Abstract
Many critics seem to consider it inappropriate or unnecessary to ask what Montaigne means by the faculty of judgment. Laumonier speaks of “le bon sens, qu’il oppose si souvent à la mémoire et qu’il appelle encore ‘jugement’ et ‘entendement’, c’est-à-dire la faculté de penser et de réfléchir juste.” 1 Our appreciation of what is implied by judgment, that is by Montaigne’s notion of judgment, has been delayed perhaps by a too facile acceptance of a so-called synonymity of meaning among the psychological terms used by Montaigne. In a discussion of key concepts in Montaigne, Donald M. Frame has accurately summarized the present situation with regard to our knowledge of Montaigne’s notion of judgment and other key concepts: “We all have our hunches, but we need more than that.” 2
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References
Paul Laumonier, “Montaigne précurseur du XVIIe siècle,” Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, III (1896), 209. André Cresson, Montaigne, sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris, 1947), P. 59, remarks that “le but doit être la formation de l’esprit, le développement de ce bon sens, de ce jugement que chacun porte en lui.”
Donald M. Frame, “What Next in Montaigne Studies?,” French Review, XXXVI (1963), 583.
No attempt will be made to differentiate between the term jugement and its concept. We assume for purposes of this study that, as Georges Matoré says, “le mot est lié au concept d’une manière quasi indissoluble.” La Méthode en lexicologie (Paris, 1953 ), p. 33.
Montaigne, OEuvres complètes, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris, 1962), I, 5o, 289, Book I, Essay 5o, p. 289. The stratum indicators denoting (A), (B), and (C) material have been corrected where necessary, and, unless otherwise indicated, all references are to this edition. The expression “stratum indicator” and its alphabetical representation (A, B, or C) refers to material of specific periods of composition; (A) indicates material written by Montaigne in time to appear in the 158o edition of the Essais; it also includes the revisions of the 1582 and 1587 editions of Books I and II; (B) introduces material first published in 1588, and ( C) material written after 1588. Throughout this study, reference to Montaigne’s “suppression” of a psychological term implies that the word has been omitted through subsequent revision.
For a compendium of passages which deal with the general idea of judging, see Eva Marcu, Répertoire des idées de Montaigne (Geneva, 1965), pp. 697–72o.
Gabriel Compayré, Montaigne and Education of the Judgment, trans. J.-E. Mansion (New York, 1908), p. 66. Only the English translation of this work was available to me.
P. Mansell Jones, French Introspectives from Montaigne to André Gide (Cambridge, 1937 ), p. 36.
B Léon Van den Bruwaene, “Les Idées philosophiques de Montaigne,” Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie, XXXV (1933), 493.
Donald M. Frame, Montaigne’s Discovery of Man: The Humanization of a Humanist (New York, 1955), p. 8o; see also his Montaigne: A Biography (New York, 1965 ), P. 259.
Jean Nicot, Thresor de la langve Françoise tant ancienne que Moderne (Douceur, 1606 ). Reproduced from the 1621 edition by Picard et Cie, Paris, 196o.
George S. Brett, Psychology, Ancient and Modern (New York, 1928 ), p. 31.
Quoted in Pierre Villey, Montaigne devant la postérité Paris, 1935), p. 57.
Frank P. Bowman, Montaigne: Essays (London, 1965 ) p. 7.
Fortunat Strowski, Montaigne (Paris, 1906), p. 81.
Joseph Coppin, Montaigne, traducteur de Raymond Sebon (Lille, 1925), p. 117.
Donald M. Frame, “Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?,” Romanic Review, XXXVIII (1947), 316.
Pierre Villey, Les Sources et l’évolution des Essais de Montaigne (Paris, 1908 ), I, 213.
Sebond in OEuvres complètes de Michel de Montaigne, ed. Arthur Armaingaud (Paris, 1924–1941), IX, v. Montaigne’s French translation of Sebond’s work rather than the original Latin is quoted in this study because the latter text was not available to me.
Villey, I, 235. Between 158o and 1588, Montaigne seems to have obtained only 12 statements from his reading of the Epistles.
The only notable exception is Camilla Hill Hay, who, in her Montaigne, lecteur et imitateur de Sénèque (Poitiers, 1938), states that many of Montaigne’s ideas repeat what is a constant theme in Seneca, “la faiblesse et l’incertitude de notre jugement,” p. 133.
Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, trans. Richard M. Gummere, The Loeb Classical Library (London, 1925 ), I, 136–137: “Judgment varies from day to day, and changes to the opposite, making many a man pass his life in a kind of game.”
Seneca, II, 142–143: “a persistent perversion of the judgment, so that things which are mildly desirable are thought to be highly desirable.”
Seneca, I, 238–239: “’Hoc Zenon dixit’; tu quid? ‘Hoc Cleanthes’; tu quid?” “’This is what Zeno said.’ But what have you yourself said? ’This is the opinion of Cleanthes.’ But what is your own opinion?”
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. J. E. King, The Loeb Classical Library (London, 1927), pp. 2x8–2x9: “you must use your own judgment.”
Pierre Villey, Les Livres d’histoire moderne utilisés par Montaigne (Paris, rgo8), p. err.
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La Charité, R.C. (1968). Introduction. In: The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0919-0_1
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