The Incarnation of the Truth

Abstract

When philosophers of science have grounded their work in the history of science, rather than in the idea of science, they have regarded the history of science as more than a merely empirical history, as more than a mere result of knowledge. They have defined that history as the incarnation of true knowledge. This means that the history of science is viewed as a history of progress; and when new results are achieved, they are understandable only against the backdrop of that history.¹ That is, science as we encounter it, i.e., as a corpus with its own theories, tools, etc., is its history. To understand those theories and tools is to understand how one arrives at them — to understand them as products of their possibility. Correspondingly, the scientific canon only admits for inclusion theories and tools that are actually results — i.e., scientific results that are enduring, which is not the same thing as results that have merely been arrived at. The history of science is not just factical; it is also normative.