The Logic of Existence

Abstract

In recent philosophical discussion regarding the nature of the concept of existence and the logical theory of cognate concepts, the tendency has been to view these problems in their Kantian setting, by focussing upon the question ‘Is “exists” a predicate?’ and the bearing which these considerations have upon the validity of the ontological argument.¹ Now it is, to be sure, inevitable that the logical theory of existence must in the last analysis rest upon ontological and not purely logical considerations. As Russell has said, ‘Pure logic has no occasion for names, since its propositions contain only variables. However, the logician may wonder in his unprofessional moments, what constants could be substituted for his variables.’² But it is clearly anomalous to hinge the entire theory of existence primarily or largely upon only one of its ontological implications. And this is especially inadmissable when it happens to be what is, after all, the most remote, abstruse, and metaphysical of the problems here involved. Furthermore, a denial that ‘exists’ is a predicate, if stemming solely from repugnance to the ontological argument and desire for its overthrow, would be highly captious, and would be as wholly indefensible as any other purely ad hoc determination made solely for the purpose of evading an unwanted consequence. It is necessary to find other reasons, wholly independent of the ontological argument, upon which a denial that ‘exists’ is a predicate can reasonably be based. However crucial the question whether ‘exists’ is or is not a predicate may be for the validity of the ontological proof, there is surely no justifiable course but to base this decision, in the final analysis, upon other grounds. Pivoting the logical theory of existence about the ontological argument is to put the cart before the horse; they go together, it is true, but not in that order.