Collection
The Legacy of the Value-Free Ideal of Science
Until the end of the 20thcentury, the value-free ideal (VFI) of science, according to which non-epistemic values should not have any influence on the epistemic phase of scientific inquiry (where hypotheses are accepted or rejected), was the dominant view among philosophers and especially scientists. However, in the last decades, the value-laden ideal (VLI) progressively became the new “received view” in the philosophy of science. But the VLI raises difficulties, and in fact, the question of (non-epistemic) values in science remains controversial, at least for the epistemic phase (for the pre-epistemic phase where research questions are formulated, and post-epistemic phase where results are communicated and applied, the influence of non-epistemic values is generally acknowledged and not controversial). There are important unfinished questions, some of which are empirical, but some of which are also normative, such as which values can or should influence science, and how they are allowed to do so. Besides particular (and influential) attempts, a general view of the role of values in science is rarely presented.
The current VLI proposals are often too complicated (designed on a case-by-case basis) and/or potentially ambiguous (when conflicting goals lead to different values and corresponding scientific claims); they conflict with the own views of many scientists and members of the general public (scientists in general, and many within the public and government panels, still tend to follow and emphasize the VFI); and they do not guarantee the epistemic integrity of science (hence maintaining the suspicion of wishful thinking). The question is still open whether there are any legitimate terrains where the VFI is a possible or more desirable option.
This problematic state of affairs gives rise to a confused image of science in the mind of scientists, policy-makers and the general public, which can have a negative impact on the trust people put in science. Worse, such unsettled debate can be used by science deniers to support their undermining enterprise.
The concern to protect the integrity of science is, in turn, a (partial) rehabilitation of the VFI, whose central philosophical motivation and demand is the preservation of the epistemic integrity of science (in order to avoid wishful thinking). Thus, in order to overcome our current predicament, we need to understand what we can learn from the VFI, and why people still deem it important today: why, in a nutshell, it still has some relevance in some way. To do so, we can look both backwards and forwards, with the following possible topics for this topical collection:
• How did the VFI come about, how was it progressively replaced by the VLI, and what is left of it from the historical and social point of view?
• How can we understand today the importance of the VFI in the public image of science, the implications of its demise on the public trust in science, and the dangers represented by the VLI (e.g. with respect to conspiracy theories)?
• What possible ways could we imagine to incorporate the fundamental insight of the VFI, namely the preservation of the integrity of science, while incorporating the influence of values in the most simple, systematic and coherent way?
• As science progresses, do new values surface among the relevant and respected non-epistemic values which already influence science?
• Does the VFI have any local and geographical dimension, or it is a universal idea?
• What are the forms and fields of science most susceptible to the VFI?
Any other topics related to the VFI and VLI are also welcome. As emphasized above, submitted papers shall focus on science and values, from a philosophical, historical, sociological or integrated perspective.
Editors
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Philippe Stamenkovic
(a) Jacques Loeb Center for the History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel) (b) MTA Lendület Values and Science Research Group
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Ádám Tuboly
