power (rather than form a history that only emphasizes struggles amongst powerful elites).

3. Deliberative dialogue may be used to establish the sort of trust and understanding that is necessary for the base of tolerance, particularly as this is contrasted with mere toleration. Whenever conflict is frozen it may be possible to use dialogue so that development can proceed, and Chakraverti describes the methods that have been developed by professionals to help those who are willing to explore the underpinnings of their conflict.

The authors of the chapter addressing the base of social cohesion and tolerance point out that cohesion only fosters peace when it is not attained by the cultivation of external enemies or the internal suppression of differences. They suggest that a positive cohesion that tolerates differences can best be attained by societies creating a superordinate identity that is able to include groups with different amounts of status and power. Such an identity is much more likely to occur when it is facilitated by dialogue between different identity groups.

4. Restorative justice and prison reform are also necessary to build a strong base of social cohesion and tolerance. Toews' chapter shows how restorative as opposed to punitive justice may be able to decrease the likelihood of criminal behavior and how a different sort of prison system may enable a peaceful culture to deal with violent deviance. Although we may want to have "zero tolerance" for criminal behavior, many citizens appear to confuse this with completely rejecting the persons who behave in contra-normative ways. They want to punish rather than transform "criminals," and this lack of understanding promotes violence and weakens social cohesion. Having a way to deal with deviant behavior is clearly a crucial aspect of the base of tolerance and social cohesion, an aspect that is largely overlooked in the UN's description of this base.
5. Police oversight seems crucial for the bases of democracy and human rights. Without such oversight it is far too easy for power to become consolidated and misused. Although this subject is overlooked in the UN's descriptions of actions to establish a culture of peace, it would seem to be an essential aspect. Diaz describes the difficulties in achieving adequate oversight, ways in which these problems may be overcome, and how oversight is being addressed in many different nations.

Of course, police oversight is only one aspect of building the base for human rights. The handbook's chapter focuses on how human rights are damaged by war and how the defense of human rights may be used as a rallying point for building spaces for peace. Anasarias and Berliner's description of how people without political or military power creates a narrative that unites them in an embrace of tolerance and human rights and challenges anyone who thinks that people cannot create a culture of peace.

6. Personal transformation is implicated in the establishment of all of the bases. Although space limitations precluded the inclusion of methods such as compassionate witnessing (Weingarten 2003; despair work: Macy 1983) and non-violent communication (Rosenberg 2003), Brenes clearly demonstrates how ways of transformation are especially involved in furthering the base of sustainable development. He shows how a sustainable economy may ultimately require the deep sorts of personal transformation that he describes and how a first step in this transformation may be achieved by involving individuals in the Earth Charter.

In her chapter on sustainable development, Oswald argues that we require major changes in the global economic system and our patterns of consumption. These "HUGE" changes will necessarily involve gender equality and will be facilitated by instruments such as the Earth Charter that can involve us as global citizens. In this regard, Boulding (2000) observes that for sustainable development to occur we all must realize our interdependence as a part of Gaia, and centers of state decision-making and corporate control must get in touch with local realities and become as concerned with the common welfare as with the production of elite wealth. Without the development of such realization and concern, modernization will threaten indigenous values and social cohesion. Such development will require education and communication systems that promote the valuing of moderation and the non-wage work that sustains families and communities.

7. Achieving peace in the family seems to be a crucial part of achieving the base of gender equality. The chapter presents us with an important paradox. On the one hand, it demonstrates that peaceful (as well as destructive) ways of behavior are cultivated in the family. Thus, one may argue that peace begins in the family. On the other hand, the authors point out that dealing with domestic abuse requires community support, laws, police, and social workers. Thus, one may argue that peaceful families require peaceful communities and a peace-oriented state. Hence, the chapter offers a clear example of how individuals, communities, and state systems must all be involved in constructing a culture of peace.

As the chapter on gender equality shows, achieving equality between genders is not only an aspect of human rights, of correcting obvious injustice, but a goal that impacts each of the other bases for a culture of peace. Stephenson argues that we may describe the genders as having different cultures and that a culture of peace requires an integration of these differences. She points out that female culture may affect the conceptualization of how negotiations should be conducted and that public opinion surveys find that women are consistently more opposed to the use of violence.

In a related vein, Boulding (2000) observes gender equality emphasizes empowerment rather than power-over. She argues that the creation of a new partnership between genders is essential for a peace culture because the skills involved in peacemaking and problem solving need to replace a male dependence on dominance. Further, it offers the opportunity for both genders to have time for home, work, and civic roles.

8. The chapter on participatory approaches to community change provides methods that are essential for building the base of sustainable development. These methods also promote democracy and gender equality, and they involve other bases such as open communication. Thomas-Slater's approach illustrates how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can encourage the development of a culture of peace at the community level. The usefulness of work by NGOs—when this work is sensitive and skillful—was also exemplified in the chapter on human rights and is inherent in the next chapter we consider.
9. The chapter on community reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction shows how the new, culturally sensitive, methods that are being developed can help establish the base of human rights and the base of tolerance and social cohesion in societies that have suffered warfare. Wessells points out that this work occurs in a wider societal context and must be understood as part of a wider system of influences. Although work must be on the community level, to some extent reconciliation at the community level is dependent on the wider culture of peace and reconciliation at the societal level.
10. Reconciliation at the societal level influences community peacebuilding and is crucial in establishing the bases of open communication and international security, as well as an important aspect of peace education. It is crucial for open communication because the intention to reconcile leads communication to be used for education and peace journalism rather than propaganda and hate.

Although governmental transparency benefits democracy and decreases corruption, the chapter on open communication reveals that press freedom is not an unmixed blessing. Much of our current media models a norm of violence, and when a society is embroiled in destructive conflicts, both the public media and the internet may contain more hate than enlightenment. We do not yet know how to change this without a censoring that would limit creative potential. However, we do know how to promote a type of journalism that would promote peace, and it seems obvious that we should encourage this “peace journalism” by making it financially advantageous.

## **Interdependencies**

Of course the methods and bases for building cultures of peace are intertwined. Human rights and democracy are co-dependent and require social trust, competent bureaucracies, and shared moral values. Genocides are less likely to occur when the state is controlled by democratic participation, but democracy depends on human rights if it is not to lead to destructive xenophobia. The chapters on these bases show the details of this dependency. It may or may not be possible to eliminate hierarchies of power and status. However, if the essence of a culture of peace is that the strong do not dominate the weak, we can certainly structure societies so that positions of power and status are based on caring for others rather than dominating them (see Maslow 1977).

Likewise, the base of understanding, tolerance, and solidarity is closely related to international peace and security. Nation-states are wrestling with the fact that most are not homogenous, and diasporas are adding to mixed populations. The chapter on tolerance and solidarity emphasizes the importance of creating superordinate goals for these groups. Failures to do this and to deal with the needs of multiple ethnic groups lead to national and international violence. The chapter on international security shows how we must secure agreements on arms control.

There is much that we need to address, and much that we do not understand. We may want to encourage power-sharing arrangements that encourage negotiation and shift the locus of authority down to regional and local units. Certainly communal groups provide a source of identity, meaning, self-worth, and support, have local knowledge, and can be self governing. However, since they may become involved in violent conflict with other groups they would still require some state-like structure that would enable the peaceful resolution of conflict. We may want to encourage diversity, but the advantages of diversity may be offset if too much diversity weakens the social trust necessary for civil society and we are still unsure about the best way to maintain group boundaries. We may want as much local autonomy and diversity as possible, while still maintaining some minimal common state identity. Along these lines, we might be able to follow Gottlieb’s (1993) suggestion of encouraging separate legal systems for ethnic groups and states.



Some problems are clear—there are power struggles, and past resentments and fears that lead groups to oppose the compromises that are necessary (Sri Lanka and Sudan are good illustrations), corruption is often present, and there are inefficiencies in having to work with many languages. It appears that parliamentary systems may work better than winner-take-all systems, but there is an important role for informal councils, and much depends on local situations and history. We will need new arrangements so that borders can be more porous and states will be less concerned with military force than with facilitating partnerships with global networks of groups and peoples.

The chapters in the first section of this Handbook illustrate how the social sciences can begin to address the fundamental challenges involved in establishing cultures of peace. Anthropology shows that it is possible for humans to construct peaceful cultures and systems and can examine the dynamics that make this possible; economics demonstrates that we can construct programs that balance the benefits of competition and cooperation; political science reveals that we invent power arrangements that encourage working with others rather than dominating them; psychology exhibits that we can examine and measure the attitudes, norms, and values essential for peace; and sociology confirms how we may study how the dynamics of inevitable conflict can be mitigated by semiotic systems. It is time for social scientists to address the challenge of creating cultures of peace.

To the extent that we ourselves become involved in dialogue, negotiation, non-violent action, and personal transformation, we will be building a culture of peace. To the extent we promote the use of problem-solving workshops and state structures that balance and diffuse power, advocate handling criminal deviance with restorative justice, prison reform, and police control, we will be constructing a culture of peacebuilding. And to the extent we help communities to develop and heal, and our national government to lead rather than dominate, we will be able to achieve a culture of peace.

Many of these practices would be facilitated by the creation of a new cabinet position, a Secretary of Peace, whose department could work with peaceful elements in our society to stimulate the cultural changes that are needed (de Rivera 2007). The department currently under consideration would provide a voice within the cabinet that would argue for policies that support international peace; create a Peace Academy to train people in conflict resolution; increase domestic peacebuilding at all levels of government by supporting agencies working with domestic abuse, and school and gang violence; and staff offices working to facilitate arms control, a more peaceful media, human and economic rights, and peace technology. Peace Alliance,\* the national grassroots campaign for such a department, has managed to involve many Americans, stimulate strong student support, and secure the co-sponsorship of almost 70 representatives. Further, it participates in a global alliance of activists working for departments of peace in over 30 other countries. It must now enlist the support of either the Democratic or Republican leadership.

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\* See [Peacealliance.org](http://Peacealliance.org) for more information on this campaign.

Building a culture of peace requires a vision of how our world can have more peace and justice, a plan as to how this can be achieved, and the will to begin work. Although this handbook is only a beginning, we hope its concepts and methods will be useful to the many alliances and networks that are building a global culture of peacemaking.

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