

LANEI M. RODEMEYER

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# Intersubjective Temporality

It's About Time



 Springer

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176

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"Gemeinschaftswelt der Menschen in mir, dem als Menschen auf  
primordialen Grund konstituierte und somit die erste personale Welt, und die  
alle Wahrheit in sich, in ihren Horizonten befassende. Der Mensch ist der  
Träger der Wahrheit."  
Edmund Husserl.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte zur Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C-Manuskripte. Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, ed. Dieter Lohmar (Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2005), p. 172.

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INTRODUCTION  
(YET ANOTHER INTRODUCTION IN PHENOMENOLOGY)

In both his published and unpublished works, Edmund Husserl, the "father of phenomenology," struggles repeatedly with the relation of the individual subject and intersubjectivity. Since his phenomenology is based upon the temporalizing foundations of the subject, though, he is often accused of solipsism, and his efforts at integrating the subject with an intersubjective existence are registered as falling short of their goal. Important philosophers who use phenomenology as their basis, such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, furthermore, while implicitly criticizing his limitations, assume the existence of intersubjective foundations without taking up the existence and formation of these foundations themselves.<sup>2</sup> This book addresses the above problematic at several levels: First, it is a careful analysis of Husserl's understanding of inner time-consciousness. I take up each aspect of temporalizing consciousness (i.e., Urimpression, retention, and protention), explaining it in light of Husserl's phenomenology and showing how it functions in the whole of the "living present," i.e., our active, constituting consciousness. These sections of the book are helpful both to the uninitiated student trying to enter the world of Husserl's "inner time-consciousness" and to the experienced Husserl scholar who desires a closer look at Husserl's theory of temporalizing consciousness. Second, as my analyses take us to Husserl's recently published manuscripts, I provide an explanation of Husserl's later considerations of temporalizing consciousness, showing how he developed his earliest conceptions. These sections also turn toward specific terms that run through Husserl's later writings, but which have only sporadically been addressed in the secondary literature (if at all), such as "near" and "far" retention, "affectivity," and "world-time." In

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger argues that Being-with and Dasein-with are fundamental states of being for Dasein, essential to Being-in-the-world, and both imply an intersubjective existence: "By directing our researches towards the phenomenon which is to provide us with an answer to the question of the 'who', we shall be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: *Being-with* and *Dasein-with* [*Mitsein* und *Mitdasein*]." *Sein und Zeit*, p. 114; Macquarrie and Robinson trans., p. 149. Maurice Merleau-Ponty builds his phenomenology of perception on the assumption of a lived-body in an intersubjective world: "The civilization in which I play my part exists for me in a self-evident way in the implements with which it provides itself. [ . . . ] The cultural world is then ambiguous, but it is already present." *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 348.

showing how Husserl makes use of these terms, I create the foundations for my own argument that Husserl's notion of subjective temporalizing consciousness includes a necessary link to intersubjectivity. These sections will be interesting to Husserl scholars and phenomenologists not only because of their analyses of important new terminology, but also because they correspond to certain texts by Husserl that have recently been published or translated<sup>3</sup>. Finally, based on the textual analysis provided in the sections just described, I argue that Husserl's structure of temporalizing consciousness includes an openness that reveals its intersubjective underpinnings. Here I introduce the notion of "intersubjective temporality" as a better way to describe our temporalizing structure--a structure intersubjectively linked and yet living in individual consciousnesses. This term acknowledges the tension in phenomenology, between a pure subjectivity and a situated one, showing that even pure presence exists in an intersubjective context. These sections will be of interest to Husserl scholars, phenomenologists, and, more broadly, anyone concerned with a philosophical link between modern philosophical claims about subjectivity and post-modern moves that "fracture" or dissipate the subject as an ideal center of meaning.

This book is organized as follows: The rest of this introduction presents the difficulties of an analysis that considers both temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity together, along with a brief review of Husserl's main and recognized positions in both these areas. Then, in Part One, I focus my discussion on the living present and its impressional core, the Urimpression. After discussing Husserl's development of these two notions, I consider the concept of "world-time" (which Husserl introduced in his later writings) as a possible solution to the question of how the present of inner time-consciousness could be shared by more than one subject. In Part Two, I take up the notion of retention, presenting an analysis of Husserl's early, middle, and later writings on this topic. During these analyses, I introduce both "near" and "far" retention, terms brought up by Husserl himself in his analyses of passive synthesis. These terms, which describe the different functions of retention itself, reveal new ways to answer difficult

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte zur Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C-Manuskripte. Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, ed. Dieter Lohmar (Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2005); Edmund Husserl, *Die "Bernauer Manuskripte" über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18)*, *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, ed. Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001); and Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, trans. Anthony Steinbock, ed. Rudolf Bernet (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001).

questions about memory, especially those memories which remain affective in the present without the activity of recollection, and they help explain how appresentation could participate in my apprehension of another subject. In Part Three, I cover protention, pointing to its function as fundamental to our relation with other subjects. In this discussion, I address Husserl's notions of "affectivity" and "association," showing their reliance upon the function of protention as well as their importance in intersubjective relations. Finally, in Part Four, I review my arguments from each chapter regarding the relation of inner time-consciousness and intersubjectivity, and then I discuss the result of these arguments: a new way to understand inner time-consciousness, called "intersubjective temporality."

It is my hope that the book before you will offer a fundamental and intricate understanding of the functions of inner time-consciousness as conceived by Edmund Husserl, as well as scholarly insight into his later thinking on the topics of temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity. Through my argument that Husserl's notion of inner time-consciousness is necessarily linked with intersubjectivity, I do not wish to overthrow current understanding of the structures of consciousness, understood phenomenologically; rather, I would like to reveal that the inner workings of temporalizing consciousness are more complex than we, or even perhaps Husserl himself, believed.

### SUBJECT, OBJECT, INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Phenomenology's main project is an analysis of the relation of subject and object; only thereafter does Husserl question the relation of subject to intersubjectivity--and even that analysis begins in such a way that the other subject is taken as an object. Nevertheless, the foundation of both these relations is "intentionality," the directedness of consciousness toward its "object," toward what it is conscious-*of*. Intentionality, then, is the "focus" of consciousness that turns it unceasingly to its goal, its intended object. When an object appears before consciousness, it is "given," it is "presented," but along with its givenness, it "calls" to consciousness to know it as a whole. This takes place in two ways: First, consciousness apprehends the object *beyond* what is immediately before it, beyond the immediate presentation, i.e., the object is taken as having angles and profiles that are not immediately in view. The presentation, in other words, is embedded with *appresentations* of other possible profiles. Second, the object calls to consciousness in a more

literal sense. Consciousness feels a pull to pay attention to a certain object, and then to learn about it more completely. This is called the *affectivity* of the object, its ability to pull consciousness toward it, to notice it in all of its profiles. Combined with the curiosity consciousness itself possesses and intentionality, affectivity leads to the constitution and learning of objects in a complete sense; it leads to knowledge. But this is elementary for the phenomenologist. An implicit question in the following chapters, though, is: What makes this intentionality possible? The answer lies in a temporalizing consciousness that is able to go *toward* something else, *beyond* the immediate presentation, and that is able to *hold onto* its experiences so that a presentation can be appreciated as presenting a single, whole object. Thus, in the analyses of retention, appresentation, and apperception that are to follow, intentionality will not be a direct topic, but instead we will be addressing its foundations in temporalizing consciousness. The same will apply when we address protention, association, and affectivity, but here the notion of intentionality will come somewhat more directly into focus. Temporalizing consciousness, along with the associated functions of appresentation, apperception, association, and affectivity, is foundational to consciousness' relation to objects--but it is equally foundational in its connection to other subjects.

Husserl's discussion of the relation of the subject to other subjects, while well-known, is less elementary. Husserl's main formal discussion of the phenomenological possibility of intersubjectivity takes place in his *V. Cartesian Meditation*. Therein, he employs two main analogies to argue that the individual subject, after the "primordial" reduction, is able to recognize the existence of another consciousness. Using the primordial reduction to circumscribe the sphere of "my ownness" as well as to identify that which is foreign to this sphere, Husserl claims that the other subject, after the primordial reduction, would appear to me only as a body, intended by my consciousness in the same way as any object--as there "for me." From the point of the appearance of the other's body, he analyzes how, phenomenologically speaking, I could recognize her as another subject.

The first analogy Husserl uses is based on a comparison between my body and the body of the other subject. My own experience of my body includes a link to my consciousness, and this is essential to my living, bodily experience. In other words, all of my experiences of my own body have, as part of that experience, the involvement of my consciousness. When I encounter the body of another, then, I note the similarities between that body there and my body here. Because of our spatial requirements, that when I am here I cannot also be there, and vice versa, I realize that that body over there cannot be part of my body here. I also realize that I cannot control that body

there the same way I control my own. Nevertheless, that body strikes me as so similar to mine in its behavior and gestures that I realize that it must exist in a way similar to my body, i.e., as associated with a consciousness. With this realization, I appresent a consciousness in that body that is similar to, but other than, my own consciousness. I then see that other body there as that of another person or subject. Simply put, my connection between my own body and my consciousness is superimposed upon the other's body, so that I appresent a consciousness as part of the existence of that body, and I do this based on my activity of appresentation and our similarity to each other in our general bodily comportment.

Husserl's second analogy appears not only in the *Cartesian Meditations* but also in his published analyses on intersubjectivity<sup>4</sup> and other published and unpublished manuscripts. In these discussions, Husserl compares my knowledge of other subjects to my knowledge of my own memories. My most absolute experience of myself is my present experience, i.e., when I focus on my present, flowing consciousness. However, I also have recollections, experiences now of past events, and I realize that they belong to me as well. As I am currently remembering something, it is experienced now but *as past*, i.e., it has a modification of "having-been" as I re-live it. In my experience of another subject, Husserl finds a parallel function. In the same way that my recollections are mine but are modified as past, i.e., they are not the same as what is directly present now, the other subject's consciousness is immediately now, but is not the same as my own now-consciousness. In both situations, I am extending my consciousness beyond the moment of being mine-now to a type of re-presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) that takes the experience to be either not-originarily-now or not-me. In one sense, I exceed my present, reaching into past experiences in order to make some of them present in a modified way; in the other, I reach beyond the present as mine and recognize it as a present belonging to another subject as well as to me. Thus the other subject is taken as a subject, a consciousness, and she is understood on the basis of my

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<sup>4</sup> The parallel between the constitution of my recollections and my empathy of another subject is considered regularly by Husserl, especially in *Husserliana XV*. See also *Husserliana XXIII*, pp. 335 and 431, as well as *Husserliana XV*, pp. 102ff. and 487ff., and, of course, the V. Cartesian Meditation. This is also an important question for Klaus Held; see Held, 1966, pp. 151-6, and "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer Phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie," pp. 40ff. (in *Perspektiven transzendentalphänomenologischer Forschung, Phaenomenologica*, vol. 49. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, pp. 3-60).



present consciousness but as not-me through an act of consciousness that essentially exceeds its own boundaries. The function of re-presenting, Husserl argues, is similar in my act of recollection and in my act of empathy, since both take something in my present consciousness, understanding it now, but assigning it specific modifications of either having-been or otherness.

Neither of these analogies is sufficient in itself to solve the problem of solipsism, but Husserl intertwines both of these analogies into each other through a consideration of how I conceive the other subject's "there" from my "here." I perceive the other person "there," but in realizing that his is a different perspective from mine "here," I extend my own orientation and adjust it, apperceiving his perspective as "such as I should be if I were there"<sup>5</sup>. In other words, I consider his position "there" as if it were my "here," even though it cannot be since I am at this "here." This conditional consideration combines both the analogy between my body-consciousness and that of the other subject and the analogy between the other's present consciousness and my own past consciousness. The analogy between my body-consciousness and that of the other subject arises in my attempt to see that "there" as my "here," even though I know it is impossible, because I see that subject as someone like me through this consideration, and because I know that that "there" is a "here" for *someone* who is similar to me. The analogy to my past consciousness comes into play since I recognize the other subject as sharing my present--our present--in a modification similar to my modified experience of past events. Given this, I "re-present" the other subject as another consciousness that constitutes this space and time. The other subject is then taken as another subject, i.e., as an actively conscious subject similar to me, but as one for whom it is impossible to be me. As we will see later, these analogies employ not only the activities of apperception, appresentation, and association, as Husserl explains, but they also rely upon passive synthesis, affectivity, retention, and protention.

Husserl's explanations do respond to the question: How could the subject, understood phenomenologically, recognize other subjects as both subjects and as other? However, they are also open to quite a bit of criticism. For example, with regard to the first analogy, is it not true that my own experience of my own body is very different from my experience of the body of another? For example, I sense my body from inside it, whereas other subjects are encountered externally. How can I ascertain a necessary similarity on this basis? With regard to the second analogy, why would I say that other subjects are experienced similarly to my recollections, when past

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<sup>5</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 148; Cairns trans., p. 119.

experiences lie dormant in my consciousness until I recall them, and other subjects do nothing of the sort? Husserl even has a tendency to describe my recollections as "sleeping" or "dead," but we would hardly want to ascribe those descriptions to all other subjective consciousness. Finally, in both of these analogies, my recognition of other subjects remains based in my own consciousness. If this is the case, how can we say we have escaped solipsism at all? Can I ever understand the *otherness* of the other, if I can only understand her on the basis of myself?<sup>6</sup>

The key to the question of intersubjectivity lies in an understanding of "empathy." According to these more popularly known descriptions by Husserl, empathy is a sort of reproductive activity on the part of consciousness, one that "produces" an understanding of the other subject on the basis of my experience of myself. While this is an aspect of empathy, one which relies on the reproductive activity of temporalizing consciousness, we will see through further analysis of retention and protention, along with specific statements made by Husserl himself, that empathy has more than one level, and the reproductive aspect is only one of them. In fact, it would seem that, in order to "produce" an understanding of another subject, one must have an experience, or a more primordial understanding, of other subjectivity already implicitly in play. The activities of retention and protention, once sufficiently studied, will reveal a "passive-associative" link with the other, along with a more immediate intersubjective "fusion," that make an *understanding* of intersubjectivity possible. Temporalizing consciousness already includes the constituting activity of the other, as Husserl states on more than one occasion in his manuscripts. Part of the following analyses, therefore, will examine how the different levels of empathy relate with temporalizing consciousness.

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<sup>6</sup> This is a question Levinas takes up, but through an entirely different method and with different goals, so that we could not really call his project phenomenological in the same way as Husserl's. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*. Trans., Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.

TEMPORALITY<sup>7</sup>

The root of the relation of subject to object, and of subject to other subjects, is temporalizing consciousness. Husserl considered the question of inner time-consciousness to be among the most crucial in the area of phenomenology<sup>8</sup>, primarily because it stands as the foundation of a consciousness that constitutes its world. He also considered this question to be among the most difficult.<sup>9</sup> I agree. This section contains merely a brief overview of the main concepts with regard to Husserl's study of inner time-consciousness that will occupy this entire book. It is not meant to be thorough in any sense.

Husserl's favorite example used in his analyses of time is the perception of a musical tone or set of notes.<sup>10</sup> He chose a musical tone because it could be taken rather easily as a temporal object, abstracted from its being in space. In other words, although listening to music can be a very physical and spatial experience (which Husserl acknowledges), we can also abstract the spatial component out of the experience, and analyze just the experience of the tone in itself. This allows Husserl to examine more directly how an object exists temporally and how we are able to have temporal experiences.

In a phenomenological analysis of the experience of a series of musical notes, we notice several things. The notes pass through perception in an ordered flow--not all at once, nor constantly remaining in present perception; even if the same note is being held for several "moments," its quality changes, or we notice that it is being "held." In addition, these notes influence one another; they are not experienced as a series of individual, independent notes that happen to be played and heard. In other words, the perception of these notes is not simply of each individual note while it is immediately before consciousness. Instead, my experience gives the notes as

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<sup>7</sup> A somewhat different version of this description of Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness was originally published in my chapter "Applying Time to Feminist Philosophy of the Body," in *Belief, Bodies, and Being*, edited by Deborah Orr, Linda Lopez McAlister, Eileen Kahl and Kathleen Earle (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). Reprinted by permission of Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

<sup>8</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 334; Brough trans., p. 346.

<sup>9</sup> *Husserliana* III, 1, p. 162; Kersten trans., p. 193; Gibson trans., p. 216.

<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, Husserl's discussions of time most often turn to an acoustic experience instead of a visual one. Indeed, our own discussion of retention will also rely heavily upon such acoustic examples, whereas our discussion of protention will refer to tactile and corporeal examples. Such examples stand as counters to the accusations that phenomenology bases itself too heavily in the visual sense, although these criticisms are not without foundation.

reflecting each other, playing in relation to one another, creating harmonies, etc. If I did only hear the notes individually, I would have what could be called a constant form of "instant amnesia," always immediately forgetting what just came before.<sup>11</sup> But I actually experience several notes in their different qualities at once: The experience of the last few that have been played is held onto by consciousness, there is an experience of the one being played that is immediately before consciousness, and even the anticipation of the next few notes to come is part of the presencing activity of consciousness.<sup>12</sup> Because of this, I am able to experience the past notes' harmony with the present note, and I can only appreciate the harmony and order of the notes because consciousness experiences *beyond* what is immediately before it. Therefore, Husserl concludes, the presencing activity of consciousness is actually a "phase" (not a "now-point"), which includes experiences of perceptions that have just passed and the anticipation of those possibly to come.<sup>13</sup> In order for this to take place, presencing consciousness includes what is called a *retention* of experiences just-passed<sup>14</sup> and a

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Alan Lightman, *Einstein's Dreams*, especially pp. 80-84 and 128-132, for some fictional considerations of a world without memory and without a future. The novel itself creates the "dreams" Einstein might have had once he realized that time could be very different from our current experience and interpretation of it. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1993.

<sup>12</sup> It is interesting to note that what guides our anticipation is not merely a general openness based upon the present moment but more importantly a familiarity with patterns experienced in the past. Thus, when Husserl asks himself how we would know that an unfamiliar musical piece has been cut off in the middle, his response is that an experience with music in general, which teaches us a construction which is similar between different pieces, gives us a general idea of when a piece should end. If it is cut off, we experience a feeling of surprise or disappointment, because we already had an idea of how and when it should end. (*Husserliana* X, pp. 139-40; Brough trans., pp. 143-145) This assumption, of course, is based on Husserl's familiarity with classical European pieces, which follow very specific structures. His anticipation of the next notes while listening to a classical piece from the Chinese Peking opera, for example, would not contain such specifics. He might not even be surprised if the piece came to an early, abrupt halt, as this music would not fit into the structures with which he was familiar.

<sup>13</sup> This is argued and assumed throughout most of Husserl's works on temporality, although his early works do often refer to a "now-point." Cf. especially *Husserliana* X, pp. 167-70; Brough trans., pp. 171-174.

<sup>14</sup> Husserl's earlier writings on temporality refer to retention under a variety of terms, for example he writes: "*Fresh memory*": the consciousness of just-having-been, of just-having-experienced--more precisely, of just-having-perceived--immediately following on the perception." *Husserliana* X, p. 165; trans. John Barnett Brough (*On*

*protention* toward experiences that are just coming.<sup>15</sup> At the "center" of these activities is consciousness of an immediate, originary presence, called the *Urimpression*, or primordial impression.<sup>16</sup>

The living present is the "expanded" consciousness of "presence" that includes the *Urimpression* and the activities of retention and protention. Returning to the example of a musical melody, we would say that the retentive aspect of consciousness is that which "holds on" to the experience of the passing melody as consciousness takes in the experiences of the next coming notes. Retention links consciousness' experiences of what has just passed to its experience of what is immediately present, so that I can understand these experiences as those of a whole (musical) object. We indicated before that, if presentive consciousness were not to "stretch" beyond what is immediately before it, holding onto experiences of what has just passed, we would not be able to appreciate the harmonies and phrases in a melody, because we would no longer know what we just heard. Another example is when I speak a sentence: If consciousness were unable to hold onto the experience of the first part of my sentence actively as part of its "presentive," I would never know what I had just said, and thus would be unable to complete my thought.

Protention is also essential to the presentive activity of consciousness. Through protention, consciousness "looks forward" to the experiences of the next notes in the melody, giving the musical phrase a sense while I am

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*the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1991), pp. 169-70. Cf. also *Husserliana* X, pp. 170 (*soeben-vergangen*); p. 190 (*Eben-gegenwärtig-gewesen-sein*); p. 206; p. 209; p. 211-12; p. 234; pp. 343-4; p. 353. "Primary memory" also refers to retention in Husserl's early works (*Husserliana* X, pp. 166-7; Brough trans., pp. 170-1).

<sup>15</sup> Husserl also uses different terminology for protention in his earlier writings: *Husserliana* X, p. 168, "*Soeben-vorher*"; p. 169, "*Noch-nicht*"; p. 211, "*Soeben-zukünftig*."

<sup>16</sup> The *Urimpression* is actually called *Urempfindung* or *Urempfindungsbewusstsein* in Husserl's earlier works on time (see *Husserliana* X, pp. 324-334 and 368-382; Brough trans. pp. 337-346 and 379-394), but in later works and manuscripts he refers more often to the *Urimpression*, often reserving the word *Empfindung* for reference to hyletic data. Cf. *Ideas II*, Chapter 3 (*Husserliana* IV, pp. 143-161; Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans., pp. 151-169), wherein Husserl chooses the word *Empfindung* for his discussion of *Leib*. *Urimpression*, on the other hand, is defined in the C manuscripts as the kernel of the living present that is both "pure" and in direct relation to the world (*Husserliana Materialien* vol. VIII, p. 27, cited in chapter one, below). Cf. also Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart: die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 17-24.

hearing it rather than only afterward. In other words, by anticipating "where the melody is going" while I am listening to it, I give it a certain qualified meaning as I experience the music; I do not wait until I have heard an entire piece and then reconstruct it so that it makes sense only after I have heard it. Of course, I may be wrong in my expectations, but protention is what allows me to apprehend both the expected and the unexpected in my flow of experiences. When I am speaking a sentence, for another example, consciousness must be "ahead of" the guttural sound that is immediately before it; instead, consciousness makes present the whole word, even with the enunciation of the very first sound of it. And some kind of idea of what I am going to say is usually "ahead" of my present consciousness as I am, for example, lecturing or teaching.<sup>17</sup>

The "living present" of consciousness therefore has an essential function in the constitution of objects. Without the retentional and protentional aspects of presencing consciousness, we would be unable to recognize objects as having their own identity, and more fundamentally, as persisting through time. If consciousness could not hold onto experiences in their passing, for example, I would keep hearing the note "C" being played anew, never knowing that the one note was just being held for a longer period of time. I would constantly be surprised at hearing the same note ("instant amnesia" again). In fact, I would not be able to recognize the note "C" as such--it would always be a completely new experience and thus could never be given the name "C".<sup>18</sup> The presencing activity of the living present of

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<sup>17</sup> Heidegger makes a similar point, as he discusses Dasein's essential temporal structure as including Dasein's being "ahead-of-itself." Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 323-331; *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, pp. 370-380.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Robert Sokolowski, *Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington/London, 1978: "But to cut through the similarities and continuities, to consider ourselves as perceiving once again the very same object, to consider the object as being the same for us as it was once before--all this involves a sense of identity which could not have been built up without language, and which ultimately could not have been reached except upon the basis of the strict identity and repetition which consonants provide. And until we are capable of so taking the object as identically the same, the object cannot present itself with this kind of identification, and this level of its ability to be truthful cannot be actualized. We are the conditions for the occurrence of its disclosure." (pp. 68-9) This is a very important claim made by Sokolowski: that our ability to constitute objects depends, or is interrelated with, our ability for language. On the one hand, it goes against Husserl's attempt to show the constitution of objects at a *pre-linguistic* level, because Sokolowski is arguing that without language, or prior to language, there is no constitution of identity at all. On the other hand, Sokolowski

consciousness, then, is the foundation of the constitution of objects. But as such, temporalizing consciousness makes the present itself *be*. The retentive and protentive activities of consciousness constitute a before and an after in experience, and thereby, they constitute temporality itself.

Temporalizing consciousness, however, is not only made up of the activity of presencing described above. Those retained experiences that are "flowing away" from what is being immediately presenced do not simply disappear, nor do they all remain forever in present consciousness. Instead, they flow away from the living present and yet remain unified with it somehow. *Recollections* are *re-presented* (*vergegenwärtigt*) by consciousness. As mentioned above, recollection is an experience now of something that has already passed, experienced with the modification of having-passed. When recollection takes place, therefore, the experience is not the same as the originary experience of something immediately present; rather it is a present experience modified as *having-been*. As Husserl himself says, "The earlier consciousness is reproduced in its entirety, and what is reproduced also has the character of reproduction, of representation, and the character of the past."<sup>19</sup> Although recollection takes place in the present, it is experienced with its own past retentions and protentions, as the presencing of a "piece" of the "flow" that has already passed away.

Somewhat parallel to recollections, *anticipations* or *expectations* are the making present of consciousness' projection "forward," beyond the more immediate extension of protention. Consciousness "re-presents" an experience that is anticipated, so that this experience is made present, but with the modification of "yet-to-come." One could argue that consciousness' experience of anticipated events could be as detailed as that of recollected events (if not more), even though no originary, or immediately direct, experience has yet taken place (i.e., my anticipation of my wedding, with all its details). In turn, the recollection of already experienced events can often be quite hazy (i.e., my blurred memory afterward of all the details of my wedding as they actually happened). Husserl unfortunately relied upon the structural parallel between recollection and anticipation too heavily; often, he merely described anticipation as an inverted form of recollection, sometimes as "vaguer" and, of course, going in a different direction with relation to the

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supports what we will be arguing, that even at the structural, supposedly pre-linguistic, level of constitution there is an intersubjective foundation. That foundation may be linguistic ability, as argued by Sokolowski, or, closer to our argument, an openness to the potential for intersubjective communication. Nevertheless, a temporally constituting consciousness seems to be a condition for the very possibility of language in the first place.

<sup>19</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 181; trans. Brough, p. 187.

now. Unfortunately, such a description does not at all reveal the different ways these two activities of temporalizing consciousness function, nor their different meanings for the subject.<sup>20</sup> We will be addressing the activities of recollection and expectation only through our analyses of retention and protention; however, our analyses will reveal the difference between these more reproductive functions of consciousness.

From the perspective of static phenomenological analysis, the living present is a standing form and active flowing all at once. In other words, the living present is a structure that remains constant in the activities of retention, Urimpression, and protention, and at the same time, it is constantly changing, always different according to what it is constituting. Klaus Held fittingly addresses the paradox of the living present, its function of both "standing" and "streaming" and how this relates to the ego, in his work *Lebendige Gegenwart*<sup>21</sup>. The constitution of temporality takes place through the gathering activity of retentions, maintaining their relation to the Urimpression, and the projecting activity of protentions, and thus these activities cannot themselves be temporal. The living present constitutes our experiences as temporal, thereby establishing temporality itself. Therefore, the activity of the living present is considered *pre-temporal*.<sup>22</sup> This same

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<sup>20</sup> "All things considered, however, the intuition belonging to expectation is something just as original and unique as the intuition of the past." *Husserliana X*, p. 307; trans. Brough, p. 173. Husserl also insists that, ideally, recollection and expectation are equal forms of intuition: "In the case of a perfect memory, everything down to the smallest detail would be clear and would be characterized as memory. But *idealiter* the situation could be precisely the same in the case of the expectational intuition." *Husserliana X*, p. 305; trans. Brough, p. 317. Husserl's early published work on time almost always used the term "expectation" (*Erwartung*) for temporal "anticipation" (the term he more often used later for the phenomenological future). Unfortunately, Husserl spends much less time describing our experiences of anticipation than recollection, often explaining that one can apply the descriptions of one (recollection) to the other (anticipation) with only minor adjustments. There are obvious difficulties with such a neglect of the futural aspect of temporality. Heidegger responds to this neglect of the future in his *Being and Time* by showing how Dasein is necessarily futural, and that Dasein could only be authentically temporal if it were to open itself up to its past (thrownness), present (falling) and future (being-towards-death) at once.

<sup>21</sup> *Lebendige Gegenwart: die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*, by Klaus Held (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Husserliana X*, pp. 368ff. (§54); Held, 1966, especially pp. 112-18; and Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, *Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens*, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2nd ed., 1996), pp. 102ff. The difficulty



activity, with a focus on the content of our experiences, is also the foundation for our constitution of objects. Temporalizing consciousness, in other words, constitutes objects as objects experienced temporally. Further, these temporal objects are always constituted as "mine," and so, through these experiences and consciousness' constitution of them, "I" am established as the center of all these experiences. The ego is therefore constituted through this constitution of temporality and objects.<sup>23</sup>

From the perspective of a genetic analysis, temporalizing consciousness is integrated into its own history of constitution. The activities of retention and protention are structures, to be sure, but they are also interrelated in certain ways with their own contents. The content of former experiences that is retained can influence the constitution of similar content that stands before consciousness, and further, can drive the content of related protentions. But isn't this counter to the position of phenomenological analysis? Shouldn't the noematic contents of our experiences be necessarily distinguishable from the noetic acts of consciousness? If this were simply a static analysis, then, yes. However, in order to comprehend the deepest layers of consciousness itself, we must engage also in genetic analysis, and face the difficulty of how the content of experience is involved in the acts of consciousness themselves. To discuss retention, for example, we must examine not only the form of this retaining activity as it recedes from the immediate presencing activity of consciousness, but also the content of retention, as retained experiences have both the capability of influencing present constitution and the possibility of being re-presented through recollection. Thus arises one of the biggest challenges to the following analyses: to address temporalizing consciousness in its activity and with regard to its content, both separately and together. I have done my best to clarify whether structure or content is the focus of each analysis, or whether they are being addressed together. However, some confusion may still arise, especially since, for example, "a retention" might mean either the content or the activity of consciousness. Usually, though, I

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here is *not* how to recognize our constitution of objects through temporality, nor even the constitution of the Ego, but how to recognize that temporalizing consciousness itself. Temporalizing consciousness must be pre-temporal, and prior to either objective or immanent temporality--i.e., primordial temporality. And it can only somehow be recognized through its own functioning of retention.

<sup>23</sup> "Weil das Ich in seiner urtümlichen Gegenwart stehend-strömendes ist, darum ist es offenbar auch imstande, alle Gegenständlichkeit als strömende begegnen zu lassen und sie zugleich in der Ständigkeit der stehenden Jetztform zu synthetisieren. [. . .] Die Frage, was die *lebendige Gegenwart* des ichlichen Funktionszentrums ist, rückt daher in den Mittelpunkt der folgenden Überlegungen." Held, 1966, p. 64.

will refer specifically to "content" or "activity," and where the context remains vague, then the fault is entirely my own.

The relation of temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity will also be taken up with regard to structure and content. Husserl's own discussions of intersubjectivity focused mainly on the content of the experience of the other subject, i.e., on the individual's experience of another subject's body. However, the activity of temporalizing consciousness is an essential condition for the apprehension of other subjectivity, and thus this will be a primary focus of the following analyses. Retention and protention, in their very structures, will show a connection to intersubjectivity in a way that is importantly informative to an understanding of phenomenology.

#### CLARIFICATION OF THE ARGUMENT

According to a traditional understanding of phenomenology, "inner time-consciousness" is the constituting living present, the activity and productivity of retention-Urimpression-protention. It creates the present as it constitutes the current flow of experiences, and thereby also constitutes the other experiences that surround the present, as part of the past and future. It is usually described as immanent to my own consciousness, apparently inaccessible to other subjects or to the world. Inner time-consciousness is what is most specifically "mine," based on the privileged perspective I have of my experiences. Of course, the term "mine" must be qualified at this level, for what "I" am, and what is "mine" at all, are also constituted at this level. So inner time-consciousness is both pre-egoic and egoic at once. Klaus Held explains: "The ego temporalizes itself into a persisting 'object-pole' in 'immanent' time; the pre-temporal constancy of the living ego-present thereby arises as a temporalized persistence over a succession of time-positions."<sup>24</sup> This level of inner temporality is therefore treated separately from that of intersubjectivity for two reasons: First, the ego is hardly fully

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<sup>24</sup> "Das Ich zeitigt sich zu einem verharrenden 'Gegenstandspol' in der 'immanenten' Zeit; die vor-zeitliche Ständigkeit der lebendigen Ichgegenwart tritt damit als gezeitigtes **Verharren** über eine Abfolge von Zeitstellen auf." Held, 1966, p. 85. My translation. Held continues: "Mit der 'Platzanweisung' an die Noesen wird nun zugleich das Ich als jeweiliger Vollzugspol jedes einzelnen noetischen Vollzuges an der betreffenden Zeitstelle (bzw. Stellenfolge) antreffbar. Es unterliegt in diesem Sinne, weil es schon im Wandel der einzelnen Noese mitströmte, einer Mitzeitigung." Held, 1966, p. 86.

formed at this level, so a discussion of any other egos at this point appears moot; and second, since this is the level of *individual* constitution (of both objects and subject), intersubjective involvement seems out of the question, i.e., intersubjectivity is only to be found at the "next" level. Inner time-consciousness is the deepest, most fundamental level of consciousness understood phenomenologically; it grounds the formation of the individual ego and therefore is most intimate with that ego's "own" self.

In contrast, intersubjective existence is apparently only out in the world: Just as other subjects cannot have first-person access to my thoughts, so I cannot have the same access to theirs. My experience of other subjects is of their bodies, living amongst the objects we share, and of communicating our differing experiences of similar objects through language and expression. For example, Husserl says:

In the intersubjective world, the other can communicate to me what he sees and I do not see, what he saw, which processes he was able to observe and which specific inductions he could make--ones which do not exist for me.<sup>25</sup>

Through the intersubjective world, my own knowledge of the physical, lived world is expanded beyond what I personally experience to include what others have also experienced and have then communicated to me. For Husserl, this is also an important aspect of the scientific world, because what one scientist may not discover, another might, and their communication of their discoveries brings the community as a whole closer to (empirical) truth.

Thus traditional phenomenology has maintained a fairly consistent division between discussions of intersubjectivity and analyses of temporalizing consciousness. Nevertheless, inner time-consciousness has always been understood as the foundation of an intentional consciousness, and thus it must also be the foundation of intersubjective constitution. An examination of temporalizing consciousness should therefore reveal how the consciousness of the other subject can be apperceived when experiencing it directly is an impossibility, whether the arrival and similarity of the other subject's body to mine is sufficient to catalyze the apperception of her consciousness, and how it is that more than one subject can experience the *same* present. These questions will be addressed here. But there are also apparently trivial aspects of the argument presented in this book. For example, I will establish how temporalizing consciousness makes the

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<sup>25</sup> "In der intersubjektiven Welt kann mir der Andere mitteilen, was er sieht und ich nicht sehe, was er gesehen hat, welche Vorgänge er beobachten und welche bestimmten Induktionen er machen konnte--die für mich nicht bestanden." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 216. My translation.

constitution of intersubjective existence even possible. While this conclusion may seem obvious from a phenomenological perspective, the argument still needs to be worked out carefully. In addition, the fact that intersubjectively related experiences are retained by an individual's consciousness is to be assumed by the phenomenologist, and thus the consequence that these experiences may affect an individual's activity of present constitution could be inferred without much difficulty. But this is a difficult inference, especially given Husserl's discussions of *pure* consciousness. The question arises whether this retained intersubjective content may influence only the *content* of other experiences, or whether it can affect the *structure of temporalizing consciousness itself*. I will be examining arguments for both cases here. However, in the sense that the structure of consciousness could be affected by intersubjectivity, I will *not* argue that intersubjectivity forms, creates, or is prior to consciousness; rather, I intend to argue that consciousness and intersubjective experience are co-foundational from a phenomenological standpoint. Finally, one could consider that my experience of the presence of another subject would be unquestionable. From a phenomenological standpoint, however, and especially given Husserl's own struggles with the topic, the presence of another subject is mired with difficulty. From the perspective of temporalizing consciousness, I will work through the apperception of another consciousness, and, using Husserl's own terminology, I will elaborate on his argument, revealing a deeper link between temporalizing consciousness and the other than he presented in his published writings.

This book is not meant to criticize or displace Husserl or his phenomenology. Instead, I work through Husserl's writings on inner time-consciousness. In doing so, I make connections between different texts and terms that Husserl did not make himself, and then I look to certain possible implications of his philosophy that he himself did not take up. My intention is to follow Husserl's phenomenology through with regard to the areas of temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity, where Husserl did not have a chance to take it himself.

PART ONE  
THE PRESENT

## INTRODUCTION

We will begin with an examination of the "now," which includes both the notion of the "living present" and that of the Urimpression or "primal impression." My analysis will follow an historical-philosophical path, so that chapter one explains how both the living present and the Urimpression emerged from Husserl's early works on inner time-consciousness. I will describe, following the careful analyses carried out by John Brough and Rudolf Bernet, how Husserl began with one structure of inner time-consciousness based on apprehension and its content, and how he apparently discarded this early structure for one based on the foundation of an absolute consciousness. Through this description, I will attend to the development of each the Urimpression and the living present, turning also to Klaus Held's extensive analysis of the living present, and concluding chapter one with a look at how the terms of living present and Urimpression were developed in Husserl's middle and later manuscripts (now published primarily in *Husserliana* vol. XXXIII and *Husserliana Materialien* vol. VIII).

Chapter two takes a look at an argument presented by Dan Zahavi, that an "open intersubjective" structure is necessary for our presentation of objects. This argument is an important complement to my own, because it claims that, in the most exemplary type of experience for phenomenology, perception, I require an intersubjective structure in order to complete my experience. The third chapter takes up an interesting notion mentioned by Husserl several times in his manuscripts: "world-time." I take up this term in my attempt to deal with a difficult question in phenomenology: How is it that I can have a fundamental experience of a "now" that is *shared with other subjects* when the foundation of temporal experience, inner time-consciousness, is at the core of what is individually mine? By analyzing "world-time," I conceive a relation between temporalizing consciousness and a transcendental, intersubjective structure.

We turn now to chapter one and an analysis of how, phenomenologically, we are to understand the temporal "present."

CHAPTER ONE  
UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT:  
URIMPRESSION VS. LIVING PRESENT

HUSSERL'S EARLIEST WORKS ON TEMPORALITY (1893-1908)<sup>26</sup>

Husserl's earliest structure of temporalizing consciousness, discussed prior to 1908, was somewhat different from what he developed later, and it was also more problematic. We will give merely an overview of this earlier temporal structure here, turning primarily to the careful and extremely helpful analyses carried out by John Brough<sup>27</sup> and Rudolf Bernet<sup>28</sup>. Both lay out this early schematic of temporalizing consciousness for us and also describe how Husserl turned to develop a structure that would work better with his system of phenomenology.

Paralleling the relation he developed in his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl first applied the schema "content of apprehension--apprehension" to temporalizing consciousness. Thus, for example, when he considered our experience of a musical tone in these analyses, he would understand this

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<sup>26</sup> I am constructing three "periods" for Husserl's philosophical development in his thinking on temporality and intersubjectivity. These periods are based on the following textual time-frames: the time during which he wrote his published time lectures (1893-1917), the time periods chosen by the editors for his intersubjectivity volumes (*Husserliana* XIII, 1905-1920; *Husserliana* XIV, 1921-1928; *Husserliana* XV, 1929-1935), the time period of his writings on passive syntheses (1918-1926), and the time periods of his L manuscripts (*Husserliana* XXXIII, 1917-1918) and his C manuscripts (*Husserliana Materialien* vol. VIII, primarily 1929-1934). Thus the three "periods" of Husserl's work and thought, for our purposes here are: early (1893-1916), middle (1917-1928), and late (1929-1935). Three similar periods are reflected in Toine Kortooms' *Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.

<sup>27</sup> Brough, J.B. "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness." *Man and World* 5, 1972, pp. 298-326. Reprinted in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, ed. by Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick. University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame, IN/London), 1977, pp. 83-100.

<sup>28</sup> Bernet, Rudolf. "Einleitung." *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)*, ed. by Rudolf Bernet. Felix Meiner Verlag (Hamburg), 1985, pp. XI-LXVII.

experience as having a tone-content and an apprehension of that tone-content. Applying this schema would thus give rise to two important theses which Husserl related to time-consciousness: First, the contents (i.e., the tone-content) of our apprehensions are "neutral," meaning that these immanent materials have no specific place in space or time; and second, these contents gain their specific character and place through the activity of our apprehension. For example, according to this schema, the color blue would remain a neutral content, immanent with regard to my experience. It would become a presentation, i.e., the "blue of the sky" or the "blue of my carpet," only through my "animating" apprehensions which, through their activity, would apply these neutral contents to specific experiences as I perceive external objects. Accordingly, with relation to time-consciousness, *the apprehensions determine the "temporal character"* of the content of an experience, for example, whether the experience is taking place in the present or whether it is an experience from the past that I am remembering. Brough emphasizes that in this schema, "the apprehensions will play the decisive role in determining whether the consciousness constituted is Now-consciousness, consciousness of elapsed phases of the object, or consciousness of phases yet to come."<sup>29</sup> For example, we see Husserl saying such things as:

Therefore the perceiving of a melody is in fact a temporally extended, gradually and continuously unfolding act, which is constantly an act of perceiving. This act possesses an ever new "now"-point. And in this now, *something becomes objective as now* (the tone heard now), while at the same time some one member of the melody is objective as just past and others are objective as still further past; and perhaps also something or other is objective <as> "future."<sup>30</sup>

Thus, according to this account, the contents of my experiences are temporally neutral until they are given a temporal component by my apprehension; only then are they known as now, past, or future experiences.

Because apprehension is required to give each momentary perception a temporal character, we must actually understand each temporal phase to contain several apprehensions at once: the apprehension of what is immediately now as now, apprehensions of moments as just past, and apprehensions of our expectations into the near future. In addition to these, of course, are the apprehensions which animate the sensory contents of our experiences and form them as appearances (i.e., the blue of the carpet being viewed now). Thus, as Brough explains, there are several layers of continua

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<sup>29</sup> Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 87.

<sup>30</sup> *Husserliana* X, pp. 167-8; Brough trans., p. 172. My emphasis.



relating to the content and apprehension of both our temporal experience and our perception:

Each momentary slice of consciousness, in other words, really embraces, simultaneously, a double continuum--a continuum of apprehensions and a continuum of contents. [. . .] Further, since the perceptual act is a continuum of phases or slices, and since each of these phases contains a continuum of contents and a continuum of apprehensions, the total perception may be described as "a continuum of continua".<sup>31</sup>

In addition, these continua presume that the act of perception is itself in time, a time that corresponds to, but is not the same as, the objective time of the object. For example, we see Husserl discussing the difference between the time of my perception and the time of the perceived, enduring object:

Perception of an enduring "a" does not occur in an enduring perception [. . .] but in a continually changing perception, which, as continually changing, constantly generates a new now, a now that is always the ultimate point of the actually present time.<sup>32</sup>

The correlation of these different temporalities is not explained, however. In fact, several other problems arise from applying this schematic to a description of temporalizing consciousness, for example, how the ability to grasp apprehensions in themselves does not lead to an infinite regress (apprehensions of apprehensions of . . .), and how we are able to re-live a memory now while experiencing it as a past event (maintaining apprehensions of both the present and the past at once). Once Husserl realized that these difficulties indicated a problem with the schema itself--as applied to a description of temporalizing consciousness--he considered a new structure, one that he would later establish as the basis of his phenomenology.

Husserl recognized that there were several difficulties which arose with his first conception of temporalizing consciousness and its structure. First of all, because the contents and apprehensions of each momentary now are themselves now, the fact that we have consciousness of things as retained in an ordered past becomes very difficult to explain. In other words, although this schema might describe our succession of consciousnesses, it does not allow for our consciousness of succession. Husserl realizes:

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<sup>31</sup> Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 88; Brough refers here to *Husserliana* X, p. 231.

<sup>32</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 205-6; Brough trans., p. 212, modified.

The primary contents that spread out in the now *are not able to switch their temporal function*: the now cannot stand before me as not-now, the not-now cannot stand before me as now. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the whole continuum of contents could be viewed as now and consequently as coexistent, and then again as successive. That is evidently impossible.<sup>33</sup>

The contents of our apprehensions, then, cannot be temporally neutral, or else they could move effortlessly to any or all moments in time. Husserl had to change his description in such a way that would explain how what is experienced now is necessarily experienced as such. Further, his description had to allow for the temporality of an event to remain with it; for example, my experience of re-living a memory has to be experienced not only as now, but also with an indication of its having been experienced originally in a past now.

This relates to another, second difficulty. The fact that the contents of our apprehensions are neutral with regard to temporality requires that the "temporalities" of the object and of my experience coincide with one another. Husserl says, for example, "I also order the acts temporally; and there I find that in seeing a thing existing as present itself, I say that it now exists and that the perception has the same now."<sup>34</sup> But the fact that these two temporalities coincide is "a piece of good fortune for which the theory does not account"<sup>35</sup>, says Brough, and Husserl struggles with this:

Just as anything real has its time, so the concrete perception of a has its time; specifically,  $a_t$  is given in a perception  $P_t$  that has the same original temporal now. But is the temporal not something on which I can focus my attention, something that can be perceived? And, as a given "moment," as a character, is it not also something that has time? If I consider the contents of the visual field in the now, they all exist at the same time, are all now. But each content does not have its own individual now-moment; on the contrary, the total consciousness has one and the same now [. . .]. The now is not a species.<sup>36</sup>

The now, in other words, cannot be applied separately to co-existent experiences. It goes beyond specific apprehensions, infused throughout all consciousness-now.

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<sup>33</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 322; Brough trans., p. 335.

<sup>34</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 201; Brough trans., p. 208.

<sup>35</sup> Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 92. Cf. also Bernet, 1985, pp. XXXIV-XXXV.

<sup>36</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 207; Brough trans., p. 214.

This last citation illustrates another, final difficulty, that of infinite regress. If the temporal aspect of an object is "something that can be perceived," as Husserl inquires above, then that perception itself must be in time, and then this time must be perceivable, and so on. Thus there would be no ultimate basis from which we could recognize either our perceptions as temporal or temporality itself. In other words, the continua within this schema would be without foundation, according to the schema itself. Thus, around 1908 or 1909, Husserl turned away from this schematic description of temporalizing consciousness and began elaborating the notion of an absolute consciousness (which he had introduced a couple years earlier) as the foundation of our temporal structure.

It is interesting to note that Husserl focuses on the perception of transcendent objects in these early analyses, rather than an examination of immanent objects. This tendency is recognized by Brough, who argues that Husserl's discussion of transcendent temporal objects corresponds to his applying the schema 'content of apprehension--apprehension' to temporalizing consciousness. Husserl only introduces the notion of absolute consciousness--which indicates his turning to a new structure of temporalizing consciousness--when he finally considers our experience of immanent objects (for example, an imagined musical tone) with relation to time.<sup>37</sup> Bernet sees this turn also in philosophical terms, but finds that the reason lies on a broader level. He argues that Husserl's turn in his description of temporalizing consciousness follows his philosophical turn overall from a schematic approach to the "phenomenological reduction" and a recognition of an "absolute consciousness." Furthermore, he argues, this turn takes place over several years, during some of which Husserl tries to maintain both a schematic understanding of temporalizing consciousness and a notion of absolute (temporalizing) consciousness.<sup>38</sup> Later, Bernet argues with Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach that, with his emphasis on transcendent objects, Husserl was responding to Brentano's argument that time, succession and change are not perceived but rather are recognized through a "reproductive and productive fantasy."<sup>39</sup> They point out that Husserl asks, for example, whether there is not a difference between my imagination of a temporal object and my consciousness of the past aspects of a temporal object that I am still perceiving now. This indicates the possibility that Husserl's focus on the transcendent object in his earliest analyses was meant to strengthen his

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<sup>37</sup> Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, pp. 88-90.

<sup>38</sup> Bernet, 1985, pp. XXXIII-XXXVI.

<sup>39</sup> Bernet, R., Kern, I., and Marbach, E., 2nd edition, 1996, pp. 97-8.

position against Brentano with regard to the imagination or perception of past temporal objects.

Toine Kortooms agrees that Husserl's earliest analyses arose out of a response to his contemporaries on the question of time. In addition to Brentano, Kortooms sees Husserl taking up Meinong, Stern, Strong, and James. In performing a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, Husserl recognizes that he must address how an objective time is constituted by a subjective consciousness. Thus he looks to intuition as a way to carry out this analysis, and as background he works to distinguish perception, imagination, image-consciousness, and memory.<sup>40</sup> Due to the phenomenological difficulties that arise in these analyses, some of which we indicated above, Husserl introduced the notion of absolute consciousness into his considerations of time-consciousness.<sup>41</sup>

#### THE INTRODUCTION OF ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS (1906-1909)

Both Bernet and Brough point out that Husserl mentioned the notion of an absolute consciousness a few years earlier (around the end of 1906 or the beginning of 1907) than when he supposedly rejected the form-content model of temporalizing consciousness.<sup>42</sup> Between 1906 and 1908, Husserl began to face several difficulties arising from a schema that clearly distinguished content and apprehension in our experience of temporal objects. During this transitional period, he introduced the notion of absolute consciousness, whose main function is constitution while it is itself not constituted, and he attempted to integrate this notion into a modified schematic structure of temporalizing consciousness. According to Brough, Husserl rejected the schema entirely soon thereafter, around 1908 or 1909.<sup>43</sup>

Bernet, Kern, and Marbach place Husserl's "turn" in his description of the structure of temporalizing consciousness at a different textual location than

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Husserl's analyses in *Husserliana* XXIII.

<sup>41</sup> Kortooms, 2002, pp. 3-78.

<sup>42</sup> Bernet, 1985, pp. XXXIII-XXXVI, and XLV-XLVI, and Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 89. Both Bernet and Brough refer to *Husserliana* X, pp. 269-86 (No. 39) as the first true consideration of absolute consciousness by Husserl, although Bernet argues that this text was actually written later than originally thought, in 1909 rather than in early 1907. Nevertheless, Husserl also mentioned absolute consciousness in his winter semester lecture in 1906-1907.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, pp. 88-92; and Bernet, 1985, pp. XXXIII-XXXIX and XLV-XLIX.

Brough, but around the same time period.<sup>44</sup> They turn to Husserl's analysis number 50 (Brough turns to number 41), where Husserl quite dramatically works through the difficulty of infinite regress and the problem of memory, realizing that we cannot be said to perceive the flow of inner time-consciousness itself:

How, analogously, am I supposed to acquire "*perception of the flow*" [. . .] Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an *objective movement*? *Certainly!* On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has *its now*, and the same now as a tone, for example. *No*. There lurks the fundamental mistake. *The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process: the consciousness of the now is not itself now.*<sup>45</sup>

This is an exciting moment in Husserl's thought! Here he realizes the need for an absolute foundation from which one can recognize temporality, but which itself is not "in" time.

Interestingly, Toine Kortooms argues that this is *not* Husserl's *final* consideration of the schema. Instead, Kortooms sees Husserl reconsidering the schema in two out of the three "models" that Kortooms distinguishes in the Bernau manuscripts (*Husserliana* XXXIII), written by Husserl mostly around 1917-18. Kortooms writes,

On the basis of what Husserl remarks in the L-manuscripts [*Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII] concerning the applicability of this schema, one may conclude that to speak of a dissolution of the schema, or of its rejection [around 1909], is at least premature. In a number of the L-manuscripts, Husserl indeed argues that this schema cannot directly be applied to the structure of time-consciousness, nevertheless he continues to make a distinction between the really immanent content of consciousness and the mode of consciousness that animates this content [. . .]. It is only once he again takes up the notion of absolute consciousness in the L-manuscripts, which indeed can no longer be reconciled with the schema, that he no longer makes use of it. However, this only occurs in what I call the third model for the description of the structure of time-consciousness.<sup>46</sup>

According to Kortooms, Husserl took up his analyses of time-consciousness with renewed energy during the years of 1917-18 when Edith Stein was organizing his earlier lecture notes and preparing them for publication. At this point, Husserl re-worked his earlier considerations one more time, with

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<sup>44</sup> Bernet, R., Kern, I., and Marbach, E., 1996, p. 102.

<sup>45</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 333; Brough trans., p. 345.

<sup>46</sup> Kortooms, 2002, p. 117, modified.

new nuances, in the first two of the models that Kortooms discerns. Then, having established that these two positions were untenable, Husserl moved on to his third model, finally taking up the notion of absolute consciousness conclusively as the founding structure of time-consciousness over the schema.<sup>47</sup> It seems then, that Husserl worked with more than one model for time-consciousness between the early and middle periods of his writing, but that, ultimately, he did reject the schema for absolute consciousness, whether it was in 1909 or 1918.<sup>48</sup> In spite of the discrepancy as to the literal moment of Husserl's rejection of the schema, this moment was crucial for his analyses of temporalizing consciousness, causing Husserl to establish a new structure in absolute consciousness.

The most important aspect of Husserl's new description of the structure of temporalizing consciousness is that our flow of experiencing, or inner time-consciousness, is identical with the absolute flow of consciousness. As Bernet says, "Absolute consciousness is pure intentionality."<sup>49</sup> This leads to Husserl's distinguishing clearly between two levels in consciousness: first, the absolute constituting flow, and second, constituted yet immanent objects. Husserl says explicitly:

Hence if we call appearances and the multiplicities of appearance "consciousness," then in strictness we must go back to the *primal consciousness* [*Urbewusstsein*] that constitutes them and designate it *as constituting*. [. . .] The *act of meaning*, understood as content, is once again not consciousness in the original sense but a flow belonging to this consciousness. The process of meaning is an "act" (an act is already a unity), and this is consciousness in a new sense.<sup>50</sup>

Thus "primal" (or "primordial") consciousness is now understood as the foundation for our experiences. Furthermore, we see it as distinguishable, at least by definition, from constituted objects or events (which themselves make up the flow of consciousness).

It is important to note that only around 1908 or 1909 did certain terminology surface with regard to inner time-consciousness. In fact, in analysis No. 50 where Husserl realizes a "fundamental mistake" resulting from applying the schema to time-consciousness (cited above), the term

<sup>47</sup> Kortooms, 2002, pp. 107-174.

<sup>48</sup> In the early texts where Husserl is taking up this new structure seriously, we no longer find any reference to the schema 'content of apprehension--apprehension'. This shows that whenever Husserl considered absolute consciousness seriously for inner time-consciousness, it was as its own structure. Cf. Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, pp. 92-3; and Bernet, 1985, pp. L-LI.

<sup>49</sup> Bernet, 1985, p. XLIX.

<sup>50</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 292-3; Brough trans., p. 303.

"retention" is mentioned for the first time: "The retention that exists 'together' with the consciousness of the now is not 'now,' is *not simultaneous* with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is."<sup>51</sup> The term protention seems to have arisen in another text, in analysis number 45, written around the same time period: "The actually present portion of the duration again and again adds a new now, and a *protention* adheres to the tone-constituting 'appearances' [. . .]."<sup>52</sup> Thus we see that, with the emergence of a new structure of temporalizing consciousness founded by absolute consciousness, we also find Husserl beginning to use the terminology that accompanied this new position, i.e., "retention" and "protention." These new terms, however, while describing similar aspects to temporalizing consciousness mentioned in his earliest analyses (i.e., the aspects of "no-longer" and "just coming"), are not understood as "parts of time" but instead are included in the (noetic) act of constitution. In other words, retention and protention are not *in* time; instead, they are aspects of the constituting flow of consciousness, which, since it constitutes time, must itself be considered *pre-temporal*. We will discuss this pre-temporal aspect of "temporal" consciousness more in a moment.

The term Urimpression (often translated as "primal impression" or "primordial impression"), or Urempfindung ("primal sensation"), also appears around the same time (analysis No. 50):

First of all, we have the *primal sensation-consciousness* [*Urempfindungsbewußtsein*], the absolutely original consciousness in which the actual tone-point stands before us "in person, "as present itself, as now. [. . .] Primal sensation is something *abstract*.<sup>53</sup>

Husserl also adds later in a footnote to this citation that "I say *primal sensation* [*Urempfindung*], which designates the non-self-sufficient phase of

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<sup>51</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 333; Brough trans., p. 345. This is the first point where Husserl actually seems to have written the term "retention" into the text. Earlier in the same analysis (No. 50), Husserl actually inserted the term "retention" into his writing as a type of revision. Cf. Boehm's editorial notes throughout this analysis, *Husserliana* X, pp. 324-333.

<sup>52</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 297; Brough trans., p. 308.

<sup>53</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 325-6; Brough trans., p. 338, modified. Husserl inserted the sentence "Primal sensation is something abstract" into his text as a footnote; however, in the following paragraph he uses the term in the original text, according to Boehm's editorial notes.

[originarity] [. . .]."<sup>54</sup> Given this, we are to understand the Urempfindung (or Urimpression) as both abstract and originary, and as a dependent moment of lived presence in consciousness. But what does this mean? Perhaps we should first consider what it is not. At least as early as 1901 (somewhere between 1893 and 1901), Husserl made it very clear that the "now" cannot be considered an abstract, mathematical point: "Moreover, the *now* is as little a fictitious mathematical time-point as the 'previous tone,' as the first or second tone before the now or after it."<sup>55</sup> And again: "That all reality lies in the indivisible now-point, that in phenomenology everything ought to be reduced to this point--these are sheer *fictions* and lead to absurdities."<sup>56</sup>

Given these strong claims with regard to the "now-point," we can assume that what Husserl later calls the Urimpression will follow the same criteria, and thus the Urimpression cannot fall under the description of "indivisible point" or "now-point." At the same time, as Husserl describes above, it is still somehow *both* abstract *and* to be taken as a lived "point" of sensation. The difference in the new term lies in the notion of "lived" experience. Whereas in his earliest works Husserl used the general term "now" (and "now-point"--understood with the above-mentioned qualifications) to indicate an abstract idea of a narrowly extended moment of pure *present* (often still somewhat mathematical in spite of his warnings), his later usage of the notion of the Urimpression is meant to abstract the moment of pure *impression* out of this experience. As Bernet says, "The Urimpression is pure *intentional* consciousness of the tone-now; it is pure *actuality* of absolute consciousness."<sup>57</sup> Husserl's new conception of temporalizing consciousness rests neither upon mathematical calculation or linearity--although he will continue to rely upon his geometric diagrams for the next couple of decades--nor upon a simple, abstract notion of the present, but instead upon originary, lived experience. Thus Husserl's "turn" to absolute consciousness and also to the term Urimpression, which is the immediate actuality of that consciousness, indicates an emphasis on intentionality and on our experience as made up of impressions. As is becoming clear, though, the Urimpression--even when understood as "abstracted out" pure impressional consciousness--can never be understood as an independent entity; rather, it is a dependent "moment" in the activity of constitution, necessarily interrelated with the activities of retention and protention.

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<sup>54</sup> For the sake of consistency, I have replaced Brough's term "originativeness" with "originarity." The German term is *Originarität*.

<sup>55</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 168; Brough trans., p. 172.

<sup>56</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 169; Brough trans., p. 174.

<sup>57</sup> Bernet, 1985, p. XLIX (my emphasis).



The Urimpression, or Urempfindung, may appear to be somewhat paradoxical in itself (given its nature as both "abstract" and "lived"), but at the same time, it appears to be essential to the structure of time-consciousness. In other words, although it is merely an abstract notion of a dependent, flowing, impressional "moment" of constituting consciousness, the Urimpression is required so that we can indicate that "moment" of actuality that founds our full, lived, sensory experience. Klaus Held explains:

Although, from a phenomenological perspective, there is no such thing as an infinitely short momentary perception, we cannot do without a concept that indicates the limit, one which, within the whole of presentation in a secondary sense, identifies the greatest closeness of consciousness to the tone that is itself a flowing limit. This is because, if we can speak of an already-flowing-away-again and of a just-coming of the tone, then this presupposes that a flowing "Between," so to speak, of the brightest and completely unconcealed presence of the tone vis-a-vis the ego belongs to the whole structure of perception--even if it is never abstractly determinable. Husserl calls this flowing Between "Urimpression" in the lectures on time from 1905 [ . . . ].<sup>58</sup>

Thus the Urimpression is *lived* "presencing" in its fullest and yet narrowest sense. In fact, we might want to avoid thinking of it as a "point" of sensation-constitution altogether--even though Husserl himself sometimes refers to it as such--and consider it more as a narrow "phase," as our constant phase of lived, actual, constitution. This phase would be understood as the actualizing "overlap" (or "Between") of retention and protention. In fact, Husserl indicates a similar "phase" already in his earliest works by calling the "now-point" a "small field": "But the point of distinct seeing is really not a point but a small field; and the point 'now' is also a small field, and this alone comes into question."<sup>59</sup> Thus, although there may be a difference in

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<sup>58</sup> "Obwohl es die unendlich kurze Momentanwahrnehmung phänomenologisch gesehen nicht gibt, kann nicht auf einen Grenzbegriff verzichtet werden, der innerhalb des Gegenwärtigungsganzen im zweiten Sinne die selbst fließende Grenze grösster Bewusstseinsnähe des Tones kennzeichnet; denn wenn von einem schon-wieder-Entgleiten und einem gerade-Kommen des Tones gesprochen werden kann, dann setzt dies voraus, dass ein fließendes--wenn auch niemals abstrakt fixierbares--"Zwischen" gleichsam hellster und völlig unverdeckter Präsenz des Tones gegenüber dem Ich mit zur Gesamtstruktur der Wahrnehmung gehört. Diese fließende Zwischen nennt Husserl in den Zeitvorlesungen von 1905 Urimpression [ . . . ]." Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 1966, p. 19. My translation.

<sup>59</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 176; Brough trans., p. 181.

understanding how Husserl means this "small field," depending on when he wrote the text in question, we must also recognize this consistency in Husserl's thinking: Clearly, Husserl saw from the very beginning that my sensory, experiencing "now" can never be atomized, but instead is always "stretched" into a "field" or a "phase" that extends beyond any notion of a "point."<sup>60</sup>

In Husserl's later works, we encounter another, more comprehensive notion of the "now-phase," one which extends beyond, and yet encompasses, the phase of the Urimpression. This "extended now" is made up of the integrated, constituting "moments" of Urimpression, retention and protention, where the Urimpression is, by definition, dependent upon the active, interrelated phases of retention and protention. We call this constituting phase as a whole the *living present*, following both Husserl's own, albeit not perfectly consistent, terminology and Klaus Held's insightful analysis in his work, *Lebendige Gegenwart* (1966). Describing temporalizing consciousness as "living" is not a completely new development for Husserl, though, as he does so already in his earliest works: " 'I am now perceiving 'a'' means: I have a perception in which the perceived a stands before me as now; as 'now'--that is, as the ultimate member (the principal member) of the *living temporal series*."<sup>61</sup> The idea of "living" becomes associated more directly with the notion of the present, however, in Husserl's later analyses. Held defines it thus: "We must therefore understand the term 'living' here both verbally and transitively, where it means something like 'bringing-together-while-letting-stream-away'."<sup>62</sup> And this bringing-together-while-letting-stream-away is nothing other than our constituting consciousness. In other words, the living present is an organizing flow, "constituting" this flow as understandable experiences. Husserl himself says, "An enduring being, and first of all a being that is an experience, necessarily becomes constituted. And to that extent every *living* [*Leben*] is living towards [*Entgegenleben*]. But living is not experience. **Living is the stream of the constituting consciousness.**"<sup>63</sup> This activity is the constituting activity of protention and retention overlapping through the Urimpression. As I am listening to a melody, for example, I am gathering the notes heard in succession and hearing them in their "phases," in their groupings of harmony and contrast.

<sup>60</sup> Bernet also points out in his "Introduction" (1985) that Husserl broke with the traditional understanding of his contemporaries by insisting that the "now" has some type of extension, and that he does this in some of his earliest texts on time (pp. XXI-XXII).

<sup>61</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 205; Brough trans., p. 211. Modified, and my emphasis.

<sup>62</sup> "'Leben' muss hier demnach verbal und transitiv verstanden werden und besagt soviel wie: verströmenlassendes Zusammennehmen." Held, 1966, p. 28. My translation.

<sup>63</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 301; Brough trans., p. 313. My emphasis on the last sentence.

As I understand the patterns and appreciate them, I also look forward to hearing them continue or play off of each other. This intertwined activity is founded in the constituting activity of the living present. And when we include the background or context that I and the musical situation bring to this moment, then we understand what Husserl means by "living." Living is experience of the world as brought together in relation and context--by constituting consciousness.

Phenomenologists consider the living present to be *pre-temporal*, as we pointed out earlier, because its activity of constitution includes the constitution of temporality.<sup>64</sup> This activity constitutes our experience of time along with everything else; thus this activity cannot be *in* time. The interrelated activity of retention-Urimpression-protection, then, constitutes our lived-experience of time as past, present, and future. We can interpret these two moments, constituting activity and experience of time, in most of Husserl's diagrams, for example in one of the diagrams given in his analysis number 53:




Figure No. 1<sup>65</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Held, 1966, especially pp. 112-18.

<sup>65</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 365. Reprinted by permission of Springer and the Husserl Archives. For more discussion on Husserl's diagrams, see M.J. Larrabee's "Inside Time-consciousness: Diagramming the Flux," *Husserl Studies*, volume 10, number 3, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 181-210. Larrabee argues that Husserl's diagrams in his early work show a consistent reference to the schema of apprehension/apprehension-content on Husserl's part. Nevertheless, she sees a

Here, the "flow of Urimpressions" would be represented by the horizontal line in the diagram, and the constituted "now" would be the vertical, intersecting line. As the vertical line of the "now" intersects the diagonal lines representing the "sinking" of experiences that are being retained by retention, we see that the "now" is an extended moment of presence which is constituted through retentional (and, implicitly, protentional) activity. Although we can consider constituted time (vertical) and constituting, temporalizing consciousness (horizontal and diagonal) separately, we understand that the constituted now is founded in the constituting activity of consciousness.<sup>66</sup>

We have been treating the Urimpression and the living present fairly distinctly up to this point. As terms, they may be taken up separately, because they indicate different ways that we can talk about temporal presencing. As activities of consciousness, however, they are necessarily interrelated, and cannot be considered independent. As Held says, there is: "[. . .] no core phase without a surrounding field of presence, and no such field without a source-point of presentation that is itself accompanying it."<sup>67</sup>

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growing dynamism in Husserl's descriptions of inner time-consciousness, and suggests different types of diagrams that would better represent this dynamic structure. In Part Three, I will address how Husserl himself tried to change his diagrams to fit his analysis of protention. Although this new attempt would probably not be satisfactory to Larrabee, as it is still relatively similar to his original diagrams, it shows that Husserl himself recognized the dynamic nature of inner time-consciousness. Interestingly, the C-manuscripts (*Husserliana Materialien* vol. VIII) contain no diagrams of inner time-consciousness, indicating a further shift in Husserl's considerations. See also Alexander Schnell's "Das Problem der Zeit by Husserl. Eine Untersuchung über die husserlschen Zeitdiagramme," *Husserl Studies*, volume 18, number 2, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, pp. 89-122. Schnell follows Husserl's developments of inner time-consciousness through an analysis of his diagrams, from his earliest work through the L-manuscripts (*Husserliana* XXXIII). He argues that the later diagrams indicate Husserl's focus on the genetic aspect of temporality, and that, in these re-workings, Husserl sees immanent temporality to be constituted in a pre-phenomenal temporality.

<sup>66</sup> Brough states: "The vertical intentionality has been described as the flow's consciousness of the immanent object; the horizontal intentionality as the flow's consciousness of itself. Husserl's texts indicate, however, that while the two may be distinguished, they are not separable in principle." Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 97.

<sup>67</sup> "[. . .] keine Kernphase ohne Präsenzfeldumgebung, kein solches Feld ohne einen selbst mitwandernden Gegenwärtigungsquellpunkt." Held, 1966, p. 30. My translation.

In fact, although we have attempted to define these terms separately, there is an interdependence already revealed in their definition. The urimpressional phase is the immediate actuality-phase of constituting consciousness that is abstracted from my living consciousness as a whole; as such, it is understood to be "part" of the living present through its necessary interrelation with the activities of retention and protention. Further, the living present requires this phase of actual presencing as the source of its constitution. Bernet explains:

The Urimpression thus distinguishes itself from other sensations as the sensation of the now, and the now distinguishes itself from other points in time as the urimpressionally known time-point. This circular definition of the connection between the Urimpression and the now, according to Husserl's own admission that there could not be one final definition, expresses a philosophical predicament. This predicament results from the fact that, essentially, we can never talk about the punctually-now present at all, at least not without making reference to a not-now.<sup>68</sup>

Thus we must remember, throughout our own analyses, this necessary, yet paradoxical, interrelation which exists within the present itself.

With the introduction of absolute consciousness into the equation, as it were, Husserl's concept of temporalizing consciousness develops into the structure with which we are familiar today. Absolute consciousness becomes the foundation of my experience of constituted objects through its own activity of constitution. More importantly, the living present surfaces as a notion in itself, made up of the phases of the Urimpression, retention, and protention. Since the notion of the present was essential to Husserl's work throughout his life, we turn now to further developments in the living present and the Urimpression carried out by Husserl in his later writings.

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<sup>68</sup> "Die Urimpression zeichnet sich also gegenüber anderen Empfindungen als Empfindung des Jetzt aus, und das Jetzt zeichnet sich gegenüber anderen Zeitstellenpunkten als urimpressional bewusster Zeitpunkt aus. Diese zirkelhafte Definition des Zusammenhangs von Urimpression und Jetzt sowie Husserls Zugeständnis, dass es sich dabei um eine eigentliche Definition nicht handeln könne, sind Ausdruck einer philosophischen Verlegenheit. Diese Verlegenheit ergibt sich daraus, dass in eigentlicher Weise über die punktuell-jetzig Gegenwart wohl überhaupt nicht gesprochen werden kann und jedenfalls nicht ohne Bezug auf ein Nicht-Jetzt." Rudolf Bernet, "Die ungegenwärtige Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit in Husserls Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins," p. 45. (In *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, vol. 14: *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg/Munich, 1983, pp. 16-57.) My translation.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE URIMPRESSION  
AND LIVING PRESENT

The term "Urimpression" appears much less frequently in Husserl's later works. The concept of a primally-living aspect of the present, however, remains quite manifest. Instead of using the term Urimpression, though, Husserl often refers to the "core" of the living present:

Thus we have an abstractable core of actual present in the concrete present as a distinguished phase in the streaming that signifies the present, one which no longer contains any just-was and coming, but instead pure present.

And he adds in a footnote:

"Pure" present. Central moments of pure "world-present," in a certain way, Urimpression of the world. Temporalizing in streaming.<sup>69</sup>

In these later citations we see, first, that Husserl has not eliminated the term "Urimpression" completely, because he still refers to it in his footnote. Second, we see a tendency to introduce new descriptive terms similar to the notion of Urimpression, such as "pure present" and "core of the actual present." Further, we see that Husserl still interprets this "core" as a phase, not as a point, which substantiates our earlier argument that the Urimpression cannot be described as a "now-point." Finally, we notice that this Urimpression is, in this case, somehow related to the world. We will address this last fact in more detail momentarily. With regard to our other

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<sup>69</sup> "Wir haben also in der konkreten Gegenwart einen abstrahierbaren Kern eigentlicher Gegenwart als eine ausgezeichnete Phase im Strömen, die die Gegenwart bezeichnet, die kein Soeben und Kommend mehr in sich schliesst, sondern reine Gegenwart. [attached footnote:] 'Reine' Gegenwart. Zentrale Momente reiner 'Weltgegenwart', in gewisser Weise Urimpression von der Welt. Zeitigung im Strömen." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 27. My translation.

observations, it suffices to say that the Urimpression, as a phase of actual presencing, remains important for Husserl in his late manuscripts, even though he is not married to the term "Urimpression" itself.

We find this tendency toward new terminology for the present in several places in Husserl's later writings. For example:

Thus there remains a core of absolute present as a core of the total present (that which is worldly in its self-presentation).<sup>70</sup>

And:

That which is accessible for it primarily and directly, the primordially present, the core, the impressional present, that which it eventually, primarily, and directly grasps, and with which it is occupied anyway--that which is the present for it in the first sense.<sup>71</sup>

Here we see the Urimpression described as "a core of absolute present," and its content described as "impressional" present and primordial present; while one could say that its meaning seems to remain generally the same, the Urimpression clearly lays claim to a wider set of imagery in these later writings.

As we will see in our discussion of the Bernau manuscripts (*Husserliana* XXXIII) in Part Three, though, Husserl seems to have dropped the notion of the Urimpression in his discussion of the activity of protention in those manuscripts written in his middle period. Clearly the term was not dropped altogether, as we see he above that he refers to an "impressional present" in his C-manuscripts (*Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII), written over a decade later. However, these manuscripts point to a development in both his middle and later writings: Husserl was moving away from a focus on immediate presencing in favor of examining broader notions of the constitution of presence. Whether he was engaged in an examination of the activities of retention and protention or looking to new and broader descriptions of the Urimpression (in the Bernau manuscripts), or indicating a new notion of presence in a constituting world-time (above, in the C-

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<sup>70</sup> "Es verbleibt also ein Kern absoluter Gegenwart als Kern der totalen Gegenwart (der weltlichen in Selbstdarstellung)." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 291. My translation.

<sup>71</sup> "Das für es primär-geradehin Zugängliche, das Urgegenwärtige, der Kern, die impressionale Gegenwart, das, worauf es primär geradehin eventuell erfasst, womit es sich ebenso beschäftigt, -- das für es im ersten Sinn Gegenwärtige." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 71. My translation.

manuscripts), Husserl was once again adjusting his philosophical approach to time-consciousness.

Toine Kortooms notes a parallel move in Husserl's C-manuscripts: In these late writings, Husserl seems to drop the notion of absolute consciousness entirely.<sup>72</sup> Kortooms argues that this absence indicates a third major structure of temporalizing consciousness that Husserl was considering. This third structure is made up of a primal stream that is unrelated to consciousness and then a second level made up of the constituting activity of the living present. It is only at this second level, Kortooms argues, that egoic intentionality takes place. He says, "Husserl does not abandon the distinction between a passive synthesis that occurs in the primal stream itself and active temporalization, but he no longer wishes to speak of the accomplishment of an intentional process with regard to the passive synthesis."<sup>73</sup> With this statement, Kortooms is disagreeing with Klaus Held's interpretation, that the primal stream is pre-accomplished egoically.<sup>74</sup> While this distinction is subtle, it is an important one. Held's understanding of the primal stream as having some "pre-egoic" relation to the constituting living present alleviates any question of the ego's relation to this primal stream. Without this connection, we would have to assume *two* streams, the primal stream, and the stream of the living present, and this is not an argument that Husserl seems to be making. In addition, as indicated, we would be faced with the problem of how intending consciousness would relate to the primal stream at all. Kortooms makes his argument on the basis of Husserl's discussions of primal association and affectivity:

The non-original character of every active constitution illustrates that Husserl develops a radical notion of the passivity of pre-consciousness in which the syntheses occur that lead to the formation of primally associative, pre-temporal unities. In order to underscore the radical character of this notion, Husserl no longer wishes to speak about an intentionality here, even if it were to be a non-egoic intentionality.<sup>75</sup>

While the passive synthesis of the primal stream may not include the active intending of the ego, however, we will examine in Parts Two and Three how these notions of primal association and affectivity could be linked with the

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<sup>72</sup> Kortooms, *Phenomenology of Time*, 2002, pp. 210, 233ff.

<sup>73</sup> Kortooms, 2002, p. 270.

<sup>74</sup> Held, 1966, pp. 98-99, and 118. Kortooms is taking up the argument presented in Held, 1966, pp. 94-122.

<sup>75</sup> Kortooms, 2002, p. 286.



activity of the living present, and thus with consciousness. Given these analyses, I will side with Held's interpretation of the primal stream, that it is passively related to constituting consciousness. However, Kortooms points us in the right direction with his focus on association and affectivity; in addition, he provides us with a fascinating observation, that absolute consciousness no longer seems to be an issue in these later works, and he recognizes this move on Husserl's part as a radical departure from his earlier understanding of time-consciousness. Without erasing or neglecting the importance of egoic consciousness to a phenomenological understanding of temporality, then, Husserl seems to be looking to how constituting consciousness can be understood over and above the activity of an individual consciousness; in this point I agree with Kortooms, although I interpret Husserl's move in a different way. This development can be seen already in how Husserl addresses the living present in his later works, as we see here, and in his introduction of the notion of "world-time," which we will discuss in chapter three.

While the notion of the Urimpression becomes scarce, the living present seems to come into its own (as a more regular term for constituting activity) in Husserl's later manuscripts, precipitating Klaus Held's analysis of it as a distinct temporal realm in his *Lebendige Gegenwart*:

One title prevailed in the later manuscripts for that concrete unity which comprises all structures, i.e., the streaming presenting of that which is originally perceived in its streaming: "living present"--a title that certainly, as we will see, signifies even more than the structural totality of sensible presenting.<sup>76</sup>

As we look at the later texts, we will see that the living present is definitely *more* than the mere sum of the parts we described earlier, 'retention-Urimpression-protention'; this active, constituting, living present constitutes the objects that I perceive, the temporality of me as the perceiver, and further, my original understanding of the world as a whole, and the structure of intersubjectivity of which I am a part. As Held states, "The entire perceived world, the open multitude of once perceived or perceivable given things [*Gegebenheiten*], has its genetic 'origin' in the primary constitutive

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<sup>76</sup> "Für die alle Strukturen umfassende konkrete Einheit, d.h. also die strömende Gegenwärtigung des originär Wahrgenommenen in seinem Strömen setzte sich in den späteren Manuskripten der Titel 'lebendige Gegenwart' durch, - ein Titel, der allerdings, wie sich zeigen wird, noch mehr als das Strukturganze sinnlicher Gegenwärtigung bezeichnet." Held, 1966, p. 19. My translation.

process of the living-presenting."<sup>77</sup> We must therefore consider this blossoming concept carefully.

First of all, the activity of the living present, as mentioned before, has a certain "span," as it were. This span encompasses the span of the Urimpression as impressional, constituting source or phase, as well as the span of the retentive and protentive phases. Considering the living present to have a certain span affects how I seem to experience temporal content: What I perceive "now" actually goes beyond any concept of an immediate, sensual flow of impressions. For example, my understanding now goes beyond the guttural sound being voiced by my partner at this immediate moment to the whole word and sentence and meaning she is expressing now overall (the expanded "now"). Or for another example, my experience now encompasses the back side of the building across the street (as well as its other perspectives) while I am facing its front. In both cases we see how my consciousness stretches *beyond* what is immediately "present" with regard to content, constituting my experience as a unity in a temporal flow. In this way, I experience indirectly the aspects of objects and meanings that are not part of my immediate, direct experience. This allows me to experience objects as identical, as wholes, and as persisting through time. Husserl explains:

The process of the living self-extension of what is newly appearing in the living present already has breadth, if we begin to reflect, and in this breadth there is a place of the source-point for the now of this breadth; this, for its part, is source-span for the breadths that arise and transform in streaming away. [. . .] But, in this process, which is the liveliness of the doubled now (present), the living constitution of oneness unfolds, which, when it is actively grasped, remains in unbreakable certainty about this or that because it stays always one and the same and merely slips into the past.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> "Die gesamte Wahrnehmungswelt, die offene Vielheit einmal wahrgenommener oder wahrnehmbarer Gegebenheiten hat ihren genetischen 'Ursprung' im urkonstitutiven Prozeß der lebendigen Gegenwärtigung." Held, 1966, p. 37. My translation.

<sup>78</sup> "Der Prozess des lebendigen Sich-Ausbreitens des neu Auftretenden in der lebendigen Gegenwart hat, wenn wir uns zu besinnen anfangen, schon Breite und in dieser Breite eine Stelle des Quellpunktes Jetzt der Breite; diese ihrerseits ist Quellstrecke für die im Verströmen entspringenden gewandelten Breiten. [. . .] Aber in diesem Vorgang als Lebendigkeit des doppelten Jetzt (Gegenwart) vollzieht sich die lebendige Konstitution der Einheit, die, wenn sie aktiv erfasst ist, nach dem und jenem in unverbrüchlicher Gewissheit bleibt, als das immerfort eine und selbe, das nur in die Vergangenheit rückt." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 51. My translation.

Through its activity as a "doubled" now, as Urimpression and living present, consciousness creates unities by "appresenting"<sup>79</sup> those other "sides" or meanings that are not in my direct view. With the present and appresent aspects of the building, for example, I am able to perceive the building as a whole entity, without actually perceiving it in its entirety (as this is impossible). And the meaning of this building will continue to exist in time for me, even when I am not perceiving it, because my temporalizing consciousness has constituted it as an enduring unity. Thus, I experience objects and meanings beyond any immediate, momentary impression, i.e., as belonging to a context of objects and meanings that recur consistently in my experience. In fact, this is why Husserl describes the living present as both "standing" and "streaming," and why Klaus Held takes up these descriptions so carefully. The "streaming" indicates the primal flow of consciousness, and the "standing" of the living present refers to its form, that which remains the same as "now" throughout the changing flow. Klaus Held explains:

The now is first of all the standing form of Urimpressionality that is constantly renewing itself, the continuous centeredness of presencing in a primal presentation whose content is always in flux. Although this content appears only in streaming toward and streaming away, there remains the standing form of an actualizing middle point with its gradually darkening periphery. –We can now distinguish the streaming flowing-along [*mitwandernden*] Nows from the Now that is an unchanging and stationary form of the primary-retentional-protentional presence [ . . . ].<sup>80</sup>

This combination of standing and streaming helps to describe the constituting activity of the living present. The standing aspect of the living present gathers and establishes unities in that aspect of it which is streaming, giving a flow of experiencing (of identical objects) rather than of pure sensing.

It is thanks to Klaus Held's in-depth analysis of the "living present" that we have such an understanding of it today, for Husserl himself used the term for this "whole" present in various ways throughout his work, without

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<sup>79</sup> We will review the notion of appresentation more formally in chapter two.

<sup>80</sup> "Jetzthaft ist zunächst die stehende Form der stetig sich erneuernden Urimpressionalität, die bleibende Zentriertheit der Gegenwärtigung in einer ihrem Inhalt nach fließenden Urpräsentation. Obwohl dieser Inhalt nur heranströmend-verströmend auftritt, bleibt die stehende Form eines Aktualitätsmittelpunktes mit seiner sich an den Rändern verdunkelnden Umgebung erhalten. - Von diesem Jetzt als der einen unwandelbaren und stehenden Form urpräsent-retentional-protentionaler Anwesenheit lassen sich nun die gleichsam strömend mitwandernden Jetzt (im Plural) unterscheiden [ . . . ]." Held, 1966, pp. 29-30. My translation.

explaining for us step by step how its different aspects of standing and streaming worked together. In fact, Husserl continued to struggle and work with the complex constitutive nature of the living present, even in his later work: "Now however we have the paradox that this temporalizing also simultaneously temporalizes itself, that the living present continually leads itself, as the present living present, into the living present that just has been, and so on."<sup>81</sup> As we have seen, this constituting living present was never a resolved issue for Husserl, and thus it continues to remain open to further analysis and interpretation even today.

One of the more interesting aspects of these later manuscripts--apparent already in the citations we viewed above--is that Husserl seems to vacillate between two dominating descriptions of the living present. One aspect is egoic; in such cases, Husserl is usually working through the phenomenological epoché, walking through it one more time, as it were, giving the ego a very clear and dominant definition. For example:

Actual temporalizing, which is presupposed and active in the evident, temporal givenness of the stream of experiences, is the temporalizing of the transcendental-phenomenologizing ego. [. . .] Thus temporality is always an achievement of the ego, either originally or developed.<sup>82</sup>

Here we see the direct link between temporalizing consciousness and the ego. In fact, temporalizing is the very accomplishment of the ego itself. Husserl's second way of describing the living present is very interesting. In these cases, Husserl discusses "world-time," "universal time," "all-time," etc., sometimes with reference to the involvement of other subjects, sometimes without. For example:

Present--the modalities of time belong to the world itself. Every single present is experienced by it, but every other [subject] also experiences identically the same present, every other [subject] within the We that characterizes our being-present-for-one-another. And, in this way, time itself exists as world-time in the existing "stream

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<sup>81</sup> "Nun aber ist das Paradox, dass auch die Zeitigung sich zugleich selbst verzeitigt, dass lebendige Gegenwart selbst wieder, als gegenwärtige lebendige Gegenwart, in soeben gewesene lebendige Gegenwart kontinuierlich überleitet usw." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 50. My translation.

<sup>82</sup> "Die wirkliche Zeitigung, die in der evidenten zeitlichen Gegebenheit des Stromes der Erlebnisse vorausgesetzt und getätigt ist, ist die des transzendental-phänomenologisierenden Ich. [. . .] Zeitlichkeit ist eben in jeder Weise Ichleistung, ursprüngliche oder erworbene." *Husserliana* XXXIV, p. 181. My translation.

of time," in the synthesis of the modalities of time that constantly exist and stream away in the mode of the present.<sup>83</sup>

Clearly indicating a very different type of present than what we are used to in phenomenology (one which supposedly belongs only to "my" consciousness), such a description hints that a link between different egos lies in temporalizing consciousness, i.e., that "my" temporalizing consciousness is at the same time somehow linked to a temporality of the intersubjective world. This creates a paradox, however, since temporalizing consciousness is, on one level that which is supposed to be most deeply "mine." Furthermore, according to Husserl's description above, this link does not seem to lie in some kind of "objective" temporality--a temporality that is "outside," "in the world," that is "measured" by clocks--but rather in a *world*-temporality that is interconnected with all individual, temporalizing consciousnesses. In fact, this new description goes beyond the traditional split between "inner time-consciousness" and "objective time," introducing a third, more universal term which makes a shared temporality between subjects possible.

This actually is quite a natural development of a study of inner time-consciousness, for if there is no discussion of it beyond its immanent, constituting existence as related to me, then we cannot explain how all subjects experience the same "now" as now. It would merely be "a piece of good fortune," to repeat Brough's description of a different, but similar, problematic.<sup>84</sup> This problematic cannot be fully answered by objective time, the measured time of society ("clock time"), because our consistent and mutual experience of "now" is more primordial than objective time.<sup>85</sup> We

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<sup>83</sup> "Gegenwart, die Zeitmodalitäten gehören zur Welt selbst. Eines jeden Gegenwart ist von ihm erfahren, aber identisch dieselbe erfährt jeder andere innerhalb des Wir, das das Füreinander-gegenwärtig-Sein bezeichnet. Und so ist die Zeit selbst als Weltzeit seiend im seienden "Strom der Zeit," in der Synthesis der jeweils im Modus Gegenwart seienden und verströmenden Zeitmodalitäten." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 415. My translation.

<sup>84</sup> Brough, in Elliston and McCormick (eds.), 1977, p. 92.

<sup>85</sup> Heidegger argues similarly, i.e., that there is a temporality more primordial than "clock-time" that makes the measurement of time possible. He argues further that the characteristics of this primordial temporality are "datability, spannedness, publicness, and worldhood." *Sein und Zeit*, p. 416; trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 469. My arguments in this chapter identify at least the characteristics of spannedness and worldhood in Husserl's work as well. The notion of span can be seen in Husserl's earliest works, and thus Husserl may have influenced Heidegger in

must have a shared experience of "now" before we ever conceive of measuring time for ourselves, or of building clocks. And we experience a "now" that is shared well before we ever learn to "tell time." Therefore, if the constitution of temporality occurs in my own consciousness--and this seems clear according to Husserl's phenomenological analysis--then we must examine how this consciousness can exist such that we all have access to the same now, to the same temporality. The answer lies in Husserl's discussion of "world-time." Before we take up this crucial problematic explicitly, though, we will examine another argument that complements my own.

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this regard; however, the notion of world-time seems to appear in Husserl's later manuscripts, which leaves open the question whether Heidegger's notion of worldhood influenced Husserl's analyses as well. *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1927. Cf. pp. 404ff.; trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, pp. 456ff..

## CHAPTER TWO THE APPRESENTATION OF PERCEIVED OBJECTS<sup>86</sup>

In his *Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität*<sup>87</sup>, Dan Zahavi wishes to defend phenomenology against accusations of solipsism, and he takes his cue from linguistics. Zahavi's approach is actually two-fold: First, he executes a careful analysis of Husserl's phenomenology, integrating Husserl's later texts and developments into a more traditional understanding of phenomenology and introducing his own interpretation of these developments; second, Zahavi argues that philosophers of language, especially Habermas and Apel, have based their criticisms of phenomenology upon a crucial misinterpretation. This misinterpretation says that phenomenology's focus upon the subject is ultimately fatal, because it neglects the integral intersubjective nature of a subject's development and language. Zahavi argues not only that phenomenology is open to intersubjectivity but also that it provides analyses key to Habermas' and Apel's own projects and goals:

I conclude that the major deficiency of the language-pragmatical approach is, first of all, its attempt to analyze intersubjectivity as an alternative to subjectivity, instead of viewing both as complementary notions, and second, its tendency to ignore and overlook the pre-linguistic manifestations of intersubjectivity, confining it exclusively to the dimension of language. Both of these errors are avoided by the phenomenologists [. . .].<sup>88</sup>

While this second main argument is important to both phenomenology and the philosophy of language, I will concentrate on the first part of Zahavi's work and his interpretation of intersubjectivity as integral to intentionality.

Zahavi's argument relies on an understanding of Husserl's notion of appresentation and apperception, however, so we will begin by reviewing how those concepts are understood in Husserlian phenomenology. Every perceptual object appears to us from different angles, or profiles, depending

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<sup>86</sup> An earlier version of this analysis of Zahavi's argument is presented in my article "The Other in Time: Husserl vs. Levinas" in *Horizonte: Klaus Held zum 65. Geburtstag von Schüler und Freunden*, Wuppertal, 2001.

<sup>87</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität: Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik*. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.

<sup>88</sup> Zahavi, 1996, p. 177, his own summary in English.

on our position in relation to it. When I am looking at the building across the street, for example, I obviously have only one aspect, or "profile" of it.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, I know that there are other profiles which exist at the moment of my looking at the building, which I cannot experience directly at the same time I hold this view, but which I know are there. For example, the back side of the building is *present with* the front side that I am currently viewing, even though I cannot see it. In other words, there are other aspects of the building which are *co-present* (German: *mitgegenwärtig*) with the aspect I currently am experiencing; they are present as part of the whole object I am experiencing, but they are not present to my current view. These co-present aspects of the object in view are also called *appresentations* (German: *Appräsentationen*). An appresentation is a co-presentation of the object before me that is not being "presented" right now, but which is implied by what is given in the profile directly before me.<sup>90</sup> Simply put, it is any profile of an object that is not currently in view, but which is embedded as an "unseen" profile in the profile I have now. Appresentations exceed the actual presentation at hand, and, as possibilities or extensions, they are embedded in the momentary presentation.<sup>91</sup>

Guiding these appresentations is a larger view of the whole, the *perception*. A perception, for example, depends upon my ability to take in my bike as a whole, even though I may be examining only the tire pressure. (A presentation, on the other hand, would be the momentary focus on the pressure gauge itself, accompanied by appresentational views beyond the gauge to its other side, then to the tire, etc.). Involved in this perception are

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<sup>89</sup> Welton explains this notion of an object's profiles well in his *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology* (Indiana University Press, 2000): "The object, we might say, has many 'looks,' many 'profiles,' yet they are all profiles of the same object. [. . .] It requires a certain distancing from our needs and a certain reflection upon the way in which the thing is present to us to realize expressly that this object, like all others, is always manifest in a certain way, always given in and through its particular profiles. The side facing us, while not the object, is the side of the pump. The profiles, we might say, are not the object but the way in which the object is present." (p. 14)

<sup>90</sup> "We have here, accordingly, a kind of *making 'co-present'*, a kind of '*appresentation*.'" *Husserliana* I, p. 139; Cairns, p. 109. We will also be discussing appresentations with relation to their futural influence--specifically with relation to protention--later in Part Three.

<sup>91</sup> "Die unthematische Vergegenwärtigung bestimmter nicht aktuell vollzogener Präsentationen, die jede aktuelle Präsentation begleitet, sei hier mit Husserl *Appräsentation* genannt." Klaus Held, "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie" (1972), p. 9.



other perceptions not directly given to me, indicating horizons that lead away and around the object as a whole. These other, indirect "perceptions," or *apperceptions*, indicate meanings and objects beyond what is being perceived as a whole right now. For example, my perception of the building across the street goes beyond itself to other possible experiences of the building as a whole (i.e., the building seen at night or after renovation) as well as other experiences related to the building (i.e., to a neighboring building or to the entire neighborhood, etc.). These are built, furthermore, upon the interrelations of presentations and appresentations. In other words, the meaning of the building as a whole (the perception) is based upon the presentation of the front side right now in relation to the other possible profiles around the building (appresentations).

These different notions of appresentation and apperception are actually used sometimes interchangeably by Husserl. Although we find that he usually employs these terms according to the distinctions we drew above, where appresentations are the "narrower" version of profiles of an individual object and apperceptions are the "broader" version of interrelated meanings associated with the object as a whole, Husserl himself was not always rigorous in his use of the terms.<sup>92</sup> Our clarifications here, while following Husserl's general usage, will help delineate the different temporal functions of consciousness associated with appresentation and apperception. For this reason, we will actually be more diligent than Husserl himself, applying the terms appresentation and apperception only according to the definitions we outlined above.

Having reviewed these terms, we can now address Zahavi's argument. Working with an example of a typical impression, his perception of a cupboard, Zahavi carefully examines, using phenomenological analysis, how we experience a transcendent object as a whole object, without ever being able to perceive the entire object at once, i.e., he examines the function of appresentation. Zahavi's question is: What is the explanation for these appresentations? How do they come about? Our dramatic phenomenological discovery of appresentations--that our experience somehow goes beyond our direct perception--is only the first step. Thus, addressing the seen and unseen perspectives of the object, i.e., the presentations and appresentations, Zahavi explains that there are three possible ways one can "know" there is a back side to the cupboard when one is viewing the front. First, one might know this through the past or future: One can remember having already seen the back of this cupboard, or know that in the future one can walk around the cupboard and see its other side, applying this information to the cupboard in

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<sup>92</sup> Our more rigorous distinction of these terms follows Held's analysis. Cf. Held, 1972, pp. 8-11.

the present.<sup>93</sup> This first way is based upon constituted temporality, on the fact that I know I have possibilities in my past and my future, and that I can integrate these possibilities into my present experience. Second, one can project that *if one were* on the other side of the cupboard *now*, then one would be seeing its back side--a fictive-subjunctive condition, as Zahavi calls it.<sup>94</sup> This second way is based upon my imagination, that I can imagine myself elsewhere, away from where I am now. Unfortunately, neither of these possibilities correlates to my present phenomenological experience of the absent back side of the cupboard. With regard to the first suggestion, when I experience the front of the cupboard now, I experience the back side as *co-present* to it, as part of the horizon of the front, as existent although absent. In fact, this is commonly expressed by Husserl himself: "I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, 'co-meant' as co-present. But they do not appear as such, genuinely."<sup>95</sup> I do not experience the absent side as being in my past or future, as a mere possibility. Rather, the back of the cupboard is there *now*, it is *present*--with what I am currently experiencing as its horizon, and I am sure of this--whether or not I ever have or ever will walk around that cupboard and see the other side. With regard to the second possibility, I also do not experience the back of the cupboard fictively, for that depends upon a condition that is impossible: I can never be both here and over there at once. I can never be both facing the front and the back of the cupboard, and yet I know they both exist now. In fact, as we have said, I experience them *both* now--the front as present, the back as co-present--and yet there is no fiction underlying this certainty. My experience of the co-existence of other perspectives of the cupboard--my experience of appresentations--cannot rest upon an impossible condition, a fiction. Therefore, these first two explanations are incapable of justifying my experience of the actually existing yet perceptually absent back side of the cupboard. Neither explains

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<sup>93</sup> Zahavi, 1996, p. 36.

<sup>94</sup> Zahavi says: "Sie korrelieren dann der fiktiven Wahrnehmung, die ich hätte, wenn ich *jetzt* dort (statt hier) wäre (irrealer Konjunktiv)." (Zahavi, 1996, p. 36) Note that Klaus Held provides an in-depth analysis of a similar conditional, but with relation to my physical empathy with and apperception of the other. ("Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie," 1972, pp. 34-42).

<sup>95</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 4; Steinbock trans., p. 40.

how my experience of the front of the cupboard is always accompanied by a *conviction*--not a supposition--that the back side co-exists *now*.<sup>96</sup>

Zahavi thus introduces a third possibility. I know that the cupboard has a co-existent back side, he argues, because other subjects make that co-existent aspect possible: Another subject *could* implicitly be there now, viewing the back angle of the cupboard for me.

The inconsistency of co-existing adumbrations [*Abschattungen*] becomes consistent through the other, as the other can have the co-existing perspectives, which are absent to me, but present to him. Co-present perspectives can be understood as the noematic correlates of the perception of the other.<sup>97</sup>

These presentations of the back side of the cupboard rest between two different structures. On the one side, we have our constituting consciousness which by definition extends beyond its own immediate present content. On the other side, we have the absent side of the cupboard within its context of meaningful horizons, i.e., its apperceptions. Each noema or meaning indicates other meanings that are connected with it, and those indicate others even further, and so on. These indications make up the network of horizons surrounding each of our experiences. But these meanings are not just for me. They are clearly there for other subjects, and within the context of horizons, it is often other subjects who have better access to certain meanings than I do. Thus, the present or front side of the cupboard indicates, through appresentation, the absent or back side of the cupboard, and by doing so, it also indicates other subjects through apperception, by referring to other meanings beyond the absent sides of the object.

Notice that we have stronger and weaker forms of this argument. In the weaker form, we have a link to intersubjectivity via indication and

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<sup>96</sup> Zahavi makes an important distinction here: "*Wie* die Rückseite des Schrankes aussieht, ist eine kontingente Frage; *dass* er eine Rückseite hat, ist dagegen eine aktuelle Notwendigkeit, und kann deshalb nicht erklärt werden, indem sie mit einer fiktiven Möglichkeit verbunden wird." (Zahavi, 1996, p. 37) In other words, the key question for Zahavi is not what kind of horizons are projected around the cupboard, but instead how those horizons have any reason to exist for consciousness at all. There must be some phenomenological reason for experiencing the cupboard as having another side *at all*. And this experience cannot be explained by my own past or future, nor by a conditional fiction.

<sup>97</sup> "Die Unverträglichkeit der ko-existierenden Abschattungen wird durch das Fremdich verträglich (*Husserliana* I, p. 148); dieses kann nämlich die ko-existierende und mir abwesende Abschattung präsent haben. Die mitgegenwärtigte Abschattung lässt sich also als das noematische Korrelat der Wahrnehmung eines Fremdichs verstehen." (Zahavi, 1996, p. 38) My translation.

apperception, from what is present (front side of the cupboard), to what is appresent (back side), to apperceptions in an horizontal structure of meaning, to intersubjectivity. According to this version of the argument, our experience of the cupboard reveals our link to intersubjectivity through the objects we share in the world. Husserl supports this interpretation in his *Cartesian Meditations*:

From that, as is easily understandable, *every* natural Object experienced or experienceable by me in the lower stratum receives an appresentational stratum [. . .], a stratum united in an identifying synthesis with the stratum given to me in the mode of primordial originality: the same natural Object in its possible modes of givenness to the other Ego.<sup>98</sup>

Real objects cannot be mine alone; they are there for everyone, and thus they relate us to horizons that are intersubjective as well as subjective.

According to the stronger form of claim made from this argument, intersubjectivity is seen as *necessary to* my experience of the appresent back side of the cupboard. This claim is much more difficult to substantiate. The question lies in how much appresentations are able to rely on the extended qualities of my own constituting consciousness, and how much they might require the consciousness of other subjects. This second, stronger form of the argument is Zahavi's position, and if it is correct, it could make my own argument quite a simple one.

Nevertheless, I would like to make two suggestions here. First, whichever form of this argument may be correct, stronger or weaker, we find a certain *givenness* of intersubjectivity in our experience of the world, one which we must examine further. Second, noting a certain relation between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity in these arguments, we see how they might *overlap* as foundations, rather than *compete*, and this is precisely Zahavi's point. The indicated intersubjective horizons, in order to be recognized, seem to require a temporalizing consciousness which is itself open to such horizons. Thus the appresentation of the absent side of the cupboard could rest upon *two* structures: that of my subjective temporalizing consciousness and that of intersubjective horizons. Further, such appresentations might act as the *link* between these two structures.

Zahavi's argument has pointed us to a very important discovery. Not only do we see that, as he has argued, other perspectives that are not our own either indicate, or rest in, an intersubjective structure of horizons, but because of this we also realize that *my own temporalizing consciousness*

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<sup>98</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 153; Cairns trans., p. 125.

*could be linked to this intersubjective structure* in its experience of the world. Consciousness is open to what lies beyond it, and through appresentations, it gives me indirect, non-present presentations in addition to, and as part of, my direct presentations. These non-present presentations, though, are precisely those presentations that can belong to subjects other than myself, and thus they indicate an intersubjective structure of meaning. Therefore it is through appresentations, which are a necessary part of my experience of the world, that "my own" temporalizing consciousness could be interwoven with intersubjective horizons. As Zahavi says, "[. . .] there appears to be a relation to foreign subjectivity in play when one speaks of a manifold of co-existing adumbrations."<sup>99</sup>

Zahavi explains carefully why other subjects do not need to be actually present in order for my experience of the horizons of an object to take place. My experience of the cupboard, he says, does not at all imply the presence of another person who must then be perceiving another angle; there may be no one actually there, and yet these other perspectives are always indicated and thus can figure in the sense of the perspective facing me. In fact, the object has an infinite number of possible perspectives that are indicated in my experience of it, but I do not experience an infinite number of subjects with those possible perspectives. That would be impossible, not to mention incongruent with my experience, taken phenomenologically.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, this experience of horizons is such that the horizons are experienceable by anyone (*jedermann*), and thus by an indefinite and multiple (even infinite) subjectivity. Zahavi calls this an "open intersubjectivity," indicating the fact that we are not dealing with the actual presence of other subjects but instead with an abstract structure of intersubjectivity. His choice of terms is based upon a variety of Husserl's references to this kind of structure.<sup>101</sup> "Open

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<sup>99</sup> "Mit anderen Worten, es scheint eine Beziehung auf fremde Subjektivität im Spiel zu sein, wenn von einer Mannigfaltigkeit von ko-existierenden Abschattungen gesprochen wird!" Zahavi, 1996, p. 38. My translation.

<sup>100</sup> "Obwohl sowohl die Appräsentation wie auch die horizonthafte Gegebenheit des Gegenstandes [. . .] irgendeine Beziehung zu fremder Subjektivität voraussetzen scheinen, geht es also weder um die Beziehung zu *einem* Fremdich allein, noch um die Beziehung zur faktischen Existenz mehrerer Iche." (Zahavi, 1996, p. 39).

<sup>101</sup> Zahavi (pp. 39-40) cites *Husserliana* XIV, p. 289; he refers the reader also to *Husserliana* IX, p. 394, and *Husserliana* XV, p. 497. I also suggest *Husserliana* XV, pp. 382-4 and pp. 581-2, as well as *Husserliana* XXXIV, pp. 426-7. Husserl's actual term in most of these references is "transcendental intersubjectivity," sometimes in conjunction with an "open horizon."

intersubjectivity," for both Husserl and Zahavi, is the necessary existence of intersubjectivity as an abstract structure.<sup>102</sup>

Zahavi says that when the phenomenological reduction leads us to transcendental subjectivity, it also necessarily leads us to transcendental intersubjectivity.

The complete reduction leads us not only to transcendental subjectivity but also to transcendental intersubjectivity. Neither of these can be thought of as isolated: transcendental intersubjectivity is precisely the shared nexus of transcendental subjects, and transcendental subjectivity is in its full concretion determined *a priori* by its relation to others [. . .].<sup>103</sup>

This means that, although a phenomenological solipsism may be necessary as the first step to the phenomenological method, maintaining any reduction to a pure solipsism is impossible, because, in order to make the discoveries we make within phenomenology, we require an intersubjective structure as well. In fact, as we have seen, these two structures themselves could be linked. Klaus Held supports Zahavi's interpretation when he points out that:

It is not the thematic consciousness of the co-subject as the first foreign-ego which founds, as Husserl believes, consciousness of a collective world, but rather it is the other way around: The appresentation of the comprehensiveness of my world and its given objects by the other, who is active alongside me but not thematized, is the foundation for the thematic apperception of the other himself.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Zahavi later, in chapter IV (pp. 81ff), discusses a third kind of intersubjectivity in addition to open and factual intersubjectivity: historical or generative intersubjectivity. This third kind arises out of our experience of the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) and relates to our intersubjective experience within our everyday world. We will have to set aside this question of historical intersubjectivity here.

<sup>103</sup> "Die volle Reduktion führt uns sowohl zur transzendentalen Subjektivität als auch zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivität. Keine von ihnen lässt sich isoliert denken: die transzendente Intersubjektivität ist eben der Konnex der transzendentalen Subjekte; und die transzendente Subjektivität ist in ihrer vollen Konkretion *a priori* von ihrer Fremdbeziehung bestimmt (vgl. *Husserliana* I p. 167)." (Zahavi, 1996, p. 68) My translation. Cf. also *Husserliana* XV, pp. 378ff.

<sup>104</sup> "Nicht das thematische Bewusstsein vom Mitsubjekt als dem ersten Ichfremden fundiert, wie Husserl meint, das Bewusstsein von einer gemeinsamen Welt, sondern umgekehrt: Die Appräsentation der Miterfasstheit meiner Welt und des darin Gegebenen durch den unthematish mitfungierenden Anderen liegt der thematischen apperzeptiven Erfassung dieses Anderen selbst zugrunde." Held, 1972, p. 47. My translation.

Intersubjectivity might therefore be more fundamental than an analysis of the constitution of another person approaching me will allow. It could be fundamental to my thematic constitution of the other subject, and fundamental to the constitution of my own self, as subject, as well.

We must admit that, although Husserl mentions the term "open intersubjectivity" occasionally in his later works, he does not work through the term as carefully as Zahavi, nor does he ascribe to it such specific meaning. He also does not analyze the relation of intersubjectivity to temporalizing consciousness to such the extent that I do here. Nevertheless, Husserl repeatedly mentions the involvement of other subjects in my constitution of the world (which he calls "co-constitution"), and my analysis, along with Zahavi's, could begin to provide the basis that is required by Husserl's claims. When we say that the world is co-constituted by me and other subjects, in other words, we say not only that multiple subjects are able to talk about the things in our midst, but also that my individual constitution of an object indicates its co-constitution with other subjects. And this co-constitution affects my understanding of the object's meaning as well as how I perceive it.

In spite of the fact that Husserl does not draw out this specific argument in his own analyses, he does refer to its conclusions. For example, he wrote in the margin of a manuscript: "The transcendence in which the world is constituted exists such that it constitutes itself through others and generatively constituted co-subjectivity, thereby acquiring the meaning of its being as an infinite world."<sup>105</sup> Husserl spends most of this specific manuscript, in fact, working through the interrelation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity with regard to the constitution of the world and of objects. The difficulty in interpreting such texts is that sometimes Husserl is actually referring to a factual intersubjectivity, i.e. the other subjects around me that are telling me about their perceptions, overlapping them with mine. In other cases, however, it is quite clear that this intersubjective "experience" cannot rest on a factual level alone. Here Husserl claims that, in my experience of the world, intersubjectivity pervades subjective constitutive activity:

My experience as world-experience (hence already each of my perceptions) embraces not only others as world-objects, but always embraces them also (in

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<sup>105</sup> "Die Transzendenz, in der die Welt konstituiert <ist>, besteht darin, dass sie sich mittels der Anderen und der generativ konstituierten Mitsubjektivität konstituiert und ihren Seinssinn als unendliche Welt dadurch gewinnt." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 393. My translation.

essential co-validity) as co-subjects and co-constituting beings, and both are inseparably intertwined.<sup>106</sup>

and later:

Human beings cannot be for each other unless primordial nature and then the shared intersubjective nature is constituted within their essential transcendental subjectivity, and with this the primordial constitution of spatio-temporality is acquired.<sup>107</sup>

In each of these citations, Husserl is referring to an intersubjectivity that co-constitutes our shared world, including its shared space and time. Thus our experience of others is *both* as other embodied subjects and as other transcendental subjects. Others appear, as he says in the first citation, both as objects in the world and as already there, as co-constitutors. In the second citation, Husserl adds that it is only through intersubjective constitution that space and time can originally exist.<sup>108</sup> Thus the world is co-constituted by co-subjects, myself included.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> "Meine Erfahrung als Welterfahrung (also jede meiner Wahrnehmungen schon) schließt nicht nur Andere als Weltobjekte ein, sondern beständig (in seinsmäßiger Mitgeltung) als Mitsubjekte, als Mitkonstituierende, und beides ist untrennbar verflochten." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 394. My translation.

<sup>107</sup> "Menschen können füreinander nicht sein, es sei denn, dass in der tranzendentalen Subjektivität, die ihnen entspricht, schon primordiale Natur und dann intersubjektiv-gemeinsame Natur konstituiert ist und mit ihr die ursprüngliche Konstitution der Raumzeitlichkeit gewonnen ist." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, pp. 401-2. My translation.

<sup>108</sup> There is an admitted difficulty in interpreting the "*dann*" ["then"] in this citation. Often "*dann*" can indicate a temporal or ontological priority, which would indicate that my "own" primordality comes "first" and then an intersubjective nature comes "after." In fact, Husserl often deconstructs into the primordial level in such a way that would substantiate this "order." Nevertheless, because such deconstructions also indicate that the primordial "first" level may be pre-egoic, we could still argue a simultaneous constitution of subject and intersubjectivity. At this point, especially since we will be dealing with the nuances of subjective/intersubjective constitution quite a bit in later chapters, we will interpret this "*dann*" to indicate a distinction between "my own" and an intersubjective level, whatever these levels may mean and in whatever "order" they may appear. Cf. *Husserliana* XV, p. 107 (footnote), where Husserl explains that the priority is not a temporal one, but that, with regard to perceptual foundation, the ego is the foundation of the others. As it is dealing with the structures of perception and intuition, his discussion seems to rest primarily at the "static" level of phenomenology. Cf. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative*



Zahavi's interpretation of "open intersubjectivity" provides insight into the details of our intentional structure, and, along with my own analysis, sheds light onto a possible relation between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjective horizons, through appresentations. Now we will take up the question of world-time, a term which arose in Husserl's discussions of the present in his later manuscripts. An analysis of this term might answer some of the questions that have come up for us already as we face the relation of individual temporalizing consciousness and intersubjective existence.

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*Phenomenology after Husserl*, (Northwestern University Press, 1995), for a discussion of the static, genetic, and generative levels of phenomenology.

<sup>109</sup> Although already apparent, I would like to take note of the fact that my citations in the last paragraph have come from only one primary manuscript. I am doing this here for two main reasons: first, I wish to reveal a consistency of thought on Husserl's part within one main manuscript on this topic, and second, I want to show that the difficulty of intersubjective constitution is a primary consideration on Husserl's part. Admittedly, Husserl wavers between a primacy of the subject and that of intersubjectivity in his later works. This does not mean, however, that he merely "happens" to bring forth intersubjectivity as primordial in a few, scattered passages. The difficulty of world constitution and the involvement of intersubjectivity are repeated topics for Husserl in his manuscripts, and for entire manuscripts in themselves. Further, the involvement of intersubjectivity in primordial constitution is regularly suggested. The citations here show one manuscript where intersubjective constitution is a main theme in Husserl's thinking. As our analysis progresses we will find that several of Husserl's manuscripts, as well as other works, indicate this transcendental intersubjectivity as well.

### CHAPTER THREE WORLD-TIME: A NEW TEMPORAL SYNTHESIS

As we already know, Husserl spent extensive time and energy working on two important topics in his phenomenology (among others): inner time-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Interestingly, he hardly worked on these two areas together. This has led to interpretations that these two levels are distinctly separate, fostered by Husserl's own references to them as separate levels of phenomenological existence.<sup>110</sup> Husserl typically separates the "primordial" pre-temporal nature of consciousness from an "intersubjective-collective" nature. At the same time, though, he sees these as two levels of *my consciousness*. But this insight introduces questions typical in this area of phenomenology: If all "otherness" is already in my consciousness, then how is it *other* at all? Or, if it is truly *other*, then how can I experience it? Here, in chapter three, I will review these two "levels" or areas of phenomenology briefly, showing that, if they are to be considered truly separate, then it becomes very difficult to explain our experience of a *shared* "now" amongst different subjects. In other words, if each individual constitutes her own now for her own consciousness, and if this level is distinctly separate from the level of intersubjective existence, then we cannot easily explain how the *present* is experienced as fundamentally the *same* by *all subjects*.<sup>111</sup> In response to this difficulty, I will take up Husserl's reference to the notion of "world-time." I will analyze what this notion might mean in itself, how it could fit into our understanding of Husserlian phenomenology and his structure of temporalizing consciousness, and how it might solve the difficulty of the "shared now."

The intersubjective level relates to a different type of temporality than inner time-consciousness, called "objective time." This temporality is constructed on the basis of our shared world, measured by clocks, indicated by language. It is out in the world, giving us an "objective" way to divide up our experiences of duration, movement, and change in the physical world. Husserl distinguishes objective time from inner time-consciousness in his earlier work:

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<sup>110</sup> Cf. *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, pp. 401-2, cited above.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," *Collected Papers, vol. III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1966) pp. 51-84, especially pp. 68-69, and Eugen Fink's commentary on the paper, *ibid.*, pp. 84-86, especially p. 85. Both refer to this same problem of the shared now.

*The time that makes its appearance there [after the phenomenological reduction] is not an objective time and not a time that can be determined objectively. This time cannot be measured; there is no clock and no other chronometer for it. Here one can only say: now, before, and further before, changing or not changing in the duration, etc. When all of the resources of natural science, understood as means of empirical determination, are excluded, how are scientific statements supposed to be established? They should be restricted to what belongs to the *cogitatio* and is given purely itself.<sup>112</sup>*

Husserl clearly sees a difference, in function as well as in structure, between our inner time-consciousness and the "objective" time that is in the world. In fact, his distinction follows a familiar delineation of "types" of temporality, an "inner" and an "outer," given throughout the history of the philosophy of time, a distinction first made popular by Aristotle.<sup>113</sup> Husserl sees inner time consciousness as the foundation of "objective" time because my experience of things as "before" and "after" is prior to the measurement of temporal units. Much later in his life, Husserl continues to set up the same kind of distinction; in a supplement to his *Crisis*, he points out that two different types of scientific evidence can be obtained, either through comparison of my present experience with my own past experiences, or through comparison of my present experience with that of other subjects. He says,

What becomes well known through repeated experience is always still only relatively known in regard to everything known about it, and it thus has in all respects a peculiar horizon of open unfamiliarity. [. . .] And this is especially so in the communalization of our experiential life with that of our fellow men. Each of us has his own experiential representations, but with the normal certainty that everyone present experiences the same things and in the possible course of his experiences can come to know the same things through similar properties.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 339; Brough trans., p. 351, modified.

<sup>113</sup> This distinction between an inner temporality and an external, physical temporality was already made by Aristotle when he took up time in two ways in his *Physics*: the first was the time of motion, seen when an object moves from here to there, and the second was the time of "psyche's nous," the mind which notices the beforehand-afterward of our experiences. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, Book IV. Cf. especially *Physics*, Book IV, 223a 22-29.

<sup>114</sup> *Husserliana* VI, p. 357; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by David Carr (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970), p. 343.

From this consistent distinction throughout Husserl's writings, we can note two important things: First, time is neither just "inner" time consciousness nor merely "objective" time, but must always be described as having (at least) these two levels. Second, these two aspects of time, while distinct, indicate two phenomenological areas, individual consciousness and intersubjective conscious existence, areas which seem to complement each other in a very important way. Each area of "consciousness" contributes to the other, even though one founds the other. Together they give an experience of the individual and of the world as a whole, "filling in" where each level on its own might have limitations. But if objective temporality is founded in inner time-consciousness, then the temporalizing consciousnesses of different individuals cannot be totally distinct: *They must connect in some way*--or else we would have *many* objective times. Further, these different temporalizing consciousnesses would not be able to communicate with one another, could not inform each other. We would be faced with the questions identified above, regarding the difficulty of explaining how different subjects, each one with her own constituting temporalizing consciousness, could experience the same now with other subjects.

This difficulty arises naturally if we both establish the constituting consciousness of the ego as the foundation of time, and take temporalizing consciousness and objective time as distinct "levels" of temporality. Thus we ask: What might be the connection between my inner time-consciousness (established in my supposedly solipsistic ego) and objective time (shared by all existing subjects)? How do we all know what "now" means when we are together? These questions are raised to a certain extent and in different ways by Husserl himself in several of his middle and later works. In his *Analyses of Passive Syntheses*, it is implied in his consideration of the relation of the individual monad and the communal world:

Thus, considering the individuality of the monad leads to the question of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, monads *genetically connected to one another*. With respect to "our" world it leads to the question of making understandable monadologically the natural psychophysical world and the communal world.<sup>115</sup>

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl asks whether evidence can be only immanent, related to my consciousness, or whether it can obtain objective status, i.e., as accessible to other conscious subjects. This question parallels our own:

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<sup>115</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 343; Steinbock translation, pp. 631-2. My emphasis.

But how can this business, going on wholly within the immanency of conscious life, acquire Objective significance? How can evidence [. . .] claim to be more than a characteristic of consciousness within me?<sup>116</sup>

And in his later writings, he specifically takes up the question of the relation of objective time and inner time consciousness:

But can objective time be separated from this streaming that, for its part, is inseparable from me and from us as the subjects who are the original bearers of the "subjective" modes of Now, Just-was, Coming, and further, of present, past, and future?<sup>117</sup>

In another manuscript, he emphatically claims that understanding the constitution of objects as not only individual but also intersubjective, on the basis of a shared place and time, is one of the most important points of his work:

Yes, this is the main point: constitution of individual, identical objects *as intersubjectively identifiable--not just through tangible presence [Anschaulichkeit]*, but rather through the constitution of an intersubjective place-time with firmly determined places, which everyone can firmly distinguish and identify. This is the main theme of objective world-constitution.<sup>118</sup>

In other words, although it is easy to distinguish objective time from inner time-consciousness, Husserl realizes that we cannot separate them completely, and in fact that it is essential to understand their relation.

In order to rescue us from this situation, Husserl asserts a relation between the inner time-consciousness of the subject, and objective, intersubjective time in his manuscripts:

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<sup>116</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 116; Cairns trans., p. 82.

<sup>117</sup> "Aber ist die objektive Zeit ablösbar von diesem Strömen, das seinerseits untrennbar ist von mir und von uns als den Subjekten, welche die ursprünglichen Träger der "subjektiven" Modi Jetzt, Soeben, Kommend und weiter Gegenwart, Vergangenheit, Zukunft sind?" *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 406. My translation.

<sup>118</sup> "Ja, die Hauptsache ist da: Konstitution individuell identischer Gegenstände als intersubjektiv identifizierbare--nicht nur durch Anschaulichkeit, sondern durch Konstitution einer intersubjektiven Stellenzeit mit festbestimmten Stellen, fest für jedermann unterscheidbaren und identifizierbaren. Das ist das Hauptthema der objektiven Weltkonstitution." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 217. My translation and emphasis.

[. . .] but for every objective time-point that is for me at all (as that of the time-world that is objective, but still for me) it is the case that it is either actually now, belonging to *my and our present*, or to *our past and future*; and *if, perhaps, I have not yet been and others have not yet been* (which is actually possible, since being in the world refers to the being of human beings and human generations), then temporal being has its meaning *in relation to this living now*, even when it is not being-now (our now) but perhaps being-past or being-future.<sup>119</sup>

Here we see Husserl stating that the living present belongs to "us," not just to "me." But this cannot be merely asserted; Husserl must give an argument or explanation as to why and how the living present can be "ours" as well as "mine," and he must explain how the living present relates to objective time. It seems as though there is some kind of prior interconnection in "my and our present" which then allows us to share this current "objective time-point." But this seems to beg the question. We cannot simply claim that we are interconnected in order to explain our mutual constitution of objective time and our experience of a shared now, especially since the living present has been established as that which constitutes the individual ego. Nor can we say that we are connected through objective time, because there must be some foundation in the experience of a shared present which would then lead to the constitution of a measured, objective time. Thus we must consider the possibility that there is a *third* temporal structure that synthesizes all individual living presents in order to make the constitution of an "objective" present possible. With this possibility in mind, we take up Husserl's references to a "world-time," a notion he hardly analyzes extensively himself, but which seems to be an indication of a structure that would resolve the questions that have arisen.

First, let us return to the citations we pointed out in chapter one, both of which mention a "world-time." Husserl says in one manuscript:

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<sup>119</sup> "[. . .] aber für jeden objektiven Zeitpunkt, der überhaupt für mich ist (als dem der Zeitwelt, die objektiv, aber doch für mich ist), gilt, dass er entweder aktuell jetziger ist, zu meiner und unserer Gegenwart gehöriger ist oder zu unserer Vergangenheit und Zukunft, und wenn ich vielleicht noch nicht war und Andere nicht waren (was doch möglich ist, da In-der-Welt-Sein Sein des Menschen und der Menschengenerationen besagt), so hat doch das zeitliche Sein notwendig den Sinn, wenn nicht Jetzt-Sein (was unser Jetzt ist), so Vergangen- oder Zukünftig-Sein in Beziehung auf dieses lebendige Jetzt." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 406. My translation and emphasis.

Thus we have an abstractable core of actual present in the concrete present as a distinguished phase in the streaming that signifies the present, one which no longer contains any just-was and coming, but instead pure present.

And he adds in a footnote:

“Pure” present. Central moments of pure “world-present,” in a certain way, Urimpression of the world. Temporalizing in streaming.<sup>120</sup>

Husserl is distinguishing in his main text between an "abstractable core of actual present" and a "concrete present." Since the "abstractable core" is described as a "pure present" which is no longer connected to the "just-was and coming," or rather, to the contents of retention and protention, we can understand this distinction to be one that points out the sense of "pure actuality" understood by the notion of the Urimpression. But the footnote is another matter. What could Husserl mean by "pure world-present"? Perhaps this is yet another term for Urimpression, where "world temporalizing" simply refers to the activity of the living present. We will hold onto this more conservative interpretation for now, pointing out only that Husserl is clearly showing a direct link between the living present's Urimpression and the *world* in this citation, without insisting that this world-present is that of the *immanent world in me*.

With this, we turn to a citation from Husserl's writings that we highlighted in chapter one:

Present--the modalities of time belong to the world itself. Every single present is experienced by it, but every other [subject] also experiences identically the same present, every other [subject] within the We that characterizes our being-present-for-one-another. And, in this way, time itself exists as world-time in the existing "stream of time," in the synthesis of the modalities of time that constantly exist and stream away in the mode of the present.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> "Wir haben also in der konkreten Gegenwart einen abstrahierbaren Kern eigentlicher Gegenwart als eine ausgezeichnete Phase im Strömen, die die Gegenwart bezeichnet, die kein Soeben und Kommend mehr in sich schliesst, sondern reine Gegenwart. [attached footnote:] 'Reine' Gegenwart. Zentrale Momente reiner 'Weltgegenwart', in gewisser Weise Urimpression von der Welt. Zeitigung im Strömen." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 27. My translation.

<sup>121</sup> "Gegenwart, die Zeitmodalitäten gehören zur Welt selbst. Eines jeden Gegenwart ist von ihm erfahren, aber identisch dieselbe erfährt jeder andere innerhalb des Wir, das das Füreinander-gegenwärtig-Sein bezeichnet. Und so ist die Zeit selbst als Weltzeit seiend im seienden "Strom der Zeit," in der Synthesis der jeweils im

Temporalizing consciousness maintains the same structure here as we have established for the living present: It is a flowing toward and away; it constitutes the modalities of past, present, and future; and the "central" moment continues to be the present. But Husserl refers clearly to a "world-time" in this citation. Can we maintain our conservative interpretation and understand this "world-time" as a new term for the "living present"? It does not seem so: This temporality "experiences" all other presents, and makes it possible for all individual subjects to experience the same present at once; the living present, on the other hand, relates specifically to my ego. This temporality is open to all subjects as world-time; it is not an immanent constitution. Is it a new term for "objective time" then? Again, no: Objective time is a measurement, a "counting of the nows," a ticking away of the clock. It is a creation by human consciousness. The world-time given here is existing and streaming away, and it is somehow related to a synthesis. We turn to yet another citation in Husserl's manuscripts, wherein he clarifies to some extent how we are to understand this new term. Husserl says:

My living present is the mode of the present for my objective being, and the whole world-present is inseparable from this as our worldly present; in its temporalizing streaming an objective time-point is constituted for me—and for us as identically the same [. . .].<sup>122</sup>

Husserl mentions all three temporal structures, my living present, world-time, and objective time in this citation, but most interesting is their relation. First, we see that my living present is *inseparable* from the whole "world-present." While this might indicate that these are identical, there is one important difference: The living present is *mine* while the world-present is *ours*. Both presents are actually the same present, of course, which gives them their inseparability. But one is my own while the other is shared. This begins to give us an answer to our problem of the shared now, although much more analysis is still required, since we are still not clear how these temporalities are linked. The second important relation we note in this

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Modus Gegenwart seienden und verströmenden Zeitmodalitäten." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 415. My translation.

<sup>122</sup> "Meine lebendige Gegenwart ist Gegenwartsmodus meines objektiven Seins, und untrennbar davon ist die gesamte Weltgegenwart als unsere weltliche Gegenwart; in ihrem zeitigenden Strömen konstituiert sich für mich, für uns ein objektiver Zeitpunkt als identisch derselbe [. . .]." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 407. My translation.



citation is that of world-time and objective time. Here, *objective time is constituted in the world-present*. Objective time is the result of a constituting world-time. And objective time is constituted not just for or by me, but for and by us. Thus world-time acts as the link between my own inner time-consciousness and the constitution of an objective, intersubjective time.

One important difficulty presents itself here: if world-time constitutes objective time, then world-time is a type of synthesizing, constituting activity, similar to the living present. The living present, though, is self-constituting through the activity of individual consciousness. World-time cannot rely simply on my individual consciousness for its activity, since it is *ours*. What, then, is the basis for the synthesizing activity of world-time? Because only consciousness can perform the activities of synthesis and constitution, then some type of consciousness must found world-time. Other than my own individual consciousness, there are two types of consciousness that are possible here: first, the consciousness of some type of deity, and second, the consciousness of all subjects together. Husserl's phenomenology is generally an attempt to create foundations *without* relying on some type of god; in fact, his *Cartesian Meditations* are explicitly a project to create foundations for the subject, the world, and intersubjectivity without turning, like Descartes, to a god's consciousness: "Aside from the (perhaps not so unimportant) exclusion of acceptance of the world as being, [how evidence can claim to be more than a characteristic of consciousness] is the Cartesian problem, which was supposed to be solved by divine *veritas*."<sup>123</sup> And let us not forget that, according to Husserl, even a god would be subject to the limitations of perspectival experience if that god were to perceive.

Thus we see that not only for us human beings, but also for God--as the ideal representative of absolute knowledge--whatever has the character of a spatial thing, is intuitable only through appearances, wherein it is given, and indeed must be given, as changing "perspectively" in varied yet determined ways, and thereby presented in changing "orientations".<sup>124</sup>

<sup>123</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 116; Cairns trans., p. 83, modified.

<sup>124</sup> *Husserliana* III, 1, p. 315 (Kersten trans., p. 362; W. R. Boyce Gibson trans., p. 386). This conclusion by Husserl is in response to an earlier consideration of the "fundamental error" in *Husserliana* III, 1, pp. 78-80 (Kersten trans., pp. 92-94; Gibson trans., pp. 122-4) that God *could* have perfect adequate perception of an object, because God requires no mediation in appearances. Husserl reiterates shortly after addressing this error that God cannot change the horizontal nature of spatial objects, in *Husserliana* III, 1, p. 81 (Kersten trans., p. 95; Gibson trans., p. 125). Cf. also *Husserliana* IV, p. 85 (Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans., p. 90), and *Husserliana* XI, pp. 18-19 (Steinbock trans., p. 56). Note also Husserl's footnote in *Husserliana* III, 1, p. 157 (Kersten trans., p. 187; Gibson trans., p. 210), where he explains his

A deity's consciousness, then, could not constitute for us what we must actually constitute for ourselves. In fact, Husserl even claims that if we are to have a shared knowledge, either with a god or with each other, then we must already have a "mutual understanding" of the objects we share:

But should the things which appear to us as they appear to us be the same as the things which appear to God as they appear to God, then a unity of mutual understanding would have to be possible between God and us, just as, between different men, only through mutual understanding is there the possibility of *knowing* that the things seen by the one are *the same* as those seen by the other.<sup>125</sup>

Therefore, the consciousness supporting world-time must be that of all subjects together, a communal type of consciousness--or as Husserl says, a "unity of mutual understanding." It cannot belong to the consciousness of a distinct deity, as we require a "mutual understanding" in order for us to recognize the shared now. World-time, as ours, is the synthetic activity of all subjective consciousness together that enables this shared now.

Husserl himself, in addition to his references to world-time, regularly discussed the *communal* nature of intersubjectivity, emphasizing the *connection* of subjects with each other, as we just saw in the citation above, and as we see here:

My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other--and thus his life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present--are objectively "simultaneous".<sup>126</sup>

But have we not just come full circle, ending up by showing some kind of pre-connection of subjects in order to explain our shared experience of the present? Not quite. Earlier, we insisted that we could not assume such a connection. Instead, we searched for a foundation and turned to Husserl's references to a world-time. Our analysis of this world-time resulted in revealing the foundation we needed to justify our experience of a shared now

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usage of the notion of "God" as a "necessary limiting concept" or as an indicator in the construction of limit-concepts. "God," for Husserl, is not a theological consideration, but is rather a hypothetical absolute limit that must be examined in questions regarding the structures of consciousness.

<sup>125</sup> *Husserliana* IV, p. 85; Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans, p. 90.

<sup>126</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 343; Steinbock translation, p. 632.

from the perspective of the living present. World-time is the synthetic link of all temporalizing consciousnesses, making the world-present together. It links all living presencing, and it constitutes objective time.

The notion of "world-time" introduces a possible response to our questions about shared temporal experience. It appears to be a temporality that is founded by the consciousness of *all* subjects, revealing a connection to each other at a fundamental level. This temporality, unlike "objective time," is a synthesizing activity that unifies all consciousness at the temporal level, thus making the shared "now" possible. On the basis of world-time, we are then able to create measurements of this shared temporal experience in the form of objective time. The most important question for phenomenology that follows would be whether the specific foundation of my experiences, my own individual temporalizing consciousness, is at all compromised by this synthesis of all consciousness in world-time. Husserl does equate the living present with world-time to some extent, saying that they are inseparable, and even saying, "I have only one time, world-time."<sup>127</sup> However, he has also made it clear that my living present can be abstracted out of the world-present, thus preserving my individuality and my privileged access to my own experiences. In fact, I can still abstract my own present from this world-present in such a way that I appear to be a solipsistic ego (performing this abstraction through methods like the epoché), but this is a process similar to abstracting the Urimpression from the living present.

If the living present is to be "abstracted"--or reduced--from the world-present, though, then we must address how world-time stands in relation to the phenomenological reduction. Here we face some difficulty, for, on the one hand, all intersubjective experience is to be "bracketed," or set aside, in the reduction. On the other hand, world-time is not *experienced* like any object or person or "objective" now, just as the living present is not experienced directly in itself. World-time is a synthesizing *structure* that constitutes a shared now-experience on the basis of all individual consciousness, similar to the synthesizing activity of the individual living present. Since it exists as a structure, world-time does not *assert* the being of other subjects; however, it does reveal an openness to their possible existence from the perspective of my own living present. Furthermore, it is a structure that can only be *recognized* after a reduction to my own consciousness. Husserl says in his manuscripts:

The individual monads have their immanent temporality and their immanent being; the monads together have an intermonadic temporality, a form of co-existence,

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<sup>127</sup> "Ich habe nur eine Zeit, die Weltzeit." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 382. My translation.

which, within the framework of their world-constitution as "actualized" monads, comprises their world-time, but which, when translated back into the monadic, is transcendental time, and a form of transcendental-subjective co-existence. [. . .] Transcendental time with transcendental being coincides with world-time according to that which is made worldly.<sup>128</sup>

Thus Husserl shows us that "my" temporalizing consciousness is fundamentally linked to, but is not the same as, our mutual world-temporality, since world-time can be "translated back" into the individual subject. Furthermore, we can recognize this world-time in immanent temporalizing consciousness, because it has been "translated back" into the individual monad, making possible our recognition of the co-existence of subjects.

World-time is constituted in much the same way as the temporality of inner time-consciousness, but with one difference: World-time rests in the consciousness of all subjects, rather than just that of the individual. Husserl actually refers to this in his analysis of intersubjectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations*:

In that way the *coexistence of my <polar> Ego and the other Ego*, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my "realities" and his--in short, a *common time-form*--is primally instituted; and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject. In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble, because it is tied up essentially with the constitution of *a world and a world time*.<sup>129</sup>

Mentioning world-time specifically in this text, Husserl refers to it as tied with an indissoluble temporal community of interrelated subjects. Further, these subjects are interrelated through their activity of constitution, and this constitution is not only of the world but of world-time itself. Thus the

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<sup>128</sup> "Die Monaden einzeln haben ihre immanente Zeitlichkeit und ihr immanentes Sein, die Monaden zusammen haben eine intermonadische Zeitlichkeit, eine Form der Koexistenz, die im Rahmen der Weltkonstitution als "realisierte" Monaden ihre Weltzeit ist, die aber, ins Monadische zurückübersetzt, transzendente Zeit ist, Form der transzendental-subjektiven Koexistenz. [. . .] Die transzendente Zeit mit dem transzendentalen Sein deckt sich nach dem Verweltlichen mit der Weltzeit." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII., p. 173. My translation.

<sup>129</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 156; Cairns trans., p. 128.

subject, in its relation with the world, finds itself also interconnected at the level of intersubjectivity.

Husserl's multiple references to a "world-time" are not followed by any detailed analyses on his part of what this term might mean. Thus, we could easily interpret it as a term used loosely to refer to either the living present (concretely understood) or objective time—depending on the citation. Given that this term does seem to slip between these two aspects of temporality, though, and the fact that it is well established that inner time-consciousness and objective time are *not* reducible to each other, it makes more sense to follow an analysis similar to the one I offer here, one which considers this term, mentioned seemingly in passing by Husserl, as one which indicates a synthetic structure connecting these two levels of temporality. This structure of world-time would then resolve the issue of the shared now and explain how inner time-consciousness can give rise to a shared objective time.

As Zahavi has argued, and as I argue here, intersubjectivity goes beyond the factual existence of multiple, communicating subjects. It is also a transcendental, constituting structure that supports our subjective and intersubjective experiences in the world. The notion of transcendental intersubjectivity thus overlaps with our understanding of world-time, because both relate to questions regarding a mutual, intersubjectively experienceable world. It is perhaps for this reason that Husserl says in his writings on intersubjectivity that:

In this way, transcendental subjectivity expands itself to intersubjectivity, or rather, to be more accurate, it does not expand itself, but transcendental subjectivity just understands itself better.<sup>130</sup>

Transcendental subjectivity, therefore, does not expand into transcendental intersubjectivity; rather, it sees itself as already intersubjective in some way.

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<sup>130</sup> "So erweitert sich die transzendente Subjektivität zur Intersubjektivität oder vielmehr, eigentlich gesprochen, erweitert sie sich nicht, sondern es versteht sich selbst nur die transzendente Subjektivität besser." *Husserliana* XV, p. 17. My translation.

## CONCLUSION

Our analyses in Part One have provided some essential groundwork, as well as worked through some foundational arguments. We have, first, shown how Husserl's understanding of inner time-consciousness developed, from a schematic structure similar to his schema in the *Logical Investigations*, to an active, constituting, living present. Taking this development to Husserl's latest manuscripts, we addressed Husserl's descriptions of both the Urimpression and the living present as a whole, and how their connection to egoic intentionality diminishes. Next, we established a relation from the individual subject to transcendent perceived objects and finally to intersubjectivity on the basis of an argument presented by Dan Zahavi, who is likewise concerned about the effects of understanding phenomenology primarily as solipsistic. We discussed the relation between my own temporalizing consciousness and an open intersubjectivity through our experience of transcendent objects, especially as indicated by the horizons of the object itself. Finally, we considered the difficult problem of our experience of a shared "now." This led us to take up the notion of "world-time," a notion which we discovered would explain a temporal interconnection amongst subjects constituted synthetically on the basis of all consciousness together. These considerations helped us to understand better the relation between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity.

We turn now to study the notion of retention, the aspect of temporalizing consciousness which "holds onto" what has just passed through the momentary phase of the Urimpression. This analysis will build upon what we have established so far, taking it beyond the immediate present and into the realm of what we retain.

PART TWO  
RETENTION

## INTRODUCTION

Because the traditional understanding of retention among phenomenologists--even today--regularly limits itself to knowledge of Husserl's published work on time and thus often to his earliest analyses, some of Part Two will carry out the groundwork necessary for a complete understanding of Husserl's structure of retentive consciousness. Thus I will proceed as follows: In chapter four, I will outline Husserl's description of retention in his earliest analyses, showing the developments that came about even in these early years. Following this, I will turn to Husserl's analyses of passive synthesis in order to reveal important developments that Husserl made in his middle period (around 1918 to 1928) with regard to his understanding of retention. In chapter five, I will address the question of intersubjectivity with relation to retention. This will require an explication of passive genesis, which, as I will show, relates directly to a discussion of retention. Following this explanation, I will return to Husserl's later writings in order to work through the interrelation of subjective temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity, and how this interrelation might be supported in the structure of retention.



## CHAPTER FOUR HUSSERL'S DEVELOPMENT OF RETENTION

### THE FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES OF RETENTION

As we know, there is a constant aspect of the "no-longer" in present consciousness. In Husserl's earliest analyses, this was usually referred to as the "fresh memory," or "primary memory," of the "now-phase," terminology which corresponds to the period of Husserl's analyses prior to his turning to absolute consciousness as the foundation of inner time-consciousness. We will set aside the importance of absolute consciousness for now, and focus instead on the qualities Husserl assigns to the notion of primary memory at this early point, especially those which remain consistent as his description of the structure of temporalizing consciousness matures.

In one of his earliest analyses between 1893 and 1901, we see Husserl defining "fresh memory" in this way:

"*Fresh memory*": the consciousness of just-having-been, of just-having-experienced--more precisely, of just-having-perceived--immediately following on the perception.<sup>131</sup>

"Fresh memory," according to this description, is my consciousness of what just has passed, as having just passed, experienced now. This consciousness, moreover, is related to my immediate perception by being known as having immediately preceded this perception. Here we can turn to an example we have used previously: If I am listening to my partner speak a sentence, I am never aware of only one word--nor of just the guttural sound--being expressed at this moment; instead, I am aware of the whole sentence expressed up until now.<sup>132</sup> This awareness continues to take place now; it is present consciousness, not a consciousness remaining in the past when the former words were actually expressed. If consciousness of the past were also to *be* in the past, then I could not have *present* consciousness of the entire sentence up to now. Since my experience is such that the whole sentence stays with me now, I realize that my consciousness must "stretch" itself to

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<sup>131</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 165; Brough trans., p. 169-70.

<sup>132</sup> There is also a temporal aspect of the future in this experience, namely, protention; we are leaving this aspect out for now in order to concentrate on the qualities of retention.

keep the just-was as a part of the now. Keep in mind here that this immediate past in the present is not merely a reverberation of the sounds just spoken. A reverberation is a specific physical event, experienced in its own, new immediate present, whereas the "no-longer" is an extension of what was formerly immediately present. Nor is this immediate past some kind of symbolic unity. If the "just-was" were a symbol for the immediate present, then it would be a separate object.<sup>133</sup> Thus we can see this "primary memory" as taking part in one consciousness, consciousness stretched between the immediately present and the just-past, because we are conscious of both what is immediately before us and what is immediately past at once. For this reason, primary memory is part of the now-phase.

In the same text wherein he defines "fresh memory" (cited above), Husserl also defines recollection, partly in order to contrast the two. Recollection, he says, is a "renewal of the perceived in phantasy as a new appearance in contrast to <what was previously perceived and 'freshly remembered'>."<sup>134</sup> As we see here, recollection is a reproduction, a "renewal" of what has passed. It is the activity of consciousness that relives former events in the present. As such, it falls under the heading of "re-presentation," or *Vergegenwärtigung*, and, in this category of re-presentation, recollection is more similar to other aspects of my reproductive consciousness, such as anticipation (my expectation of my future), or phantasy (my fictive image-consciousness), than it is to primary memory. In spite of the crucial differences between recollection, anticipation, and phantasy, they are fundamentally linked through their function as (re)production.

So far, we have seen a very important definition of primary memory: It is interrelated with my immediate experience, and therefore it is not reproductive. Husserl then takes this definition one step further. The "no-longer" is not only still "now" (as part of the now-phase), it is also still *originary* experience. In fact, the originarity of primary memory is what most fundamentally distinguishes it from recollection. Although the *activity* of primary memory is "presencing," though, its *content* is no longer present itself. Husserl says:

It is common to both primary and reproductive memory that what is represented is "not there itself now." But primary memory <is> an originary act; it constitutes the

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<sup>133</sup> Cf. Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 1966, p. 24; also cf. Bernet, R., Kern, I., and Marbach, E.: *Edmund Husserl--Darstellung seines Denkens*, 1996, p. 98, footnote.

<sup>134</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 165; Brough trans., p. 170.

being-past of "A" primarily in primary originary time, just as perception (the boundary of primary memory) constitutes time: being-now.<sup>135</sup>

Primary memory, therefore, is an originary act, rather than a reproductive one, retaining what just-was immediately present for consciousness.

Husserl also calls primary memory "the first impressional memory," showing the relation of this consciousness of just-was to our immediate impressions, and contrasting it again with recollection, which is described in the same text as "the reproduced and represented now."<sup>136</sup> With this, Husserl has clearly established two of the most important qualities of primary memory, originarity and being non-reproductive. While these two key qualities remain fundamental throughout Husserl's analyses, though, they also develop with his analyses. Importantly, with the introduction of absolute consciousness to the structure of time-consciousness, the notion of primary memory gains another essential quality, that of constitution.

Husserl introduced absolute consciousness as a way to alleviate some of the problems that we can discern already from the descriptions above. If the apprehension of the "no-longer" is part of the "now-phase," how can it be both now and no-longer? Further, what temporality determines from whence it is no-longer? Husserl saw that placing the weight of temporal determination in apprehending acts led to certain contradictions, especially if the content of those apprehensions was to remain neutral. Nevertheless, as the "no-longer" transformed into "retention," with its attending new definition, certain qualities survived this activity of consciousness. First, just as the "no-longer" was not reproductive, retention is not reproductive as well. Reproductivity will remain a distinguishing characteristic of recollection. Second, while retention can not be considered "now," as this leads to certain confusion, it is still an activity of consciousness. Instead of being described as an originary act, though, it is now a constituting activity. In fact, this constituting activity is the definitive activity of absolute consciousness.

As we know, Husserl introduced the concept of absolute consciousness as the foundation of temporalizing consciousness around 1908 or 1909. With this introduction arose the terminology with which we are familiar today, namely, retention, Urimpression, and protention. Here we find Husserl's first actual mention of the term retention:

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<sup>135</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 166; Brough trans., p. 171, modified. I have made minor adjustments to the Brough translation in order to be consistent with my own translations of Husserl's manuscripts and with our discussion here.

<sup>136</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 198; Brough trans., p. 204.

The retention that exists "together" with the consciousness of the now is not "now," is *not simultaneous* with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is. The mistake is already made if one characterizes retention in relation to the earlier phases of consciousness as *memory*. Memory is an expression that always and only refers to a constituted temporal object. *Retention*, on the other hand, is an expression used to designate the intentional relation (a fundamentally different relation) of phase of consciousness to phase of consciousness; and in this case the phases of consciousness and continuities of consciousness must not be regarded as temporal objects themselves.<sup>137</sup>

At this point, the most important function of retention, constitution, begins to come to the fore. This constitution is a unifying, a bringing together of the flowing stream of sensations as the objects and meanings experienced by me. Thus, this activity of constitution must be pre-temporal, as Husserl intimates in the citation above, because time is itself constituted by this activity. It is for this reason that he insists that retention cannot be now, because the now is temporal, and retention constitutes this very temporality. The activity of consciousness constitutes time for us, as past, present, and future, and constitutes the objects and meanings *of* which we are conscious.

Understanding retention as essential to temporalizing consciousness raises a new series of questions, however. Clearly, retention must be more than a mere "comet's tail," extending the field of presence beyond the Urimpression and constituting the experiences contained within this field. What happens to these experiences once they "leave" this field of presence, for example? How does retention function so that these experiences remain "mine" and accessible to me once they are no longer present? Retention cannot be merely a function of extending momentary intuition into constituted experiences. It must also somehow maintain a continuum of its phases so that there is a continuity of my consciousness as past. Each retention, therefore, as it "sinks" further and further away from the Urimpression, is modified such that it retains the experiences that come after it. This continual modification shows that retention gains "depth" in two different ways. First, retentions gain "depth" in the sense of their content. Experiences that are retained "sink away," as Husserl often says, losing their definition as they move further along the continuum of retentions. This aspect of retention's content might follow the analogy of a rock sinking down into a pond; although the rock never completely disappears, its formation becomes vague for the viewer looking into the depths of the pond. Second, retentions gain

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<sup>137</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 333; Brough trans., pp. 345-6. Husserl inserted the term retention into texts written earlier, but this is where it seems to have first appeared in the original draft. Cf. Boehm's editorial comments in *Husserliana* X (p. 333ff).

depth through becoming modifications of each other, gaining more weight, as it were, with each new retention. Here one could use the analogy of sliding boxes into each other, making one big box of "boxes within boxes." Another analogy could be that of adding lenses to a viewer, where each new lens affects the view of all prior lenses together. These continual modifications establish the unity of retention, a unity that Husserl identified clearly in his early works:

The memory I now have of the tone's initial point is a *unity of memory to which memories of the memories that I just had of the same tone-phase also belong*. And every such remembered memory, taken completely, is a unity that also <includes> the memories of the memories that, related to the same tone-phase, had preceded it.<sup>138</sup>

This unity therefore also gives depth to the living present, to inner time-consciousness overall, because this continuum of retentions in retentions remains constantly in touch with the constituting activity of the living present. On a more superficial level, we can further point out that a temporality that includes a continual modification of itself can no longer be described with a simple time-line. All of these points become clearer in Husserl's analyses of passive syntheses, however, because it was only through a more careful analysis of this modifying retention, as well as a consideration of such concepts as association and sedimentation, that Husserl was able to clarify the relation of our unifying retention with our constituting activity in the living present as a whole. We will address these notions in more detail later.

Husserl calls the two aspects of retention's activity the "double intentionality" of retention. This "double intentionality" refers to both the constitutive retention of objects in the living present and retention's unification of itself with the flow of all retentions. Husserl describes it in this way:

Every adumbration of consciousness of the species "*retention*" has, I answer, a *double* intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object, of the tone [. . .]. The other intentionality is constitutive of the *unity* of this primary memory in the flow [. . .].<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 327-8; Brough trans., p. 340.

<sup>139</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 379; Brough trans., p. 390.

Retention, then, is a constituting activity in two ways: First, it constitutes the object of its intention with regard to holding onto aspects of the object which have passed. Second, retention is a self-constituting activity, retaining its own phases in itself in order to maintain a unity of consciousness.<sup>140</sup> In this way, then, retention assists in the constitution of time itself through its double intentionality and its involvement with the living present as a whole.

OTHER TYPES OF "MEMORY":  
WHAT LIES "BETWEEN" RETENTION AND RECOLLECTION?

Husserl's notion of retention has, somewhat famously, become known as the "comet's tail" of the "now," with the comet itself representing the immediate hyletic flow of the Urimpression and its tail, retention, following constantly and closely behind it. With this image, as well as with the definitions we have reviewed thus far, we take retention to be "part" of the living present: The activity of retention extends the presencing activity of the living present by "holding on" to what is immediately passing. However, this extension must have a limit. Klaus Held points out that:

Obviously, every still-having-present has a limit beyond which lies the past, a past which, intentionally and perhaps with difficulty, must be called back into memory.<sup>141</sup>

Husserl's imagery of retention as a comet's tail, however, complicates the clarity of any simple definition. For example, Husserl says, "Every phenomenon has its comet's tail, or every phenomenon is a continuity of phases with a principal phase of which we say that it dies away."<sup>142</sup> The comet's tail of retentions, here, is meant to indicate how my retention of an object can fade away in two ways: First, I do not retain my earlier

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<sup>140</sup> Bernet, Kern, and Marbach describe the process in this way: "Die Retention einer vergangenen Tonphase (z. B. des Einsatzpunktes des Tones c) ist auch Retention der verflissenen *Retention* dieser selben Tonphase, und in dieser Retention selbst ist wiederum die vorangegangene Retention dieser Tonphase impliziert und so kontinuierlich bis zur Urimpression dieser Tonphase." Bernet, Kern, Marbach, 1996, p. 105. Trans. Bernet, Kern, Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 111.

<sup>141</sup> "Offenbar hat jedes Noch-Gegenwärtig-haben eine Grenze, jenseits deren Vergangenes liegt, das erst ausdrücklich und evtl. mühsam in die Erinnerung zurückgerufen werden muss." Held, 1966, p. 26. My translation.

<sup>142</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 295; Brough trans., p. 306.

experiences of, for example, this chair as I move around it, forever. If I were to focus on this chair for hours, I would no longer have my first glimpses of it in active retention, although I could *recall* them if I wished to reflect and reproduce the experience. The limitation seen here coincides with Held's claim, above, that my retention of a lengthy experience in the living present has its boundaries, i.e., my living present has its limits with regard to the immediate constitution of temporally long objects. This more formal aspect of retention leads us to the second type of retention, regarding the unified experience of an object. My experience of this chair now, for instance, becomes its own unity, fading into past consciousness as I move into another room or concentrate on another object. This shows us that the content of a certain experience continues to be "held onto" in its own "phase," even as it fades into the past. And it shows a different kind of "holding onto" than we saw above: Here, what is being retained may have nothing to do with that which I currently have in my focus. Thus we must address both the retentional phase active in the living present and those retentional phases which are "beyond" the current activity of constitution--both of which, as we are beginning to see, have their own type of form and content. The latter situation, however, leads us to certain questions regarding the relation of retention and recollection: How do my retentions both disappear and, at the same time, become reproducible as recollections? Also, how do we understand our retentions of retentions if their contents apparently "die away"? Clearly, there must be some relation between retentions and recollections, as they are both part of the same temporalizing consciousness. Their definitions, however, as laid out in Husserl's early analyses, do not clarify this relation.

In another reference to this "tail," though, Husserl begins to give us a response to this problematic:

If we focus reflectively on what is presently given in the actually present now [. . .] then we note the *trail of memory* [*Erinnerungs-Schweif*] that *extends* the now-point of the sound [. . .]. This reflection makes it evident that the *immanent thing* could not be given in its unity at all if the perceptual consciousness did not also encompass, along with the point of actually present sensation, the continuity of fading phases that pertain to the sensations belonging to earlier nows. The past would be nothing for the consciousness belonging to the now if it were not represented\* in the now; and the now would not be now [. . .] if it did not stand before me *in that consciousness* as the *limit of a past being*. The past being *must* be represented\* in this now as past, and this is accomplished through the continuity of adumbrations\*

that in one direction terminates in the sensation-point and in the other direction becomes blurred and indeterminate.<sup>143</sup>

Here we clearly see retention functioning in the constituting activity of the living present, giving the "immanent thing in its unity." We also see recollection carrying out its re-presenting activity in the living present, giving the past "in this now as past." In addition to this, however, we find that our recollection is made possible by the continuity of retentions, and further, that this continuity is one that begins with the Urimpression and ends in blurriness. The exact relation between retention and recollection remains unclear, if for no other reason than the fact that our recollections, which one would think must be at the "blurry" end of retention, are often experienced in the utmost of clarity. Given this, though, we are forced to recognize that our recollections are more than mere faded-away retentions. The difficulty lies in how we are to understand this fading "continuity" of retentions, and how it "connects" to recollection.

As a complement to this discussion, I would like to mention a certain critique made by David Carr, one which is quite appropriate. Carr says:

Whether I am conscious of some event in retentional or recollective consciousness is not a question of how far removed it is from the present; it is rather a question of whether it figures for me in the background of the present I am living through or whether I am attending to it in its own right by reliving it as a segment of the past.<sup>144</sup>

In an example later in his argument, Carr considers two people going to the theater who also maintain an ongoing discussion before, during the intermission, and after the performance. He argues that, upon returning to the discussion or to the play, no recall is necessary, as the earlier segment is still in retention, even though some time has passed. Many things can remain in retention, he shows, some of which may have originally been experienced a long time ago. The difference between retention and recollection remains the difference between what remains present for me and what must be reproduced through a specific act of consciousness. But Carr's example also

<sup>143</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 280; Brough trans., p. 290, modified. Asterisks (\*) indicate terms that Husserl changed later, from *repräsentiert/repräsentieren* to *vergegenwärtigte/vergegenwärtigen*, and from *Abschattungskontinuität* to *retentionale Kontinuität*. Note that Husserl's term *Erinnerungs-Schweif* is reminiscent of the term *Kometenschweif* which he uses elsewhere in his discussion of a now-consciousness that is extended into the past.

<sup>144</sup> David Carr, *Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies*, *Phaenomenologica* vol. 106. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1987.



shows that "remaining present" in these cases does not include retention in the usual way we understand it. In Carr's example, the first part of the conversation between the two people, held before the curtains opened, is not part of the active constitution of the living present during the performance itself. And yet, there is no need to *reproduce* it during the intermission, because the first part of the conversation *is still there*. Since it is necessary to the constitution of the continuance of the conversation, we could say that this first part of the conversation is still present at the intermission because it necessarily relates to something immediately and directly present, but this is a new understanding of retention. In this case, it no longer has the immediacy of lived presence usually understood by the term. Although Carr does tend to trivialize the importance of the more immediate, lived aspect of retention, speaking minimally of retention in its function as just-past--a tendency which I would argue is mistaken--he does argue successfully for an important, new understanding of retention, one that does not limit retention to the just-past nor defines it by its "distance" from the present. Carr's insight and argument that retention understood as "remaining present" spans a much broader territory than the "just-past" are quite correct, and as we will see, this new understanding is quite important for several reasons.

Let us return to our example of my experience of a chair. As I circle the chair, viewing its different profiles, there must be more in play than my retaining each profile as I move and the possibility of my recollecting having experienced this same chair before. If I have experienced this chair many times before, as my beloved, comfy desk-chair, for example, I do not need to recall any of my former experiences of it in order to recognize it as this familiar chair. I just know it to be my favorite chair, without any need for recollection. But this knowledge, which clearly is related to my past experiencing, exceeds the definition of retention we have given so far. Somehow, my former experiences with this chair, while I could recollect them individually if I wished (or at least ideally), must also somehow remain present for me so that, when I ease into this chair, I neither have to constitute this chair anew as my favorite nor consciously recollect former experiences of this chair that established it as my favorite.

Let us consider this chair again, but this time as if it were our first experience of this chair. Here we find that I know this to be a "chair" without having to recollect other experiences of chairs and drawing an analogy, or having to remember my learning what a chair is and drawing a conclusion about this specific chair-type object. Again, my automatically knowing this to be a chair at all exceeds both my recollection of specific past experiences and my constitution of this chair as an object currently in my living present.

In this case, my past is somehow involved--as it was in the example above--but here I have access to the concept of "chair" in general. In some way, I have kept the concept "chair" alive in my consciousness as an "habitual object" so that my constitution of this chair includes an analogy between the general concept and this object--but this happens immediately, unthematically. The concept of "chair," though, must have been established through my prior experiences of chairs, experiences which have compounded to make it "habitual." Thus some aspect of my memory must be involved in this activity, one that is different than recollection and also exceeds the limits of retention as "just-past."

Through these two examples, therefore, it becomes clear that there must be some "in-between" that exists between immediate retention and recollection, an "in-between" whose activity makes possible my comfortable, and usually effortless, dealings with common and familiar objects. This "in-between," we will find, is a new, broader understanding of retention, one which will also help us work through the relation between retention and recollection.

#### "NEAR" AND "FAR" RETENTION

Husserl's analyses on the topic of passive synthesis, many of which are compiled in volume XI of his complete works (*Husserliana*), often deal directly with the difficulties we outlined above. The notion of passive synthesis encompasses many functions, but overall it tries to provide an answer to how different types of past experiences are constituted by consciousness, a problematic which points us directly toward the activities of retention and, in a different way, to recollection. In these analyses, Husserl introduces such concepts as association, when one experience will suddenly remind me of another, similar one; affectivity, when an object calls my attention to it, often because it has some meaning for me in my past experience; and sedimentation and habitualization, when the repetition of certain activities or experiences becomes part of me so that I automatically expect or carry out their patterns. Here, I will touch on each of these concepts and their relation to retention, as well as discuss in depth how Husserl develops his understanding of retention.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Cf. Aaron L. Mishara, "Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious," in *Husserl Studies* vol. 7, 1990, pp. 29-58. Mishara examines questions reminiscent of my own, discussing "empty retention" in a way very similar to my analysis of "far retention" here. He also notes the important interrelation of affectivity, association,

The difficulty in understanding retention, as we will see, lies in its self-unifying function that does not seem to be an active part of the living present and yet is still somehow integral to my present experiences, i.e., the modifying continuity of retentions in retentions. Husserl combats this difficulty by describing retention as having different gradations in its activity: At the one end, we find retention actively constituting within the living present, and at the other end, it seems to rest quietly in darkness. Husserl says, for example, that retention is its own infinite flow, one whose content appears to lose its distinguishing characteristics the further it "flows away" from the living present:

Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of the living present, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented [*niederschlaegt*] in the realm of the dead, or rather, [sleeping] horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a [steady, continual] order of sedimentation [*Sedimentenordnung*]: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented [*niederschlaegt*].<sup>146</sup>

While the specific functions of these modes of retention are not yet clear, we begin to see here how Husserl recognizes a difference between that which is still actively being presenced and that which is past and yet remains part of my present consciousness without my being actively aware of it. Notice, also, that the latter process of retention, the unifying process of modification, is described as sedimentation. Here Husserl is beginning to show that that which I actively constitute now can remain part of my living present indefinitely, as "sedimented" into modified retentions. These sedimented experiences are no longer "on the surface," as it were, but instead are compacted down underneath it, acting as an inevitable foundation of the present.

This description brings us back to our discussion of the "double intentionality" of retention. This "double intentionality," we said, delineated the activity of retention as both constituting the immanent object at hand and maintaining a continuity of retentions in retentions that is continually modified with the arrival of "new" retentional phases. Here we see how this new description begins to clarify both aspects of retention's intentionality. At

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and retention, which we will be discussing throughout the rest of this chapter. More importantly, Mishara picks up on Husserl's references to a *primordial association* [*Urassoziation*], understanding this new definition of a type of association in a way that complements my own analyses.

<sup>146</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 178; Steinbock trans., p. 227, modified.

the "head" of the process, we find the active constitution of an experience, a constitution which also is a "constituting" of the retentional phase in itself. As these phases move toward the "foot" of the process, the content of the experience "goes to sleep," as it were, i.e., it no longer is actively part of my present consciousness. At the same time, this retentional phase is integrated into the unified continuum of retention, a unity that remains "present," but "in the background," passively.<sup>147</sup>

But here we make an important discovery: Husserl gives names to these two different aspects of retention in his analyses of passive and active synthesis! Husserl realizes that these two "ends" of the retentional continuum have different, important functions in our active and passive constitution. He thus identifies these areas within retention as "*near*" retention and "*far*" retention, indicating (problematically) their supposed "distance" from the "center" of the living present, and thus their relation to the affectivity of a present object:

The present turns into the past as the past that is constituted for the ego through the lawful regularity of retention; and finally, everything that is retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the [*far*] retention [*Fernretention*] of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations. However, this extinguishing is to be understood in the following way: The affective force is necessarily decreased with the [sinking down], which is to say, it decreases the force that makes possible the special prominent elements, the unities for themselves even within the non-intuitability of retention [. . .]. What is given there broadly in *near retention* [*Nahretention*] as something extended and as a unity of continuously connected affections, and likewise, what exists there as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the other, but as largely diverse--[all of this] moves closer together; I would say that corresponding to the temporal perspective, to the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of affections.<sup>148</sup>

Near retention, in other words, is retention in the way we have understood the "comet's tail" from Husserl's early descriptions. It is retention that is actively involved in the constitution of the living present, making it possible, for example, to experience objects as wholes through retaining their different perspectives as I move around them. It is also the active constitution of the

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<sup>147</sup> We must try here not to let the images of "foot" and "head" cause us to fall back into the habit of seeing the retentional phases as moving "away," as attaining more "distance," from our originary experience in the Urimpression. Instead, we should take these simply as different "profiles" of the retentional phase, just as the foot and head are different profiles of a body.

<sup>148</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 288; Steinbock trans., p. 422-3, modified. My emphasis.

continuity of retentional phases, and of the "newest" phase as it modifies this continuity. Far retention, on the other hand, is my retention of these phases in their relation to each other, as modifying and interlocking with each other as a unified whole, even after their experiences are no longer in my present, active consciousness. In addition, far retention retains the contents of these experiences in a minimal fashion, as "sleeping" but passively present.<sup>149</sup>

In this description, near retention actually includes two important functions at once. On the one hand, near retention forms the retentional phase that then sinks into far retention with its ever-diminishing affective content. The experience is not "lost" in far retention, it is merely minimized or generalized. It "goes to sleep," according to Husserl. On the other hand, near retention contributes to the formation of an experience that may later be recollected, giving us the capability to reproduce past events and "relive" them in the present if we wish. This is a constitution of the content of our experiences in a more specific sense. Further, the formation of retentional phases is carried out in near retention so that the interrelations and orderings of these phases remain part of our memory. Given these two types of constitution in near retention, we can surmise that far retention and recollection, both taken as ways that we retain our past experiences, have different but interrelated functions: Far retention concentrates on retaining the continuity of the retentional flow while recollection focuses on the specific contents of past experiences. Both are related to the activity of the other. In fact, it is only through the activity of retention as a whole--both "near" and "far"--that we constitute what can be reproduced as past events:

The present, as it was present, had to sink down according to the rule of [temporal] streaming-away and became a past to which I can return afterward, which I can remember and eventually do remember, and thus every memory refers back to the primordial becoming of the past through retentionalizing [. . .].<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> This aspect of memory is a very important discovery, especially for phenomenology. But Husserl was not the only philosopher or phenomenologist to discuss it, as we know from Bergson (*Matter and Memory*), and even Edith Stein makes mention of a similar phenomenon in her *On the Problem of Empathy* (pp. 80-85; W. Stein trans., pp. 71-75).

<sup>150</sup> "Die Gegenwart, als sie Gegenwart war, musste nach dem Gesetz des Verströmens versinken und wurde zu einer Vergangenheit, auf die ich hinterher rekurrieren kann, deren ich mich erinnern kann und eventuell erinnere, und so weist jede Erinnerung auf das Urwerden der Vergangenheit durch Retentionalisierung zurück [. . .]." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 132. My translation.

Recollection, therefore, depends upon the activity of retention in order to maintain the group of retained events which we are then capable of reproducing, because near retention constitutes them as experiences in the first place. Further, we require the activity of far retention in order to recall these same, retained events, because it is only through the interlocking of retentions in retentions that we have access to former events and their relation to the flow of consciousness (i.e., the order in which they proceeded). To put it more simply, retention acts as the condition of possibility for our recollection, both in the more apparently passive sense of "holding onto" the contents of past experiences and in the more apparently active sense of recalling and "reliving" them.

Here we must pause, however, to comment critically on Husserl's description of this new understanding of retention. Since we have found that the enveloping of retentions into one another is a process that undermines an understanding of temporality as linear, we should first be critical of a description that compares the retentive process to, for example, the "melting together" of telephone poles as they disappear into the distance along with the road behind my speeding car. The telephone poles, we might add, do not "modify" each other in any way.<sup>151</sup> Perhaps a better description, which also highlights the complexity of this process, might be that of two mirrors facing each other. Each image is contained within the next into infinity, and yet, each image is distinguishable in itself while relying upon the whole for its existence. Spatially, these two mirrors do not "move away" from each other, and yet their "activity" of reflection causes their images to become less and less clear. In addition, all of the reflections remain quietly present, no matter which "phase" we decide to bring to the foreground of our attention. This example clearly has its own limitations, however. For example, each image is exactly the same in these reflections, whereas our retentions contain different and changing experiences. Furthermore, the limits of our attention span are not represented here. Nevertheless, this example of double mirrors does assist us in imagining the modification of retentions in retentions, and how this process is interrelated with the contents being retained.

Second, in addition to commenting on Husserl's mixed spatial and temporal imagery, we must also take him to task a bit for confusing form and content in his descriptions. Whereas the specific contents of past experiences might "go to sleep" in far retention, becoming more "vague" as they "move away," the retentive phases themselves do not sleep or become vague. In fact, the continuum of retentions is, understood in its purest form, always the

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<sup>151</sup> Cf. Carr, *Interpreting Husserl*, 1987, p. 254.

same "size"; it never gets "larger" with the addition of new retentional phases, although it is always freshly modified by them. And the contents can always be "re-awakened" as extremely vivid recollections, recollections which contain their own retentional phases. Nevertheless, we must admit that there is a certain amount of influence between content and form with respect to the phases of retention. The modification of my retentional continuum is at least somewhat informed by the content of my experiences, just as earlier experiences are somewhat involved in my constitution of an experience now. Because retention is involved in the constitution of different types of objects and meanings, in other words, the content of different phases will modify the continuum as a whole in different ways. For example, my constitution of a physical object versus that of an ideal number will have different effects on my retention as a whole. The retentional phases will unify themselves differently, depending on whether they contain a simple number, or a long, drawn-out musical tone.

As a final critical point, we must ask whether Husserl means for "far retention" to define recollection; both are understood as a mode of access to my past that takes place in my present. But this is not the case for Husserl. Retention and recollection, in spite of these developments within the realm of retention, remain quite distinct: "In their very nature and with respect to their intentional accomplishment, they [*Retentionen*] are fundamentally different from rememberings [*Wiedererinnerungen*]."<sup>152</sup> Thus, although we might find that far retentions link us to our recollections--a link which we sought in our discussions of Husserl's earlier work on retention--we know that they do not replace recollections. Recollections remain their own activity. In fact, as Husserl makes clear in this same analysis, the main difference between retentions and recollections remains the difference between originary experience and reproduced, re-presented experience: "Thus, the retentions and protentions that are contained in it [*Erinnerung*] are not actual retentions and protentions, but reproductions of them."<sup>153</sup> We must therefore look further in order to discover how we should understand far retentions more fully, as well as their relation to recollection.

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<sup>152</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 324; Steinbock trans., p. 612, modified.

<sup>153</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 325; Steinbock trans., 613, modified.

## RETENTION AND ASSOCIATION

In order to understand far retention better, and in order to provide a more complete answer to the above questions, we turn to the notion of association, as it addresses most directly those areas where our own analysis remains unclear.<sup>154</sup> Interestingly, associations, for Husserl, most originally take place in the realm of reproduction:

A first group of pure phenomena and nexuses [*Zusammenhänge*] to which the traditional doctrine of association leads us concerns facts of actual and possible reproduction, or more clearly, of actual and possible rememberings [*Wiedererinnerungen*]. [. . .] The doctrine of the genesis of *reproductions* and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense.<sup>155</sup>

An experience of this type of association might be when, for example, I am discussing politics with a group of my friends, and a certain idea expressed by one of these friends suddenly reminds me of the same idea expressed by my mother in a telephone conversation several days before. This immediate association clearly involves reproduction, because my conversation now causes me to reproduce my earlier telephone conversation. Further, if my present conversation with my friends, through this link with my earlier conversation with my mother, causes me also to think about other ideas expressed by my mother, then I have moved from an immediate association

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<sup>154</sup> On the topic of association in Husserl's phenomenology, cf. Elmar Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der Passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. As will be confirmed in our own analyses, Holenstein recognizes the important link between inner time-consciousness and association, as well as their relation to apperception and affectivity. In fact he states that, "Die Genesis der assoziativen Erwartung und die Genesis der Apperzeptionen gehören zusammen." (p. 34) However, Holenstein's analysis of primordial associations do not take the direction that ours do here. Cf. also Nam-In Lee, *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. As does Holenstein, Lee addresses the *Nahverschmelzung* and *Fernverschmelzung* that Husserl discusses in his analyses of passive synthesis. These terms identify two different levels of association that take place, usually in visual encounters. Lee gives a helpful example of a white background with three pairs of red spots on it. (pp. 98ff.) The association of each pair as a pair would be a *Nahverschmelzung*, an association of two immediately related objects; the association of all three pairs in the larger image would be a *Fernverschmelzung*, a higher order association beyond the individual pairs. While these notions overlap with my analyses of near and far retention, I do not take them up here because they do not address the questions of types of memory that guide my analyses.

<sup>155</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 119; Steinbock trans., p. 164, modified. My emphasis.



(from an idea in one situation to the same idea in another) to mediate association (from an idea in one situation to different ideas in another).<sup>156</sup> Both of these cases, though, involve what we will call "reproductive association"; even in the second case, I am still reproducing experiences related to my mother because of my current conversation with my friends.

We can take this example, however, where one incident specifically calls forth the recollection of another, and generalize it. In such a situation, my "memories" would be general memories, ones that "remind" me of tendencies or similarities, not specific events. These types of associations function as "motivations," because having had originary experiences of a certain kind can "motivate" me to expect a similar kind of experience in a similar setting. In fact, we see this to be the case whenever we experience a new object that is similar to others we already know, i.e., that is similar to objects that are "habitual." Here I am not recalling a specific event related to the present; rather I am expecting a general similarity now based upon experience(s) in the past. Husserl himself mentions such a type of association:

The similar reminds me of the similar, and by analogy with what was given with the similar on the one side, I expect something similar on the other side. It is associated with it and "reminds" me of it, though as analogon of something remembered in the usual narrow sense.<sup>157</sup>

Here our association is not to a specifically remembered event or object; instead it brings up a general "memory" according to similar objects I have experienced over time in my past. Keep in mind, though, that Husserl does not mean the term "analogy" in the same academic sense we usually use it, where an analogy is a cognitive activity of connection. Here the "analogy" is a similarity in experiences that "motivates" similar expectations, without the involvement of active, cognitive thought. My consciousness passively draws connections between similar objects, and then a certain expectation is "awakened" upon my new experience of a similar object. Because that which is "awakened" is a type and not a specific memory, however, we cannot say that this type of association involves reproduction or recollection. Instead, I would argue that this type of association, for the very reason that there is no effort or act of recall, nor a specific experience being reproduced, takes place through the activity of my *far retention*. In fact, this further explains Husserl's description of far retention as having lost the distinguishing characteristics of its contents: *Far retention remains passively associated*

<sup>156</sup> Cf. *Husserliana* XI, pp. 122ff; Steinbock trans., pp. 167ff.

<sup>157</sup> *Husserliana* IV, pp. 225-6; Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans., p. 237.

*with my living present in the form of types and typifications of my specific experiences.* Husserl says:

Furthermore, the entire realm of *associations* and *habits* fits in here. They are relations established between an earlier and later segment of consciousness within one Ego-consciousness. But motivation occurs in the "present" consciousness, namely in the unity of the conscious stream, characterized as time-consciousness (originary consciousness) in act.<sup>158</sup>

And further:

Here we have a judgment motivated by another judgment, but prior to the judgment the temporal forms themselves motivate each other [*motivieren sich die Zeitformen selbst ineinander*].<sup>159</sup>

Given our descriptions of far retention earlier (as the form of the continuity of "retentions in retentions," with a "content" that is "undifferentiated" compared to our immediate experience in near retention), these passages could provide us with necessary details as to its function. Differences between specific experiences disappear in far retention as similar experiences become grouped together into general "memories." Nevertheless, these "memories" remain in touch with the living present; we could say they remain passively present. And when these "memories" arise through association with our current experiences, they are what we can call "motivated" associations. They give us general expectations about the experiences we face now, because of their similarities with the current situation. These "motivated" associations are to be distinguished from specific memories (i.e., the activity of recollection), which, with their clarity of content, are the reliving of certain experiences from the past, regardless of any connection with present circumstances.

This understanding of motivated association in far retention could then explain many things about my experiences, for example, how it is that I know English and can use it without having to remember learning it, how I can get up and walk every morning without a second thought, how the process of memorization often reaches a level where the words or actions are performed "automatically," without thought or conscious recall. As we mentioned above, this process of far retention is integrated with the processes of sedimentation and habitualization, and through these examples we begin to see how the things we learn reveal an interweaving of mind and

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<sup>158</sup> *Husserliana* IV, p. 222; Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans., pp. 233-4.

<sup>159</sup> *Husserliana* IV, pp. 227-8; Rojcewicz and Schuwer trans., p. 239, modified.

body, of temporality and corporeality. Understanding far retention in this way might reveal both its crucial importance to our temporal activity of constitution and its contribution to our temporal "depth" which links this supposedly "pure" process to our bodies and our intersubjective world.

Taking a look at the practice of memorizing can help us distinguish the functions of far retention and recollection. In the fourth grade, I had a wonderful teacher who believed very strongly in teaching her students the skill of memorization. When faced with another poem or phrase to learn, I would break the piece into segments, and then take up each segment in turn, recalling the words over and over with effort until finally the process of recalling each segment became easy. The first part of memorization, for me, involved my recollection and its involvement with my living present. After constituting the words and phrases of a segment, I would try to "find" them in my recollection. If I could not, I would start over by looking at the text again. Soon I found that I could recall the words in order, although it was sometimes with much struggle. The second part of my memorization, interestingly, seemed to involve far retention more than recollection, for by this time I no longer needed to "search for" and "find" the words in my memory. All I had to do was start the first word and then the rest would follow without my conscious effort. In fact, after much practice, I would find myself daydreaming as I recited the poem. At this point, the poem, while probably still in my recollection, was being recited through the activity of my far retention because it had sedimented into my present consciousness and I did not need to recall it in order to recite it. The poem, through repetition, had become a habit. In fact, if my flow of recitation were interrupted, I would sometimes not know where in the poem I had stopped, and I would have to work quite hard to recall the poem; if I could not, I would have to start all over. Take note, however: In the process of memorization, it takes "longer" (more empirical time) for the poem to become part of far retention, whereas it enters my recollection quite "soon" (in less empirical time). This, again, challenges the notion that recollection might be "farther away" from the present than that which is maintained in retention, for at times we might hold something in recollection that has not yet settled into far retention. Likewise, as we pointed out, once something becomes a habit we no longer need to remember having learned it and thus we might "lose" the reproductive memory of our first experience: Imagine teaching someone to tie a shoe, without tying a shoe yourself first to "remember" the process you go through everyday. The functions of far retention and recollection clearly

overlap, but they just as clearly fulfill very different requirements for living consciousness.<sup>160</sup>

Two questions arise at this point. First, how can we be sure that this activity of association is still related to temporalizing consciousness, and thus to far retention? Husserl himself addresses this point:

We see very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, a higher continuation of the study of original *time-constitution*. *Through association, constitutive accomplishment is extended to all levels of apperception*. As we know already, specific intentions arise through such apperception.<sup>161</sup>

Husserl says specifically that the study of association finds itself within the realm of time-constitution. In addition, association manifests itself as temporal through its relation to apperception. Apperception, as we have noted, is directly related to temporalizing consciousness because it depends on the activity of retention and protention to extend beyond the immediate now to other absent, co-present meanings. Here we see how association, through apperception, links retention to protention: My far retention of several similar experiences, i.e., of a typified experience, informs my present experience of a similar situation so that, through a motivated association, I can expect similar aspects not yet perceived. Thus, I apperceive the whole object or situation as an identity with specific types of meanings and profiles, even if I actually only have limited direct experience of it.

Husserl, on many occasions, claims that protentions are motivated by retentions, often indicating that the content of a retention as "just-past" can

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<sup>160</sup> Here another example might also be helpful. Every morning when I wake up in my own bed, I know where I am without having to think about it. This knowledge is part of me, it is sedimented into my body's knowledge, and it is retained in far retention as a generalization of all mornings I have woken up there, a generalization that remains with me passively as part of my consciousness. Often, however, when I am away from home and staying in a hotel room, I wake up after a deep sleep, and for a moment, I don't know where I am. In order to establish where I am, I must *recall* the activities of the day before: travelling to this new city, checking into the hotel, unpacking, etc. Because the hotel is not part of my repeated experience, it is not part of my retained consciousness, and thus my realizing why I am there requires the effort of recollection. After staying in the same hotel for a couple of days, my existence there sinks into my far retention, and then I no longer need to recall where I am when I wake up, because it is already with me. Here we see how these different aspects of my past function with regard to far retention and recollection. We also see again how far retention, in a sense, takes more "time" than recollection, in order to function in my living present.

<sup>161</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 118; Steinbock trans., p. 163, modified. My emphasis.

influence my expectation of the "just-coming." Here we see, however, that this "influence" is much broader than that of immediate content relating to immediate situations. Far retentions, through motivated association and with the activity of apperception, guide my protentions and expectations in a much wider sense. They are the source of my anticipation of certain patterns and structures, not only in physical objects but also in my own activities, in ideas, in social interrelations, and so on. Husserl himself discusses this relation of passive association in retention to my expectation:

Indeed, it is a primordial law that every retentional course--in pure passivity, without co-participation by the active ego--immediately and steadily motivates and thus generates intentions of expectancy that are determined in the sense of a similarity of style.<sup>162</sup>

Thus we see that association is clearly involved in temporalizing consciousness, through far retention as well as through apperception, and indeed, through the interrelated constituting activity of retentions and protentions.

The second question that arises with regard to association is related to the first: How might these motivated associations have an impact on the constitutive activity of near retention? We began to see this relation as we answered the first question just above, but how is a passive synthesis of structures and patterns, which remains "asleep" in far retention, brought into our activity of constitution? The first answer to this would be that far and near retention are, by definition, necessarily interrelated; in fact, although they have different functions, they are both part of one and the same activity, that of retention. Thus the activity of far retention, which includes acting as the foundation for associations, must overlap with the activity of near retention, which includes the constitution of presentations. Both activities, clearly, are required for constituting a present object, for we need both an immediate retaining and an access to past, similar experiences in order to apperceive this experience as that of a whole, identifiable object.

The second answer to this question regarding the relation of association to near retention has to do with a specific aspect of association named by Husserl, called "primordial association," or *Urassoziation*. Primordial associations are a special part of associations that are found in the active living present and, as such, are themselves originary:

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<sup>162</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 323; Steinbock trans., p. 611. Cf. also *Husserliana* XI, pp. 289-90.

These are all processes of phenomenal formations of unity that, seen from within, are processes of affective connection, and affective connection is at the same time the awakening peculiar to affective force. This is why I am obligated to see primordial forms of association here, so to speak, originary association, *association within the impressional sphere*.<sup>163</sup>

This means that primordial associations relate directly with near retentions and are precluded from the original definition of association as reproductive:

Naturally, introducing the language of awakening already alludes to the fact that we are dealing here with something that is so closely related to associations in the common sense that we could already speak of associations in a broader sense, of primordial associations, where there is not yet any question of reproduction.<sup>164</sup>

Elsewhere, Husserl actually distinguishes primordial association from association through recollection by identifying the latter as "far association"<sup>165</sup>. However, although Husserl does sometimes call this association through recollection "far association," we will refer to it as "reproductive" association in order to avoid confusion with far retention, which is a very different type of activity. Passive, motivated associations (in far retention), then, relate to primordial associations (in near retention) in the following way. Far retentions and their motivated associations are the generalizations, the typifications of past experiences that relate to my specific experiences in the present. Through my experience now, and the affective strength of the experience at hand, general features of the past are "awakened" so that they can participate in the constituting activity of the living present. Through this awakening in originary experience, the associations in far retention contribute to constitution, especially via apperception.

Primordial associations, for their part, can be understood as the originary link between what is immediately present and certain originarily retained structures, causing me to perceive objects as belonging to certain types, and thereby awakening my motivated associations of similar structures in past experiences. For example, my originary experience of a four-legged table does not only call forth my association of four-legged tables in general, relating to my motivated associations in far retention, but it also maintains a certain active association so that I see that table automatically as a typical whole (which includes four legs and one flat surface) as opposed to seeing it

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<sup>163</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 286; Steinbock trans., 420-21, modified.

<sup>164</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 151; Steinbock trans., p. 199.

<sup>165</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 286.

as several elements or as part of a different structure. My primordial association, in other words, causes me to see that table as one entity in itself, immediately. Given this, we realize that primordial associations are also directly related to affectivity, the drawing effect that objects have on me, calling my attention. For this reason, we have seen Husserl discussing in several citations above how the affectivity related to associations seems to fade away as the associations sink into retention. Primordial associations occur before this "fading away," with their affections remaining "alive" in the living present through near retention. They are the link in the constitutive process that connects the affectivity of perceived objects to our motivated associations of objects in general. Thus affectivity, while specifically directed toward the future, also has the important function of awakening primordial associations. Affectivity and motivated association mutually support each other through the activity of primordial associations. The relation of primordial association and affectivity, then, is the fundamental link between consciousness and the world.

Perhaps we should take a moment to review all of these terms and their relations before we move on to our next section. In fact, a simple table should aid our description:

	<b>near retention</b>	<b>far retention</b>	<b>recollection</b>
<b>originaryity</b>	originary	indirect originaryity	not originary
<b>activity</b>	constitution	typification and constitution	reproductive memories
<b>associations</b>	primordial associations	motivated associations	reproductive "far" associations
<b>affectivity</b>	strong affectivity	little affective strength, "sleeping"	affective strength in reproduction only
<b>living present</b>	part of the living present	part of the living present	not part of the living present

Figure No. 2

Husserl's main consideration of association is as reproductive, where it falls into the temporal realm of recollection. Reproductive association calls

forth our recollections of specific events and experiences through their relation to something that is being experienced in the present. Next, in the realm of the living present, we discover a certain depth to temporalizing consciousness through far retentions. Far retentions contain the vague, typified "memories" of different types or groups of experiences in our past. These typified experiences are "awakened" as motivated associations that participate in our constitution of familiar, "habitual" objects or recognizable aspects of our experiences. The associations in far retention are only indirectly part of my originary experience, however. Originary constitution takes place primarily through the involvement of near retention, that aspect of my retention which is most closely involved with the Urimpression; far retention is originary only as a necessary part of current constitution through motivated associations. In near retention, we find primordial associations, which, themselves originary, are the link between the affective call of the objects I experience and the motivated associations in far retention that contribute to my constitution of these objects. All in all, this temporal flow gains more and more depth as it flows "away" from the urimpressional moment of actualization.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF RETENTION IN HUSSERL'S MANUSCRIPTS

We have described the relation of (near and far) retention to recollection as one of interrelated activity but distinguishable functions. Husserl confirms the relation between retention and recollection in his Bernau manuscripts (*Husserliana* XXXIII), describing how retention brings forth a former experience with the activity of recollection:

Recollection is congruent then with the empty total retention. Here we can apply the original rule that an empty, concrete retention [. . .] can only find fulfillment through a recollection which newly constitutes the concrete perception of the same event in the manner of a "consciousness-again" of the same [. . .].<sup>166</sup>

Empty retention, Husserl says here, somehow needs the specific content held in recollection in order to be fulfilled. By this we can understand that, in the

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<sup>166</sup> "Die Wiedererinnerung deckt sich dann mit der leeren Gesamtretention. Es gilt hier das ursprüngliche Gesetz, dass eine leere, konkrete Retention [. . .] Erfüllung nur finden kann durch eine Wiedererinnerung, die die konkrete Wahrnehmung desselben Ereignisses, in der Weise eben des 'Wiederbewusstseins' desselben, neu konstituiert [. . .]." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 5. My translation.



activity of recollection, retention functions as the link to the present while recollection brings the specific content of the past event to present consciousness, thus "fulfilling" the "empty" retention. More importantly, though, Husserl is assuming a necessary relation between retention and recollection: Recollection *corresponds with* retention. This description further confirms that the distinction between retention and recollection does not lie in their "distance" from the living present or the Urimpression; rather, their distinction lies in their different functions: Retention acts as access to past experiences through the linking of retentions in retentions, whereas recollection acts as the maintenance and then reliving of the contents of our past experiences in themselves. It is only through their interrelated activity that we then re-experience past events as recollections in our present.

Husserl makes this distinction even clearer in a later manuscript, written in the early 1930s. Here he explains that we need to distinguish between different types of "reproduction" in our past consciousness:

But this makes us aware that we must distinguish within my original reproductions between reproductions of what has just passed, [i.e.,] retention, including the farther away retention which has already become empty, and the past in its usual sense, as what already "lies behind me," the far away, that which has already-become-"lifeless."<sup>167</sup>

Husserl adds a footnote to the end of this sentence, saying merely "Living and lifeless retention."<sup>168</sup> This is meant, I believe, to differentiate near and far retention further, such that near retention is understood as "living" in the living present, and far retention is considered "lifeless" because its presence in the living present is merely passively maintained. In fact, far retention seems to be described quite often in Husserl's manuscripts as "empty," "lifeless," or "sleeping." Usually these descriptions apply to the specific content in far retention, and for this reason, some of these descriptions also apply to the content of recollection as well.

Husserl's distinction between different types of "reproduction" in this citation further substantiates the definitions of near retention ("what has just

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<sup>167</sup> "Aber eben dies macht aufmerksam darauf, dass wir in den Eigenreproduktionen als ursprünglichen scheiden müssen zwischen Reproduktionen von soeben Vergangenen, der Retention, auch der schon leergewordenen ferneren Retention, und der Vergangenheit im gewöhnlichen Sinne dessen, was schon 'hinter mir zurückliegt', dem Fernen, dem Schon-'unlebendig'-Gewordenen." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 72. My translation.

<sup>168</sup> "Lebendige und unlebendige Retention." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 72. My translation.

passed"), far retention ("farther away retention"), and recollection ("the past in its usual sense") which we have been establishing. Although it is difficult to understand Husserl's reference here to retention as a "reproduction," one could interpret Husserl to mean that we can consider the activity of retention abstractly in itself, and, in fact, we can reproduce for ourselves the objects and meanings constituted through the activity of near and far retention in the living present. Nevertheless, the reference is problematic. In spite of this, Husserl distinguishes between the contents of far retention and those of recollection, by calling far retention "empty" of content, while the content of recollection is "lifeless." By this we can understand that all specific content of memory is maintained passively in recollection, and, while retention is "empty" of specific content, it still maintains the "typified" memories we discussed earlier. In any case, we can see in these passages that Husserl distinguishes two aspects of retention, near and far, and that he separately identifies reproductive recollection.

Notice that we have diverged a bit from Husserl's usual way of describing recollection. For Husserl, recollection is simply the activity in consciousness of experiencing an event with the modification that it has already passed. In other words, the activity of recollection is constituted as present, although its contents are experienced as being originally in the past. Without detracting from this understanding of recollection, I have added a further activity to recollection: the maintenance of these past experience-contents so that their potential reliving is possible. In the same way, then, that far retention is retaining its own phases in itself, recollection is maintaining the contents of past experiences for future recollecting. Given this, we can say that there are two functions to recollection: Active recollection is the current re-experiencing of a past event; passive recollection is the maintenance of all past experiences that may be actively recollected in the future. This second, passive understanding of recollection is a consequence of our interpretation of the activity of far retention, and it is indicated in Husserl's citation above.

We turn now to two final passages from Husserl's later manuscripts on time that further substantiate that he continued to distinguish what we are calling near and far retention from each other, and from recollection, in his later work:

From the source-point emanates a next consciousness of a just-was, of the immediate just-was; next comes a phase of consciousness of the just-was of this just-was, and so we have further a continual "of of of. . ." That which has retentionally flowed-away is characterized in itself not only as flowed-away in general, but rather as a continual

having-flowed-away, wherein the flowed-away in each stage is characterized as the flowed-away of a flowed-away and thus as mediately flowed-away, etc.<sup>169</sup>

Here Husserl is describing retention's function with relation to the Urimpression and to past experience. Notice that he mentions the "immediate just-was" separately from his discussion of retention's flowing away. The "immediate just-was," similar to what we have been calling near retention, has a special place in our phenomenological study of inner time-consciousness, primarily because it is actively and immediately functioning in the living present. Husserl then continues to discuss retention in such a way that the "past of a flowing away" correlates with our discussions of retention in general. Note also the importance of this flow to our recognition of the past, that it is the link of past experiences with the present. This linking of retentions in retentions brings us to the "end" of retention, or to far retention, which is still passively present in the living present.

Husserl turns to discuss recollection later in the same manuscript:

In close connection to these representations we find other representations that are reproductive, like the recollections which are now to be described.<sup>170</sup>

It is important to note how Husserl names both retention and recollection as types of representations, revealing their close relation to each other. Nevertheless, recollections are specifically named as *reproductive*, and thus as distinct from retentions. While it might be troubling to see retentions as types of representation, we must recall that, in the citation prior to this one, we saw that Husserl referred to retentions as reproductions as well. This problematic description on Husserl's part indicates that he must have seen retentions as somewhat reproducible, so that they could be analyzed in themselves. In spite of these odd references--and even alongside these odd references--Husserl is fairly consistent throughout his works in defining

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<sup>169</sup> "Vom Quellpunkt strahlt aus ein nächstes Bewusstsein von einem Soeben, dem unmittelbaren Soeben; daran schliesst sich eine Bewusstseinsphase vom Soeben von jenem Soeben, und so haben wir weiter ein kontinuierliches "von von von . . .". Das retentional Verfllossene ist in sich selbst charakterisiert als nicht nur überhaupt verflossen, sondern als ein kontinuierliches Verfllossenein, worin das Verfllossene im jeweiligen Stadium charakterisiert ist als Verflossenes eines Verflossenen und so als mittelbar Verflossenes usw." *Husserliana* XXXIV, p. 167. My translation.

<sup>170</sup> "Zu diesen Vergegenwärtigungen in naher Beziehung stehen andersartige Vergegenwärtigungen, die reproduktiven, so die Wiedererinnerungen, die nun zu beschreiben wären." *Husserliana* XXXIV, p. 169. My translation.

retention and recollection separately from one another, with the primary distinction being the reproductive aspect of recollection.

The notions of near and far retention, although not popularly known except, perhaps, through reference to the "double intentionality" of retention, are clearly apparent in Husserl's works, even if these exact terms are not invoked frequently. As we have seen, they are terms which result from working through retention's "double intentionality" in detail; such analysis reveals specific, separate functions within this aspect of the living present. Each of these functions, furthermore, has its own style of form and content, contrary to what a simple description of "double intentionality" might indicate. Thus our analyses here have brought us closer to an accurate understanding of the constituting activity of temporalizing consciousness, especially that aspect of it which is considered "past." Further, we have shown how Husserl works with these concepts--and with the terms themselves--in his middle and later works. Although not many phenomenologists have taken up these specific terms, perhaps our analysis here will provoke further study of these concepts as well as reference to the terms of near and far retention.

CHAPTER FIVE  
INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSTITUTION IN RETENTION

A CONSIDERATION OF PASSIVE GENESIS

In chapter four, we turned to Husserl's discussions of association, habitualization, and apperception in order to explain the function of far retention. By doing so, we already entered into a discussion of passive genesis. Here we will return to the notion of apperception (and, implicitly, appresentation) as our guide to understanding passive genesis, not only because it is a notion with which we are already familiar, but also because Husserl himself says essentially that an understanding of the genesis of consciousness requires an understanding of apperception:

The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions; the stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series [*Nacheinander*], but rather a development [*Auseinander*], a process of becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of different types (among them, all the apperceptions that give rise to the universal apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out of a primitive kind of apperceptive intention.<sup>171</sup>

Apperceptions, as we understand them, are those related meanings that are indicated by our current view. We are first forced beyond the simple perspective at hand to other angles, which makes possible the constitution of a whole object (appresentation). Then our consciousness moves to objects and meanings beyond, yet related to, this one (apperception). These apperceptions help define that aspect of temporalizing consciousness called "genesis." Importantly, we will find that the main link between apperception and genesis must lie in far retention.

As we established in last chapter, far retention is the basis for motivated associations, those associations that act as typified "memories" in the living present, helping us to constitute objects as certain known types and as already familiar. This process includes extending beyond the immediate profile to profiles, meanings and objects that are not directly present but are indicated by the perception as a whole; in other words, this process of motivated association includes apperception. Since apperception relates to

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<sup>171</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 339; Steinbock trans., p. 628, modified.

motivated association, and motivated association is based in far retention, then the activity of apperception can be seen to be supported by the temporal activity of far retention. Husserl indicates this relation in his *Analyses of Passive Synthesis*:

To the latter [kind of apperceptions] belong the intentions that customarily come into question under the rubric of association. At each place in the stream it is possible for constellations that are *similar* [. . .] *to be produced again with earlier ones, to recall the earlier similar ones, to point back to them* [. . .]. (Could we not also define apperception in the following way: a consciousness that is not only conscious of something within itself in general, but at the same time intends this something as a motivation for a consciousness of something else [. . .].)<sup>172</sup>

A discussion of apperception, then, is also in part a discussion of motivated association, and thus, further, of far retention. Understanding this overlap in constituting consciousness begins to help us define passive genesis.

Genesis, for Husserl, is a general term that names the development of consciousness, especially how certain forms or structures within consciousness are brought about and then how they interrelate. In addition to this, genesis indicates the development of the individual subject and its interconnection with other subjects. Genetic analysis differentiates itself from static analysis in that it examines the layers within consciousness and how they passively affect one another rather than studying consciousness itself as a whole simple structure. For example, genetic analysis might study how my own past passively affects my present, how new ideas are discovered and then become part of me, or how several subjects can all experience the same temporal moment. For this reason, apperceptions--because they link very different parts of consciousness to each other, i.e., linking my present perception to profiles and meanings beyond it--are an important part of a genetic analysis of consciousness. In fact, the term "genesis" actually identifies the overall structure of factual apperceptions and associations, as well as the primordial (temporal) structure that supports them. As Klaus Held explains, active and passive genesis describe the inner "history" of consciousness and the "primordial foundations" [*Urstiftungen*] which lie deep within it.<sup>173</sup> According to Held, the primordial foundations of

<sup>172</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 338; Steinbock trans., pp. 626-27, modified, my emphasis. Cf. also *Husserliana* XI, footnote on page 337; Steinbock trans., footnote 98, p. 625.

<sup>173</sup> Klaus Held, "Einleitung," *Edmund Husserl: Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt, Ausgewählte Texte*, II; Philipp Reclam Jun. Stuttgart, Germany, 1986. "Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World," trans. Lanei Rodemeyer, in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, ed. Donn Welton, pp. 32-62. The explanation here of active and

active genesis are the moments of discovery which momentarily change the mind-set of an individual, or even an historical community. As an individual, a decision I make and then act upon, such as stopping to give a stranger directions, becomes a part of me, so that it affects my character in general, but also, more specifically, it makes it easier for me to repeat that behavior. This decision becomes a passive part of my consciousness, but as passive, it is not dead. It "colors" my consciousness, as it were, along with all other decisions I make. In each case, a certain activity on my part (making a decision to help the stranger) becomes absorbed into my past, but remains a passive foundation of my present (influencing my reaction to a new stranger who looks lost). Husserl himself describes genesis partially in this manner in his *Cartesian Meditations*:

I decide; the act-process vanishes but the decision persists; whether I become passive and sink into heavy sleep or live in other acts, the decision continues to be accepted and, correlatively, I am so decided from then on, as long as I do not give the decision up. [. . .] *I myself*, who am persisting in my abiding volition, *become changed* if I "cancel" my decisions or repudiate my deeds.<sup>174</sup>

The study of these "habitualities," Husserl says two pages later, is a study of genesis:

With the doctrine of the Ego as pole of his acts and substrate of habitualities, we have already touched on the *problems of phenomenological genesis* and done so at a significant point. Thus we have touched the level of *genetic phenomenology*.<sup>175</sup>

The major decisions or actions of an individual stay with that person, just as her repeated actions do, and these actions and decisions affect her present consciousness. Further, a study of these influences, how actions that are past affect present consciousness, constitutes an important area of genetic phenomenology.

But these types of influences, of how events of the past can have effects on the present, can be seen at the intersubjective level as well. In other words, a community as a whole has its own "consciousness" which can be affected by past happenings or decisions. A couple examples of the active primordial foundations within such a "communal consciousness" might be

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passive genesis somewhat follows Held's, pp. 38ff.; Rodemeyer trans., in Welton ed., pp. 52ff.

<sup>174</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 101; Cairns trans., p. 67.

<sup>175</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 103; Cairns trans., p. 69.

the discovery of a new tool, or a new scientific explanation of a common phenomenon. Today, the introduction of the internet and today's generations' adaptation (or rather, sedimentation and habitualization) to this new mode of communication and learning is the active formation of what will become, in the future, a passive foundation of our community's consciousness. In a few generations, the internet will be assumed into the way of life of those who live in industrialized, commercially run societies, just as the telephone, radio, and television are assumed parts of their existence today. Because we function with the use of these discoveries, they act as passive foundations in our collective consciousness.

This process of development, i.e., of taking active moments in consciousness and absorbing them into a passive part of consciousness that continues to influence the present, requires a certain structure to maintain it. We have already come across several terms that describe such foundations, such as: inner time-consciousness, association, and apperception. Each of these structures stands as a cornerstone of consciousness understood phenomenologically. These structures maintain a constant activity in consciousness, and yet we are hardly aware of them. As opposed to the active foundation of specific discoveries discussed above, which later are passively assumed, these passive foundations are passively constituted, and yet are always active. Held explains,

[Passive] genesis has no beginning that sets it up in the inner history of consciousness; rather, it takes place at all times. The constitutional events that are "underneath" the level of perception are involved in this genesis, especially the original development of time in the "living present," "association," and kinesthetic consciousness. All of these passive processes, which are continually in motion, already prefigure activity. For this reason, there is a smooth transition from passive genesis to [. . .] *the active genesis* of primordial foundation. This activity, for its part, remains surrounded by passivity by means of the "secondary passivity" of habitualization.<sup>176</sup>

Here we see how active genetic formations as well as passive genetic structures are actually each active and passive in their own ways. More importantly, we see how these formations and structures relate to one another, usually taking an event or series of events that is part of past consciousness and relating it to the present. But, according to our earlier definitions, this means that these active genetic formations must be related to the function of *far retention* in temporalizing consciousness. If this is true,

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<sup>176</sup> Klaus Held, "Einleitung," 1986, p. 40; Rodemeyer trans., in Welton, ed., 2003, p. 53.



we can better understand how so much seems to remain "present" for consciousness in the living present, even though we are usually only consciously aware of our current activities and surroundings. These current activities and surroundings call us to move in familiar ways, to go on the internet or use the telephone, to think about certain ideas in a specific language, and to do many other things without our having to recall how we got to know these abilities and things. These primordial foundations, supported by the genetic structure of far retention, remain passively present, contributing to the constituting activity of our living present.

We mentioned above, however, that active primordial foundations could also take place in the development of a "communal consciousness." If this is so, we need to explain how far retention could actually "retain" more than my own personal experiences. In other words, we need to show how the genetic structure of consciousness is able to maintain (indirectly) the primordial foundations of our communal history as well as (more directly) the activities of my individual consciousness. It may be clear how my own individual experiences become part of both my recollection and my retained past such that they can be not only remembered but also retained to have an influence on my present *without* my recalling them; however, it is not clear how the events of my community--which I have not always experienced directly--could become part of my retention and thus influence my present. Here we need to return to the notions of apperception and indication. When I have an object, such as a desk, present before me, I experience not only the front of the desk facing me, but also, indirectly, its other sides as well. These are the presentations of the other, non-visible, sides of the desk. In addition to this, as we discussed, I also experience the related meanings associated with the desk, including intersubjectively mediated meanings. In this way, I experience the desk as something related to work, to computers, to organization, etc. These are the apperceptions which arise with the perception of the desk. Indicated through these apperceived meanings is intersubjectivity itself, as we discussed in chapter two. Important for our inquiry here is that all of these indirectly experienced meanings, as part of the direct experience of the front of the desk, *are retained by consciousness*. Maintained in far retention, these apperceptions influence my experiences of other desks, and even affect my experiences of related objects like computers. In this way, my communal history becomes part of my individual consciousness, indirectly, through apperception, indication, and retention.

Of course, I must have some kind of direct experience for these connections to take place. If I see a tie-dyed shirt, for example, it might refer me to the counter-culture of the sixties, but mostly because I have seen films

and photographs, heard lectures, met people, etc., of that time period, not because I lived as an adult through much of it myself. Today, young people who may not have learned about that period will perceive the shirt in a different, fairly unrelated context. Some direct experience that links me to intersubjective events and existence may be very subtle, though, so that I never notice it (it will be, as Husserl would say, in the "background" rather than in the "foreground"), and yet it will be retained so that it influences my present experiences. Living in a capitalist society, for instance, may be something I never thematize, and yet it will strongly affect how I treat--even how I might constitute--the objects, or commodities, around me (even, sometimes, the people around me). I will see them as things to be purchased or negotiated through money, and I will see my own labor as something I can (and should) sell. "Living in a capitalist society" is not a single, direct experience. Instead, it is a pervasive and constant experience, an intersubjective structure, direct but often unexamined. I do not even notice it until, perhaps, I read Marx. Whether or not I thematize capitalism, however, it is clearly retained as an "experience" influencing my present consciousness. It becomes part of my far retention as a constant "background" to all my experiences, affecting my interpretation of the present. Thus intersubjective experiences, even those which are not directly my own, can become part of my retentive consciousness, influencing my current constitution of the world. Intersubjective meanings are retained based on my experiences of shared objects or intersubjective structures, and some of those meanings or structures indicate specific events I may not have experienced myself but which become a part of my consciousness by virtue of my experience of this community.

From a phenomenological perspective, understanding this level of consciousness is very important. Husserl describes the analysis of our primordial foundations in passive genesis as an analysis of the universal essence of the foundation of consciousness, of the primordial rules which govern consciousness. As such, this analysis is essential:

Thus, it is a necessary task to establish the universal and primitive laws under which stands the formation of an apperception arising from a primordial apperception, and to derive systematically the possible formations, that is, to clarify every given structure according to its origin.

This "history" of consciousness (the history of all possible apperceptions) does not concern bringing to light a factual genesis for factual apperceptions [ . . . ]. Rather, every shape of apperception is an essential shape and has its genesis in accordance with essential laws [ . . . ].<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 339; Steinbock trans., p. 627.

The study of genesis is a study of the last and deepest level of consciousness, and of the rules that guide its activity. It reveals the foundations of human consciousness understood phenomenologically.

This understanding of passive genesis ties into some of the arguments given earlier regarding intersubjective connection. Passive primordial foundations, such as association and apperception, provide us with an indirect connection to other subjects. For example, our experience of the world as having many perspectives including our own is a fundamental aspect of our experience, and we know that other perspectives exist even when we do not experience them directly. We apperceive these other perspectives as those that could be had by other subjects. This point returns us to the argument made by Dan Zahavi. In this case, we do not have other subjects within us, nor do we have access to their consciousness, but we do have an assumption of their possible perspectives, a link to them via apperception. This connection to others could be understood as a primordial foundation of intersubjectivity. In fact, in describing the different questions of genesis, Husserl specifically includes the question of intersubjectivity:

And connected to all of the preceding we ask: In what sense can the genesis of a monad be implicated in the genesis of another, and in what sense can a unity of genesis, according to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplicity of monads [?] [. . .] Thus, considering the individuality of the monad leads to the question of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, monads *genetically connected to one another*.<sup>178</sup>

Here Husserl is referring not only to the physical unity of our world, to the fact that we all share one and the same physical world generally without confusion, but also to our unity of consciousness, to the fact that my thoughts and desires can be motivated through the existence of other subjects. Multiple consciousnesses, in other words, are connected by more than just a shared world, because their connection can be found as a *genetic* foundation in consciousness, i.e., at the level of primordial foundations.

Later in the same text, Husserl adds temporalizing consciousness to this equation. We live in one unified objective time, one wherein we all know what "now" means. This shared "now," as we discussed in chapter three, requires some kind of connection at the level of inner time-consciousness. We discovered such a connection in world-time, the synthesis of all

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<sup>178</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 343; Steinbock trans., p. 631. My italics.

individual temporalizing consciousnesses into a shared temporality. Here we see that such a connection relates to our genetic structures of consciousness:

My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other--and thus his life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present--are objectively "simultaneous".<sup>179</sup>

Although Husserl does not mention world-time here, he does explicitly say that "my passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others." This connection is exactly what we sought in our discussion of world-time, i.e., a synthesis of all consciousness that would make possible the constitution of a shared world and a shared objective temporality. Thus, the synthesis of a world-time, which results in the constitution of a shared, objective time, must take place in the *passive* realm of consciousness.<sup>180</sup> Further, this connection, which lies in the passivity of consciousness, is probably supported by the passive activity of far retention.

It seems ironic that the genesis of consciousness would reveal to us a link between inner time-consciousness--which supposedly constitutes the pure, solipsistic subject--and intersubjectivity. As we will see, however, this was not merely a chance exclamation by Husserl. In his latest manuscripts, he often refers to this kind of intersubjective connection. Important to stress throughout these analyses, however, is the fact that this associative link between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity does not undermine the individuality of the ego. The ego-pole will always remain central to phenomenological study, as it is the only direct perspective from which I can ever gain knowledge. Thus the individual ego remains individual; now, however, we begin to see that its link to others is fundamental to its experience as an individual, perceiving subject.

#### GENETIC INTERSUBJECTIVE CONNECTION

In Husserl's "C" manuscripts on temporalizing consciousness (*Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII), we find several passages where Husserl discusses the interrelation of the individual ego and other absolute egos. Here we turn to

<sup>179</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 343; Steinbock trans., p. 632.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. also Held, 1972, p. 51: "Die passive Genesis [. . .] ist nunmehr als ästhetisch und intersubjektive zu bestimmen."

those specific passages that will help us to understand this relation with regard to passive genesis and retention. Through analyzing these citations from Husserl, we will also gain better insight into the development of Husserl's thought in his latest work.

In one of these texts, Husserl takes it upon himself to describe the law of passive synthesis that guides the constituting ego. Interestingly, this constitutive synthesis includes an encounter with other subjects:

Life is encompassed by a universal essential law of passivity: the synthesis of association. New synthetic associative unities continually originate in it, the "data" of immanent time as the form of the unities of immanence and of the self-constituting unity of the stream of experiences. [. . .] these unities are essentially based in their constitution on the activities of the ego, which in this constitution is joined by other, foreign egos and their immanent experiences, which, in turn, are constituted as being-with in the immanent life of the ego.<sup>181</sup>

How are we to understand this "foreign egos *and their immanent lived experiences*" which arise in constitution along with my associative unities? And how are they constituted as co-existing in the same activity that constitutes my own temporalizing unity of consciousness? A more traditional understanding of phenomenology tells us that we have no access at all to the *immanent* experiences of other subjects. Immanent experiences belong to the individual consciousness that lives them. Here, however, Husserl says that, in the constitution of one ego there arises the immanent experiences of another as co-existing. In these statements, three things are clear: First, although the immanent experiences of the other may somehow arise in my consciousness, the other ego and I are not one and the same. The other subject is *constituted* in me, and is not the same as my own immanent acts. Second, the immanent lived experiences of the other ego do not arise as an analogy, nor as a comparison to my own activities. They arise, instead, *along with* my own fundamental activities, activities which act as the formation of associative unities. And at this level, they are constituted already as co-existing. Third, the immanent activity of the other ego arises in my own

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<sup>181</sup> "Das Leben ist umspannt von einer universalen Wesensgesetzmäßigkeit der Passivität: der Synthesis der Assoziation. In ihr entspringen immer wieder neue synthetische assoziative Einheiten, die 'Daten' der immanenten Zeit als Form der Einheiten der Immanenz und der sich konstituierenden Einheit des Erlebnisstromes. [. . .] diese Einheiten beruhen in ihrer Konstitution wesentlich auf Aktivitäten des Ich, wobei in die Konstitution miteintreten die im immanenten Leben des Ich als mitseiend konstituierten fremden Ich und ihre immanenten Erlebnisse." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 42. My translation.

consciousness through the "synthesis of association." My link to intersubjectivity, then, comes through the *associative* activity of consciousness in constitution.

Thus we see here that the immanent life of the other ego is constituted through association in passive synthesis. Since association and passive synthesis are fundamentally related to apperception, the co-existence of the other ego can arise for me through my association of the indication of other subjective perspectives in former experiences with my current experience of "new synthetic associative unities." This association gives me, indirectly, the immanent lived experiences of the foreign ego. With this, I constitute her as a co-existing ego. More radically, though, we can see in this citation that the ego and the other, along with their immanent experiences, are co-constituted, *together*. In other words, at the level of passive constitution, the immanent lived experiences of my ego and the other are *in the same stream*. The ego and the other are therefore *not* mutually exclusive; rather, they are constituted together in a shared form of passive consciousness. Given this connection, we are able to constitute not only the shared world and a shared objective time, but also each other as egos.

Constitutive synthesis takes on a new meaning here. The constitution of a perceived object includes the association to other, similar objects, as well as the synthesis of different perspectives and similar experiences into this one experience now. This is the general law of passive association. Underlying this synthesis, though, is also a connection to other subjects, their contribution to the object's meaning, their involvement in similar experiences, their possible constitution of the same object. More fundamentally, my constitutive synthesis of an object indicates the activity of other subjects in their co-constitution of it as a shared meaning as well as their co-constitution of related meanings, and their activity is passively associated with my own.

We saw in the citation above that Husserl recognized an intersubjective implication already at the level of associative constitution, where the immanent activities of the other subject arise with my own as I am in the process of constituting unified objects and meanings. This relation takes place specifically through apperception and association, each of which stretches "my" consciousness beyond its immediate view. Usually, apperceptions and appresentations are based on motivated associations. The "general memories" guiding motivated association, we have established, rest in the structure of far retention. The activity of far retention therefore ultimately acts as a support of our link to the structure of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, since this intersubjective connection rests in far retention through the activities of association and apperception, it falls under the

category of a passive genetic structure. In other words, the link of individual temporalizing consciousness with intersubjectivity, here seen to rest primarily in far retention, arises through the passive genetic structures of apperception and association. Thus this link itself forms a genetic foundation.

Let us look at this foundation in temporalizing consciousness in another way, through Husserl's later discussions of "empathy." Husserl mentions on more than one occasion that empathy, or our recognition of the other person as another conscious existence, is a type of "memory":

[. . .] thus the co-presence of others is also in the wellspring [*Ursprünglichkeit*] of empathy, which is a co-memory rather than a recollection, a self-remembering of the other.<sup>182</sup>

Husserl often compared our empathy of other subjects to our own recollection; thus it is important for us to note that here he places this empathetic relation in "co-memory rather than a recollection." As a memory which is not a recollection, this empathy could lie in our "general memories," and thus in far retention. But now we must try to understand this "new" type of empathy which might lie in far retention rather than recollection.

Our findings so far have revealed that far retention is extremely important to both near retention (contributing to the active constitution of the living present) and recollection (maintaining the connection between past experience and present consciousness). Functioning as a general "memory" that remains in the living present and aids in constitution, far retention links the specific memories of recollection to the living present. Thus, through far retention, not only are we able to perceive objects immediately as belonging to certain familiar groups that are part of our generalized experience, but in addition, we are able to associate specific past events with present ones. Now, according to Husserl's claims in his fifth *Cartesian Meditation*, our experience of other subjects, even unfamiliar ones, is accompanied by an appresentation of their consciousness, which he calls "empathy."<sup>183</sup> This "association" clearly does not link this presentation to a past presentation in recollection, because we never have and never will experience the consciousness of another subject directly. Yet it is related to some type of memory, as we see above. Such an association, perhaps a motivated

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<sup>182</sup> "[. . .] so ist auch Mitgegenwart-Sein von Anderen in der Ursprünglichkeit der Einfühlung, einer Miterinnerung statt einer Wiedererinnerung, ein Selbsterinnern der Anderen." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 57. My translation.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. especially §54; *Husserliana* I, pp. 147-9; Cairns trans., pp. 117-20.

association that takes us beyond our specific experience, could lie in far retention. But what kind of memory could this be? Husserl above calls it a "self-remembering" of the other. Since there is nothing in my memory to associate my consciousness directly with that of the other, however, there must be a kind of "echo" of the other in far retention, making this association possible. Husserl calls it a "mirroring" in his fifth *Cartesian Meditation*.<sup>184</sup> In fact, he continues by asking how this mirroring is possible. Here we can suggest that this echo or mirroring is possible through the passive synthesis of my connection with the other subject. Conservatively speaking, through the accumulation of general memories in far retention, I am able to have a passive connection with other subjects through an association with their indication through the meanings in past experiences. With this general memory, which provides a sedimented foundation in far retention, I am able to "remember" intersubjectivity with every experience, to have a "co-memory," as Husserl says, with my experience of every subject I encounter. More radically, we could say that this co-memory derives from a retention of our co-constitution, founded in passive genesis. This would be a new understanding of Husserl's discussion of my empathy with other subjects, and as we will see, Husserl actually gives us more than one description of empathy in his later manuscripts.

Elsewhere, Husserl mentions that my empathy of another's consciousness is a re-presentation, similar to the re-presentations of memory:

As to the re-presentations through which the world is known to me, they can be considered as present memory-presentations, etc., but also my empathies and my mediate re-presentations of the other's psyche. These must be included in the perceptual existence of my soul. Naturally, all psychic experiences--the passive-associative as well as all acts of the ego—have to be considered [. . .].<sup>185</sup>

Here Husserl is vague as to whether these memories (*Erinnerungen*) are recollections (*Wiedererinnerungen*), because he does seem to use these terms sometimes interchangeably in many of his works. I have been arguing implicitly that these terms can be used to identify different types of memory to which Husserl is referring, often without his making an overt distinction.

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<sup>184</sup> Cf. especially *Husserliana* I, pp. 125-6; Cairns trans., p. 94.

<sup>185</sup> "Was die Vergegenwärtigungen anlangt, durch die Welt mir bewusste ist, so kommen sie als gegenwärtige Erinnerungsvorstellungen u. dgl. in Frage, aber auch meine Einfühlungen, meine mittelbaren Vergegenwärtigungen des Psychischen der Anderen. Sie sind mitzurechnen zum wahrnehmungsmäßigen Bestand meiner Seele. Natürlich kommen alle psychischen Erlebnisse, die passiv-assoziativen ebenso wie alle Ichakte in Frage [. . .]." *Husserliana* XXXIV, p. 389. My translation.



In fact, I have been using these terms to refer to different types of memory throughout this chapter, associating the term "memory" with the function of far retention, and "recollection" with that of recollection. Without performing a specific analysis of Husserl's use of each of these terms, I believe a general overview of his writings would reveal that he uses the term *Wiedererinnerung* (recollection) specifically with regard to recollection, whereas his use of the term *Erinnerung* (memory) is used much more broadly. For this reason, the term "memory" would also include the function of far retention, and we saw earlier that Husserl used this term in exactly this way. Returning to Husserl's vague use of the term *Erinnerung* in the above passage, we note his ambivalence. On the one hand, he calls these memories "presentations" as if they are the "re-presentations" of specific memories; on the other hand, he points out how they are necessary to our current perception of the world. His reference to empathies is also interesting; the empathies I have of other subjects is both a "mediate re-presentation" and part of the "perceptual existence of my soul." Furthermore, he later inserts the description "passive-associative," leading us to believe that both these memories which aid in constitution and these empathies which give me the "psyche" of the other are now to be understood through the rubric of association, and thus through passive genesis. It appears that, in his latest review of his own work, Husserl wished to establish one type of empathy as a passive-associative "memory" and, through this, point to a structure that makes the connection between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity possible.

This reference to a "passive-associative" type of empathy actually resonates closely with our analyses so far. Our connection to intersubjectivity rests at least partially in far retention, as our "general memories" in far retention passively associate the indications to intersubjective constitution embedded in our memory with our current situation. This type of "empathy" differs from an analogy to recollection, and thus we could take it as a different function of empathy, one which is founded in far retention. Thus we have here a "*passive-associative*" empathy in addition to the "reproductive" empathy usually referred to by Husserl when he is discussing the correlation between my own recollection and the analogy between myself and the consciousness of the other subject.

Husserl actually takes this position one step further, asking whether there is a *primordial* type of empathy in the living present. In fact, this primordial empathy would be founded by retention:

To the primordial continuation (retention) which belongs to every streaming present, does there also belong a primordial empathy, or rather, instead of empathy, which is

explicative, a primordial intentionality of the manifestation of a continuity with the other, which, like the temporal fusion, is mediate, and continually mediate as facing-presenting [*ad-präsentierende*]?<sup>186</sup>

This is an astounding suggestion made by Husserl! We see here a consideration of a *primordial empathy*, perhaps linked with our primordial association in near retention, that highlights our *link through temporalizing consciousness* to other subjects. Husserl describes this link as a "continuity," insinuating that temporalizing consciousness does not end with my own consciousness, with my own perspective, but instead that it would be continuous with the consciousness of the other subject. More importantly, this continuity would be founded in my own primordial consciousness. Here it is clear that the link between the ego and intersubjectivity, described by the term "empathy," does not *only* arise through our analogizing experience of an intersubjective world (as seen in the *Cartesian Meditations*) but is also founded in temporalizing consciousness, especially through retention.

Given Husserl's consideration of this "primordial intentionality of the manifestation of a continuity with the other" as a sort of proto-empathy that would reveal a "mediate," "temporal fusion" with the other, why would he need a more reproductive empathy to "discover" intersubjectivity in his fifth *Cartesian Meditation*? On the technical side, we can point to the fact that the manuscript from which this citation was taken was written after the drafting of his *Cartesian Meditations* (1929), and around the time of its publication in French (1931). These considerations, made in December and January, 1931-2, are possibly the result of challenges made to the analogy based on empathy put forth in the *Cartesian Meditations*, challenges made by French colleagues or by Husserl himself as he reviewed his own work. In any case, one could challenge Husserl's argument in the *Cartesian Meditations* by saying that seeing another body does not necessitate my recognition that it is similar to mine, nor does it require the conclusion that, if I have consciousness, then this similar body must likewise have consciousness. Here, however, we find a response to this criticism: At a fundamental level, primarily resting in the structure of temporalizing consciousness, I and the other are already connected.

These citations reveal that Husserl actually addresses three levels of empathy: The first, and most famous, is reproductive empathy, which we see

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<sup>186</sup> "Zu jeder strömenden Gegenwart gehörigen Urkontinuierung (Retention), gehört dazu auch Ureinfehlung, oder vielmehr statt Einfühlung, die explizierend ist, eine Urintentionalität der Bekundung einer Kontinuität mit den Anderen, die, wie die zeitigende Verschmelzung, mittelbar, kontinuierlich mittelbar ist als ad-präsentierende?" *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 437. My translation.

repeatedly in Husserl's comparisons between my recollection and my experience of another subject. This level of empathy appears to function parallel to what we have been calling "reproductive association," where something in our present view triggers a recollection of a similar experience in the past. The second level of empathy relates to what we have named "motivated association." This type of empathy functions through far retention, and, since far retention makes the connection between the living present and recollection possible, this "passive-associative" empathy could be the link between my present experience of another subject and my reproductive empathy which analogizes my recognition of her consciousness. Passive-associative empathy is based in the "general memories" we have of shared objects, memories which indicate the co-constitutive activity of other subjects and the meanings that are intersubjectively accessible. Finally, the third level of empathy would be found most probably in near retention, since Husserl describes it as "primordial," and since it is not even a complete form of empathy in itself. We have tentatively named it "proto-empathy," since it is only a suggestion made by Husserl of an introductory level of empathy that reveals a primordial connection between myself and the other subject. This "temporal fusion" with the other would be based upon the appresenting activity of near retention, that aspect of temporalizing consciousness which connects my passing consciousness with what is immediately present (and launches me beyond it through protention). This last level of empathy would function parallel to what we have called "primordial associations," which are based in near retention, and as such are originary and essential to the activity of the living present. All of these levels of empathy, as we have seen, are directly linked with temporalizing consciousness, and are supported by the activity of retention.

We ought to pause for a moment and remind ourselves of Husserl's use of the terms "appresentation" and "apperception" with regard to intersubjectivity in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations*, since Husserl discusses empathy in light of appresentation and apperception in this text. Husserl attempts to explain how appresentation and apperception make possible my indirect experience of another absolute consciousness at the transcendental level, in order to explain how phenomenology is open to intersubjective existence.<sup>187</sup> He argues that the other person's living body (*Leib*) functions as a presentation, and that the consciousness of the other subject is known to me through appresentation. The present body of the other

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<sup>187</sup> The following is a summary primarily of §§50-54 of the *Cartesian Meditations* (*Husserliana* I, pp. 138-145), although at issue is actually the entire V. *Meditation* (*Husserliana* I, pp. 121-177).

person, in other words, indicates the existence of her consciousness to me. This intersubjective appresentation is different from that of a spatial object, though, because in most cases of the latter--at least ideally--I could move and view an appresented "other side" of an object, making it a direct presentation; however, I can *never* make the consciousness of another subject a direct presentation for my own consciousness, even ideally. Thus I must understand the other's conscious existence through an analogy to my own consciousness. This "pairing," as Husserl calls it, which is arguably more than a mere analogy, takes place immediately. In other words, in the same way that I *know* that there is another side to the building across the street, I also *know* that there is another consciousness, an "alter ego," related to the body before me. This is an appresentation or apperception of the other subject as conscious other ego.

Husserl uses both terms, appresentation and apperception, in this discussion of intersubjectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations*, without any lengthy explanation that distinguishes between the two. For our own purposes we have distinguished them a bit, following Husserl's own subtle distinctions and Klaus Held's analysis, such that appresentation refers to the other profiles of a specific object embedded in the current presentation, and apperception refers to the meanings indicated in the broader horizons of the object. Husserl somewhat follows these subtle differentiations in his usage of the terms appresentation and apperception in the *V. Meditation*. On the one hand, Husserl describes appresentation as a "making intended as co-present," saying that the term usually indicates a relation between originary presentation and non-originary appresentation. He addresses how this relation is challenged by my experience of another subject since the other subject's consciousness has no basis of originary presentation in my own consciousness, and yet the other consciousness is appresented to me somehow.<sup>188</sup> He then confuses the issue a bit by describing this appresentation of another subject's consciousness as an "assimilative *apperception*" based on analogy. Simply put, appresentation is here delineated as a specific type of apperception. In the explanation that follows, Husserl refers to a type of association, like when a child, having figured out what scissors are for, automatically knows what scissors are every time he sees them.<sup>189</sup> This would relate to the "motivated associations" we identified earlier, which are supported by the activity of far retention. The child's original experience of the scissors is part of his present consciousness as a primordial foundation, and so he is able to use the scissors without reflection. Correlatively, Husserl says that the "pairing" that takes place between my

<sup>188</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 139; Cairns trans., pp. 109-10.

<sup>189</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 141; Cairns trans., p. 111.

and the other's consciousness is based on an *association* through a "*primal form of [ . . . ] passive synthesis*"<sup>190</sup>, which we also argued earlier takes place in far retention. So this pairing association between my and the other's consciousness is an appresentation, according to Husserl, that is based in passive synthesis. However, Husserl says that this "assimilative apperception" of the other is a *reproductive* experience, where the body of the other awakens a specific association between my consciousness and that of the other person.<sup>191</sup> This would relate to what we are calling "reproductive associations," which rely upon specific recollections that associate with the present. These assimilative apperceptions, though, do not recall a specific personal experience of my own, but instead use the same type of reproductive activity of consciousness to create a comparative link between my "here" and the other's "there." Since my body and my consciousness are *here*, then that similar body, which is *there*, must have a similar consciousness which is also there. In this way, Husserl's description of my recognition of another subject as another consciousness in that body there turns both to passive synthesis in far retention and the reproductive activity of recollective consciousness.

This associative activity is both passively motivated and reproductive in the following ways. The passive synthesis of many similar experiences of my body-consciousness is sedimented in far retention. Any experience of my body naturally has associated with it my living consciousness. When I see another person's body, then, this passive association takes place again, as that body comports itself similarly to the way I comport my body. This time, however, the body in question is there, not here, so it cannot be my body, nor my consciousness. Since the passive association to a consciousness is already taking place, though, I make a reproductive association of sorts. I apperceive in that body a consciousness *like mine but not mine*, reproduced on the basis of my own consciousness. In this way, passive association in far retention and reproductive consciousness work together to form my apprehension of another subject.

In a later C manuscript, we see Husserl continuing to claim that my relation to the other depends on appresentation and apperception. Here, though, he specifically relates these activities to empathy, and even more importantly, he argues that there are different levels of empathy which relate to the different activities of appresentation and apperception:

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<sup>190</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 142, Cairns trans., p. 112.

<sup>191</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 147; Cairns trans., p. 117-18.

In the area of "empathy" we have again various differences in origin, in empathy itself (which is the analogical appresenting of others) and in the apperceptions which are constituted through this empathy.<sup>192</sup>

"Empathy" is in this case an umbrella term that covers several different aspects of empathy: "Empathy itself," the most direct form of empathy, is described as "the analogical appresenting of others." Appresentation and analogy are therefore crucial to this type of empathy, and this follows our description above, where I appresent the other subject's consciousness on the basis of an analogical association to my own consciousness. This would relate to the "passive-associative empathy" we identified earlier. Additionally in the citation above, under the general heading of "empathy," we find apperceptions constituted through empathy. This type of apperceptive empathy indicates the more reproductive aspect of empathy we discussed earlier, where I am able to constitute "there" as the "here" of another subject. Given these types of empathy and their relations to appresentation and apperception, it is clear that they are formed based on the structure of temporalizing consciousness, where appresenting empathy relies on far retention, and apperceptive empathy turns to a more reproductive consciousness. In this way, *temporalizing consciousness is a fundamental structure supporting my empathetic relations to others*. Since temporalizing consciousness founds my constituting activities of appresentation and apperception, and these, in turn, are implicated in the various forms of empathy, then my temporalizing consciousness is the foundation of my link to intersubjectivity.

As we know, I do not have any original experience of another subject's consciousness on the basis of which I can create an association between others and myself. This is obvious to Husserl as well: "[. . .] in the case of that appresentation which would lead over into the other original sphere, such verification [through a possible direct presentation] must be excluded a priori."<sup>193</sup> It is also becoming clear that I do not cognitively calculate the consciousness of another subject reproductively, on the basis of some specific *memory* (although some type of reproductive activity seems to be involved). Husserl himself says that, "Apperception is not inference, not a thinking act."<sup>194</sup> My experience is such that I simply appresent and

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<sup>192</sup> "Im Gebiet der 'Einfühlung' haben wir wieder mancherlei Unterschiede der Ursprünglichkeit, so in der Einfühlung selbst (dem analogisierenden Appräsentieren von Anderen) und in den mittels dieser Einfühlung sich konstituierenden Apperzeptionen." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 72. My translation.

<sup>193</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 139; Cairns trans., p. 109. modified.

<sup>194</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 141; Cairns trans., p. 111.

apperceive another's consciousness as a part of my experience of her body. Thus, while this description of appresentation and apperception in relation to intersubjectivity is an important modification of the terms (compared to how we understand them in relation to objective constitution), Husserl's terminology is quite apt as a description of my experience of other subjects: I experience the consciousness of another subject via the presence of her body as necessarily as I experience the absent back side of a building with the presence of the front. His choice of the term "appresentation" appears fitting, as the appresentation of the other subject's consciousness seems to be embedded in the presentation of her body. The question remains, however, how this appresentation takes place without any possible original experience to found it.

We find that, as we noted above, this activity requires a combination of both the motivated analogizing of far retention and the reproductive activity of recollective consciousness. Husserl explains often that the connections arising in certain types of experiences become part of me, so that they are implied regularly in similar experiences. Simply put, based upon the passive synthesis of past, similar events, we are able to "fill in the gaps" of present experiences. Built up throughout my life, I have a wealth of sedimented experiences of myself, experiences which show my body to be necessarily associated with my consciousness. When another person appears before me, I recognize a similarity between her and my body, and a "higher level" association takes place, allowing me to "fill in" her consciousness "there" which is similar to my consciousness "here," based upon my own self-perception of my consciousness: "My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego [there] is *appresented*, as *other* than mine."<sup>195</sup> Because we are physically, and thus necessarily, in different places, indicated by the primordial experiences of "here" and "there," there is never a question of that subject being the same as me. However, because my body and her body are presented to me as similar, I am able quite naturally to appresent her consciousness as that of another ego. Husserl mentions this associative appresentation already in his explanation of "pairing":

Pairing is a *primal form of that passive synthesis* which we designate as "*association*", in contrast to passive synthesis of "*identification*". In a *pairing association* the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis--essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they

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<sup>195</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 148; Cairns trans., p. 119, modified.

are noticed or unnoticed)--, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they *found phenomenologically a unity of similarity* and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair.<sup>196</sup>

Thus I automatically apperceive the body of any person to be the body of a *person*, containing egoic consciousness just like mine, but other than me.

Let us now return momentarily to David Carr's argument, which we presented earlier in chapter four. Carr introduced the function of far retention, without naming it as such, as a necessary function of retention in general. Here I would like to point out an extension to Carr's argument, where he claims that retention is not merely made up of my own experiences, but also of the experiences of my community. More importantly, he refers to sedimentation as a communal consciousness rather than an individual's:

Once we acknowledge that hearsay, acquired opinions, and beliefs belong to the context within which we experience events, our notion of what belongs to the horizon of retention need not be limited to those events one actually has lived through. At the same time we must emphasize once again that it is a horizon-consciousness we are speaking of. In other words, it is not a question of explicitly thinking about the past [. . .]. Rather, it is knowledge of the sort that Husserl called *sedimentation*. [. . .] It is that which *figures* in my awareness of the present, frames or sets it off without my having to think about it explicitly.<sup>197</sup>

We must recognize that Carr is blending the content and form of temporalizing consciousness in his description. Nevertheless, he offers another way to understand consciousness as communal, as beyond my own specific experiences. The analyses of this chapter show that Carr's insight into the possibilities of Husserl's notion of temporalizing consciousness is actually suggested by Husserl himself.

An attention to the difference between temporal form and content leads us to one last important consideration. So far, it has been the *content* of our experiences which ultimately has led us to the existence of other subjects. Every object I experience, in other words, indicates the co-constituting activity of another consciousness besides my own, and then that indication of co-constitution is retained as sedimented in my far retention. While this is an exceptional discovery, we have not yet fully shown how it might necessitate an intersubjective *structure* that is interwoven with my own structures of consciousness--it reveals only intersubjective content. However, this content of our experiences, as we have pointed out repeatedly, *indicates*

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<sup>196</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 142; Cairns trans., p. 112.

<sup>197</sup> Carr, *Interpreting Husserl*, 1987, pp. 262-3.



intersubjective cooperation, and thus this content leads us to the horizon of interconnecting references (*Verweisungszusammenhänge*), which itself is a structure of interconnecting and intersubjective meanings. In order for the indication from my own constituting activity to the co-constituting activity of others to take place, though, and in order to avoid a circular argument regarding the interconnection of subjects at the level of consciousness, my own structures of consciousness must be *open*, giving these interconnecting references a primordial foundation. Thus, if the content sedimented in far retention indicates the co-constitution of other consciousness, then the structure of temporalizing consciousness itself must include an open support that allows for this connection. Not only the content within far retention--which has been minimized anyway through sedimentation--but also the structure of temporalizing consciousness must make the connection to intersubjectivity possible. This structure would be an open one, open to the horizon of referential interconnections, and open to intersubjective experiences as well. We have seen this structural connection and openness already in our discussion of world-time as well as in Husserl's consideration of the ego's fusion with the other in passive genesis. The openness of temporalizing consciousness will become especially important as we discuss protention in Part Three.

If empathy, and further, if a connection to intersubjectivity can be found in retention, then we can begin to argue that temporalizing consciousness, rather than being the source of solipsism, has an important intersubjective element to it. We call this element "*intersubjective temporality*" which, relating to world-time, names that aspect of temporalizing consciousness which connects with an intersubjective structure. In our analyses here, we have noted this connection through far retention, in association and apperception. Our "general memories" in far retention already contain a link to intersubjectivity through their indication of co-constituting activity and shared meanings. This link through sedimented content in far retention is made possible by a structure that is open to the interconnecting references of our intersubjective horizons as well as our passive co-constitution with other subjects. Additionally, empathy may already be apparent in near retention as a proto-empathy that reveals our "temporal fusion" with other subjects. Since we are beginning to see that the very structure of temporalizing consciousness is itself allowing for this intersubjective connection, though, then we might tentatively say that this structure *is itself* this intersubjective temporality. In order to establish this claim, however, we must continue our analyses of the phenomenological structure of temporalizing consciousness.

## CONCLUSION

Here in Part Two, we took up retention in several ways. First, in chapter four, we examined Husserl's earliest published analyses of retention. In doing so, we established some of the fundamental qualities of retention, and we revealed how Husserl's introduction of absolute consciousness to his consideration of inner time-consciousness added a new dimension to the function of retention, namely, constitution. Then we turned to Husserl's middle period of work, especially his analyses of the synthetic function of consciousness. There we discovered that Husserl understood the functioning of retention to fall into two main areas, "near" and "far" retention. Near retention, we found, is originary retention, actively involved in the constitution of current experiences. Far retention, for its part, is a general retention of our experiences that remains passively present, still part of our living present. The general "memories" of far retention, through motivated associations, participate in our constitution of familiar and habitual experiences and patterns. After substantiating these conclusions through passages in Husserl's later works, we turned in chapter five to an analysis of passive genesis, the area of phenomenology which studies the "history" and ultimate structure of temporalizing consciousness. Here we found that this "history" of our consciousness is founded partly in far retention. Further, we discovered that the genetic structure of consciousness includes a passive-associative link to intersubjectivity. Finally, we returned to Husserl's later writings in order to work through this intersubjective connection and to highlight Husserl's own discussion of empathy as it relates to the structure of temporalizing consciousness. We found that Husserl mentioned a link to intersubjectivity, through three different levels of empathy, in several passages in such a way that the notion of "intersubjective temporality" has already been outlined within the realm of Husserlian phenomenology.

We turn now to an examination of protention, where we must take up the difficulty of a temporalizing consciousness that exceeds itself, going beyond the presentation at hand and thus beyond the temporally perceiving ego as well.

PART THREE  
PROTECTION

## INTRODUCTION

Having established the role of retention in the living present, we turn now to protention. Here we will examine the function of protention with relation to the living present and to intentionality. Although it is understood among phenomenologists that Husserl wrote relatively few analyses on the "futural" aspect of temporalizing consciousness, he did study the notion of protention both directly and indirectly, and we will look at those applicable texts in chapter six, spanning the course of his work from his earliest to latest writings. Husserl may not have mentioned protention often, but the texts we will examine here reveal both a consistency in his thinking as well as important developments. We will discover an intricate and necessary relation between protention and intentionality, and we will consider the implications of our intention toward spatial objects. In chapter seven, we will take these conclusions to the question of the relation between "futural" temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity.

CHAPTER SIX  
HUSSERL'S DEVELOPMENT OF PROTENTION<sup>198</sup>

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PROTENTION

Husserl's early works on time (1893-1917), published in *Husserliana X*, give relatively little attention to what we now call protention. For this reason, in our review of these early discussions of a consciousness of the "not-yet," we will find indications of what Husserl would accomplish more thoroughly in later writings. The notion of a consciousness of the "not-yet," in fact, is often only implicated through analyses of other concepts at this early stage. And sometimes the term "not-yet," is not even mentioned, and yet the discussion centers around the importance of consciousness of the "*futural*" aspect of a certain notion or relation. For example, we find that Husserl's early descriptions already show a "futural" aspect of consciousness to be *fundamental* to our intentional relation to objects. In a text written as early as 1893, Husserl says that temporalizing consciousness is directed forward, and that what comes *before* an intuition (in this case, "interest") *influences* what is actualized:

[. . .] interest is fixed on what is more vital, newer, and is directed forwards throughout. [. . .]The whole preceding development, insofar as it was followed with undivided interest, has its influence on the esthetic character, and therefore on the feeling-character, of what is actually present.<sup>199</sup>

Our interest in an object pulls consciousness forward, ahead of what it is actualizing, and this interest also has an influence on the actualizing experience itself. Thus Husserl points out a definite relation between a momentary actualized intention and a consciousness that is "ahead" of itself. In fact, he launches in this same text into a discussion of the "striving" (*Streben*) and the "attraction" (*Reiz*) that is a necessary part of intuition.<sup>200</sup> Striving and attraction indicate a lack of fulfillment or satisfaction in an experience; only when consciousness follows this pull can it satisfy or fulfill

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<sup>198</sup> An earlier and abridged version of this chapter was originally published in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, edited by Donn Welton (Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 125-154). Reprinted by permission of Indiana University Press.

<sup>199</sup> *Husserliana X*, p. 138; trans. Brough, p. 142.

<sup>200</sup> *Husserliana X*, pp. 145-6; trans. Brough, p. 148-50.

the intention of the object (even if specific expectations are disappointed). Only by moving into a consciousness of the "not-yet," in other words, can intentions be fulfilled. Importantly, these notions of striving and attraction indicate in these early works how the "now-moment" must extend forward beyond itself, for if it did not, we would always be "satisfied" with what was momentarily actual and would never strive for--and thus would never have--experiences of whole objects and complete situations.

It is important to point out here that striving requires an intending forward, an attention "beyond" immediate actualization. By its very nature, striving is futural to what is in my momentary actualized consciousness: I must be able to "see beyond" what is immediately present in order to strive for what is not-yet. Thus striving relies upon a consciousness of what is coming. Furthermore, the fact that an object can draw me toward it also requires my "intending beyond" what is immediately now. Husserl deals more with the notion of *Reiz*, or attraction, later in his work, through his analyses of the concept of *Affektion* (or *Affektivität*). *Affektion*, which is translated as "affection" and "affectivity," is described by Husserl as being necessarily futural, and thus we will execute a more detailed analysis of the term later.

In another early text, written around the same time period (1893-1901), Husserl concentrates on the notion of a consciousness of the "not-yet," more than he does in any other text from his early works. Here he insists that consciousness of what is coming is essential to the structure of temporalizing consciousness: "But we are not and we cannot be entirely without apprehension directed forwards. *The temporal fringe also has a future.*"<sup>201</sup> In the sense that temporalizing consciousness is "streaming," it has a direction that is "futural"; in the sense that it is "standing," there is always a "part" of the "form" of the living present that "stands" in the immediate "future."<sup>202</sup> Then Husserl makes an important claim: This aspect of temporalizing

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<sup>201</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 167; trans. Brough, p. 172. One might disagree with Brough's interpretation of "-hof" as "fringe," here, since *Hof* usually means a courtyard or a square or yard of sorts--even a halo. I believe Husserl wished to emphasize the *expansion* or *stretching* of the now which he discussed in many of these early texts, and which later became known as the temporal "horizon." Brough is indicating a similar problematic found in William James' work, which James presented with the term "fringe." This problem of translation and terminology, interestingly, points to the philosophical problem of the temporal horizon in general, for the difficulty in naming the "extensions" of the now-moment reveal the even more difficult problem of understanding them.

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Klaus Held, 1966, for his analysis that describes the "standing" and "streaming" of the living present.

consciousness is often *part of intuition*: "In the case of a given experience [...] we frequently have *intuitive expectations* as well."<sup>203</sup> In other words, temporalizing consciousness of a "future" is not merely an empty anticipation of the distant future, nor is it an empty forward-movement into what might become a fulfilled impression. Instead, *what is expected is part of what is intended and fulfilled*--it is part of my experience. In the cases to which Husserl is referring, these "expectations" are almost always fulfilled, because they base themselves on past experience, for example, when I am hearing a musical piece I already know. This "intuitive expectation" nevertheless shows how intuitions themselves can rest in the "futural" aspect of temporalizing consciousness. Although the expectation may not always be fulfilled (or, at least, it may not be fulfilled by what is expected--it will always be "filled" by something), the fact that that it can be "intuitive" shows that intuition can extend into "futural" consciousness. Further, we see that this description of "futural" temporalizing consciousness as fulfilled parallels Husserl's description of consciousness of the "no-longer" as originary. In fact, we recognize this also in Husserl's early distinctions between "immediate" futural consciousness and "more distant" expectations.

Although the two notions of "protention" and "expectation" were not to be worked through carefully by Husserl until later, in this early analysis he sees immediate "futural" temporalizing consciousness as an extension of "present" consciousness, whereas "expectation" is understood as consciousness of something futural that is brought into the now in a way similar to recollection, i.e., through a reproductive act of consciousness. Consciousness of what is coming is referred to as the "not-yet" (*Noch-nicht*), as we have seen; expectation, meanwhile, is called "reproductive expectation" (*reproduktive Erwartung*). The first is still a part of the *Zeithof*, or temporal "fringe," of the (expanded) now, whereas the second is *reproduced*. Husserl explains:

The expectation of the "not yet" connected with the "now" is fulfilled [...] [reproductive expectation is] not of the immediate future of the temporal field--what is immediately future in the temporal field is not the same as the more distant future, which is the object of phantasy-expectation [...].<sup>204</sup>

The reproductive aspect called expectation is here described as the constitution of something more "distant" from the now, and as involving the activity of fantasy or imagination. The "immediate future" of the "temporal

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<sup>203</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 167; trans. Brough, p. 172.

<sup>204</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 169; trans. Brough, p. 174.

field" is described as fulfilled, rather than empty, because of its direct relation with what is immediately present. As "fulfilled," this "immediate future" continues to show its relation with what is currently being intended. Given this, the "futural" aspect of consciousness can be seen as the initial connection between temporalizing consciousness and intended object. And it continues to show the extension of the fulfilled "now"-consciousness into its own "future."

The actual term "protention" arises later in these early works, and is mentioned only briefly. In a text written and corrected sometime between 1906 and 1909, Husserl explains that protention is an extension of intuition into the future, and that it fulfills itself in the now--a similar description to the one he gave earlier of the "not-yet."

And in the same way, a continual "intention" reaches into the future: The actually present portion of the duration again and again adds a new now, and a *protention* adheres to the tone-constituting "appearances"--a protention that is fulfilled as a protention aimed at this tone just as long as the tone endures and that is annulled and changes if something new begins in its place.<sup>205</sup>

This description reveals both the development of Husserl's thought about protention and his consistency. As we see here, protention is considered a "part" of the activity of the living present, understood as a living, constituting "extension" of "momentary" intuition. The term protention thus seems to be brought in to emphasize the relation between intentionality and temporalizing consciousness, since intentionality is always looking forward, toward what is coming, in our experiences of the world. Protention is that aspect of constituting consciousness that is extending "ahead" of what is immediately being actualized.

Given what we already know about the living present, we can say the following about the relation of protention to temporalizing consciousness: First, it is the aspect of constituting consciousness engaged in those objects or experiences that are "just-coming" into consciousness, which is similar to what Husserl said about consciousness of the "not-yet." As such, it has a direct relation to the fulfillment of intentions. Further, because intentionality necessarily depends on a consciousness that is "ahead" of what is

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<sup>205</sup> *Husserliana* X, p. 297; Brough trans., p. 308-9. Husserl also adds a footnote to this manuscript (probably having returned to it later), writing that protention is essentially different from retention because of its openness to what is coming, and to when the duration of a temporal object will end. Retention, on the other hand, is closed with regard to such possibilities, as it is "tied" to what has already been actualized.



immediately being actualized, protention is essentially related to the activity of intending consciousness. Also, because the living present is that which constitutes temporality as its fundamental activity, protention, as an activity that contributes to the living present, is a pre-temporal constituting activity. The focus of protention is to constitute "ahead" of what is immediately actual, bringing experiences into constituting consciousness and relating them to a constituted temporality.

#### A RADICAL ANALYSIS OF PROTENTION IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS (*HUSSERLIANA* XXXIII)

Here we will closely examine those portions of the Bernau manuscripts<sup>206</sup> that deal with protention directly, especially those manuscripts with the designations "L I 15"<sup>207</sup> and "L I 16"<sup>208</sup>. It is hoped that our work here with these more recently published manuscripts will contribute to the argument of their significant value in Husserl studies, and especially in the work on Husserl's inner time-consciousness.<sup>209</sup>

Husserl begins his discussions in these manuscripts by focusing on the relations of protention and retention, without mentioning any type of "now-point." Having already established the "now-point" as mere fiction in his early works, he clearly no longer needs to mention it at all. Husserl does not use the term *Urimpression* either in these manuscripts, though, focusing

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<sup>206</sup> *Die "Bernauer Manuskripte" über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18). Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII. Ed. Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

<sup>207</sup> *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, pp. 20-49, and 210-234.

<sup>208</sup> *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, pp. 3-19.

<sup>209</sup> Cf. Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar, "Einleitung der Herausgeber," *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, pp. XVII-LI (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001); Dieter Lohmar, "What Does Protention 'Protend'? Remarks on Husserl's Analysis of Protention in the Bernau Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness," *Philosophy Today*, volume 46:5, SPEP Supplement 2002, pp. 154-167; *Phenomenology of Time*, by Toine Kortooms (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, *Phaenomenologica* series, no. 161), especially Part II; James Mensch, "Husserl's Concept of the Future," *Husserl Studies*, vol. 16 (1999), pp. 41-64; John B. Brough, "Time and the One and the Many (in Husserl's Bernauer Manuscripts on Time Consciousness)," *Philosophy Today*, volume 46:5, SPEP Supplement 2002, pp. 142-153; and Klaus Held, "Phänomenologie der 'eigentlichen Zeit' bei Husserl und Heidegger," *Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik*, vol. 4. (Tübingen, 2005).

instead on the "fulfillment" or the "maximal point" within the temporal stream. For example, in one crucial set of diagrams<sup>210</sup>, where each following diagram builds upon the one prior, he enters the horizontal line--symbolizing the stream of primordial impressions--last. This fact would be unremarkable, were it not for the discussion that accompanies this set of diagrams and throughout the manuscript.

Husserl begins this discussion by examining how protention and retention relate to one another. Specifically, he wishes to "add" protention to his analyses of the now:

But we are missing a label for the protentions that would be in the angle E-E<sub>2</sub>-E<sub>2</sub>. We will now extend the [vertical] line E<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup>E<sub>2</sub> upward and in this way label the protentions which, in consciousness-union with the lower line, make up the missing intentionality.<sup>211</sup>

The last diagram in this progressive set, given below, illustrates Husserl's plan:

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<sup>210</sup> *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, pp. 31-33.

<sup>211</sup> "Es fehlt aber eine Signatur für die Protentionen, die im Winkelausschnitt E E<sub>2</sub> E<sub>2</sub> liegen. Wir ziehen nun eine Verlängerung von E<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup>E<sub>2</sub> nach oben und signieren damit die Protentionen, die in Bewusstseinsunion mit denen der unteren Strecke die fehlende Intentionalität ausmachen." (*Husserliana* XXXIII, pp. 22-3). My translation.




Figure No. 3<sup>212</sup>

<sup>212</sup> *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 22. Reprinted by permission of Springer and the Husserl Archives. In the diagram, we see a diagonal line originating at point  $E_1$  and slanting

Thus we see the line from  $E_1^2$  extended through the impressional "point"  $E_2$  upward through a new, protentional point,  $E'_3$ . In this way, Husserl causes the area "above" the horizontal line of the present to represent the realm of protention.<sup>213</sup> The point  $E'_3$  therefore indicates the protention toward what I will experience in the futural moment of  $E_3$ , the protentional activity of which is experienced "now" at the moment  $E_2$ .

With the "addition" of protention to the "equation," as it were, Husserl gives recognition to its importance. As we know, protentions are "motivated" by retentions, meaning that what I anticipate in my immediate future is usually based upon what has just transpired. For example, my current experience of walking down the block, which requires a constant retention of this ongoing activity (knowing where I have just been), has a direct influence on what I expect in the next immediate moments of walking as well as when I turn the corner (knowing where I am going). I pretend a continuing experience of sidewalk underfoot, cars on the street, people around me, and forward movement, for example. Husserl, however, also draws another

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downward. This represents an impression that originates perceptually at "point"  $E_1$ , and then sinks away as retention while our current perceptions continue to flow through  $E_2$ ,  $E_3$ , and so on. Thus, the point  $E_1^2$ , found on the slanting line starting at  $E_1$ , represents our retention of the experience that took place at  $E_1$  but which is retained at  $E_2$ . In the "lower half" of the diagram, then, which here represents the realm of retention, the superscripted numbers indicate the current moment in the flow of consciousness, whereas the subscripted numbers represent the retained originary experience--in this case, from a moment in the past. Further, the vertical line between the current moment at  $E_2$  and the retained moment at  $E_1^2$  represents the link that exists at the moment  $E_2$  between the now-moment  $E_2$  and the retention of the moment  $E_1$ . Cf. Dieter Lohmar, "What Does Protention 'Protend'? Remarks on Husserl's Analyses of Protention in the Bernau Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness," in *Philosophy Today*, vol. 46:5, SPEP Supplement 2002, pp. 154-167. Lohmar also notes the difficulty in the designations in this diagram, and he suggests that the  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  on the horizontal line have different designations at the end of the descending, slanted lines that intersect with them. This interpretation could help in understanding some of Husserl's claims in reference to this diagram.

<sup>213</sup> In his earliest diagrams, Husserl represented retention *above* the horizontal line, instead of below. He then realized that the diagram would better represent the "sinking away" of retentions if the diagonal lines for retention were beneath the horizontal line. Cf. *Husserliana X*, p. 331, footnote to the diagram; trans. Brough, p. 343.

conclusion: *Retentions are also motivated by protentions*. This interrelation, however, is not easy to understand:

The previous [intention] as such is retained in a new retentional consciousness, and this consciousness is, on the one hand, characterized in itself as fulfillment of what was earlier, and on the other, as retention of what was earlier. But is there not a difficulty here? The earlier <consciousness> is protention (i.e., an intention "directed" at what comes later), and the following retention would then be retention of the earlier retention which, at the same time, is characterized as [its] protention. This newly arriving retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with its protentional tendency and fulfills it at the same time, but in such a way that a protention of the next phase goes through this fulfillment.<sup>214</sup>

The introduction of protention into an analysis of temporalizing consciousness reveals the complicated way in which the constituting flow overlaps itself. According to this text, retentions are retained as both retentions of what came before (as fulfillment) and as former protentions; each retention has a retentional and a protentional aspect. Furthermore, in the above citation the "now" itself is never mentioned, neither as an unimpressional "point," nor as the now which is constituted by this protentional-retentional activity; the protentions themselves are simply discussed as either fulfilled or unfulfilled. Each protention has a direct relationship with its own fulfillment. As a fulfilled moment passes into retention, then, it is not a retention of a momentary former now-point--that would be the "mathematical" explanation; instead, it is a retention of a fulfilled protention, one which itself protends toward the next fulfillment. We should note, however that this analysis continues to focus attention on the retentional aspect of the present, betraying the fact that protention is still a recent "addition" to the discussion. Nevertheless, we begin to learn more about protention even here.

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<sup>214</sup> "Die vorangegangene als solche wird retiniert im neuen Bewusstsein der Retention, und dieses Bewusstsein ist einerseits charakterisiert in sich als Erfüllung des früheren und andererseits in sich als Retention des früheren. Aber ist hier nicht eine Schwierigkeit? Das frühere <Bewusstsein> ist Protention (d.i. eben auf Späteres "gerichtete" Intention), und die nachkommende Retention wäre also Retention der früheren Retention, die zugleich charakterisiert ist als Protention. Diese neu eintretende Retention reproduziert also die frühere Retention mit ihrer protentionalen Tendenz und erfüllt diese letztere zugleich, aber in einer Weise, dass durch diese Erfüllung hindurchgeht eine Protention auf die nächsten Phasen." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 25. My translation, modified.

We must pause to address two critical difficulties arising in our analysis so far: First, Husserl uses such vocabulary as "motivating"<sup>215</sup> and "projecting"<sup>216</sup> when discussing the relation of protention and retention, but such terms seem to address the relation of protentional and retentional *content* rather than these temporal forms. Clearly, I can say that my having been walking along the sidewalk will "motivate" what I expect in my immediate future, but if I abstract from this content, can I say the same of the relation of retention and protention as forms? It seems that we cannot easily say that one temporal form "motivates" another. We can use this terminology with reference to temporal content to help us possibly gain a better understanding of the formal relations, but not to describe them per se. We must point out here that Husserl also uses the term "modifying" in his descriptions, which seems more applicable to the relation of these forms of temporalizing. The form of protention might modify the form of retention, and vice versa, but they will not motivate or project into one another (as forms). We must assume, then, that Husserl was using descriptions of the content of temporalizing consciousness to provide examples for his analyses of its form. While a reference to content is indeed helpful when struggling with an analysis of the form of temporalizing consciousness, we must be careful--more careful than Husserl himself, perhaps--not to confuse the two in our most intricate studies.

The second difficulty is that of the Urimpression. We discussed in chapter one how the Urimpression is meant to designate that "moment of actualization" which can be abstracted from the other activities of the living present, namely, retention and protention. We discover here, however, that the notions of "fulfilled retention" and "fulfilled protention" provide us with the same "moment of actualization"--without insinuating any type of punctual, actualized, sensory data as does the Urimpression. Granted, Husserl often invokes the Urimpression (and the Urempfindung) to indicate that precise "moment" when a specific aspect of an experience is actualized by consciousness, but it seems that this tends to reify the abstraction. With regard to a phenomenology of temporalizing consciousness, the term Urimpression can lead us astray, giving priority to an abstract moment and to actualized, punctual data. The terms "fulfilled protention" and "fulfilled retention" describe much better both the content of my experience and the form of temporalizing consciousness. This form, in other words, is primarily

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<sup>215</sup> For example: "Diese Antizipation ist aber durch das Kontinuum vorangegangener Retentionen als fortschreitendes Kontinuum motiviert [ . . .]." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 24.

<sup>216</sup> For example: "Diese Urfolge projiziert sich in die Zukunft in Form des protentionalen Bewusstseins, das jede Phase begleitet." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 21.

the functioning of retention and protention; the area, or zone, of actualization is merely their fulfillment. (I say "area" or "zone" in order to emphasize the *span* of actualization, as opposed to a *point*). In fact, this zone of actualization is contingent upon the activity of retention-protention, and on their being fulfilled, for its existence. This is one interrelated process.

The interrelation of protention and retention can be understood in two essential ways so far: Retentions "contain" protentions, first, in the limited sense that they "contain" protentions directed *from one "moment" to the next "moment,"* linking the retentions to one another, and second, in the broader sense that *groups or phases* of retentions are linked to each other as events with the help of protention. Protentions and their fulfillments likewise may link serially from "moment" to "moment," or may protend toward phases interpreted as events in themselves.<sup>217</sup> Thus we find in protention tendencies both toward immediate linking "moments" in the flow of temporalizing consciousness and toward whole experiences. Further, the tendencies toward connecting both on the immediate and on the constituted level of the event are reflected in the ways that protention and retention relate to each other.

Given these distinctions, we can now consider in detail how protention and retention overlap. We now know that what has just-passed gives us a basis upon which to project into the "future," with regard to the content of temporalizing consciousness; my next moment's expectations arise out of the last moment's fulfillment. Further, retentions are retentions *of protentions*; retention is always affected by what was protended in a given manner (as well as by what continues as protention). In fact, this is especially the case if the prior protention has passed unfulfilled, because a disappointment in the expected content of an experience will color both past retentions of the anticipation and future protention of the experience. Retention and protention, therefore, are integrated into one another such that they influence the meaning and direction of each other's content; their difference lies in how they relate to the factual fulfillment of an intention. With regard to form, retentions modify protentions and protentions modify retentions: Their mutual modification is processed through their being fulfilled, through the shared zone of actualization. The fulfillment of an intention in the living present is thus "doubled" in the senses of retention and protention, and yet remains one fulfillment:

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<sup>217</sup> *Husserliana*, vol. XXXIII, p. 29. For Husserl, here, there is also another, more abstract understanding of the event (*Ereignis*), in both a protentional and retentional sense: this is the temporal flow itself as unending, albeit divided according to its two functions.

The new phase is not merely the transformation of a retention into a retention of the next level--which in its mediated intentionality is conscious of the earlier intention in a modified way--and a transformation of the co-interwoven protention; it is also a retention of the earlier protention. [. . .] The new protention is new and a modification of earlier ones, which itself, however, is conscious through a moment of interlaced retentional consciousness.<sup>218</sup>

In other words, although there is clearly only one fulfillment, it functions in two very different ways: It is both the fulfillment of protention and the actualized aspect of retention. At the same time, though, this fulfillment remains one, as the zone of actualization with regard to both protention and retention. And it is through this zone of actualization that the forms of each protention and retention are modified. Keep in mind also that this relation between protention and retention can be understood both as limited to the next immediate phase and, in a broader sense, as extended to an experience as a whole.

Let us take the speaking of a sentence as an example, as we have earlier. If I am in the middle of speaking a sentence (and you in the middle of hearing it), our retention is not merely of the last spoken syllable or last uttered sound, nor is our protention only of the next sound to be uttered. Instead, our retentions are made up of all the words I have spoken as we protend toward the completion of my sentence or idea. A very "narrow" understanding of retention takes each retained word as linked serially to the one spoken before; a "broader" understanding shows how each "individual" retention has embedded in it all those that came before, relating the whole of the meaning to what is currently fulfilled and emerging into fulfillment (the word being spoken at this moment). Thus our retention is layered such that the last several words, back to the beginning of the sentence and including the contexts that might have brought this verbalization about, remain present as we speak and hear this sentence. Otherwise the sentence would make no sense for either of us. Likewise, the protentions we had up until this moment (which are now past), of each word leading to the next, remain embedded in these layered retentions. And the protentions experienced now, with the word being spoken at this moment, protend forward both toward the next word and

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<sup>218</sup> "Die neue Phase ist also nicht nur Wandlung der Retention in eine Retention nächster Stufe, die in ihrer mittelbaren Intentionalität die frühere modifiziert bewusst hat, und eine Wandlung der mitverflochtenen Protention, sondern auch eine Retention der früheren Protention. [. . .] Die neue Protention ist neue und Modifikation der früheren, die aber selbst durch ein Moment eingeflochtenen retentionalen Bewusstseins bewusst ist." *Husserliana* XXXIII, pp. 26-7. My translation.



toward the meaning of the whole sentence and conversation. In addition, these protentions have embedded in them the unity of retentions back through the beginning of the sentence. As speaker, I must have an especially active protention, so that I not only know where I have been but also where I intend to take my spoken claim. Notice, too, that these protentions (and retentions) are not of guttural sounds, but instead are of words and meanings, showing that these phases of retention and protention--and, more importantly, of their fulfillment--are not punctual but instead are complex, interconnected units.

Husserl moves on to explain in the same manuscript (often in quasi-mathematical terms) how we are to understand the relations of each protention and retention to their "moment" of fulfillment. As protention gets closer and closer to fulfillment, it is also moving toward attaining its "maximum." Likewise, retention, moving away from "maximum," is being "emptied" as it flows away from its point of fulfillment. Both protention and retention, then, have an abstract "zero-limit" or "zero-point" [*Nullgrenze* or *Nullpunkt*] most distant from their fulfillment and a maximal point in their "moment" of fulfillment. In the flow of temporalizing consciousness, we thus see a flow from zero to maximum in protention, attaining maximum at its endpoint, the point of fulfillment. Then the flow progresses from maximum to zero in retention, beginning at the point of maximal fulfillment. Husserl also qualifies these two "halves," protention and retention, as respectively "positive" and "negative" as well as "over" and "under" the maximal point.<sup>219</sup>

Although this "mathematical" description might help us to understand the relation of protention and retention and their fulfillment, we must ask whether such a description is at all phenomenological. Or, even if it is not a phenomenological approach, what might it bring to phenomenology? With regard to the content of temporalizing consciousness, the living present might "expand" and "contract" depending on the experience at hand; for example, the living present might "extend" itself very differently, depending on whether we were concentrating on a temporal object of extremely long duration (like a note being held for a long time, for example, or a lengthy melody in a musical piece) or facing an unexpected experience that we could not anticipate (like a sudden honk of a horn). This would oppose the notion

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<sup>219</sup> For example: "Sie sind nach den Protentionen der oberen Hälfte Kulminationspunkte, Punkte maximaler Erfüllung, nach den Retentionen der unteren Hälfte auch Kulminationspunkte, Punkte minimaler 'Entleerung'." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 30. Also: "Dadurch ist nun für jedes  $U_x$  von  $m$  an eine positive und negative Richtung oder ein positiver und negativer Zweig vorgezeichnet." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 32.

that protention and retention always "climb" and "sink" at the same "rate." With regard to the form of temporalizing consciousness, furthermore, it seems misleading to discuss it in terms of "points," "halves," and "maximum" or "minimum." While it is interesting to note that, even in this discussion, Husserl never mentions the Urimpression (possibly because this mathematical description is meant to exclude all impression), the discussion as a whole is still highly problematic. The form of temporalizing consciousness, we are discovering, is a complex mutual functioning of protention and retention, where each modifies the other, and where the area of actualization fulfills this process. To describe this process as gradations from minimum to maximum and back to minimum seems to counteract such discovery. These descriptions, in other words, appear only to help in the understanding of the geometric diagrams, which themselves were meant to aid in understanding temporalizing consciousness itself. But here, the diagrams seem to have led us astray from the form of temporalizing consciousness into the realm of mathematics, where we are no longer in touch with a phenomenological analysis of temporalizing consciousness but instead with a mathematical description of a visual aid. Thus, while we must admit that Husserl's discussion here does contribute some new insights--for example, that there must be limits to protention and retention--as a whole, it directs us away from a *phenomenology* of temporalizing consciousness and from an accurate understanding of its form.

Let us return to Husserl's discussion, however. Having established the interrelation of protention and retention at a deeper level, Husserl then takes them up as systems in themselves. He describes protentional and retentional consciousness as respectively "climbing" and "sinking" with relation to their fulfillment. He then acknowledges that this "climbing" and "sinking" of protention and retention are what give meaning or substance to the supposedly fleeting moment of fulfillment. Without protention, there is no real fulfillment; without retention of the fulfilled protention, there is no recognition of this fulfillment. Husserl actually changes his description of his diagram in such a way that shows this thinking:


The  $U_X$  actually is not to be symbolized as a straight line with two branches, but rather as two lines colliding with each other (*zusammenstoßen*) with different forces, but overall more symmetrical.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>220</sup> "Die  $U_X$  ist eigentlich nicht zu symbolisieren als eine Gerade mit zwei Zweigen, sondern als zwei zusammenstoßende Geraden mit verschiedener Belegung, obschon im ganzen symmetrischer." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 34. My translation.

The  $U_X$  to be symbolized as a "straight line"—a symbolism against which Husserl is arguing in the beginning of this citation—would be the horizontal line representing the flow of experience; its "two branches" would be those of protention and retention. This problematic image, of a line with two branches, would minimize the importance of protention and retention, because they would be described merely as two branches which are part of the horizontal line. The description which Husserl offers instead turns its focus to the two "lines" of protention and retention as they are "pushing into each other." The "line" of the  $U_X$  is now the result of the activities of protention and retention, and it is no longer mentioned for itself. In this improved description, Husserl's emphasis is clearly on the activity of retention and protention, as the description itself expresses the active "pushing" of the lines together and never mentions their "point" of convergence. The maximal "point" is no longer necessary. Instead, it is merely to be understood as the fulfilled zone of convergence of two different, but similar, streams.

We can take the diagram below to help us visualize this description, even though this diagram is actually placed a page earlier in Husserl's text. Remember that the single horizontal line represents our flow of presentations, whereas the diagonal lines represent our protentions (above and slanting "into" the horizontal line) and our retentions (below and slanting "away" from the horizontal line). The vertical lines represent our constituted consciousness. Husserl's description actually focuses on only one diagonal line of protention and retention. The interesting thing about his description is that he shifts his attention entirely away from the horizontal line of presence, changing his focus to the diagonal lines. Further, he interprets the diagonal line of protention and retention as *two* lines pushing into the horizontal line. Thus it seems that the horizontal line of actualization merely arises out of the activity of protention and retention.

Figure No. 4<sup>221</sup>

Husserl continues:

So we would do better if we symbolized this through an angle, [presenting] the whole parallel system as two systems that create an even angle as two half-planes, whose line of intersection is [the line] E-E [the horizontal line of actualization]. Thus we will think of the paper folded at E-E and [the line] E-E pulled upward, held over the surface of the paper.<sup>222</sup>

With this, Husserl bends the diagram in half along the horizontal line of actualization, pulling it upward, away from the flat surface of the original diagram. The diagram then looks like the roof of a house, with the

<sup>221</sup> *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 33. Reprinted by permission of Springer and the Husserl Archives.

<sup>222</sup> "Also hätten wir besser zu symbolisieren durch einen Winkel und das ganze Parallelsystem <darzustellen> als zwei Systeme, die als zwei Halbebenen einen ebenen Winkel bilden, deren Scheitelgerade die E-E <Linie> ist. Also, wir denken uns das Papier in EE geknickt und EE nach oben gezogen, über die Papierfläche gehoben." *Husserliana* XXXIII, pp. 34-5. My translation.

protentions "climbing" up one side toward the horizontal line of actualization (the "peak"), and then with the retentions "sinking" down the other side, away from the angled line at the top. In fact, with the paper bent and pulled upward, the lines representing protention really *do rise* toward their fulfillment while the lines symbolizing retention *sink* toward the table. Husserl makes an incredible move here, with two major effects. First, he changes his original visualization of temporalizing consciousness into two systems, protentional and retentional, and reduces the flow of actualized experiences to a "fold" or crease in the paper. The zone of actualization is minimized in importance with respect to the activities of protention and retention. Second, these changes are augmented by Husserl's converting his diagram from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional system. By pulling the paper upwards, the protentional "half" of the model presents its "climbing," leaving the flat plane in which it was represented. Temporalizing consciousness thus gains a certain "depth" in its visual presentation. Further, protention finally appears to achieve an image of equal importance to retention, as one of the two "half-planes" that support the activity of consciousness.

Thus I must qualify the argument I just offered against Husserl's "mathematization" of inner time-consciousness. By considering a three-dimensional model and representing protention and retention as intersecting planes, Husserl produces a model that more accurately represents the interrelation of protention and retention and their intersection in the zone of actualization. While it still has its limits, such a geometrical model better allows for the complexity of this difficult phenomenological area, and it even brings new insights to mind for consideration, as we see here.<sup>223</sup> However, I believe that we still must remain somewhat wary of describing phenomena through mathematics, and we should be careful of the tendency to *reduce* the phenomenon to its model.

These changes in the diagram and its description reflect Husserl's shift in focus to the two systems of protention and retention and away from the zone of actualization; here, fulfillment functions merely as the site of convergence for both systems (although in different ways). The "moment" of the zone of actualization, for itself, practically disappears; it exists only at the "intersection" of the protentional and retentional flows with their constituted contents. As fulfillment, of course, this zone does not disappear--it remains essential to the structure of temporalizing consciousness--but relative to the

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<sup>223</sup> Husserl's move to represent retention and protention as intersecting *planes* may have been influenced by the new emphasis in non-Euclidian geometry by his mathematical contemporaries. I thank Joe Block for this insight.

emphasis placed upon the primordial present in earlier writings (especially with regard to intuition), its minimized importance in this discussion is notable. The activity of protention and retention seems to take precedence over the actual "moment" of fulfillment. In fact, we might want to ask, How can we understand this zone of actualization given these new developments? An attempt to provide a response reveals that our understanding of fulfillment actually rests heavily upon protention.

As Husserl describes in these manuscripts, protention is "maximized" in its fulfillment. On a more experiential level, we also notice that--especially in perception--we are most often focused "forward," always beyond what is actually "now" (as evidenced by our "interest" and "striving"). And more formally, we know that protentions modify retentions even so far that protentions are integrated into our retentions and recollections. In each of these cases, the actual moment of fulfillment has very little meaning without the directedness of the flow and the expectation or openness which precedes actualization. Protention gives the zone of fulfillment both its sense and its frame. Instead of understanding protention as founded by a so-called "now-point" or Urimpression--in other words, instead of understanding the "source" of temporalizing consciousness to be in the constitution of the "instant of primordial impression"--we realize that fulfillment itself must actually be supported by the co-functioning of protention and retention. Thus the source of temporalizing consciousness is in the protending and retaining activity of consciousness rather than in the zone of actualization. Let us take up a couple of examples in order to emphasize this point.

Imagine that I am looking at my desk. Without being able to protend beyond the presentation I have at this moment, this "momentary" vision would have very little meaning or coherence. I would not only be unable to perceive that the desk has more than one perspective--in fact, I would not move into other presentations because nothing would take me beyond this very moment--but I also would not be able to connect each moment's presentation with the next one coming. Protention is the condition of possibility of going beyond what is fulfilled in consciousness. In fact, we can understand protention as taking us "beyond" fulfillment more specifically: It makes appresentations possible. While we know that appresentations are now, not in the future (i.e., they are embedded in a presentation), actualized consciousness alone does not allow for the possibility of being beyond this zone of actualization. We argued in chapter two that appresentation actually reveals an indirect link between consciousness and an intersubjective structure through its indications of intersubjectively constituted meanings. We suggest here that, without the protentional activity of the living present, we would be unable to access either the other profiles of the object or the

intersubjective structure indicated in its horizons. Protention is consciousness' openness to that which is beyond it, to its own possibilities. Husserl mentions the connection between protention and appresentation when he says in his analyses of passive syntheses that "In this way, pre-expectation [*Vorerwartung*] is at work 'apperceptively,' it is co-productive in the configuration of coexisting objects."<sup>224</sup> Thus it is not merely the possibility of my moving around an object that allows for my appresenting its other profiles, but also and more importantly, a "futural" temporalizing consciousness opens me up to what is beyond the fulfilled presence, making it possible for me to conceive of other profiles at all, and to consider the possibility of moving toward them.

I find that protention's influence on intentional fulfillment becomes even more clear when we consider the notion of touch. Although it is possible to feel something without moving--for example, I can feel the impression of my chair as I sit here very still--the sensation of touch most often includes motion.<sup>225</sup> Usually I am running my fingers over a surface, bumping into an object, or moving about in some way when I am paying attention to how something feels (or it is moving along my skin while I remain still). This motion is in itself always one step ahead of the sensation. I must be intending motion just prior to intending the feeling in order to be moving and thus facilitating the feeling. Thus there is a double sense of immediate expectation in this activity: Feeling an object (like a piece of cloth) requires both an expectation of the sensation (even as I am sensing) and the ability to be "ahead of myself" in order to move. Both of these require protention. In fact, when I feel the chair pressing itself into my back, there still is a sense of expectation in the experience, even though there is no apparent movement involved.

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<sup>224</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 190; Steinbock trans., p. 241, modified. Here we are understanding Husserl's term *Vorerwartung* ("pre-expectation") to imply protention as we are describing it. Also, we are assuming that "apperception" and "appresentation" are, in this case, at least somewhat interchangeable, given Husserl's fairly flexible usage of the two terms.

<sup>225</sup> One could argue here that we never are completely motionless, and thus there is always some kind of motion involved in our experience of touch. Cf. the article on "Funktionelle Entspannung" ("Functional Relaxation") in *Handbuch der Salutogenese. Konzept und Praxis*, ed. by Schüffel et al [Ullstein Medical, pp. 227-32], especially p. 230, where the student discovers the rhythms of breath, digestion, heart, etc. through this form of relaxation. These are motions of our body that are continuous and necessary for our tactile experience, even when voluntary movement has ceased. In fact, these involuntary rhythms could conceivably contribute to an imperceptible movement of the skin that allows for the sensation of touch.

Each of these examples (looking at my desk, feeling a piece of cloth, sensing the chair) reveals that protention is not only necessary for experience, but also that its activity is a primary source of meaning for the now-phase. The fact that I am always "ahead" of the "moment" of actualization makes it possible for me to intend objects as wholes, and this, in turn, allows for meaning to exist in my experiences. Granted, retention is also essential, but our argument here is to show that, without protention, retention would have very little to work with. Without protention, in other words, no sentences would be begun, no movement would take place, no appresentations would be apprehended, no objects would be intended as wholes--nothing meaningful would be fulfilled. Thus, although retention is required in order to maintain a sense to our experiences, this sense would not arise without protention.<sup>226</sup>

PROTENTION AND INTENTION  
IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS (*HUSSERLIANA* XXXIII)

We return here to our consideration of the relation between protention and intention in Husserl's phenomenology. With regard to their form, intentions and protentions are both activities of consciousness that extend beyond or "ahead of" their fulfillment. Protention is the openness in temporalizing consciousness that goes beyond its own fulfillment, an openness which then modifies retention. Intentionality is a directedness toward an object, one which includes both fulfilled and unfulfilled aspects of that object (i.e., presentations and appresentations). While it is clear to us, therefore, that intentions and protentions are not exactly the same thing, we begin to see that these descriptions reveal a relationship that is more than merely parallel. In order for us to intend objects at all, in other words, the intentional act must rely upon the activity of protention in order to be carried out. An intention is an act of consciousness directed toward an object; protention, meanwhile, is the aspect of that same consciousness which founds the intending act as directed *toward* something. This becomes clearer in Husserl's Bernau manuscripts:

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<sup>226</sup> We can even take this experience of touch to another level. The position "I touch" is a form of the position "I can." In order to be in the position to express "I can," I must have a protending temporalizing consciousness, for without it, I would be unable to know (or express) what "I can" do. Thus protending consciousness is essential to the temporal ego as the source of the "I can."



The constant punctual fulfillment belongs itself to intention as intention of the arrival (*Eintreten*) of the still streaming event. Meanwhile, the intention goes constantly through the new points and maintains constantly beyond them the character of unfulfilled expectation. The intention goes toward the fulfillments, or rather from expectation to expectation in the continuum of expectation, and by this toward the always newly fulfilled expectations (fulfilled after a phase). These are two sides of one and the same thing [ . . . ].<sup>227</sup>

Intentionality is, according to traditional descriptions, a "directedness toward the object," and thereby, it is a pointing at the object as a whole. This "pointing" or "directedness" thus requires an activity of moving outward from what is specifically fulfilled in consciousness. As Husserl says above, "the intention goes constantly through the new points [ . . . ] toward the fulfillments." This movement toward what is unfulfilled, with the goal of its becoming fulfilled, is itself an activity of consciousness. Furthermore, this activity, since it relates with the "futural" possibilities of the object, corresponds directly with the activity of protention. Thus the specific act of intention, because of its function, rests primarily in protention. In addition, intentionality directs itself toward objects as wholes, an activity which includes their appresentations. *These appresentations in themselves already imply protention.* In other words, in order for appresentations to go beyond what is immediately present to other profiles of an object, they must be supported by a consciousness that constitutes beyond the presentation, i.e., consciousness must include protention in its constituting activity in order to make appresentations possible. Thus an object cannot be experienced as a whole without the involvement of both intentionality (which implies appresentation) and, as its foundation, the protentional activity of temporalizing consciousness.

Let us pause for just a moment. We discussed earlier that Husserl might be making a move in these manuscripts to go beyond the notion of the Urimpression. Notice in the citation above that Husserl again does not mention the Urimpression (nor the "now-point"). While he does remain with the image of "punctual" fulfillment, he refers here only to *fulfillment* with relation to both intentionality and expectation. It seems that in this

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<sup>227</sup> "Die stetige punktuelle Erfüllung gehört doch selbst zur Intention als Intention auf Eintreten des noch im Fluss befindlichen Ereignisses. Indessen, die Intention geht stetig durch die neuen Punkte hindurch und behält stetig über sie hinaus den Charakter unerfüllter Erwartung, und die Intention geht auf die Erfüllungen bzw. von Erwartung zu Erwartung in dem Erwartungskontinuum und damit auf die immer neu erfüllten Erwartungen (erfüllt nach einer Phase). Das sind zwei Seiten einer und derselben Sache [ . . . ]." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 9. My translation.

manuscript as well as in those we analyzed earlier, Husserl is moving beyond the problematic notion of "data" with relation to temporalizing consciousness. In fact, when discussing intentionality, a broader notion of actualization seems more appropriate, and thus this move away from the term Urimpression would be consistent with the developments we see in these manuscripts.

Husserl's discussion both of intentionality with relation to protention (cited above), and of the horizons of that intentionality, are in answer to his question: "How is this intentionality, according to its structure, necessarily constituted?"<sup>228</sup> The structure of intentionality, he mentions elsewhere, is based upon the expectations that arise from horizons, which rest in a *protentional structure*:

The continuous appearance of new primordial presences does not only mean the appearance of these data, but it is also part of the essence of this process, *which is necessarily a time-constituting process*, that it requires a forward directed intentionality [. . .].<sup>229</sup>

That which is beyond, yet part of, an experience relates to the horizons of the object. These horizons, as extensions of that which is presented, rest heavily in the protentional and retentional aspects of temporalizing consciousness. While the retentional aspects of consciousness focus on maintaining what has already been experienced, protention centers around the possibilities of what is being experienced as well as what might be experienced. Unfortunately, Husserl is still discussing the flow of *data* with regard to temporalizing consciousness, whereas we are seeing that these analyses would be more accurate if they were to address the flow of *experiences*, i.e., that of objects, meanings, or events. While making a move to discuss the "fulfillment" of protention and retention rather than the Urimpression, Husserl problematically continues to vacillate between punctual data and experiences as wholes in his descriptions of the content of temporalizing consciousness.

Protention is therefore an essential aspect to all fulfillment, because protention provides the "now-phase" with the framework for that which will be fulfilled. By doing so, fulfilled protention also provides retention with the

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<sup>228</sup> "Wie ist diese Intentionalität ihrer Struktur nach notwendig beschaffen?" *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 9. My translation.

<sup>229</sup> "Das Auftreten immer neuer Urpräsenzen aber besagt nicht bloß das Auftreten dieser Daten, sondern es gehört ebenso zum Wesen des Prozesses, der notwendig <ein> zeitkonstituierender ist, dass eine vorgerichtete Intentionalität notwendig ist [. . .]." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 7. My translation and emphasis.

content which will be held in retention and memory: "The now is constituted through the form of protentional fulfillment, and the past through a retentional modification of this fulfillment [. . .]." <sup>230</sup> Protention, therefore, has some sort of priority over the zone of actualization in phenomenological experience. The most challenging example to this claim is the situation where I am completely surprised, where suddenly the unexpected appears. Husserl addresses this situation as well in these manuscripts, primarily as an analysis of the "new." Here he says that, if what I am expecting does not occur, there remains an empty protention that is not fulfilled. In the cases of specific events, I will expect the ongoing event to continue. If it does not, then I am no longer dealing with fulfilled but instead with empty protentions, which will then adjust themselves according to the new situation. Thus the very first "moment" of a completely new situation will not be apprehended as fulfilled until it is also retained, when the interrelation of retention and protention will once again allow me to form protentions toward the continuance of this new situation. This example shows us the basic character of protention, for protention is a constant openness to the possibility of surprising situations. The "frame" of protention, although most often fulfilled through an interrelation with retentions where a known situation is continuing, is an openness to the ever-new, even if what is "new" is usually predictable. Only in the cases of true surprises are we suddenly aware of our capability to be surprised--a capability which is constantly possible because of the open structure of protention.

#### PROTENTION, AFFECTIVITY, AND OBJECTIVITY

In a description of affectivity, we should begin with an example. When I look out my window, fortunate to have a fairly expansive view, I am faced with an interesting landscape of hills, river, bridges, houses, and roads. Often, however, I find myself focusing on the bridges that cross the river--not because they are closer to me or larger in the view, nor because they are brightly painted or stand out in any way. I am simply drawn to the bridges. Perhaps it is because they "cut across" the view in a way that the hills and roads do not. Perhaps they symbolize some special sort of "crossing" for me.

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<sup>230</sup> "Das Jetzt ist konstituiert durch die Form der protentionalen Erfüllung, das Vergangene durch retentionale Modifikation dieser Erfüllung [. . .]." *Husserliana* XXXIII, p. 14. My translation.

In any case, they pull on my gaze, and I find myself looking at them each time I look outside.

Objects pull me to them through what is called their affectivity or affection, i.e., they "affect" me. Specifically, affectivity is the name for the draw that an object has upon me which causes me to turn my attention toward it and to intend it. Husserl describes affectivity as: "the allure given to consciousness, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego [ . . . ]."<sup>231</sup> Affectivity is a special aspect of my relation to an object, an aspect that, first, reveals the *object's* influence in our relation, and second, reveals *how consciousness can "see ahead"* to what pulls it. An examination of affectivity, then, will provide insights into the relation between objectivity and temporalizing consciousness beyond what came out of our discussions of intentionality, and it will disclose more specifically the activity of protention in this relation.

Husserl says that the primordial source of affection actually lies in the Urimpression: "Insofar as the most original affection is to be seen as the affection generated in the *impressional present* [*impressionalen Gegenwart*], contrast is then to be characterized as the most original condition of affection."<sup>232</sup> Interestingly, his discussion of affection focuses on retention and association, because of the tendency for certain visual patterns, especially those we have experienced before, to draw our attention. Important for our analysis here, however, is his claim that affectivity itself is primarily directed toward the *future* (rather than the past):

In the living present the primordially impressional emergence has *ceteris paribus* a stronger affective tendency than what is already retentional. For that very reason, *affection has a unitary tendency toward the future* where the orientation of the propagation is concerned; intentionality is predominantly oriented toward the future.<sup>233</sup>

We must examine this claim more closely. Although affectivity may often rely on retention because familiar patterns from our past may trigger our attention to a similar pattern, the draw comes not from the past but from the future, or rather, from the future's connection with the past. Husserl says that affectivity is stronger in the immediate impressional present, i.e., Urimpression, than in retention. In order for any patterns to draw my attention at all, though, my attention must be directed toward the future, and Husserl realizes this. Thus the primary direction of affectivity, in order for it

<sup>231</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 148; Steinbock trans., p. 196.

<sup>232</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 149; Steinbock trans., p. 197, modified.

<sup>233</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 156; Steinbock trans., p. 204, modified, my emphasis.

to arise, must be futural. In correlation with our description of intentionality, we see here that affectivity relies upon a futurally directed consciousness, a consciousness that moves forward, beyond itself, in order to take up the world as meaningful.

After describing affectivity as an "allure" or "pull" of an object on consciousness, Husserl continues on to say that this pull relaxes itself when the ego turns toward the affective object, transforming itself into a call to learn more about the object itself, to gain knowledge of the object through closer observation.<sup>234</sup> Husserl also claims that "sense data" may send affective rays to the ego, but they are usually too weak to reach it, and thus do not attract the ego in any true way.<sup>235</sup> How can we understand this? Since in general objects call to me *as objects*, we can surmise that, overall, affectivity is not involved in the direct constitution of objects or ego. Instead, it is the pull of an *already constituted object* on my attentive ego that attracts me. Thus it seems clear that "sense data" cannot in themselves pull the ego toward them; they can only do so through their being part of a constituted object.<sup>236</sup> The color of bright red, for example, might draw my attention away from an intended object, but it will be intended as an object in itself or in relation to the object connected with it.

The ego often originally feels the pull of an object in the case of great contrast, where a unified object stands out from its background and from other objects. While contrast is not a necessary attribute for affectivity to take place, it does often accompany an object's affective pull; in fact, as we saw above, Husserl states that contrast is "the most original condition of affection." An object that is not the focus of my attention cannot pull me toward it, however, unless I am able to perceive *beyond* what is in focus at this moment. In other words, an object must be already somewhat constituted in the background, and must be already somewhat in my consciousness, in order to attract my attention, for there to be any pull at all. Since apperception describes my ability to extend beyond a currently intended object to other objects and meanings and beyond what is present, we must

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<sup>234</sup> *Husserliana* XI, pp. 148-9; Steinbock trans., pp. 196-7.

<sup>235</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 149; Steinbock trans., p. 196: "Sensible data (and thus data in general) send, as it were, affective rays of force toward the ego pole, but in their weakness do not reach the ego pole, they do not actually become for it an allure that awakens."

<sup>236</sup> See *Husserliana* XI, pp. 159-61; Steinbock trans., pp. 207-209. Husserl explains that an entire sense field does not require affectivity in order to be constituted. Individual objects in the sense field, however, may or may not affect the ego through their pull--and this pull may occur some of the time but not all of the time.

recognize a link between affectivity and apperception: An object can only call me to it if consciousness is able to apperceive beyond that which is in focus. Because apperception relies upon a protentional temporalizing consciousness for my ability to extend beyond the zone of actualization, we also realize that there must be a similar link between affectivity and protention. Simply put, affectivity requires a structure of temporalizing consciousness that extends itself beyond what is currently being actualized so that an object in the periphery can attract my attention. This structure is the activity of protention. Affectivity, then, like apperception, is supported by the protentional aspect of temporalizing consciousness.

Protention reveals a primary connection between consciousness and the objects of the world, for it is only through moving forward into the world, going beyond the presentations at hand to others that call to it, that consciousness can relate with the world at all. But there is more to it than this. I can only recognize objects based upon my familiarity with their types, and even my familiarity with sensory experience in general is necessary; protention connects a consciousness of past experiences with an openness to what is coming. If a bridge is going to rise up out of a landscape for me (affectivity), for instance, I must already have an understanding of “bridge” as an independent object, one which I can identify and recognize (far retention and association). Thus association and far retention are interrelated with my experience of affection. This interrelation, further, relies upon the activity of protention.

We pointed out earlier that Husserl says that affectivity is the call of an object, and that once my attention is upon that object, the affectivity transforms into a call to learn more about the object as a whole:

[. . .] it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object.<sup>237</sup>

Here we see that affectivity can also play a part in appresentation--not in making appresentations possible, but in calling me to realize these appresentations, to make them presentations. This transformed affectivity, which earlier called me to this object as a whole and now calls me to learn more about it, pulls me to move beyond what is currently presented. This relation of protention and affectivity is the foundation of my search and desire for knowledge.

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<sup>237</sup> *Husserliana* XI, pp. 148-9; Steinbock trans., p. 196.

Our description of affectivity might help us further develop our understanding of intentionality. As it is intending, consciousness seeks to fulfill what is incomplete in its experience of the intended object. In order to fulfill these intentions, we might move toward or around an object so that it becomes complete. This activity, however, is also an answer to the call of affectivity when it transmits itself to the object that has drawn us, pulling us to experience the object further. Intentionality and this modified affectivity, then, describe the same situation: my being drawn to experience an object completely. Intentionality, however, describes my part in the experience--my need for completeness, for knowledge, for the satisfaction of my curiosity; affectivity, on the other hand, describes the object's play in this situation--how the object for its own part calls us to gain more thorough knowledge of it. Thus these two terms, intentionality and this modified form of affectivity, describe two sides of the same subject-object relation. Further, they reveal this relation to be dynamic, interactive.

Keep in mind that affectivity proper usually takes place prior to a specific and directed intention toward the object calling me. Affectivity is primarily understood as a calling for my intention of a certain *unintended* object. Importantly, Husserl notes this relation between affectivity and intentionality: "Where the object is concerned, we can also characterize affection as the awakening of an intention directed toward it [i.e., the object]."<sup>238</sup> Thus both the modified form of affectivity and the original form of affectivity are interrelated with my intentions of objects. The latter directs me to intend the object in general, while the former leads me to fulfill my intending experience of the object more completely. In both cases, though, we are talking about a protentional consciousness which can relate my intending consciousness with the object that affects me.

Because both intentionality and affectivity describe my going *beyond* an immediate presentation toward the object as a whole, we can conclude that the relation of subject to object relies heavily upon a protentional temporalizing consciousness.<sup>239</sup> This is not to say that the involvement of

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<sup>238</sup> *Husserliana* XI, p. 151; Steinbock trans., 198.

<sup>239</sup> James Mensch articulates the relation between affectivity and protention quite well, through his discussion of affection in his article "Husserl's Concept of the Future," *Husserl Studies*, vol. 16, 1999, pp. 41-64. Mensch shows how Husserl's notion of affection is both related to intentionality--drawing my attention outward, pulling it toward the object--and to the future. This then also affects my retention. Mensch says, "This increasing draw or pull of affecting content is what yields the protentional intentionality inherent in the retained." (p. 48) Mensch also points out the similarity in the meanings of *intentio* and *Zug*, both of which contain an implicit

retention is to be trivialized. Instead, we can now see how retention works through protention to connect past experiences with present ones, and how protention works with retention as it responds to the calls of various objects upon consciousness. In fact, we could say that only through retention and protention can the object affect us at all. Protention reaches forward to constitute objects, and then gives us the opportunity to feel the pull of these objects as they are constituted. In a sense, protention has two activities, acting as both the constitution of "arriving" experiences and an openness to their affective pull on the ego. As such, it remains directly involved in the constituting activity of the living present and it also exceeds that constitution by being open to the affectivity of objects that are not in focus.

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tension, or stretching. In this case, the stretching and tension is directed futurally. (p. 48) Mensch draws two conclusions from his analysis of affection. The first, "that affectivity is a necessary condition for our temporalization" (p. 48), is an attempt to explain why my consciousness extends beyond itself into its future. It seems, however, that, in order to be drawn to an object, temporalizing consciousness must already be established, i.e., consciousness must already have a futural extension. In fact, as we have been arguing, affectivity requires the living present in order to arise in the first place, especially given its reliance on protention. Mensch's second conclusion with relation to affection is that "constitution is also dependent on affection" (p. 49). We have argued, however, that the object must be already constituted--albeit passively--in order to affect the ego. Thus it seems that Mensch wishes to apply more influence to affectivity than might be possible, given Husserl's descriptions. Nevertheless, he is correct to note the importance of affection, especially when one considers protention in Husserl's philosophy.



CHAPTER SEVEN  
PROTENTION AS LINK TO INTERSUBJECTIVE TEMPORALITY

CONSIDERING "FAR PROTENTION" AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

"Far *protention*," to my knowledge, is not a notion that Husserl ever considered.<sup>240</sup> Since the notion of "far *retention*" was not taken up systematically for itself, even in Husserl's extensive analyses of passive syntheses where it was mentioned, perhaps it is not surprising that "far protention" never surfaced. However, given the activity of passive syntheses, association, and appresentation in my relation to other subjects, and the fact that each of these activities relies at least partially upon the protentional aspect of the structure of temporalizing consciousness, we could at least hypothesize as to the possibility of far protention in this area. Working parallel to the structure we established for retention, we could suggest that there might be both near protention and far protention, where near protention would act as the "immediate" protending activity based on the current constitution of the living present. Far protention, correlatively, would be a more extended anticipation in the living present and would be based not only upon current constitution but also on typifications that are sedimented through passive synthesis. Far protention would thus be only partially based on current, originary experience, and it would be involved in current constitution through its protention of general types and habits (in conjunction with far retention). Given far protention's probable relation with both the current presentation and the sedimentations in far retention, it would be the activity more fittingly applied to my appresentation of another subject's consciousness (as described by Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations*), rather than near protention. The consciousness of the other is a very different aspect of her being that I seemingly can only pretend on the basis of my

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<sup>240</sup> Cf. Dieter Lohmar, "What Does Protention 'Protend'? Remarks on Husserl's Analyses of Protention in the Bernau Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness." Lohmar's discussion of "rigid" hyletic protentions and "movable" intentional expectation is somewhat parallel to my considerations of a "near" and "far" protention. In fact, my analysis may answer more directly his question of how I can pretend two conflicting possible contents: While my "near" protention pretends a continued red light at the intersection, to use his example, "far" protention will pretend a change in the light similar to many past experiences that form a general expectation in the present.

experiences of myself. For this reason, I must rely upon a more extended aspect of protention than traditionally understood, one that reaches back into far retention as well as takes me beyond the physical being before me.

This consideration of "far protention" is not a consideration of any "new" aspect of protention, but rather, it is a discussion of what we already know about protention, one which gives the different activities of protention the headings of "near" and "far." Protention toward what is *not* specifically in the immediate present, toward what is most often based upon sedimentations of types in far retention, would be called "far protention," whereas protention toward the "immediately coming" would be "near protention." As with near and far retention, the designations of "near" and "far" would indicate *function* rather than *distance* from the immediate presencing of consciousness, as these functions of constitution all relate in some way with present constitution, and analogies to distance are inaccurate to any of them. Whether or not this new terminology works, though, we have a better understanding of how I can appresent the consciousness of another subject through the protentional activity of my own consciousness. Given my constant typical experiences of my own relation between my body and consciousness, and given my experience of the lived body of that subject there, I appresent the consciousness of that subject as a part of her total being. Structurally, this activity requires protention (or "far protention"), appresentation, apperception, and the passive synthesis (in far retention) of my own self-perception. Given this, we have described the foundations in temporalizing consciousness of Husserl's "analogy" to the other subject's consciousness.

Let us look at this a little more carefully. According to our analyses so far, my experience of another person, understood phenomenologically, occurs in the following way. As the other person approaches, my sensory experience can only be of her living body, which comports itself similarly to mine. Because of this similarity, I automatically "pair" that body with my own through an association based in my own passive synthesis of my body and a far protention that takes me beyond myself. In this pairing, a further association is made: My own self-experience in passive synthesis, of the fact that my lived body is always connected to my consciousness, is extended to this other body. This takes place through passive synthesis in far retention and through further activity of far protention, as I extend my self-experience of my body-consciousness to the other person, appresenting a consciousness for her. In other words, because I have always known my body to be linked to my consciousness, and because that body over there is similar to mine, I am able to appresent a consciousness related to that body there. This would be the passive-associative empathy we discussed earlier, which has its

foothold in far retention and passive synthesis, and which we now realize extends itself outward toward the other person through the activity of far protention. However, this pairing also takes place for another reason. Since that body is over there, and not over here where I am, I realize that we cannot be the same. Thus through a reproductive activity in consciousness, I take that body as having a consciousness itself, similar to mine *but not mine*. This move relates to the reproductive empathy we discussed earlier, which constitutes the other as an other being based on my experience of myself but in a reproductive way. This activity relies not only on far protention in its extension to the other as it constitutes her, but also on the reproductive activity of consciousness that normally carries out recollection or expectation. In reproductive empathy, I "recollect" my own experiences of myself and then pretend a constituted subject over there on the basis of that reproductive activity but as something other than myself. Husserl himself struggles with the fact that the other subject is like me but not me, and he asks how to create a philosophy that describes the other as neither one with me nor completely inaccessible to me.<sup>241</sup> Here we might suggest that passive-associative empathy constitutes the other as like me (through passive synthesis, appresentation, far retention and protention), and that reproductive empathy constitutes the other as not-me (through reproductive consciousness, passive synthesis, apperception, far retention and protention). These many functions together, manifested in these two coordinated levels of empathy, constitute my experience of other subjects.

Because this experience of another consciousness will never and can never be direct, we phenomenologists will forever remain somewhat frustrated on this topic. And in fact there are multiple criticisms of Husserl's phenomenological explanation of intersubjectivity. The most compelling critique from within the realm of phenomenological analysis, I believe, is that which argues that my experience of my own body is nothing like my experience of another person's body, and thus this "natural" similarity between the two bodies would never be automatically given. In a similar criticism, one can ask how it is that my experience of my own consciousness could ever approximate the assumption of another's consciousness. The crux of Husserl's argument, by his own admission, is that I must have some kind of *primordial experience* on the basis of which I can analogize, pair, mirror, and/or apperceive the other as a conscious being similar to myself. Husserl's answer is that my primordial experience of *myself as body and consciousness together*, along with *my direct experience of another person's lived body*, is sufficient as that experience on the foundation of which I can appresent the

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<sup>241</sup> *Husserliana* I, p. 139; Cairns trans., pp. 108-9.

other's consciousness. Most criticisms of Husserl's phenomenological intersubjectivity, at least those which understand the phenomenological project as a whole, challenge this combined experience as sufficient. So the question becomes: Is this self-experience and my experience of the other's body sufficient for a recognition of the other subject (as both a subject like me and yet other than me), or is there another experience even more fundamental that could serve as the foundation of this phenomenological link between myself and the other?

What would be the conditions of possibility of my knowing of another absolute consciousness? First of all, I must be able to extend my consciousness beyond itself, which means that I must have a consciousness that goes beyond a momentary presentation. We find this in my consciousness as living present which includes protention. It is because of this protentional structure, furthermore, that I am capable of having appresentations. Second, the other subject cannot be so foreign to me that it is impossible for me to experience her at all, because then I would have no experience that could bring me out of solipsism.<sup>242</sup> There must be some similarity between myself and the other subject, and there must be some kind of recognizable experience that indicates her conscious existence. Husserl suggests the similarity of our bodies, that the similar body of the other subject indicates a similar consciousness. But this suggestion may not be satisfactory, as we mentioned above, because my experience of my own living body, "from the inside," as it were, is essentially different from my experience of another person's living body "from the outside."<sup>243</sup> In addition, hearing the voices or footsteps of other subjects is often enough to convince me of their existence--sometimes all I need is to smell a familiar perfume. However, these footsteps or this perfume still do not give us that primordial experience that would make my appresentation of another consciousness possible. Finally, as we pointed out above, I seem to know of the existence of another consciousness immediately, and yet this occurs without any

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<sup>242</sup> This claim, of course, goes against Levinas's position when he discusses phenomenology and our apprehension of other subjects. Cf. especially Emmanuel Levinas's *Time and the Other*, trans. R.A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. Gail Soffer's insightful article, "The Other as Alter Ego: A Genetic Approach" (*Husserl Studies*, vol. 15, 1999, pp. 151-166), where she argues that the appresentation and empathy of the other subject cannot rely upon associative analogy alone. Instead, it is a combination of certain qualities that are already part of the human infant at birth and a lengthy learning process that takes place from birth well into childhood. Thus the solipsistic individual could not conceive the notion "if I were there" without a presupposition of intersubjectivity.

originary experience of that consciousness, such as I have of my own. The conditions of possibility for recognizing another subject as another conscious subject like me require *both* a structural openness to that recognition, i.e., protention, *and* a primordial foundation of intersubjectivity, i.e., some type of primordial experience on the basis of which I can recognize the other.

We will address the structural level briefly first: We find such openness built into the structure of temporalizing consciousness, established primarily in the living present, through protention. Because this structure *both* constitutes my "sphere of ownness" (as the structure of the present) *and*, protentionally, founds my openness toward much that is not mine, *this structural link to intersubjectivity rests in the structure of temporalizing consciousness*. In fact, in our discussion of retention, we found there the necessity for an openness to the other at the structural level because we already retain intersubjectivity in passivity. Here we discover such openness in the structure of protention, because protention is that aspect of the living present which is open to what is not immediately present, to what is not here right now, to what is not mine. Further, we note the integral relation of protention and retention, so that the passive synthesis of intersubjective experiences in far retention will inform the far protention of current intersubjective existence. And my openness in far protention will make this synthesis possible. It is because of this open structure that is the foundation of my own ego that Husserl can make the following claims in his manuscripts:

The other is co-present in me. Absolute ego, as living-, streaming-, existing-, concrete present, has the other's present as co-present, as she appresentatively manifests herself as herself in me, but also as the other manifests herself by having me in herself, constituted in her living present as co-present.<sup>244</sup>

Husserl is indicating in this citation an intersubjective existence associated with my own temporalizing consciousness, founding my immediate appresentation of another subject's consciousness. Protentional openness to what is other than myself makes it possible for me to constitute the other

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<sup>244</sup> "Der Andere ist in mir mitgegenwärtig. Ich absolut, als lebendig strömend seiende konkrete Gegenwart, habe seine Gegenwart als Mitgegenwart, als Appräsentativ-sich-als-er-selbst-bekundend-in-Mir, aber auch ihn selbst bekundet als mich in Selbstbekundung habend in ihm, in seiner lebendigen Gegenwart konstituiert in der Weise der Mitgegenwart." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 56. My translation.

subject as co-present with me, and to have the other subject "in me." Husserl says in another manuscript :

I and my primordial present. My primordial co-present as first horizon: primordial world, my intersubjective co-present which is mediated by the other subject. The existence of other egoic subjects with their primordial worlds—which impact me, from the horizon, in certainty of being or in modalities of being.<sup>245</sup>

*My relation with other-subjectivity surfaces already at the level of the "primordial present,"* so that we can say that the structure of temporalizing consciousness is open to this relation at its most fundamental level. The other arises in my present as fundamental to my experience of the world; she is my "first horizon." Given this, we can see that the protentional openness and retaining activity of temporalizing consciousness make possible a structural connection with intersubjectivity.

But while this structural foundation of intersubjective openness in protention, as well as in far retention, is necessary, it may not be sufficient for the apprehension of another's consciousness as I directly experience her living body. Thus we return to our problem of finding that primordial experience which would also be necessary for recognition of another consciousness. The other subject needs to affect me in such a way that I recognize her *as other subject*. This affecting, in other words, must be more than a simple encounter with a body or my experience of myself; it must be an experience that makes possible my experience of *any* subject *as other subject*. We consider the possibility, therefore, of the *affectivity* of the other. Does the other subject not call upon my attention in a way that is different than objects do? Do I not feel drawn to notice the other as he enters the room? Is this affectivity not a fundamental experience of my existence, different from any other experience in the world? Even very young children attend differently to other humans, especially to other children, than they do to objects and things. In fact, we often say that we can "feel" someone looking at us, even when we are not otherwise aware of another's presence.

Sartre's description of "The Look"<sup>246</sup> is an example of our phenomenological experience of another subject (through a visual

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<sup>245</sup> "Ich und meine primordiale Gegenwart. Meine primordiale Mitgegenwart als erster Horizont: primordiale Welt, meine fremdsubjektiv-vermittelte, intersubjektive Mitgegenwart. Das Dasein anderer Ichsubjekte mit ihren primordialen Welten - als mir mitgeltenden in Seinsgewissheit oder in Seinsmodalitäten, horizonthaft." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 372. My translation.

<sup>246</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Washington Square Press, New York, NY, 1956),

encounter), which shows the effect of the other's look upon me and my constitution of the world. Although Sartre's argument which addresses "The Look" is an *existential* one that describes the de-centering of one For-itself by another, I would like to examine his description with a *phenomenological* eye, one which takes the shared world as foundation for this experience. Even if the other subject does not look at me directly, according to Sartre, her regard of the world de-centralizes my own constitution of the world so that, necessarily, I no longer am center of the world. The world is hers as well.<sup>247</sup> Further, the look of the other makes me into an object in the world, and I have to fight this objectification with my own objectifying look if I do not wish to be objectified myself. Setting aside the obvious struggle between subjects that is implicit in Sartre's description, as well as his focus on "shame" as one of the primary experiences of the other, we can see in his discussion of "The Look" that there is a fundamental difference between my experience of an object and my experience of another subject because the other is a being that is actively constituting. In other words, *the other subject affects me through her constituting activity*. The other's constituting consciousness calls to me, it is a draw upon my consciousness. Further, it is a call *not* from her body, but from the activity of her consciousness: A specific, unperceived "angle" of her being calls for constitution, and thus it is appresented. This "angle" is appresented because the world is--and I am--constituted by someone in addition to me, and there must be a source for this other-constitution which I experience. This experience of the other's constituting activity is not a sensory one, although it is usually associated with the presence of the other subject's body. Instead, it is an imperceptible activity which, as an activity of constitution, converts the world-for-me into

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pp. 340-400. Although there are valid criticisms to this project of "The Look," I feel that the phenomenological description of the *experience* still stands as a valid suggestion for a primordial experience of the other. My own criticism, though, is against Sartre's argument that one may never need the actual experience of another subject in order to experience "The Look" (Barnes trans., pp. 368-70). While I agree that the structure established by "The Look" does not require the continual experience of other subjects in order to be effective, i.e., I can sense the "gaze" of the other even in complete solitude, I argue that this structure can only be established through some original and originary experience of another subject. In this chapter, I am arguing that there must be an original experience of the affectivity of another consciousness in order to establish the intersubjective link with my consciousness.

<sup>247</sup> Cf. also Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, p. 3; trans. Waltraut Stein, p. 5: "The living body of this [other] 'I' not only fits into my phenomenal world but is itself the center of orientation of such a phenomenal world." My modification.

an intersubjectively shared world. Thus the affectivity of the other's consciousness draws me toward it, even though I can never experience it directly. The other's consciousness affects me in such a way that this other consciousness is indicated through its own constituting activity. Just as other sides of an object call me to constitute them and thus I appresent them, so too the consciousness of the other subject affects me and causes me to appresent it. In fact, we could say that this call of the other's consciousness *is* my primordial experience of the other; when the consciousness of the other affects me, only then, it seems, would I be able to appresent and apperceive its existence.

I may never have seen the other sides of an object, *and yet they call to me*. In fact, these sides *as appresented* are what call me to them in the modified form of affectivity which we discussed earlier. So, something I have never directly experienced is capable of affecting me (partly based on my ability to protend), and this modified affectivity works in conjunction with what is currently appresented. Now we consider further: Husserl considers in his manuscripts that an affectivity as a unity may actually contain a multitude of affectivities within it.

So, affections can be not only united associatively as such, or, what is the same, only united through a simultaneous concurrence in the ego. They can also be united in the manner of an affection that has several affections in it.<sup>248</sup>

Thus, for example, when a beautiful painting in a museum calls me to examine it more closely, I could be drawn not only to the image as a whole, but also to the interplay of colors on the canvas, the meaning depicted through the image and painting's style, perhaps also the life of the artist or political messages intended in this type of art, etc. In the same way, the living body of another subject draws my attention toward it, but I am called not only by the physical presentation of a body, but also by the constituting activity that is performed by its consciousness. The consciousness of the other subject can call to me like the unseen sides of an object, and it calls me "through" both the visible presentation of the living body and, more importantly, *its own constituting activity*. This "call" of the other's consciousness is the primordial experience of the other which we seek as the

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<sup>248</sup> "Also Affektionen können nicht bloß als solche assoziativ einig sein, oder, was gleich gilt, bloß durch simultanes Zusammentreffen im Ich einig sein. Sie können\* auch einig sein in der Weise einer Affektion, die mehrere Affektionen in sich hat." [\*Husserl adds as a footnote to this statement: "Müssen sie?"—indicating that he was still working through this issue.] *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 196. My translation.



sufficient "originary" experience of other subjectivity that founds all intersubjective experience. We know we can never experience the other person's consciousness directly, and for this reason, we know that the primordial experience of other subjectivity cannot be a direct other-consciousness experience. However, the affectivity of the other subject's constituting activity is its own form of direct experience.

Husserl himself substantiates this conclusion by describing the other's constituting activity as a "co-constitution" with my own activity. Understanding the other's activity as *affecting* my own consciousness also contributes to an explanation of how Husserl can claim that the other's immanent experiences are "*in me*." And it shows how my consciousness and the other's can overlap to constitute a shared time and world. This affectivity of the other's consciousness, most importantly, provides the final clue to our understanding of *world-time*. Through the affectivity of other-consciousness (and the affectivity of my conscious activity on others), the consciousnesses of all subjects are able to synthesize and co-constitute a world-time, one that links all inner time-consciousness into one shared co-consciousness of the world. We will return to this later.

At this point, we should briefly consider intersubjective affectivity in light of our earlier discussions on empathy. As we noted above, the reproductive and passive-associative levels of empathy are exhibited as we constitute an other subject based upon our experiences of ourselves, i.e., our experiences of our own body and consciousness. But given this notion of affectivity as integral to my constitution of other subjects, we need to ask whether such intersubjective affectivity will fit into our conception of empathy as we have laid it out. Since the affectivity of the other's consciousness seems to act similarly to the affectivity of the "other side" of an object that is currently being viewed, we might say that it relies upon what we have called "near" protention, i.e., the extension of consciousness beyond what is immediately present but directly related to it. Correlatively, we have identified a type of "proto-empathy" that, as Husserl described it, revealed something like a "temporal fusion" with the other subject.<sup>249</sup> This "primordial" empathy, or proto-empathy, would be related with "near" protention, given its immediate relation with the present. Thus the primordial affectivity of the other, as her constituting consciousness calls me to appresent it, would be related to both "near" protention and this "proto-empathy" suggested by Husserl. In fact, the affectivity of the other further explains how I am able to *appresent* the other in addition to *apperceiving* her. Constituting the other on the basis of myself calls for a reproductive act of consciousness: I apperceive another

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<sup>249</sup> *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 437.

consciousness There, based on my understanding of my own Here, which results in a reproductive form of empathy (often mentioned by Husserl). But when the other's consciousness affects me through its own activity, then it calls to me as an unseen "angle" of her body, and I am able to appresent its existence as part of her present body. This proto-empathy then relates to a passive-associative empathy, founded in far retention and far protention. Thus we are able to consider intersubjective constitution through protention in a way similar to our review of retention earlier:

	<b><u>"near"</u></b> <b><u>protention</u></b>	<b><u>"far"</u></b> <b><u>protention</u></b>	<b><u>anticipation</u></b>
<b><u>originary</u></b>	originary	indirect originary	not originary
<b><u>activity</u></b>	constitution	futural typification and constitution	reproductive expectations
<b><u>empathy</u></b>	<u>"proto"-empathy</u>	<u>passive-associative empathy</u>	<u>reproductive empathy</u>
<b><u>intersubjective constitution</u></b>	<u>affectivity of the other's consciousness</u>	<u>passive-associative link with my own body-consciousness</u>	<u>reproductive link from my consciousness to the other's</u>

Figure No. 5

This table reveals how the different levels of protention are tied to affectivity and empathy in our encounter with other subjects. Our "fusion" with the other is immediate and related to temporalizing consciousness in near protention through proto-empathy and affectivity. Meanwhile, our experience of the other as a constituted subject relies both on this immediate connection and the passive-associative and reproductive activities of temporalizing consciousness. My ability to link with the other on the basis of the presence of her body, to associate a similar consciousness with that body, depends on a passive-associative empathy that is supported by what we have been calling far protention as well as far retention. Further, my reproductive activity, which identifies her There as similar to my Here, and which compares the otherness and similarity of the other with the otherness and similarity of my own recollections, is supported by the reproductive activity of consciousness. The other is present to us at every level of temporalizing consciousness, made possible by our protending activity (in conjunction with retention).

With this we have established both a structural and a primordial connection with the other. Both of these connections rely upon the interaction of retention and protention, through dependence on passive

synthesis in retention, retentive and protentional activity in appresentation, apperception, and association, and importantly, the protentional foundation of affectivity. Our last analyses revealed the crucial importance of protention in this link, as the affectivity of the other's consciousness depends directly upon protentional activity. Only through an analysis of the living present as a whole, i.e., of all its parts, are we finally able to see how the relation of intersubjectivity to individual temporalizing consciousness takes place. It is a relation both structural and primordial, based on protentional openness, retentive synthesis, and original experience.

Rather than understanding other subjects as conscious entities that I can *never* reach from a solipsistic position after the phenomenological reduction, and rather than merely imposing upon them some basic analogy to myself (a suggestion with which Husserl himself struggled because it seemed to oversimplify the experience), we find here that the other subject is already a part of me, at the most fundamental level of constitution. This mutual participation of self and other is seen through the retentive structure, which retains all intersubjective experience and indication, and through the protentional structure, which remains open to all otherness to myself, and which founds the primordial experience of intersubjectivity through the affectivity of the other subject's constituting activity. It is thus through the interrelated functions of retention and protention that I experience other subjects as co-constituting subjects in our shared world. Here we note that Husserl himself was tending toward similar conclusions. In fact, he writes in a manuscript:

The other subject is for herself just as well, but her for-herself is at the same time my for-me, *in the form of my potentiality of appresentation*. But the other subject herself is appresented in me and I in her. *I carry all others in me as themselves appresented and to be appresented, and as carrying myself in them in the same way.*<sup>250</sup>

According to Husserl, my consciousness "carries" the existence of other subjects in it, just as other consciousnesses "carry" my own existence. And we can only "carry" each other through the intersubjective aspects of our retentive and protentional structures. Intersubjective existence is therefore embedded in each subject through primordial foundations brought about

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<sup>250</sup> "Der Andere ist für sich ebenso, aber sein Für-sich ist zugleich mein Für-mich, in Form meiner Potenzialität der Appräsentation. Aber er selbst ist appräsentiert in mir und ich in ihm. Ich trage alle Anderen in mir als selbst appräsentierte und zu appräsentierende und als mich selbst ebenso in sich tragend." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 56. My translation and emphasis.

through affectivity, protentional openness, and retentional indication. In fact, we have finally identified "intersubjective temporality," as well as an understanding of how constituting consciousness can link with others in the synthesis of world-time.

#### FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The traditional founding relation in phenomenology has been the relation of the individual subject and object. The individual's constitution of the object established the fundamental structure of intentionality as "consciousness of . . .", and this relation cannot be dismissed. In fact, it remains as the foundational structure of phenomenology, even though the relation of subject to intersubjectivity at first might appear to challenge this original relation of subject to object. And yet, intersubjectivity is an integral part of this relation, for it is only through a shared world of objects (and bodies) that the relation of subject to intersubjectivity takes place, and it is likewise only through indication to intersubjectively mediated meanings that objects make their fullest sense. Perhaps, then, the most basic phenomenological structure should be tripartite (not a duality): *subject-object-intersubjectivity*.

As we know, temporalizing consciousness is still the source of my experiences, and my experiences can never belong to anyone else. A priori, I cannot have any other starting point than myself. Thus every experience will always appear as "mine." And yet, my intuitions as I experience them, i.e., as having different perspectives, as appearing in a shared temporal and spatial world, and as embedded in horizons of meanings beyond me, depend upon an intersubjective structure. In a different way, then, *intersubjectivity acts as a foundation of my experience*, phenomenologically understood. Intersubjectivity is part of me, both structurally and primordially, and it makes possible my experiences of the world as shared spatially and temporally. Conversely, intersubjectivity also supports itself on my experiences of the world. Through my very perception of spatial objects, I verify the intersubjective world. Even more strongly, I do so when I encounter another subject and find my consciousness affected by the consciousness of the other. My conscious activity in the intersubjective world, therefore, is also the validation of that world. And the intersubjective world validates me, for it is only through my constitution of this world that I am possible as phenomenological subject. In this way, we co-found each other, mutually, temporalizing subject, object, and intersubjectivity.

Such a three-part foundational structure would resolve any lingering challenges of philosophical solipsism in phenomenology, as well as negotiate more easily the relations between the subject and objects, not to mention other subjects. In fact, it will explain more easily our experience as examined phenomenologically. When I walk into a room, for example, I do not experience the entire room simultaneously, nor as a mere blend of stimuli; I experience a series of objects, already constituted, that rise up from the entirety of the room and call my attention to them. This is an elementary experience, analyzed phenomenologically. According to such analysis, these objects rise up according to their own ability to call notice to themselves, i.e., their affectivity. The analysis would reveal appresentations, horizons, meanings, etc. with relation to each object. But while I realize that the objects I notice first when I enter a room have much to do with their placement, colors, the lighting of the room, etc.--all of which affect what will rise up for me--this affectivity due to contrast and placing is not the only thing involved in my experience. Objects are constituted not only by way of their affection through contrast and its pull on my consciousness, but also through their affectivity due to the meaning they have for me, and this meaning comes through my involvement in an intersubjective world. Thus I see the couch as "something to relax on," and it may arise as most strongly affective, even if it blends completely into the colors of the walls, because of this meaning (especially if I need to relax). The intersubjective world gives me these meanings, and even if I may try to "create" some meanings on my own, it is through my link to intersubjectivity that I experience objects as meaningful, complete things. The link to intersubjectivity completes our phenomenological understanding of a basic experience. In addition, it places our understanding of temporalizing consciousness in a new light, i.e., as intersubjective temporality.

This new structure of subject-object-intersubjectivity complements our mentioning, although abbreviated, of the new notion of "*intersubjective temporality*." We are beginning to see here that intersubjective temporality is not *another* temporalizing consciousness in addition to my own. Rather, it is an important aspect of *my own temporalizing consciousness*, one which provides the link between my consciousness and other consciousness. Intersubjective temporality founds a co-constitution with other subjects through the open structures of retention and protention. As Husserl writes in the margins of a manuscript:

In all of this there is--as long as we have not gained primordially--an equivocality; for everything is implied in me, and the totality of consciousness is not only my

"stream of consciousness," but implies (totality) all other streams of consciousness, etc.<sup>251</sup>

Here Husserl points to temporalizing consciousness as the foundation of both the phenomenological subject and intersubjective existence. My own stream of consciousness already implies those belonging to all others. While my own structures remain my own, they are also open to and connected with the constituting activities of other consciousness. Thus we each structurally "carry" everyone else in ourselves as potential intersubjective encounters.

Intersubjective temporality, then, is the activity and structure that gives us world-time. Through its link with other subjects, through implying all other streams of consciousness in itself, intersubjective temporality is the basis of the synthesizing structure of world-time. And with this we have verified a connection with intersubjectivity at the level of temporalizing consciousness. At this point, we conclude our analysis of protention and its relation to intersubjectivity. This analysis has been the final contribution to our analysis of the living present as a whole, and with it, we have finally reached the meaning of what we are calling intersubjective temporality. The openness of protention, as foundation to appresentation, association, and affectivity, is clearly a cornerstone to the relation of individual temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity, and thus to intersubjective temporality.

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<sup>251</sup> "In all dem herrscht, solange die Primordialität nicht gewonnen ist, Zweideutigkeit; denn in mir ist doch alles impliziert, und Totalität des Bewusstseins ist nicht nur mein 'Bewusstseinsstrom', sondern implizit (Totalität) aller anderen Bewusstseinsströme etc." *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 362. My translation.

## CONCLUSION

Our analyses have resulted in several important conclusions. First of all, in chapter six, we established a fairly thorough understanding of protention, including the following points. Protention functions as the open framework for temporalizing consciousness, whose openness allows for our apprehension of new and surprising situations as well as the continuance of ongoing situations. Further, through its functioning as open framework, protention itself becomes fulfilled, and this discovery has caused us to call into question the necessity of the term "*Urimpression*." We suggested that Husserl's discussion of "fulfilled protention" indicated that a broader term for the "moment of fulfillment" would be more appropriate, such as the "zone of actualization." Second, while in the process of comprehending protention in itself, we found that there exists an essential relation between protention and intentionality, where protention is the active foundation of intending consciousness, allowing for the appresentations of a presentation. We also found that there is an essential relation between protention and affectivity, which shows the "object's side" of the connection between subject and object and an indirect relation between intentionality, affectivity, and appresentation via protention. This notion of affectivity, furthermore, gave us an important link between constituting consciousness and the other subject, which we addressed in chapter seven. The openness of protentional temporalizing consciousness, its support of appresentation and especially of affectivity, and Husserl's own indications in his later work all point to an important interrelation between intersubjectivity and temporalizing consciousness, a relation which appears to contribute to the essential foundation of phenomenology.

PART FOUR  
INTERSUBJECTIVE TEMPORALITY



## INTRODUCTION

Here I will discuss the notion of intersubjective temporality for itself. First, I will tie together the arguments from each chapter, fleshing out the structure of intersubjective temporality. Then I will address some general questions that arise when one considers both the temporalizing subject and its intersubjective relations at once in phenomenology. Finally I will define intersubjective temporality directly and in relation to the phenomenological project. Because intersubjective temporality is not an entirely new structure within consciousness, understood phenomenologically, but instead is based upon structures already recognized by phenomenologists, it could be integrated into ongoing analyses in phenomenology without difficulty, and it might provide a perspective that would be helpful in reaching important conclusions.

## CHAPTER EIGHT INTERSUBJECTIVE TEMPORALITY

### A REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

My work up until now has meant to establish the foundations of a notion for which Husserl's analyses opened the door. I have shown that, at each level of temporalizing consciousness, there exists a connection to an intersubjective structure and content, and I have suggested that this connection be called "intersubjective temporality." Here I will review the accomplishments of each chapter, bringing these individual arguments together to create the complete picture of intersubjective temporality as understood from the paradigm of Husserlian phenomenology. I will present the individual arguments, placing them alongside one another in order to show their overall contribution to a phenomenological understanding of intersubjectivity. Each individual aspect of temporalizing consciousness reveals its own link to intersubjectivity, and in the same way that the different functions of temporalizing consciousness interrelate with one another, so too do their individual links with an intersubjective structure and content work together to establish intersubjective temporality.

I began chapter one with an analysis of the Urimpression and then of the living present. This established that the Urimpression can only be understood as an abstract, hypothetical notion, "pure immediate impression," but that we could never experience this Urimpression as such nor could we discuss it without admitting its dependence upon retention and protention. On the other hand, the living present is understood as the living, constituting level of consciousness that stretches beyond any immediate presence, and in its activity, constitutes our experiences as temporal. In chapter two, I turned to discuss an argument made by Dan Zahavi, that objective constitution indicates an intersubjective structure through its reference to the object's "mundane" horizons as well as to broader, "transcendental" horizons of meaning. Zahavi points out that, if I am experiencing an object as a whole, then I am necessarily appresenting the infinite number of profiles of that object that are not directly present to me, and these profiles are the perspectives and meanings that could only be had by other subjects at this moment. As such, the absent profiles indicate an open, intersubjective horizon, and they therefore link me with intersubjectivity. This description would begin to explain Husserl's reference to our world as co-constituted by

me and others, as well as to a "transcendental intersubjectivity." This "transcendental intersubjectivity," according to Zahavi, is indicated through my experiences of transcendent objects. In chapter three, I turned to a related question: How, if the world is co-constituted by a multitude of subjects (each with his own temporalizing consciousness), are we all able to have *the same now*? Since Husserl had mentioned a notion called "world-time" several times in his later manuscripts, I considered it as a possible solution. World-time, I found, is an intersubjectively constituted present, arising from all individual constituting consciousnesses. It is the synthetic link of all temporalizing consciousnesses, making a world-present together. Since it is the constituted presence of all consciousness, it is not reducible to any individual inner time-consciousness, although the now is the same for both; it is based in my temporalizing consciousness just as it is based in all others. Thus world-time is the level of synthesizing consciousness between any individual now-consciousness and what we understand as objective, scientific, or "clock" time.

In chapters four and five, I carried out a careful analysis of retention, and discovered that the different functions of retention can be divided into two main categories, called "near" and "far" retention by Husserl. Near retention is primarily involved in the active, immediate constitution of the living present. In other words, near retention is involved in constituting the objects and meanings we are encountering currently. Near retention "holds onto" the experience of what is immediately present as it passes, making it possible for us to understand what is currently transpiring. Far retention, since it is interrelated with near retention, also contributes to current constitution; this it does by maintaining the general "memories" that contribute to our everyday recognition of identities and types, and synthesizing them with current experiences. This means that far retention holds onto the typification of similar objects and patterns in past experiences, helping to constitute related objects or patterns that are present. In addition to this function, far retention maintains primordial foundations, which are the major discoveries, decisions, new skills, etc., that become part of us even after we have forgotten about them. For example, my having learned how to type is not something I regularly recollect, but this ability is always passively present, and it is activated (without being specifically recalled) whenever I sit at a typewriter or computer. These primordial foundations allow for the possibility of certain activities, such as some types of association, since we relate these past momentous occasions to similar ones that arise in the present. The analysis of far retention, finally, revealed that the genetic structure of consciousness also contains a primordial foundation of intersubjectivity: The genetic structure is the foundation of such activities of constitution as apperception

and association, and these activities link us to the perspectives of other subjects. They do this by opening us up to intersubjective meaning and by leading us to the horizons of perspectives held by other subjects. Both the typifications of our recognition of other perspectives belonging to other subjects, along with the experience of their co-constitution, and our constitutive functions (such as apperception) that make such recognition possible are supported by far retention. This discovery gave us new insights into the relation of individual temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity.

In chapters six and seven, I added a new layer to the argument, revealing protention as the crux of a temporalizing consciousness that exceeds its own boundaries. First, the notion of the "Urimpression" is more appropriately understood as a "fulfilled protention" which is integrated into its becoming "near" retention. In fact, "fulfilled protention" better describes the function of the living present as an overlapping of its extensions, and precludes any misguided idea that one can experience the Urimpression in itself. It also supports the argument that the living present must be understood through its overlapping extensions. This discovery led to further development of the overall thesis: Because of protention, temporalizing consciousness is able to reach beyond its own borders, linking it with what is "other." Therefore, the openness of protention makes possible the extension of constitution into the realm of what is "other" to the ego, including an openness to other subjectivity. In this way, protention acts as an essential foundation to the link between the subject and intersubjectivity, and it does so both structurally and at the level of primordial experience. Protention extends consciousness beyond immediate presencing and allows for the possibility of being surprised. More specifically, protention acts as the structural support for anything new and different, including the experience of affectivity. Affectivity is not only understood as the call of objects or their absent profiles, but it can also refer to the call of the constituting activity of other subjects. Further, the affectivity of another subjective consciousness is arguably the required primordial experience of the other which is needed to describe intersubjective experiences from a phenomenological perspective. Given this, protention would act as the structural foundation for any intersubjective relation through its function of openness to what is "other," and it would also make possible the primordial experience of affectivity of the other's temporalizing consciousness that grounds this relation. Finally, protention's interrelation with retention, including passive synthesis, provides the basis for the connection with the other subject. Because I am able to link my own self-experience with the primordial affective experience of another

constituting subject, we apperceive each other as co-constituting our shared world and as living in a shared presence.

In these discussions of the different aspects of temporalizing consciousness, I also addressed the notion of empathy. An analysis of Husserl's references to empathy revealed that empathy itself can be understood to have more than one level: The first, and most well-known, level is that which I called reproductive empathy, where I re-present the other as other. The second level is based in far retention and relies also on far protention, and I called it passive-associative empathy. This sort of empathy connects me with the other subject such that I can recognize her as a subject similar to me. This empathy is also integrated with my apprehension of the other through association and appresentation. Finally, Husserl asked about a third possible level of empathy, which I called a "proto-empathy." This form of empathy is my "fusion" with the other, revealing our connection in the present immediate constitution of each other and of objects. Each of these levels of empathy show, first, the complexity of our interconnection with other subjects, and second, that this interconnection, at every level, is based in temporalizing consciousness. Thus the notion of an "intersubjective temporality" developed throughout our analyses of both temporalizing consciousness and empathy.

In chapter seven I began to consider the ramifications of these analyses, by suggesting that phenomenology might no longer base itself upon a duality between subject and object but rather upon a triad relationship of subject-object-intersubjectivity. This triangular relation "fills in the gaps," as it were, of each dual relation within it, through reference to the third member. It also reveals a way for us to understand the notion of intersubjective temporality, as this term includes the links of all three, subject, object, and intersubjectivity, implicitly. Thus in considering intersubjective temporality, we effect a transformation of the traditional phenomenological project in itself: Phenomenology must now regard some of its own discoveries, namely its intersubjective foundations, as part of its ongoing project.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Cf. Kelly Oliver, "The Gestation of the Other in Phenomenology," printed in *Epoché*, volume 3, numbers 1 and 2, 1995, pp. 79-116. Although Oliver's position is admittedly critical of Husserl's way of defining the ego in phenomenology, it is interesting to see that her general argument is fairly similar to ours here, that Husserl's ego is not defined solely on the basis of itself.

## RECONSIDERING PHENOMENOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

The above analyses have led repeatedly to a certain paradoxical conclusion: that a phenomenological analysis of inner time-consciousness results in a recognition of intersubjective temporality. In other words, a careful examination of "my" inner time-consciousness reveals its necessary link not only with objectivity but also with intersubjectivity. At the same time, I have shown that this relation to other subjects does not destroy the individual subject but rather is part of the very structure of consciousness. It is for this reason that I have called this discovery "intersubjective temporality," in order to indicate both the individual side and the intersubjective side of this relation. "Intersubjective temporality" is meant to describe temporalizing consciousness in its true form, i.e., as linked to both objective and intersubjective horizons.

This conclusion may be quite obvious in some disciplines--for example, in psychology it is usually assumed that the individual subject is created through its relation to other subjects, and vice versa--but this is not so obvious in philosophy, and especially in a philosophy that often hearkens back to its modern foundations, i.e., to Descartes and Kant. It is for this reason that I have been working to disclose this link between subjective temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity on the basis of phenomenology's own assumptions. I took the different aspects of inner time-consciousness in themselves and questioned them against the relation of consciousness to its experiences of perceived objects and other subjects. By doing so, what began as a phenomenological assessment in the traditional sense, i.e., through a methodological solipsism, produced a new development in phenomenology itself: The phenomenological method revealed its own intersubjective foundations. And this arises through the important fact that, because of its temporalizing structure, individual consciousness necessarily exceeds its own borders, and it creates a bridge with the consciousness of other subjects.

But how can there be intersubjective foundations at a level where the ego itself may not be fully constituted? The level of inner time-consciousness could be understood as a pre-temporal transcendental field made up only of the flow of experiences. "I" would not exist here, nor would anyone else. An examination of this level, however, reveals not only the activities of retention and protention but also the constitution of this flow as experiences *through an individual perspective*. Thus, while my person may not be apparent at this level, the *individual* perspectives of a person are. But given this, how can the world give itself to me as having multiple perspectives at once when I only have one perspective at a time? The answer, we discovered, is twofold: First, we can only recognize multiple perspectives if consciousness is able to go

beyond the immediate moment at hand, and it does this through the active living present. Then, these other, absent profiles, we realized in chapter two, indicate perspectives that could be had by other subjects, and further, horizons of meaning not originally constituted by me. In other words, while I might be able to have other profiles as I move into them later (or earlier), the *coexistence* of unlimited absent profiles with this present one here reveals not only the transcendence of objects as perceived, but also the transcendence of their meaning. Both of these types of transcendence indicate, furthermore, the presence of objects and meanings *for others*, beyond my perspective. In addition, I see that my own consciousness is able to access these meanings, even though they exceed my own experiences. My consciousness reaches out into these horizons of intersubjective meaning.

If consciousness is interrelated with other consciousnesses, though, then what position does the living body play in this relation? Is it merely secondary to an abstract intersubjective structure, or rather, is the body fundamental to intersubjective experiences? Although I have had to set the body aside in these analyses of temporalizing consciousness, we can address it briefly with relation to Husserl's own arguments. Husserl himself argues that intersubjective experience *begins* with the appearance of the other subject. Even if the other subject is not bodily before me, I may hear her voice over the telephone, smell her perfume, feel her tiptoeing up behind me, etc. For this reason, I would challenge Sartre's position that "The Look" of the other subject is completely independent of any individual bodily presence. Instead, I suggest that there must be some originary experience of other, living subjects before one can talk of a general intersubjectivity that would affect me in the absence of any individuals. But let us consider this question in a way similar to the considerations above, by examining intersubjective structure and content. The notion of an intersubjective structure harkens back to the discussion of the indications of intersubjective meanings, recognized through the openness of consciousness to other profiles beyond the one directly before it. This structure of meaning does not depend upon the physical presence of others, and yet it implies their existence. But could it stand without any direct experience of other subjects, ever? It would seem that our openness to intersubjective horizons and meanings could only arise through some kind of direct experience of others, for the following reasons: It is only through the existence of the other subject that I know that such perspectives and horizons transcend me in the first place, because without intersubjective horizons I would only have horizons that could be based in my own position and temporalizing consciousness, giving me a very limited perspective on the world. Further, I only know the existence of the other through her body. The body of the other subject is my

only *direct* evidence of her existence at all. In fact, it is usually via the body that I am affected by her constituting consciousness. Given this and my own self-experience, I know that the body of the other is integrated with her constituting consciousness. Since the constituting consciousness of the other makes me aware of intersubjective horizons overall, and since this consciousness is integrated with a body, then we would have to say that the body of the other is required at some point in our recognition of intersubjective horizons, even if the body is not needed for *every* recognition of these horizons. The living body of the other subject, we can suggest, is not secondary to her consciousness in my apprehension of an intersubjective structure, rather, they are somewhat inter-dependent--but an in depth analysis establishing this suggestion must be left for another project.

Now we turn to a final question: If we argue that temporalizing consciousness is structurally open to intersubjectivity, how does this affect the phenomenological project as a whole? Must we now abandon the phenomenological method entirely, and thus phenomenology itself? Because phenomenology is by definition a self-critical project, a project which develops and changes according to its own effectiveness--and we see throughout Husserl's own work how this is true--then we can hardly give up phenomenology or its method because of this discovery. At the same time, however, the manifestation of individual temporalizing consciousness as having an important intersubjective aspect could lead to some adjustments in the traditional phenomenological approach. The reduction to "my" experiences must always recognize the transcendental ego's intersubjective connections as the phenomenological method strives toward its results. Furthermore, the notion of "absolute consciousness" must be taken with regard to its intersubjective underpinnings. One might argue that a solipsistic position can only be achieved at a static level of phenomenological analysis, but that at the genetic level, which underlies it, we will always discover an intersubjective connection. But these new developments hardly ruin the phenomenological project. Instead, they better prepare it for new kinds of investigations, some of which are prevalent in current philosophy. These include investigations that take up the notion of the individual subject not as an atomic "agent" but as an integrated being, both influencing and influenced, for example, in philosophical studies of race, gender, and manifestations of cultural power. Phenomenology is one of very few philosophical methods that, first, continues to develop its approach, and second, is fundamentally interested in human subjectivity and living consciousness. As such, it can address these relatively "recent" topics in philosophy quite adeptly. But it is also able to carry out Husserl's final



desired goal: a program of ethics, as a systematic philosophical approach.<sup>253</sup> For this reason, the notion of intersubjective temporality is important not only because it has become apparent in the very foundations of the subject, but also because it is a notion that brings us closer to an analysis of ethics through revealing this foundational relation of subject and intersubjectivity. In fact, it is for these more broadly teleological reasons that this book was originally begun--and will lead to further work. But let us turn now to defining this important aspect of subjectivity understood phenomenologically.

#### DEFINING INTERSUBJECTIVE TEMPORALITY

Intersubjective temporality can be addressed on two now-familiar levels of temporalizing consciousness, on the levels of structure and content. But we have neither eliminated the need for subjective inner time-consciousness nor created a completely new form of temporality. Instead, we have shown that both the form and content of temporalizing consciousness reveal intersubjective links at this primordial level. With this, I have not lost my sense of self, but instead am able to understand, phenomenologically, how consciousness, which appears to be "isolated" from others, is able to apprehend the existence of other conscious beings, and to experience its world and its temporality as shared with others. Thus, intersubjective temporality gives us a way to understand the ego without isolating it in itself (an extreme version of modernism), or losing it completely to external influences and meanings (an extreme version of post-modernism).

In order to finalize our understanding of intersubjective temporality, we shall look at its structure first. The primary link to intersubjectivity lies in the structure of protention (although, of course, this is supported by retention and the living present as a whole). In order to co-constitute a world with others, consciousness must be able to reach outward toward other profiles, and toward the horizons of other meanings and consciousnesses, and it can only do this if it has a structural openness to what is other from itself. Protention makes this possible through its stretching into the future and to all that is beyond the scope of immediate consciousness. Structurally, protention is the

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<sup>253</sup> Cf. *Husserliana* XXXVII, *Husserliana* XXVII, especially pp. 20ff., and *Husserliana* VI. Cf. also Klaus Held, "Intentionalität und Existenz Erfüllung," in *Person und Sinnerfahrung: Philosophische Grundlagen und Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven*, ed. Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Peter L. Oesterreich. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 101-116), especially pp. 111-116.

form of the living present that extends itself outward, toward the future and toward what is not yet immediately present for the ego. As such, it brings the consciousness of other subjects into the scope of its own constituting activity. It forms the bridge between my consciousness and the other's. In conjunction with this, protention supports the experience of affectivity, because protention takes consciousness beyond immediate constitution into the perspectives that are beyond my direct reach, allowing these other perspectives to attract my attention. In this way, protention makes possible the affectivity of another consciousness which calls me to constitute it as other. The bridge established by protention enables the constituting consciousness of another person to affect my own, in such a way that I am able not only to notice her, but also to notice her as another subject similar to myself. More generally, protention makes possible all appresentation and apperception, by taking consciousness beyond the presentation and perception at hand. This activity is essential in the constitution of another consciousness, both as consciousness and as other, since appresentation and apperception take what is present and indicate aspects of it beyond what is before me.

As part of the structure of intersubjective temporality, retention appears to play a somewhat subordinate role to protention, but its activities are equally essential to those of protention. Retention maintains past experiences that are part of present constitution; this includes certain past experiences which are beyond what is immediately past and yet are still somehow involved in immediate constitution, i.e., the "general memories" that assist us in constituting types of objects or patterns that we have already experienced in the past. As such, retention supports the "other side" of appresentation and apperception, taking the familiarity of a current presentation or perception, linking it to similar experiences in the past, and projecting these possibilities based on past experience into the appresentations and apperceptions. This connection between retention and the activity of appresentation and apperception has two important effects with regard to intersubjectivity: First, the retained consciousness as *my own* is linked with protention's openness to the other, so that I can appreciate both the similarity and the otherness of the other. Second, this experience of the other is itself retained, making intersubjective connection a persistent part of my constituting living present. Along with this, retention maintains my passive synthesis of myself as a consciousness involved in the world through my body, and it maintains my experiences of horizons of objects and meanings that indicate intersubjectivity. These it projects into my constitution of another subject so that I understand both her similarity to me and her otherness. Thus past

experiences of intersubjective horizons and my own self-experience are synthesized and maintained in far retention, to be integrated into my experience of any other subject. Structurally, then, retention connects the bridge maintained by protention (between my consciousness and the other's) with my experiences of myself and of intersubjective horizons. In doing so, this activity of retention, in conjunction with protention, completes the link between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity.

The activity of retention also reveals the presence of intersubjective content, and so we turn here to address the level of content in intersubjective temporality. This retained content, even when taken as reduced to its pure givenness, continues to support the link between consciousness and intersubjectivity. Several types of retained content indicate intersubjective connections: the indications of intersubjective horizons that arise with the experience of transcendent objects, the experience of and reference to intersubjective meanings, the consistent experience of the now as shared, and the primordial experiences of other constituting consciousnesses as they affect my consciousness. All of these types of content, maintained by retention, assist in the present constitution of objects as well as of other subjects. They inform current experiences when they fit the type or pattern of retained intersubjective experience. In other words, retained content of prior intersubjective experience, or of typical experiences that indicate intersubjectivity, are part of the living present as retained, and they contribute to current constitution when present experience awakens this retained experience or typification. We must note that this is not a circular argument for intersubjectivity, as at the basis of all retained intersubjective content lie our primordial foundations of intersubjective experiences. These primordial foundations are our primary intersubjective experiences, through the affectivity of the other's consciousness. These affective experiences ground all experiences of other subjects, making the apperception of another consciousness possible through passive synthesis. Simply put, my originary affective experience of another consciousness is embedded in retention and, as such, it enables the "automatic" constitution of other subjects as others. Thus even the content of intersubjective experience is founded on primordial foundations and passive synthesis, all of which is maintained and made possible by a structure that both retains and is open to intersubjective horizons.

Intersubjective content on the side of protention is also important. This is the content that arrives through the affective call of the other subject's consciousness. While this content is not any direct apprehension of the other's consciousness or her own experiencing acts, it is still intersubjective in nature. The other's constituting consciousness affects me differently than

any object, or even any other sort of experience. I recognize a constitution of the world that is not my own, which de-centralizes me. This pulls me to realize that there is another constituting activity besides my own, one that shares and co-constitutes our world. This de-centralizing experience, along with the affection of the other's constituting activity itself, is the content of my experience of the other. Naturally, I cannot have the other's consciousness directly, or else she would be me. But I am affected by her consciousness along with her body, and this becomes the content for my primordial foundation of intersubjective experience. Thus, protention brings intersubjective content into the realm of retention, bringing about the primordial foundations of intersubjective experience, and in doing so, establishing the basis for the passive synthesis of intersubjective connection.

So let us address intersubjective temporality with regard to both its structure and content at once. Intersubjective temporality is the aspect of temporalizing consciousness that, structurally, reaches out for and maintains a connection between consciousness and other consciousness, and, with regard to content, indicates intersubjectivity both through retained experiences of intersubjective horizons and through affectivity. Intersubjective temporality refers to specific aspects of temporalizing consciousness as it is already understood phenomenologically, not a new type of temporality. It points to the structure of temporalizing consciousness as enabling an intersubjective link through its activity of constitution. And it points to the constituted content of consciousness, either retained or currently experienced, as indicating the co-constituting activity of multiple subjects. Thus we find the link between the temporalizing subject and intersubjectivity through recognizing the intersubjective links and indications within the phenomenological subject itself. Further, because intersubjective temporality reveals the bridge between my consciousness and that of the other, it also reveals our interdependence: The consciousness of the other must also reach out to me.

But, in order to clarify our understanding of this notion, we should perform one final analysis: my encounter of another subject as understood phenomenologically through intersubjective temporality. We can pretend, as Husserl did, that the experienced world is entirely reduced to the realm of constituted experiences, and that I take all experiences to be *without* any references to intersubjectivity. Another human body appears before me, and looks at me. In this reduced realm, I cannot assume the existence of another consciousness, but I can acknowledge, and must address, how this other body affects me. When the other subject looks at me, I feel pulled toward it, even if I take it only as a body. I am called to consider its perspective in

comparison with my own. I am pulled to feel the emotions related through its expressions. I am provoked to consider how I appear from that perspective. How does this take place? First, I can only consider a perspective or emotion other than my own on the basis of a protentional activity. Even if this is still not another subject in my eyes, I require the protentional aspect of temporalizing consciousness to exceed my position and consider another. Second, through the very activity of extending consciousness beyond its own realm, I am forced to recognize something *other* than myself, and I am open to this on the basis of protention. Third, the pull I feel, for example, when I see the pain on another's face, does not necessarily arise through a constituted similarity between that body and my own. Thus this emotive pull must have some other source than the similarity of our bodies. It is at this point that we recognize the affective pull of the other's constituting consciousness. Since I am called to feel the emotions of the other on the basis of something other than a comparison between our bodies, then something about her actual experiencing, i.e., her constituting consciousness, has affected me somehow. In other words, the criticism of Husserl's comparison of our bodies as the basis for intersubjective recognition can be taken as the launching pad for acknowledging the affectivity of the other's consciousness. If the other's body should not awaken a connection between me and her (because of the essentially different experience of my body versus of her body), then there must be some other reason that I am pulled to consider her perspective in such a specific way. The reason is found in the affectivity of her constituting consciousness. But although the emotions of the other assist us in understanding this situation, the affective call of the other's consciousness does not necessarily occur through emotion. I can be pulled by the very recognition of the other as sharing my constitution of the world, the recognition that the body over there contains an activity that takes the absoluteness of my "zero-point of orientation" away from me. I recognize a similarity between her constituting activity and my own, and constitute her as another subject similar to myself. This is made possible because of the interconnected activity of retention and protention in constituting consciousness. Retention brings my own experience of myself as active consciousness connected with this body, in passive synthesis, into my protending activity which is taking me beyond my immediate present into the horizons of the other subject. In this way, retention and protention are essential to the phenomenologically reduced experience of another subject, and they also show how this experience is made possible.

Alfred Schutz would say that this recognition of another subject forces me back into the natural attitude, that I can no longer maintain the phenomenological reduction once I acknowledge the existence of other

subjects and their effect on me.<sup>254</sup> But I can make claims about intersubjective experiences without insisting on intersubjective existence, just as I analyze worldly experiences without asserting the existence of the world. These analyses have not been about intersubjective *validity* (which Schutz insists cannot be had at the phenomenologically reduced level), rather, they seek the *phenomenological foundations for intersubjective experiences*, just as Husserl sought the foundations of our experiences of transcendent objects after having bracketed out the world. According to all of the above analyses, intersubjective experiences are structurally maintained by consciousness. But here is the more radical argument: Constituting consciousness itself contains structural indications of intersubjective horizons. This we have seen through analyses of the constitution of transcendent objects, of the notion of the affectivity, of appresentation and apperception, of association, and, most basically, of protention and retention. Temporalizing consciousness maintains a structural link to intersubjectivity as part of its foundation, and in answer to the call of the other. Therefore, intersubjectivity, as Husserl indicates himself, can be seen at this primordial level of consciousness. In this way, Husserl counters Schutz's assertion (although analyses of *social* consciousness and interaction may still be limited to the natural attitude).

But let us consider this in light of our analyses of world-time. Is intersubjective temporality the same as world-time, or are they two distinct temporalizings? We have defined intersubjective temporality as the intersubjective aspect of my own temporalizing consciousness. Since it is based entirely in individual consciousness, however, it cannot be the same as world-time. World-time we defined as the synthesis of all constituting consciousnesses which together constitute a shared present. In fact, this synthetic activity makes possible our subsequent constitution of an empirical, or "clock," time. World-time, then, is not the same as intersubjective temporality, but instead, it is founded on the interconnection of all consciousness. But given our understanding of intersubjective temporality as making possible any connection to other egos, we could suggest that the interconnection of all egos in world-time would be founded in intersubjective temporality. In other words, the openness to intersubjective horizons in intersubjective temporality is the ground for our co-constitution of the world with other subjects, and this co-constitution includes the synthetic

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<sup>254</sup> Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," trans. Frederick Kersten. *Collected Papers, III, Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. I. Schutz. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1966, pp. 51-84.

constitution of a world-time by all subjects. World-time, therefore, is supported by intersubjective temporality.

We have clearly taken Husserl beyond his own realm: We filled out his descriptions of "near" and "far" retention, even considered the possibility of a "near" and "far" protention. We took his references to a "world-time" and pushed them to their limits, and we constructed the notion of "intersubjective temporality" in order to name the link between temporalizing consciousness and other subjective consciousness that is regularly indicated in Husserl's own writings. But these analyses have been supported by references to Husserl's work, taking up his direct claims, and some of his hints, with regard to the need to find the foundation for intersubjective experience. As a final note, I would like to point to a couple remaining citations that show Husserl's explicit interest in the relation between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity:

Now I experience the other, and naturally I have self-experience of myself. I find that *"in my now I experience the other" and his now*; I find *my and his now as existing in one*, my appearances and his, that which is appearing for me as valid and his, but both as the same.<sup>255</sup>

In another passage, we see even more clearly how Husserl intends the subject to be understood as integrated with other subjects:

What I am now does not arise from my past and my therein respective directedness toward futural becoming, but rather, in my respective present I take up the being of the other due to an importance which grows in him, which now keeps working in me because it belongs to me—and then it works into the others, and this process continues.<sup>256</sup>

In both passages, we see how Husserl was tending toward an analysis of the relation of temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity. We also see

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<sup>255</sup> "Ich erfahre nun den Anderen und habe von mir natürlich Selbsterfahrung. Ich finde das 'in meinem Jetzt erfahre ich den Anderen' und sein Jetzt; ich finde als in eins seiend mein und sein Jetzt, meine Erscheinungen und seine, mein Erscheinendes als mir Geltendes und seines, aber beides als dasselbe." *Husserliana* XV, p. 332. My emphasis and translation.

<sup>256</sup> "Was ich jetzt bin, erwächst nicht aus meiner Vergangenheit und meiner darin jeweiligen Gerichtetheit auf künftiges Werden, sondern in meiner jeweiligen Gegenwart nehme ich das Sein des Anderen hinsichtlich gewisser seiner in ihm erwachsenen Geltungen mit auf, die nun als die mir zugeeigneten in mir fortwirken--dann hineinwirken in die Anderen, und so beständig." *Husserliana* XV, p. 603. My translation.

that he was indicating a necessary link between these two levels of phenomenological study, a link which is essential to a phenomenological understanding of the world. Husserl never carried out an extensive analysis which sought the foundations of these experiences, but the relationship between temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity was clearly important to him. Intersubjective temporality might answer some of the challenges he faced, and our descriptions of the intersubjective aspect of inner time-consciousness grounds the link between constituting consciousness and intersubjectivity to which Husserl was pointing.

I have intended here to link Husserl's notion of the temporalizing subject with an intersubjective structure by establishing an understanding of intersubjective temporality. This will further enable productive discussion between philosophical analyses which focus on the subject and those which examine intersubjective relations. The notion of intersubjective temporality has pushed the limits of phenomenology on the basis of its own assumptions, showing that phenomenology is fully capable of being both a philosophy of subjectivity and one of intersubjectivity.



## CONCLUSION

I have analyzed Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness at every level, taking up each aspect for itself and examining Husserl's discussions from early to late writings. I looked at the Urimpression and the living present, then retention, and finally protention. Each of these aspects of constituting consciousness was established for itself, and then considered in light of intersubjectivity and our co-constitution of the world. Executing my own analyses in many cases, but basing them on Husserl's own writings, I argued that this foundational level of consciousness, which constitutes temporality, the ego, and all of our experiences, is necessarily linked with intersubjective horizons and consciousness. I called this aspect of consciousness "intersubjective temporality."

Intersubjective temporality maintains my own self-experience alongside my experiences of intersubjective horizons, and it projects beyond my presencing of consciousness toward other consciousnesses in my experience. It enables my fluid constitution of other subjects, and my experience of the world as shared, co-constituted, and mutually experienced in one temporality called world-time. It does not cause my own ego to self-destruct, nor does it disable my ability to reflect or carry out the phenomenological reduction. Instead, intersubjective temporality explains phenomenologically most of my experiences of the world and any experiences of other subjects.

The notion of intersubjective temporality led me to consider intersubjectivity as included in the foundations of phenomenology. Thus there would be a three-part foundational structure, subject-object-intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the structure that enables the experience of transcendent objects such that they appear to have an infinite number of intersubjectively accessible possible profiles. Conversely, these profiles indicate this intersubjective structure. Intersubjectivity also makes up part of the foundation of the subject itself, as intersubjective horizons are embedded in and indicated by the experiencing subject. Naturally, the subject indicates intersubjectivity as well. And, of course, the relation between subject and object has already been well established in phenomenology. For these reasons, intersubjectivity seems to be a necessary leg in the foundations of phenomenological study, without trivializing the importance of the other two. But how this new understanding of phenomenology will affect it as a discipline has yet to be seen. It could be that the foundations of phenomenology will hardly be shaken by these conclusions, since its method and its primary conclusions still stand as essential to its program. But perhaps, given the preceding analysis of the foundations of consciousness and my description of intersubjective temporality, our approach to

phenomenological investigation will now include a new perspective. In any case, it is hoped that the analyses carried out here, and their conclusion in the notion of intersubjective temporality, are worthy of consideration by phenomenologists who take the questions of temporalizing consciousness and intersubjectivity seriously.

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