Abstract
In this chapter, a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma model (first formalized in Tucker and Luce (1959)) is introduced — but with an additional, non-participation, option. A stochastic term perturbates the participating agents expected payoff: a cheating strategy, in the limit, is however dominated by a cooperative strategy, but during every round the advantage is only theoretical (the expected cooperating value exceeds defection), given by a probability distribution which favors cooperators.
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References
Beraldo, S. and Sugden, R. (2010). The Emergence of Reciprocally Beneficial Cooperation. Working Paper 18, ICER.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of the Species by Natural Selection. Murray, London.
Tucker, A. W. and Luce, R. D. (1959). Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 4. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
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© 2015 Matteo Morini
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Morini, M. (2015). The Emergence of Cooperation. In: Agent-based Models of the Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137339812_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137339812_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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