Abstract
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 which devastated global capital management is often partly attributed to bad corporate governance. For example, the OECD Steering Committee on Corporate Governance argues that ‘the financial crisis can to an important extent be attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance’ (Kirkpatrick, 2009). The standard story appears to be that weak boards tolerated the rise of a culture of greed and excessive pay, which led financial executives to take the risks that ultimately caused the financial crisis (see for instance Obama, 2009). In this chapter I examine the rationale for this assertion.
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Thomsen, S. (2013). Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis. In: Pinedo, M., Walter, I. (eds) Global Asset Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137328878_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137328878_13
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