US Policy and the Iran—Iraq War 1980–1981

Abstract

Little attention has been paid to the Carter administration’s response to the outbreak of the Iran—Iraq War. Carter himself makes only five passing mentions to the conflict in his memoirs. Nevertheless, within the limited scholarship reside some widely divergent interpretations. According to most former US officials, including Carter, Iraq’s invasion provoked shock and disapproval.¹ To others, the initial phase of Iraqi victories provoked barely concealed satisfaction.² The Iranian government’s allegation that America provided a ‘green light’ to Iraqi aggression continues to frame contemporary US—Iranian relations. Within this Machiavellian narrative lurks the possible origin of America’s ‘tilt’ towards Iraq and the arms-for-hostages deals that evolved in the Iran—Contra scandal. In essence, therefore, there have been at least some suggestions that two of the most controversial episodes of the Reagan policy can be linked to the previous administration. This chapter argues in opposition to this suggestion. It charts US assessments of deteriorating Iran—Iraq relations after the Revolution and re-examines the nature of America’s relationship with Iranian opposition groups which undoubtedly did encourage Iraq to attack the Islamic Republic.³ Evaluating all the evidence, it shows that US officials were genuinely caught by surprise when hostilities broke out.