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ACADEMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will reflect upon the involvement of the academic staff of universities and colleges in a number of European countries in the governance of their own organisations. Certain aspects of the nature of this involvement will be discussed as well as the appreciation of the academics of their own governance activities. In addition an estimate will be made of the costs of the academic involvement in institutional governance processes. The countries included are Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

In the framework of this chapter governance refers to the rules, structures and enforcement mechanisms concerning the academic and administrative decisions made in a university or college. It has to do with the preparation of the decisions, the actual decision-making process and the implementation of the decisions taken. We interpret governance *structures* as "the ways in which an organization divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them" Mintzberg (1979, 2).

Why is the involvement of academics in institutional governance of relevance for understanding the academic profession? One answer to this question can be found in interpreting a university or college as a professional organisation. Scott (1995) refers to professional organisations as organisations in which professionals take part in the determination of goals and standards. Professionals have in general more power than other categories of employees. They can also be distinguished as regards the aspects of their work they try to control. In this respect professional groups differ, for example, from unions in the sense that they not only want to control their working conditions but they even want to be able to define their own work.

> Professionals seek cognitive control-insisting that they are uniquely qualified to determine what types of problems fall under their jurisdiction and how these problems are to be categorized and processed; they seek normative control, determining who has the right to exercise authority over what decisions and actors in what situations; and they seek regulative control, determining what actions are to be prohibited and permitted and what sanctions are to be used. *(Scott, 1995, x).*

This control-seeking behaviour is also a characteristic of the academic profession, especially in universities. Academics not only want to be involved in the determination of their working conditions, e.g. salary, benefits, and facilities, but they also want to control the definition of their work and profession, inside their own organisation as well as in the wider regulatory, normative and cognitive context. As a consequence, analysing various aspects of the actual involvement of academics in the governance of their own organisations will give an insight into the nature of the control-seeking behaviour of academics and the effectiveness of it.

Anthony Welch (ed.), The Professoriate: Profile of a Profession, 35-58.

In this chapter we will mainly use data from *the International Research Project on the Academic Profession*, published by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching[1] in 1996, for reflecting upon the effects, effectiveness and (qualitative and quantitative) nature of the involvement of academics in institutional governance. In the Carnegie study, research directors from each participating country were involved in the design of the core of the joint questionnaire used. Even though research directors could omit questions from their own country's survey instrument, the questionnaires used in the four European countries were to a large extent identical.[2]

2. GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN UNIVERSITIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2.1 Administration versus Governance

In the Carnegie study various items have been distinguished that are assumed to have an impact on the working conditions of academics as well as on the way they perceive their profession. One of these items is administration. Under the main heading of "administration" a number of issues have been addressed, of which the most important are:

1. The degree to which specific decisions are made centrally or decentrally in a higher education institution.
2. The opinion of academics on the governance of their institution.
3. The extent to which academics can influence specific decisions within their university or college.
4. The degree of control academics have over designing their own courses and determining their own research projects.

The first two of these "administration issues" are of an administrative nature, while the third and fourth are academic in nature. We prefer to use the term "governance" instead of "administration" when referring to the set of academic and administrative activities in which the academic staff of universities and colleges are involved.

In order to understand the importance of institutional governance for the functioning of academics in universities and colleges we will report the scores for the four included countries for each of the four "administration" issues included in the Carnegie survey. This reporting consists of the mean scores per issue for each of the four countries and a statistical analysis of the variation of the scores between the countries.[3]

Second, we will analyse the impact of the employment status on the scores. This refers to the difference between those academics with a tenured, full-time position and those who do not have such a position. We assume that tenured, full-time staff are in general more interested and involved in the governance processes at their institution leading to different opinions on these governance processes.

Third, we assume that different types of higher education institutions will have different governance protocols and procedures. Since the Carnegie survey took place in 1992 the institutional arrangements are a reflection of the situation in that year. This implies that we did make a distinction in each of the countries between a university and a college sector. In (Western) Germany the distinction is between the *Universitäten* and the *Fachhochschulen*, in the Netherlands between the *Universiteiten* and the *Hogescholen*, in Sweden between the *Högskolan* with and without research, and in England between the (old) universities and the polytechnics.[4]

In general in each of the countries the universities have a fundamental research task, and have the right to offer Master and Ph.D. degree programmes, while the colleges are more vocationally oriented, do not have an explicit research function, and offer Bachelor and in some cases Master degree courses.[5]

Finally, we will look into the effects of the disciplinary background of academics on their opinions on governance issues (Becher 1989; Biglan 1973a, 1973b). We have used a disciplinary classification that makes it possible to analyse the impact of the discipline in a comparative way.[6] The discipline is assumed to affect both the substance of the academic work as well as the organisation of it. Even though we only cover the organisation of the academic work, this assumption would imply, amongst other things, that the discipline will have a major impact on the way academics perceive the governance of their institution.

How important is "institutional governance" for academics? In other words, how much are they themselves involved in governance processes and how are they influenced by the outcomes of these processes? In the Carnegie questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate the hours they spend per week on teaching, research, service, governance (referred to as administration in the relevant question

Table 1: Involvement of academics in institutional governance

Hours "governance" Per week	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	England
0	16.4%	25.4%	8.4%	4.5%
0 < x >1	0.7%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%
1 < x > 8	57.9%	54.9%	61.7%	57.8%
8 < x > 20	21.0%	18.0%	22.2%	31.4%
> 20	4.0%	1.7%	5.4%	6.5%
Valid number (=100%)	2575	1424	1026	1853
% missing	8.1%	18.9%	8.6%	4.8%

Legend:
In the first column the numbers of hours spent on governance activities are presented. In columns 2-5 the percentage of the respondents per country who answered the question are indicated. The valid number of respondents per country is mentioned in row 7, while the percentage of respondents missing, i.e. not having answered this question, are reported at the bottom of the table.

in the Carnegie survey), and other academic activities. In table 1 the indicated numbers of hours spent on governance are presented.

In looking at these data carefully, a number of observations can be made. First, the involvement of academics in institutional governance is highest in England, followed by Sweden respectively, with the lowest participation in the Netherlands and Germany (see also table 6). Second, while in England only 4.5% of academics are not involved in governance at all, this figure amounts to over 25% for the Netherlands. Third, only in Germany and Sweden do a (small) group of academics participate in governance just a little, i.e. less than 1 hour per week. Fourth, in all four countries more than half of the academics are involved in institutional governance between 1 and 8 hours per week, i.e. the equivalent of one working day of 8 hours or less. Finally, in England almost twice as many academics as in the Netherlands are involved in governance processes more than 8 hours per week (38% versus 20%).

All in all it can be concluded that the general pattern as regards the time spent by academic staff of universities and colleges on institutional governance differs considerably from country to country, as well as from academic to academic within the four countries.

An indication from another country for this diversity can be found in the Norwegian studies on the developments in university administration undertaken by NIFU in 1991 and 2000 (Gornitzka, Kyvik and Larsen, 1998; Gornitzka and Larsen, 2001). These studies show that the average time tenured, full-time employed academic staff of Norwegian universities spend on administration is between 17 and 18 percent of their gross working hours[7] per week. Remarkably enough the time spent on administration is rather stable. The outcomes of the 2000 study show no significant change compared to the situation in 1991.

How are these differences between countries reflected in the data from the governance section of the Carnegie survey? By looking in more detail on how the four variables mentioned above, i.e. country, employment status, type of institution, and discipline, affect the answering patterns we expect that we can indicate the degree to which each of them is of influence on the respondents' perceptions of and their involvement in institutional governance. The discipline and the employing institution are expected to affect the work of academics most (Clark, 1983). Since hardly any comparative research has been done on the influence of the national context on the working conditions of academics, we are especially interested in the influence of the variable "country".

2.2 Centralised versus Decentralised Decision-making

The respondents were asked to indicate whether certain decisions in their institution can be characterised as "centralised", "decentralised", or a blend of both. In the Carnegie questionnaire it was explained that *"centralised" usually means that key decisions are made by top administrators (or a governing board). "Decentralised" means that such executive decisions are made by faculty of the institution*.

Table 2: Perception of level of centralisation in institutional decision-making

Country/variable	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Key decisions								
Selecting key administrators	1.83* (1812)	1.30 (1243)	2.15 (885)	1.20 (1701)	x	o	o	o
Choosing new faculty	4.17 (2347)	4.29 (1598)	3.19 (839)	3.30 (1821)	x	o	+	x
Faculty promotion/tenure decisions	3.54 (2136)	3.79 (1535)	3.13 (901)	2.01 (1738)	x	o	+	o
Determining budget priorities	2.40 (2087)	2.79 (1383)	2.87 (927)	1.80 (1759)	x	o	+	x
Determining overall teaching load	2.56 (2128)	4.26 (1504)	3.07 (934)	3.47 (1778)	x	-	+	x
Setting admission standards for undergraduates	**	**	2.74 (910)	3.23 (1707)	x	o	-	x
Approving new academic programmes	3.19 (1743)	3.72 (1453)	3.03 (914)	2.41 (1732)	x	+	+	x

Legend

I The figures in columns 2-5 are average scores per country. The respondents could choose on a five-point scale from (1) completely centralised to (5) completely decentralised. We interpret a score of < 2 as centralised and > 4 as decentralised. A score between 2 and 2.5 is interpreted as 'tending to centralisation' and one between 3.5 and 4 as "tending to decentralisation".

* *Reading example*: The figure of 1.83 is the mean opinion of the German respondents on the degree to which the selection of institutional key administrators is centralised in their country. The figure between brackets (1812) refers to the number of valid answers. The score of 1.83 indicates that the selection is perceived as being centralised.

** In Germany and the Netherlands the statement on setting the admission standards for undergraduates was not included in the questionnaire since this decision is made outside the institutions by the central government.

II In columns 6-9 we have indicated the effects each of the four relevant independent variables, i.e. C(ountry), E(mployment status), T(ype of Institution), and D(iscipline) has on the dependent variable, i.e. the perceptions of the academic respondents on where specific decisions are made. With respect to C and D we have indicated whether the differences between the categories of these variables (4 countries and 5 disciplines respectively) are significant on the 1% reliability level. With respect to these two variables an **x** suggests a significant difference, while a **o** indicates that the differences are not significant. With respect to the other two variables we have indicated the positive or negative effects of the variables E and T on the dependent variable, by using the categories tenured/full-time and (respondent coming from a) university as the reference categories. This implies that if the dependent variable has a higher score for tenured/full-time employees (E) or for university respondents (T) the effect parameter has a positive sign; a **o** suggests no significant effect.

As can be seen in table 2 in England, Germany, and the Netherlands the degree of centralisation differs greatly between the seven decision-making areas. In none of these three countries a clear centralisation or decentralisation pattern can be observed.

With respect to Sweden six out of seven decisions seem to be a mixed responsibility of centralised and decentralised decision-makers, while the seventh, i.e. selection of key administrators, is only perceived as tending towards being a central responsibility. As regards the other three countries a closer look at the data reveals a remarkable differentiation between these countries concerning the

centralisation versus decentralisation perceptions. It can be concluded that each national higher education system is perceived to have a typical distribution of authority, i.e. centralised versus decentralised responsibilities, with respect to the seven decision-making areas in question.

In general the English scores suggest that the key decision-making processes are perceived as being somewhat more centralised than the same processes in the institutions in the other three countries. With all mean scores being lower than 3.5 the English academics have the perception that with respect to none of the seven items decision-making is decentralised, with only the determination of the teaching load slightly tending towards being considered as a decentralised responsibility.

To what extent are the mentioned differences between the academics of the four countries the result of cultural and other differences between countries? In addition, can we find indications that variables such as employment status, type of institution, disciplinary background, have a strong effect on the perceptions of the academics with regard to the statements on centralised versus decentralised decision-making? Studying the effects of all four variables simultaneously, the result is that the effect of the country is for all items statistically significant. However, most of the observed variation remains unexplained, implying that unknown variables play a role in the perceptions of academics on centralisation issues.

A second observation is that the explanatory power of the three other variables besides country, however statistically significant they may be, is small compared to the explanatory power of the variable 'country'.

2.3 Perceptions of Institutional Management Matters

An important governance issue concerns the relationship between academics and the institutional management. A number of statements relating to the functioning of specific institutional management and decision-making processes are included in the Carnegie questionnaire. The opinions of the respondents concerning these statements are presented in table 3.

The scores show interesting differences between the countries. The statement *Lack of faculty involvement is a real problem* is the only statement with respect to which all four average national scores are neutral, i.e. they are between 2.5 and 3.5. When comparing the ranking of these average scores with the actual involvement of academics in governance (see table 1) it is interesting that the English respondents tend most to agree with the statement while they have the highest involvement in governance. On the other hand the Dutch respondents are tending most to disagree with this statement while their involvement in governance matters in their institution is lowest.

With the exception of the statement mentioned above, all statements have led to at least one average score that is outspoken. The greatest differences in average scores between countries can be found with respect to the statements *The administration is autocratic* and *I am kept informed about what is going on at this institution*. As regards the first the Dutch academic respondents disagree with the statement, while the English respondents agree with it. This difference in perception

on the autocratic nature of the institutional administration could possible provide an explanation for the differences in opinion between English and Dutch academics on the control over academic policy processes discussed in the next section.

The second statement (I am kept informed, etc.) is rejected by the German academics, while the Swedish respondents tend to agree with it. The German score is in line with the perception of German academics on the poor quality of the communication between faculty and management in their institution.

Table 3: Opinions about institutional management and decision-making processes

Country/variable Statements	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Top-level administrators are providing competent leadership	3.75	3.70	3.13	3.49	x	o	-	x
I am kept informed about what is going on at this institution	3.96	3.28	2.68	3.30	x	o	-	x
Communication between the faculty and the management is poor	2.49	3.26	3.09	2.63	x	o	+	x
The institutional management is often autocratic	2.59	3.56	2.80	2.25	x	o	+	x
Lack of faculty involvement is a real problem	2.82	3.42	3.13	2.72	x	o	+	x
Students should have a stronger voice in determining policy that affects them	2.87	3.62	3.04	2.89	x	+	+	x
The administration supports academic freedom	3.96	**	2.89	2.74	x	o	-	x

Legend:

I The figures in columns 2-5 are average scores per country. The respondents could choose on a five-point scale from (1) agree through (3) neutral to (5) disagree. We interpret a score of < 2.5 as agreement and > 3.5 as disagreement with a statement. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as a neutral score, i.e. the respondents have on average not an outspoken meaning on the statement in question.

** The statement *The administration supports academic freedom* was not included in the Dutch questionnaire.

II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

Looking at the remaining statements two interesting results are first that the German academics feel that their institutional administration does not support academic freedom. There are no data from the Carnegie survey that might help us to understand this negative feeling.

Second, the Dutch academics do not want to give students a stronger voice in (co-)determining policies that affect them. Given the nature of the governance structure of Dutch universities introduced in the early 1970s in which students have a strong voice in determining *any* institutional policy, the negative feeling of Dutch academics towards giving students more power can possibly be explained by their (negative) perceptions of the effectiveness of this democratic structure. This governance structure was changed at the end of the 1990s resulting, amongst other things, in a far more limited role of students in university decision-making processes

(de Boer, Denters, and Goedegebuure, 1998; Maassen, 2000). In the light of the above mentioned opinions of Dutch academics concerning the role of students in institutional governance, it is not surprising that there were hardly any protests from the side of the academic staff on this limitation.

Finally, it can be observed that the respondents are in general not impressed by the leadership qualities of their top-level managers. The German and Dutch academics disagree, while the English academics strongly tend towards disagreeing with the statement *Top-level administrators are providing competent leadership*.

The general conclusion is that the relationship between academics and institutional management is far from optimal. The data indicate that many academics in the four countries feel that there is a lack of competent leadership as well as a lack of information about institutional matters. In addition communication between academics and management is, with the exception of Sweden, considered to be rather poor, while with the exception of the Netherlands the institutional management is seen as being often autocratic.

The academics coming from England and Germany clearly feel more strongly than their Dutch and Swedish colleagues that the institutional management is often autocratic, while communication with the managers is apparently more problematic in Germany and England than in the other two countries. In which way this perception of the functioning of institutional management can explain the general negative opinions on institutional governance in Germany and England has to be a topic for further research, since this suggestion can not be supported from the Carnegie data-set.

The second part of table 3 consists of a factor analytic index indicating the influence of the four factors *country, employment status, type of institution,* and *discipline*, on the answering patterns of the respondents. This index strongly suggests that the factor *country* has a far stronger explanatory power than the other factors.

2.4 Influence of Academic Staff on Academic Policy-making

The degree to which academics can personally influence the shaping of key academic policy-making is an important governance issue, since the participation of academics in decision-making on academic policies at various levels in their institution can be expected to be related to the commitment of these academics to their institution. While, as can be seen in table 4, the differences in scores between the countries seem to be relatively small, nonetheless the effect of the country is statistically significant.

Table 4: Influence of academics on institutional policy-making

Country/variable Level	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Department	2.90	2.41	2.36	2.34	x	-	-	x
	(2608)	(1692)	(1069)	(1913)				
Faculty/School	3.39	3.49	3.30	3.18	x	-	-	x
	(2657)	(1658)	(1064)	(1908)				
Institution	3.81	3.85	3.46	3.67	x	-	-	o
	(2661)	(1630)	(1065)	(1909)				

Legend:

I The figures in columns 2-5 are average scores per country. In England, Germany, and Sweden the respondents could choose on a four-point scale between (1) very influential; (2) somewhat influential; (3) a little influential; and (4) not all influential. The Dutch respondents were offered a five-point scale from (1) very influential to (5) not at all influential. We transformed the Dutch answers into: $y = (x-1)4/5 + 1$ (with x = old score; y = new score). The interpretation of the score is as follows: very ($< 1,5$), somewhat ($1,5 < x < 2,5$), a little ($2,5 < x < 3,0$), not at all ($> 3,5$) influential.

II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

However, the variable responsible for the explanation of the most variance is in this case the employment status. Especially at the institutional level the influence of non-tenured staff is minimal. It can be assumed that an explanation for this can be found in the long time it takes academics in general to become involved in institutional policy matters. Non-tenured staff in most occasions simply have not been employed long enough by an institution to have become part of the institutional academic policy networks in such a way that they can exercise influence on academic policy making at the institutional level (see also table 9).

The type of institution or the discipline hardly has an effect on the degree to which academics influence academic policy making. The overall explanation of the other two variables is reasonably high.

2.5 Control over Teaching and Research Activities

The Carnegie questionnaire included a question on the amount of control academics have on designing their own courses and research projects. This question was not part of the Dutch questionnaire. Therefore, only the results of the other three countries can be discussed.

As can be seen in table 5 academics feel that they are in control over the design of their teaching and research activities. The Swedish and English respondents have indicated that they have more control over choosing their own research topics than over deciding upon the substance of their teaching activities.

Table 5: Control in designing courses and research projects

Country/variable Statement	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Free to determine content of own courses	2.40 (2253)	*	2.40 (1004)	2.46 (1788)	x	-	-	x
Free to focus research on any topic	2.34 (2420)	*	1.90 (982)	1.87 (1767)	x	-	-	x

Legend

I The figures in columns 2, 4, and 5 are average scores per country. The respondents could choose on a five-point scale from (1) agree through (3) neutral to (5) disagree. We interpret a score of < 2.5 as agreement and > 3.5 as disagreement with a statement. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as a neutral score, i.e. the respondents have on average not an outspoken meaning on the statement in question.

* This question was not included in the Dutch questionnaire.

II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

The multivariate analysis suggests that the impact of the employment status and the type of institution is less than expected. The effects of the country and the discipline on the answering patterns, despite these being statistically significant, are hardly relevant since they only explain a minor part of the variation.

3. COSTS OF ACADEMICS' INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction

Earlier in the chapter we gave an overview of the hours academics indicate that they spend per week on institutional governance matters. As can be read in table 1 large differences exist between the four countries as well as between individual academics within the countries. What do these differences mean when it comes to the costs of higher education? How expensive is the involvement of academics in institutional governance?

Next to the questions on governance, questions on salary were also included in the Carnegie survey. Combining data on these two items with data on the background of the respondents enables us to calculate the costs of the time spent by academic staff on governance.

We have used two different ways of making the calculations. The first consists of taking the contract of the academic staff as a starting-point. We assume that full-time academic staff of universities and colleges are supposed to work 40 hours a week and we have taken the number of hours indicated to be spent on average on governance as a percentage of the 40 hours. This percentage is multiplied with the indicated annual salary resulting in the average annual (salary) costs per academic staff member.

The second way is based on the (indicated) actual working hours per week. The included full-time respondents are hired to work 40 hours a week. However, they indicate to that they actually work many more hours per week than 40 herewith

reducing in fact their hourly (salary) costs. As a consequence you can argue that the hours spend by academics on governance are less expensive than they appear to be when taking the contract as a starting point for cost-calculations. One might say that in practice academic staff of higher education institutions produce an output surplus.

In tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 these two ways of calculating governance costs are presented for each of variables used in the first part of the chapter, i.e. country, the discipline, the position and the type of institution. These variables are presented in the first column of each table. In the second column the average number of hours spent on governance as indicated by the respondents can be found for each (sub) variable as well as the total average score per variable. In the third column the reader can find what percentage the average number of hours spent on governance presented in the second column is of the total indicated hours of work per week. In the fourth column the average annual costs per academic staff member of the involvement of academics in institutional governance calculated on a contract-basis (40 hours per week) are presented. Finally in the fifth column the reader will find the average annual costs per academic staff member calculated on the basis of the indicated hours of work per week. Leaving the small differences[8] between the variables that can be read in the bottom row of each table aside, the overall figures show that on average each respondent spends about 6.2 hours per week on governance matters, which is about 13% of the total number of working hours as indicated by the respondents themselves. The average costs of these 6.2 hours are about $7,450 per academic per year when calculated on a contract-basis and about

Table 6: Costs of involvement of academics in institutional governance per country

Country	Average indicated hours per week spent on governance	Percentage of total indicated hours of work per week spent on governance	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (contract-based costs)	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (real time costs)
Germany				
Mean	4.81	10%	$6,065	$5,020
N	2575	2575	2521	2521
Netherlands				
Mean	4.99	10%	$6,045	$4,610
N	1424	1424	1402	1402
Sweden				
Mean	6.86	16%	$8,280	$7,435
N	1026	1026	1008	1008
England				
Mean	8.76	19%	$9,960	$8,400
N	1853	1853	1808	1808
Total				
N	6878	6878	6739	6738

$6,210 when calculated on the basis of the actual working hours as indicated by the respondents. Taking these average scores as a reference point, one can see in each of the tables for which (sub) variable the score is higher than the average and for which it is lower.

Table 7: Costs of involvement of academics in institutional governance per discipline

Discipline	Average indicated hours per week spent on governance	Percentage of total indicated hours of work per week spent on governance	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (contract-based costs)	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (real time costs)
Natural science				
Mean	5.86	12%	$7,275	$5,970
N	1643	1643	1618	1618
Engineering				
Mean	6.62	15%	$8,165	$7,180
N	1042	1042	1022	1022
Health sciences				
Mean	4.86	10%	$6,210	$4,925
N	1057	1057	1030	1030
Social & behavioral sciences				
Mean	6.94	15%	$8,000	$6,825
N	1790	1790	1757	1757
Humanities & arts				
Mean	6.29	13%	$7,205	$5,815
N	1165	1165	1135	1135
Total				
N	6697	6697	6562	6562

Table 8: Costs of involvement of academics in institutional governance per type of institution

Type of institution	Average indicated hours per week spent on governance	Percentage of total indicated hours of work per week spent on governance	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (contract-based costs)	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (real time costs)
University				
Mean	6.03	12%	$7,335	$5,905
N	5534	5534	5416	5416
"College"				
Mean	7.02	17%	$7,915	$7,520
N	1282	1282	1262	1262
Total				
N	6816	6816	6678	6738

Table 9: Costs of involvement of academics in institutional governance with reference to employment status

Employment status	Average indicated hours per week spent on governance	Percentage of total indicated hours of work per week spent on governance	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (contract-based costs)	Average annual costs in US$ per academic (real time costs)
Tenured				
Mean	7.81	16%	$10,230	$8,285
N	3322	3322	3250	3250
Non-tenured				
Mean	4.67	11%	$4,765	$4,215
N	3402	3402	3342	3342
Total				
N	6724	6724	6592	6592

The data presented in tables 6 – 9 confirm that the diversity between countries and between individual academics referred to above is also reflected in the costs of the academics' involvement in institutional governance. The average real costs of this involvement are, for example, in Sweden per academic about 60% and in England about 80% higher than in the Netherlands (table 6). When it comes to disciplinary differences (table 7) the "academic governance" costs in the health sciences are remarkably lower than in engineering and social & behavioural sciences. Also the employment status affects costs significantly (table 9). In contract related costs the

involvement of tenured academic staff is more than twice as expensive as the involvement of non-tenured staff in institutional governance. The type of institution seems to have less influence on academic governance costs (table 8), at least when using the contract as the basis for calculating the costs. As a consequence of the larger number of hours academics in universities work per week compared to their counterparts in the college sector, the difference becomes more dramatic when the real time costs are taken as a basis for the calculation.

We realise that we have to be very careful in interpreting the Carnegie data in this respect, given that they only include self-indicated accounts of time spent on broad categories of activities. Nonetheless, we feel that by relating the data on time spent to the data on salaries we can at least give a rough indication of the costs of academics' involvement in institutional governance.

A more sophisticated approach is needed to understand how the nature of institutional governance *structures* affects the involvement of academics in governance and the costs of this involvement. In the next sections an example of such an approach is given.

3.2 Communication and Implementation Costs

A number of researchers at CHEPS have developed the contours of a conceptual framework for analysing the link between specific characteristics of a university or college governance structure and the costs that are related to these characteristics (Binsbergen, de Boer and van Vught, 1994, 219). In this framework a governance structure is interpreted as an "institution." Based, amongst others, on Giddens (1979), March & Olsen (1989), Rowe (1989), and North (1990), CHEPS' institutional interpretation of organisational governance structure in higher education implies that it can be defined as a social fact consisting of formal as well as informal rules. This social fact is constructed by actors for meeting two rather fundamental requirements underlying every organised human activity, i.e. the division of labour into tasks and competencies (structural differentiation) and the co-ordination of these tasks and competencies (Binsbergen, et al. 1994, 222-223).

For describing and examining differences in organisational governance structures, in other words the differentiation requirement, it is of importance to start with specifying the organisational tasks, the relevant actors involved, and the rules that guide their behaviour. However, these three categories (tasks, actors, and rules) are not enough for comparing different governance structures. For that the co-ordination requirement has to be conceptualised as well.

In the conceptual framework developed by CHEPS it is assumed that every governance structure implies a certain point of view regarding co-ordination. Alternative governance structures can be compared according to the ways co-ordination is achieved in these structures. With respect to higher education the authors take as a starting point "that every form of co-ordination to be found in the real world of higher education institutions can be "scored" on the continuum of co-ordination mechanisms ranging from *planning* to *mutual adjustment*" (Binsbergen et

al. 1994, 231). In addition every form of co-ordination will have its own set of costs and benefits.

With respect to the co-ordination mechanisms referred to above, i.e. planning and mutual adjustment, it can be argued that both are potentially costly. In order to understand their specific cost structure Binsbergen and his colleagues (1994, 231-233) have applied notions from the transaction costs and principal agent approaches (Williamson 1979, 1981). They argue that in each organisation there are co-ordination costs related to reaching agreements (to be called *communication costs*) as well as costs that come from enforcing the terms of agreements (to be called *implementation costs*). It is assumed that in an organisation in which co-ordination takes place (mainly) through mutual adjustment, the communication costs will be high as a consequence of the time that needs to be invested in bargaining, negotiation, consultation, and persuasion. All these different forms of communication imply, amongst other things, that many formal and informal meetings have to take place that take up a lot of time. As is argued by Lindblom (1977, 80): "Transactions…. are costly. Negotiation of an exchange is sometimes more costly than it is worth."

The communication costs of co-ordination through planning will be lower as a consequence of the way in which a planning mechanism routinises and standardises problem solving and decision making processes. It can be assumed, though, that co-ordination through planning leads to higher implementation costs than co-ordination through mutual adjustment. Decisions made and agreements reached through mutual adjustment are to a much larger extent "owned" by those who have to implement them, than decisions made and agreements reached through routinised and standardised planning procedures. The assumption is that the higher the feeling of (joint) ownership with respect to decisions and agreements the easier it is to implement them. Lindblom's (1977, 19) finding in relation to institutional planning that "there can be no denying …. that the establishment and maintenance of authority is often costly", should be cited here.

Based on these considerations two hypotheses have been formulated (Binsbergen et al. 1994, 235):

a. *The more a governance structure of a higher education institution includes a form of co-ordination which is close to the basic co-ordination mechanism of planning, the lower the level of communication costs and the higher the level of implementation costs*
b. *The more the governance structure of a higher education institution includes a form of co-ordination which is close to the basic co-ordination mechanism of mutual adjustment, the higher the level of communication costs and the lower the level of implementation costs.*

In the framework of this chapter we will not present a full empirical test of these hypotheses. However, we do want to examine the extent to which the Carnegie data allow for an exploration of the assumed balance between communication and implementation costs. We will do so by following the operationalisations of

Binsbergen and his colleagues, after which we will discuss the extent to which an indication of implementation costs can be derived from the Carnegie data.

Communication costs can be operationalised by measuring the costs of the total and relative amount of time invested in governance matters. By using the salary data of the academics in question, and by multiplying the salaries by the total, the relative number of hours spent on governance communication costs can be estimated.

Implementation costs are more difficult to calculate. One possibility is linking these costs to agency relationships, resulting in three kinds of costs: monitoring costs, enforcement costs, and residual loss or consequence costs. These three forms refer to: the costs of evaluating an agent's performance; the costs of enforcing an agent's task when he performs inadequately; and the costs when an agent does not realise the principal's goals completely (Binsbergen et al. 1994, 238). Possible operationalisations of these three forms might be the time spent on evaluation and reporting procedures and processes multiplied by salary data on those being evaluated and those reporting (monitoring costs); time spent by managers on control activities, again multiplied by salary data (enforcement costs); and various indicators, for example, the number of conflicts between academics and managers, the time spent on these conflicts and the effects of these conflicts on goal attainment (consequence costs).

Using these operationalisations it can be argued that the Carnegie data on the involvement of academics in governance can be interpreted in two ways if one wants to use these data for analysing implementation costs. In the first interpretation it is assumed that the time academics indicated they spent on "governance" is time spent on reaching decisions (giving an indication of communication costs). In this interpretation we assume that time spent on implementing or enforcing decisions (giving an indication of implementation costs) **is not** included in the time spent on governance. This would imply, for example, that the respondents considered time spent on evaluation and reporting being part of teaching or research activities, instead of governance activities.

In the second interpretation it is assumed that the time academics indicated they spent on 'governance' includes both time spent on reaching decisions and time spent on implementing them. This would imply that time spent on evaluation and reporting **is** included in the time the respondents have indicated to spend on governance.

We do not have any indications for either of these two interpretations applying to the Carnegie data. However, it can be expected that the interpretations of the respondents of the broad answering categories concerning the question on hours spend per week on work (i.e. teaching, research, service, administration, and other academic activities) are such that the answering patterns underlying the Carnegie data include both interpretations. As a consequence, we do not want to present any firm conclusions here. Nonetheless, we do want to discuss the issue of the costs of the involvement of academics in institutional governance activities in the light of the conceptualisation and accompanying hypotheses presented above. For this purpose we will use both interpretations for attempting to test the hypotheses. However, before we can do so we first want to present and discuss the data from the Carnegie survey on evaluation.

3.3 The Evaluation of Teaching, Research, and Services

In tables 10, 11 and 12 some information on the nature and intensity of the practice of evaluation in the higher education institutions of the four countries involved are presented. As can be read in these tables, the differences between the four countries are significant.

Let us first look at the proportion of academic staff being evaluated. While in England 73% of the respondents indicate that their teaching is being evaluated regularly and 71 % that their research is evaluated regularly, the same figures for Germany are 9% and 18% respectively. The Netherlands and Sweden are somewhere in the middle with between 40% and 50% of the respondents indicating that their teaching or research is being evaluated on a regular base. While about 25% of the English respondents have indicated that their service activities are evaluated regularly, this figure is far lower for the respondents from the other countries.

Table 10: Intensity of evaluation of work

Country/factor Activity	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Teaching	9%	49%	47%	73%	x	+	+	x
Research	18%	46%	40%	71%	x	+	+	x
Service	6%	11%	7%	26%	x	o	o	x

Legend

I In columns 2-5 the percentage of respondents per country indicating that their teaching, research, and service activities are being evaluated regularly are presented.

II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

Apparently at the time of the Carnegie study in England the evaluative higher education institution had become a reality, while the Netherlands and Sweden were approaching such a situation, and Germany still had a very long way to go. In addition, when comparing the intensity of the evaluation of research and teaching, in England, the Netherlands, and Sweden the proportion of the faculty that indicates that its teaching activities is being evaluated is slightly higher than the proportion whose research is being evaluated, while in Germany the figures suggest a different order, i.e. 9% whose teaching and 18% whose research is evaluated regularly.

A closer look at tables 11 and 12, showing by whom teaching and research is being evaluated, gives insight into the multiplicity of the evaluation processes. Is evaluation, as it was traditionally, a process through which academics look at each others' work, or has it (partly) become an process through which managers assess the quality of the activities of academics? Among the possible evaluators mentioned by the respondents we have distinguished the following three groups. First, peers and staff of other departments (the academic evaluators); second, the heads of department and the senior administrative staff (the managerial evaluators); third

students and external reviewers (who can be part of either academic or managerial evaluation processes: students for teaching, and external reviewers for research).

Table 11: Multiplicity of teaching evaluation

Country/factor Evaluators	Germ. (2801)	Neth. (1755)	Swed. (1122)	Engl. (1946)	C	E	T	D
Peers in own department	4%	25%	10%	11%	x	O	+	x
Head of own department	5%	23%	13%	44%	x	O	-	x
Members of other departments at own institution	1%	4%	6%	4%	x	O	o	o
Senior administrative staff at own institution	1%	4%	4%	9%	x	+	o	o
Own students	7%	51%	49%	45%	x	+	+	x
External reviewers	1%	10%	4%	14%	x	+	-	x

Legend

I In columns 2-5 the percentage of respondents per country indicating that their teaching activities are being evaluated regularly by are presented.

II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

With respect to the evaluation of teaching no clear pattern can be observed. Only in England it seems that the emphasis is on evaluation by the head of department, suggesting that evaluation of teaching is mainly a managerially driven activity. It can be assumed that the initiative to involve students in the evaluation of teaching is also an administrative one. In Sweden and the Netherlands there seems to be academic (peers) and managerial (head of department) evaluation processes going on, without one of the two being dominant. This is in line with the suggestion above that these two countries are somewhere on the way towards a system emphasising managerial evaluation.

Evaluation procedures and processes seem to be rather managerially driven in England where 80% of the researchers are being evaluated by the head of their department and 17% by the senior administrative staff of their institution. Two other striking outcomes are first that in Sweden 40% of the researchers are evaluated by senior administrative staff of their institution, while the comparative figures for the Netherlands and Germany are 13% and 2% respectively. Second in the Netherlands 80% of the academic researchers are evaluated by peers in their department, while the comparative figures for the other countries are 24% (Sweden), 18% (Germany), and 17% (England) respectively. Apparently the research review process in the Netherlands is heavily academically based, while England can be regarded as the

country being most managerially oriented in its research evaluation. Finally, in regard to the use of external reviewers, the data showed that the majority of Swedish researchers (57%) are evaluated regularly by external reviewers, while the comparative figure for the Netherlands is just under half the research population (49%), in England about one third (30%) and in Germany less than one sixth (16%).

Table 12: Multiplicity of research evaluation

Country / Evaluators	Germ.	Neth.	Swed.	Engl.	C	E	T	D
Peers in own department	18%	80%	24%	17%	x	-	+	o
Head of own department	24%	51%	32%	81%	x	o	+	x
Members of other departments in own institution	2%	14%	17%	9%	x	o	+	o
Senior administrative staff at own institution	2%	13%	40%	17%	x	o	+	o
Own students	1%	5%	4%	6%	x	o	o	o
External reviewers	16%	49%	57%	30%	x	o	+	x

Legend
I In columns 2-5 the percentage of respondents per country indicating that their research activities are being evaluated regularly by are presented.
II For an explanation of columns 6-9, see table 2, Legend II.

All in all, our suggestion above that the English institutions are most managerially driven in their evaluation processes followed by Sweden and the Netherlands, with Germany hardly having an evaluation culture at all, let alone a managerial evaluation culture, seems to be confirmed by the data presented in tables 11 and 12.

Both with respect to the evaluation of teaching and research the multivariate analysis suggests that there are not only significant and relevant differences between the countries, but also that having a tenured, full-time position, as well as working at a university increases ones chances of being evaluated considerably. In addition ones disciplinary background has an impact on the chance of being evaluated.

3.4 Two Interpretations of Governance Costs

How can the data on the governance activities of academics as presented in section 2 be related to these data on evaluation in order to get more insight into the issue of governance costs?

Table 13: Respondents' perceptions on governance and evaluation issues per country as indications on co-ordination through planning versus co-ordination through mutual adjustment.

Governance issues	***Germany***	***The Netherlands***	***Sweden***	***England***
Centralised/ Decentralised	Combination	Combination	Blending	Centralised
Perceptions of management	Communication problem and lack of competent leadership	Lack of competent leadership vs management is not autocratic	Neutral	Autocratic
Evaluation intensity	Low	Middle	Middle	High
Evaluation multiplicity	Academic	Academic/ managerial	Academic/ Managerial	Managerial

We want to answer this question by using the factor "country" as an independent variable. In table 13 an overview is presented of the perceptions of the respondents per country concerning a number of governance issues. These issues have been selected because they give an indication on the extent to which the respondents perceive the governance structure in their institution to be closer to the mutual adjustment form of co-ordination or to the planning form. As can be seen in table 13, the English respondents are of the opinion that decision-making in their institutions is centralised, they feel that their institutional management is autocratic, while they also indicate that their academic work is intensively evaluated mainly from a managerial perspective. On the other hand the German respondents feel that institutional decision-making in their case is a combination of centralised and decentralised processes. Contrary to the English respondents they do not feel that institutional management is autocratic, but instead are of the opinion that there is a clear lack of competent leadership in their institutions and that the communication between academics and managers is very poor. Concerning the evaluation of their work as indicated above, German academic work was hardly evaluated at all at the time of the Carnegie survey, and if, it was from an academic perspective. The

perceptions of the Dutch and Swedish respondents suggest that they are somewhere in between the English and German scores. The Dutch scores indicate that the respondents' opinions on the level of centralisation of institutional decision-making and their perceptions concerning institutional management are closer to the German scores than to the English. The Swedish scores in this are perfectly neutral. Decision-making is a blending[9] of centralised and decentralised processes, and the Swedish respondents have no explicit positive or negative opinions on their institutional management. With respect to evaluation the Dutch and Swedish scores are more or less similar. The academic work of faculty in both countries is evaluated, but the evaluation intensity is lower than in England, while the evaluation perspective consists of a combination of academic and managerial approaches.

This overview leads to the following conclusion with respect to the nature of the institutional governance structures in the four countries in question. Of all four, the governance structure in the English institutions has most characteristics of a planning form of co-ordination, while the German institutional governance structure includes most characteristics of a co-ordination mechanism of mutual adjustment. The Dutch and Swedish institutional governance structures are somewhere in between these extremes, with the Dutch structure having more in common with the German than with the English structure. It has to be emphasised that this conclusion is based on the perceptions and opinions of the respondents, and that no formal characteristics[10] of the governance structures in question have been used.

What does this conclusion concerning the perceived nature of governance structures mean when it comes to understanding the cost dimension of the academics' involvement in governance activities? To what extent can the Carnegie data be used for testing the hypotheses on costs? What is the balance between communication and implementation costs in the four countries included?

For answering these questions we want to use the two interpretations mentioned above, i.e. the respondents have either not included or included "evaluation and reporting" activities in the indicated time spent on governance. We will start with the first interpretation, i.e. respondents have not included "evaluation and reporting" time in the hours they have indicated to spend on governance matters. This interpretation would imply that the costs presented in tables 6 – 9 give an indication of the communication costs of the governance structures of the higher institutions in the four included countries. In this case the presented figures show, for example, that the communication costs, i.e. the costs of reaching decisions, are much higher in England and Sweden than in the Netherlands and Germany.

According to the hypotheses presented above we would expect first that the high communication costs in England are the result of the co-ordination mechanism underlying the institutional governance structures being close to the mutual adjustment form of co-ordination. This is not in line with the perceptions of the English academics as presented in table 13 and our conclusion based on these perceptions on the nature of the English institutional governance structure.

A second expectation on the basis of the hypotheses would be that if the communication costs are high the implementation costs are low. This would imply that English higher education would have the lowest implementation costs and German and Dutch higher education the highest. Unfortunately, the Carnegie survey

did not include a question on the actual time spent on evaluation and reporting. However, as was presented in section 3.3, we do have information on the intensity and multiplicity of the evaluation of the respondents' teaching, research and service activities. The picture emerging from tables 10, 11 and 12 is clear. Teaching and research activities are more intensively evaluated in England than in the Netherlands and Sweden, while these activities are hardly evaluated at all in Germany. Service activities are overall evaluated less than teaching and research activities, but also with respect to services the evaluation intensity is highest in England. Leaving Germany aside for a moment, the data on the multiplicity of teaching and research evaluation indicate that in the English institutions the evaluation of teaching and research is more managerially driven than in the Netherlands and Sweden. Also these data are not in line with our conclusion concerning the nature of the institutional governance structure that would lead us to assume that monitoring costs would be lowest in England and highest in Germany and the Netherlands, while the data suggest almost the opposite situation. All in all it has to be concluded that the Carnegie survey outcomes are not in line with the theoretical expectations expressed in the two hypotheses. Consequently this either implies that we have to reject the hypotheses and the theoretical assumptions on which they are based, or we have to conclude that the first of the two interpretations, i.e. the respondents did not include "evaluation and reporting" time in the hours they indicated to spend on governance, is incorrect. In the latter case the second interpretation, time spent on evaluation and reporting is included in the indicated hours per week spent on governance, might help us to interpret the Carnegie data correctly.

If time spent on evaluation and reporting is included in the indicated time spent on governance the data presented in tables 6 – 9 do not allow us to draw separate conclusions concerning the communication costs of the governance structures in the four countries. However, the data presented in tables 10 – 12 do give an indication on parts of the implementation costs, i.e. those costs connected to evaluating the teaching, research and service activities of academics. These data indicate that the costs of evaluating (or monitoring) academics are highest in England and lowest in Germany, implying that the English governance structure is closest to a form using planning as the coordination mode, while the German structure is more mutual adjustment based. This is in line with our conclusion concerning the nature of institutional governance structures in the four countries.

4. CONCLUSION

The data presented in this chapter reflect the significant differences between countries when it comes to the way in which the governance of universities and colleges is regulated. In addition the data show many striking differences in the effectiveness and efficiency of the governance structures, at least as perceived by the academics working in higher education institutions. While the differences refer to the governance activities concerning the conditions under which academic activities have to be undertaken, a major similarity is the amount of control academics feel to have over their basic teaching and research activities. In other words, referring to

Scott's description of the control-seeking behaviour of professionals (Scott, 1995, x), while academics feel to have a high level of cognitive control, their perception of the level of normative and regulative control they have concerning their working environment is relatively low. The latter is despite the amount of time spent on governance activities consisting to a large extent of activities related to regulative and normative issues. Nonetheless, despite the low level of control and the accompanying general dissatisfaction with their involvement in institutional governance matters, as a consequence of the nature of their profession and the professional organisation in which they are working, academics still seek to be part of institutional governance. They will not withdraw to the cognitive part of their professional working environment. Academics want to be involved in the governance activities in their professional organisations, i.e. universities and colleges, but they do not like the results of their involvement. It can even be argued that the more academics are involved in institutional governance activities, the less they appreciate the results of their involvement.

Even though we cannot emphasise enough that we have to be careful in interpreting the Carnegie data in the way we have done in this chapter, we do want to draw one major conclusion concerning the link between the nature of institutional governance structures and the costs of the involvement of academics in governance activities. Our conclusion based on the Carnegie data is that the overall costs of the involvement of academics in institutional governance activities is higher in governance structures that are based on a coordination form of planning than on a coordination form of mutual adjustment. We realise that not all governance-related costs are included in our analysis, and we also are aware of the fact that we are not basing our conclusion on formal structures and empirical functioning of these structures. However, we do feel that the perceptions of academics concerning the governance dimension in their professional working environment provides a valuable and important basis for an interpretation of the effectiveness and efficiency of their involvement in this dimension. This includes, in our view, the costs of the involvement.

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[1] In addition to the four European countries mentioned, the following countries were included in the study: Australia, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

[2] A complete report describing the outcomes of the project as well as the specific details of the administration of the study in each country is available at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (Altbach, 1996).

[3] In the reporting of the data we do not present a mean total score for the four countries altogether since the samples are only representative for each country separately. We consider the national data as being representative for the higher education system of the country in question, even though a different sampling method was used in each country (see: Boyer, Altbach, and Whitelaw, 1994).

[4] We have to keep in mind that while in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden the structure of the system has not changed much since 1992, in England 1992 marked the end of the binary system.

[5] For our analyses the starting-point is that the binary structures found in each of the four countries are comparable. This implies that we assume that despite the mutual differences between individual universities (intra- as well as inter-nationally), and the mutual differences between the colleges (intra- and internationally), in our study the universities as well as the colleges can be treated as one sector if we want to analyse the impact of a type of institution on specific governance issues.

[6] We have distinguished five disciplinary categories, i.e. engineering, science, medicine/health sciences, social/behavioural sciences, and humanities/arts.

[7] Gross working hours refers to the total number of hours academics work per week according to their own estimate. For Norway the average number of hours tenured, full-time employed university academic staff indicate to work per week is about 50.

[8] These differences are caused by the different levels of non-response per variable.

[9] Blending in the Swedish case means that only one of the included decision-making processes is perceived to be centralised while all the others are neither seen as centralised nor as decentralised. The term combination used for the Dutch and German cases indicates that some decision-making processes are perceived to be centralised and others decentralised.

[10] As indicated above, with respect to such formal characteristics one could think of the *tasks* of the organisation, i.e. university or college, in question, the relevant *actors* involved, and the *rules* that guide their behaviour. Binsbergen and his colleagues (1994, 239-245) have undertaken an empirical exploration of the formal characteristics of institutional governance structures of Danish and Dutch universities through describing and analysing the organisational tasks of establishing new study programmes.