Abstract
Joseph Agassi’s paper and my critical appraisal were not very far apart; his reply shows we are closer than appeared. He notes we both accept the distinction between applied science and technology, though for different reasons; he agrees about the need to find out what agrees and what does not agree with a theory and that we want to solve our problems; he corrects me about success, for the attacks not success but success philosophy. (I confess I still think that in denying the relevance of corroboration to science he is denying the significance of success.) Our slight divergences are these: (1) Agassi argues against my estimate that there might be grave loss if a theory were refuted at the first test. (2) He thinks I have made a technical mistake about what is to count as corroboration on Popper’s theory. (3) Agassi continues to object to reducing scientific invention to an algorithm.
First published in Technology and Culture 8 (1967), 210–212.
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© 1967 The University of Chicago Press
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Wisdom, J.O. (1967). Rules for Making Discoveries. In: Rapp, F. (eds) Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology. Theory and Decision Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2182-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2182-1_6
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