A Reluctance to Intervene: NATO and the First Years of the Yugoslav Conflicts (1990–94)

Abstract

The first years of the Yugoslav wars of secession are outlined in the context of the challenge NATO faced in the carving out of new functions for itself in the years after 1989. In the first section, Mulchinock concentrates on the early initiatives that the then NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, and NATO member states developed with regard to the new security environment of the recently liberated states in Eastern Europe, along with the first Gulf War of 1991. Then, focusing on the devastating war in Croatia, along with the first two years of the Bosnian conflict, he examines why NATO was so reluctant to use defiant military force, and which particular NATO member states were influencing such a policy. He also looks at how Manfred Wörner tried to alter such institutional paralysis in 1993.