Efficient 1-Out-n Oblivious Transfer Schemes*

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Abstract. In this paper we propose an efficient (string) OT_n^1 scheme for any $n \geq 2$. We build our OT_n^1 scheme from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. It achieves optimal efficiency in terms of the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure. The computation time of our OT_n^1 scheme is very efficient, too. The receiver need compute 2 modular exponentiations only no matter how large n is, and the sender need compute $2n$ modular exponentiations. The distinct feature of our scheme is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and *universally usable*, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors specific to each of them. For our OT_n^1 scheme, the privacy of the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the un-chosen secrets is based on hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.

We extend our OT_n^1 scheme to distributed oblivious transfer schemes. Our distributed OT_n^1 scheme takes full advantage of the research results of secret sharing and is conceptually simple. It achieves better security than Naor and Pinkas's scheme does in many aspects. For example, our scheme is secure against collusion of the receiver R and t-1 servers and it need not restrict R to contact at most t servers, which is difficult to enforce.

For applications, we present a method of transforming any single-database PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR protocol with only one extra unit of communication cost.

1 Introduction

Rabin [33] proposes the concept of the two-party oblivious transfer (OT) scheme in the cryptographic scenario. It has many flavors, such as, original oblivious transfer (OT), 1-out-2 oblivious transfer (OT_2^1) and 1-out-n oblivious transfer (OT_n^1). For OT, the sender S has only one secret m and would like to have the receiver R to obtain m with probability 0.5. On the other hand, R does not want S to know whether it gets m or not. For OT_2^1, S has two secrets m_1 and m_2 and would like to give R one of them at R's choice. Again, R does not want S to

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know which secret it chooses. OT_n^1 is a natural extension of OT_2^1 to the case of n secrets, in which S has n secrets $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$ and is willing to disclose exactly one of them to R at R's choice. OT_n^1 is also known as "all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)" in which R is not allowed to gain combined information of the secrets, such as, their exclusive-or. Essentially, all these flavors are equivalent in the information theoretic sense [10,13,16]. Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive for cryptography and secure distributed computation [24,26] and has many applications, such as, private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure computation, etc [6,15,22].

A general approach for constructing an OT_n^1 scheme is that we first construct a basis OT_2^1 scheme and then build the OT_n^1 scheme by (explicitly or implicitly) invoking the basis OT_2^1 scheme for many runs, typically, n or $\log_2 n$ runs [10,12,28]. Another approach is to build an OT_n^1 scheme from basic techniques directly [31,32,34,36]

In this paper we propose an efficient OT_n^1 scheme for any $n \geq 2$. We build our OT_n^1 scheme from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. It achieves optimal efficiency in the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that R's choice is unconditionally secure. The computation time of our OT_n^1 scheme is very efficient. R need compute 2 modular exponentiations only no matter how large n is, and S need compute $2n$ modular exponentiations. By the speedup techniques [25], S's computation time can be much reduced. The distinct feature of our scheme is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and *universally usable*, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors (eg. factorization of $N = pq$) specific to each of them. For our OT_n^1 scheme, the privacy of R's choice α is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the un-chosen secrets m_i, $i \neq \alpha$, is based on hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Our OT_n^1 scheme can be parallelized to construct an OT_n^k scheme, in which R can get k secrets among n secrets at its choice.

We can combine our OT_n^1 scheme with any secret sharing scheme to form an efficient distributed OT_n^1 scheme [30]. In this setting, there are p servers. Each server holds partial information about the secrets m_i's. If R contacts t (the threshold) or more servers, it can compute m_α of its choice; otherwise, it cannot get any information about the secrets. Our threshold OT_n^1 scheme takes full advantage of the research results of secret sharing and is conceptually simple. In particular, we can construct access-structure distributed OT_n^1 scheme (Γ-OT_n^k).

For applications, we present a method of transforming any single-database PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR (SPIR) protocol with only one extra unit of communication cost. As SPIR is equivalent to OT_n^1, this transformation provides a reduction from PIR to OT_n^1 with almost no extra communication cost. In particular, any computational PIR [27], in which the receiver's choice is computationally private, with efficient communication complexity can be transformed to an OT_n^1 scheme (with R's choice is computationally secure) with almost the same efficiency for communication complexity. Some communication-efficient single-database PIR schemes have been proposed [14,27].

1.1 Previous Work and Comparison

Oblivious transfer has been studied in various flavors and security models extensively (cf. [2,5,8,10,12,18,22,28,32,34,36]). In particular, bit OT_2^1 (where m_1 and m_2 are only one bit) attracts much attention from researchers since it is the basis oblivious transfer scheme to which string OT_2^1 and OT_n^1 schemes are reduced. Most previous oblivious transfer schemes are based on hardness of factoring or quadratic residuosity problems.

The reduction approach is studied in [9,10,12,16,28]. For example, a k-bit string OT_2^1 scheme can be achieved by invoking βk runs of a bit OT_2^1 scheme for some β, $2 \leq \beta \leq 18$, [9,10,12]. In [28], a string OT_n^1 scheme is constructed by invoking $\log_2 n$ runs of a string OT_2^1 scheme.

The generic construction is studied in [1,22,32,34,36,31]. Stern [36] proposes a general construction for OT_n^1 based on the public-key encryption scheme that has some specific properties. The privacy of the receiver's choice of the scheme is computationally secure. The scheme takes $O(\sqrt{\log_2 n})$ rounds if better efficiency for exchanged messages is desired.

Recently, Naor and Pinkas [31] proposes a two-round OT_n^1 scheme that is computationally efficient in amortized analysis, that is, one modular exponentiation per invocation. In comparison, their scheme is indeed more efficient than ours in computation when the scheme is invoked many times. But, the system parameter of their scheme is $O(n)$, while ours is a constant. Furthermore, our protocol can be extended to threshold oblivious transfer easily and used to transfer any PIR protocol into a SPIR protocol without increasing communication complexity. Aiello, etc. [1] proposes a general methodology for constructing a two-round OT_n^1 scheme based on the homomorphic property of a public-key encryption scheme. But, no specific construction is given. Furthermore, in their construction, each receiver need a pair of public and private keys.

Distributed oblivious transfer has been studied in various contents under variant models, such as function evaluation [4] and private information retrieval [23]. Naor and Pinkas [30] identify the important attributes of distributed oblivious transfer. They propose a threshold OT_2^1 scheme such that R and the involved servers need do polynomial evaluation only. For comparison, in our distributed version the receiver and each server need one invocation of our OT_n^1 scheme. Nevertheless, their scheme is only for threshold OT_2^1, not threshold OT_n^1, and comes with cost of privacy and simplicity. For example, a coalition of less than t servers can compute R's choice. One scheme (based on sparse polynomials) is not secure against collusion of R and a single server. Some schemes cannot prevent R from learning linear combination of secrets. Furthermore R cannot contact more than t servers; otherwise, the scheme is not secure. On the contrary, in our scheme R's choice is unconditionally secure against any coalition of the servers.

In some sense, our schemes fall in the category of non-interactive oblivious transfer [5,35], in which R selects a public key and S performs non-interactive oblivious transfer using R's public key. The schemes in [35] are based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Each R uses a specific Blum integer N that is re-usable by the R. The privacy of R's choice is computationally secure and the

privacy of the un-chosen secret is unconditionally secure. The bit OT_2^1 scheme is extended to the bit OT_n^1 scheme. The k-bit string OT_2^1 scheme invokes k runs of the bit OT_2^1 scheme. The number (size) of exchanged messages is not as efficient as ours. For example, if k is close to the security parameter, our k-bit string OT_2^1 scheme exchanges $O(k)$ bits and that of [35] exchanges $O(k^2)$ bits.

Transforming any PIR scheme to a symmetric PIR scheme has been studied in [20,28]. Naor and Pinkas [28] show such a reduction using one call to the base PIR scheme and $\log_2 n$ calls to an OT_2^1 scheme. Crescenzo, etc [20] show a reduction using communication $poly(k)$ times of that of the base PIR scheme, where k is the security parameter. In comparison, our reduction uses only one extra communication cost.

2 1-Out-n Oblivious Transfer

Let $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$ be the secrets of S. We assume that S is honest, that is, it won't send secrets that are not the same as claimed ones, either in content or in order. An OT_n^1 scheme should meet the following requirements:

1. Correctness: if both R and S follow the protocol, R gets m_α after executing the protocol with S, where α is its choice.
2. Receiver's privacy: after executing the protocol with R, S shall not get information about R's choice α.
3. Sender's privacy: after executing the protocol with S, R gets no information about other m_i's or their combinations, $i \neq \alpha$,

We first present a basic scheme that is secure against the curious (passive) receiver and then modify it to be secure against the active receiver.

2.1 $\mathbf{OT_n^1}$ against the Passive Receiver

Let g and h be two generators in G_q of an order-q group, where q is prime. Let $x \in_R X$ denote that x is chosen uniformly and independently from the set X. We assume that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem over G_q is hard. That is, it is not possible to distinguish the following two distribution ensembles with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time:

- $D = \{D_{G_q}\} = \{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})\}_{G_q}$, where $g \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$ and $a, b \in_R Z_q$;
- $R = \{R_{G_q}\} = \{(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\}_{G_q}$, where $g \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$ and $a, b, c \in_R Z_q$.

For simplicity, we omit the security parameter size(q) in the later arguments. Note that the DDH assumption is stronger than the discrete logarithm assumption. Typically, G_q is the set of quadratic residues of Z_p^*, where $p = 2q + 1$ is also prime. Any element in $G_q \backslash \{1\}$ is a generator of G_q.

The system-wide parameters are (g, h, G_q), which can be used by all possible senders and receivers. Assume that the discrete logarithm $\log_g h$ is unknown to all. As long as $\log_g h$ is not revealed, g and h can be used repeatedly. Our OT_n^1 scheme is as follows. Wlog, we assume that the secrets m_i's are all in G_q.

$\mathbf{OT_n^1}$ scheme:

– S's input: $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n \in G_q$; R's choice: α, $1 \leq \alpha \leq n$;
1. R sends $y = g^r h^\alpha$, $r \in_R Z_q$.
2. S sends $c_i = (g^{k_i}, m_i(y/h^i)^{k_i})$, $k_i \in_R Z_q$, $1 \leq i \leq n$;
3. By $c_\alpha = (a, b)$, R computes $m_\alpha = b/a^r$.

Correctness. Since $c_\alpha = (a, b) = (g^{k_\alpha}, m_\alpha(y/h^\alpha)^{k_\alpha})$, we have

$$b/a^r = m_\alpha(y/h^\alpha)^{k_\alpha}/(g^{k_\alpha})^r = m_\alpha(g^r h^\alpha/h^\alpha)^{k_\alpha}/(g^{k_\alpha})^r = m_\alpha.$$

Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. This is optimal since at least R has to choose α and let S know, and S has to respond to R's request. R sends one message y to S and S sends n messages c_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$, to R. This is also optimal (within a constant factor of 2) by the argument for the lower bound $\Omega(n)$ of communication cost of the single-database PIR when R's choice is unconditionally secure [15].

For computation, R need do 2 modular exponentiations for y and m_α. Straightforwardly, S need do $2n$ modular exponentiations for c_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$. We can reduce the computation by using the fast exponentiation methods. Let $l = \lfloor \log_2 q \rfloor$. S can pre-compute g^{2^j} and $h^{-2^j}, 1 \leq j \leq l$. When y is received, S computes $y^{2^j}, 1 \leq j \leq l$. Then, S chooses k_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$, and computes c_i by multiplying appropriate g^{2^j}, h^{-2^j}, and y^{2^j}, $1 \leq j \leq l$.

Security. The above OT_n^1 scheme has the properties that the choice α of R is unconditionally secure and R gets no information about any other m_i, $i \neq \alpha$, if the DDH problem is hard.

Theorem 1. *For the OT_n^1 scheme, the choice α of R is unconditionally secure.*

Proof. For any α', there is r' that satisfies $y = g^{r'} h^{\alpha'}$. Therefore, S cannot get any information about R's α even if it has unlimited computing power. □

Theorem 2. *For the OT_n^1 scheme, if R follows the protocol, it gets no information about m_i, $1 \leq i \neq \alpha \leq n$, assuming that the DDH problem is hard. That is, all c_i's, $1 \leq i \neq \alpha \leq n$, are computationally indistinguishable from a random $z = (g, h, a, b)$, $g, h \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$, $a, b \in_R G_q$, even if R knows the r and α in $y = g^r h^\alpha$.*

Proof. Since the DDH assumption is stronger than the DL assumption, R cannot compute two different pairs of (r, α) and (r', α') that both satisfy $y = g^r h^\alpha = g^{r'} h^{\alpha'}$. Otherwise, R computes $\log_g h = (r' - r)/(\alpha - \alpha')$. Therefore, R cannot get two secrets.

We show that c_i, $i \neq \alpha$, looks random assuming that the DDH problem is hard. Formally, we define the random variable of c_i as

$$C_i = (g, h, g^{k_i}, m_i(g^r h^{\alpha - i})^{k_i})$$

where $k_i \in_R Z_q$, $g, h \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$. Note that we treat g and h as random variables in C_i. Let $Z = (r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4)$, where $r_1, r_2 \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$ and $r_3, r_4 \in_R G_q$. We show

that if C_i and Z are computationally distinguishable by distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$, D and R of the DDH problem are computationally distinguishable by the following $\mathcal{A}'$, which uses $\mathcal{A}$ as a procedure:

– Input: (g, u, v, w); (which is either from R or D)
1. If $u = 1$ then output 1;
2. Randomly select $r \in Z_q$;
3. If $\mathcal{A}(g, u, v, m_i v^r w^{\alpha-i}) = 1$ then output 1 else output 0.

We can see that if $(g, u, v, w) = (g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$ is from D and $a \neq 0$,

$$(g, u, v, m_i v^r w^{\alpha-i}) = (g, h, g^b, m_i (g^r h^{\alpha-i})^b)$$

has the right form for C_i, where $h = u$. If $(g, u, v, w) = (g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$ is from R and $a \neq 0$,

$$(g, u, v, m_i v^r w^{\alpha-i}) = (g, h, g^b, m_i g^{br+c(\alpha-i)})$$

is uniformly distributed over $G_q \backslash \{1\} \times G_q \backslash \{1\} \times G_q \times G_q$, which is Z. Therefore, if $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes C_i and Z with a non-negligible advantage ϵ, $\mathcal{A}'$ distinguishes R and D with an advantage $\epsilon \cdot (1 - 1/q) + 1/q$, where $1/q$ is the offset probability in Step 1. □

2.2 Without System-Wide Parameters

We can remove the requirement of using system-wide parameters (g, h, G_q). Now, S first chooses g, h and G_q, and sends them to R, that is, the following step is added to the scheme.

0. S chooses (g, h, G_q) and sends them to R, where $g, h \in_R G_q \backslash \{1\}$.

When R receives (g, h, G_q), it need check that q is prime, $g \neq 1$ and $h \neq 1$. Otherwise, if S chooses a non-prime q and g and h of small orders, it can get information about R's choice. Even if S knows $\log_g h$, R's choice α is still unconditionally secure.

2.3 $\mathbf{OT_n^1}$ against the Active Receiver

R may compute y of some special form such that it can compute combined information of the secrets. We don't know whether such y exists. To prevent this attack, we can require R to send a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of r and α that satisfy $y = g^r h^\alpha$, denoted by NI-ZKIP(g, h, y). The new step 1 of the OT_n^1 scheme becomes:

1′. R sends $y = g^r h^\alpha$ and $\beta =$ NI-ZKIP(g, h, y), where $r \in_R Z_q$.

In this case, S should check validity of NI-ZKIP(g, h, y) in Step 2. If the check fails, S aborts the protocol. In fact, this modification results in a very secure OT_n^1 scheme. We shall discuss this in Section 7.

We can apply the technique in [31] so that the protocol is secure against the active R under the random oracle model, in which a one-way hash function is assumed to be a random function. Let H be a one-way hash function. We modify the steps 2 and 3 as:

2′ S sends $c_i = (g^{k_i}, m_i \oplus H((y/h^i)^{k_i}, i))$, $k_i \in_R Z_q$, $1 \le i \le n$;
3′ By $c_\alpha = (a, b)$, R computes $m_\alpha = b \oplus H(a^r, \alpha)$.

Theorem 3. *The sender's privacy of the OT_n^1 scheme, consisting of steps 1', 2' and 3', is secure against the active receiver under the random oracle model.*

Proof. In the random oracle model, the receiver has to know the whole information $(y/h^i)^{k_i}$ in order to get $H((y/h^i)^{k_i}, i))$. Nevertheless, computing computing k_i from g^{k_i} is to solve the discrete logarithm problem, which is computationally hard. □

3 *k*-Out-*n* Oblivious Transfer

We can have k parallel runs of the OT_n^1 scheme to obtain an efficient OT_n^k scheme, which takes only two rounds.

$\mathbf{OT_n^k}$ scheme:

– S's input: $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$; R's choice: $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_k$, where $1 \le \alpha_i \le n$, $1 \le i \le k$;
1. R sends $y_l = g^{r_l} h^{\alpha_l}$, $r_l \in_R Z_q$, $1 \le l \le k$.
2. S sends $c_{i,l} = (g^{k_{i,l}}, m_i(y_l/h^i)^{k_{i,l}})$, $k_{i,l} \in_R Z_q$, $1 \le l \le k$, $1 \le i \le n$;
3. By $c_{\alpha_l,l} = (a, b)$, R computes $m_{\alpha_l} = b/a^{r_l}$. $1 \le l \le k$.

We can show that the OT_n^k scheme has the same correctness and security properties as those of the OT_n^1 scheme.

4 Threshold Oblivious Transfer

For a threshold t-out-of-p OT_n^1 (or (t, p)-OT_n^1) scheme, there are three types of parties: one sender S, p servers $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_p$, and one receiver R. S has n secrets $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$. It computes shares $m_{i,j}$, $1 \le j \le p$, of m_i, $1 \le i \le n$, and distributed shares $m_{i,j}$, $1 \le i \le n$, to server S_j, $1 \le j \le p$. Then, R chooses α, $1 \le \alpha \le n$, and contacts with any t or more servers to get information about the shares. We assume a mechanism, such as the broadcast channel, for ensuring that R contacts severs with the same request. By the received information, R should be able to compute m_α and no others.

By [30], a (t, p)-OT_n^1 scheme should meet the following requirements:

1. Correctness: if R and servers follow the protocol and R receives information from t or more servers, R can compute one m_α, where α is its choice.

2. Sender's privacy: even if R receives information from t or more servers, it gains no information about any other m_i, $1 \le i \ne \alpha \le n$. Furthermore, if R receives information from less than t servers, it gains no information about any m_i, $1 \le i \le n$.
3. Receiver's privacy: there is a threshold t', $t' \ge 1$, such that no coalition of less than t' servers can gain any information about the choice α of R. The threshold t' should be as large as possible.
4. Security against receiver-server collusion: after R gets m_α, there is a threshold t'', $1 \le t'' \le t$, such that no coalition of less than t'' servers and R can gain any information about any other m_i, $1 \le i \ne \alpha \le n$. The threshold t'' should be as close to t as possible.

By the OT_n^1 scheme in Section 2, we can easily construct a threshold (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme. Our scheme can make use of any threshold secret sharing scheme. Our (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme achieves $t' = \infty$ and $t'' = t$. Both are optimal.

We construct our (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme using the standard (t,p)-secret-sharing scheme. Let m_i be shared by the servers via polynomial $f_i(x)$ of degree t-1 such that $f_i(0) = m_i$, $1 \le i \le n$. Each server S_j, $1 \le j \le p$, holds the shares $m_{i,j} = f_i(j)$, $1 \le i \le n$. By contacting t servers, R can compute t shares of $m_{\alpha,j}$'s and construct m_α, where α is R's choice. Our (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme is as follows.

$(\mathbf{t},\mathbf{p}) - \mathbf{OT_n^1}$ scheme:

– S_j's input: $m_{1,j}, m_{2,j}, \ldots, m_{n,j}$; R's choice: α, $1 \le \alpha \le n$;

1. R sends $y = g^r h^\alpha$ to t different servers $S_{j_1}, S_{j_2}, \ldots, S_{j_t}$, $r \in Z_q$;
2. Each S_{j_l}, $1 \le l \le t$, sends $c_{i,j_l} = (g^{k_{i,j_l}}, m_{i,j_l}(y/h^i)^{k_{i,j_l}})$, $1 \le i \le n$, to R;
3. By $c_{\alpha,j_l} = (a_{j_l}, b_{j_l})$, R computes shares $m_{\alpha,j_l} = b_{j_l}/a_{j_l}^r$, $1 \le l \le t$. Then, R interpolates these t shares to get

$$m_\alpha = \sum_{l=1}^{t} m_{\alpha,j_l} \Big(\prod_{1 \le d \ne l \le t} \frac{j_d}{j_d - j_l} \Big)$$

by Lagrange's interpolation method.

Correctness. If R contacts with t or more servers, it can compute t shares m_{α,j_l} of m_α, $1 \le l \le t$. Therefore, it can compute m_α as shown in the scheme.

Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. This is optimal, again. R sends one message y to t servers and each contacted server S_j responds with n messages $c_{i,j}$, $1 \le i \le n$. For computation, R need do $t+1$ modular exponentiations for y and t shares m_{α,j_l}, $1 \le l \le t$, and one Lagrange interpolation for m_α. Each contacted server S_j need do $2n$ modular exponentiations for $c_{i,j}$, $1 \le i \le n$.

Security. Our (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme has the following security properties:

1. Sender's privacy: if R contacts with t or more servers, the privacy of m_i, $1 \le i \ne \alpha \le n$, is at least as strong as the hardness of the DDH problem. (The

proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.) Furthermore, if R gets information from less than t servers, R cannot compute information about any m_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$. This is guaranteed by the polynomial secret sharing scheme we use.

2. Receiver's privacy is unconditionally secure. Since for any α', there is r' that satisfies $y = g^{r'} h^{\alpha'}$. Even if the servers have unlimited computing power, they cannot compute R's choice α.
3. It is secure against collusion of R and t-1 servers $S_{r_1}, S_{r_2}, \ldots, S_{r_{t-1}}$, assuming the hardness of the DDH problem. Since for R and $S_{r_l}, 1 \leq l \leq t-1$, the privacy of shares $m_{i,j}$, $i \neq \alpha$, $j \neq r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{t-1}$, is at least as strong as the hardness of the DDH problem, R and these t-1 servers cannot compute any information about other secrets m_i, $1 \leq i \neq \alpha \leq n$.

4.1 $(\mathbf{t, p})$-$\mathbf{OT_n^k}$ Scheme

We can extend the (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme to a (t,p)-OT_n^k scheme easily. This is done by executing k parallel runs of the (t,p)-OT_n^1 scheme, similar to the OT_n^k scheme in Section 4.

4.2 $(\mathbf{p, p})$-$\mathbf{OT_n^1}$ Scheme

For (p,p)-OT_n^1, we can use $m_i = m_{i,1} m_{i,2} \cdots m_{i,p}$ to share m_i. Then, R can compute $m_\alpha = (b_1 b_2 \cdots b_p)/(a_1 a_2 \cdots a_p)^r$. It need do $2p-1$ modular multiplications and one modular exponentiations.

4.3 Verifiable $(\mathbf{t, p})$-$\mathbf{OT_n^k}$ Scheme

We can combine Feldman's or Peterson's verifiable secret sharing scheme and our OT_n^k scheme to form a verifiable (t,p)-OT_n^k scheme. In this case, the sender S, who has all m_i's, publishes the verification values for m_i's. Typically, the verification values for the shares of m_i are $g^{a_0}, g^{a_1}, \ldots, g^{a_{t-1}}$, where m_i is shared via a degree-(t-1) polynomial $f_i(x) = m_i + a_1 x + a_2 x^2 + \cdots + a_{t-1} x^{t-1}$. After computing m_{α,j_l}, $1 \leq l \leq t$, R can verify these shares using the verification values published by S.

5 Access-Structure Oblivious Transfer

Let $\Gamma = \{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_z\}$ be a monotonic access structure over p servers $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_p$. Each $\gamma_i = \{S_{i_1}, S_{i_2}, \ldots, S_{i_l}\}$ is an authorized set of servers such that all servers in γ_i together can construct the shared secret. Assume that n messages $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$ are shared according to Γ by some secret sharing scheme $\mathcal{S}$ such that $S(\gamma) = (m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n)$ if and only if $\gamma \in \Gamma$, where $\mathcal{S}(\gamma)$ means that $\mathcal{S}$ computes shared secrets from shares of the servers in γ.

We define Γ-OT_n^1 such that R can get the secret m_α from the servers in an authorized set $\gamma \in \Gamma$, where α is R's choice. The requirements for a satisfactory Γ-OT_n^1 are the same as those for the threshold OT_n^1 schemes in Section 4.

We can combine our OT_n^1 scheme and a general secret sharing scheme $\mathcal{S}$ to form a Γ-OT_n^1 scheme as follows.

1. Let S_j obtain a share $m_{i,j}$ of m_i by the secret sharing scheme S, $1 \le i \le n$.
2. Let γ be an authorized set that R contacts its servers to obtain m_α. When R contacts $S_j \in \gamma$ with $y = g^r h^\alpha$, S_j responds with $c_{i,j} = (g^{k_{i,j}}, m_{i,j}(y/h^i)^{k_{i,j}})$, $1 \le i \le n$.
3. R computes $m_{\alpha,j}$ for each $S_j \in \gamma$ and applies $S(\gamma)$ to compute m_α.

The above Γ-OT_n^1 scheme meets the requirements. This can be proved by the same arguments for the threshold oblivious transfer schemes in Section 4. We omit them here.

6 Applications

Efficient string OT_n^1 schemes can improve practical efficiency of the schemes in which oblivious transfer is used. One primary application is for private information retrieval (PIR), in which the user (U) wants to query one data block from a database, but U does not want the database manager (DBM) to know which data block he is interested in [15]. The regular PIR does not restrict U to obtain only one data block of the database. We consider the symmetric PIR (SPIR), in which DBM does not want to release more than one data block [23]. Assume that the database has n data blocks m_i's, each is in G_q. The following steps achieve SPIR. U wants to obtain m_α.

1. U sends $y = g^r h^\alpha$ to DBM;
2. DBM computes $c_i = (g^{k_i}, m_i(y/h^i)^{k_i})$, $1 \le i \le n$;
3. Now, DBM treats c_i's as its data blocks. DBM and U perform a regular PIR protocol so that U obtains c_α.
4. U computes $m_\alpha = b/a^r$, where $c_\alpha = (a, b)$.

This method transforms any single-database PIR scheme into a single-database SPIR scheme with only an extra unit of communication cost in step 1. If U's choice α of the base PIR scheme in Step 3 is computationally private, the transformed SPIR scheme's user privacy is computationally secure. On the other hand, if the base PIR scheme is unconditionally secure, the user's choice of the transformed SPIR is unconditionally private.

The transformed SPIR scheme uses at most one more round than that of the base PIR scheme. The reason is that the fist step may be combined with the first step of the base PIR in step 3.

Theorem 4. *If there exists a single-database PIR scheme with computation complexity $t(n)$, communication complexity $c(n)$ and round complexity $r(n)$, there exists an OT_n^1 scheme with computation complexity $t(n)$ + ($2n$ modular exponentiations), communication complexity $c(n) + 1$ and round complexity $r(n) + 1$, but with the additional assumption of hardness of the DDH problem.*

7 Further Security

Naor and Pinkas [28] give a very formal definition for security of OT_n^1 oblivious transfer:

1. Receiver's privacy – indistinguishability: S's views of R's different choices α and α', $\alpha \neq \alpha'$, are computationally indistinguishable.
2. Sender's privacy – compared with Ideal Model: The Ideal Model is that there is a trusted third party (TTP) that gets S's secrets $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$ and R's choice α and gives m_α to R. Sender's secrecy is that for every probabilistic poly-time substitute R' for R, there is a corresponding R'' in the Ideal Model such that the outputs of R' and R'' are computationally indistinguishable.

The modified OT_n^1 scheme, consisting of Steps 1′, 2 and 3, in Section 2.3 meets both requirements.

Theorem 5. *The modified OT_n^1 scheme, consisting of Steps 1′, 2 and 3, in Section 2.3 meets both the requirements of Receiver's privacy and Sender's privacy above.*

Proof. Since R's choice is unconditionally secure, the scheme meets the requirement of Receiver's privacy.

For each probabilistic polynomial-time adversary R', substituting for R, in the real run, we can construct a corresponding R'' (in the Ideal Model) whose output is computationally indistinguishable from that of R' as follows. R'' uses R' as a *re-settable* subroutine. When R' sends y and $\beta = \text{NI-ZKIP}(g, h, y)$ to S, R'' simulates R' to get α in a re-settable way with an overwhelming probability. If β is not legal or the simulation fails to produce α, TTP outputs $\perp$ (*abort*). The probability of TTP outputting $\perp$ is almost equal to that of S outputting $\perp$. After obtaining α, R'' sends α to TTP and gets m_α. R'' sets $c_\alpha = (g^k, m_\alpha(y/h^\alpha)^k)$ and $c_i = (a_i, b_i)$ for $1 \leq i \neq \alpha \leq n$, $a_i, b_i \in_R G_q$, and outputs the simulation result of R' on $c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n$. The output of R'' is computationally indistinguishable from that of R'. If there is a claim that R' gets information about $m_{\alpha'}$, $\alpha' \neq \alpha$. We can use R' to solve the DDH problem by manipulating its input c_i's, which is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Therefore, the scheme meets the requirement of Sender's privacy. □

8 Conclusion

We have presented an efficient (string) OT_n^1 scheme and extended it to construct threshold, access-structure and verifiable OT_n^k schemes for any $n \geq 2$ and $1 \leq k \leq n$. We also present its application on private information retrieval. It is interesting to find more applications of this construction.

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