Abstract
Presidents understand that reelection, reputation, and ultimately their place in history are intimately tied to their ability to get policy initiatives through Congress. Given the vital role Congress plays in the legislative process, presidents must carefully cultivate their relationship with members of the House and Senate to achieve policy successes. Roosevelt is remembered for social security and the GI Bill (among many other things), while Johnson successfully passed both the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Bush 43 managed to pass the Tax Relief Act of 2001 as well as implement a new prescription drug program for seniors. President Obama will likely be remembered for the passage and upholding by the Supreme Court of his signature healthcare legislation—the Affordable Care Act. Compared to tenures of the other branches, the president’s window for policy movement is short so they are naturally in a greater hurry to accumulate a policy record. Such legislative victories ultimately cement a place in history for presidents, but they also help fashion a reputation for political effectiveness that can strengthen a president’s influence in Congress.
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Notes
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The basic dataset was built using the EUGene data generation software program. See D. Scott Bennett and Alan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions, 2000, Volume 26, pp. 179–204.
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In addition to IMI, we also test our argument using the Military Interventions by Powerful States (MIPS) dataset collected by Patricia Sullivan and Michael Koch. These data record military uses of force that involve the “official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to attain immediate-term political objectives through action against a foreign adversary.” We use these data as an additional assessment of Party Cover using interventions that are more clearly coercive in nature and politically risky. Figure 15.2 illustrates the frequency of IMI humanitarian and strategic interventions, as well as MIPS interventions by the U.S. from 1950–2000. See Patricia L. Sullivan and Michael T. Koch, “Military Interventions by Powerful States,” Journal of Peace Research, 2009, Volume 46, pp. 707–718.
David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data,” Political Analysis, 2010, Volume 18, pp. 271–292.
Brandon C. Prins and Mark Souva, “The Use of U.S. Military Force,” in The Handbook of American Foreign Policy, ed. Steven Hook and Christopher Jones (New York: Routledge Press, 2011).
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© 2014 R. Ward Holder and Peter B. Josephson
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Marshall, B.W., Prins, B.C. (2014). The Politics of Presidential Foreign Policy: Unilateral Authority and the Role of Congress. In: Holder, R.W., Josephson, P.B. (eds) The American Election 2012. Elections, Voting, Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137389220_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137389220_16
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