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The International Monetary System and the Debt Issue

  • Chapter
International Debt

Abstract

The crisis of “global finance” that broke into the open in 2008 has not been resolved so far. There is a broad consensus that it is in the interest of all countries to find a solution that will prevent a drastic erosion of the value of financial assets—people’s savings—and will allow a return to sustained growth. This solution will have to be based on reliable theoretical concepts and up-to-date data and analyses. Above all, it will need political cooperation, innovation and reforms. A key task in this context is the rebuilding of a stable international monetary system.

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Notes

  1. Some of these had already been raised by the author in earlier years and again more recently. See, for example, Otto Hieronymi (1998) “Agenda for a New Monetary Reform,” Futures, Vol. 30, No. 8, pp. 769–81;

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  1. Otto Hieronymi
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Webster University, Geneva, Switzerland

    Otto Hieronymi (Professor of International Relations) (Professor of International Relations)

  2. European Center of Economic and Financial Law, Panteion University, Athens, Greece

    Constantine A. Stephanou (Professor and Director) (Professor and Director)

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© 2013 Otto Hieronymi

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Hieronymi, O. (2013). The International Monetary System and the Debt Issue. In: Hieronymi, O., Stephanou, C.A. (eds) International Debt. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137030573_2

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