Abstract
The question as to the point when accumulated knowledge is to be interpreted as evidence of “scientific” knowledge and which part of it is to be designated as “scientific” knowledge, receives a variety of answers depending on the definition of what is science. The question presumes that, in the course of history, the nature of human cognition changed which makes it necessary to distinguish between prescientific and scientific forms of knowledge. Knowledge is usually called “prescientific” if it is directly derived from practical experiences and maintains its association with practical applications within the process of labor—regardless of how the dividing line between prescientific and scientific knowledge is drawn. Thus, the problem of how to define science leads to the historical question of how cognition developed in the context of labor so that particular forms of mental labor eventually emerged which can be distinguished from their precursors as “science.”
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References
Damerow, P. & Lefèvre, W.: “Arbeitsmittel der Wissenschaft.” In Damerow, P. & Lefèvre, W. (Eds.): Rechenstein, Experiment, Sprache: Historische Fallstudien zur Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pp. 223–233.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Lefèvre, W. (1996). Tools of Science. In: Abstraction and Representation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 175. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8624-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8624-5_12
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