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Double Whammy: Targeted Minorities in South-Asian States

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International Criminal Law—A Counter-Hegemonic Project?

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 31))

Abstract

This chapter explores ways in which both international criminal law and TWAIL fail to address the needs of accountability and remedy for violently targeted minorities in South-Asia. It will bring forth the selective, political manner of the institutionalisation of international criminal law by examining the prevalent power dynamics of the global political economy that shield powerful perpetrators, particularly in South-Asia. Majoritarian consolidation ensures the appearance of electoral democracy in these countries despite widespread crimes against minorities. Western states have a critical interest in protecting allied regimes in South-Asia due to their strategic geopolitical location and symbolic democratic appearance that provide ideological alternatives vis-à-vis China. Large population sizes in some of these countries also provide vital markets for western business interests. These factors often protect powerful perpetrators from any international scrutiny for mass crimes. The nation-state-building goals of the non-aligned post-colonies shaped TWAIL’s origin. The process of nation-building for postcolonial South-Asian states has often involved fortifying national borders that were arbitrarily and rashly drawn by former imperial powers in the first place. Such fortification involved silencing dissenting minorities through targeted state violence. Likewise, second-generation TWAIL scholarship continues to be constricted by the inapt binary of First World versus Third World. This narrow contextualisation of TWAIL scholarship restricts its lens to interests of Third World nation-states rather than the needs of their people, especially minorities. TWAIL’s foundational goals block effective engagement and articulation of the minorities’ pleas for accountability and remedy in South-Asian countries, creating its own hegemonic narrative.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Baqai 2004, pp. 57–68; Minority Rights Group International 2020, pp. 10–13.

  2. 2.

    The words ‘minorities’ is broadly used to include ethnic, linguistic, religious, caste and racial minorities in these nation-states. Considering time and word limitations, the chapter does not delve into sexual minorities.

  3. 3.

    Original Nation Approaches to ‘Inter-National’ Law (ONAIL) creates a distinction between the nation and the state and argues that the Euro-centric view privileges the state over the nation as state borders continue to divide and occupy different nations. It defines ‘nation’ as culturally bound peoples and ‘state’ as a legal construction in which people are held together using centralised institutions and legal mechanisms. See Fukurai 2019, pp. 202, 207. Applying this framework, we will be using the term ‘states’, instead of ‘nation-states’.

  4. 4.

    Khan and Rahman 2011, pp. 372–384.

  5. 5.

    Riaz 2019, pp. 18–19.

  6. 6.

    Khan and Rahman 2011, pp. 367–368.

  7. 7.

    Mishra 2016, pp. 12–13.

  8. 8.

    Guha 2011, pp. 13–14; Hasan 2002, pp. 26–27; ‘ethnic groups transcend six of the seven borders of South Asian states.’ Baqai 2004, p. 57.

  9. 9.

    Hay 2006, pp. 74–79; Chatterji 1999, pp. 186–187, 192–194; Kaur 2019, pp. 116–118.

  10. 10.

    Talbot and Singh 2009, pp. 67–89; Guha 2011, pp. 15–16; for an account of gender based violence and gendered implications of the partition of the subcontinent, see Butalia 1994, pp. 36–42.

  11. 11.

    Riaz 2019, p. 2.

  12. 12.

    Samaddar 2019, p. 10.

  13. 13.

    Shahabuddin, Minorities and the Making of Postcolonial States in International Law, https://twailr.com/minorities-and-the-making-of-postcolonial-states-in-international-law/. Accessed 26 January 2022.

  14. 14.

    Phadnis and Ganguly 2001, p. 13.

  15. 15.

    For example, Bangladeshi liberation struggle was fought under an assimilative ‘Bangla/Bengali’ identity which was substituted by a ‘Bangladeshi identity’ as the army took over in 1976, see Khan and Hossain 2006, pp. 324–339. The army carried out a massive resettlement plan to settle Bengalis in Chittagong Hill Tracts, imposing assimilation on the non-Bengali speaking, non-Muslim indigenous communities there, see Shahabuddin 2013, p. 92.

  16. 16.

    Indic used to refer to religions that are thought of as having been conceived on the Indian subcontinent, or having their places of worship there. See for e.g. this argument (and use of the term Indic/non-India) used by Nageswara Rao in his article in trying to justify the CAA, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/opinion-civilisational-responsibility-limits-indian-citizenship-to-persecuted-adherents-of-indic-religions-only/339876. Accessed 26 January 2022.

  17. 17.

    Fazal 2015, pp. 5–10, 18–19.

  18. 18.

    Roy 2010, pp. 5–6.

  19. 19.

    Roy 2010, p. 11.

  20. 20.

    Tambiah 1996, p. 22.

  21. 21.

    Grugel et al. 2017, pp. 2–3.

  22. 22.

    Roy 2010, pp. 10–11.

  23. 23.

    Kannabiran 2012, p. 282.

  24. 24.

    Noronha Dos Santos 2007, pp. 45–46.

  25. 25.

    Tambiah 1996, pp. 3–4.

  26. 26.

    Riaz 2019, pp. 21–22.

  27. 27.

    Fein 2007, p. 15.

  28. 28.

    See for example Delhi Minority Commission 2020, pp. 99–103.

  29. 29.

    Tambiah 1996, p. 12.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 25.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    Baqai 2004, p. 57.

  33. 33.

    Riaz et al. 2019, p. 2; Tambiah 1996, pp. 3–4.

  34. 34.

    Noronha Dos Santos 2007, pp. 54, 63.

  35. 35.

    Arthur 2010, p. 271.

  36. 36.

    Bekou 2015, pp. 134–135.

  37. 37.

    Amnesty International 2011.

  38. 38.

    Begum 2018, pp. 72–75.

  39. 39.

    Rai 2016.

  40. 40.

    For example, the Tamil Sri Lankan community has time and again spoken about the destruction of remembrance memorials by Sri Lankan state authorities. See Srinivasan 2021; BBC 2021.

  41. 41.

    For example, see the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in India. S.4 of the act empowered security forces to shoot to kill suspects. S. 7 of the act gave prosecutorial immunity for any actions taken pursuant to the respective acts.

  42. 42.

    For examples, see Reuters Staff 2007; India Today 1996.

  43. 43.

    For more information on the 1984 anti-Sikh Genocide, resources are available at https://www.sikhcoalition.org/blog/2021/remembering-1984-2/. Accessed 26 January 2022.

  44. 44.

    State and Others v. Sajjan Kumar and Others, 2019 IAD (Delhi) 1, paras 136–150, 282–296, 368 (xii).

  45. 45.

    Amnesty International 2020, pp. 1–2.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., p. 6.

  47. 47.

    Mollah 2019, pp. 654–659.

  48. 48.

    Haque 2018, pp. 247–248.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., pp. 246, 256–257.

  50. 50.

    Association Tamil Uzhagam 2017; Together Against Genocide 2017.

  51. 51.

    For example, see Forum Asia 2018, pp. 232–234.

  52. 52.

    FIDH 2015; Human Rights Watch 2017.

  53. 53.

    Amnesty International 2018.

  54. 54.

    Forum Asia 2018, pp. 251–252.

  55. 55.

    Al Jazeera 2016.

  56. 56.

    Reynolds and Xavier 2016, p. 976.

  57. 57.

    Nair 2014, pp. 13–15.

  58. 58.

    BBC 2012; News18 2019.

  59. 59.

    Gomez 2021. Gomez states that after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, power-sharing discussions completely slipped off the table and this positioning had the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority who were not willing to concede political powers.

  60. 60.

    Jha 2018, p. 304.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Hall and Jeffery 2021, p. 670; Dawn 2003.

  63. 63.

    Jha 2018, pp. 301–303.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 305.

  65. 65.

    Kaul and Jha 2018, pp. 2–3. The authors discuss how South-Asian states such as India (then comprising the current landmass that now is Pakistan, and Bangladesh) participated during the drafting of the UN Charter, suggested universal membership, and later advocated for a greater representation of smaller states. They have also formally engaged with mechanisms such as the predecessor to the current Human Rights Council, since their inception. India was also offered a permanent UN membership to the UN Security Council, twice, in 1950 and 1955, and India’s bid since then to secure a seat has been supported by its regional allies, Nepal, the Maldives, Bangladesh. See ibid., pp. 16, 19.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., p. 20. India was the first country that brought up the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa, before the UN GA in 1946. It has been significantly involved in peacekeeping operations, supported bans on nuclear tests, brought together developing countries within the New International Economic Order and along principles of non-alignment.

  67. 67.

    Cohen 2000; see also Lundseger 2011, discussing how the US has made a case for expanding Asian representation within the IMF, entered into agreements such as the Transpacific Partnership, that will ultimately lead to reducing trade barriers between the countries for facilitating exports.

  68. 68.

    Jha et al. 2018, p. 20; Kugelman 2016; Ramachandran 2019.

  69. 69.

    Kugelman 2016.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Michaelsen 2012, p. 287.

  72. 72.

    Held 2004, p. 63.

  73. 73.

    Kaur 2014; Doward 2017.

  74. 74.

    Borger 2020.

  75. 75.

    D’Souza 2012, pp. 425–426.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 426.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p. 409.

  78. 78.

    Eslava and Pahuja 2012, p. 195.

  79. 79.

    D’Souza 2012, p. 413.

  80. 80.

    Anghie and Chimni 2003; Nesiah 2016, 2019.

  81. 81.

    Reynolds and Xavier 2016, p. 976.

  82. 82.

    See for example Anghie 2005.

  83. 83.

    Gathii 2011, p. 30.

  84. 84.

    Natarajan et al. 2016, pp. 1946–1956.

  85. 85.

    Chimney 2017, p. 35.

  86. 86.

    Esmeir 2017, p. 93.

  87. 87.

    Choudhury 2017, p. 323.

  88. 88.

    Khan 2017, p. 116.

  89. 89.

    Choudhury 2017, pp. 324, 334.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., pp. 322–324, 331.

  91. 91.

    Ibid., p. 334.

  92. 92.

    Dirar 2017, pp. 355–357.

  93. 93.

    Anand 2002, pp. 5–29; Pahuja 2017, pp. 552–573.

  94. 94.

    Para 2019, pp. 207–210.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Kalhan et al. 2006.

  97. 97.

    Anghie and Chimni 2003, pp. 79, 82.

  98. 98.

    Fukurai 2019, p. 241.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., p. 240.

  100. 100.

    Valerie 2007, pp. 319–323; Fukurai 2019, p. 241.

  101. 101.

    For a further explanation of nation-core, see Fukurai 2019, p. 206.

  102. 102.

    Valerie 2007, p. 322.

  103. 103.

    Burra 2016, p. 113.

  104. 104.

    Ibid., p. 126.

  105. 105.

    Teltumbde 2020.

  106. 106.

    For example, Ratna Kapur traces the origin of the rise of Hindu Right in India to the Bandung anti-colonial, anti-western framing. See Kapur 2017, pp. 311–321.

  107. 107.

    For example, dog whistles insinuating western linkages to Christianity were the precursor to the Anti-Christian Kandhamal pogrom in India in 2008, National People’s Tribunal on Kandhamal 2010, p. 4.

  108. 108.

    Nesiah 2006, p. 916.

  109. 109.

    Ibid.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., pp. 916–917.

  111. 111.

    Kumar et al. 2003, p. 84; Human Rights Watch and Ensaaf 2007, pp. 12–14.

  112. 112.

    Manoharan 2006, p. 2.

  113. 113.

    International criminal justice does not contemplate simple errors in decision-making processes over prosecution of criminal actors. Rather, according to Professor Bassiouni, these crimes come from the state’s wilful intention and premeditation, since if it did not have the requisite intention, one would have expected it to stop its own organs from committing the acts. See Kuwali 2010, p. 28.

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Chakrabarty, I., Kaur, G. (2023). Double Whammy: Targeted Minorities in South-Asian States. In: Jeßberger, F., Steinl, L., Mehta, K. (eds) International Criminal Law—A Counter-Hegemonic Project?. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 31. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-551-5_5

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