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Global Environmental Issues and International Solidarity: Between Myth and Reality

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The Principle of Solidarity

Part of the book series: Global Europe: Legal and Policy Issues of the EU’s External Action ((GELPIEEA,volume 2))

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Abstract

The international society moves towards an international community—a sociological unit where common concerns are the core element. This evolution raises the question of how solidarity has impacted the international legal framework. This chapter draws on the concept of solidarity as a core normative ideal underpinning the development of modern international law. It investigates the influence of the common interest on international solidarity and the evolution of international law. First, focusing on environmental issues, it elaborates on international solidarity as the mysterious concept driving the evolution of international law to address global challenges. Then, it analyses how solidarity has shaped the legal framework, both at the normative and institutional levels.

[S]ans ‘valeurs’ morales supérieures, le droit international n’est qu’une mécanique privée d’âme.

Prosper Weil (Weil 1982, p. 18)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, 31 ILM 874 (1992 Rio Declaration), Preamble.

  2. 2.

    The Holocene comprises a long period of relative environmental stability which facilitates the development of human civilization. Unlike the Holocene, the Anthropocene is characterized by change, uncertainty, and considerable instability, due to human impact on the Earth system. See Zalasiewicz et al. 2012.

  3. 3.

    Rémond-Gouilloud 1998, pp. 11–12.

  4. 4.

    In one of its decisions, the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia stated that ‘[a] sovereignty-oriented approach [of international law] has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the international community as well’. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Motion for Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, IT-94-I-AR72.

  5. 5.

    Such evolution is already noticeable. This can be illustrated in decision-making process, for example, where the recourse to the Conference of Parties under international environmental agreement, help to make decisions faster; or the use of the tacit acceptance procedure at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This evolution foreshadowed this moving toward the Anthropocene epoch as the international law is now more dynamic than it was before, where international norms and rules were more or less stable during the past centuries.

  6. 6.

    United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC), Preamble para 1.

  7. 7.

    Horn 2009, p. 170.

  8. 8.

    On that point, Bruno Simma referred to all States when talking about ‘community interests’. He describes ‘a consensus according to which respect for certain fundamental values is not to be left to the free disposition of States individually or inter se but is recognized and sanctioned by international law as a matter of concern to all States’. Simma 1994, p. 233.

  9. 9.

    There are two definitions of the notion of ‘international community’. On the one hand, legal scholars define it as the “community of nations”, composed by all existing States that are involved in international relations (see Higgins 1963, pp. 11–12; Wolfrum 2011). On the other hand, some scholars define the ‘international community’ as a group sharing the same fundamental values, going beyond the sum of all States.

  10. 10.

    MacDonald 1996, pp. 259–260.

  11. 11.

    Santiago Villalpando refers to “identical community interests”. He pointed out that, “internationally, there is no one collective interest, but many (as many as there are States) identical interests having a collective content”. Such single collective interest would exist only if there is a single authority, or entity, that fulfil the collective interests of States. Even if such an entity exists, States do not renounce their identical community interest, which they continue to hold. See Villalpando 2010, p. 394.

  12. 12.

    As Emer de Vattel rightly pointed out, international solidarity is the condition for the existence of a community of States. See de Vattel 1758, pp. 1–16.

  13. 13.

    MacDonald 1996, p. 261.

  14. 14.

    In that sense, it is interesting to connect the increasing collective action to what-is-called “law of solidarity”, a third generation of international law, co-existing in parallel with the law of co-existence and the law of cooperation. See Wellens 2005, p. 804.

  15. 15.

    As the expression of the Lotus dictum, international law governs “relations between independent States … in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims”. PCA, Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States), Award, 4 April 1928, 1928 RIAA 2, p. 870. In the United Nations Charter, this common good refers to the international peace and security, for example.

  16. 16.

    Rousseau 1970, pp. 25–26.

  17. 17.

    Those factors were developed by Santiago Villalpando, to demonstrate how community interest have been incorporated into international law in relation to the preservation of public goods. Villalpando 2010, p. 396. It is worth noting that the environment, here, is considered as a public good. Therefore, the protection of the environment is a common good or value that ensures the preservation of a public good.

  18. 18.

    See Dupuy 1979, pp. 9–232.

  19. 19.

    Devin 2010, p. 34.

  20. 20.

    Simma 1994, p. 234.

  21. 21.

    Jouannet 2008, p. 820; Wellens 2010, p. 6. This link between law and morality exists since the birth of international law, when Grotius, in his work, distinguished two types of law in the international arena: on the one hand, the natural law (divine) and, on the other hand, the positive law, which derives from the will of States. Even they are distinct in their very nature, they are linked as, from his point of view, the natural law takes precedence over voluntary law, which was the source of States respect to international law. See Grotius 2005.

  22. 22.

    It has been emphasized that “contemporary international law cannot claim anymore to be value-free, even if the precise meaning and consequences of those values have to be determined in each and every single case and might not be found at all in hard cases”. Paulus 2001, pp. 751–752. Commenting the Nicaragua case before the ICJ, J. Tasioulas noted that “by making explicit, and reflectively articulating, the genuine reasons on which decisions are based […] self-consciously value-based adjudication can enhance, rather than corrode, the realization of the rule of law”. Tasioulas 1996, pp. 104–105.

  23. 23.

    MacDonald 2005, p. 853.

  24. 24.

    UN General Assembly 2005, para 4(f).

  25. 25.

    This is the so-called negative and positive solidarity. See Wellens 2010, p. 4. The protection of the environment is the main purpose of the international environmental law. Regarding the increasing number of global challenges, such as the loss of biodiversity or the effects of climate change, the consideration of the environmental requirements became crucial to set rules and standards governing human activities. Therefore, such environmental requirements guarantee a specific cohesion at the global level, entailing the so-called international solidarity, and therefore shared values among the international community.

  26. 26.

    UNFCCC, Article 4(3).

  27. 27.

    UNFCCC, Articles 4(1)(c) and 4(3).

  28. 28.

    The conditional obligation of developing States under the Article 4(7) of the UNFCCC, to comply with the framework Convention is a means to put pressure on developed States to respect their commitment. See Birnie et al. 2009, pp. 134–135.

  29. 29.

    See McCorquodale 2004, p. 478. The author stressed that “conceptual or philosophical ideas in international law are strengthened if developed by reference to the reality of international actions.”

  30. 30.

    For example, the UNFCCC; the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 818 (CBD); the 1992 Rio Declaration.

  31. 31.

    Klučka 2017, p. 32.

  32. 32.

    Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, opened for signature 3 October 2018, entered into force 25 June 2021. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2554f475-6e25-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF. Accessed 2 May 2022.

  33. 33.

    Kiss and Beurrier 2004, p. 145.

  34. 34.

    Allot 1999, p. 31.

  35. 35.

    Kolb 2003, p. 25.

  36. 36.

    ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) Judgment, 25 September 1997, 1997 I.C.J. Reports 7, para 140.

  37. 37.

    Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted 16 June 1972, UN Doc A/Conf.48/14, 11 ILM 1416, para 6 (1972 Stockholm Declaration).

  38. 38.

    The Preamble states that: “A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the common international realm, will require extensive cooperation among nations and action by international organizations in the common interest.” See Principles 21 and 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. In its 1975 Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution, following the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to “a spirit of international solidarity” when States cooperate for preventing and controlling transfrontier pollution (14 ILM 242). See also Simma 1994, p. 244.

  39. 39.

    Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, opened to signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 20 March 1966, 559 UNTS 285.

  40. 40.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened to signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).

  41. 41.

    See UNCLOS, Articles 116 to 119.

  42. 42.

    Shaw 2014, pp. 932–933.

  43. 43.

    Rozakis 1975, pp. 1–2. To that extent, Prosper Weil refers to a less stringent version of State consent within the voluntarist scholarship. Thus, the general State consent to the entire international law is enough to make it legally binding for that State, without a required consent for each international rules and norms. See Weil 1996, pp. 69–70.

  44. 44.

    Trindade 2014, p. 158.

  45. 45.

    Dominicé 2013, p. 51. See also Institut de Droit International 2005.

  46. 46.

    Dupuy 2000, p. 217.

  47. 47.

    Wyler and Papaux 2014.

  48. 48.

    In 1994, Christian Tomuschat warned about the development of legal norms and processes that develop obligations for States without their consent. See Tomuschat 1994.

  49. 49.

    The core elements of Bolivia’s objection concerned the insufficiency of discussion on the content, ambition, and characteristic of the regime established by the agreements. See Rajamani 2011, pp. 515–516; French and Rajamani 2013.

  50. 50.

    Krisch 2014, p. 17.

  51. 51.

    Drumbl and Ulhířová 2021, p. 14.

  52. 52.

    Wolfrum 2010, p. 229.

  53. 53.

    Weil 1983, p. 414.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., pp. 413–442; Holloway 1967.

  55. 55.

    Druzin 2017, p. 361.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Freestone 1999, p. 136.

  58. 58.

    MacDonald 1996, p. 287.

  59. 59.

    Boyle 2005, p. 574.

  60. 60.

    Tanaka 2012, p. 241.

  61. 61.

    Weil 1983, p. 415.

  62. 62.

    Freestone 1999, p. 137.

  63. 63.

    For different formulation of the concept of precaution in international environmental instruments, see Peel 2021, pp. 309–310.

  64. 64.

    Several international law instruments and international courts and tribunals decisions refers to a ‘precautionary approach’. For example, the ICJ refers to a ‘precautionary approach’ in the interpretation and application of an environmental treaty. See ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 2010, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 977, para 164. Without considering the precautionary principle as a principle of international law, The ITLOS refers to a ‘trend towards making [the precautionary approach] part of customary international law’ (ITLOS, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory opinion, 1 February 2011, 2011 ITLOS Reports, para 135. See also ITLOS, The MOX Plant case (Ireland/United Kingdom) Provisional measures, Order of 3 December 2001, 2001 ITLOS Reports 2001, at paras 108–110).

  65. 65.

    Freestone 1991, p. 36.

  66. 66.

    According to Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, ‘[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.

  67. 67.

    Peel 2021, p. 302.

  68. 68.

    See Kiss 1994, p. 55; Cameron and Abouchar 1996, p. 30.

  69. 69.

    McIntyre and Mosedale 1997, pp. 221–241; Trouwborst 2007, p. 185.

  70. 70.

    Peel 2021, p. 303.

  71. 71.

    Tarlock 2007, p. 581.

  72. 72.

    Bodansky 2004, p. 389. See also Background Paper No. 3 for the 4th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (1996) Report of the Expert Meeting on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 26–28 September 1995, para 72.

  73. 73.

    Hickey and Walker 1995, p. 425.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., p. 426.

  75. 75.

    Some critics was made on this idea of international legal system as a State-based system. Regarding the evolving situations, this conceptual idea was considered as an ‘intellectual prison’. Higgins 1994, p. 49. See also the work of Koskenniemi 1989; Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000.

  76. 76.

    This choice refers to the definition given by a UN Report, in 1994, defining an NGO as ‘a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members or of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates’. UN Economic and Social Council (1994) General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc E/AC.70/1994/5.

  77. 77.

    Alkoby 2003, p. 32. In that sense, a UN Report on Human Development states that ‘[o]ne big development in opening opportunities for people to participate in global governance has been the growing strength and influence of NGOs’. See UN Development Programme 1999, p. 35.

  78. 78.

    McCorquodale 2004, p. 478. To that extent, NGOs are considered as part of ‘international civil society’. See Cullen and Morrow 2001, p. 7.

  79. 79.

    Raustiala 1997, p. 565. NGOs were perceived as providing a “crucial guardianship role” for all matters that are outside the interest of individual State, especially the global commons, in order to pursue their protection. Ibid., p. 567. On the notion of guardianship, see Stone 1993, pp. 35–49.

  80. 80.

    Raustiala 1997, p. 567.

  81. 81.

    Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, opened for signature 1 April 1919, entered into force 28 June 1919, 15 UNTS 35.

  82. 82.

    For a study on the work before the ILO, see LeClercq 2015, pp. 105–132. For an insightful analysis of non-State actors’ role in international law in general, see Noortmann and Ryngaert 2010.

  83. 83.

    For an insightful analysis of this evolution, see Thomann 2008, pp. 71–94.

  84. 84.

    As this chapter will not dwell upon this matter, it is left to the discretion of the reader to refer to some insightful studies. One relevant argument according to which non-State actors, especially NGOs, do not have a legal impact per se in the development of international law is that their political impact is limited by States’ willingness to consider their advice or recommendations, or not. Alkoby 2003, p. 26.

  85. 85.

    See Falk 1995, p. 34; Reinicke and Witte 2003, pp. 75–114. For an analysis of the interaction between the role of non-State actors in international law and globalization, see the very important work of Delmas-Marty 2007. See also Gordenker and Weiss 1995, pp. 357–387.

  86. 86.

    See the Preamble of the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations, opened for signatures 24 April 1986, entered into force 1 January 1991, ETS No. 124. They were called as ‘international public interest organizations’. See Dolidze 2013, pp. 379–418.

  87. 87.

    Törnquist-Chesnier 2007, p. 170.

  88. 88.

    See Raustiala 1997, p. 559.

  89. 89.

    Alkoby 2003, p. 34. The author refers to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. See Lindborg 1992, p. 1.

  90. 90.

    See Bowman 1999, pp. 281–300.

  91. 91.

    Article 12 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, opened for signature 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975, 993 UNTS 243 (CITES). The Montreal Protocol in its Article 11(5) refers to non-governmental organizations “qualified in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer”. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (with annex), opened for signature 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989, 1522 UNTS 28.

  92. 92.

    Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, opened for signature 2 February 1971, entered into force 21 December 1975, 11 ILM 963.

  93. 93.

    Some legal scholars tend to consider the IUCN as an NGO. See Bowman 1999, p. 298.

  94. 94.

    The draft of the Global Pact for the Environment is available at https://globalpactenvironment.org/en/document/draft-of-the-international-group-of-experts-for-the-pact/. Accessed 2 May 2022. For a study on the legal background of the Global Pact, see Aguila and Viñuales 2019, p. 3.

  95. 95.

    See their ongoing work, available at https://globalpactenvironment.org/. Accessed 2 May 2022.

  96. 96.

    This is for example, at the national level, the case of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Judgment, 20 December 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006. For an overview of the decision, see Cox 2016, pp. 143–163.

  97. 97.

    In the field of human rights, see Van Boven 1990, p. 357.

  98. 98.

    The Conference of the contracting Parties of the Ramsar Convention recognizes the role of NGOs in ‘[making] important technical, promotional and financial contributions to the implementation of the Ramsar Convention, and to support the Ramsar Bureau’. To that extent, some NGOS were explicitly cited such as the IUCN, the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau (IWRB), BirdLife International and the WWF. See Recommendation 5.6 on The role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Ramsar Convention, 5th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties, 9–16 June 1993, Kushiro, Japan. https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/key_rec_5.06e.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2022.

  99. 99.

    Bowman 1999, p. 298. NGOs ‘operate as fact-finding bodies, lobbyist, and advocates in a way that generates publicity about violations of international law’. See McCorquodale 2004, p. 495.

  100. 100.

    Article 50 of the ICJ Statute and article 57 of the Rules of the Court.

  101. 101.

    Shelton 1994, p. 611.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., p. 642.

  103. 103.

    Rules of the Tribunal, Articles 72 and 77.

  104. 104.

    See Gautier 2013, p. 80. The author refers to the Volga case. ITLOS, the Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia) Judgment, 23 December 2002, 2002 ITLOS Reports 10.

  105. 105.

    ICJ, Practice Direction XII, adopted in 2004. https://www.icj-cilensj.org/en/practice-directions. Accessed 30 September 2022. Instead of placing the said documents, the ITLOS publish them on their website, in a separate section entitled ‘Statements from NGOs (not part of the case file)’, thus enhancing their publicity, even if they are not considered per se part of the case file.

  106. 106.

    See Special Arbitration Tribunal, Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v. France) Decision, 30 April 1990, 82 ILR 499.

  107. 107.

    Some authors rally the consideration of IUCN as a nongovernmental organization. See Shelton 1994, p. 622.

  108. 108.

    McCorquodale 2004, p. 496. See also Cullen and Morrow 2001, p. 7; Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, p. 169.

  109. 109.

    On that matter, Judge Guillaume has pointed out that the pressure groups are ‘besieg[ing] [governments and inter-governmental institutions] today with the support of mass media’. See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume, 8 July 1996, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 226, p. 288.

  110. 110.

    The call for participation of NGOs in legal proceedings are supported by some scholars. See Popovic 1993, p. 683; Raustiala 1997, p. 537; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002, p. 20.

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Rafaly, V. (2023). Global Environmental Issues and International Solidarity: Between Myth and Reality. In: Kassoti, E., Idriz, N. (eds) The Principle of Solidarity. Global Europe: Legal and Policy Issues of the EU’s External Action, vol 2. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-575-1_5

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