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The Ideology of Free Judicial Decision-Making

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The Judicial Application of Law

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 15))

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Abstract

The ideology of free judicial decision-making is historically formulated as the negation of the ideology of bound judicial decision-making, and expresses the “revolt against formalism”, the paradigm of which was legal positivism. The ideology of free judicial decision-making is rather differentiated. I detail here its moderate and radical version, both of which share a common theoretical background.

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Notes

  1. K. Opalek and J. Wróblewski, 1954, 1968; N. Bobbio, 1965; S. I. Shuman, 1963; M. Cattaneo, 1964; U. Scarpelli, 1965; R. Hernandez Marin, 1986, Ch VI; H. L. A. Hart, 1983, p. 57ff; Tavola rotonda sul positivismo giuridico, 1967.

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  2. F. Gény, 1932, vol. II, part 3, Ch 2, para 155–168 and “epilogue”, Ch I, para 188— 195; According to W. Friedmann, 1961, p. 827 “most of the subsequent philosophical discussions of the judicial process are an elaboration or resumption of Gény’s pioneer work”; E. Ehrlich supports Gény’s theses, cf., E. Ehrlich, 1987, p. 170ff). Cf., also A. Ross, 1929, Ch 3, para 4–7; E. Waskowski, 1936, Ch IV.1.

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  3. L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, Ch III.2; F. Gény, 1932, vol. II, para 205–222; H. Reichel, 1915, pp. 28, 4; R. Hernandez Marin, 1986, Ch XIII.

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  4. The term “family of law” is from R. David, 1969, par 16.

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  5. K. Opałek and J. Wróblewski, 1963, pp. 152–168; K. N. Llewellyn, 1962, Ch 1, 2; W. Krawietz, 1978, para 12–18; R. Hernandez Marin, 1986, Ch IX, XV, XVI; J. Bjarup, 1978; E. Pattaro, 1985, Ch VI-VIII; R. S. Summers, 1982, Ch 5, 6.

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  6. Cf., a historical description F. Ryska, 1964, part II, Ch 1, and notes 119–125 below.

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  7. Doctrine of contra legem decision, cf., H. Reichel, 1915, pp. 123–145; H. P. Schneider, 1969, p. 19ff; O. Bachof, 1959, p. 43ff; H. Coing, 1969, p. 258; E. Waskowski, 1936, p. 230ff.

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  8. P. Heck, 1912, p. 25; H. Reichel, 1915, p. 48.

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  9. F. Gény, 1932, vol. II, p. 21; E. Waskowski, 1936, p. 219.

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  10. L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 258.

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  11. The free law movements are convergent with legal realism opposed to legal positivism, and could be coordinated with “solidary” natural law tendencies (L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 360ff). Attitude versus positivism, cf., E. Fuchs, 1929, p. 13; P. Heck, 1912, p. 5, 9; F. Gény, 1932, vol. 1, para 61–64, 102; position to natural law, F. Gény, 1927, part II, para 70, 71; part IV, Ch XXVIII and Etudes complementaires part II, para 1, 12.

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  12. O. Bülow, 1885, p. 41 and <i>passim; J. Esser, 1964, pp. 193ff, 286ff; F. Wieacker, 1957, p. 6; H. P. Schneider, 1069, p. 10ff; K. Larenz, 1964, p. 386ff.

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  13. E. Ehrlich, 1987, pp. 172, 174ff.

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  14. J. C. Gray, 1916, pp. 98–100.

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  15. “Vanité de la logique purement abstraite, F. Gény, 1932, vol 1, p. 133, cf., <i>ibidem part <b>II,</b> Ch 2.

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  16. H. Reichel, 1915, p. 17 treats this as “Gesetzesabsolutismus”.

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  17. H. P. Schneider, 1969, p. 16ff.

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  18. O. A. Germann, 1960, p. 51ff; 1964, p. 245ff.

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  19. Cf., in general M. P. Bleicherode, 1937; K. Makkonen, 1965, p. 147.

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  20. P. Heck, 1912, pp. 5, 9.

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  21. E. Fuchs, 1929, p. 55; Nazi ideology postulates the sovereignty of the judge as the “judge-king”, G. Bull, 1953, p. 148.

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  22. K. G. Wurzel, 1904, pp. 40–42; E. Fuchs, 1929, p. 13.

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  23. Cf., criticism of “Gefühlsjurisprudenz”, E. Fuchs, 1912, Ch III.

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  24. P. Oertmenn, 1909, pp. 37, 39; K. G. Würzel, 1904, p. 86ff; J. W. Hedemann, 1933; P. Werner, 1966; J. Esser, 1964, p. 165ff; L. Leszczynski, 1986; Ch. Perelman and E. Vander Elst, 1984.

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  25. J. W. Hedemann, 1933, p. 10ff.

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  26. General clauses are “ein Stück offengelassener Gesetzgebung”, J. W. Hedemann, 1933, p. 58.

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  27. Cf., note (VII)66.

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  28. L. Lombardi Vallauri is a partisan of “free law” as a “dynamic synthesis” of natural law, legal positivism and legal realism (L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1981, p. 188).

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  29. Cf.. notes (VII)76. 77: (X) 36–49.

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  30. The tendency to negate the existence of gaps or to treat them as “ideological gaps” or “de lege ferenda gaps” expresses a form of “logical maximalism” and is contrary to the free law (L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, pp. 253–254).

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  31. J Nowacki, 1970.

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  32. E. Ehrlich, 1987, p. 186; 1913 p. 148.

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  33. Cf., note 3 above.

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  34. Representative ideas are formulated by J. C. Hutcheson Jr, 1938.

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  35. L. Brütt, identifying the free law movement with “Gefühlsjurisprudenz”, writes “Ihre Methode besteht eben darin, dass sie keine haben” (L. Brütt, 1907, p. 105).

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  36. F. Schmidt, 1957, p. 166; E. Fechner, 1956, p. 218; F. Reynolds, 1967, pp. 15, 84.

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  37. E. Fuchs is against Freirechtlerei but for sociological legal science (E. Fuchs, 1921, p. 151ff, Ch IV) J. G. Gmelin is against “logical deduction” and for the “sociological method” of finding justice (J. G. Gmelin, 1917, Ch II.11).

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  38. P. Oertmann, 1909, p. 22ff; M. Rumpf, 1923, p. 11ff.

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  40. According to Rommen where the judges have a creative role they “. . . appeal and appealed precisely to the natural law and natural justice” (H. Rommen, 1949, p. 260).

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  41. The most famous case is of justice Magneaud, cf., F. Gény, 1932, vol. II, para 196, 200.

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  42. Cf., note (X)93, 94.

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  43. F. Berolzheimer, 1911, p. 14; E. W. Patterson, 1934, vol. II, p. 379ff.

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  44. I use the materials presented in L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 337ff without the data, which seem a bit dubious to me.

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  45. The most precise construction of “données” is elaborated by F. Gény, 1927, part II, Ch XIV, para 166–170; on the degrees of objectivity of sources, cf., A. Ross, 1958, par 15.

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  46. Cf., the analysis in B. Wróblewski, 1934, Ch II, IX and passim.

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  47. According to E. Ehrlich judicial law is more ancient and richer than statutory law (E. Ehrlich, 1987, p. 180ff) and is a source of many statutory rules (E. Ehrlich, 1897, Ch III; 1918, pp. 5, 10, 116, 170, 205, 212; 1913 pp. 101, 121, 141ff, 197). O. Bülow, 1887, pp. 2, 17ff, 29ff; a rejection of judicial law is linked with the “etatistische Gesetzesbegriff”, J. Esser, 1964, pp. 17ff, 148ff, 242, 293ff; cf., L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, Ch IV.

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  48. L. C. Cueto-Rua, 1961, Ch 1, 4; L. Recasens Siches, 1959, Ch XII.10; H. Silving, 1968, pp. 83ff, 86ff; P. Stein, 1984, Ch 7; M. Virally, 1960, Ch XII.2.

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  49. Cf., typology in L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 12ff; H. Schneider, 1969, p. 20ff.

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  50. L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, pp. 371–375.

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  51. Only decisions are “authentic norms”, L. Recasens Siches, 1959, pp. 315, 628ff; decisions have higher power than statutes O. Bülow, 1885, pp. 7, 10ff; M. E. Mayer, 1903, p. 4; conception of “operative law”, J. Wróblewski, 1982d, pp. 218–222.

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  52. J. Esser, 1967, pp. 118, 129ff; A. Ross, 1929, p. 333.

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  53. C. Cossio, 1967, Ch I, par 2; Ch II, para 2, 3; 1964, pp. 101–113, 167ff, 187, 191.

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  54. ZTP, Ch III. 1, 2; J. Wróblewski, 1978a, pp. 5–13.

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  55. Precedent as “norma giurisprudenziale” which has “effettività occasionale”, L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 445.

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  56. Cf., the view of B. N. Cardozo, 1957, p. 259ff, and p. 110.

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  57. Activity praeter lagem is accepted in many judicial law conceptions, cf., H. Schneider, 1969, p. 18ff; O. A. Germann, 1960, pp. 11–126ff; C. W. Canaris, 1964.

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  58. L. Lombardi Vallauri, 1967, p. 595.

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  62. C. Schmitt, 1934; conformity of Interessenjurisprudenz with the changes of law in the Nazi period P. Heck, 1946, pp. 8, 26ff.

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  63. W. Hildebrandt, 1935, pp. 27ff, 42; H. Hoehn, 1948, p. 23.

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  64. W. Hildebrandt, 1935, p. 26.

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  69. G. Radbruch, 1946, p. 347. Before Radbruch was for the observation of any law (G. Radbruch, 1956, p. 182).

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  79. The “rule of law” as close to natural law conception according to G. Fassó, 1964, p. 218ff, but not so in J. Raz, 1979, Ch 11.

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Łódz, Poland

    Jerzy Wróblewski

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Zenon Bańkowski Neil MacCormick

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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Wróblewski, J. (1992). The Ideology of Free Judicial Decision-Making. In: Bańkowski, Z., MacCormick, N. (eds) The Judicial Application of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_13

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  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4113-5

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