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Planting the Seeds of Market Power: Digital Agriculture, Farmers’ Autonomy, and the Role of Competition Policy

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Regulating New Technologies in Uncertain Times

Part of the book series: Information Technology and Law Series ((ITLS,volume 32))

Abstract

Digital technologies are expected to radically transform agriculture, especially as the use of collected data could influence farmers’ decision-making and facilitate precision farming. In the face of major food security challenges, production-enhancing and resource-efficient innovations in digital agriculture are generally considered beneficial. However, digital agriculture could also exacerbate existing power imbalances, dependencies and barriers to entry in the already highly concentrated agricultural inputs markets of seeds and agrochemicals, particularly since the few remaining conglomerate suppliers could misuse their market power and platforms for digital agriculture services could benefit from network effects. As data-driven digital agriculture grows rapidly as a valuable asset and an important input factor for agricultural production in the European Union, it is important to assess its role from a competition policy perspective. This chapter explains how some digital agriculture-related practices may lead to distortions of competition and deteriorations of farmers’ autonomy, but nonetheless do not necessarily violate EU competition rules. In response to these market power concerns, however, authorities may seek regulatory solutions beyond EU competition law. In that regard, (proposals for) laws on unfair trading practices, sector-specific legislation and self-regulatory mechanisms are worth exploring, not in the least on the basis of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

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  3. 3.

    Lamborelle and Fernández Álvarez 2016.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Ferris 2017; Sykuta 2016; Wolfert et al. 2017.

  5. 5.

    See Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (CMO Regulation) [2013] OJ L347/672.

  6. 6.

    For an overview, see Renda et al. 2014, pp. 385–389.

  7. 7.

    European Commission 2018a.

  8. 8.

    Van Es and Woodard 2017.

  9. 9.

    The Hale Group and LSC International 2014.

  10. 10.

    Poppe et al. 2015, p. 11.

  11. 11.

    Ferris 2017, p. 310; Magnin 2016.

  12. 12.

    Tzounis et al. 2017, p. 32.

  13. 13.

    Wolfert et al. 2017, p. 70; Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 5.

  14. 14.

    Russo 2013.

  15. 15.

    Khan 2013.

  16. 16.

    Coble et al. 2018, p. 80.

  17. 17.

    Dowell 2015 via Ferris 2017, p. 313.

  18. 18.

    Wolfert et al. 2014, pp. 267–268.

  19. 19.

    Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, pp. 5–6.

  20. 20.

    Keulemans 2015.

  21. 21.

    According to the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action, food security exists “when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

  22. 22.

    Gebbers and Adamchuk 2010; Perez 2002; Poppe et al. 2013; last two sources via EIP-AGRI Seminar 2016, p. 7.

  23. 23.

    Tzounis et al. 2017, p. 32.

  24. 24.

    Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 10.

  25. 25.

    Lamborelle and Fernández Álvarez 2016.

  26. 26.

    OECD 2017, p. 58; Schepp and Wambach 2016, p. 121.

  27. 27.

    Schumpeter 1942.

  28. 28.

    Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 8.

  29. 29.

    Carbonell 2016. Environmental protection could benefit from the increased transparency, as the technologies would gather information that may be used for research purposes. In that regard, one could, for example, think of research on the Bee Colony Collapse Disorder. Related to this, the European Commission adopted new rules in May 2018, which allow satellite data to be used as evidence when checking farmers’ fulfilment of requirements under the CAP for area-based payments as well as cross-compliance requirements. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/modernising-cap-satellite-data-authorised-replace-farm-checks-2018-may-25_en (accessed July 2018).

  30. 30.

    Ferris 2017, p. 317; American Farm Bureau Federation 2016, which refers to a US survey in which a majority of farmers (77%) actually expressed their concerns that data would be used for regulatory enforcement purposes.

  31. 31.

    European Commission 2017.

  32. 32.

    Lamborelle and Fernández Álvarez 2016. Visit EIP-AGRI’s website for more information: www.ec.europa.eu/eip/agriculture/en/focus-groups/mainstreaming-precision-farming (accessed July 2018).

  33. 33.

    Lamborelle and Fernández Álvarez 2016.

  34. 34.

    For an extensive discussion of EU agriculture law and the CAP, see McMahon and Cardwell 2015.

  35. 35.

    Johnson 2012.

  36. 36.

    For an elaborate overview of recent consolidation processes in the agricultural input industry, see IPES-Food 2017.

  37. 37.

    Kirchfeld A, Noel A and Winters P (2014) Monsanto Said to Have Weighed $40 Billion Syngenta Deal. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-23/monsanto-said-to-have-weighed-40-billion-syngenta-deal (accessed July 2018); Gillam C (2015) Monsanto drops pursuit of Swiss agribusiness rival Syngenta. www.reuters.com/article/us-syngenta-ag-m-a-monsanto/monsanto-drops-pursuit-of-swiss-agribusiness-rival-syngenta-idUSKCN0QV1SL20150826 (accessed July 2018).

  38. 38.

    In line with its case practice, the Commission assesses parallel transactions according to the so-called ‘priority rule’ (first come, first served): European Commission (2017) Dow/DuPont (Case M.7932) [no final non-confidential version published yet]. www.ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf; European Commission (2017) ChemChina/Syngenta (Case M.7962) [no final non-confidential version published yet]. www.ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7962_4097_3.pdf (accessed July 2018); European Commission (2018a, b, c) Bayer/Monsanto (Case M.8084) [no non-confidential version published yet]. In May 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the acquisition as well. Similar to commitments made in the European Commission’s merger review, Bayer made commitments to divest some assets to secure approval from the antitrust authority. See U.S. V. Bayer AG and Monsanto Company (2018) U.S. V. Bayer AG and Monsanto Company, Case 1:18-cv-0124. www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-bayer-ag-and-monsanto-company (accessed July 2018).

  39. 39.

    In contrast, most players from the crop protection industry, on the other hand, felt more able to predict the future and stated that “precision agriculture will play a major role in the [European Economic Area] in the next five to 10 years.” See European Commission (2017) Dow/DuPont (Case M.7932) [no final non-confidential version published yet]. www.ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf (accessed July 2018), para 246.

  40. 40.

    Original text: “Die Digitalisierung verändert auch die Landwirtschaft radikal. Man kann für jeden Quadratmeter genau ermitteln, was die ideal dosierte Saat oder Pestizidmenge ist. Das ist faszinierend. Gerade deshalb müssen wir aufpassen, dass durch die Fusion der Wettbewerb beim Digital Farming und bei der Forschung hierzu nicht eingeschränkt wird.” Höning A and Beermann M (2018) “Wir wollen Fusionen nicht verhindern”. www.rp-online.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/margrethe-vestager-wir-wollen-fusionen-nicht-verhindern_aid-20606393 (accessed July 2018); translation from Taylor E (2018) EU says Bayer Monsanto must not hurt competition in digital farming. www.reuters.com/article/us-monsanto-m-a-bayer-eu/eu-says-bayer-monsanto-must-not-hurt-competition-in-digital-farming-paper-idUSKBN1FU0IJ (accessed July 2018).

  41. 41.

    European Commission—DG COMP (2018) Mergers: Commission clears Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto, subject to conditions. Press Release IP/18/2282. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2282_en.htm (accessed July 2018).

  42. 42.

    Porter 1979.

  43. 43.

    DG COMP (2017) Mergers: Commission opens in-depth investigation into proposed acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer. Press Release IP/17/2762. www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2762_en.htm (accessed July 2018); Bayer/Monsanto (Case M.8084), Initiation of proceedings, OJ 2017/C 286/01.

  44. 44.

    DG COMP (2018) Mergers: Commission clears Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto, subject to conditions. Press Release IP/18/2282. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2282_en.htm (accessed July 2018); European Commission (2018a, b, c) Bayer/Monsanto (Case M.8084) [no non-confidential version published yet].

  45. 45.

    Vance A (2013) Monsanto’s Billion-Dollar Bet Brings Big Data to the Farm. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-02/monsanto-buys-climate-corporation-for-930-million-bringing-big-data-to-the-farm (accessed July 2018); press release Monsanto (2013) Monsanto to Acquire The Climate Corporation, Combination to Provide Farmers with Broad Suite of Tools Offering Greater On-Farm Insights. www.monsanto.com/news-releases/monsanto-to-acquire-the-climate-corporation-combination-to-provide-farmers-with-broad-suite-of-tools-offering-greater-on-farm-insights/ (accessed July 2018).

  46. 46.

    Press release Monsanto (2013) Monsanto Completes Acquisition of The Climate Corporation. www.monsanto.com/news-releases/monsanto-completes-acquisition-of-the-climate-corporation/ (accessed July 2018).

  47. 47.

    Press release Monsanto (2016) The Climate Corporation Acquires VitalFields to Expand Digital Agriculture Innovation for European Farmers. www.monsanto.com/news-releases/the-climate-corporation-acquires-vitalfields-to-expand-digital-agriculture-innovation-for-european-farmers/ (accessed July 2018).

  48. 48.

    Accenture 2017.

  49. 49.

    Visit Monsanto’s website for more information: www.monsanto.com/company/monsanto-growth-ventures/ (accessed July 2018).

  50. 50.

    Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 10.

  51. 51.

    Gillam C (2013) DuPont, with Deere & Co, to roll out precision farming program. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-farming-data/dupont-with-deere-co-to-roll-out-precision-farming-program-idUSBRE9A709920131108 (accessed July 2018); Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 18: “BASF and Monsanto have collaborated since 2007 on R&D partnerships worth $2.5 billion in breeding, biotech, pesticides, ag microbials, ag biologicals, and precision agriculture.

  52. 52.

    For example, Monsanto has publicly expressed its desire to build a “centralized and open data platform”. See Burwood-Taylor L (2016) What do Monsanto’s Plans to Open Up its Digital Platform Mean for the Agriculture Industry? www.agfundernews.com/what-do-monsanto-plans-to-open-up-its-digital-platform-mean-for-the-agriculture-industry.html (accessed July 2018).

  53. 53.

    European Commission 2018b.

  54. 54.

    Olson et al. 2010, p. 10.

  55. 55.

    ETC Group 2015; Lianos and Katalevsky 2017, p. 19; IPES-Food 2017; Wesseler et al. 2015. Other agricultural input markets with high concentration levels are fertilisers, animal pharmaceuticals, and farming equipment.

  56. 56.

    Wesseler et al. 2015, pp. 75–76.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., 20 (see figure 6).

  58. 58.

    European Commission (2017) Dow/DuPont (Case M.7932) [no final non-confidential version published yet]. www.ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf (accessed July 2018); European Commission (2017) ChemChina/Syngenta (Case M.7962) [no final non-confidential version published yet]. www.ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7962_4097_3.pdf (accessed July 2018); European Commission (2018a, b, c) Bayer/Monsanto (Case M.8084) [no non-confidential version published yet].

  59. 59.

    Kritikos 2017, p. 39.

  60. 60.

    Khan 2013: ““If you inadvertently teach Monsanto what it is that makes you a better farmer than your neighbor, it can sell that information to your neighbor,” said John McGuire, an agriculture technology consultant who runs Simplified Technology Services and developed geospatial tools for Monsanto in the late-1990s. And if the corporation gathers enough information, “it opens the door for Monsanto to say, ‘We know how to farm in your area better than you do,’” he said.

  61. 61.

    Kritikos 2017, p. 39.

  62. 62.

    This is especially relevant as agricultural data as can constitute a hybrid of business, personal and intellectual property (trade secrets). Different regulatory frameworks apply to the different categories of data. Particularly, in the area of personal data recent developments can have far-reaching consequences—see, for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). See also Sykuta 2016, p. 57.

  63. 63.

    Kritikos 2017, p. 40. See also DG Agriculture and Rural Development (2013) How many people work in agriculture in the European Union? www.ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/rural-area-economics/briefs/pdf/08_en.pdf (accessed July 2018).

  64. 64.

    Examples are taken from the Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.

  65. 65.

    European Commission 2013.

  66. 66.

    On competition and algorithms in general, see OECD 2017.

  67. 67.

    Noyes K (2014) Cropping up on every farm: Big data technology. www.fortune.com/2014/05/30/cropping-up-on-every-farm-big-data-technology/ (accessed July 2018); Kritikos 2017, pp. 15–16. John Deere has stated on its website (see www.deere.com/privacy_and_data/policies_statements/en_US/data_principles/frequently_asked_questions.page?) that it “will NOT use internally or share anonymized data to external parties who John Deere believes intend to use it to influence markets, provide an advantage to commodity traders or support supply hedging by food companies.

  68. 68.

    NGOs like Friends of the Earth even dubbed the acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer the ‘Merger from Hell’: www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/agriculture/2017/foee-ceo-baysanto-190517.pdf (accessed July 2018); www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/baysanto-the-campaign-against-the-merger-from-hell (accessed July 2018).

  69. 69.

    Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (EU Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1.

  70. 70.

    The third main pillar of EU competition policy, state aid control, is excluded from the scope of this chapter.

  71. 71.

    Perhaps needless to say, the fact that farmers do not support or do not intend for anticompetitive effects to take place is of no relevance for the applicability of the cartel prohibition.

  72. 72.

    Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01), para 6 and 100; Bishop and Walker 2010, p. 191.

  73. 73.

    Bishop and Walker 2010, p. 195.

  74. 74.

    Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation), L 102/1, Article 3.

  75. 75.

    Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission (1978) ECR 207, para 65.

  76. 76.

    This is illustrated by the Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (emphasis added).

  77. 77.

    Bakhoum 2018.

  78. 78.

    European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment 2018, p. 16.

  79. 79.

    Falkowski et al. 2017, p. 23.

  80. 80.

    Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions.

  81. 81.

    Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising.

  82. 82.

    Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom. See European Commission Staff Working Document 2018, p. 14.

  83. 83.

    Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden.

  84. 84.

    Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands.

  85. 85.

    See European Commission Staff Working Document 2018, p. 151.

  86. 86.

    Recital 8 of Regulation 1/2003 states: “Member States should not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national competition laws which prohibit or impose sanctions on unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. These stricter national laws may include provisions which prohibit or impose sanctions on abusive behaviour toward economically dependent undertakings.” For example, Germany’s §20(2) of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen and France’s Art L420(2), 2nd para of the Code de Commerce.

  87. 87.

    European Commission Staff Working Document 2018, pp. 150–155.

  88. 88.

    Supply Chain Initiative (2018) Five years of Supply Chain Initiative and future prospects. www.supplychaininitiative.eu/news/press-release-five-years-supply-chain-initiative-and-future-prospects (accessed July 2018).

  89. 89.

    European Commission 2018a, pp. 2–3.

  90. 90.

    See www.agdatatransparent.com/the-privacy-and-security-principles-for-farm-data/ (accessed July 2018).

  91. 91.

    See www.agdatatransparent.com/principles/ (accessed July 2018).

  92. 92.

    Hettinger J (2018) Few Big Ag companies have yet to follow through on data transparency pledge. www.newfoodeconomy.org/big-ag-follow-through-farm-bureau-data-transparency-pledge/ (accessed July 2018): “Among those who have yet to do so are some of the industry’s biggest players – Monsanto, Dow DuPont, John Deere and CNH Industrial, the equipment manufacturing company that makes both the Case IH and New Holland brands of combines, tractors and other equipment.” Also Ferris 2017 (p. 310) questioned the effectiveness of the principles, noting that “these are simply voluntary standards which do not hold the force of law.

  93. 93.

    European Commission 2018c.

  94. 94.

    European Commission 2018a. The proposed directive is the result of a long process, in which the Commission involved stakeholders and academia. Already in 2010, it set up a High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, which helped to launch a voluntary code of conduct, the SCI’s Principles of Good Practice, in 2013. Other subsequent initiatives included the establishment of the Agricultural Markets Task Force in 2016, and the launch of an inception impact assessment and a public consultation on the improvement of the food supply chain in 2017. The Commission’s co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council, have also not been silent on the matter of UTPs. Both institutions called on the Commission—through a resolution (2015/2065(INI)) and conclusions (press release 769/16), resp.—to submit a proposal.

  95. 95.

    European Commission 2018a, Article 1(2).

  96. 96.

    European Commission 2018b.

  97. 97.

    European Commission 2018b, Article 1(2).

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Verdonk, T. (2019). Planting the Seeds of Market Power: Digital Agriculture, Farmers’ Autonomy, and the Role of Competition Policy. In: Reins, L. (eds) Regulating New Technologies in Uncertain Times. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 32. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-279-8_7

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