Abstract
Peirce was not a “one-idea’d” philosopher. He is most famous for his development of the idea of pragmatism, but this was one idea among many for Peirce. As Peirce continues to become more widely known, the recognition grows that he had original and incisive things to say on almost all of the most interesting philosophical questions. In this chapter we will see Pcircc at his best, making many creative suggestions which bear upon most difficult questions. First we will discuss the basic role which our primitive instincts play in the reasoning process, particularly as our instinct guides the abductive process. Then we will try to show where instinct should be trusted and where it should not be trusted, by way of balancing the emphasis which Peirce places on instinct.
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Davis, W.H. (1972). Concrete Reasonableness: Cooperation Between Reason and Instinct. In: Peirce’s Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2802-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2802-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-1296-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2802-8
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