Abstract
Probably as interesting as Castellani’s polemic against scepticism — and, apparently, of as little influence — was Joannes Rosa’s commentary on the Academica, printed for the first and only time at Frankfurt in 1571.1 Here we have a substantial commentary on Cicero’s work and one which is of both philological and philosophical interest. Unlike most earlier commentaries, this attempt is substantial in length and has numerous extended discussions of especially interesting texts. The commentary, along with the introductory material, runs to about two-hundred pages or 40,000 words, viz. a length about twice that of the Academica itself. This far outstrips both in size and in philosophical interest any commentary which preceded it, all of which, as we have observed, are almost exclusively philological in orientation. In a sense, along with the treatises of Talon and Castellani, it points the way towards the serious philosophical concern with Academic scepticism, which will be exhibited by numerous thinkers in the next decades.
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References
For the full title and further details see the Bibliography. Rosa’s work seems to have escaped the notice of most later students of Renaissance thought, scepticism, and Cicero. Indeed, the book itself seems to be quite rare, no copy being listed in the printed catalogues of the British Museum or the Bibliothèque Nationale. In this study I have utilized a microfilm of the Bodleian copy (shelf mark: 80 A 124 ART). As far as I have been able to determine, the only one to mention Rosa’s commentary in relation to Cicero has been Fabricius (1773–74) I, 180. For literature on Rosa himself see the following note. I shall refer to his book in this section by folio number.
Zeumer, 28–30. See also Jöcher (1750–51) III, 2218; Zedler (1732–50) XXXII, 807–08; Steinmetz (1958) I, 41, 48; II, 460, 804.
Among his other works are Oratio de vitachwr(133) Erharti Schnepfiichwr(133) (Leipzig, 1562); Oratio de vita aeterna (Jena, 1572); Regni Pontifici Euvo4A.q. Excerpta ex lectionibus ethicischwr(133) (Erfurt, 1578); Orationes duae (Erfurt, 1586). Some poems were published in Arthur Johnston, Delitiae poetarum Scotorumchwr(133) (Amsterdam, 1637). For further information see the literature cited in the preceding note.
v-27v. On 24v we read: `Notabunt autem studiosi diligenter significata quarundam vocum, quae in hoc libro et alibi quoque occurrunt: ut sunt: visum, xaticiAr14iç, é7rox~, ópt4, auyxocr&Ora ç, probabile.’ KpL-rilpcov is, of course, another word often referred to, e.g. 92r.
E.g. 38r where xa’raaijn’roi5 and xaTana(1ßâvcO0o are given as equivalents for perceptis and percipi in successive lines of commentary. Cf. Acad. II, 11, 34 (Reid ed. 219, lines r1 and 13).
E.g. 141, 25r, 26r, 26°, 27r,30°, 31r, 33°, 37°, 531, 58°, 59r, 66v, 78r, 80v, 83r, 83v, 1o1v, 103V, 1o6r, 106v. Many of these, of course, refer to the Life of Pyrrho, the most important Greek source of ancient scepticism after Sextus Empiricus. On this see especially fol. 97r, where he says: ‘Iota haec disputatio (qui cognata sunt, quae apud Laertium in vita Pyrrhonis extant)chwr(133)’
There is no trace whatever of Sextus in Rosa’s commentary as far as I have been able to determine and his name is never mentioned.
E.g. Busson (1957), 3o, who says: ‘Lucrèce a l’athéisme si agressif qu’il devait être suspect entre tous.’ Cf. Randall (1961), 85.
For Valla and Ficino see the references cited by Kristeller (1964), 1711114. For Castellani see above pp. 129, 132. For further evidence of Lucretius’ influence see Schmitt (1967c), 399 and note 19. A general survey of Lucretius influence up to 1600 (with much further bibliography) is to be found in the article by W. B. Fleischmann in Catalogue translationum et commentariorum II (1971), pp. 349-65.
Inserti sunt interdum huic commentario numeri indicantes paginas, ubi quaerenda sint quae ex Cicerone adducuntur, eos de Argentoratensi editione, cuius exemplaria fere in omnium adolescentum manibus circumferentur, accipies.’ fol. Ayr. It is not clear precisely which edition Rosa is here referring to. Though there are various Strasbourg editions of Cicero, the one which would seem most likely to be meant here is Cicero (1569), edited by J. Sturm. This edition of the philosophical works is in a rather inexpensive format and one which it would seem appropriate for students to have. There is a copy of this rare edition in the Christie Collection of Manchester University.
Cumque iam manu admota operi accepissem Ciceronis opus a Dionysio Lambino editum, non vano titulo superbum, sed, ut ex collatione deprehendi, emendatum ab infinitis mendis et restitutum lectioni veteri, gratulatus sum mihi et omnibus literarum studiosis mirum in modum, quod is laborem a doctissimis viris magna cum laude inchoatum tam feliciter in tantum superasset.’ Fol. ASv. It is not clear which edition of the works of Cicero is meant here. Lambin’s basic edition of the works of Cicero was that of Paris 1565–66 (see Sandys (1903–08) II, Igo). There is also, however, an edition of the philosophical works, printing Lambin’s text, at Strasbourg in 1571. It is possible that he means this edition both here and in the text cited in the previous note. This seems unlikely, however, seeing that this edition was printed the same year as Rosa’s own book.
E.g. 25“, 46°. At the former, we read: ‘Errokh est suspensio assensus. Augustinus, ut paullo ante vidimus, refrenationem vocat, cum scilicet qui cognovit, non continuo rei cognitae assentitur, etiamsi iudicat earn esse probabilem, sed assensum sustinet, etrrdXeiv Cicero vertit assensum sustinere, an sich halten, nit bald zublatzen, et negat per verbum inhibere, quo initio putarit vocabulum in6zer.v posse reddi, satis apte exprimi nativum graeci verbi significatumchwr(133)’ This practice seems to have been fairly common in the sixteenth century. For examples in Zabarella see Schmitt (1969), 1 oon49.
Ad vocem hanc [i.e. perceptum] attendas, rursus studiose Lector mono, saepissime enim in his pagellis repetetur.’ 36r-36v. Again, to the text Percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent [Acad. II, 9, 29; Reid ed. z1o, lines 10–11] he says: ‘Iterum lectorem mono, ut et hic et deinceps de usu harum vocum, quem in his disputationibus habent, quae supra dicta sunt, meminerit. Nam saepius idem ad taedium usque inculcare, non est animus.’ 37f.
E.g. on 15r (in the introductory section) he says: ‘Quid tarnen de Academica rroX in omnibus sustinente assensum iudicandum sit, in fine Luculli monebo.’
E.g. 62v-63v, 66r-69r, 72r_73r, 75r-76r and esp. 39v-44r, where more than eight pages are devoted to discussing the text Nunc ea videamus [Acad. II, 13, 4o; Reid ed. 225].
Omnis autem instituti mei ratio in hoc est: quod cupio hac inchoata saltem opera excitare discentium studia ad accuratiorem lectionem eorum librorum Ciceronis, quos expertus sum, et a me adolescente ideo olim habitos esse, et hodie a plurimis haberi negligentius, quia vulgo sic persuasum est, et plus in illis otiosae subtilitatis quam utilis sapientiae contineri, et eas res de quibus agant, tanta obscuritate esse circumfusas, ut impossibile sit legenti quid ubique Autor velit, elicere.’ Fol. Aar (the prefatory letter). In the following letter to the reader, Rosa says: `Oro autem amanter, ut in interpretando meo qualicunque labore te aequum iudicem praebeas, nec me ulla alia causa quam studio iuvandi iuniores, quibus libenter in pluribus, si vires meae ferrent, inservirem, ad eum perductum esse certo statuas.’ Fol. Ayr.
See our discussion above in Chapter IV, pp. 81–91.
Castellani knew Pico’s work and through it some of the most important arguments of Sextus Empiricus. See above Chapter V.
See our discussion above in Chapter III, pp. 59–62.
’Finita disputatione, quae fuit Ciceroni cum Lucullo, ne relinquantur animi legentium in dubio et vel autoritate [!] vel rationibus Ciceronis fascinati Academicae ircoyp implicentur, sed sciant quid de iis, quae a Cicerone contra certitudinem visorum sunt allata, statuendum sit, breviter consignabimus nuda capita (nam plenius singula explicaturis peculiare et bene prolixum opus foret instituendum, quae opponi possunt Academicis his praestigiis et studiosis stylum exercentibus subministrare materiam, in qua contra Ciceronis opinionem per iustam orationis formam evolvenda ipsi se exerceant.’ Rosa (1571), 87V.
’Haec utinam multi, praesertim iuvenes, qui facillime levi gustu doctrinarum et ingenio confisi in maximam arrogantiae et fastus vanitatem attolluntur, et se claves totius arcis sapientiae in sua potestate habere putant (nam in maturiore aetate usu rerum nonnihil domita atque de humana infirmitate edocta remittunt multum ista <ppu&maTa et tumor desidet) non obiter, sed attente et saepe apud animum volverent et revolverent.’ Ibid., 89v-90r.
Picus (1601), 654 [Examen vanitatis III, 141. Cf. Schmitt (1967a), 53.
’Quae autem potest esse maior fatuitas, quam cum quis imaginatione eximae doctrinae in tantum superbiens, ut omnes alii ipsi sordeant, solus sapere, alios ut umbras oberrare, ipse solus in gremio Palladis sibi sedere videatur, caecitatem tarnen summam prodat, ignoratione et neglectione earum virtutum, quae cum solidiore eruditione universaliter sunt coniunctae, et testetur, quod ne quidem per transennam adhuc cogitationem aliquam de humana infirmitate susceperit?’ Rosa (1571), 9or-9ov.
’Quod autem Academici hinc intulerunt hyperbolen et concluserunt in universum nihil sciri, sed omnem noticiam esse incertam, horrendum est mendacium.’ Ibid.,goy’.
’Etsienim quaeruntur variae praestigiae ad eludendamcertitudinem’rwvxpv-rr)pk v, tarnen res ipsa omnes sanos convincit, nequaquam fallere experientiam, quae fit per sensus integros et non impeditos, et observationes ex ea sumtas esse verissimas.’ Ibid.,90v.
Ibid., 90v; cf. Diogenes Laertius (1925) II, 266–67 [Book VII, chapter 2, section 163].
’Non inficias imus, alicubi sensus hallucinari, sed ut recte dicit Plutarchus est ingens discrimen inter 6pâv et rrapopâv, inter ipsum videre et perperam videre.’ Ibid.,9ov-91r. See also his third argument against Cicero (fol. 94r), which we shall discuss below.
’Deinde nulla ratione everti potest certitudo principiorum practicorum et speculabilium, quae sunt scintillae nobiscum natae (non enim nos omnem eorum noticiam ex solis sensibus deducimus) et ipso usu, solertia, institutione, meditatione, exercitatione illustrantur et confirmantur; et quae non lucent in unius atque alterius hominis aut unius aetatis, sed in omnium hominum animis.’ Ibid.,91r.
E.g. Diogenes Laertius (1925) II, 494–95 [’Life of Pyrrho’, Book IX, chap. 1t, sect. 82] or Sextus Empiricus (1933–49) I, 62–63 [Outlines of Pyrrizonism I, chap. 14, sects. 105–06], which has a more detailed treatment.
’Non ignoro assensum principiorum practicorum varie oppugnari et fieri interdum, ut hommnes furiosi et is6vETo6, illa principia vivendi petulantia ita abruant, et illis plane nihil moveantur, sed etiamsi ipsorum mens, dum est inebriata continuatione flagitiorum, quodammodo stupet, non tarnen propterea sic penitus deletur eorum omnis noticia ex animo, ut plane evanescat.’ Rosa (1591), 91r. There still seems to be an echo here of the polemic against the Fourth Sceptic Trope. See the texts cited in the previous note.
Norma seems to be derived from Cicero’s use (Acad. I,ix, 42; frag. 8 apud Reid, 162), which is a translation of the Greek yvwli.wv or xavc’ov. See Reid’s note in Cicero (1885), 155. Rosa uses the word several times, e.g. 38v (norman certitudinis); 9x1 (probabilitatis normam); 92r (unicam et certissimam fidei nostrae normam); 96v(veritatis normam).
’Certissimum etiam est, cum Deus in homine relinquat facultatem per ratiocinationem aliud ex almo colligendi, ea quae bona consequentia ex propositionibus vel natura notis vel per experientiam confirmatis extruuntur, firma et immota esse, ut testatur tota doctrina demonstrationum et quaecunque in artibus et scientiis ex principiis et experientia bona consequentia sunt extructa.’ Rosa (1571), 91v. Cf. 94r-96r for a further defense of the validity of dialectic.
There is, of course, an enormous literature on this. For a useful summary and a guide to further literature see S. Vanni Rovighi (1969).
Schmitt (1963). Here the similarities between Pico and Rosa are quite striking, though the conclusions they draw from the matter are radically different. Pico, starting from the premise that the sceptic arguments are valid and that the senses cannot provide us with trustworthy knowledge, defends the notion that divine intervention makes legitimate knowledge possible to man. Rosa seems to begin with the premise that by divine intervention certain standards of truth have been given man and, once this is established, the criticisms raised by the sceptics no longer remain serious obstacles to the attainment of true knowledge. Though representing nearly opposite poles regarding their judgements of the value of scepticism for the sixteenth century Christian, Pico and Rosa exhibit very similar attitudes on this point. They differ, it seems, on what is to be the starting point of the analysis. Is it the fallibility of man’s senses (Pico) or is it the fact that God has given man a standard whereby knowledge can be judged as valid or invalid (Rosa)? Once they assume their respective starting points, each argues to a conclusion, which in each case happens to be the starting point of the other. The result is that one sees scepticism as absolutely essential for the Christian, whereas the other sees it as wholly incompatible with Christianity.
`Non igitur patiamur nobis certitudinem ‘râ>v xpr-rrIpkiv ulla ratione eludi et Deo gratias agamus, quod tarnen reliquit aliquam in vita communi veri et falsi regulam, ut aliquod esse posset de rebus iudicium firmum, constans et stabile, nec omnia opinionum fluctibus agitarentur; et grati fruamur iis, quae in vita per experientiam et diuturnam observationem inventa sunt, aut erudite ex principiis per demonstrationes extructa.’ Rosa (1571), 91v-92r.
See, for example, Henry of Gent’s Summa, a. 1, q. 2–3 (in Henricus a Gandavo (1953), fols. IIIv—XIr) and the criticism of this by Duns Scotus in Opus Oxoniense ord. I, dis. 3, pars I, q. 4 (in Joannes Duns Scotus (1950f.) III, 123–72). References to further literature will be found in the article cited above in note 5o and in Schmitt (1963).
Also interesting is his defense of geometry (fol. 191v), which, because of its preeminent place as a discipline par excellence by which truth can be derived, seems always to have been a battleground for discussions between sceptical and anti-sceptical writers. See, inter alla, the IIpòs yeoN./.6–7paq in Sextus Empiricus (1933–49) IV 244–303 or Marin Mersenne’s La venite’ des sciences (1625), a large section of which (esp. Book IV, pp. 7171008) is a defense of geometry against the sceptical attack.
See esp. Acad. II, 105–11 (Reid ed., 300–07).
’Cum his fundamentis certitudinis coniungantur postea tetrae absurditates, quae ex eorum eversione emergunt. Nulla prorsus doctrina habebit, in quo vel leviter sua sententia fundata consistat. Eodem modo iacebunt omnia, quae diuturna observatio, multiplex usus et vitae necessitas probarunt humanae vitae esse salutaria vel perniciosa, incertus erit medicus de viribus herbarum et aliarum rerum, quarum in medicamentis usus est, incertus agricola de natura soli et laborum temporibus.’ Rosa (1571), 92r• Also interesting is 910, where predictions of eclipses (versas esse eclipsium praedictiones) are taken to indicate that a valid science is possible.
’Scepticismus universalis, ut factum internum, est physice impossibilis; ut doctrina, sibiipsi contradicit, seu metaphysice repugnat.’ Hickey (1915–16) I, 185.
`Ita sequetur necessario ruina legum, iudiciorum, omnis honestatis in moribus, ut mirum sit, vel una ratione Ciceronem ab applausu, quem dedit Academicis, non fuisse revocatum.’ Rosa (1571), 92’.
`Cum autem de sensibus et principiis dicitur, recte hoc obijcitur Academicis, unde sumant probabilitatis normam, si plane nullam habeant ullius veritatis in mente noticiam? Ibi haeret Cicero, quid enim ad hanc obiectionem respondit? Ita dum probabilitatem admittunt, tacite, nolint, velint, agnoscunt veritatem sensuum et lucentem in mentibus aliquam veri notionem.’ Ibid., 91r-91v.
I, 3; ro94brif. It should also be remembered that a whole work of Aristotle’s, the Topica, is devoted to those modes of reasoning which fall short of the conditions of ‘scientific demonstration.’ If one considers the matter, he discovers that in the final analysis the realm of ‘scientific demonstration’ is a relatively limited one for Aristotle, though this aspect of his logical argumentation has been very much emphasized by later interpreters Similarly, the Platonic dialogues clearly show that in very few cases did Plato give a dogmatic and definitive answer to the problems raised. Rather, both Plato and Aristotle were somewhat more hesitant to issue dogmatic statements than most of their Renaissance interpreters and systematizers would lead us to believe.
Used e.g. by Castellani (1558), 121, who also quotes Lucretius, De rerum natura IV, 473–77 See above, p. 123.
’Primum quaero, unde sit ista probabilitas aestimanda, si nihil prorsus erit veri?’ Rosa (1571), 92“. Probabile and verisimile are equivalent terms in the Academica as can be seen at II, 10, 32 (Reid ed., 216, line 9). See also Reid’s note to this text.
’Deinde si tantum probabilia sunt, quae in his rebus statuuntur, facile per alia probabilia tolli poterunt. Cumque vita virtuti contraria videatur hominis depravatae naturae maxime probabilis, et multa plausibiliter contra iusticiam et alias virtutes possint excogitari, quam diu memor disciplinae homo nihil firmiter statuere audens manebit?’ Ibid., 920.
`At speciosa sunt quae Cicero de argumento, quod sapiens non opinetur et propterea non etiam debeat assentiri, praeterea de authoritate philosophorum deplotantium humanam inscitiam, de incertitudine sensuum, de similibus quae alicui imponant, de tenuitate dialectices in iudicanda veritate, de philosophorum dissidiis Lucullo opposuit.’ Rosa (1571), 93r. The refutation of these six points is on fols. 93r_971
’At tertium, quod est de incertitudine sensuum, dico. Est argumentum a dicto secundum quid ad dictam simpliciter. Alicubi sensus fallunt, ergo semper fallunt, ubi autem et quando fallant supra est ostensum, et quod Cicero quaedam affert de nimis brevi spacio, ad quod se acies oculorum humanorum extendit, respondeo: aliud est loqui de sensuum qualitate magna aut parva, et aliud de illorum certitudine.’ Ibid.,94r. I have not been able to identify the argument referred to by Rosa’s `et quod Cicerochwr(133) extendit’ in the text of the Academica.
Ibid. I have been unable to identify the source of this statement. Its clarity and directness sound classical and quite different from Rosa’s murky style.
’Et tarnen in his opinionum ventis non necesse est, etiamsi infinitae sint opinionum varietates, veritatem nullam esse. Sed quaecunque congruunt ad veritatis immota xpaTiJpta, ea manent vera, etiamsi sexcentae sententiae ab illis discrepent, et quae ex illis probantur ea merito omnibus omnium autoritatibus L!] anteferuntur.’ Ibid.
’Quantae fuerunt semper religionum confusiones in mundo omnibus temporibus? An propterea ne ea quidem, quam vos Verbum Dei pie sequentes amplectimur, erit certa? An quia Anaxagoras ausus fuit contendere nivem esse nigram, de eius albedine dubitabimus? Aut cum ipso filio Dei in Palaestina visibiliter docente, in illo ipso loco, ubi erat sedes populi Dei, tam diverse sentiunt in doctrina de Deo homines, propterea vocem ab ipso prolatam arguemus mendacii? Aut postea cum in Ecclesia tantae turbae excitatae sunt per eos, qui relicta veritate secuti sunt alia, propterea nemo prorsus fuit qui recte sentiret? Aut dum hodie in nostris Ecclesiis doctores digladiantur, inde, quod sycophantae soient, inferemus esse impossibile, ut in illis uspiam sit ulla veritas?’ Ibid., 961–96v.
E.g. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 33 and II, 244 (Loeb. ed. I, 22–23, 312–13) and Cicero, Acad. II, 72 and loo (Reid ed., 260, 297). Also see Reid’s notes on p. 260. For sixteenth-century examples see Picus (1601), 547 and Castellani (1558), 108.
Popkin (1968a), 1–16. See also Popkin (196o, 1965). His focus is, however, on the seventeenth century and perhaps less attention has been given to sixteenth-century religious debates concerning scepticism than is deserved. For some information see above, Chapter III, pp. 58–66. The whole question will be treated in greater detail in my forthcoming paper mentioned below in note 94.
Rosa’s Regni Pontifici Eúvocnas (1578) is, however, a polemical anti-Papist piece.
E.g. 9r, where the prisca theologia transmission of knowledge is given.
On this see Schmitt (1966,1970) where further references will be found. For example, in the first chapter of the De perenni philosophic,Steuco speaks in terms very similar to Rosa in saying: ‘chwr(133) unam necessario semper fuisse sapientiamchwr(133) sicque in unam omnia spectare veritatem.’ Steuchus (1590–91) III,z“.
’Veritas semper una est et ipsa sibi consonat, etiamsi myriades opinionum ab ea discendentium discrepent.’ Rosa (1571),96V.
’Restinguit praeterea dogma Academicum omnem ardorem discendi et omnem industriam atque studium comparandae scientiae misere infringit. Quorsum enim atti-net diu sudare in rebus, in quibus omnis labor est irritus?’ Rosa (1571), 92v. Whether Rosa uses the word dogma here after much consideration is not clear. The Academics, of course, would oppose their philosophy to that of the dogmatic sects. He may use it to suggest that the Academics are quite as dogmatic as their opponents or it may merely be an incautious usage.
This is very similar to the statement of M’Cosh (1865), 335, who says: ‘chwr(133) the evil of scepticism [is] in chilling the ardour of youth, and confirming the hardness of age, in repressing even noble aspiration and every high effort, while it leaves the soul the servant or slave of the lower, the sensual, the ambitious, the proud or the selfish, impulses of the heart.’
’Et horribilis ingratitudo est adversus Deum, qui semina artium et doctrinarum et regulas rectrices humanae vitae, etiam post lapsum in natura hominis reliquit, talia beneficia non modo extenuare, sed conculcare pedibus et in universum abijere. Et ne singula prosequamur, quanta impietas esset et quanta blasphemia, gloriam veritatis doctrinae de Deo, qua omnis salutis nostrae ratio continetur, detrahere?’ Rosa (1571), 92 °-93’.
Schmitt (1967a, 1967b). I plan to deal with this question in much greater detail in a forthcoming paper to be entitled ‘Epistemological and Religious Scepticism in the Sixteenth Century.’
I will not here document what I have to say about Pico’s position. For details see Schmitt (1967a).
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Schmitt, C.B. (1972). Joannes Rosa and His Commentary on the Academica . In: Cicero Scepticus. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idees, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1037-4_6
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