Abstract
On February 5, 1971, the Apollo XIV Lunar Module touched down on the surface of the moon. This was followed a few weeks later by the release of the President’s Report to Congress on Foreign Policy in the 1970s.1 The report used the successful completion of the Apollo XIV mission to reiterate that the achievement was not simply a reflection of American scientific and technological capability. “It is equally a measure of an older American tradition, the compulsion to cross the next mountain chain. The pressurized space suit is, in a very real sense, today’s equivalent of the buckskin jacket and the buffalo robe. Apollo XIV is the latest packhorse, and its crew the most recent in a long line of American pioneers.” It ingeniously introduced the international dimension by stressing that “mutual help and cooperation” was “essential to life on the American frontier.” In a reference to the new climate of détente it noted that NASA and the State Department had been instructed to pursue broader collaborative projects with Moscow “with the utmost seriousness.” Congress was also advised that while “substantial participation” was being sought in the post-Apollo program, “the result is uncertain, for there are very real difficulties to be solved.”2 Two of those concerned the scope of NASA’s international commitments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Memorandum Whitehead to Flanigan, February 6, 1971, attached to memo Flanigan for Erlichman, in John Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown. Selected Documents in the U.S. Civil Space Program. Vol. II. External Relations (Washington, DC: NASASP-4407, 1996), Doc. I-19.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, both the Board of Governors and the Assembly of Parties were concerned. Thus, “[t]he Board of Governors will render its advice to the Assembly of Parties in accordance with the voting procedures for substantive matters […]. i.e. an affirmative vote of at least four Governors representing two-thirds of the voting participation on the Board or an affirmative vote of all Governors, less three, regardless of total voting participation. The Assembly will decide upon its findings and make its recommendations in accordance with its own voting procedures, i.e. an affirmative vote of two-thirds of those present and voting with each representative possessing one vote.” Richard R. Colino, The Intelsat Definitive Arrangements: Ushering in a New Era in Satellite Telecommunications. EBU Legal and Administrative Series, Monograph No. 9 (Geneva: European Broadcasting Union, 1973), 93–94.
William Cohen, Results of Conference Among A. Frutkin, D. Myers, C. Donlan and Staffs, February 1, 1971, document dated March 11, 1971, Record Group NASA 255, Box 17, Folder VI.D.7, WNRC.
Memo Kissinger to Rogers, Post-Apollo Space Cooperation with the Europeans and Launch Assurances, August 18, 1971, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/el/46389.htm. See also Doc I-21 in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown. Vol. II.
T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision. NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4221, 1999), 364–366;
Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Krieger: Malabar, 1994), Reading No.19, reproduces the memorandum.
This spacecraft, favored by Low, resembled a shuttle but would not be able to propel itself into orbit. Its payload bay would be 12 x 40 feet, its payload weight about 30,000 pounds, and it would be lofted into space on a two-stage Titan IIIL class rocket. For the evolving shuttle design in this period, see Ray A. Williamson, “Developing the Space Shuttle,” in John M. Logsdon (ed.), Exploring the Unknown. Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Vol. I V. Accessing Space (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1999), Chapter 2. See also
John M. Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program: A policy Failure?” Science 232:4754 (May 30, 1986), 1099–1105; “The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,” Space Policy 2 (May 1986), 103–119; Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision, 368–369, 373, 385.
Douglas R. Lord, Spacelab. An International Success Story (Washington, DC: NASA SP-487, 1987), 5.
See John Krige, “The Decision Taken in the Early 1970s to Develop an Expendable European Heavy Satellite Launcher,” in John Krige, Arturo Russo, and Lorenza Sebesta, A History of European Space Agency. 1958–1987. Vol. 2. The Story of ESA (Noordwijk: ESA SP 1235, 2000), Chapter 9.
Copyright information
© 2013 John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Krige, J., Callahan, A.L., Maharaj, A. (2013). European Participation in the Post-Apollo Program, 1971: The United States Begins to Have Second Thoughts—And So Do the Europeans. In: NASA in the World. Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137340931_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137340931_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-34092-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-34093-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)