Abstract
It is an irony of contemporary philosophy of mind that that which does the explaining seems hell-bent on explaining itself away. Bundle theories of the self, seeking to explain it within familiar scientific parameters, tend to get tangled up in this methodological paradox. Substance theories, on the other hand, avoid losing the self, but do so at the cost of providing those who demand it no scientifically or naturalistically acceptable handle on the self—no way to analyze, manipulate and make predictions about the self. Responding to these problems, this paper explores and defends (with qualifications) McTaggart’s account of the self as a substantial person, mutually related to other substantial selves, which are all individuated from each other by determining correspondence relations among their perceptions.
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Cesarz, G.L. (2016). Renovating McTaggart’s Substantial Self. In: Mander, W., Panagakou, S. (eds) British Idealism and the Concept of the Self. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46671-6_13
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