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Part of the book series: Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 12))

Abstract

The basic idea of this essay is that the past is no longer contingent, hence that which has always been past was never contingent, and is, therefore, necessary in a time-independent fashion.1 In this way we can give an account of physical necessity in terms of the passage of time. My purpose is to clarify this somewhat obscure idea, and to argue for the resulting account of necessity.

I would like to acknowledge some extremely useful comments from David Armstrong, from Brian Ellis and from the anonymous referee.

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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Forrest, P. (1996). Physical Necessity and the Passage of Time. In: Riggs, P.J. (eds) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4750-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8607-8

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