Abstract
We study the formation of emission abatement coalitions. A necessary condition for a coalition to be viable is that all of its members are net gainers. For this to happen, a coalition has to be at least of a certain size, the minimum critical size. We show that if there are fixed costs associated with abatement programs, or if there are “reinforcement effects”, then under certain conditions coalitions in excess of the minimum critical size are not vulnerable to “free riding” or to prisoners’ dilemma problems.
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Heal, G. (1994). Formation of International Environmental Agreements. In: Carraro, C. (eds) Trade, Innovation, Environment. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_13
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