Abstract
At different stages of development, Communist China was faced with dissimilar social contradictions, resulting in the leaders’ debasement language addressing different groups. This chapter analyzes through a textual interpretation method the consistency and change of such debasement language as expressed in all the regime leaders’ speeches that sought to strengthen Socialism while “maintaining stability.” The core questions of this study, relating to the leaders, are: (1) what language did they use against intellectuals and corrupt officials? (2) Why did they use such language? (3) How did such debasement language influence the public? This study’s conclusions are: First, Mao Zedong used debasement language mainly against reactionaries, including intellectuals; Deng Xiaoping, primarily against hostile forces undermining social stability; Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao inherited Deng's idea of intellectuals as “part of the working class” and therefore focused on domestic stability; Xi Jinping targeted corrupt officials. Second, debasement language underwent change in light of domestic contradictions and national goals, as well as the need to improve governance capacity. Third, undermining intellectuals was disastrous for Chinese socialism, whereas disparaging corrupt officials enhanced the ruling party’s legitimacy.
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Notes
- 1.
Kuomintang is a Chinese political party that ruled mainland China from 1927 to 1949 prior to its relocation to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War.
- 2.
Rectification movement is the movement in which the CPC started to improve itself in the transition period of history, the purpose being to prepare the new historical mission, or to summarize the major historical experiences and lessons. It included studying Marxism-Leninism, integrating theory with practice, engaging in criticism and self-criticism, and unifying party thought and understanding. The two most influential rectification movements in the history of CPC were the Yan’an Rectification movement in 1942, aimed to maintain the ideological and political unity of the whole Party and carry out Marxist education throughout the party. The second was the rectification movement in 1957. Its purpose was to sum up the experience and lessons of the socialist revolution and to meet the arduous task of socialist construction. It was against bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism, calling on people outside the CPC, especially the intellectuals, to put forward their ideas and opinions, thus helping the CPC and government to improve.
- 3.
During the Cultural Revolution, nine groups of people were classified as class enemies, namely landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitors, secret agents, bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals. Because intellectuals were ranked ninth, they were called the “stinking ninth category”.
- 4.
On Xi’s usage of metaphors see Wang (2020).
- 5.
The use of “a handful” in Chinese political language is often associated with vandals. The word means “a small number” or “a tiny minority,” creating antagonism with the majority. The term is found in Mao’s style and continues to be used in Chinese political language, considered as “the enemy”.
- 6.
Jiào shòu, the homonym for “professor” and “calling beast.” is used to satirize scholars who speak for the government for their own benefit or rely on their authority to speak in disregard of the facts.
- 7.
Zhuān jiā, the homonym for “expert” and “brick expert,” refers to people who constantly spew out nonsense and pretend to be an academic authority.
- 8.
Jìzhě is a homophone of “journalist” and “prostitutes” i.e., those who are tempted by money or power to disregard the professional ethics of journalism.
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Miao, H. (2023). Consistency and Change: Derogatory Language in Chinese Leaders’ Speeches. In: Feldman, O. (eds) Political Debasement. The Language of Politics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0467-9_6
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