Abstract
In epistemology, premises about knowledge ascriptions often play important roles in arguments about the nature or extent of knowledge. However, such arguments are often objected to on the grounds that it is a methodological error to think that mere linguistic claims about knowledge ascriptions could support metaphysical conclusions about knowledge itself. My aim in this chapter is to examine this issue and related issues as they arise in one specific area of epistemology 1 namely debates about the nature of knowledge-how and its relationship to knowledge-that. In particular, I will be concerned with examining the role that linguistic claims have played in recent defenses of intellectualism - the view that to know how to Φ is to possess a kind of knowledge-that — by Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011a, 2011b).
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Cath, Y. (2015). Knowing How and ‘Knowing How’. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_21
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