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Security Governance in the Post-Colony: The Political and Social Consequences of Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy

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The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy

Abstract

This chapter works through the dynamics of counterterrorism policy in Pakistan in relation to its inconsistent and often contradictory political imaginary and other postcolonial formulations. It sketches some of these contours and reveals Pakistan’s unevenness towards religious and secular modernities; inequitable patterns of social, political, and economic development; and problematic regional relations. The chapter then examines Pakistan’s approach toward counterterrorism since 9/11 and subsequent changes in counterterrorism policies after the 2015 Peshawar school bombings, which culminated in the National Action Plan. These discussions are framed within the broader sociopolitical entanglements in which Pakistan and its people are enmeshed, including changes within daily public and social life. Without diminishing the persistent reality of terrorism in Pakistan, the chapter concludes by arguing that Pakistan’s counterterrorism policies risk being formulated solely based on oversimplified narratives of national security and increasing state legibility without a deeper appreciation of the social, political, and intellectual lives of its citizens, and their aspirations for the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The ISI is Pakistan’s feared intelligence agency that in coordination with the Pakistani military is often touted as being a “state within a state” (Al Jazeera 2012; Wash 2009). The ISI is accused of maintaining close ties with various Taliban factions and terrorist organizations in the region pursuing what the organization claims to be Pakistan’s strategic “interests,” making it a controversial actor in the Global War on Terror for Western protagonists and for Pakistanis themselves.

  2. 2.

    The Muslim Ummah refers to the wider brotherhood of Muslims, which extends far beyond the nation-state.

  3. 3.

    Bankoff (2003) argues that terrorism is only the most recent in a long line of dangerous conditions that have come to represent how certain areas of the non-Western world are usually imagined and subsequently depicted as regions of risk, part of a much wider Western discourse invoked to describe unfamiliar cultures and landscapes. Previous versions include “tropicality,” “development,” and “vulnerability.” He argues that although terrorism shares with previous discourses the same essentializing and generalizing cultural depiction of large regions of the world as regions of risk, it also possesses certain novel properties of significance. Unlike disease, poverty, and hazard, terrorism and its close association with Islam is much more “exportable,” bringing the condition of criminality from the borderlands directly home.

  4. 4.

    Current policy discourses toward (in)security governance predominately privilege technology and national defense considerations over broader concerns with human security and social learning, as well as partnering with the public for vulnerability reduction (Mitchell 2003; Wisner 2002).

  5. 5.

    There have been a number of attempts to analyze the governance of in(security) under postcolonial conditions (e.g., Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Ayoob 1995; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Krishna 1999). However, these attempts have received little mainstream attention.

  6. 6.

    An important consequence of frequent unexpected terrorist attacks is the constriction of public space and fear of expression of social and political life (Mumtaz 2010). Public events in urban Pakistan (cultural, social, religious) now employ multiple layers of security and surveillance as do hotels, restaurants, and schools (Ayub 2014; Aziz 2015; Wise 2012).

  7. 7.

    Pakistan and India have fought three wars over the control of Kashmir, which to this day remains a disputed territory. In the heydays of the Kashmir liberation struggle, Pakistan was suspected of training and arming Kashmiri proxy groups to infiltrate the LoC into Indian territory for various military campaigns. Similarly, Pakistan also encouraged surplus fighters following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to move to the Kashmir theatre. While the nature of the Kashmir liberation struggle has substantially changed, many believe that the same armed groups, once referred to as “Freedom Fighters” in the context of the Kashmiri struggle, have shifted their militant activities into mainland India and Pakistan.

  8. 8.

    The Durand Line is a 1,529-mile long porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has been under heavy criticism for not regulating transnational movement across the border, which is routinely exploited by both the Afghan Taliban, and their sympathizers, the Haqqani network, who plan attacks in both nation-states from their sanctuaries in Pakistan’s semiautonomous tribal areas.

  9. 9.

    Even though Pakistan’s provinces and administrative divisions are drafted along ethnic lines, the provinces themselves are far from homogenous. Ethnic groups typically lack official recognition from the state and the fair integration of their cultural, spiritual, and social systems into state institutions such as in school curriculums and matters of language (Ayres 2009; Dean 2005; Rahman 2008).

  10. 10.

    Contrary to this analysis, Yusuf (2014) argues that non-state armed groups in Pakistan have actually managed to rise above their ethnic and linguistic ties. He explains that for example even though the TTP is largely composed of ethnic Pashtuns, the armed group has killed more than 600 tribal elders and dismantled numerous jirgas (local assemblies of tribal leaders and judiciary courts) which are essential to ethnic Pashtun claims of place making and governance. The TTP, according to Yusuf’s (2014) analysis, gain support by “creating a leadership vacuum in the traditional tribal society” than relying on ethnic and linguistic ties (p. 19). Similarly, Pakistan’s Punjabi Taliban or the Al-Qaeda have rarely sought support based on ethnicity.

  11. 11.

    Like other mysteries of statecraft, the term “strategic interests” require further intellectual unpacking in relation to statehood, foreign policy, and governance.

  12. 12.

    However, Pakistan’s historically unresolved stance toward such groups provided the Afghan Taliban ample opportunity to exploit the fluid nature of the Durand Line, the financial resources of Al-Qaeda, and the regional memory of a previous jihad. They successfully established strategic bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas (FATA), which they used to launch offensives against international forces in Afghanistan as well as targets within Pakistan.

  13. 13.

    Interview with General Pervez Musharraf, Financial Times, October 26, 2005.

  14. 14.

    Pakistan’s military incursion in its tribal areas as in the previous Swat incursion is often understood as the Pakistani military killing its own people. This view is also shared by some segments of the military. Dr. Humeria Iqtidar from King’s College London reminds us that the Pakistani military is not a cohesive, monolithic entity as generally thought but there are often disconnects between the top brass and the soldiers within whom “there is immense cynicism and there is immense despair” (Fielding-Smith et al. 2015).

  15. 15.

    In order to facilitate the speedy conviction of suspected terrorists, the Pakistani Parliament amended the country’s constitution to set up numerous military courts to try civilian terrorism suspects and lifted the moratorium on death penalty. Concerned about the transparency of these convictions and the right to appeal, this was met with stiff resistance from human rights lawyers and their allies. In April 2015, Pakistan’s Supreme Court suspended death sentences handed down by the country’s new military courts and stated that those convicted by military courts had the right to appeal (Al Jazeera 2015a).

  16. 16.

    In the weeks following the Peshawar attacks some 147 individuals (including suspected militants, civilians, and security personnel) were killed as a result of increased military operations (Chughtahi and Hashim 2015).

  17. 17.

    In a recent news report published in the Urdu daily Dunya, Lahore’s chief traffic officer Hafiz Cheema was cited as identifying 36 areas deemed high risk for terrorism majority of which were Pakthun-dominated areas. Similarly, Pakistan’s Interior Minister dispelled accusations of ethnic bias and racism after a recent order to clear Afghan illegal settlements from the outskirts of Pakistan’s capital city claiming that it had become a “safe haven for terrorists.”

  18. 18.

    Other ways to increase state legibility include Islamabad’s new counterterrorism safety initiative which takes the form of some 2,000 close circuit television cameras (CCTV) throughout the city to monitor the movements of its residents to counter terrorism and crime (Azeem 2015; Shahid 2015b).

  19. 19.

    The 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, United States once again reignited the debate on more closely monitoring Islamic schools and seminaries in Pakistan and elsewhere (Bengali and Sahi 2015; Tanveer and Shahzad 2015).

  20. 20.

    The “good Taliban” were those who didn’t attack Pakistan. They were “non-state actors” and “strategic assets” useful to further Pakistan’s “strategic depth” in Afghanistan or attack targets in “enemy” India (Sarwar 2014).

  21. 21.

    Islamabad’s Red Mosque under the leadership of Maulana Aziz is no stranger to controversy. In 2007, elite commandos under the direction of then-President Pervez Musharraf stormed the mosque after students there burned a government building, kidnapped police officers, and carried out a vigilante campaign to enforce sharia law in Islamabad. Stockpiles of weapons were found inside the mosque and numerous students were killed in the military operation. Exact figures of the number killed remain unknown, it was reported that bodies of dead students were buried in mass graves. Till today information on the number of dead is withheld from the public. In 2014, Aziz renamed the mosque and seminary’s library after Osama bin Laden (BBC 2014). The 4,000 female-student madrassa affiliated with the mosque complex recently also launched a video message in Arabic declaring allegiance to ISIS and welcomes the implementation of Sharia law in Pakistan (Mir 2014).

  22. 22.

    On the eve of the Peshawar attack, the radical cleric Moulana Aziz refused to condemn the school attack on national television justifying it as a response to children killed in Pakistani army operations. The next day, outraged Pakistanis gathered on the street outside the mosque calling for an apology. The protest resulted in a confrontation between students from the mosque and the protesters. Under severe public pressure, Aziz condemned the incident the next day but also prayed in his Friday sermon that the Pakistani military, the Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban would unite, and remained agnostic on condemning the Taliban and questioned who the “real” perpetrators of the massacre were (Naviwala 2015). Hundreds of peaceful protesters and journalists returned to the Red Mosque for a third day to find the mosque cordoned off and protected by police. An ongoing movement demanding the arrest of the cleric is underway.

  23. 23.

    Another trend has been the reduction of terrorism to calculations of risk and probabilities. The recently launched PredictifyMe, a startup relying on “big data” does just that. The analytics company is partnering with the United Nations in an initiative to use “data” from past school bombing to generate algorithms which can predict school attacks in the future (Kavilanz 2015).

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Correspondence to Omer Aijazi .

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Aijazi, O. (2017). Security Governance in the Post-Colony: The Political and Social Consequences of Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy. In: Romaniuk, S., Grice, F., Irrera, D., Webb, S. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55769-8_27

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