Abstract
According to Kant in the preface to its second edition, the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft [KrV]) “is a treatise on the method” of a future scientific metaphysics intended “to transform the previous procedure of metaphysics by attempting in it that complete revolution exemplified by geometers and natural scientists.”1 Introduced in the new preface as an essential element of this revolutionary treatise is the experiment of pure reason (Experiment der reinen Vernunft) that Kant undertakes in the “Antinomy of Pure Reason.”2
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Notes
KrV, Bxxii. My translation. All other English translations of KrV are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), the margins of which reference the AA edition.
Brett Fulkerson-Smith, “On the Apodictic Proof and Validation of Kant’s Revolutionary Hypothesis,” Kantian Review 15, no. 1 (2010): 37–56.
K. L. Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks, trans. James Hebbeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 176.
Breazeale, “Fichte’s Conception of Philosophy as a ‘Pragmatic History of the Human Mind’ and the Contributions of Kant, Platner, and Maimon,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 4 (2002): 686;
see also Breazeale, “What Is a ‘Pragmatic History of the Human Mind’? Some Methodological Remarks on Fichte’s Jena Project,” in Fichte: Crença, imaginaçãi e temporalidade, ed. Fernando Gil, Virginia Lopez, and Luisa Couto Soares (Porto: Campos das Letras, 2002), 91.
See, for instance, Meir Buzaglo, Solomon Maimon: Monism, Skepticism, and Mathematics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), chs. 1 and 2;
Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), ch. 10, and German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781–1801 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 248ff.; Abraham P. Socher, The Radical Enlightenment of Solomon Maimon, ch. 3.
Cf. Gesammelte Werke, vol. II, ed. Valerio Verra (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), 62–65, 182–183, 362–364.
English translations are from Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman, and Merten Reglitz (London: Continuum, 2010), the margins of which reference the Verra edition.
Cf. Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 94–98, where he distinguishes between a form of intuition and a formal intuition; the latter, he explains, is a “determinate (conceptualized) intuition” (ibid., 96). I am using the term in the same way to designate time as a possible sensible intuition, not merely as the form of all sensible intuitions.
S. H. Bergman, Philosophy of Solomon Maimon, trans. Noah J. Jacobs (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), 97.
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Fulkerson-Smith, B. (2014). Fichte’s Experiments with the Productive Imagination. In: Rockmore, T., Breazeale, D. (eds) Fichte and Transcendental Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412232_8
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