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Peace(keeping) Operations: Soldiers Without Enemies?

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Abstract

Peacekeeping as an operative tool has existed almost for as long as the United Nations (UN) and while its value is recognised, indeed it has become an all-encompassing means to building, securing and maintaining peace, it was never meant to exist. The drafters of the UN Charter and its framework had envisaged a system of collective security that was very much built on the experiences of the past. Yet, events immediately evidenced that the new world order was not going to be easily managed by the rules and regulations that proved already out of step with the times. The UN, however, proved that there is room for innovation and interpretation within its system; so much so that a tool could be created that had been neither envisaged nor does it have, to this day, a legal foundation in the UN Charter. Rather, peacekeeping was put under the auspices and authority of the UN Security Council which administers missions with reference to UN Charter terminology but without generally anchoring them to any particular Chapter or Article. Despite their flexible and versatile nature, peacekeeping has over the years faced a variety of challenges and suffered from a range of drawbacks that might under different circumstances have caused calls for abolition of the whole initiative. Peacekeeping, however, has endured and is undergoing a renewed transformation to make the future of peace operations part of the continued UN narrative.

Peacekeeping is a risky activity (dos Santos Cruz 2017, Executive Summary).

This is with reference to Fabian’s work of 1971.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Preamble, Charter of the United Nations 1945 (henceforth UN Charter).

  2. 2.

    The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 recognised the increasing threat posed by new, more sophisticated weaponry. See UNIDIR Resources 2017.

  3. 3.

    See Preamble, The Covenant of the League of Nations 1919.

  4. 4.

    United Nations undated.

  5. 5.

    ‘Peace’ is a term subject to differentiation as it can at best connote the absence of strife or armed conflict. See UN News 9 September 2014.

  6. 6.

    Article 2(3), UN Charter. For more discussion on the scope of settling international disputes, see Mani and Ponzio 2018.

  7. 7.

    Preamble, UN Charter.

  8. 8.

    Article 7, UN Charter.

  9. 9.

    Article 24(1), UN Charter.

  10. 10.

    Article 24(2), UN Charter.

  11. 11.

    Article 24(3), UN Charter.

  12. 12.

    United Nations Peace Operations undated.

  13. 13.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations undated.

  14. 14.

    United Nations Department of Political Affairs undated. Note that while the text identifies ‘peace operations’, the focus of this chapter will be on peacekeeping operations.

  15. 15.

    Notably Boot 2000.

  16. 16.

    Reform discussions are beyond the remit of this chapter. For discussions, see e.g. Fassbender 1998; Hurd 2002; and Hassler 2013.

  17. 17.

    The other organs are the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the (defunct) Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat (notably represented by the UN Secretary-General). See Article 7, UN Charter.

  18. 18.

    Article 24(1), UN Charter. Arguably, primary does not mean exclusive responsibility as the General Assembly’s ‘secondary’ role was highlighted in the case of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution, see n. 56 below.

  19. 19.

    Article 24(2), UN Charter.

  20. 20.

    See Article 25, UN Charter.

  21. 21.

    Article 23(1), UN Charter. The remaining 10 members are non-permanent, Article 23(2), and are elected for two-year terms.

  22. 22.

    Finkelstein and Finkelstein 1966.

  23. 23.

    The permanent members’ continued tenure at the centre is subject to much debate. It is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss this, however.

  24. 24.

    Article 33, UN Charter.

  25. 25.

    Article 38, UN Charter.

  26. 26.

    Article 25, UN Charter. On the force of binding Security Council resolutions, see Delbrück 2002, p. 457, para 11.

  27. 27.

    This has been confirmed as being of ius cogens status and therefore not simply only applicable to UN member states: see Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986) 99.

  28. 28.

    The debate on whether an armed attack is a necessary prerequisite or whether a pre-emptive or even preventive use of force in self-defence is permissible with reference to customary international law is not within the scope of this chapter.

  29. 29.

    Emphasis added. The point at which the relevant threshold has been reached when disputes are or should be referred has been the subject of debate from the start. See Eagleton 1946.

  30. 30.

    For an overview of the Security Council’s practice in the pacific settlement of disputes see Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI).

  31. 31.

    Article 36(3), UN Charter. See e.g. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) Judgment of 9 April 1949 ICJ Rep. (1949) 4.

  32. 32.

    Article 35, UN Charter.

  33. 33.

    These methods are ‘supplementary to those methods traditionally established in international law’. Sands and Klein 2001, p. 43.

  34. 34.

    Article 27(2), UN Charter. For information on the Security Council’s procedures, see Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rules 6–12.

  35. 35.

    The binding nature of Article 25 does not apply to recommendations under Chapter VI. See above n. 22 and 28.

  36. 36.

    See Article 2(1), UN Charter.

  37. 37.

    This endeavour is reflected in a multitude of instruments such as the ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’ (A/RES/2625 (XXV), October 1970); the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (A/RES/37/10, November 1982); the ‘Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field, A/RES/43/51 (December 1988); or the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005).

  38. 38.

    For a record of Chapter VI dispute resolution, see Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI).

  39. 39.

    For an overview of the Security Council’s practice under Chapter VII, see Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII).

  40. 40.

    Hassler 2013, p. 14.

  41. 41.

    Hassler 2013, p. 14.

  42. 42.

    For a record of Chapter VII actions, see Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII).

  43. 43.

    Miller 1999.

  44. 44.

    Article 40, UN Charter.

  45. 45.

    Article 41, UN Charter.

  46. 46.

    Article 42, UN Charter.

  47. 47.

    For an analysis of the use of Article 42 as a means of ensuring the collective security framework, see e.g. Rumage 1993, also Vidmar 2017.

  48. 48.

    See Article 42, UN Charter.

  49. 49.

    Article 46, UN Charter.

  50. 50.

    Article 47, UN Charter.

  51. 51.

    Relevant arrangements as per Article 43, UN Charter, have never been implemented and the article remains, to all intents and purposes, ineffective. See Rossman 1994.

  52. 52.

    S/RES/83 (27 June 1950) and S/RES/84 (7 July 1950).

  53. 53.

    The extent to which this has now been developed, especially the controversies surrounding the authorisation practice, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

  54. 54.

    A/RES/377 (V), 3 November 1950. This is the one, and only, instance in which the General Assembly stepped up to taking the place as the alternative organ.

  55. 55.

    To ensure the backing of the permanent members a non-procedural vote is required. This requires a majority of nine, including the concurring votes of the permanent members as per Article 27(3), UN Charter.

  56. 56.

    For a discussion on the veto and its place within Security Council decision-making, see e.g. Fassbender 1998.

  57. 57.

    Following the endorsement by the General Assembly in November 1947 of a plan for the partition of Palestine, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, in 1948, unarmed UN military observers were deployed to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement. UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organisation) was established by S/RES/50 (1948).

  58. 58.

    See, e.g. United Nations undated-a.

  59. 59.

    Bildt 2011.

  60. 60.

    See Hammarskjöld 1958.

  61. 61.

    Bildt 2011.

  62. 62.

    United Nations undated-a, Background.

  63. 63.

    There is a range of constraints, including lacking financial and logistical support. See e.g. Press Release 2000; NYU Center on International Cooperation undated; and Langholtz 2010.

  64. 64.

    For an overview of the developments, see Fetherstone 1994.

  65. 65.

    Indeed, peacekeeping operations are but one means in the wider spectrum of the UN’s peace and security activities. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 2.

  66. 66.

    Annan 2017.

  67. 67.

    For an assessment of the uncertainty with respect to the use of force to protect civilians with a particular view of missions’ rules of engagement, see Blocq 2006.

  68. 68.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-f. See also United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003.

  69. 69.

    Hatto 2013 charts the developments and considers the challenges.

  70. 70.

    Aoi et al. 2007, p. 4.

  71. 71.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 16.

  72. 72.

    Useful and instructive guidance is provided in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008.

  73. 73.

    Although, arguably, many if not all peace operations mandates have failed in effectively tackling, managing and eradicating the root causes owing to complex scenarios on the ground. For more detailed analyses see e.g. Woodward 2007, Annan 2014, and United Nations Meetings Coverage 2017.

  74. 74.

    Aoi et al. 2007, p. 5.

  75. 75.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 31.

  76. 76.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-c. For a more detailed outline of each principle, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3. See also Clemons 19931994. Clemons charts the historical developments of peacekeeping principles.

  77. 77.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, p. 31.

  78. 78.

    For further details, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, pp. 31–33. For a more detailed consideration and discussion of the issues surrounding host-State consent see Sebastián and Gorur 2018.

  79. 79.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, p. 33.

  80. 80.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, p. 33.

  81. 81.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, p. 33. For further details, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, pp. 33–34. For a more detailed consideration and discussion of the issues surrounding impartiality, see Rhoads 2016.

  82. 82.

    See text to n. 63 above.

  83. 83.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, p. 34. For further details, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, pp. 34–35. For a more detailed consideration and discussion of the issues surrounding the non-use of force, see Berdal 2019.

  84. 84.

    For further details, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, Chapter 3, pp. 36–40. See de Coning and Peter 2019.

  85. 85.

    For extensive analyses of the underlying principles and theories, see Ryan 2000; Sitkowksi 2001.

  86. 86.

    Annan 2017.

  87. 87.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 14.

  88. 88.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-b.

  89. 89.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-b.

  90. 90.

    It is here that the General Assembly plays a key role in assessing the feasibility of a peacekeeping operation. See United Nations Peacekeeping undated-e.

  91. 91.

    Notably, in ‘its first 40 years, the Security Council authorized only 13 peacekeeping operations’. For an overview of how this tool became revitalised and acquired a new drive under then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, see Meisler 1995, p. 187.

  92. 92.

    Staffing, especially with regard to senior officials, is within the remit of the Secretary-General’s office. This is alongside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support.

  93. 93.

    Peacekeepers are only identifiable as such owing to the UN blue helmet or beret and a badge; as military personnel, they continue wearing their own countries’ uniform. See United Nations Peacekeeping undated-b.

  94. 94.

    This in itself has proven a major barrier to operations in the past owing to dwindling support and a failure to provide troops when needed. See Meisler 1995, p. 193. Also, as Hurd pointed out, the Security Council has ‘enormous formal powers’ yet has no direct control with which to enact them. Hurd 2002, p. 35.

  95. 95.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 14.

  96. 96.

    Increasingly, Security Council mandates also reflect the broader normative debates shaping the international environment and there are a number of landmark Security Council resolutions. See S/RES/1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; S/RES/1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict; or S/RES/1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 14.

  97. 97.

    Annan 2017.

  98. 98.

    Clemons 19931994, p. 120.

  99. 99.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 18.

  100. 100.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 20.

  101. 101.

    Although peace enforcement ‘may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.’ See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 19.

  102. 102.

    For a brief and useful overview of how peacekeeping developed and which phases can be discerned, see Goulding 1993.

  103. 103.

    Successive Secretaries-General advocated a more activist approach to conflict prevention, notable among these were An Agenda for Peace and In Larger Freedom. Kofi Annan, e.g., called for a ‘culture of prevention’ within the UN. Press Release 1999.

  104. 104.

    The peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention are closely related concepts. However, while the former concentrates on “damage limitation”, the latter seeks to go deeper by addressing both more immediate and the root causes of conflict. For an excellent overview, see Mani and Ponzio 2018.

  105. 105.

    Report of the Secretary-General 1992.

  106. 106.

    Report of the Secretary-Genera 1992, para 20.

  107. 107.

    Annan 2017.

  108. 108.

    Blocq 2006 further picks up the issue that there is ambiguity in the law guiding peacekeepers in their missions.

  109. 109.

    Annan 2017.

  110. 110.

    For a useful overview of the development of peacekeeping with regard to the use of force, see Sloan 2014

  111. 111.

    Pugh 2004, p. 39.

  112. 112.

    Clemons 19931994.

  113. 113.

    Annan 2017.

  114. 114.

    See S/RES/733 (23 January 1992).

  115. 115.

    Annan 2017.

  116. 116.

    For an overview that outlines the issues at the time, see Clemons 19931994, pp. 123–135.

  117. 117.

    Blocq 2006, p. 202.

  118. 118.

    Note from the Editor to Annan 2017.

  119. 119.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, pp. 49–51.

  120. 120.

    Annan 2017.

  121. 121.

    Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000.

  122. 122.

    Bildt 2011.

  123. 123.

    Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000, p 1.

  124. 124.

    Bildt 2011.

  125. 125.

    Bildt 2011.

  126. 126.

    Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda 2009.

  127. 127.

    Bildt 2011.

  128. 128.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-f.

  129. 129.

    Review teams, which are being led by independent experts, have been charged with questioning fundamental assumptions. Where required, they will aim for a “strategic reset” of operations in need of new direction. Haeri 2018.

  130. 130.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  131. 131.

    In terms of training needs, it is worthwhile looking at Blocq 2006.

  132. 132.

    Haeri 2018.

  133. 133.

    dos Santos Cruz 2017, Executive Summary.

  134. 134.

    Press Release 2018.

  135. 135.

    UN Secretary-General 2018. For a discussion on whether the High-Level Panel can deliver reform, see Whalan 2016.

  136. 136.

    See Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 2015.

  137. 137.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  138. 138.

    See Autesserre 2019.

  139. 139.

    See Haass and Ansorg 2018.

  140. 140.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  141. 141.

    See, e.g. Oswald 2016; Kihara-Hunt 2017.

  142. 142.

    United Nations undated-b.

  143. 143.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  144. 144.

    Williams 2018.

  145. 145.

    This also highlights a fundamental issue at the heart of such operations: they depend on the Security Council with that organ itself being dominated by five permanent members and attendant power struggles at a political level. For a fundamental assessment and critique of peace operations as part of a ‘global governance’ that ‘is not neutral but serves the purpose of an existing order’ and therefore can be seen as a form of ‘riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace’, see Pugh 2004, p. 41.

  146. 146.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 47.

  147. 147.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 37.

  148. 148.

    Haeri 2018.

  149. 149.

    United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 37.

  150. 150.

    Williams 2018.

  151. 151.

    Williams 2018.

  152. 152.

    Haeri 2018.

  153. 153.

    Annan 2017.

  154. 154.

    See above Sect. 9.3.2.

  155. 155.

    Annan 2017.

  156. 156.

    Annan 2017.

  157. 157.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-d.

  158. 158.

    UN Secretary-General 2018, and dos Santos Cruz 2017

  159. 159.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-a.

  160. 160.

    Press Release 2018. For the launching speech, see UN Secretary-General 2018.

  161. 161.

    dos Santos Cruz 2017, p. 10.

  162. 162.

    Williams 2018.

  163. 163.

    Haeri 2018.

  164. 164.

    Annan 2017.

  165. 165.

    Annan 2017.

  166. 166.

    Haeri 2018.

  167. 167.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  168. 168.

    Haeri 2018.

  169. 169.

    United Nations Peacekeeping undated-a.

  170. 170.

    The Secretary-General called for an end to ‘mandates that look like Christmas trees’ in UN Secretary-General 2018.

  171. 171.

    Particularly pertinent as peacekeeping as we know it has no capital fund, no reserve of equipment, and no reserve force. Annan 2017.

  172. 172.

    Member states call for lower budgets while the world expects greater results to prevent violence and atrocities. See Haeri 2018.

  173. 173.

    UN Secretary-General 2018.

  174. 174.

    For a detailed analysis of the issue non-State actors represent in classic international law, see Noortmann et al. 2015.

  175. 175.

    See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

  176. 176.

    See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

  177. 177.

    But then, neither had it catered for the process of decolonisation that started only a few years after the organisation’s creation. Originally, most members of today fell within the remit of the Trusteeship Council.

  178. 178.

    As was acknowledged in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports (1962) 151.

  179. 179.

    Haeri 2018.

  180. 180.

    Annan 2017.

  181. 181.

    Bildt 2011.

  182. 182.

    Haeri 2018.

  183. 183.

    Annan 2017.

  184. 184.

    Haeri 2018.

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Hassler, S. (2022). Peace(keeping) Operations: Soldiers Without Enemies?. In: Sayapin, S., Atadjanov, R., Kadam, U., Kemp, G., Zambrana-Tévar, N., Quénivet, N. (eds) International Conflict and Security Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_9

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