Keywords

1 The Promise of Breakthrough

Public works programme—otherwise known as workfare programme—has emerged as the strategic intervention in addressing unemployment, poverty, distress migration as well as buttressing basic infrastructure. Such programme is favoured in developed countries as a means to reduce disincentives provoked by social security systems and in the developing countries, it is being embraced not only for better target benefits to the poor but also to use the growing labour force to build up infrastructure (Ravi and Engler 2015). The rationales of the programme rest on some critical planks. By affording income transfer particularly during distress times, such programme enables consumption soothing of the poor households. The substantial and sustainable assets like infrastructure coming out of the programme works generate another bout of employment/livelihood potentialities.

Such programmes, as in India and elsewhere, have few common and crucial characteristics. (i) The central/federal government funds the activities related to the works which are open to anybody willing and able to avail the opportunity. (ii) Such works offer a living wage notified by the government and decent working conditions and facilities. (iii) By its basic nature, the programme is not targeted social protection programme or welfare programme for the poor. Rather it is universal in nature where anybody can work under the envisaged design and provisions. (iv) The programme is demand driven and not definitely supply oriented and its design favours self-selection. The potential beneficiaries decide whether and when to seek and actually work. (v) From administrative standpoint, the programme is highly rewarding. In many other erstwhile welfare programmes the government sought to select the beneficiaries where the administrative cost was quite high and the possibility of wrong selection was unavoidable. But in case of self-selection, the administrative cost is minimal and aberration is least. (vi) The primary purpose of such programme is to palliate poverty of those who face joblessness and income deprivation. Yet, the programme is not anti-poverty per se. The design is such where non-poor will find least incentive to participate in manual, strenuous and occasional works with fixed wage rate. It does have positive impacts on various dimensions of poverty when and where only the really poor people are incentivized to embrace the programme. The incremental income from works would certainly impact the livelihood of the poor households (hereafter HHs).

Compared to employment guarantee programme in many other countries, MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) in India is the most comprehensive in terms of statutory ordination and coverage. Covering the entire length and breadth of India, MGNREGA—hereafter the programme—has reportedly opened up enormous number of person-days, certainly much more than the previous welfare and anti-poverty programmes. And serious headways into the food insecurity, migration and rural poverty are supposed to be unequivocal. The programme has evoked positive expectations and euphoria, arguably bordering on bravura. This robust ‘social protection’ and employment programme is all set to reduce poverty, reverse inequality and to regenerate rural economy by improving infrastructure and enhancing agricultural productivity (UNDP 2010).

Few survey reports reveal its significant impacts on extreme poverty, measured in terms of increase in monthly per capita expenditure on food and non-foods among HHs, per capita consumption expenditure and reduction on the number of meals foregone by the participating HHs (Liu and Deininger 2010; Ravi and Engler 2015; Coffey et al. 2011; IDYWC 2010; Kareemulla et al. 2009). It has provided basic income assurance to a large number of beneficiaries (NREGA Sameekha 2012), and because of such works only a minuscule proportion of rural HHs opt for alternative employment options (NSSO 2012).

Notwithstanding the potentialities and survey assertions, it is also imperative to emphasise that the impact of the programme would hinge on many preconditions such as the outreach of the programme, participation of the poor, the extent and seasonality of the employment, timely wage payment, rise in market wage in agriculture as well as non-agriculture works and enhancement of agricultural productivity. More legislation and consequent programme are likely to mean little, given the awful Indian experience of poverty alleviation efforts.

One absorbing debate is whether the finding of NSSO (2010–11) that poverty has declined considerably was anyway related to the successful implementation of the programme. However, in the poverty debate one has to tread cautiously and the role of the programme should not be over-stated. Even if one accepts the official poverty line of Rs. 816 per capita per month for the rural areas (a la Tendulkar Committee 2009), a typical five member HH will have to earn at least Rs. 48,960 per annum to come out of poverty clutches. If three members of the HH participate, say, in 100 days of work—as is the stipulation—it can on average earn Rs. 45,000 (@150/- per day). One moderately poor HH can move out of poverty for the year, if it is provided with 100 days of work. For the ultra poor (<75% of poverty line income), 100 days of work will certainly reduce the intensity but not the incidence of poverty.

Arguably the most important prerequisite for denting in rural poverty will be the availability of at least 100 days of work and that too during the times of joblessness as in the agricultural lean season (August–November in West Bengal) and the nature of programme works having a particular focus on enhancing agricultural productivity. In other words, the focus and consequent efficacy must be on poverty ridden geographical regions and pockets. Otherwise, the spectre of poverty will continue to haunt or hobble, notwithstanding some improvement or breakthrough here and there.

2 Objective and Methodology

Is the programme reaching particularly to the poverty concentrated areas or is it serving the rural landless, agricultural labourers or the rural poor who hail necessarily from lower social stratum and who need the programme most?

Admittedly, one authentic way to ascertain the efficacy of the programme relating to poverty is the survey-based investigation in a specific locale. However, the focus of this chapter is not on survey-based exploration but on analysis of official data concerning mainly the person-days created in poverty-ridden areas. Such aggregate level analysis seems important for the reason that if and when there are not enough work opportunities, justification for primary-level investigation will be least. After all, the very objective of the programme can come into fruition only when sufficient work opportunities are made available to the rural poor. And the person-day per HH is one objective and an important indicator for such estimation.

Confining investigative attention exclusively to the state of West Bengal, the chapter explores the aggregate performance of the programme in one district that has the highest proportion of BPL (below poverty line) households, agricultural labourer and incidence of migration in the state. Moreover, the administrative Block having the most BPL HHs, labourers and migration in the district has also been attended to for the purpose of gaining some insights into the progress and impact of this flagship as well as touted programme.

In West Bengal, the sample district is Cooch Behar and the administrative block is Dinhata-I. Such selection is not based on subjective choice but on the official figures of BPL HHs, agricultural labourer and extent of migration for causal labouring. Based on the BPL Survey, 2002 (subsequent survey is yet to be published) and Rural Household Survey, 2005 (undertaken by the Department of Panchayats and Rural Development), the district and block have been singled out as they have the highest proportion of BPL HHs and labourers in the state and district respectively.

West Bengal is a state that is hobbled by inordinately higher rates of population density, unemployment, migration, sagging agriculture and of course poverty, more so in rural Bengal. All these features, both individually and collectively, make a strong case for successful and sustained MGNREGA.

According to Census Report, 2001 the work participation rate in West Bengal has increased in percentage term. But this is singularly because of increase in marginal workforce. The significant decrease in the main workforce and a consequent jump in marginal workers essentially imply that new jobs have been opened mostly outside of the organised or formal sector of state economy. Such trends entrench uncertainty and vulnerability of the workforce.

As per NSSO Report (61st Round, 2004–05), West Bengal holds the dubious distinction of having the highest (10.6%) number of HHs not having enough food every day for some months of a year. Moreover, the state holds the inauspicious third rank in respect of percentage of rural HHs not getting enough food every day in all months of a year. Such persistent hunger coupled with starvation deaths bodes ill for the poor of the state.

Regarding the incidence of poverty, there is the claim that the reduction of poverty in West Bengal has been phenomenal and this is because of successful land reforms impacting positive changes in economic relations and agricultural upsurge. Establishment of panchayats has also reinforced the momentum and reach of land reforms. The panchayats have led to the effective implementation of development policy without target failure, leakage or hijacking by elites. Undoubtedly, during 1981–91 the annual exponential agricultural growth was as high as 6.4% and during this decade the decrease of poverty was unequivocal (28%). However, in subsequent decades there has been stagnation and decline in agriculture, sharp fall in agricultural productivity and because of such reversals, the rural poverty reduction could not be sustained, as in 1993–2005.

In the state, more than 60% of rural and 40% of state population depend on agriculture which contributes about 30% of state’s GDP. However, agriculture has not undergone structural overhauling in strict and dispassionate terms. The touted land reform remains parochial in general and unfinished in particular. Out of total 10 lakh acre of acquired land, only 2.5 lakh acres have actually been distributed. And, out of 3 million bargadars, only 1/2 has been registered. When 40% rural HHs are landless, 13% Pattadars lost possession of land and 14% bargadars get evicted from land (HDRWB 2004), the situation is amply worrisome.

At the same time, the reverse trend in real wage has set in. The real wage for both casual agricultural and non-agricultural workers has slumped in between 1993–2000. Both in percentage and absolute number, the extent of agricultural labourers has increased significantly. Thus, many rural HHs remain engaged in those works that offer trifling little prospect of sufficient income necessary for getting out of poverty trap. To cut a long story short, agriculture in West Bengal is rapidly becoming non-remunerative for the small and marginal farmers, a sizable portion of the rural workforce is being pushed out of agriculture and the growing number of marginal works with lesser and exploitative wage rates are stark starring at the rural HHs.

Regarding the incidence and frequency of poverty in West Bengal, there are several estimates with contrasting methodologies and these divulge disparate results. In the poverty discourse, there is a virtual duel between central and state governments. While central government tends to deflate poverty, state governments try to peg it at the maximum level so much so that it does not discredit them. The underlying reason is that the resource allocation from central government is based on the proportion of poor in the states.

Without entering into the debate as to the representative and comprehensive methodologies etc., let us focus on poverty estimates by the West Bengal government itself. Two specific recent sources are BPL Survey, 2002 and Rural Household Survey (RHS), 2005. The RHS, in particular, is fundamentally different from others estimates. It was based on 12 parameters (housing, clothing, education, migration, etc.), each with 5-point scale. In the survey, each HH could score maximum 60 and minimum 12 points. Less than 33 was the cut off score for designating HH as BPL. Moreover, the survey was undertaken by the state government employees (i.e. primary school teachers). And more importantly, the survey results are being used for offering targeted benefits to rural people (houses under IAY for instance).

What the BPL and RHS reports reveal are not very cheering or emboldening. The state’s own surveys substantiate that rural poverty is no less enormous. BPL Survey, 2002 found total 34% HHs as BPL, 49% as agricultural labourer and 16% HHs resorting to migration for causal labouring (Table 15.1). Both in absolute and percentage terms, the figures do not validate the assertion that rural poverty in the state is manageable or palatable. Among districts, while Purulia and Uttar Dinajpur had more than 40% BPL HHs, the highest position was apportioned by Cooch Behar (52%). Contrary to popular expectation, Purulia, one least developed and tribal inhabited district, did not have ominous extent of poverty.

Table 15.1 Rural poverty in West Bengal
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If BPL Survey Report was not damning, RHS, 2005 really is. RHS corroborates not only the massive extent of poverty but also the worsening situation over the years. RHS discloses that out of total 1.5 crore rural HHs, 43.8% was BPL, 51% agricultural labourer, 57% landless, 31% marginal farmers and 21% HHs opting to migration. Compared to BPL Survey, 2002, the situation had thus aggravated, not a credible report card for the state. Malda district accounted for the highest BPL HHs (58.7%), closely followed by Cooch Behar and Murshidabad. However, computing the average ranking of the districts, Cooch Behar is found to be the most poverty infested district. Out of total 689,316 HHs, 55.6% was BPL, 59% was agricultural labourer, 53% landless and 25% inclined to migration in Cooch Behar. Despite having 2nd rank in BPL, Cooch Behar stood first in two other parameters (Agricultural labourer and migration). Cooch Behar has thus been regarded as the poorest district in the state.

In the poorest district of Cooch Behar, Dinhata-I Block has the highest rate of poverty in overall rankings. Though Dinhata-I has less than 3.5% of BPL HHs than the first ranked Block, it accounted for highest extent of agricultural labourer and migration. Like Cooch Behar district, Dinhata-I is thus found to be the most poverty stricken block. Based on such rankings, Cooch Behar and Dinhata-I Block have been taken as the sample unit for the exposition of progress of the programme in West Bengal.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, an overview of the progress and performance of the programme in West Bengal has been furnished—mainly as the background information on which the reflections should be posited. Then relatively detailed dissection of performance of the programme is made in the district Cooch Behar and Dinhata-I Block. And together with overall trends perceptible in the district Cooch Behar, few general remarks are appended at the last part.

3 Poverty of Progress!

West Bengal tends to be one intriguing state where the outreach and effectiveness of the programme could have been much more substantial than what it is till date. Some specific reasons for positive expectations being that: the then ruling Left Front, CPI(M) in particular, passionately supported the employment guarantee Bill and proclaimed strong political commitment to it (unlike many other ruling parties). The panchayat system—having pivotal role to play relating to this programme—is supposed to be vibrant, dynamic and representative in the state. Moreover, about 27% of total HHs is BPL and the state has the highest unemployment rates. However, since inception of the programme, the state has fumbled and its performance is comparatively and considerably dismal. To use the prognosis of Drèze and Oldiges (2009), the lurching in West Bengal is perhaps due to the ambivalent attitude of the state government towards MGNREGA right from the beginning.

The performance of the programme in West Bengal has been no less poor right from the commencement. Since inception of the programme, West Bengal fared poorly compared to other Indian states (like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan) and its performance was not in any way commensurate with the number and nature of poor people in the state. Against the demand of employment, only 14 person-days of job could be provided in 2006–07 which later on increased to 25 in 2007–08 and 26 in 2008–09. And the corresponding national person-days were 43, 42 and 47. The state’s average person-days have subsequently stagnated and could not come anyway near to the national average: 20 in 2009–10, 25.6 in 2010–11, 27 in 2011–12 and 31.7 in 2012–13. The average person-day per HH in the state was 20, 25, 27 and 31.7 in 2009–2011.

Among its 18 districts, North 24 Parganas could provide the highest 28 person-days and Uttar Dinajpur provided barely 11.6 and Cooch Behar 13.7 days during in 2009–10 (Table 15.2). Incidentally, North 24 Parganas fared better among the districts consistently and comparatively. The average higher person-days in Darjeeling could be because of its better performance in 2011–13. Cooch Behar stood last in 2010–2013: the 4-year average generation of person-days was just 14.5, closely followed by Uttar Dinajpur, Siliguri and Dakshin Dinajpur. Incidentally, all the major poor performers were from the Northern region of the state.

Table 15.2 Average person-days generated in districts of West Bengal (2009–13)
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Though West Bengal could hardly reap benefits from the programme (Rao et al. 2008), there has been debate as to its turnaround in subsequent years. In 2013–14, the state is reported to have gained some ground. Till 2011–12 the state was among the worst performing states in terms of person-days, with an average figure of around 20 days against the Indian figure of 45 days. Total person-days had never earlier crossed 10 crore in the state that has about one crore job card holder, one-half of which are active job seekers.

The state government in West Bengal claimed that the state topped in 2012–13 with implementation of projects worth Rs. 4475.80 crore, which is the highest in the country, and generated employment for 57.76 lakh families. In an advertisement published in local dailies (May 16, 2013) the Panchayat and Rural Development Department claimed that West Bengal had achieved a total man-days of about 20 crore which is 109 per cent higher than the national target. “Compared to the 2011–12 financial year, we have increased 33 per cent more man-days in 2012–13 which itself is an achievement.”

In 2013–14 the state is supposed to have emerged as one of the best performing states and it generated over 11.3 crore person-days that positioned it as the 5th ranking state. This was due to the change of attitude of the state government. Earlier the programme was treated as one of many schemes. Now it was being regarded as the most important scheme (The Telegraph 2014).

However, the claim is not without contestation. The national statistics suggest that the state ranked 24th on the 2012–13 list. The former Union Minister of State for Urban Development Ms. Deepa Das Munsi retorted: “The state has ranked 24th on the list. It is all about statistical jugglery. West Bengal is on the top of the list in terms of getting sanctioned funds under MGNREGS and its disbursement. But since the numbers of total families are more in our state, statistics show a different picture as we have to divide total man-days with the number of total households.”

Though only handful in-depth studies have so far been undertaken in West Bengal, their general conclusions are not unequivocally heartening. Among the positives, the additional employment had increased the rate of wage for agricultural labourers. The combined effects of such employment and higher wage rate impacted (as in Birbhum) positive changes in per capita annual income of programme workers, monthly per capita expenditure on food consumption (Sarkar 2011). Another positive contribution (again in Birbhum) was the outcome of better quality jobs—better working environment, higher daily wage compared to the prevailing market rates (Dey 2009). Consequent upon such works, the overall living standard had reportedly improved a bit. Due to incremental income, HHs could spend more on food, clothing, housing and education (Ghosh 2011). Moreover, few sample Job Card holders used the programme income to start, run or expand rural business. The programme tended to have fan rural entrepreneurship (Mangatter 2011).

However, the villagers were generally unaware about the provisions of the programme even in the areas where it had relatively been successful in creating a substantial number of person-days. In some areas people were not aware of the wage rates, and they in almost all the areas, were not aware of the fact that they are legally entitled to at least 100 days of employment and unemployment allowance in the absence of work (Das 2013). Another striking point is that villagers did not know that it is a demand-based programme where applicants should get work within 15 days of applying for the work. There were times during the lean season when they could work neither as an agricultural labourer nor in the programme works as the panchayats reported unavailability of works. As a result, they migrated to the adjacent cities to find employment (Das et al. 2012).

The situation was found to be more disquieting at the Gram Panchayat (GP) level. Survey reports in Birbhum attested that while the demand was to the extent of 204 days, the actual works could be to the tune of just 61 days—meeting about 10% of demand and 20% of entitlement. The variations of performance across GPs were equally emphatic: the better performing GPs created about three times more jobs than the laggard ones (Dey 2009).

More worrisome is the finding that during agricultural lean session when traditional agricultural activities dry up and poor households try to cope up the severe scarcity of livelihood with distress migration and selling off durable possessions, the programme works fail to emerge as the succour. The abnormally lower extent of employment during lean session essentially implies that the programme stumbles to provide income safety net to the poor HHs (Dey 2009). One probable accounting reason is that during lean session the monsoon does not permit earth works, which are the predominant component of the project works. Thus, unless the fixation with the earth works is shifted to other works, the succour is unlikely to be imminent in West Bengal.

Surely, the programme is universal and rights based. The poor people otherwise finding income-earning opportunity difficult should get the works. Yet, the works could not be availed as entitlement and as per demand. Political clientelism punctures their rights. As in Cooch Behar district, the ruling party supporters (at GP) worked in significantly higher number of days and they earned more than the non-ruling party supporters. Perceived supporters of non-ruling party were denied works even after recording demand (Das 2015). Seen overall, political clientelism may be preferable to regressive elite or caste-based domination, but such political manoeuvring or manipulation mars the universal entitlement of the rural poor.

The programme must receive due importance and must be better implemented in areas having higher concentration of poor people. But survey evidences evince otherwise: relatively successful implementation in those GPs having fewer agricultural labourer (as in Birbhum). At the same time, the availability of programme fund at GP and block levels was not associated with the number of job cards and public demand for employment (Mukherjee and Ghosh 2009).

Thus, the fundamental question survives. If the poverty concentrated GPs do not come up with commensurate works absorbing labour force demand and if the programme fund does not conform to the demand, the very efficacy of the programme will remain awry.

The programmes could not stem even the short-term migration by ‘any of the member of the households’ (Das 2015). However, it was observed that had the number of days of getting work increased the probability of migration would have deceased. This could have been possible through creation of more employment opportunities especially during lean season and overall increase in rural agricultural and non-agricultural wage rates.

What is unequivocal is the fact that almost all the survey reports contend that unpalatable is the extent of employment offered, denial of works, untimely wage payment and scanty coverage to the marginalised stratum of rural HHs. The programme benefits could be greater and comprehensive if HHs were provided with more works, especially during distress times.

4 Cooch Behar District

To reiterate, Cooch Behar district has the largest proportion of BPL HHs (51.8%), agricultural labourer (59%) and out-migration for causal labouring (23%) and these are in sharp contrast to the incidences and figures of West Bengal. Thus, the programme must receive foremost importance in order to arrest or alleviate all the disquieting features. However, closer look at the official figures relating to the implementation of the programme does not divulge reassuring trends. In fact, the overall situation is worse and to some extent unacceptable.

In contrast to the usual feature where the official figures tend to testify that almost all HHs demanding employment have been provided works, the position of Cooch Behar district is evidently eerie. While in the first year of implementation about 60% of total HH demanding employment could be offered works, there was sharp slump in the engagement of workers in subsequent years. Though the initial demand for work in 2007–08 was somewhat modest compared to the succeeding years, the momentum could not be sustained in the following years and this perhaps points to the petering out of the popularity of the programme. Compared to the total number of demand for employment (273,508) in 2007–08, it slumped to 228,955 in 2008–09 and 205,173 in 2009–10. The public demand rose a bit in 2010–11 but again dipped in next two years. Thus, the perceptible pattern of high demand was followed by a slip thereafter. However, the demand for employment increased by about threefold in 2013–14.

While barely 55% HHs had on average been offered employment during 2009–14 (Table 15.3), such appalling rates reveal the inability of the implementing agencies to come up with adequate, if not sufficient number of projects that could have absorbed the labour demand. Almost identical trend over the years indicates that the authorities did not redirect or re-marshal the initiative or strategy.

Table 15.3 Employment status under MGNREGA in Cooch Behar
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More ominous is the average person-day per HH. Except in 2009–10, abysmally low person-days had been created, the average of which was barely 19 days. The number of HHs completing 100 days of work was just 12 in the second year, though it increased gradually particularly during 2013–14.

Starting with a meagre number in 2007–08, the volume of works undertaken increased over the years particularly from 2009–10. But the works completion rates were certainly unenviable—only 17% each in 2011–12 and 2013–14 and the 7 year average is 34.6%. Such low completion rate might be due to selection of unviable project works, abandonment of work in subsequent stages or arguably less probable is the nature of works having longer duration or gestation period.

In a poverty-stricken district, durable assets and enhancement of agricultural productivity should get due importance. Yet, the nature of works undertaken shows odd trends. The road connectivity has all along received highest priority—well over 55% of total works and 62% on average. Such emphasis on roads etc. may have long-term implications on the economic growth, but it throws up many vexing questions (taken up later). In the first 2 years, activities relating to flood control might have received some weightage but those lost steam in later years. Compared to flood control works, land development works have received more eminence but not to the extent of having lasting impact on agricultural growth in particular.

5 Dinhata-I Block

Dinhata-I in Cooch Behar district has the highest incidences of poverty, more so the share of agricultural labourer and migration. How has the programme progressed in the Block? Has it catered to the economic plights of the poor or has it sought to rejuvenate the local agriculture?

Let us start with few aggregate dimensions in Dinhata-I. Till 2014, total job cards were 74,468, of which 57% are active which is somewhat higher than the state average figure of around 50%. Out of total 154,234 workers, 37% was active workers for the programme. Total person-days generated in the block were 247,920 in 2012–13, 794,081 in 2013–14 and 1,124,184 in 2014–15 and during these three years the average person-days per HH happened to be 11.9, 27.9 and 33.6 respectively. Some improvements over the years are thus noticeable—though they fall far short of the guaranteed days and the palliative effects on the poor HHs are suspect. The average per-day wage rate was Rs. 145, 150 and 168 in between 2012–15. It is also worth mentioning that the average cost per worker was Rs. 252 in 2012–13, 173 in 2013–14 and 210 in 2014–15. Thus, the cost of work is considerably high and with this expenditure tangible benefits ought to have been created; otherwise the amount could go down the drain.

At disaggregate level, 16 GPs in Dinhata-I together have 50,325 BPL HHs (Table 15.4). Among the GPs, the higher BPL HHs were concentrated in Okrabari, followed by Petla, Putimari I and Matalhat. Conversely, Putimari-II had the lowest BPL, followed by Dinhata Village I and Bara Atiabari-II.

Table 15.4 MGNREGA performance in Dinhata-I block of Cooch Behar (cumulative till 2014–15)
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It may be instructive to note that the number of HH completed 100 days of work in the BPL concentrated GPs was rather moderate, 60 in Petla, 16 in Matalhat, 15 in Orkabari. The performance of these three GP was however far better than four other GPs who stumbled to offer significant number of days to each HH. Much higher rates are observed for moderately poor GP––Gitaldaha I and II.

Out of the major BPL concentrated GPs and in terms of ranking according to the generation of total person-days and person-day per HH, the position of Gitaldaha I seems notable, as it occupies first rank among all GPs. For other GPs, particularly second- and third-ranked GPs, the performance was moderate. Seen from overall perspective, the progress and performance of Gitaldaha I and II are outstanding relatively and considerably. And this perhaps authenticates many other local dynamics rather than mere presence of BPL HHs.

The share of SC in the total person-day was somewhat low, 38.5 on average. And this seems lower because the district has the highest extent of SC—more than 52% of total population—in the state. However, the meagre visibility of SC may be due to the considerable presence of Muslim population in Dinhata-I and whose participation is not recorded separately in the database. As to the share of SC workers, one has to tread cautiously because the SC population in the GPs many very considerably and the ranking should better be based on absolute number of SC in each GP concerned. Tentatively, fifth ranked GP Gosanimari I employed higher number of SCs and Gitaldaha I and Okrabari offered the least.

Work completion rate is yet another indicator that amplifies the health—sound or otherwise—of the programme. Suffice it to mention, West Bengal fairs poorly and the state has received flak from Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) on this front. In Dinhata-I, the work completion rate is more or less akin to the state. The average rate for the 16 GPs of the Block was 51 during 2009–14. Year-wise, the highest rate was in 2009–10 and lowest in 2013–14. Among GPs, worst performer was Gitaldaha I—otherwise better performing one—which could not complete even single work in 2011–14 and its average rate stood at just 3 during 2009–14. Less than average 50% completion rate was observed in Gosanimari-I, Bara Atiabari-II and Bara Soulmari. Conversely, more than 80% rate could be achieved in Putimari-II and Bhetaguri-I. Such poor, if not awful rates vindicate either the selection of non-viable projects—may be because of scarcity of fund or substandard planning or lack of concerted initiatives of the GPs concerned. Either way, clear dearth of fruition of projects is unlikely to bolster the rural economy and infrastructure and mere creation of person-days will have trifling little influence on poverty etc.

6 Beyond the Rhetoric of Rights-Based Programme

Pre-requisites for poverty reduction efforts are the augmentation of productivity and profitability of agriculture, generation of gainful employment opportunities and inclusion of SCs, STs and women in the programme process and development of resources in deficient areas. In the absence of diversification of agriculture and rural economy as well as occupational diversification of the labour force, the livelihoods of the poor households dependent on agriculture revolve around the productivity of agriculture. The programme has the potentiality to address the issues of rural unemployment and poverty and to revitalise agriculture. However, the programme will have to come full circle if the potentialities are to be harnessed.

Like many other states, West Bengal is, however, besieged with many problems and inconsistencies as to the successful implementation of the programme. Survey and anecdotal evidences inform that the programme suffers from few procedural and substantial imbroglios, which stultify the overall outreach and efficacy of the programme as well as its positive impact on rural poverty.

Many rural people are not adequately aware about the procedures and process of the programme. Such insufficient knowledge makes them hardly equipped in actualising the demand driven nature of the programme as well as putting pressure on the implementing agencies as to their specific needs particularly during distress time. Such inadequacy is due to the imperviousness or inability of the implementing and other public agencies.

For the ordinary rural people the programme paraphernalia are rather complex and cumbersome. Registration for job card, written application for employment for at least 14 days at a stretch, receiving the dated receipt of the application, claim of unemployment allowance if works are not given within 14 days of demand all are tall order for the semi-literate poor people who remain busy with subsistence struggle and find little time to go or parley with GP officials etc. Because of poor knowledge, cognitive incapacity and scarcity of time, most people tend to depend on the power brokers—party functionaries and panchayat officials—who virtually control the demand, availability of works and selection of workers. Such intermediation was neither anticipated nor serves the interests of the poor. Unless direct linkage between people and implementing agencies is restored, the poor are likely to suffer and for this purpose some simplicity and predictability of the programme may be imperative.

The success of the programme depends squarely on the commitment, involvement and ability of GPs. Job card registration, receipt of work demand, assortment of labour demand including its seasonality, preparation of labour budget and self of projects (often in synchronisation with Gram Sabha), engagement of workers with work-site facilities, measurement of work, maintenance of muster roll and database, etc., all are the onus of GPs. The fundamental question is whether or how far GPs are devoted, equipped and willing to undertake all the responsibilities.

Together with the almost perennial shortage of manpower and technical know-how, etc, another problem is the preparation of annual and perspective plans. GPs are to implement at least 50% of total works and they are reportedly implementing close to 83% of total MGNREGA works. The programme puts serious governance pressures on panchayats. Each GP in particular has to make a perspective plan and annual plan for implementing the scheme. The perspective plan is an extensive exercise that includes charting of the village’s resources, its poverty, its demands, work situations and based on these facts prescribing a template for future development requirements. The annual plan involves identifying needy people, scooping works for them in advance and also preparing horde of accounts. GPs are to get the plans approved by block and district officials as well. While these are easily said than done, it is also important to reiterate that the works can be offered if there is factual estimation of labour demand and approved shelf of projects in the annual and perspective plans.

At the same time, delay in allocation of fund throws GPs into the ire of the workers. Otherwise overburdened GPs find themselves really stretched in all inclusive sense. The poverty ridden GPs are generally far off from the block headquarter and they are relatively understaffed and technically wanting and this is one reason accounting for the failure of GPs in the poverty concentrated areas.

Timely availability of fund is another constraint. December–March is the usual period when works are relatively and substantially made available. But for inexplicable reasons, the fund availability during this eventful period gets a beating. Unless this session is used most effectively, the performance of the programme will remain skewed.

Fund based on the labour budget from the central and state government is not always made available to the implementing authorities, particularly to GPs. Allocation from the government takes time to reach to the implementing agencies. The situation has recently reached such a pass where wage payment is delayed for at least 6 months. Murmur is heard in many GPs where payment has not been paid for a year. Such delay discourages the poor to bank on the programme and agencies to spur or sustain their interests.

While in few other states the average engagement per active job card is somewhere in between 40–50 days, in West Bengal the disaggregate data divulge that about one-fourth job card holders receive <10 days of work in a year and another quarter work in the range of 11–20 days. With such meagre (and inconsistent) income, one cannot positively change the economic fortune. It cannot substantially be income safety net for a poor family. To be effective in the fight against poverty, the intervention must provide longer period of engagement and timely payment of wage.

West Bengal faces some exclusive impediments. Here the land–man ratio and population density are quite high and at times adverse. Available land for undertaking programme works is rather paltry. High cropping intensity in many Southern districts restricts the availability of land further. At the same time, whatever free land was available has already been used up, say for social forestry.

Long spell of monsoon throws yet another spanner. During this period any type of works requiring land cannot be embarked on. Flood and flood-like situation, particularly in Northern districts, sap the possibility of earth-related works. As such, the poor HHs do not in general get works during agricultural lean session when they find alternative works really scanty. Thus, unavailability of works during the tough times dashes the popularity and positive impact of the programme on poverty etc.

Situation-specific and regenerative resource generations are not getting appropriate emphasis. In the arid areas plantation, afforestation and water conservation and flood control measures in flood-prone zones—in other words, planning of works with long-term perspective—are exception rather than the rule. Conversely, earth works seem to be the preoccupations of Bengal’s panchayats. Since their rejuvenated journey from 1977, GPs in West Bengal are expending huge funds on kutcha road construction. One specific reason for such fixation is that such works do not last long and these get washed away or perish soon. Thus, the same work can be undertaken again and again, utilising the fund and creating considerable man-days. This sort of obsession continues under MGNREGA. Fairly and squarely, unless the obsession with road connectivity and earth works is done away with, it is unlikely that the rural regeneration and poverty alleviation will descend in foreseeable future.

7 The Futurity

It bodes ill when MGNREGA is not as effective in poverty basket as it must. In poor states and poverty concentrated areas, the demand for employment is expected to be comparatively higher and the public agencies will have to offer larger quantum of works. But the ground realities do not testify such a trend. In fact, in poor states the demand might be higher but the richer states usually come up with more employment. Indeed 2010–11 figures present a damming story. Poorer states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh which together account for 59% of total BPL population generated just 34% of total employment. Conversely, richer states like Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu with just 8% of BPL share catered to 23% of aggregate employment. Similarly, the GPs with more poor people, agricultural labourer and incidence of migration are lagging behind in generating proportionate employment. Unless such gaps are bridged fairly and quickly, the rural poverty is unlikely to be tackled head on.

The guaranteed employment is likely to contribute to not more than one-fourth to one-third of income required for meeting basic needs of the poor HHs. To overcome the plight of poverty, the income contribution has to be more than what is presently available or made possible. The impact on poverty can be emphatic as well as sustainable if the development schemes of the state and central government converge with the programme and local governments (panchayats) function with concerted commitment. Few convergence attempts are recently being made and these are likely to enlarge the ambit. But the capacity building and devotion of panchayats are still not receiving due priority. Nonetheless, with the elapse of a decade, the steam and support to the programme tends to be fizzling out—one ironic trend discernable for most of the erstwhile public programmes. Somewhat cynical attitude and scuttling tendencies on the part of the (central) government may bode ill for this otherwise proverbial programme!