Abstract
In this chapter, we will first study an equivalence theorem for the bargaining set for economies with a continuum of agents. Then, we will analyse the concept of bargaining set for finite games.
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References
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Vohra, R. (1994). Bargaining Sets. In: Mertens, JF., Sorin, S. (eds) Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. NATO ASI Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4442-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1656-7
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