Abstract
We have said that Husserl’s Platonism, in his theory of meaning, concerns the intended meaning or the content of the meaning-intending act, whereas his positivism concerns the fulfilled meaning or the content of the meaning-fulfilling act. It is the intended meaning of which the language of entities holds good; besides, it is of the intended meaning that we can predicate that identity, objectivity and universality, in short, that ideality which Platonists ascribe to the socalled abstract entities. On the other hand, the idea of meaning-fulfilment seeks to accommodate the phenomenological element in the positivist’s emphasis on empirical verification. Thus Husserl may be said to have brought about a synthesis of Platonism and Anti-Platonism, the two opposed camps who have fought the battle over the problem of ‘meaning.’
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References
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mohanty, J.N. (1976). Husserl’s Philosophy of Language. In: Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning. Phaenomenologica, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1337-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1337-6_4
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