The varieties of anti-skepticism, from past to present

Since the days of Pyrrho of Elis, skepticism has had a long-standing appeal for philosophers. From Pyrrho’s time, the major controversies between philosophical schools have often been defined by skeptical ideas. This is illustrated by the debates between Epicureans, Stoics and Academics in Hellenistic philosophy, and perhaps even more so since the rediscovery of Pyrrhonism in Modernity. Even in the Middle Ages, recent historiography has shown that the discussion of skeptical arguments played a central role. The historical recurrence of these arguments reveals that skeptical ideas never went out of fashion. Troubled by the prospect of skeptical entrenchment, philosophers like Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Descartes, Reid, Kant, Hegel, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein dealt with some varieties of radical skepticism. Yet the alleged limits of their responses do not entail that skepticism cannot be successfully dealt with. This is because contemporary forms of skepticism have become part and parcel of epistemology, or of a particular branch of it. In so doing, they share some assumptions and presuppositions of mainstream epistemology about cognition. Exploring these assumptions and presuppositions, this issue gives continuity to the idea that, despite their limits, our rational capacities are trustworthy and generally apt to truth, and that, even though they are rational, skeptical arguments cannot undermine our quest for truth.

We may divide the articles contained in this issue in two groups: the historical and the topical. Historical articles assess Descartes’, Kant’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s anti-skeptical strategies, as well as of Levinas’ and Cavell’s considerations about the limits of anti-skeptical replies. On the other hand, topical articles include discussions of assorted skeptical theories, arguments and stances such as brains-in-vats arguments, skepticism about the external world, about other minds, or about our very experiences and assessments of such arguments and stances—that may be positive or negative. On the whole, these artices represent an extended variety of anti-skeptical strategies that include externalism, self-undermining responses, contextualism or common sense theories. Together, all these contributions to this special issue provide us with a mosaic view of the relative strengths and weaknesses of many skeptical and anti-skeptical strategies.