Abstract
The conditions for manifestation in general and, first of all, for the manifestation of a being have been shown. A being, as we have seen, does not manifest itself, its encounter can take place only within a horizon which itself must present itself in the form of an effective phenomenological ‘offering’. Insofar as a being manifests itself, it is capable of affecting us. “All affection,” says Heidegger, “is a manifestation by which a being already on hand gives notice of itself.”1 Insofar as the manifestation of a being implies the manifestation of the horizon, every affection by it, every ontic affection presupposes an ontological affection and finds in it its foundation. This is why the concept of affection must be drawn forth from the uncertainty where philosophy too often leaves it. What we [574] call an affection, the immediate arising of a datum and more specifically its passive pre-giveness, such as takes place prior to every operation of knowledge, to every activity to grasp it explicitly or spontaneously, is not simple; it is not something original if, as is usually the case, we reduce it to that which in it excites us or affects us.
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References
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 194.
Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. (Hamburg: Classen und Coverts, 1948) 53.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 345.
R. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and C.R.T. Ross. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 240.
Martin Heidegger, Aletheia-Heraklit, fragment 16, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, III, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 68.
Ibid.
Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, II, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 9. [Henry’s italics]
Cf. Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s verse: “We are a sign devoid of meaning” in Was heisst Denken? 10–11.
This is the thesis of M. Merleau-Ponty. Cf. Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith. (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1962) 215
This is the thesis of M. Merleau-Ponty. Cf. Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith. (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1962) 240.
“The essence of sensibility,” says Heidegger, “lies in the finitude of intuition.” Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 31. By this Heidegger views sensibility as restricted to receiving a being which it has not created (the instruments of this reception are the senses whose necessity thus resides in the finitude of the intuition and must be understood beginning with it), [he understands sensibility] as empirical sensibility. But pure sensibility, in which empirical sensibility is based in every case, can itself take place only in the reception of the content which it itself presents, viz. by intuiting it.
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson. (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1969) 88.
Ibid. 400.
Ibid. 88.
Ibid. 400.
M. Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu. Du côté de chez Swann. I. (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) 427.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 345.
Ibid.
J.G. Fichte, Die Anweisung zum Seligen Leben, in Sammtliche Werke, V. (Berlin: Veit, 1845) 411.
On this, cf. Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 663ff.—This functional justification of affectivity, however, does not exclude, independently of all pathological fixation, a certain ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ stability of feeling so to speak, a stability, however, which is always relative and which expresses the stability of adaptation itself, for example, as it takes place in marriage, within a profession, in the choice of an activity pursued, viz. when the situation no longer changes or changes only in an unobtrusive way, then the ceaseless changing of our affections and our will to maintain this change by constantly furnishing them with new objects can mean, under certain conditions, a refusal of adaptation itself and its requirements; then such affections themselves can become ‘pathological’.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 197.
Lagneau, Célèbres Leçons et Fragments. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950) 182.
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, tr. anon. (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948) 196.
“Affection is only an automatism,” Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 617.
Ibid. 185.
Ibid. 281.
Ibid. 395.
Ibid. 281
Ibid. 450.
Lachelier, Psychologie et Métaphysique. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949) 35.
Ibid. 35–36.
Bénézé, L’allure du transcendental. (Paris: Vrin, 1936) 71–72.
Ibid. 74–75.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) 333.
Ibid.
Ibid. 331.
Ibid. 118. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 456.
The essence of affectivity is capable of being represented in such a content, but this is something altogether different. On this point, cf. infra, chapters 66 and 67.
Bénézé, L’allure du transcendental, 63.
R. Descartes, Letter to Elizabeth, in Essential Works of Descartes, tr. Lowell Blair. (New York: Bantam Books, 1961) 218.
R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and C.R.T. Ross. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 153.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis White Beck. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956) 77–78.
“All feeling is sensuous.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 78
Ibid. 77.
Ibid. 78.
Ibid. 77.
Ibid. 78.
Ibid. 77–78.
Ibid. 78. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 79.
“This feeling, under the name of moral feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason… By what name better than moral feeling could we call this singular feeling, which cannot be compared with any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal only of reason, and indeed only of the pure practical reason.” Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. 80–81.
Ibid. 82.
Ibid. 83. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 79.
Ibid. 78.
Ibid. 91.
Cf. Michel Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), chap. 2.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 88.
Ibid. 90–91.
Ibid. 91. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. [Henry’s italics]
Cf. Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 179
Cf. Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 185
Cf. Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 282
Cf. Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale, I. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) 380.
M. Guéroult, Etendue et Psychologie chez Malebranche. (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1939) 100.
Cf. supra, chapter 38.
J.G. Fichte, Die Anweisung zum Seligen Leben, in Sammtliche Werke, V. (Berlin: Veit, 1845) 411.
Lachelier, Œuvres, I. (Paris: Alcan, 1933) 201.
Our sensations are different from us, said Lachelier, Psychologie et Métaphysique. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949) 35; cf. supra, chapter 57, note 1.
Martin Heidegger, Dichterisch wohnt der Mensch, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, II, 3 ed. (Pfülligen: Neske, 1967) 75.
R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and C.R.T. Ross. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 237.
Montaigne, Essays II, 12, in Great Books of the Western World, XXV, ed. Robert M. Hutchins. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952) 211a.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in Existentialism and Human Emotions. (New York: Wisdom Library, s.d.) 20
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in Existentialism and Human Emotions. (New York: Wisdom Library, s.d.) 23.
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, in Gesammelte Werke, VI (Bern: Franke, 1963) 68.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis White Beck. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956) 76.
Ibid.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 169.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 165.
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, tr. anon. (New York; Philosophical Library, 1948) 98.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith. (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1962) 378.
This is evidently the case with Freud in spite of the decisive affirmation according to which, “a representation can itself exist even if it is not perceived, whereas feeling consists in perception itself.” (Note added by Freud to the thesis of De Saussure on La méthode psychanalytique); cf. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, tr. A. Strachey, XVI (London: Hogarth Press, 1971) 435. Hence, according to this, feeling is ‘up-rooted’ from the transcendent masses of unconsciousness and of psychological mechanism. Because affectivity, whose essentially phenomenological character is thus incorrectly but effectively recognized by Freud, nevertheless constitutes the reality of representation itself as well as its possibility, it is the entire philosophical and conceptual context of Freudianism which collapses.
G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J.B. Baillie. (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966) 127.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die maieriale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 260.
Ibid. 299.
Ibid. 434.—This original meaning of the power of revelation proper to vital feeling is a direct challenge to Husserl’s statement according to which “in order that something may be given as… indubitable, repulsive, attractive… it must be present in a certain way… in immediate sensible experience, even if we go no further in its perception and do not seek to explain it…”
E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. (Hamburg: Classen und Coverts, 1948) 53.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 298.
Ibid. 309.
Ibid. 299.
Ibid. 262–263.
Ibid. 263. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid.
Ibid. 262.
Ibid. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 262–263.
Ibid. 343.
Ibid. 261.
Ibid. 262.
Ibid. 265. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 264.
Ibid. 262, note 1. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 337–338. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 299. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 263, note 1. [Henry’s italics]
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungs Lehre, in Gesammelte Werke, VI (Bern: Franke, 1963) 36–37.
Ibid. 38.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 246.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 390.
Ibid. 385.
Ibid. 235.
Ibid. 321.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 164.
Ibid. 234. [Henry’s italics]
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 393. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 392.
Ibid. 396.
Ibid. 317. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 391.
Martin Heidegger, Überwindung der Metaphysik, in Vorträge und Aufsätze. I. 3 ed. Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 90–91.
Ibid. 91.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 164.
Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, tr. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being. (London: Vision Press Ltd., 1949) 338–339. [Henry’s italics]
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
Ibid. 304.
Ibid. 342.
Ibid. 333, 343.
Ibid. 390.
Ibid. 391–392. [Henry’s italics]
On this point and the analyses which follow, cf. Martin Heidegger, Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, I, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 107
On this point and the analyses which follow, cf. Martin Heidegger, Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, I, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 93–118.
Ibid. 104.
Ibid. 114.
Ibid.
Ibid. 100.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 396.
Cf. Ibid. 395.—The same remark is made about fear: “The specific ecstatical unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above… as a mode of having been…” 392.
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 166.
Ibid. 165.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 336.
Ibid. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 359. [Henry’s italics]
Ibid. 335.
Ibid. 337.
Ibid. 335.
Ibid.
Ibid. 337.
Ibid. 340–341.
Ibid. 341.
Ibid.
Ibid. 342.
This theory of immediate contact, which actually hides the transcendental phenomenon of affection and more originally of auto-affection, which for this reason could not take place ‘in space and time’, has already been criticized by the problematic. Cf. supra, chapter 56.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 343.
Ibid. 334.
Ibid.
Ibid. 341. [The French translation of aufgebraucht reads réunis instead of épuisés.]
Ibid.
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungs Lehre, in Gesammelte Werke, VI. (Bern: Franke, 1963) 71.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 350.
Ibid. 349.
Ibid. 347. [Henry’s italics]
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, 71. [Henry’s italics]
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 334.
Ibid. 336.
Ibid. 344.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 337.
Cf. Scheler’s fine analyses, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 49.
Max Scheler, Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, in Vom Umsturz der Werte, in Gesammelte Werke, III. (Bern: Franke, 1955) 266, note 1.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) 331.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 262; The Nature of Sympathy, 2–3; Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, 220, note.
Max Scheler, Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, 263.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith. (New York: Humanities Press Inc. 1962) 379.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 91.
Ibid. 92.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 255–256.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 342.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 346.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 201.
Cf. supra, chapter 58.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 346.
Ibid. 349.
Ibid. 353.
Cf. Ibid. 353–354.
Ibid. 354, note 1.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in Existentialism and Human Emotions. (New York: Wisdom Library, s.d.) 27.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 351.
Ibid.
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungs Lehre, in Gesammelte Werke, VI. (Bern: Franke, 1963) 64.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 111.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 350, note 2.
Ibid. 339.
George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, I, ed. A.C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901) 403.
“It is thought which first causes pain in mortels,” said Heidegger in his commentary on Hölderlin; Was heisst Denken? in Vorträge und Aufsätze, II, 3 ed. (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1967) 12.
“Old joys, old sorrows, like geese in single file,” Paul Verlaine, Sagesse I, vi, in Œuvres complètes, I. (Paris: Messein, 1953) 195. [My translation]
Franz Kafka, Diaries -1914–1923, tr. Martin Greenberg and Hannah Arendt. (New York: Schocken Books, 1965) 184.
J.G. Fichte, Die Anweisung zum Seligen Leben, in Sämmtliche Werke, V. (Berlin: Veit, 1845) 499.
Franz Kafka, Journal Intime, tr. P. Klossovski. (Paris: Grasset, 1945) 276. [Henry’s italics]
S. Bernard, Sermones in Psalm. 90, serm. 17, n. 4 (PL 183, 252 C); Meister Eckhart, A Modem Translation, tr. Raymond B. Blakney. (New York: Harper and Row, 1941) 66f
S. Bernard, Sermones in Psalm. 90, serm. 17, n. 4 (PL 183, 252 C); Meister Eckhart, A Modem Translation, tr. Raymond B. Blakney. (New York: Harper and Row, 1941) 68.
Meister Eckhart, tr. R. Blakney, 216.
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungs Lehre, in Gesammelte Werke, VI. (Bern: Franke, 1963) 46.
Ibid. 69.
Ibid.
Ibid. 70.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, II, 5th ed. (Bern: Franke, 1966) 349.
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 349.
Max Scheler, Vom Sinn des Leides, 69.
Ibid. 68–69.
Ibid. 40.
Ibid. 53.
Ibid. 70.
Here we must reject categorically the assertion of Heidegger according to which Kierkegaard could grasp the problem of existence only as an existentiell problem such that “the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is more to be learned philosophically from his ‘edifying’ writings than from his theoretical ones.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 278, note vi. Because the determination of the fundamental affective tonalities of existence, i.e. of existence itself, is actually worked out by Kierkegaard, notably in his Sickness unto Death, i.e. a theoretical work, beginning with the internal structure of immanence and in it, it is not merely invested with a manifest, ‘existential’, ontological meaning, but actually presupposes a conception of ontology radically different from that of the Greeks and Hegel and even from that of Heidegger himself. Furthermore, this is why the thesis, whereby Heidegger would attribute to certain existential developments of Kierkegaard, notably those in his Concept of Dread, an ontological dimension which they do not have, must also be rejected. Cf. supra, chapter 47, note 10.
Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, tr. Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941) 27.
Ibid. 97, note.
Ibid. 82.
Ibid. 18.
Cf. Ibid. 99.
Ibid. 18.
Ibid. 26
Ibid. 28.
Ibid. 30.
Ibid. 25.
Ibid. 30.
Cf. Ibid. 18
Cf. Ibid. 29
Cf. Ibid. 78
Cf. Ibid. 107.
Ibid. 29.
Cf. Ibid. 92.
Ibid. 109.
Ibid. 39.
Ibid. 132.
Meister Eckhart. Selected Treatises and Sermons, tr. James M. Clark and John V. Skinner. (London: Collins-The Fontana Library, 1963) 233; cf. supra, chapter 39, note 68.
John 3: 8.
W. Jankelevitch, L’Odyssée de la conscience dans la dernière philosophie de Schelling. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1933) 73.
Pascal, Pensées. (Paris: Lafuma-Delmas, 1952) 333.
Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, IV, ed. N. von Hellingrath, F. Seebass, L. von Pigenot. (Berlin: 1923ff) 240.
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Henry, M. (1973). The Fundamental Ontological Interpretation of the Original Essence of Revelation as Affectivity. In: The Essence of Manifestation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2391-7_5
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