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THE POLITICS OF REWRITING HISTORY: NEW SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN RUSSIA

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the representations of Imperial Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet history in official school textbooks and curriculum materials used in Russian upper secondary schools. As we will see, the new textbooks portray a new, post-Soviet, national identity that indicates a radical ideological repositioning and redefinition of what are seen a 'legitimate' culture and values in Russia. As will become apparent, the textbooks and other materials particularly set out to overturn the Soviet emphasis on orthodoxy in historical interpretation by encouraging a critical consciousness among in students. They do this by approaching history from multiple perspectives and inviting students to confront certain chapters in the country's past in a questioning and analytical manner (for other discussions of post-Soviet educational reform in Russia, see McLean & Voskresenskaya, 1992; Kaufman, 1994; Zajda, 1998, 1999, 2002). It can almost be argued that in the textbooks, pluralism, and critical awareness replace Marxism-Leninism as the new dominant discourse.

These dramatic changes in the history curriculum have been motivated by the major political, economic and social transformations that have occurred in Russian society since 1991. The collapse of the totalitarian USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation signalled the beginning of liberal reforms, and hopes for the development of civil society. The 'Soviet' mentality, so carefully nurtured in schools, universities, unions and soviets now had to be replaced in every sphere of society. The new Law on Education (1992, revised in 1996) provided the definition of a new post-Soviet education structure. Since then new curricula, new textbooks, and methodologies have been gradually implemented in schools as soon as they became available.

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2. CHANGING PERCEPTION OF RECENT HISTORICAL EVENTS IN RUSSIA

The break-up of the USSR and the resultant collapse of communism in 1991 necessitated, among other things, the rewriting of school history textbooks, which, for seventy years had been dominated by Marxist-Leninist interpretations of historical events. This chapter evaluates the new post-Soviet school history textbooks in upper secondary schools, giving particular attention to the way the models for a new Russian (non-Soviet) identity presented in the new textbooks redefine what is seen as legitimate culture for students. Attention is also given to the multiple perspectives on history that school textbooks and other curriculum materials emphasise. These new methods contrast with the Soviet grand narrative that dominated the study of history before 1991.

Beginning with *perestroika* (restructuring) era in 1990, extending through the collapse of the communist system in 1991, and continuing on into the contemporary post-Soviet era, a process of rewriting history has been undertaken in Russia. The new history textbooks for schools which have been published in Russia are one of the major outcomes of this process. This chapter and the book (forthcoming) were partly inspired by the authors' early conversations with Eduard Dneprov, the then Minister of Education, Vladimir D. Shadrikov, then Deputy-Chair of the Ministry of Higher Education in 1992, and with other key players in the process of change and revision in the following years.

In a world familiar with a post-Soviet Russia for over a decade, it is necessary to stress that the intensity and the suddenness of political and economic transformations were overwhelming for most citizens. 'Culture shock' is not too strong a way of describing the feelings of Soviet citizens, who became ex-Soviet, virtually overnight, on the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. The attempted formation of a democratic society, the adoption of a new constitution, the introduction of a multi-party system (for the first time since 1917), and freedom of the press, have created a totally different *milieu* in Russian society and education. The ensuing avalanche of information in the form of thousands of post-Soviet newspapers, journals and books, all reflected the much awaited diversity and pluralism.

If after, seven decades of the ubiquitous Soviet totalitarian regime, hegemony, and censorship, many now ex-Soviet citizens suffered individual crises of civic identity, history teachers faced a double burden. They were charged with mastering the new approaches to history themselves, as well as interpreting them to their students. Vinogradov (1996) attempted to explain the intellectual turmoil in the following way[i]:

> Russian society is going through a period of painful reflection on its historical ways and basic values. [The Russians] are trying to understand Russia's past and present, and to look into its future with the help of history and political science (p. 7).

This chapter, using an approach based on Foucault's notion of discourse, examines the shifts in ideological and cultural representations of history's narrative in core Russian school history textbooks. It will be argued that the new history

schools textbooks represent a new form of hegemony and disciplinary practice. We also argues that Russian school textbooks represent a new post-Soviet hegemony or 'regime of truth' depicting a distinctly Russian interpretation of pluralist democracy, nationalism and presidential rule.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Discourse analysis as applied to history textbooks

A critical discourse analysis of school history textbooks is employed. Discourse analysis can be found in Foucault's books *The Order of Things* (1970), The *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), and *Power/Knowledge* (1980). As an approach it has been applied to the production of knowledge. Foucault (1984, p. 110) suggested that dominant discourses are determined by power struggles:

> Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the power for which and by which there is struggle; discourse is the power, which is to be seized.

It was Foucault who alerted us, in a post-structuralist sense, to the politics of the text and the knowledge-power connection. According to Foucault (1980, p. 68):

> Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power.

The term *discourse*, as employed by Michel Foucault, involves an intertwining of ideas, themes, forms of knowledge and also positions held by individuals in relation to these (Hudson, 1984). Furthermore, these meanings can be 'embodied in technical processes, in institutions…in forms for transmission and diffusion and in pedagogical ideas' (Foucault, 1977a, p. 200). In this sense, discourse can refer to not only statements, but also to social and institutional practices through which the social production of meaning takes place or is embodied. This leads to the construct of '*discursive practices'*, or activities which are systematically subjected to a certain (attempted) regimentation and patterning by one or more dominant discourses (Minson, 1985, p. 124). Textbook activities encourage students to approach history critically, and 'persuade' teachers to abandon the earlier, more rigid teaching styles of the Soviet era in favour of innovative and diverse approaches. The critical aspect of discourses challenges the accepted *hierarchical* structuring of *authority* concerning knowledge and the *neutrality* of knowledge and ideology. It asks questions about the historical and cultural conditions in which discourses emerged.

4. DATA COLLECTION

Ten school history textbooks were subjected to a critical discourse analysis. Post-Soviet school history textbooks were represented by core text published

between 1992-2001, and approved by the Ministry of Education. Of these, 8 were published by the State publishing houses (*Pedagogika* etc). The problem of sampling did not emerge as officially prescribed school history textbooks were used uniformly throughout the country. For example, one of the texts analysed *Istoriia Otechestva* (History of the Fatherland), which was a prescribed text for the final year secondary history curriculum, has a circulation of 3, 018, 000 copies.

In our discourse analysis of the new versions of Russia's post-Soviet school history textbooks, the focus was on:

– critiquing the *new* interpretation of social and political change,
– the representations of significant *events* (political transformations, especially revolutionary politics, as represented by the 1917 October revolution and the Civil war),
– leadership (the contribution of key individuals and players during the 1917-45 period),
– ideology (transformation from Soviet Marxist-Leninist hegemony to democracy) and continuities (how the State preserved social and political aspects of Russian society throughout the centuries, and the importance of cultural heritage and traditional values).
– *ideological reproduction*, or an ideological re-positioning of post-Soviet representation of the historical narrative with the emphasis on cultural heritage, tradition, and patriotism – as an attempt to create a new hegemonic synthesis, and a new form of the control of meaning (here Foucauldian notions of ‘discipline’ and the ‘regime of truth’ are particularly relevant in the discourse).

These reflect the central themes in the post-Soviet reinterpretation of the past of Russian society. Only those segments of history textbooks were analysed which represented new interpretations of historic events, and leaders.

To summarise, in our discourse analysis of textbooks the emphasis has been on *value-laden* historical and political *constructs* that consistently appeared in reinterpretation of events, leaders and other major actors on the historical arena.

5. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA SINCE 1991

In the 1990s, education policy reforms in developed and developing economies have emerged as a top-priority political, economic, and cultural issue. Improving the quality of education in the new Russia has become associated with the following three key goals of post-industrial states. First, improving the quality of education is linked to international economic competitiveness. This is highly significant for Russia, one of the global military super powers, currently undergoing a painful transitional period. Second, quality education is a necessary condition for development and higher living standards. Third, the *affective* dimension of education reforms is a catalyst for transforming and changing attitudes and values. The new history curriculum in schools is likely to reflect these global goals – at the civilisational, political and cultural levels.

5.1 School History Textbooks and Ideology

Education in the Soviet Union always carried an ideological agenda. As early as 1958, during a major overhaul of the school system, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union defined the socialising function of education thusly: “Upbringing must inculcate in the schoolchildren a love of knowledge and of work, and [a] respect for people who work; it must shape the communist world outlook” (cited by Grant, 1979, p. 25). In a sense, this vision for education was a continuation of Lenin’s ideas. It was Lenin who reminded his audiences at the 3rd Congress of Communist Youth Organisations (2 October, 1920) that the goal of schooling was the creation of a communist morality:

The whole task of upbringing, education and learning of contemporary youth should be the cultivation of communist morality.

We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our morality stems from the class struggle of the proletariat… We say that morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite the tools around the proletariat, which is creating a new, communist society. (Lenin, 1977, 155-159).

> What “ideology” meant in Soviet education was not as problematic as in the West. Whereas in the West “ideology” may refer to a form of “false consciousness” that distorts one’s perception of social reality and serves the interests of the dominant class, in the Soviet Union it was used to refer to a system of ideas, beliefs, and values about communism. More specifically, it referred to Marxist-Leninist ethics. Direct, centralised, and systematic teaching of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of socialist reconstructionism, based on the proposition that desired schooling can promote desired social change, took place in history and other school subjects; it was also reinforced in school-based children’s organisations like the Komsomol, the Octobrists, and the Pioneers (Zajda, 1994, p.166).

However, the values and ideas that pervaded Soviet schools could not be explained by the Marxist-Leninist belief system alone. Despite the hegemony of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet state had a strong affinity to the heritage of the Russian Empire. Particularly during the darkest days of World War II (July 1941-1942), when dozens of Soviet armies were either defeated or captured, the state propaganda machine advanced a Soviet identity based on a combination of nationalism and patriotism. World War II came to be referred to as “The Great Patriotic War,” for instance, and the Soviet Union became a metaphor for “Our Motherland” (*Nasha Rodina*). Soviet media treated the war as a sacred crusade to save not just the Soviet system and communism, but Mother Russia herself:

> During 1942 the war was presented as a war to save historic Russia [and as] a nationalist war of revenge…The words “Soviet Union” and “communism” appeared less and less frequently in official publications. The words “Russia” and “Motherland” took their place. The “Internationale,” the anthem of the international socialist movement played on state occasions, was replaced with a new national anthem. (Overy, 1999, p. 161-162)

The Soviet regime also employed other strategies and techniques to emphasise the great heritage, power, and tradition of Russia and Russian civilisation. In the

teaching of history, great leaders and national heroes predominated. Aleksandr Nevsky, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great, to name a few, made up for their ideological differences by means of their significant contributions to the building of the Russian Empire. Grant (1979) observes that the Soviet authorities used nationalism and patriotism as a "prop" for securing further loyalty to the regime and that they enjoyed "considerable success" in this project (p. 32). Stalin's famous broadcast on 3 July 1941, for example, began with "brothers and sisters" and "friends" – words that were foreign to his normal political and public vocabulary – and went on to invoke the great heroes of the Russian past who had fought off invaders (Gevurkova & Koloskov, 1993; Stalin, 1944). Stalin's appeal to popular patriotism and nationalism, rather than Soviet citizenship, was a vivid example of the shift in official ideology.

During this same period, the film *Aleksandr Nevsky*, a masterpiece by Sergei Eisenstein (music by Prokofiev), became essential viewing and a morale booster; the film depicted the heroic exploits of Aleksandr Nevsky, a Muscovite prince who defeated the Teutonic Knights in 1242. Another film, *Ivan Grozny* (Ivan the Terrible), was also made. A brilliant masterpiece, this film examined the power, control, and discipline exercised by the autocratic Muscovite prince during the initial stages of the building of the Russian Empire. These films signalled a shift in thinking in the Soviet Union – from international communism to national consciousness, traditional values, and Russian patriotism (Billington, 1970).

A similar shift occurred in the military. The tsarist-era Nevsky military order was revived, new medals commemorating the great military heroes of Russia's past were struck, and tsarist officer uniforms – complete with the hats, gold braids, and shoulder boards that revolutionary mobs had torn off soldiers in 1917 – were redesigned and worn. The new uniforms provided a psychological boost to the officer corps, particularly at the end of the battle of Stalingrad, and officers could not wait to get their hands on them. After this watershed battle, political commissars (the dual command/authority structure) were abolished, and the tsarist term for "officer" replaced the familiar egalitarian "comrade" (Overy, 1999).

The reinvention of tradition did not stop with past heroes and new lexicons in the media and military. The power of religion was also rediscovered. Beginning in September 1941, antireligious publishing houses were closed. The Russian Orthodox Church, suppressed and persecuted by the Soviet regime's atheistic and militant ideology for two decades, was "suddenly rehabilitated" (Overy, 1999, p. 162). In 1943, Stalin invited Metropolitans Aleksei, Sergei, and Nikolai to the Kremlin and agreed to the election of the Patriarch of All Russia, a seat that had been vacant since 1924 (Werth, 1992). Ultimately, Patriarch Sergei was invited to lead the Church. The word "God" began to appear in *Pravda* with a capital letter. In the final analysis, religion was allowed to flourish in the Soviet Union during the Second World War not because Stalin was an ex-seminarian, but because it served a larger purpose for the Soviet regime: It gave ordinary citizens a sense of belonging to – and a commitment to – a community that was under threat from foreign forces.

6. NEW NARRATIVES IN HISTORY SCHOOL TEXTS

6.1 Grades 10 and 11 history school textbooks

In the 2001 prescribed history textbook for Grades 10 and 11 (recommended by the Ministry of Education), *Rossiia v XX veke* (Russia in the 20th century, fifth edition), which is one of the key texts, judging by the print run of 100,000 copies, Russian 16 year-olds are urged to take, which is new, a more *analytical* and critical approach to history:

> History, according to Kluchevski, is not a teacher but a mentor, *magistra vitae*. She does not teach anything, yet punishes for lessons not learnt…
>
> The crucial periods of the past will pass by our reflective gaze: Russia with her bright and dark pages of life prior to 1917 . . . the depressing shadow of massive repressions…the growth of our Fatherland, with great achievements and unforgiving errors…More than ever before it is necessary for you to explain…the inner logic of a historical process, and find the answers to the questions why such events occurred…You need to be guided by the principle . . . Sine ira et studio – learn without hate or passion. You need to understand historical facts for what they are, rather than guessing and rushing to categorise them in ideological schemes (pp. 3-4).

The new school textbook has eight chapters and 20 themes, covering the period from the early 1900s to 1997. Nearly half of the book, which covers over 100 years of Russian modern history is taken up by the wars and revolutions, reinforcing the image that Russia's history is one of blood, suffering and anguish, resulting in the needless sacrifice and death of tens of millions of people during the two World Wars alone, not to mention the Civil War and the subsequent Red Terror, and Stalinism. An analysis of the representation of major events in Soviet and post-Soviet history in the latest books shows that students are now given access to facts and documents relating to major events which were excluded from any public representation, particularly in textbooks, during the Soviet era.

Theme 1 'Socio-economic development of Russia at the end of XIX to the beginning of XX centuries' introduces the students to monopolies, power, foreign capital in Russia, and the backwardness of the rural sector, whereas the theme 'The cardinal changes in the country' examines the formation of the 'Presidential Republic' (pp. 339-348) under Yeltsin, who in March 1993 issued a decree defining 'a special order of governance', which gave the President the unlimited power and control, or dictatorship. In September 1993, Yeltsin issued another decree – number 1400, which dissolved the Upper House (*Verkhovny Soviet*) and the Congress of People's Deputies, creating a constitutional crisis. Students now learn that the Deputies refused to leave and, as a result, Yeltsin ordered the army to use tanks and fire on the 'White House' (p. 341). Despite the reiterated stress on the need for a critical approach to history throughout the new school textbooks, students are not invited at this point to question whether such an action was appropriate in a modern democracy? However, students are told that, after the *spetsnaz* stormed the building,

the Deputies, together with their leaders (including Rutskoy), and their defenders were arrested. This passage illustrates the way traces of the ambivalent legacies of the Soviet and Imperial past, where might was ruler, can still be found in the texts.

Likewise, it is difficult to imagine what the 17 year-old students were supposed to make of the 'storming' of the 'White House' in October 1993. Anyone present at that event would have observed a small war being waged, as the tanks moved in and began firing on the parliament house or *Bely Dom* ('White House'), and the bullets whistled by. The textbook does not ask students to debate the implications of this episode. When we asked Moscow locals about the *Bely Dom* battle a few months later, they were reluctant to discuss it. It was a case of 'characteristic amnesia'.

As we glance back to the October Revolution of 1917 in the section *Shturm vlasti* (the Attack on Power) this crucial moment in the world history, which brought the Bolsheviks to power, is now described as a low-key event, in radical contrast to the accepted Soviet versions, which typically portrayed it as one of momentous significance. In contrast to Soviet pictorial representations of the mass-storming of the Winter Palace, students now learn that in fact, only small detachments, organised by the Military-Revolutionary Committee (which was directed by Trotsky, whose role is finally acknowledged in this post-Soviet climate) actually 'seized' the Winter Palace. The Provisional government simply 'ceased to exist' and its ministers were arrested. However, students are not invited to reflect further on the reasons for such different versions of the same event, nor to consider that while the coup itself was not a mass event, it did set in train drastic and far-reaching changes in the structure and culture of Russian society.

The students discover that representatives of other influential parties, following the Bolshevik coup, left the 2nd Congress of the Soviet, held on 25 October. Of the 670 registered delegates only 300 were Bolsheviks, which meant that they had no overall majority. The new Soviet government of 1917 includes Trotsky, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

> . . . the new Soviet government was formed – the Soviet of People's Commissars (SNK). Lenin was the chairman. Prominent Bolsheviks were members of the SNK (L. Trotsky—*narkom* (People's Commisar) of Foreign Affairs, A. Rykov – narkom of the Ministry for the Internal Affairs, A. Lunacharsky, narkom for education, and I. Stalin – narkom of the Ministry for Ethnic Affairs) (p. 113).

Contemporary students are asked to judge whether the October 1917 was a *coup* (*perevorot*) or the revolution, as previously represented. This is a new and critical approach to analysing the October Revolution, which in the Soviet textbooks was always regarded as the culminating phenomenon of the victory of the Bolsheviks, depicted in the dramatic *sturm* (storming) of the Winter Palace. Now the students, based on their research of available documents and publications are encouraged to offer their own interpretations:

> Many contemporaries regarded the October 1917 events as another political *perevorot*, which temporarily brought to the top one of the Russian parties, which "won" over the other parties by arming itself with popular slogans and by using conspiratorial and forceful tactics . . .

> The Bolsheviks were quick to declare the October Revolution as the socialist one…But did this third revolution bring in the end the creation of the socialist society? We will find the answer when we analyse further events in Russia (p. 116).

Here is an attempt to encourage students to consider competing dominant ideologies in Russia between 1917 and 1920. Students are asked, on the basis of their research, to come up with their own interpretation of the ideological struggle. Prior to that there was only one accepted version of the Civil War, the one written by the 'winners'. The 'losers', despite their equal claim to history in the war of liberation, were, until now, written out of history.

A more controversial fact, which the students discover (and which was not presented in a such a critical manner before), is Lenin's direct role in the creation of the secret police (not unlike the tsarist *okhranka*, but more deadly), when he appointed F. Dzerzhinski as the first Director of the *Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia* (VCHK—All-Russian Extraordinary Commission—the predecessor of the NKVD and KGB):

> On 7 December 1917, on Lenin's initiative the organ of direct political repressions was formed – *Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia* for combating the counter-revolution and sabotage…At first, the VCHK's role was to prevent open anti-soviet demonstrations . . . But a few months later this punitive organ acquired unlimited powers, including the right to sentence and carrying it out (p. 123).

The students now learn that Lenin, who presented himself as a great democrat had another darker side to him (not unlike some of leaders of the French Revolution) – ruthless dictator, who was not afraid of using the notorious secret police – the ChK (and *chekisty*) and the Red Terror to consolidate his grip on power, which, as we now know, was contested even before the outbreak of the Civil War. The voice of opposition is captured in F. Dan's (leader of the Mensheviks) speech prior to his expulsion from the "parliament":

> "You will not frighten us by any *okhrankas* (Secret Police – JZ) and repressions" he shouted in anger at the meeting of VtsIK. We fight and continue to fight by means of agitation during the elections and re-elections of the Soviet. The most evil lie in relation to the working classes is when you say that the Soviet are different from other democratic organs in its ability to mirror the contemporary life of the proletariat…You have the arrogance to write that if the workers do not approve of the government of Lenin and Trotsky, or the government of SNK, they can re-elect it. This is a lie, because in the present regime it is impossible to re-elect not only Lenin and Trotsky but even a rank and file communist. (p. 127)

The students also learn that during the first ever parliamentary election, the Bolsheviks were defeated and the new *Uchreditelsoe sobranie* (Constituent Assembly), consisted of 60 per cent of seats won by the socialists of various factions, and 17 per cent of seats were won by the bourgeois parties:

> Immediately after (the election – JZ) the Bolsheviks took measures . . . to soften their political defeat. At the end of November 1917 Sovnarkom approved the decree denouncing the Cadet party as the "party of the enemies of the people". By doing this it negated the mandates of this influential party…The arrests of the prominent Cadets followed. Earlier on, the decree of 27 October closed the press "which was poisoning

> the minds and which brought confussion in the conscience of the masses" (some 150 prominent oppositional newspapers and magazines were closed).

The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, held on 5 January 1918, was chaired by V. Chernov, leader of the right faction of the Socialist Revolutionaries. He was elected by the majority of deputies. Delegates refused to ratify the VtsIK Declaration of the workers rights, which would sanction the October coup and Soviet decrees that had been issued. Many had left the meeting and there was no quorum:

> Even though the Constituent Assembly had no quorum it approved the draft resolutions, which were read in a hurry by V. Chernov . . . On 6 January, the VTsIK decree dissolved the Constituent Assembly, accusing it of 'non-compromising attitude towards the tasks of the creation of socialism"

The Civil War is now described as the struggle between the 'two evils'—the Reds and the Whites, which resulted in the death of 8 million people, who perished as a result of famine, the Red Terror, or were killed on the battlefields:

> For Russia the Civil War became the greatest tragedy. The damage done to the economy was in excess of 50 billion gold roubles. In 1920 the industrial output was seven times less than it was in 1913 . . . (p. 165).

One of the questions students are asked is: "In your opinion, of the 'two evils'- the Whites and the Reds, why did the majority of the population of the former Russian empire choose the latter? 'Was there such a real choice', the textbooks authors ask? It may have been, the authors suggest, that the 'multimillion mass of peasantry was in the state of complete indifference towards the Reds and the Whites and was unable to organise the opposition against one or the other'. This is an attempt to re-think the role of the masses during the Civil War and to suggest that the victorious Bolshevik army (which grew from 300,000 in 1917 to 5.5 million in 1920) was not necessarily representative of the masses.

New is also the inclusion of documents describing the political ideals and manifestoes of the Whites. In the section 'The ideology of the White movement', students learn, for the first time in history, about the Whites and their slogan '*Za edinuiu i nedelimuiu Rossiiu'* (For the united and singular Russia), a slogan that is more applicable today in the post-Soviet Russia (p. 156).

The collapse of the USSR is described in less than 3 pages. The students discover that during the first ever referendum held in the USSR in March 1991, 76.4% still voted for the 'preservation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a regenerated federation of equal and sovereign republics' (p. 320). But on 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia (B. Eltsin, L. Kravchuk, and S. Shushkevitch) 'announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv* (SNG)'. Gorbachev was outmanoeuvred and displaced. On 25 December, M. Gorbachev, now defacto leader, resigns from the post of the President of the USSR (p. 323).

6.2 Grade 9 history textbook

Similar events are covered in the new core history textbook for Grade 9 (fifteen year olds) but with less depth and detail. They are introduced to a more critical approach to the history of major events through us of the technique of inviting them to offer other possible scenarios to the course and outcomes of events. In their newest 2001 edition of *Istoriia Rossii* (History of Russia, the seventh edition) – the latest core history textbook for Grade 9 (recommended by the Ministry of Education), which is one of the key school texts, with the print run of 200,000 copies, Russian 15 year-olds learn about the 'Silver Age of the Russian Culture' (pp. 72-81), 'Russia in Search of Perspectives' (part 2), 'Stalinist Modernisation of Russia (part 3), the history of the Soviet Union between 1939-1991, the *perestroika* years of 1985-1991, and 'The New Russia: 1991-1998' (pp. 322-336). The text focuses on the twentieth century Russia (1900-1998).

The events of February and October 1917 are described on pp. 82-91. The October Revolution of 1917 is described in less than two pages. Fifteen-year-olds now learn that the tsar Nicholas II had 'missed his last chance' of transforming the 'revolution begun from "below" into a less painful for the country revolution from "above". Instead, he issues a decree on dissolution of the Duma, thus depriving the liberal movement of any hope of the transition to a constitutional monarchy (p. 82).

In the section 'The Bolsheviks seize power' (pp 89-91), (part 2, 'Russia in Search of Perspectives – 1917-1927') the students learn of the true role of Lev Trotsky (Lev Davidovich Bronstein—the textbook also contains a brief bio on pp. 89-90), who, as an elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet in October 1917 and the chairman of the Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Committee, played a critical role in taking over the power and arresting the Provisional Government, located in the Winter Palace:

> L. D. Trotsky is elected the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet…On 12 October 1917 the Revolutionary-Military Committee (*Voenno-revolutsionny komitet*, or VRK) is created within the Petrograd Soviet…In reality, Trotsky was in charge of VRK…On 24 October the armed detachments of the Red Guard and the revolutionary soldiers of Petrograd began to seize bridges, post office, telegraph and railway stations. No one opposed them in the slightest…A slow delay occurred during the seizure of the Winter Palace, which was defended by a Junker (cadets) detachment and a volunteer women's battalion…Kerensky, prior to the storming of the Winter Palace, left for the front. The remaining members of government were arrested. The total losses during the "armed uprising" consisted of six dead (p. 90).

One of the questions at the end of the chapter is: In your opinion, what variants of possible scenarios were possible after February 1917? This question already demonstrates a more critical and reflective approach to teaching history in schools.

The section 'The Red Terror' (*Krasny terror*), in less than a page, describes the September 1918 decree, following the assassination of M. Uritski, the Chairman of the Petrograd Extraordinary Committee (the forerunner of the NKVD), which resulted in the execution of 500 hostages (p. 115). Trotsky's role is described as follows:

> In the armoured train where Trotsky travelled across the various fronts there was working the military-revolutionary tribunal with unlimited powers…The first concentration camps were created . . . (p. 115).

In yet another section 'The Liquidation of the Romanovs is now described as one of the most 'evil' chapters of the "Red Terror" – the extermination of the former tsar's immediate family and other members of the Imperial family:

> On 16 July, evidently by the order from the Sovnarkom, the Ural regional Soviet had decided to execute Nikolai Romanov and his entire family. During the night of 17 July . . . . a bloody tragedy occurred. Nikolai, together his wife, his five children and servants were executed (p. 115).

The chapter fails to mention that Yeltsin, who was the party boss of the city of Sverdlovsk during the 1980s, and a hard-line communist, did everything to destroy every trace of the house where the Royal family was executed.

What is new is the inclusion of documents (which, for political reasons, were not available before) brief bios and photographs of prominent leaders, like G. Lvov, L. Trotsky, M. Alekseev, A. Kolchak, A. Denikin, P. Vrangel, and M. Tukhachevsky, seen for the first time ever after a seventy year period of 'air brushing.' The author during his schooling in the USSR never saw these photos.

In the 'Political System of Stalinism (chapter 26), Russian 15 year-olds learn about the excesses of totalitarianism, which is defined and explained in great deal, especially the notion that the political system of the USSR was a 'unique form of totalitarianism' during the 1930s, when the Party constituted the 'nucleus of the totalitarian system' (pp. 169-170). In the section 'Repressions' (less then 2 pages) students learn that the entire leadership group of Lenin's faction – Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin (the 'Party's favourite'), and later Trotsky (who was murdered in Mexico) were executed:

> During the early 1930s the final political trials were held and the accused were the former opponents of the Bolsheviks . . . Most of them were either shot or sent to prison and concentration camps (p. 172).

According to 'official sources', between 1930-1953, some 3,778,234 individuals were accused of 'counter-revolutionary' and 'anti-government' activities and were sentenced, including 786, 098 who were executed (p. 173).The students now learn the 'cult of Stalin' began in earnest in 1929, which coincided with Stalin's 50th birthday anniversary:

> All the newspapers, for the fist time, published Stalin's photos and numerous articles. Stalin is cited as the 'leader of the global proletariat' . . . Stalin's deification continues. The 270-page pamphlet *Comrade Stalin* appeared…There were 700 greetings, and 'shouting' slogans: 'To the Leader of the World's Revolution' . . . The Organiser of the Victories of the Red Army' . . . It seems that comrade Stalin is higher than Lenin, and above the entire Party…Where is the humility demanded by Lenin? (from the *Diaries* of A. Sokolov, pp. 174-5).

World War 2 (Part 4: The Soviet Union during the World War Two) is described as a tragedy, which cost 27 million lives (including 10 million killed in the Armed Forces). Zhukov was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief in August 1942 (Stalin's number 2 man). He is still regarded as a great military leader, who 'saved'

the country. What the students are not told that there were many other great commanders, who together contributed to the defeat of Germany: "In the people's memory, G. Zhukov has remained as the Victory Marshal, the Great Russian leader, who had saved the Fatherland from the enemy's enslavement" (p. 206).

One of the documents included is a fragment of Stalin's speech of May 1945, delivered at the reception of the Red Army officers. It refers to government's earlier mistakes during the conduct of the war and the incredible heroism of the Russian people (other minorities are not mentioned) in defeating the enemy. Stalin concludes his speech with these emotional words: "Thank you, the Russian people, for your trust (in the Soviet government)" (p. 240).

During the early 1990s there were two attempts by the opposition to change the course of history. The textbook presents a very incomplete and sketchy picture of 19th August 1991, an attempt by the pro-Soviet Union preservation group, which included Vice-President Yanaev, and the Minister of Defence Yazov to stop the transformation of the USSR into a federation of autonomous republics. Gorbachev was still hoping to sign a new agreement at the August meeting ratifying the new federal structure of the Soviet Union:

> In the absence of Gorbachev (on holidays in the Crimea—JZ), on the night of 19th August 1991 the State Committee for Extraordinary Situation (Gosudarstvennyi komitet po chrezvychainomu polozheniiu, or GKCHP) was formed…They introduced in some regions the 'extraordinary regime', dissolved the government structures that acted contrary to the 1977 Constitution, closed the activities of oppositional parties and movements, meeting and demonstrations were strictly forbidden, established the total control over the mass media, and ordered the Army to enter Moscow . . . (p. 306).

The students are told that due to Yeltsin's role in organising a rally, which surrounded the White House, in order to defend the government, the Putsch was crushed, and soon as President Gorbachev returned to Moscow, the leaders of the GKCHP were arrested. Gorbachev was forced to create a new union – *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv* (SNG): "Initially, the union united 11 former union republics (without Georgia and the Baltic states). In December 1991 President Gorbachev resigns. The USSR had ceased to exist" (p. 307).

The above is a small fragment of the power struggle that went on in 1991, involving Gorbachev, who was elected to the new post of President of the USSR in March 1990, and Yeltsin, President of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics – now Russian Federation).

The other event, mentioned briefly in the history textbook, refers to a mini uprising of 2-4 October, staged by members of the Upper House, who opposed Yeltsin's autocratic presidential rule. Yeltsin decided to dismiss the entire government – the House of Representatives (People's Deputies) and the Upper House (*Verkhovny Soviet*). Both the Speaker of the Upper House Khasbulatov and Vice-President Rutskoy led the parliamentary revolt against the Presidential *ukaz* (decree):

> The Speaker (of the Upper House) Khasbulatov, and the majority members of the Constitutional Court declared the President's actions unconstitutional and relieved him of his duties. Vice-President Rutskoi assumed the office of President and commenced

> the formation of the parallel government . . . President Eltsin issued his ultimatum (to the opposition) to leave the 'White House' before 4 October . . .
>
> On October 4, the 'White House' was subjected to artillery bombardment, which resulted in catastrophic fire and the deaths of people. In the end the building was occupied by the army and the leaders of the opposition were arrested (p. 331).

What the students are not told is that this incident was far more serious than we are led to believe. Yeltsin's style of leadership, which became increasingly undemocratic, autocratic and totalitarian, was, unsuccessfully contested by his own government—in the opposition. More people were killed during the October 1993 'crisis' then during the storming of the Winter Palace back in 1917. This event became another form of 'characteristic amnesia'. By the end of 1999, Yeltsin retires from his office and appoints his Prime Minister Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, his protegee, as a caretaker President. In March 2000 Putin was elected President of Russia. No mention is made of the strings of Prime Ministers and other members of the Cabinet that Yeltsin kept appointing and firing. In short, this is a very uncritical and incomplete account of the events.

7. HEGEMONY AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

The manipulation of ideas and identity that occurred in the USSR since the 1920s, but especially during World War II in the Soviet Union, constitutes an experiment in social engineering that later became known as "cultural reproduction." Starting with Marx and Engels' (1965) famous dictum that "[the] ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (p. 61), the reproduction theorists of the 1960s and the 1970s in the West examined hegemony as the process of achieving consent to a dominant ideology in society (for example, Apple, 1979; Aronowitz, 1973, Bernstein, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Connell, 1977; Livingstone, 1976; Willis, 1977). More specifically, they analyzed patterns of reproduction with reference to dominant values, cultural capital, norms, and attitudes transmitted by the institutions Gramsci (1971) referred to as "civil society" – particularly schools. Because of their bourgeois origins, cultural reproduction theories were not taken seriously by Soviet sociologists (officially there were no social classes or class antagonisms in the egalitarian Soviet society), who in particular rejected the view that cultural reproduction integrated with social reproduction — that is, with the perpetuation of economic inequality.

The concept of cultural reproduction is, however, relevant to our analysis of school history textbooks. Central to the process of rewriting history is the notion of ideological repositioning – which involves the interplay of socialisation, the hidden curriculum, and school or curricular knowledge in the production (or reproduction) of "legitimate culture" (see, for example, Apple, 1979). The questions for us, then, become: What ideological repositioning are history textbooks in post-communist Russia facilitating? More specifically, what culture are these texts producing or reproducing as legitimate, and how?

8. A NEW RUSSIAN IDENTITY

In some ways, Russia's post-communist transitional period has been more difficult than in other Central and Eastern European countries because it lacked that unifying surge of social solidarity and patriotism that accompanied the sense of freedom from the Soviet Union's dominance. In other Central and Eastern European states, the sense of a battle for self-determination having been fought and won buoyed public consciousness in difficult times. For Russia, however, change meant only economic chaos, poverty, loss of international status and influence, blame and guilt for the repressions of communism, and a moral and political vacuum. Thus, in the transitional period, a search for historical models for the new nation's identity became imperative. Now, instead of interpreting history through the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the writers of Russia's new school history textbooks had to disclaim the Soviet narrative of identity (post-communist texts are in general very critical of Stalin and the Soviet past, for instance). More importantly, they had to embark on a process of "rediscovery" of what it means to be Russian. What sources would be found for the nation's new identity?

Nation builders rarely make new myths. Rather, they mine the past for suitable heroes and symbols. Just as Lenin (and later Stalin during 1941) resorted to borrowing religious symbols and myths from the Russian Orthodox Church and giving them a socialist interpretation to attract peasants (Tumarkin, 1983) and Stalin reopened the churches during the darkest days of World War II in order to boost morale, so too did Russia's immediate post-communist leaders and intellectuals turn to Russia's cultural past in an effort to redefine national identity.

In their Grade 8 textbook, *Istoriia Otechestva* (History of the Fatherland), of which 2.6 million copies were circulated, Russian 14 year-olds examine maps and charts to learn about the contributions made by both the Romanov and the Rurik imperial dynasties to the growth of Russia's territory (Rybakov & Preobrazhenskii, 1993). *Istoriia Otechestva* also devotes much space to Peter the Great and his major social and economic reforms (Rybakov & Preobrazhenskii, 1993). Although the students learn that under Peter tsarist rule became absolute, he is portrayed as a great builder of symbolic power. His innovation was the design of the Imperial Coat of Arms, the now-renowned two-headed eagle symbol that was resurrected after the fall of the familiar hammer and sickle in 1991 to decorate official Russian documents and the new parliament house. They also learn about his great administrative and modernising contributions to Russia's strength as a European naval and military power. His contribution in building St. Petersburg is described, but a significant omission is any reference to the means he used. In fact, Peter's use of the forced labour of tens of thousands of serfs was not unlike Stalin's use of forced labour—in the latter's case, of tens of thousands of political prisoners—in the great projects of the 1930s.

Reliance on this particular historical figure in the search for national identity had further developed by 1995 when the textbook treatment of Peter the Great grew almost to the point of cult-fostering proportions. In the 1995 prescribed history textbook for 10th grade, *Istoriia Rossii, Konets XVII-XIX Vek* (History of Russia, 17th

to the 19th Centuries), students learn that Peter the Great's reforms were so significant that they mark a watershed in Russian cultural history, with Russia's past being divided into pre-Petrian and post-Petrian periods. In fact, according to Kliuchevski, a famous 19th century Russian historian cited in the text, "the whole methodology of our history [is] based on the evaluation of the reforms of Peter the Great." Further, for Soloviev, another major historian cited in the history textbook, Peter was a "revolutionary on the throne," and the changes he initiated in Russia constituted "revolution from above" (Buganov & Zyrianov, 1995, p. 4; all translations from Russian language documents are the authors).

A post-communist revival of Eurasianism, which stresses Russia's distinctive mission as a nation leading the Turkic peoples (see Paramonov, 1996), also surfaces in the contemporary search for the sources of national identity. An example emerges in the 10th grade textbook *Istoriia Rossii* (History of Russia) (Sakharov & Buganov, 1995). In this text's all-important method-defining introductory chapter, 16-year-old readers are told that "Russia is regarded as the only Eurasian country in the world" (Sakharov & Buganov, 1995, p. 8). Russia's distinctive mission in interpreting and translating between the cultures of East and West is emphasized by the authors, who note that Russia is "a distinctive world bridge where two global civilisations meet – Europe and Asia—and [where] their active interaction is realised" (Sakharov & Buganov, 1995, p. 8). To ensure that the readers do not miss this point, the questions at the end of the introductory chapter include the following: "Russia is a Eurasian nation. Explain what this means. What effects has this Eurasian identity had on Russia's history?" (Sakharov & Buganov, 1995, p. 14).

9. A NEW HISTORICAL CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

While the new history texts mine Russia's and the Soviet Union's past for models for post-communist identity, they also seek to instill in students a critical consciousness regarding historical events. The 1993 syllabus *Planirovanie Prepodavaniia Istorii* (Planning of Teaching History), for example, contains detailed course and lesson plans for 5th through 11th grades (Zakharova, Starobinskaia, & Fadeeva, 1993). The 10th grade course "World History and the History of the Fatherland" covers events between 1917 and 1920. Lessons 63-77 (on the creation of the Soviet State) have the following topics: "The Soviets – People Power or Totalitarianism?," "October 1917 – Revolution or Counterrevolution?," and "A Step Towards Progress or Reaction." An 11th grade course discusses more recent history. Lesson topics include: "The Essence of '*Perestroika*,'" "The Collapse of the USSR – A Necessity or Accident?, "The Causes and Outcomes of the Collapse of the USSR," "The Russian Constitution: Presidential or Parliamentary Model of the Republic," "Political Parties and Factions," and "The Need for a Spiritual Renewal of Society." These topics indicate that both teachers and students are meant to develop a more informed and critical understanding of Soviet and Russian history.

Further examples of these critical expectations for students are found in *Uchebnye Materialy k Teme*: *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskogo Soiuza*

(1941-1945) (Teaching Material for the Theme: The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945). This particular manual for teachers, published by the Russian Academy of Education, is a collection of documents and other primary sources (some never published before due to their "highly secret" classification) covering the World War II period (Gevurkova & Koloskov, 1993). In one of the secret protocols, 10th and 11th grade history students read:

1. Germany withdraws its claims to the parts of Latvia, mentioned in the Secret Supplementary Treaty of 28 September 1939.
2. The Soviet Government agrees to compensate Germany for the territory depicted in the protocol by paying Germany the sum of U.S. 7.5 million gold dollars, equivalent to 31.5 million German marks. (Gevurkova & Koloskov, 1993, p. 14)

Another document (labeled "Strictly Secret: Must be Returned") deals with the 1940 execution of some 21,857 Polish prisoners in Katyn and other parts of the Soviet Union by the NKVD (Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrennykh Del, the Soviet secret police). The largest mass grave was in the Ostashkovski camp (Kaliningrad region), where 6,311 prisoners were executed. The official Soviet version that circulated at that time implicated Germany in the executions. In 1956, Khrushchev was advised to destroy all documents related to this event. The students' questions on this topic include:

1. Based on facts detailed in documents, formulate your own opinion [on the execution of Polish prisoners of war].
2. Why do you think these documents were secret for such a long time?
3. When was the question of the Katyn issue first mentioned? (Gevurkova & Koloskov, 1993, p. 32)

On the basis of secret documents from Moscow's Military Commandant, students study the panic and despair that swept Moscow in October 1941, as the German army was approaching the capital. Tens of thousand of citizens fled Moscow. On 1 October, orders went out to evacuate the government to the city of Kuibyshev, some 800 kilometres to the east. Lenin's embalmed body was transported to Tiumen. Stalin ordered that all archives and art treasures, together with his own library and his family, were to be evacuated. His papers were sent ahead to Kuibyshev, and his personal train and a fleet of aircraft stood by (Overy, 1999). Panic gripped the city. Theft and robberies were the norm, and empty shops, apartments, and offices were looted. Over one million roubles were stolen from state enterprises by fleeing managers and workers. As one observer recalled, "The general mood was appalling" (cited by Overy, 1999: 97). Ultimately, however, Stalin decided not to evacuate. On 17 October, he went to his dacha, which had already been mined by the NKVD. He had the mines cleared, and he directed the NKVD to restore order and to shoot looters and *panikiory* (panic merchants).[ii]

Information about the 1941 panic, particularly that plans were made to evacuate the government, was not available prior to 1991. Contemporary Russian students are asked to answer the following questions about this period of Soviet history:

1. What kind of concrete-historical situations are depicted in these documents?

2. How do they correspond to the official propaganda that existed in the country during the pre-war years?
3. Why did these facts become available only recently? (Gevurkova & Koloskov, 1993, pp. 67-68)

The critical consciousness that the new history texts intended for students emerges perhaps most clearly in the foreword of *Istoriia Otechestva 1939-1991* (History of the Fatherland 1939-1991). Accentuating pluralism, tolerance, patience, and a romantic, quasi-humanistic perception of history, the author advises students to consider the complex and contradictory past of the nation during its past decades:

> Today the events of those years have become the subject of sharp, at times angry disputes. In our history we have [witnessed both the] heroism and tragedy of the Soviet people, their hopes and disappointments. . . .We hope that you, having learned new facts and opinions and either agreeing or disagreeing with us, will find it necessary to work out your own viewpoints. In this [pursuit], other books, periodicals and newspapers, TV, and radio will help you. Remember, many of those who lived during those years [and] who have created history are still around you. Ask them. (Ostrovskii, 1992, p. 4)

In this "advanced organiser," pupils are being taught the complexity of historical events and the plurality of perspectives and approaches involved in the study of history. In suggesting that they develop their own "viewpoints," the text encourages students to approach history critically.

Similar approach to a critical analysis of historical phenomena is found in the foreword of *Rossiia v XX veke* (Russia in the 20th Century, fifth edition) of the latest Grades 10-11 history school textbook:

> You will have the opportunity to encounter contradictory viewpoints concerning the same facts, events and phenomena. We hope that you yourselves will attempt to formulate your own viewpoint, either agreeing or disagreeing with the textbook's authors and other historians. The textbook's methodology is directed to such an approach to the study of Russian history (Levandovsky & Shchetinov, 2001, p. 4).

In another textbook, *Istoriia Otechestva 1900-1940* (History of the Fatherland), a popular Grade 10 school textbook, the authors advocate the discursive analysis of history, focussing on the analysis of the theme of 'progress' and a new multi-paradigm approach to the study of history:

> We have attempted to depict the specifics of history as a humanistic discipline to be viewed through a personal perspective. For this reason there in no need to be afraid of incorrect answers…Questions are designed for discussions during lessons and do not require the singular 'correct' answer. It is not the answer to the question that is important but rather the importance of the question that leads you into other questions and reflection (Mishina & Zharova, 1999, p. 3).

There is also an attempt to teach feeling and emotions, and the love of one's country in the study of history in school textbooks. This is clearly defined in the foreword of the newest Grades 6-7 textbook *Istoriia Otechestva* (History of the Fatherland, seventh edition), of which 200, 000 were circulated. Here, Russia's 12 year-olds study narratives, maps and charts to learn about the greatness of the Russian state and its imperial past:

> Knowing the history of one's *Rodina* (Motherland) is important for every human being. History is correctly called the people's memory and the teacher of life…The most

> important thing in the study of history of one's Motherland – is learning to love her. To love the Fatherland means to love the country, the geographic space where a person was born. To love the Fatherland means loving one's people, norms, customs, culture and native tongue.
>
> …You need to be able to answer the question: Why this even occurred? Only when you can answer such a question will you be able to *understand history* . . . Understanding history will enable you to understand how it influences our cotemporary life (Preobrazhenski & Rybakov, 2001, pp. 5-6).

10. THE POST-SOVIET HISTORY NARRATIVE

The reinterpretation of Soviet history has become part of the struggle among various strata of the post-communist elite in Russia. The new democrats like Yeltsin of the 1990s tended to portray the communist regime of Lenin and Stalin as a tragedy never to be repeated. The new humanist-communists like Ziuganov, on the other hand, have nostalgia for the past, for the old golden era of the Soviet Union as a superpower brimming with social and economic stability and security, and for the moral purity of the communist regime in relation to the contemporary world of bourgeois individualism and capital.

This struggle over the past emerges also in history classrooms in Russia, where students are presented with models for a new Russian identify ranging from Peter the Great, to Nicholas II, to Trotsky. To use the terms introduced earlier in this chapter, rewriting history in post-communist Russia involves an ideological repositioning and a redefinition of legitimate culture. Judging by the models chosen for the new Russian identity and the way they are presented in post-communist history textbooks, we suggest that this legitimate culture links with Russian heritage, tradition, and patriotism. More specifically, legitimate culture derives largely from – and thereby established continuity with – pre-Soviet Russian history.

But students in new Russian history classrooms are not simply being presented with historical models to inform their contemporary identities. In fact, through the structure of the curriculum, they are being invited to adopt a critical consciousness about history by looking at events from multiple perspectives. What this seems to reflect is the loss of the grand narrative privileged during the Soviet Union—from a single or orthodox version of history, to an historical perspective characterised by plurality and heterodoxy. In a recent article, Suppes, Eisner, Stanley, and Greene (1998) speak directly to this issue. Endorsing an "openness to the visions of human possibility" in education, they argue for a greater role for imagination and metaphorical thinking in classrooms. "It is time to break through old dichotomies," they conclude, "time to acknowledge the 'blurring of the disciplines' and the role of richly multiple 'realities' (Suppes, Eisner, Stanley, & Greene, 1998, p. 35).

11. EVALUATION

In evaluating the new versions of Russia's post-communist history taught in schools, especially the interpretation of social and political change, significant events (looking for possible new biases and omissions), leadership (the contribution of key individuals), and continuities, as demonstrated by the above, we can draw the following tentative conclusions:

1. The notion of '*continuities*' or how people in the past tried to preserve social, cultural, and economic aspects of the society, especially between 1917 and 1945, especially the importance of cultural heritage, and traditional values (e.g., religious revival during World War II and since the 1990s) occupies a very important place in post-Soviet history texts.
2. *Leadership*, or the contribution of key individuals in politics, war and the arts continues to be a significant theme in all history texts. Students now have a greater access to primary sources, particularly documents, which are used during classroom discussion of the events, and key leaders.
3. *Change*, especially political, economic and social transformations, and the impact of change on people's lives is also addressed. The text and other material used in schools attempt to compare different perspectives about a significant event, or a key participant.
4. *New Ideology*, or the transformation from communism to democracy, and the impact of political events on people, their values and attitudes is also given a far greater prominence. The notions of patriotism and nationalism, as before, continue to occupy a central part in the new post-Soviet consciousness.
5. *Ideological Reproduction*, or an ideological re-positioning of post-Soviet representation of the historical narrative with the emphasis on cultural heritage, tradition, and patriotism is an attempt to create a new hegemonic synthesis, and a new form of the control of meaning through Foucauldian 'discipline' and the 'regime of truth'. The new ruling class, as Marx had predicted in *The German Ideology*, has given its ideas the form of universality, and authenticity.

Since 1992, the Russian society has experienced a painful and disruptive transition from Soviet Marxist-Leninist hegemony to pluralist democracy. The nostalgia for the 'Great Power mania' and the feeling of belonging to 'great-Russians' that existed before the collapse of the USSR is still 'very much alive' (Bogolubov, et al., 1999, p.525).

In some ways, Russia's post-Soviet transitional period has been more difficult than in other Central and Eastern European countries because it lacked that unifying surge of social solidarity and patriotism that accompanied the sense of freedom from the Soviet Union's dominance. In other Central and Eastern European states, the sense of a battle for self-determination having been fought and won buoyed public consciousness in difficult times.

For Russia, however, change meant only economic chaos, poverty, loss of international status and influence, blame and guilt for the repressions of communism, and a moral and political vacuum. Thus, in the transitional period, a search for historical models for the new nation's identity became imperative. Now, instead of interpreting history through the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology,

the writers of Russia's new school history textbooks had to disclaim the Soviet narrative of identity (post-Soviet texts are in general very critical of Stalin and the Soviet past, for instance). More importantly, they had to embark on a process of "rediscovery" of what it means to be Russian.

12. CONCLUSION

In general, school history textbooks continue to emphasise the historical greatness of the Russian State. Added to this nostalgia for the past is the new concern for teaching the concepts of participatory democracy (never experienced by the ex-Soviet citizens), national identity (Russia has not yet become a 'real nation state'), active citizenship, and patriotism (Bogolubov, et al., 1999, p. 532).

The new history school textbooks attempt, in their limited ways, to address some of these issues. Much of the archival and statistical data are still not available. Very limited time has been made available to the study of history in schools. Given this, evaluation of the past events and leaders (the October Revolution, wars, Lenin, and Stalin) in schools has been somewhat uninformed, biased and superficial. However, there is a tendency, as demonstrated by our discourse analysis, to present different views, and different interpretations of the events.

Given that the students are exposed to so many heroes and role models – from Aleksandr Nevsky to Putin, which values are they to internalise on their journey of discovering democracy and citizenship in the Russian Federation in the 21st Century? Russia is not alone in discovering the current post-Soviet absence of a sense of cohesion or a sense of belonging to the civic culture. Similar discoveries have been made in other societies (Torney-Putra, Schwille & Amadeo, 1999, p. 14).

An unresolved tension is found in the problem of both achieving a synthesis between the Western and Russian reform in the government-dictated quest for modernity and democracy and the imperative to define elements, which are uniquely Russian and contribute to a new and authentic Russian national identity. As illustrated above, the source of "Russianness" is usually sought in the pre-communist past, so the Russians find themselves in the paradoxical position of trying to embrace both tradition and modernity. More specifically, Russian history textbooks, apart from repositioning the taken-for-granted assumptions about the everyday world that affect every level of education and society, will need to address significant, yet unresolved historical dilemmas concerning the reification of power, domination, and control in contemporary Russia and the effects this reification has in terms of the growing inequality in society.

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Table 1. The Structure of the Secondary School History Curriculum 2001

Grade	Hour per week/ per year	First half year	Second half year
5	3/102	Rasskazy po narodnoi istorii (Stories about the history of our land) 51 hours	Istoriia drevnego mira (Ancient history) 51 hours
6	3/102	Istoriia drevnego mira (Ancient history) 51 hours	Istoria srednikh vekov (History of the Middle Ages) 51 hours
7	3/102	Istoria srednikh vekov (History of the Middle Ages) 51 hours	Istoriia otechestva s drevneishikh vremion do kontsa XVIII veka (History of the Fatherland from the Antiquity to the end of XVIII century, 51 hours
8	3/102	Istoriia otechestva s drevneishikh vremion do kontsa XVIII veka (History of the Fatherland from the Antiquity to the end of XVIII century), 51 hours	Novaia istoriia: 1640-1870 (Modern History), 35 hours
9	5/170	Novaia istoriia: 1640-1870	Istoriia otechestva XIX v.

Grade	Hour per week/ per year	First half year	Second half year
		(Modern History), 37 hours The Law and the Student, 35 hours Istoriia otechestva XIX v. (History of the Fatherland: 19th century), 13 hours	(History of the Fatherland: 19th century, (43 hours) Istoriia otechestva: konets XIX-nac. XX veka (History of the Fatherland: the end of 19th century-beginning of 20th century), 29 hours Novaia istoriia: 1898-1918 (Modern History), 33 hours
10	4/138	Noveishaia Istoriia. Mir v nachale XX v. (Modern History: the beginnings of the 20th Century), 34 hours Istoriia otechestva: pervaia pol. XX v. (History of the Fatherland; first half of the 20th Century), 35 hours	Istoriia Otechestva do 1945 goda (History of the Fatheralnd up to 1945), 36 hours Noveishaia istoriia: 1918-1945 (Modern History: 1918-1945), 33 hours
11	5, 170	Istoriia Otechestva: 1945-1990 (History of the Fatherland), Noveishaia istoriia: 1945-1990 (Modern History) 52 hours, Obshchstvoznanie (Civics), 34 hours	Istoriia Otechestva: 1945-1990 (History of the Fatherland), Noveishaia istoriia: 1945-1990 (Modern History), 50 hours, Obshchstvoznanie (Civics), 34 hours

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[i] This chapter draws on ethnographic research conducted by the authors over the course of the last 10 years. One of the authors, Joseph Zajda, experienced not the usual "one world of childhood" described in Bronfenbrenner's (1971) Cold War-inspired *Two World's of Childhood*, but three quite different school environments: the first in the Soviet Union until he was 12; the second in Poland as a young teenager; and the third in Australia, where he finished his schooling. As a former Soviet school child and Pioneer and later as an Australian teacher, he was accepted as a researcher by Russian teachers as "one of us." A large reservoir of shared experience and memories between him and the Russian teachers facilitated this ethnographic research.

[ii] Vinogradov, V. (1996). *Modern and Newest History*, 5 (in Russian).

[iii] The atmosphere of absolute panic and disorder in Moscow during those difficult days was captured vividly by war correspondent Konstantin Simonov in his novel *Zhivye i Mertvye* (*The Living and the Dead*) (1960).