

In Search of a Political Sphere in Alfred Schutz

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Abstract. *In my paper, I deal with three points: 1) Schutz's notion of the social world; 2) the differentiation of the public sphere within the social world; 3) a comparison of Arendt's "space of appearance" with Schutz's "musical space." I conclude that they have similarities as well as differences in two respects: first, both indicate a space of common appearances in direct communication within the actual reach, that is, the space being seen and heard simultaneously; second, none of them is meant to be a receptive space, that is, the space of mere passivity. On the other hand, they reveal differences, too: in the first, Schutz is concerned primarily with "making" (poiesis), whereas Arendt is concerned with "doing" (praxis). This difference is due to the fact that the space for Schutz is one of (polythetic) sound, whereas for Arendt, it is that of (monothetic) speech.*

I.

In the following discussion, I will concentrate on Alfred Schutz's notion of the social world. In connection with that, I will explicate Schutz's ontological standpoint in contradistinction to Husserl's constitutional standpoint. Then, I will turn to the problem of the constitution of a political or public sphere within the social world.

At first glance, Schutz seems to develop his notion of the social world along the line of Husserl's idea of the life-world. Schutz includes the social world within the realm of the life-world. As Schutz says, the life-world is "man's fundamental and paramount reality." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 3) And it is only in this pre-eminent reality of everyday life that we can find the social world. According to Schutz, the life-world is "the province of reality" which is given to "the wide awake and normal adult" in the "attitude of common sense" or "natural attitude." The life-world is "what is plainly given to us in the natural attitude." Schutz sees in this life-world two different realms, the realm of "nature" or "the province of things in the outer world" and the realm of "fellow-men" or the "social world." The life-world includes, in its totality, both the "natural" and

“social” world. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 6) This means that the social world is one realm of the life-world: the social world is the life-world shared among fellow-men. The life-world can be experienced only intersubjectively. To put it another way, the individual experiences in the life-world a social world, and enters the realm of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity, Schutz reiterates, is one of the basic categories of the life-world:

As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence. (Schutz, 1970b: 82)

The critical point Schutz raises here is that it is only in the pre-scientific life-world that we can enter the realm of intersubjectivity; intersubjectivity is possible only in correlation with this “social, natural attitude” (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59-61) and the world given to it, that is, the life-world. This is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl, or, as Gurwitsch points out:

He deliberately abstains from raising questions of transcendental constitution and pursues his phenomenological analyses within the framework of the ‘natural attitude.’ (Gurwitsch, 1970: xv; 1974: 116)

Schutz disagrees with Husserl on the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity. Schutz posits intersubjectivity of the social world as essentially an ontological problem of the natural attitude rather than a constitutional problem of the transcendental ego. Schutz argues that any attempt to constitute the intersubjective social world from the activities of transcendental subjectivity necessarily leads to solipsism. Thus, no concrete problems of social science, i.e., the problems arising in the intersubjective social world, can be solved by transcendental phenomenology.

In particular, in a critical essay, “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” Schutz sums up “Husserl’s attempt to account for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity” as a failure. The reason for this failure, Schutz says, is that “intersubjectivity” is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (Gegebenheit) of the life-world. “Intersubjectivity” is the fundamental ontological category of the

human life-world. The social world has a prior existence in prescientific life-experience, in common-sense perception. The social world in which men actually live with other men is a world built up in the naive natural point of view of everyday life. It is the world where men's lives are lived spontaneously in the natural attitude. In this sense, the social world is an original or pre-predicative construct. (Schutz, 1973a: 5-6) Schutz's ontological standpoint concerning the social world is fundamental in two senses: first, it is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl; second, it is the point where Schutz's own "phenomenology of the social world" begins.

We can contrast Husserl and Schutz in terms of two parallel terms: "transcendental" and "mundane." Against Husserl's notion of transcendental phenomenology and transcendental intersubjectivity, Schutz develops mundane phenomenology and mundane intersubjectivity. Schutz agrees with Husserl that my living body is always present and given as the primal instituting organ. But Schutz's question is that the constitution of the other must be distinguished from the way in which my own psychophysical ego is constituted. I observe merely the exteriority of the other's body whereas I experience my own body from within. Accordingly, my living body is

present precisely in a way which is as dissimilar as possible from the external perception of an animate body other than mine and therefore can never lead to an analogical apperception. (Schutz, 1970b: 63)

Another problem, which Schutz sees in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, is that the second epoché does not yield a "transcendental" alter ego but merely a "psychophysical" alter ego. Schutz asserts,

The second epoché could never yield the constitution of the Other as a full monad within my monad, but at most it yields appresentation of another psychophysical ego beginning from the substratum of my psychophysical ego. (Schutz, 1970b: 67)

According to Husserl, the first epoché reveals the world as a transcendental phenomenon. The world effected by the first epoché, however, is not the world "properly" given to the ego; the sense of the world is still codetermined by "strange" elements, by what is not "properly" of the ego.

Another epoché is necessary, Husserl says, “to create a unique philosophical solitude which is the basic methodological requirement for a genuinely radical philosophy.” Thus, a second epoché is performed to obtain the realm of “what is peculiarly my own” (des Selbst-eigenen). The aim of the second epoché is then twofold: the first is to separate out all that is “properly” of the ego from all that is not; the second is to yield the constitution of the other as a full monad within my monad. (Schutz, 1970b: 55-61)

Schutz further argues that the transcendental intersubjectivity as constituted by Husserl is not yet an “intersubjectivity.” The “transcendental intersubjectivity” which Husserl constitutes is a “subjectivity” existing purely in me, in the meditating ego. It is constituted purely from the sources of my intentionality, though constituted in such a manner that transcendental subjectivity in every single human being may be the same. To put it more exactly no transcendental “community,” no transcendental “We,” is established by the second epoché. On the contrary, “each transcendental ego has constituted for himself, as to its being and sense, his world.” Thus the world which the transcendental ego has constituted is “just for himself and not for all other transcendental egos as well.” This is why Husserl’s “transcendental intersubjectivity” would be a community for “me” or for “you”, even “a cosmos of monads” but not an “inter”-monadic relationship or “inter”-communication between a plurality of transcendental subjects. (Schutz, 1970b: 75-77)

At this point, Schutz refers to a similar view as advanced by Eugen Fink, a later assistant to Husserl. According to Fink,

[t]he creation of a universe of monads and of the objective world for everyone proves to be impossible within the transcendental subjectivity of the meditating philosopher, a subjectivity which is supposed to subsist for him, and for him alone. (Schutz, 1970b: 84)

In short, Schutz’s critical arguments are three: first, no transcendental constitutional analysis can disclose the essential relationship of intersubjectivity; second, no social science can find its true foundation in transcendental phenomenology; third, we have to turn to the intramundane center of the life-world, that is, the mundane ego. For Schutz, intersubjectivity, the most fundamental category of the social world and, for that reason, of social science, is a realm belonging to the mundane ego.

II.

Mundane ego or its underlying natural attitude is the foundation upon which Schutz establishes his “ontology of the social world.” For Schutz, “the mundane world” given to the “mundane ego”—this world alone “is the topic and ought to be the topic” of a social ontology. (Schutz, 1973b: 131) The central point Schutz drives at concerning the mundane ego is its “natural attitude.” “Mundane ego” refers to the human being living in the “natural attitude” within the everyday life-world as the basis of his actions and thoughts. Schutz founds on this “natural attitude” of the mundane ego the whole realm of an ontology of the social world. “Natural attitude” is the matrix within which the mundane ego experiences the world in the mode of self-givenness. (Schutz, 1970a: 5)

Schutz’s ontology of the social world can be summed up by what Husserl calls the “general thesis of the natural standpoint.” To put it in the simplest way: “in the natural attitude of everyday existence one accepts the existence of other men as taken for granted.” (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59) Schutz takes, from the outset, the intersubjective social world as unquestionably given in the natural attitude and starts “by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint.” (Schutz, 1967: 97) To the naive attitude of our everyday life, others are simply given as subjects. From the outset, the other-subjects are given to me in the unquestioned assurance of an uncontested “belief,” and thus not on the ground of a particular act of positing or judgment. For Schutz, the other’s existence does not require proof. The existence of other subjects is unquestionable. Only radical solipsists or behaviorists, Schutz argues, would demand proof of this fact—the fact that other intelligent fellow-men do exist. In point of fact, even these thinkers do not doubt in their natural attitude the existence of their fellow-men.

In the natural attitude, all men—that is, “men” in the sense of “healthy, grown-up, and wide-awake human beings” (Schutz, 1973b: 135-136)—naively presuppose the sphere of “We.” “We,” the basic relationship of the social world, is the first and most original experience given by the very ontological condition of my being in the world. I was born and brought up by others and live among others. The “basic we-relationship,” Schutz points out, “is already given to me by the mere fact that I am born

into the world of directly experienced social reality.” (Schutz, 1967: 165) My knowledge of my “birth” and my expectation of my “death” assures my existence in the intersubjective social world. Or “I can not locate my birth in my inner duration;” nor can I derive the certainty of death from my solitary existence; they all arise out of my “existence in the intersubjective world.” (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 46-47) At this point, we need to keep in mind the comments made by Michael Theunissen about Schutz, that is:

When, in the transition to the social world, he leaps out of the transcendental into the natural attitude, this only means that he situates his social ontology at a level on which the transcendental constitution of the Other is already presupposed. (Theunissen, 1986: 345)

Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that Schutz rejects any possibility of questioning the existence of others. The existence of other-subjects is an unquestioned but always questionable background. Schutz goes even further arguing that any

circumstance that what has up until now been taken for granted can be brought into question is a point with which, of course, we will still have to deal. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 4)

Schutz, however, asserts that in the “natural attitude,” there is no reason to question the existence of others. In the natural attitude,

[n]o motive exists for the naive person to raise the transcendental question concerning the actuality of the world or concerning the reality of the alter ego, or to make the jump into the reduced sphere. (Schutz 1973b: 135)

Rather, the person living in the life world

posits this world in a *general thesis* as meaningfully valid for him, with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living beings (especially with human beings), and with meaningful products of all sorts (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, etc.). (Schutz, 1973b: 135)

Schutz insists that naively living persons hold fast to the belief that other-subjects exist; that they live in and endure and support this belief. What Schutz indicates here is that “the natural attitude of daily life has a special form of epoché.” Natanson calls this epoché the “epoché of the natural attitude.” (Natanson, 1973: xviii)

In the natural attitude, Schutz continues, the epoché is performed in a “special” or in a “positive” way by affirming the belief in the existence of others. In the natural attitude, we suspend not “the existence of other-subjects” but the very “doubt” concerning the existence of other-subjects and, more generally, the “doubt” concerning the existence of the world and its objects:

In the natural attitude, a man surely does not suspend his belief in the existence of the outer world and its objects. On the contrary, he suspends every doubt concerning their existence. What he brackets is the doubt whether the world and its objects could be otherwise than just as they appear to him. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 27, 36)

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Schutz holds that the “everyday life-world” is “fundamentally intersubjective” or “a social world;” it “is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience;” “it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture.” (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 16, 68; Schutz, 1973a: 10) These statements can be easily understood in terms of Schutz’s basic thesis—the “general thesis of the natural standpoint.” In particular, it is of critical importance to notice that he means by the natural attitude “fundamentally intersubjective” as well as “social,” “common” or “public.” In his posthumously published work, *The Structures of the Life-World*, Schutz uses the term “social, natural attitude” instead of merely saying “natural attitude.” (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59-61) For Schutz, what is “social” is already pregnant in “natural attitude;” “sociality” is something prepredicatively given in the natural attitude.

Schutz’s arguments can be restated as follows: the social world has near and far zones. In the first, there is the domain of fellow-men or consociates (*Umwelt*), that is, the so-called We-relation. In this domain, you and I experience one another in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity. Beyond this domain, there is the domain of contemporaries

(*Mitwelt*). Contemporaries are those others with whom I do not share my spatial immediacy but only temporal simultaneity. I share temporal simultaneity with my contemporaries not in terms of “inner time” or “lived time” but only in terms of “clock time” (Dauenhauer, 1969: 83-90) or world time (chronological or cosmic time). In multiple transitions, this domain passes over into those domains of predecessors (*Vorwelt*) and successors (*Folgewelt*). The social world is given from the outset as a “structured world;” it is given “within a horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship which is, as such, just taken for granted.” The structures of the social world are understandable by reducing them to human actions; they are, so to speak, sediments of human actions. Human actions, in turn, are understandable by referring to their typical motives out of which these actions arise; the subjective or immanent meaning the action has for the actor can be made understandable by revealing the motives, that is, by revealing either the in-order-to motives (*Um-zu-Motive*) or the because-motives (*Weil-Motive*) which, in turn, determine a given course of action. According to Schutz, the motive signifies an intentional meaning of an action.

The fundamental methodological problem Schutz sees in social science is that the social scientist, qua scientist, cannot experience the social world as it is experienced by a man living naively within his everyday life, within the social world. This is due to the particular attitude of the social scientist. First of all, Schutz characterizes the “attitude of the social scientist” as “that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world.” Then he analyzes observation and the observer in correlation with the “one-sided Thou-orientation.” There are two types of Thou-orientations: one-sided and reciprocal. One-sided Thou-orientations are correlated with the observational situation, while reciprocal Thou-orientations are correlated with the face-to-face we-relation. Schutz’s analysis of the attitude of the social scientist begins from that of the reciprocal Thou-orientation.

In a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the unique biographical situation, i.e., the physical and socio-cultural environment as defined by individual persons, is equally accessible to all fellow-men or consociates. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, I turn to you and you turn to me; we grasp each other in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity; each of us is experienced “in person”—although only certain layers of the whole personality become apparent—and “in unique biographical situation”—

although this is revealed fragmentarily. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, each other's stream of consciousness flows in "common time-form" and remains "tuned in" upon one another; we are growing older together. Richard M. Zaner elaborates.

To be with another is for Schutz to grow older with another ... you and I grow older together by caring what becomes of each other. (Zaner, 1968: 83, 94)

In reciprocal Thou-orientations, Schutz adds, "[e]very phase of my inner duration is co-ordinated with a phase of the conscious life of the Other;" (Schutz/ Luckmann, 1973: 66) step by step, I grasp the conscious process of my fellow-man, i.e., my consociate; I submerge in the subjective contents of my fellow-man; the experience of each fellow-man is reciprocally determined, interwoven together; fellow-men are mutually involved in one another's biography in vivid present; they live, as it were, in a common flow of experiences.

As unique to reciprocal Thou-orientation, Schutz calls attention to the "reciprocal mirroring of self." In reciprocal Thou-orientations, "my fellow-man is ... presented to me as more 'alive' and more 'immediate' than I am to myself;" my fellow-man experiences himself vividly through me and I through him. Schutz calls this "the reciprocal mirroring of self." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 66-67) In complex refractions of mirror-reflexes, the intersubjective "We-relation" is developed and continually affirmed. The essential characteristics of the reciprocal Thou-orientation lie in "the mutual participation in the consociate's onrolling life." As Schutz observes, "we direct our acts and thoughts towards other people;" "we live rather in Others than in our own individual life." In this way, in pure we-relation, the action is "understood" from within or "in terms of the meaning the action has for the actor." In a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the partner grasps the subjective meaning of the actor's action. I "understand" what you mean by your action in the same way I would "understand" my own analogous action if I were "There" (*illic*) instead of "Here" (*hic*). This is what is meant by "the subjective interpretation of meaning" or "Verstehen." It is, for Schutz, the proto-mode of everyday experience, the mode according to which man in daily life experiences the social world immediately and organizes this experience in direct relationship.

But, if I am merely observing, my Thou-orientation is one-sided. In observation, my conduct is oriented to the observed, but his conduct is not necessarily oriented to me. The observer confronts a fellow-man, but the fellow-man does not take account or is not aware of the presence of the observer at all. In observation, the body of the other is given to the observer as a field of direct experience. The observer may make observations of expressions that indicate the other's conscious processes. Thus, the observer may apprehend both the manifestations of the other's conscious processes and the step by step or "polythetic" constitution of the processes manifested. This is possible because he witnesses the other's ongoing experiences in synchrony with his own interpretations of the other's overt conduct in an objective context of meaning. But the observer is not in a position to verify his interpretation of the experiences by checking them against the other's own subjective interpretations. The observer cannot project his "in-order-to" motives so that they will become understandable to the observed as his "because"-motives. The "disinterestedness" or "detachment" of the observer makes it impossible to interlock their respective motives into common intentionalities for enactments of single projects. Under all circumstances, it is merely the manifested fragments of the overt conduct of the observed that are accessible to the observer. The overt conduct of the observed does not offer adequate clues to the subjective interpretation of the meaning the action has for the actor. The observer cannot tell whether and how the course of action is fulfilling the actor's subjective projects.

Schutz even mentions that the observer cannot say whether the observed fragments of overt conduct constitute an action—"action" defined as "conduct based upon a preconceived project"—in the pursuit of a projected goal and whether they are mere behavioral or physical movements. The observer cannot apprehend the subjective meaning of the action as intended by the observed as could a partner in a reciprocal We-relation. (Schutz, 1971b: 33-36) What Schutz brings up here is the necessity of constructs of ideal types. In observational situations, Schutz argues,

it is possible to construct a model of a sector of the social world consisting of typical human interaction and to analyze this typical interaction pattern as to the meaning it might have for the personal types of actors who presumptively originated them. (Schutz, 1973a: 36)

Social science can actualize the idea of “Verstehen” by a modification of the first-order construct of the social world. That is the method of ideal types. Schutz explains:

By this method the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. In this way the structure of the social world is disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meanings. (Schutz, 1967: 7)

The crucial point is that Schutz takes the method of ideal types as the “only” one by which social science can “understand” or, rather, explain the social world. The social scientist, therefore, has to construct “thought objects” of his own, that is, the second order constructs which would then supersede the “thought objects” of common sense thinking, i.e., the first order constructs. In connection with this, let me quote Psathas’ very perceptive comments:

It is perhaps this commitment to a transcendent model of a scientist, committed to a discipline, constrained by the already formulated rules and methods (e.g. ideal type constructs and models) of the science, and dedicated to building on the already received interpretations and finding of prior empirical studies, which occluded Schutz’s vision of alternative possibilities. (Psathas, 2004: 210)

Psathas continues:

His connections to the methodological perspectives of Felix Kaufmann and Ludwig von Mises, and his Bergsonian and Husserlian philosophy assisted him in critiquing and clarifying the methodology and construct formation found in prevailing models of interpretive sociology, such as Weber’s. However, these perspectives were not utilized by him to develop a different kind of social science which would be oriented directly to the study of the practical actions and reasoning practices of ordinary actors as they engaged in specified kinds of activities in the world of everyday life. (Psathas, 2004: 184f.)

III.

What I am going to do in the following two sections is to differentiate the public sphere within the social sphere, so that the realm of intersubjectivity is to be seen as divided into two different spheres, that is, the sphere of mere intersubjectivity or the naive social sphere on the one hand and the public or political sphere on the other. There is no doubt that the life-world is an intersubjective world. What I suspect, however, is that the intersubjectivity of the life-world does not necessarily mean publicness. Although the life-world is not solipsistic, it still belongs to the realm of intersubjectivity, which lacks publicness and, in that sense, is private. In this regard, I think Schutz and, along with him, Gurwitsch and, to some extent, Natanson too, are misleading.

As indicated above, Schutz maintains that the

life-world is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience. (Schutz, 1973a: 10)

More definitely, Gurwitsch characterizes “the life-world” as “a public world” by saying that:

Each of us does not experience the life-world as a private world; on the contrary, we take it for a public world, common to all of us, that is, for an intersubjective world. (Gurwitsch, 1970: xxii-xxiii; 1974: 123, 115)

In a similar vein, Natanson calls Schutz’s “common-sense world” “the public domain:”

As common-sense men living in the mundane world, we tacitly assume that, of course, there is this world, all of us share as the public domain within which we communicate, work, and live our lives. (Natanson, 1973: x, xvi)

The points I am arguing for are these: mere intersubjectivity or what is social is not simply identical with the public. In a more challenging way, Ilja Srubar also charges that

we cannot just assume that the structure of the life world—as the basis for the relatively natural attitudes—also includes the political as one of its distinct components since the figure of the life world derives its critical and substantiating intention by setting the pre-political ‘natural’ order of the life world in opposition to all other orders. (Srubar, 1999: 6)

Then Srubar questions:

How the move from life to political life is made, or more precisely, from which moments of the structure of the life world can this transition emerge? (Srubar, 1999: 6)

In order to answer this question clearly, we need to examine, after the fashion of David Hume, the emergence of the “civil” or political society out of the “natural” or smaller social relations.

According to Hume, men can live, as shown “in the American tribes,” “in concord among themselves without any established government,” and are able to maintain “three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation” or transference “by consent, and the performance of promises” without having recourse to government. It is, however, “in time of war” or with the emergence of “a larger society” and, with this, the occurrences of disturbance or disorder in “the enjoyment of peace and concord,” that men are prompted to “form” or “invent” government. What Hume means here is: first, men, “in the ordinary conduct of life, look not so far as the public interest;” rather, they are “naturally selfish, or endowed only with a confined generosity;” second, with the intervention of self-interest as well as of thought or reflection, especially on convenient as well as inconvenient experiences of human life, there arises the sense of public interest; third, the sense of instability of this public interest causes men to quit non-political social life and to enter into political society.

Let me put the third point in detail: with the development of society, men easily tend to forget the interest they have in common for their peculiar interests. All men are subject to the same weakness of preferring “any trivial advantage that is present, to the maintenance of order in society.” Now, the trust in convention or in the common system of conduct and behavior becomes unstable in the sense that, though the

systems of conduct and behavior be sufficient to maintain any society, yet it is impossible for men to observe these systems “of themselves:”

You have the same propension, that I have, in favour of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing me, that I should be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou’d impose on myself a severe restraints amidst the licentiousness of others. (Hume, 1968: 535)

There arises then a sense of instability or ineffectiveness of voluntary observance of public interest. On the other hand, men “cannot change their nature.” As Hume emphasizes:

Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. ... All they can do is to change their situation [that is, to establish government] and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons [the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and ministers, our governors and rulers.] (Hume, 1968: 537)

This is what Hume calls “the origin of civil government and society.” (Hume, 1968: 537) The emergence of civil government, however, means that the ruler is differentiated from the ruled, the realm of inter-subjectivity is divided into two different spheres, that is, the public and the private, and political life follows upon social life or, to put it another way, “natural society” is succeeded by “civil society or government.” (Hume, 1968: 539-542) As Robert S. Hill summarizes it:

Some men are made rulers, i.e., they are placed in a position where they have an immediate interest in the impartial administration of justice and no interest or only a remote one in the contrary. The rest of men are ruled [that is, they are] made [or] placed in a position to see obedience to government as their immediate interest. (Hill, 1987: 550-551)

In short, the sense of public interest is not natural but artificial; it is, as it were, something constituted either by “interest” or from “reflections,” but

is not itself a nature like “hunger, attachment to offspring, and other passions;” it is more the creation of human convention or the artifice of human contrivance, than naturally inherent in human mind; there is no such a nature as public interest in human mind itself; it comes rather from the labor of reflections—the reflections on the common experience or interest of human life; it is formed, neither by nature as such nor by instinct of human mind, but by reflection which “insensibly and by degrees” alters the direction of mind and remedies “in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections.” (Hume, 1968: 481, 499, 519, 538-539, 543; 1902: 201) Here, Hume makes it very clear that the intersubjective sense of public interest is something artificial or invented, not something natural or given. From this stance, he declares:

Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. (Hume, 1985: 37)

To our surprise, Husserl also shows a similar position in a manuscript of 1910, entitled as “Die menschlichen Gesellschaften und Gemeinschaften.” In it, he lays down the:

Unterschiede zwischen offenen und personal gebundenen, geschlossenen geselligen Verbindungen. Eine Räuberbande, gemeinsame Verabredung zum Raub. Ein Verein, der Statuen hat, in denen er die Neuaufnahme von Mitgliedern offen lässt und regelt.¹ [And he adds up:] Der Staat eine offene Gemeinschaft wie auch der Verein. (Husserl, 1973a: 109-110)²

In a way, Husserl differentiates two different regions within intersubjectivity: one is an open one like “Verein” (association) or “Staat” (state) and

¹ Difference between open and personally bound, closed social associations. [The latter is the case of] a gang of robbers with common agreement on robbery. [The former is the case of] an association that has the statutes, in which it makes open the new admission of members and by which it rules them.

² The state [is] an open community just like the association.

the other is a closed one such as “Räuberbande” (gang of robbers). In any way, Husserl distinguishes the state from “a robber band,” even though he recognizes some states are hardly that distinct. To repeat, the state is the sphere to which is attributed the “open” or “public” intersubjectivity. This implies a paradoxical and thus an infinite task inherent in the political life. That is, the state ought to effectuate a public realm with members born private. At least, I read Husserl in this way, when he says that:

Im Staat scheidet sich das Private und das Staatliche, und es scheiden sich auch die Menschen in solche, die normalerweise ganz in der Alltäglichkeit, im Privaten aufgehen, was einen bestimmten Begriff von Alltagsmenschen ausmachen würde, und solche, die „berufsmässig“ staatlich beamtet sind, Staatsfunktionäre, und eine neuartige Alltäglichkeit, Normalität von Lebensinteressen und Lebenstätigkeiten haben. Für sie ist das ursprünglich Alltägliche das Sekundäre, wenn auch nicht geradezu Anomale, da es sich stets meldet und seine Fürsorge braucht, die aber sekundär wird und zum grössten Teile ihnen abgenommen ist durch die Organisation der alltäglichen Gemeinschaftskultur und die ihr zugehörige Gliederung der privaten Berufe, der durch sie ermöglichten Güteransammlungen, durch die (staatlich geordnete) Geldwirtschaft usw. Andererseits, im privaten Leben, in seinen verschiedenen Berufsformen als Formen des ganzen Interessendaseins und Interessenlebens der privaten Menschen, fehlt es nicht an Lebensweisen staatlicher Funktion. In gewisser Weise ist jeder gelegentlich Funktionär, aber eben nicht in der Weise des Berufes, der ständigen Hinrichtung darauf und in der Weise ständig einheitlicher Auswirkung dieser Willensrichtung. Sowie der Beamte als Beamter mit ihm in Konnex tritt, wird er zum Bürger oder wird er als Bürger aktuell und steht damit in Korrelatfunktion. (Husserl, 1973b: 413-414)³

³ In a state, there is a division between the private and the public, and human beings are also divided by that criterion. There are those, if we apply the exact definition of everyday men, who are singularly engaged in private matters in their everyday lives, and the others who are civil servants by “profession” with their own new routines and standards about interests and activities in life. For them [the latter], everyday life which is fundamentally ordinary is not something completely extraneous, but secondary. The reason is that the everyday things are constantly going on, and need personal care. However, this care becomes something secondary, and most part of it is taken over from them by organizations of everyday community culture, sub-divisions of private occupations, with the accumulation of products which has become possible by the differentiation of monetary economy which is arranged by the state. On the

As Schutz already mentioned, “man is born of woman.” In this sense, man is a being condemned to intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, he is not conceived to be born public from the very beginning. Of course, publicness has been thought, from ancient times on, as something noble any intersubjectivity could attain only on its highest level, but not in its ordinary reality. In this sense, it is more like “something,” if we are allowed to paraphrase Husserl, “which mankind could have only in the form of the struggle for their truth, the struggle to make themselves true.” (Husserl, 1970b: 13) And I would even argue that Kant’s essay on “What is Enlightenment?” can be read in a similar way, that is, as exhorting “publicness,” especially in the use of human reason. Kant urges:

The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind. (Kant 1992: 41)

It is also intriguing to note that Kant sets off the “scholar,” in a sharp contrast to the “citizen” in general, as the unchallengeable carrier of publicness and that publicness in a Kantian sense is transnational or even transpolitical showing an inclination to cosmopolitan or “eurocentric” taste. (Kant, 1992: 41-48; Jung, 1998: 19-30)

Anyhow, the point I am arguing is that both Hume and Husserl conceive of publicness as something acquired or constituted on a higher level of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, I want to contend that the acquisition of the sense of publicness is a process as much agonistic as antagonistic, demanding choices, struggles and above all else, using Kant’s own expression, “audae” or courage and a process, somehow, entailing a sense of tragedy, that is, the sense of absence of communion or “unhappy consciousness.” These conflicts and agonistic consciousness arising out of the division of intersubjectivity are shown in an acute form in Greek tragedies. Hume, however, does not go deeply into this matter.

other hand, even in the private life, because of its variety of occupations and its individuals’ completely worldly and interest-seeking ways of being of the private man, the function of the state can’t be omitted there. In some ways, everyone is a temporary civil servant, even though not in such a way by profession, with constant work to execute and constant willpower for unified effects. In addition, the civil servant who has some relations with other civil servants as a civil servant is a citizen, or has some relationship with the citizens as an actual citizen.

No sooner had he entered the domain, as Husserl quipped, than his eyes were “dazzled,” (Husserl, 1952: 183) whereas Hannah Arendt seems to meet it frontally. Hence I expect in her accounts of the political sphere much more enlightenment.

Firstly, Arendt contends that in the ancient city-state,

the division between the public and private realms, between the sphere of the polis and the sphere of household and family, and, finally, between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of life [was] self-evident and axiomatic. (Arendt, 1958: 23)

She goes on:

The foundation of the polis was preceded by the destruction of all organized units resting on kinship, such as the phratry and the phyle; ... the rise of the city-state and the public realm occurred at the expense of the private realm of family and household; ... [even] Aristotle’s definition of man as *zoon politikon* [was] opposed to the natural association experienced in household life. (Arendt, 1958: 24)

In order to bring out more clearly this “sharp distinction” underlying the two realms, she even quotes the authority of Fustel de Coulanges’ *The Ancient City*:

The regime of the gens based on the religion of the family and the regime of the city were in reality two antagonistic forms of government. ... Either the city could not last, or it must in the course of time break up the family. (Arendt, 1958: 27)

And she adds: “the gulf between household and city” was “much deeper in Greece than in Rome.” (Arendt, 1958: 28) But “with the rise of society” in the modern age, that is, “the rise of the ‘household’ (*oikia*) or of economic activities to the public realm,” the dividing line has become “entirely blurred” and finally disappeared. In this sense, the “disappearance” can be said to be “an essentially modern phenomenon.”

The disappearance of the gulf that the ancients had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the household and 'rise' into the realm of politics is an essentially modern phenomenon. (Arendt, 1958: 33)

Secondly, Arendt excludes "everything merely necessary or useful" from the "realm of politics" and includes in the latter only two things: action (praxis) and speech (lexi). These two are what constitute the political life (bios politikos) in the original sense. In this way, she begins to constitute the political sphere. Let me start out from her descriptions of "the" political sphere (polis):

(1) "To be political," she says, is "to live in a polis;" it means that everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence;" it refers to "a way of life in which speech and only speech" makes sense and "where the central concern of all citizens" is "to talk with each other;" on the other hand, everybody living outside the polis, that is, the slave or the barbarian, means to be deprived of such a way of life (Arendt, 1958: 25-27);

(2) if everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence," then speech and action are considered "to be coeval and coequal, of the same rank and the same kind;" it is only in the pre-political realm of violence or in the life of sheer survival as found in the family or in the barbarian empire of Asia, that man is in no need of words; violence is mute; it is only in so far as political action "remains outside the sphere of violence," that it is "transacted in words" and, to that extent, both action and speech meet together; what is fundamental in understanding the sphere of polis, she stresses, is that "finding the right words at the right moment is action;"

(3) action and speech are closely related; or "[n]o other human performance requires speech to the same extent as action;" speechless action is no longer action, because there is no longer an actor, and the actor is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words; as often as not, an action can be perceived, even without verbal accompaniment, in its brute physical appearance, but it becomes relevant only through the spoken word; an action is disclosed by words; and by means of these words alone, man identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done and intends to do. The critical point, however, is this: man as an actor or as an agent, is not identical with an author or a producer: since every actor "moves in relation to other acting beings," he is not

only an actor, but at the same time a sufferer, but never an author. (Arendt, 1958: 178-181, 185, 186, 190) This is the reason why in the world of politics, that is to say, in the world of speech and action, there is no such being as an author. Arendt explicates:

In any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion; and although this agent frequently remains the subject, the 'hero' of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual outcome. (Arendt, 1958: 185)

(4) "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities." Here we need to note that Arendt distinguishes "the disclosure of who somebody is"—the "person" or "human essence"—from "what somebody is"—one's "qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings" or "human nature;" what is disclosed in one's speaking and acting is not his "what" but "who;" and the revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer "human togetherness;" and for her, the Ancient Greek polis is a paragon of such a "human togetherness;" it was supposed "worthwhile for men to live together (syzen)" in polis not only to win "fame" and to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinction, but above all else to keep this memory of greatness immortal; but "whenever human togetherness is lost" and "when people are only for or against other people," the "speech becomes 'mere talk'" losing its revelatory quality; and along with that, action, too, loses "all human relevance." (Arendt, 1958: 179-182, 193, 196-198)

Thirdly, Arendt, on the basis of the above descriptions of speech and action, undertakes to constitute the political sphere. In the beginning, she continues the previous descriptions: (1) "action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men;" they are dependent "upon the constant presence of others;" they "need the surrounding presence of others;" plurality is "the basic condition of both action and speech." This means that speech and action have "intimate relationship to the public," or they are the very activities which "constitute the public." Between men, she goes on, there lies the world of objective things "in which men move, which physically lies

between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests;” and these “interests,” as Arendt interprets, are what

constitute, in the word’s most literal significance, something which interest, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together. (Arendt, 1958: 23)

Now, Arendt re-designates “interests” as “interest” which is then identified with “in-between” or “web.” The point is that the “in-between” or “web” owes “its origin exclusively to men’s acting and speaking directly to one another.” (Arendt, 1958: 175, 182, 183, 188, 198) Virtually, the last expressions, that is, “men’s acting and speaking directly to one another” reminds us of Schutz’s “‘face-to-face relationship’ between consociates”—a relationship in which consociates share “a ‘vivid present’” within the space of “immediate observation of gestures and other physiognomic expressions” and by which each consociate grasps “one another’s thoughts, plans, hopes, and fears” (Gurwitsch, 1974: 124-125; 1970: xxiii-xxiv) or a relationship which Natanson characterizes, in contrast to a realm of “anonymity” and “agency,” as the realm of “recognition” and “personhood.” (Jung, 1999: 96) The real significance, however, lies in that the “in-between” or “web” is finally integrated into a more comprehensive concept of “the space of appearance.”

(2) “Action and speech create a space between the participants;” previously Arendt named it as the “in-between” or the “web;” now she renames it as

the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word; ... the space of appearance [is that] space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly, [i.e.] the revelation of men’s own authentic Being through the appearance of speech and action. (Arendt, 1958: 194f.)

When people gather together, the space of appearance is potentially there, “but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever;” it is only when “men are together in the manner of speech and action,” that the “space of appearance comes into being;” the being of that space “ultimately resides on action and speech.” The space of appearance is peculiar in

that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men, [but also] with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves. (Arendt, 1958: 198)

It is Arendt's opinion that the first public space of appearance—that is, polis—came into being when

the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homestead. (Arendt, 1958: 198)

In this sense, the authentic carriers of the polis are “not Athens, but the Athenians,” not the tangible locations but the intangible qualities arising out of the people; of course, before a man could act, “a definite space [has] to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place;” but Arendt argues that “these tangible entities themselves [are] not the content of politics;” they are pre-political, though not non-political. The publicness, and thus the political character, of the space of appearance consists in

the presence of others, [in] its appearing to all; [its reality comes] from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men; ... whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream. (Arendt, 1958: 199f.)

The dream as the most “intimate” and “exclusive” domain of the private. (Arendt, 1958: 200)

IV.

Now, I ask, from the standpoint of Arendt, whether we can locate a “space of appearance” in Schutz. In the following, I am going to argue that there exists in him a similar conception. Schutz prefigures a sort of public space in his “Making Music Together: A Study of Social Relationship.” He discloses a musical space approaching quite closely to that “space of appearance.” Furthermore, by focusing his “analysis” on the

“character of all social interactions connected with the musical process”, he goes beyond Arendt.

Schutz’s develops his analysis of the “social interactions” of the musical space in three phases. First, the musical space presupposes the existence of a “web of socially derived and socially approved knowledge” of music. (Schutz, 1971c: 169) He designates this pre-knowledge as “the stock of knowledge at hand.” This knowledge refers to the “past and present fellow-men whose acts or thoughts have contributed to the building up” of it. According to Schutz, no performers or audience, that is, the direct or immediate participants in the musical space, can be said to be in the blank state deprived of any previous knowledge, but more or less stuffed with sedimented experience. A performer, for example, “sitting at his piano before the score of a sonata by a minor master of the nineteenth century” and anticipating to play that piece of music, is taken to “have a well-founded knowledge of the type of musical form called ‘sonata within the meaning of nineteenth century piano music’,” with a “set of his previous experiences, which constitute in their totality a kind of pre-knowledge of the piece of music at hand.” So it is the same with the rest of the performers or, in different degrees, with the audience, too. The presupposed pre-knowledge refers to what the participants—the direct or immediate participants—have learned from their parents, their friends or their teachers, and these, in turn, from their parents, friends or teachers; what they have taken in from other players’ performance; or what they have “appropriated from the manifestation of the musical thought of the composer” etc. (Schutz, 1971c: 167-168) Among the “past and present fellow-men” referred to in the stock of knowledge, Schutz selects out the composer as one of the leading co-makers of music. In this way, the musical space is constituted by three principal participants: the performers, the audience and the composer. Though the composer participates only indirectly or mediately through the actual performance of the players and/or through the memories of the audience, he nevertheless conditions or co-determines, with the other two, the musical process going on within the musical space. Second,

all musical notation remains of necessity vague and open to manifold interpretations, and it is up to the reader or performer to decipher the hints in the score and to define the approximations. (Schutz, 1971c: 166)

Here, we need to distinguish between musical language and musical notation. By musical language, Schutz means “sounds” and “combinations of sound.” By musical notation, he means conventional means approximating the musical language—the sound. Musicians live in “a world exclusively filled with sounds” and are “interested in nothing else but creating or listening to a combination of sounds.” The “creative act of the composer is merely a discovery” of “sounds” in the “world of sounds that is accessible exclusively” to musicians. (Schutz, 1971c: 163) On the other hand,

the composer has to communicate his musical idea to the performer by way of a system of visible signs [so that] the performer can translate these ideas into sounds to be grasped by the listener.

The signs or the system of signs of musical notation, however, are “by no means identical with musical language.” They are neither “sounds” nor “images of the sounds.” They are “just one among several vehicles” of communicating musical experience of sound, “expressing in a conventional language all the commands which the musicians must obey if he wants to reproduce a piece of music properly.” In other words, the musical sign is an approximation or an

instruction to the performer to produce by means of his voice or his instrument a sound of a particular pitch and duration, [a suggestion] as to tempo, dynamics, and expression, [a direction] as to the connection with other sounds [or] a hint about how to secure in performance a convincing transmission of the work’s feeling content without destroying its emotional and intellectual community. ... The composer’s specific indications are themselves not always a part of his original creation but rather one musician’s message to another about it. (Schutz, 1971c: 163)

This is why, Schutz claims, “the indicated effect” or “the way to obtain” that effect “is left to the performer” and, for that sake, “an improvisation” is “executed by one or several instrumentalists.” In short, the semantic system of musical notations is “of quite another kind than that of ideograms, letters, or mathematical or chemical symbols.” As Schutz illustrates, the “ideogram refers immediately to the represented concept

and so does the mathematical or chemical symbol.” Whereas “the signs of musical notation and their combination” could bring about their effect only “by continuous reference to the group which invented and adopted them.” (Schutz, 1971c: 165-166)

In order to understand what Schutz means here, we need to remind ourselves of Husserl’s distinction between “subjective and occasional expressions on the one hand, and objective expressions, on the other.” According to Husserl,

an expression [is] objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one’s attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance. (Husserl, 1970a: 314)

On the other hand, “an expression” is “essentially subjective and occasional” if it is essential “to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation.” So the “word ‘I’” (including such words as “this,” “here,” “there,” “above,” “below,” “now,” “later,” “yesterday,” “tomorrow” etc.) “names a different person from case to case, and does so by way of an ever altering meaning.” Thus an occasional meaning, Husserl summarizes, “can be gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it.” (Husserl, 1970a: 314-315) I think this is the sense Schutz is also trying to make us understand in connection with the musical notation. In a similar context, Schutz quotes Wilhelm Furtwängler, a conductor, as follows:

the composer’s text ‘cannot give any indication as to the really intended volume of a forte, the really intended speed of a tempo, since every forte and every tempo has to be modified in practice in accordance with the place of the performance and the setting and the strength of the performing group’ and that ‘the expression marks have intentionally a merely symbolic value with respect to the whole work and are not intended to be valid for the single instrument, wherefore an ‘ff’ for the bassoon has quite another meaning than for the trombone.’ (Schutz, 1971c: 161)

Third, any meaningful analysis of musical process must be focused not on the character of musical signs but on the flow of musical sound. Sound

must be the primary concern of musical analysis. And in the light of this concern with sound, Schutz proceeds to deal with the social relationships existing among the participants in the musical space. To begin with, Schutz defines “a piece of music” as “a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time.” The very essence of music consists in the non-conceptual “occurrence in inner time.” (Schutz, 1971c: 170) This means that the “outer time” such as measurable by metronomes or clocks cannot be the medium within which the musical being can be given. Only “inner time” or what Bergson calls “durée” can be “the very form of existence of music.” To a beholder listening to a record, for example, the outer time means nothing.

While listening he lives in a dimension of time incomparable with that which can be subdivided into homogeneous parts. The outer time is measurable. [But, there is] no such yardstick for the dimension of inner time the listener lives in. [For him,] the musical content itself, its very meaning, [can neither be] related to a conceptual scheme, [nor be grasped] monothetically, [that is] in a single glance [or independently of the actual process of inner time, but only be lived by submerging oneself] in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time. (Schutz, 1971c: 166)

Since the meaning structure of a musical work is not capable of being “translated and conveyed to the other partner by way of a common semantic system,” but articulable only in terms of “step by step occurrence in inner time, in polythetic constitutional process itself,” every single phase of the musical tone must be co-performed or re-performed polythetically, that is, step by step in the inner time of the beholder which then brings in a quasi-simultaneity of stream of consciousness between the beholder and the composer. This is how, Schutz argues,

a beholder of a piece of music participates in and to a certain extent re-creates the experiences [of the composer.] (Schutz, 1971c: 169-170)

According to Schutz, the composer arranges tones, by means of specific “acts” (such as rhythm, melody, technique of diminution, tonal harmony or large harmony like that of Sonata, Rondo, Variations, and so on) in such a way that

the consciousness of beholder is led to refer what he actually hears to what he anticipates will follow and also to what he has just been hearing and what he has heard ever since this piece of music began (Schutz, 1971c: 170)

and thereby evokes in the hearer's stream of consciousness interplay and interrelations of "the successive elements" of sound. Of course, "the sequence of tones" flows in "the irreversible direction of time," but Schutz emphasizes that "this irreversible flux is not irretrievable." (Schutz, 1971c: 170) Although the beholder is separated from the composer, let us say, by hundreds of years, he can participate in the latter's "stream of consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought." In this way, Schutz says, the beholder shares with the composer "a form of vivid present." This "living through a vivid present in common"—the form of time prevailing in such a relationship as between "speaker and listener" as in "a genuine face-to-face" situation—is what unites the beholder with the composer. Schutz also calls it a "mutual tuning-in relation" or "the 'we' relation." (Schutz, 1971c: 171-173) What is striking here is that Schutz does not take the listener's activity as "merely an internal activity," but, following Weber's "famous definition," as "a social action," which involves "the action of Others" and is "oriented by them in its course." In short, Schutz stresses purposively the active role of the listener. He is now not a mere passive recipient, but an active agent participating in the process of "Making Music Together." In this sense, Schutz's "beholder" looks more like what Hisashi Nasu calls "the beholder in a drama" than "the beholder in a novel." Nasu makes this point very clear, when he says that

[t]he beholder in the novel is ... always simply an 'interpreter of meaning' of the completed and unchallengeable events. In drama, [however], the beholder is 'omniscient' in relation to the individual character by virtue of the author who performs 'the technical task' of presenting, immediately and without interpretation, the relations between characters to the beholder. He is both the 'eye-witness' to the drama and the 'completer of meaning.' He is in this sense a co-creator of the ongoing drama. (Nasu, 1998: 133)

Schutz then moves to that relationship between the performers and describes a musical space consisting of co-performers with “a soloist accompanied by a keyboard instrument.” The co-performers, as the intermediaries between composer and listener, have to execute activities gearing into the outer world and occurring in spatialized outer time, because “all performance as an act of communication is based upon a series of events in the outer world.” Since “[t]he process of the communication proper is bound to an occurrence in the outer world,” all the activities of performing must occur in “outer time,” which, however, synchronizes in this face-to-face relationship with “the fluxes of inner time.” The critical point Schutz assures us is that “making music together is an event in outer time, presupposing ... a community of space.” So each performer’s action responds not only to the composer’s thought and to the feeling of the audience but also to the experiences going on in inner and outer time of his co-performers. One’s facial expressions, his gestures in handling the instrument, and all the other activities of performing, gear into the outer world and are grasped by others in immediacy. Each finds in the music sheet his portion of that musical content which the composer has assigned to his instrument for translation into sound. Each of them takes into account what the others have to execute in simultaneity. He has not only to interpret his own part, but he also has to anticipate the other players’ interpretations of his. His freedom of interpreting the composer’s thought is constrained by the freedom granted to the others. He has to foresee, by listening to the others, by protentions and anticipations, any turn the others may take and has to be prepared at any time to lead or to be led. Any activity, even if performed without communicative intent, is received by the one as an indication of what the others are going to do and therefore as a suggestion or a command for one’s behavior. Each of them undergoes the inner *durée*, but everyone also shares each other’s stream of consciousness in vivid present. They make music together in a face-to-face relationship, sharing not only a section of time but also a sector of space. Where a larger number of executants is required, one of them—a song leader, concert master, or a continuo player—assumes the function, establishes with each of the performers the contact which they themselves are unable to find with one another in immediacy. The evocative gestures of the conductor translate the musical events going on in inner time and takes up for each performer the immediate grasping of the expressive activities of all his co-performers. And these co-performers,

including the singer, the player of various instruments, and the conductor, participate, by re-creating the “musical process,” in “the stream of the composer as well as of the listener.” (Schutz, 1971c: 174-178)

It is surprising to see that a rigorous analysis of social relationship such as Schutz’s ends up with moving and vivid description of musical scenes. And I think the above analysis shows certain underlying similarities between Schutz and Arendt. In particular Schutz’s description of the musical space comes very close to Arendt’s “space of appearance” in two senses: first, both indicate a space of common appearances indirect communication within the actual reach, that is, the space being seen and heard simultaneously; second, neither is meant to be a receptive space, that is, the space of mere passivity. On the other hand, they reveal two differences: first, Schutz is concerned primarily with “making” (poiesis), whereas Arendt is concerned with “doing” (praxis); second, the space for Schutz is the one of (polythetic) sound, whereas for Arendt, it is that of (monothetic) speech.

To sum up: the life-world is an intersubjective world, but it is not yet public. How then can it be public or political? According to Arendt, it is when men are together in the manner of speech and action that the space of appearance comes into being. This space is peculiar in that it disappears not only with the dispersal of men, but also with the disappearance of the activities themselves. Thus the publicness and political character of the space of appearance consists in its “being seen, being heard, and generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men.” In a similar way, Schutz prefigures a sort of public space in his “Making Music Together.” By focusing on the social relationships existing among the participants in the musical space, Schutz describes vividly the process of making music together. *Mutatis mutandis*, Schutz’s musical space can help us in understanding and describing the actual process of constituting the publicness or the political, of which, however, Arendt’s space of appearance is not capable.

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