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Sanctions on Russia: What Impact Do They Have on the Question of “Third-Party Countermeasures”?

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the sanctions on Russia may contribute to creating the rule of “third-party countermeasures” under general international law. In this context, this chapter explores the history of the discussion on the question of third-party countermeasures in Sect. 5.2. The main contents of the sanctions on Russia are discussed in Sect. 5.3. Section 5.4 analyzes the impact of sanctions on Russia on the question of third-party countermeasures. This analysis indicates that overall, the sanctioning States do not intend to rely on (third-party) countermeasures to justify their measures. It follows from this that the sanctions on Russia are not considered a practice that may contribute to creating the rule of third-party countermeasures; in other words, this practice negatively impacts the question of third-party countermeasures.

This paper is the result of my research as a Research Fellow at Ryukoku University (2021–2022).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Tams (2005); Tams (2010), pp. 379–405; Katselli Proukaki (2010); Dawidowicz (2007), pp. 333–418; Dawidowicz (2016), pp. 3–15; Dawidowicz (2017).

  2. 2.

    Doxey (1980), p. 90.

  3. 3.

    See Focarelli (2016), p. 22.

  4. 4.

    Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading: State Responsibility, A/CN.4/L.600, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2000, Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 70–71.

  5. 5.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 23 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.14, paras 40–41 (China). See also Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 79 (China); Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 11th meeting, 29 October 2001, A/C.6/56/SR.11, p. 10, para 62 (China).

  6. 6.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 59 (Cuba).

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., pp. 91–92, para 7.

  9. 9.

    Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 93–94 (Japan).

  10. 10.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 23 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para 45 (United Republic of Tanzania).

  11. 11.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 15th meeting, 24 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para 29 (India).

  12. 12.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 15th meeting, 24 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para 43 (Guatemala).

  13. 13.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 15th meeting, 24 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para 63 (Botswana).

  14. 14.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 16th meeting, 25 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.16, para 36 (Iraq).

  15. 15.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 16th meeting, 25 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.16, para 51 (Sierra Leone).

  16. 16.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 17th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para 85 (Greece).

  17. 17.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, paras 2, 5 (Algeria).

  18. 18.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 27 (Slovenia).

  19. 19.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 51 (Russian Federation).

  20. 20.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 65 (Brazil).

  21. 21.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 22nd meeting, 1 November 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.22, para 52 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).

  22. 22.

    Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add.1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 94 (Republic of Korea).

  23. 23.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 23rd meeting, 2 November 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.23, para 4 (Colombia).

  24. 24.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 17th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.17, para 85 (Greece).

  25. 25.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 51 (Russian Federation).

  26. 26.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 20th meeting, 31 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.20, para 36 (Mexico). See also Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 91, para 6 (Mexico).

  27. 27.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 22nd meeting, 1 November 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.22, para 52 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).

  28. 28.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 24th meeting, 3 November 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.24, para 64 (Cameroon).

  29. 29.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 15th meeting, 24 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.15, para 25 (Israel).

  30. 30.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 18th meeting, 27 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.18, para 17 (Jordan). See also Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 15th meeting, 1 November 2001, A/C.6/56/SR.15, p. 4, para 21 (Jordan).

  31. 31.

    Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 94 (Austria).

  32. 32.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 23 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para 31 (United Kingdom). See also Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 94 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

  33. 33.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 23 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para 54 (Germany).

  34. 34.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 23 October 2000, A/C.6/55/SR.14, para 67 (Japan).

  35. 35.

    Comments and observations received from Governments, A/CN.4/515 and Add. 1–3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 93 (Japan).

  36. 36.

    James Crawford, “Fourth Report on State Responsibility”, A/CN.4/517 and Add. 1, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 18, paras 71–73.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., p. 18, para 74.

  38. 38.

    Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), A/56/10 (2001), Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 139.

  39. 39.

    Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 14th meeting, 1 November 2001, A/C.6/56/SR.14, p. 9, para 56 (Mongolia).

  40. 40.

    Institut de Droit International, ‘Resolution on Obligations erga omnes in International Law’, Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. 71(2) (2005), pp. 286–289.

  41. 41.

    Supra note 1. Iwasawa acknowledges that the rule of third-party countermeasures in response to breaches of obligations erga omnes is now developing, if not established. IWASAWA (2020), p. 606.

  42. 42.

    US Department of the Treasury, ‘Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions’, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/ukraine-russia-related-sanctions; US Department of State, ‘Ukraine and Russia Sanctions’, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/index.htm (to 20 January 2017), https://www.state.gov/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions/ (from 21 January 2017).

  43. 43.

    European Council & Council of the EU, EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/.

  44. 44.

    Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, ‘Measures related to the situation in Ukraine’, https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/external_economy/trade_control/01_seido/04_seisai/crimea.html; Ministry of Finance of Japan, ‘Sanction measures and list of sanctions target’, https://www.mof.go.jp/policy/international_policy/gaitame_kawase/gaitame/economic_sanctions/list.html.

  45. 45.

    See Timofeev (2021), p. 94.

  46. 46.

    See Congressional Research Service, ‘Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses’, 20 December 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11869.

  47. 47.

    E.g., Hayashi (2019), p. 232. See also Desierto (2014); Mälksoo (2017). Ukraine, which is clearly a State directly injured by Russian aggression, is indisputably entitled to invoke countermeasures to justify their prima facie illegal measures. Barmore and Miller (2014), pp. 67–74.

  48. 48.

    Dawidowicz (2017), p. 235.

  49. 49.

    Dawidowicz (2017), pp. 252–253.

  50. 50.

    ‘Certain Trade Restrictive Measures Adopted by the United States’, Communication from the Russian Federation, S/C/W/353, G/C/W/697 (23 April 2014).

  51. 51.

    WTO Council for Trade in Services, Report of the meeting held on 8 May 2014, S/C/M/117 (27 May 2014), paras 7.1–7.7; WTO Council for Trade in Services, Report of the meeting held on 20 June 2014, S/C/M/118 (15 August 2014), paras 7.1–7.5.

  52. 52.

    Executive Order 13,662 of 20 March 2014, ‘Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine’, Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 56 (24 March 2014), p. 16,167.

  53. 53.

    ‘Certain Trade Restrictive Measures Adopted by Canada’, Communication from the Russian Federation, 28 May 2014, S/C/W/354, G/C/W/698 (3 June 2014).

  54. 54.

    WTO General Council, Minutes of the meeting on 24–25 July 2014, WT/GC/M/152 (9 October 2014), para 16.1. See also WTO General Council, Minutes of the meeting held on 12 May 2014, WT/GC/M/151 (30 June 2014), para 5.2–5.8.

  55. 55.

    See also WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 19 June 2014, G/C/M/119 (31 October 2014), para 9.2.

  56. 56.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding further anti-Russian sanctions agreed by the European Union’, 30 July 2014, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1629654/; ‘Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Nebenzya’s interview with Rossiya Segodnya’, 31 December 2014, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1726431/; ‘Statement by Gennady M. Gatilov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Russian Delegation at the 66th Session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe’, 14 April 2015, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1507309/; ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at a meeting with members of the Association of European Businesses in Russia Moscow’, 31 October 2017, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1556129/; ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to questions at the Primakov Readings International Forum’, 11 June 2019, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1463433/; ‘From Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with the MIC Izvestia multimedia information centre Vladivostok’, 4 September 2019, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1468699/.

  57. 57.

    Communication from the Russian Federation, WT/GC/245 (16 March 2022).

  58. 58.

    Azaria (2022), p. 408.

  59. 59.

    Supra note 54(WT/GC/M/152), para 16.2.

  60. 60.

    See also Reuters (Tom Miles), ‘Russia says U.S. sanctions break WTO rules, may cause trade dispute’, 24 July 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-wto/russia-says-u-s-sanctions-break-wto-rules-may-cause-trade-dispute-idUSKBN0FT1YI20140724.

  61. 61.

    Supra note 54(WT/GC/M/152), paras 16.9 (EU) & 16.12 (Canada).

  62. 62.

    Supra note 51(S/C/M/117), paras 7.8 (US) & 7.9 (Canada).

  63. 63.

    Supra note 54(WT/GC/M/151), paras 5.9 (US), 5.10 (Canada) & 5.11 (EU).

  64. 64.

    Supra note 55(G/C/M/119), paras 9.5 (US) & 9.6 (Canada).

  65. 65.

    Supra note 51 (S/C/M/118), paras 7.7 (Canada), 7.9 (Australia), 7.10 (US) & 7.11 (EU).

  66. 66.

    US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 12 September 2014, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/09/231529.htm. The video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ElD_8M9gaI (The quoted part is at 56:48–57:38).

  67. 67.

    However, in the case where certain Russian companies filed a lawsuit against the Council of the European Union at CJEU and alleged, among others, the incompatibility with GATT of the EU’s trade restrictions, the General Court dismissed the claim, deciding that even if GATT were directly applicable in the present case, the restrictions would be justified under Article XXI of GATT. T-715/14, PAO Rosneft Oil Company, formerly NK Rosneft OAO and Others v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 September 2018, paras 180–185.

  68. 68.

    See 192nd session, Minutes of the Committee on Economy, Trade and Industry of the House of Representatives, No. 5 (28 October 2016).

  69. 69.

    General Council, Communication from Albania, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States, WT/GC/244 (15 March 2022).

  70. 70.

    Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs et al., ‘Russia’s Trade Status, Tariffs, and WTO Issues’, CRS In Focus, IF12071, 11 April 2022.

  71. 71.

    Minutes of the Committee on Market Access, 30 & 31 March 2022, G/MA/M/76, para 4.32 (EU); Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 21 & 22 April 2022, G/C/M/142, paras 43.21 (UK), 43.41 (Canada), 43.56 (Australia); Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Committee on Safeguards, 25 April 2022, G/SG/M/60, para 10(Canada); Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 26 April 2022, G/SCM/M/118, para 7 (Canada); Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, 27 April 2022, G/ADP/M/6, para 10 (Canada); Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 9–10 May 2022, WT/GC/M/198, paras 12.8 (EU), 12.10 (Canada), 12.18 (UK), 12.20 (Iceland); Report of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Services, 16 May 2022, S/C/M/149, paras 10.33 (Canada), 10.46 (EU), 10.60 (Iceland), 10.78 (Albania); Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 7 & 8 July 2022, G/C/M/143, paras 6.26 (EU), 6.58 (Canada), 6.69 (Australia).

  72. 72.

    208th Session, Minutes of the Committee on Financial Affairs of the House of Councillors, No. 11 (19 April 2022), p. 7, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=120814370X01120220419&current=6.

  73. 73.

    Recent examples are: Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 31 March 2022, ‘The negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights’, A/HRC/RES/49/6, para 29; Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 2022, ‘Human rights and unilateral coercive measures’, A/RES/77/214, para 1. See also Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2021, ‘Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries’, A/RES/76/191, para 3.

  74. 74.

    Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 7 & 8 July 2022, G/C/M/143, para 6.7.

  75. 75.

    G7 Foreign Ministers, Statement on Russia’s war against Ukraine, 14 May 2022, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-russias-war-aginst-ukaine/2531268, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/news/2022/article/statement-on-russia-s-war-against-ukraine-g7-foreign-ministers-14-may-2022.

  76. 76.

    Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 7 & 8 July 2022, G/C/M/143, para 6.24.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., para 6.32.

  78. 78.

    Claimant’s Memorial, 3 July 2020, paras 4–5.

  79. 79.

    Respondent's Counter Memorial on the Merits, 3 May 2021; Respondent Rejoinder on Merits & Reply on Jurisdiction (Redacted), 22 February 2022.

  80. 80.

    Briefing by Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department Ivan Nechayev, Moscow, 11 August 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1825841/. See also Foreign Ministry statement regarding the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 8 February 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1852877/.

  81. 81.

    Department Press Briefing, 16 August 2022, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-16-2022/; Department Press Briefing, 22 August 2022, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-22-2022/.

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Yamada, T. (2023). Sanctions on Russia: What Impact Do They Have on the Question of “Third-Party Countermeasures”?. In: Furuya, S., Takemura, H., Ozaki, K. (eds) Global Impact of the Ukraine Conflict. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4374-6_5

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