Abstract
In this and the next chapter, the concept of reason for action will be discussed. Since the final objective is to use this notion for an analysis of other concepts, we will be moving on a metalinguistic level. I will undertake, first of all, a review of the different meanings the term has been given in philosophical discussions. It will then be possible to assess which of these uses can be helpful for a better understanding of the questions that will be taken on in the second part of the book, concerning the concept of legal norm, the notion of acceptance as a necessary condition for the existence of a legal system, and the justification of legal decisions.
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References
Since the main purpose of this study concerns the notion of intentional action, I will not analyse the notion of reaction. On this, cf. von Wright, Georg Henrik, Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press 1971, p. 87.
A relevant case of an internal act, i. e., that of accepting a norm, will be analysed in Chapter V.
Cf. Davidson, Donald, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in: id., Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon 1982, pp. 3–19. Against this interpretation, cf. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, op. cit.
Von Wright, Georg Henrik, Freedom and Determination, Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. XXXI, Amsterdam: North Holland 1980, P. 17.
Cf. von Wright, Georg Henrik, Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1963, pp. 36 f. For a similar distinction between ‘act types’ and ‘act tokens’, cf. Goldman, Alvin, A Theory of Human Action, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press 1970.
But remember that, in contrast to von Wright, I will admit that the psychological elements that make up the intention of an agent are causally related to the result of his actions.
The example is taken from Blanke, Richard A., Objective Reasons and Practical Reasons, in: Meta-philosophy 17:1 (January 1986).
There are several definitions of ‘institutional action’. The definition offered here is not exactly the same as that proposed by other authors. John Searle, for instance, distinguishes between brute and institutional facts on the basis of a classification of rules as regulative or constitutive. Institutional facts, then, are those which presuppose constitutive rules. Such rules define new kinds of conducts, but they also regulate behaviour. Cf. Searle, John, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969, pp. 33–42 and 50–53. Even if the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules were made to coincide with the one indicated above between rules of conduct and semantic rules, the characterization of institutional acts based on them would not be the same. According to Searle, the aspect that belongs exclusively to institutional acts is their dependence on constitutive rules. In contrast, from the point of view adopted in this book, no action, whether institutional or not, is independent of a semantic rule constituting it as an act-category. On Searle’s theory of institutional facts, cf., e. g., MacCormick, Neil and Ota Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law, Dordrecht: Reidel 1986, pp. 21–24. On the notion of constitutive rule, cf., e. g., Gonzalez Lagier, Daniel, Clasificar acciones. Sobre la critica de Raz a las reglas constitutivas de Searle, in: Doxa (Alicante) 13 (1993) pp. 265–276.
Note that only individual actions can be classified in these terms; cf. von Wright, Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, op. cit., eh. Ill, sect. 3, and id., Explanation and Understanding, op. cit.,p. 199, n. 38. A different characterization from that of von Wright can be found in Danto, Arthur C., Basic actions, in: Alan R. White (ed.), Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968, pp. 43–58. In the line of Danto, cf. also Moya, Carlos J., The Philosophy of Action. An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press 1990, pp. 14–17.
Cf. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, op. cit.,pp. 87 f.
Cf. Anscombe, Elisabeth, Intention, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press 1957, sects. 23–26.
I use the expressions `bring about’ or `produce’ in order to designate the relationship between the psychological states internal to the agent and the empirical or normative effects constituting either the result or the consequences of his action.
Von Wright, Georg Henrik, On the Logic of Norms and Actions, in: id., Practical Reason, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press 1983, p. 113.
Cf. Goldman. Alvin, A Theory of Human Action, op. cit., ch. 2.
Cf. von Wright, Georg Henrik, On the Logic of Norms and Actions, op. cit., pp. 114 f.
Cf. Alchourrdn, Carlos and Eugenio Bulygin. Los limites de la Idgica y el razonamiento juridico, in: id., Antilisis Idgico y Derecho, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1991, pp. 305 f.
For example, by extending the argument presented by von Wright in the analysis of the rules of a game. Thus, one could say that semantic rules define all the moves admitted in the game. Real moves would then be qualified as correct or incorrect, depending on whether or not they conform to what the rules stipulate. Furthermore: „It is understood that moves which are not correct are prohibited […j, and that a move which is the only correct move in a certain situation in the game is obligatory […j“ (von Wright, Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, op. cit., p. 6).
Cf. Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (1961), Oxford: Clarendon 2nd ed. 1994, ch. III, pp. 38 ff.
In Chapter III, I will analyse different concepts and kinds of practical syllogism.
The ontological status of the mental states constituting the internal aspect of action is controversial; and therefore, so is the way how they affect the process resulting in the change produced by an action. However, the controversy about the mind-body problem that comes into play here cannot be treated within the much narrower confines of this book.
Searle, John R., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983, pp. 1–4.
These characteristics apply only to those intentional states the content of which is a complete proposition, i. e., to so-called propositional attitudes. Cf. ibid., pp. 6 f. This is the case of desires and beliefs, which will be the only intentional states considered here.
The idea of what later came to be known as ‘direction of fit’ was first introduced by Elisabeth Anscombe in her Intention,op. cit., § 32. Later, the concept has been discussed by several authors: cf., e. g., Platts, Mark, The Ways of Meaning, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979; Smith, Michael A., The Humean Theory of Motivation, in: Mind 96 (1987); Pettit, Philip, Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation, in: Mind 96 (1987); Smith, Michael, On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit, in: Mind 97 (1988); Price, Huw, Defending Desire as Belief, in:Mind 98 (1989); Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell 1993. According to Humberstone, the expression was first used in Austin, John L., How to Talk — Some Simple Ways, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53 (1953), pp. 227–246; cf. Humber-stone, Lloyd, Direction of Fit, in: Mind 101 (1992).
Smith, Michael, The Humean Theory of Motivation, op. cit. (hereafter, THTM).
Ibid., p. 54.
Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons, op. cit., p. 27; the example is taken from Anscombe, Elisabeth, Intention, op. cit.,p. 56. Note that Dancy, although he offers an analysis of the notion of ‘direction of fit’, does not think that it allows one to stipulate a difference between beliefs and desires, as the Humean conception claims.
This link between speech acts and intentional states holds only if the act in question has some direction of fit. For instance, acts of excusing oneself and mental states of remorse are speech acts and mental states that have no direction of fit, although they presuppose other states that do.
Searle, John, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, op. cit., p. 10.
This may be controversial. For example, according to Jonathan Cohen, making an assertion commits the speaker to accepting, rather than to believing the propositional content. Cf. Cohen, Jonathan, Acceptance and Belief, in: Mind 98 (1989), pp. 374–378. In Chapter V, I will discuss the distinction between these two kinds of intentional states in more detail.
Searle, John, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, op. cit., p. 9.
The paradoxical nature of the assertion is based on the thesis that in conversation all acts of assertion imply the belief in what is said. This idea is widely accepted in the field of legal theory. Furthermore, in a certain parallel to the case of assertions, it is also held that issuing of a norm commits the norm-giver to the belief in the moral correctness of the norm’s content. One of the theses of the necessary connection between law and morality is based on this opinion. As will be seen in Chapter V, the paradox can be reformulated in terms that do not lead to that necessary connection with the belief in truth or correctness.
The idea that intentional states compel action implies that they not only make an action rational or intelligible, but also have causal relevance for its result. This double role of internal attitudes can be found in Davidson, Donald, Actions, Reasons and Causes, op. cit., pp. 3–19.
This happens when the action itself is the object of the agent’s intention and not a means for reaching some other end. Cf. von Wright, Georg Henrik, Explanation and Understanding, op. cit., pp. 122–124.
Bernard Williams, e. g., uses the expression in this sense when he refers to the „agent’s subjective motivational set’. Cf. Williams, Bernard, Internal and External Reasons, in: Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973–1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 101–113.
Falk, W. D., ‘Ought’ and Motivation, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1947–48), pp. 116–118. This is the sense that is involved when the relationship between the recognition of a duty and the motives of an agent are discussed.
For instance, Hume’s theory is committed to an intemalist position on the identification of reasons for action. Furthermore, from that perspective the practical relevance of normative statements presupposes an intemalist conception of the relationship between the existence of a duty and the motivation of an agent. With respect to the first subject, cf. section 7.b) of this chapter; on the second, sections 2 and 3 of Chapter IV about legal norms and reasons for action.
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, op. cit., pp. 28–32.
Pettit, Philip, Humeans, Anti-Humeans and Motivation, op. cit., p. 531.
Raz, Joseph, Practical Reason and Norms, London: Hutchinson 1975, p. 32.
Cf. Smith, Michael, THTM, op. cit., p. 56.
Cf. Brown, Harold I., Perception Theory and Commitment. The New Philosophy of Science, Chicago, Ill.: Precedent 1977, ch. VII.
Lewis, David, Desire as Belief, in: Mind 97 (1988), pp. 323–332. Lewis argues that one cannot regard desires as beliefs. Throughout his essay, he attempts to prove that a thesis that admits desires as beliefs would contradict standard theories of rational decision.
Price, Huw, Defending Desire as Belief, op. cit., pp. 123–125. Price argues in favour of a position that is opposed to that of David Lewis.
It must be pointed out that the idea of desires motivated by beliefs is not incompatible with Hume’s conception. The disagreement lies in the fact that for Hume such a motivation is also based on some ulterior desire. In this way, we come to basic desires that are not motivated, i. e., that do not depend on nor can be explained through other beliefs or desires.
Cf. Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons, op. cit., ch. 2.
The idea that for an action to be performed there must be a mental state with the adequate direction of fit is compatible with the conception of Hume as well as with that of his critics. On this point, there is agreement, e. g., in Michael Smith, who attempts to defend Hume’s conception, and in Jonathan Dancy, who criticizes Hume and attempts to show how mental states other than desires are also capable of bringing about action. In conclusion, it does not matter what kind of states one favours. What matters is their direction of fit.
This is the conception of Plato and Aristotle. It is also the one adopted by Mackie, although with the purpose of rejecting the existence of such entities. Cf. Mackie, John L, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin 1977. For the characterization of metaphysical realism, cf. Moore, Michael S., Moral Realism as the Best Explanation of Moral Experience, Paper presented at the Saturday Discussion Group of Southern California Legal and Political Philosophers, January 21, 1989, mimeo.
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, op. cit., p. 7.
Cf. Hare, Richard M., Ontology in Ethics, in: id., Essays in Ethical Theory, Oxford: Clarendon 1989, pp. 82–89. I will come back to the ontological question in Chapter V.
To the extent that the truth-conditions of such statements are fully established within a theory, an existential statement only commits to theoretical entities internal to that theory. Cf. Carnap, Rudolph, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in: L. Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, Urbana, HI.: University of Illinois Press 1952, pp. 208–228.
Williams, Bernard, Internal and External Reasons, op. cit., pp. 101–113.
Cf. Cohon, Rachel, Are External Reasons Impossible?, in: Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 545–556.
Williams, Bernard, Internal and External Reasons, op. cit., p. I I I.
In the following chapter, t will present different kinds of action explanations and the different concepts of reason they are grounded on.
Mackie, John L., Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, op. cit., p. 77.
Cf. Caracciolo, Ricardo, Autoridad sin normas y normas sin autoridad, unpublished manuscript, 1994, p. 18.
This distinction between voluntary and involuntary intentional states will be seen in more detail in Chapter VI. There, different kinds of mental states will be characterized in order to give more precision to the notion of acceptance.
Cf. Smith, Michael, THTM, pp. 42 f.
An example of that inadvertent step from one to the other type of reason can be found in Jay Wallace when he characterizes the rationalist conception in contrast to the Humean position. Wallace asserts that rationalism advocates two theses: a stipulative one about the motivations a rational agent would have to have; and an explanatory one according to which the motivations of a rational agent can be explained in terms of norms or principles of correct reasoning. The Humean position, in contrast, is said to deny that the principles of rationality can explain motivation if no desire is involved. In that sense, the two conceptions are said to be opposed. Cf. Wallace, R. Jay, How to Argue About Practical Reason, in: Mind 99 (1990), pp. 358–360. According to the point of view adopted in the present work, to say that the principles of rationality can explain motivation or action, i. e., that they can be explanatory reasons, implies the confusion of two different and independent senses of reason.
Among them, all classical theories — the ernotivist (non-descriptivist) as well as the naturalist subjectivist (descriptivist) ones. As a contemporary example, one can see Sen, Amartya, Rights as Goals, in: Guest, S. et al. (eds.), Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice, ARSP Beiheft 21 (1985); cf. also Harman, Gilbert, The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press 1977.
The argument in favour of that possibility will be presented in Chapter II, sect. 5.
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, op. cit., pp. 14 f.
Richards, David A. J., A Theory of Reasons for Action, Oxford: Clarendon 1971, p. 54.
Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., p. 54.
Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon 1979; id., Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit. (hereafter, PRN); id., The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986.
Raz, Joseph, PRN, p. 17.
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 18.
The distinction between mental causes and motives can be found, e. g., in Anscombe, Elisabeth, Intention, op. cit., pp. 15 ff.; cf. also Anscombe, Elisabeth, Intention, in: White, Alan (ed.), The Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968, pp. 144–152, esp. pp. 145–148.
On this, cf. Grice, G. R., Motive and Reason, in: Raz, Joseph (ed.), Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975, pp. 168–177.
Cf. Nino, Carlos S., Introduccidn a la filosoffa de la accidn humana, Buenos Aires: Eudeba 1987, p. 83.
On this question, see Ricardo Caracciolo’s critique, pointing out the consequences following from that relation of dependence between the concepts of reason. Caracciolo observes that if one adopts Rai s thesis only true beliefs can be considered reasons that explain an action. If the belief is false, that is, if the fact that makes it true (the justificatory reason) does not exist, then that belief is no reason, since explanatory reasons depend on justificatory reasons. If a false belief were an explanatory reason, then one would have to admit that justificatory reasons are irrelevant, in other words, that beliefs are explanatory reasons independently of the existence of justificatory reasons. Cf. Caracciolo, Ricardo, Autoridad sin normas y normas sin autoridad, op. cit., pp. 34 f.
Von Wright, Georg Henrik, On so-called practical inference, in: id., Practical Reason, op. cit., p. 30. I will come back to this concept of justification in Chapter V in the context of the discussion of the notion of acceptance in relation to justificatory reasons.
On the different concepts of justification cf. Schueler, G. F., The Idea of a Reason for Acting. A Philosophical Argument, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 1989, pp. 25–63.
Carlos Nino, for example, directly commits himself to that identification which makes it impossible to speak of objective or external ‘explanatory’ reasons and of subjective ‘justificatory’ reasons; cf. Nino, Carlos S., La validez del derecho, Buenos Aires: Astrea 1985, p. 126.
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Redondo, C. (1999). Reasons for Action — First Part. In: Reasons for Action and the Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9141-6_2
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