Abstract
This paper analyses the link between effectiveness and efficiency of climate change policies and the structure and design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The structure refers to the set of signatories to an IEA. The design refers to the aggregate abatement target agreed upon in an IEA, the distribution of the abatement burdens among signatories, the policy instruments used to implement abatement targets and possible compensation measures among signatories or between signatories and non-signatories. The paper argues that the design of an IEA has an immediate impact on global welfare and on the welfare of individual countries. Consequently, the design of an IEA affects countries’ decision about whether and which coalition they will join. However, the design of an IEA also affects the effectiveness and efficiency of policy strategies. Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiency of policy strategies are also linked to the structure of IEAs — a link that has been neglected so far in the literature. In order to take a first step to remedy this deficiency, this paper surveys the main results of two strands of the literature (game-theoretic analyses and cost-benefit studies), sketching the ingredients of an integrated analysis and indicating preliminary policy conclusions.
The Author is indebted to an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions both on the contents of this chapter and on the presentation of its main ideas. He is also grateful to Barbara Buchner, Carmen Marchiori, Marni Wood, Silvia Bertolin and all members of FEEM Climate Change Modelling and Policy Unit for valuable assistance.
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Carraro, C. (2003). International Regimes and Policy Strategies for Climate Change Control. In: Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M., Withagen, C. (eds) Environmental Policy in an International Perspective. Economy & Environment, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0333-8_1
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