Abstract
I used to be a full-time anthropologist. Anthropologists often make Statements of the form: The So-and-so believe that... Few of them have bothered to discuss what they mean by belief (the most notable exception being Rodney Needham, 1972). Over the years, I raised several objections against these attributions of beliefs and I have tried to outline a more fine-grained account of the cognitive attitudes involved (Sperber 1975, 1982/1985, 1990, 1994b, 1996). Just as the common term jade corresponds to two substances, Jadeite and nephrite, with similar phenomenal properties but quite different chemical structures, the folk-psychological term belief, I have argued, corresponds to two psychological categories, similar in some behavioural and epistemological respects, but different in cognitive organisation and role. I call these two psychological categories intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. In this paper, I would like to develop the argument in a manner that addresses questions and objections that I have received from psychologists and philosophers of mind.
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Sperber, D. (2000). Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs. In: Engel, P. (eds) Believing and Accepting. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 83. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4042-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4042-3_13
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