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Conditional Logic

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 4))

Abstract

Prior to 1968 several writers had explored the conditions for the truth or assertability of conditionals, but this work did not result in an attempt to provide formal models for the semantical structure of conditionals. It had also been suggested that a proper logic for conditionals might be provided by combining modal operators with material conditionals in some way, but this suggestion never led to any widely accepted formal logic for conditionals.1 Then Stalnaker [1968] provided both a formal semantics for conditionals and an axiomatic system of conditional logic. This important paper effectively inaugurated that branch of philosophical logic which we today call conditional logic. Nearly all the work on the logic of conditionals for the next ten years, and a great deal of work since then, has either followed Stalnaker’s lead in investigating possible worlds semantics for conditionals or posed problems for such an approach. But in 1978, Peter Gärdenfors [1978] initiated a new line of inquiry focused on the use of conditionals to represent policies for belief revision. Thus, two main lines of development appeared, one an ontological approach concerned with truth or assertability conditions for conditionals and the other an epistemological approach focused on conditionals and change of belief.

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  1. University of Georgia, USA

    Donald Nute & Charles B. Cross

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    D. M. Gabbay

  2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    F. Guenthner

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Nute, D., Cross, C.B. (2001). Conditional Logic. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_1

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