Abstract
The point of this chapter can be put as follows: The theory that man is a machine (of any sort whatever) may be viewed in two very different ways, the extremist and objectionable, and the more moderate which may be true. Man is a machine may mean, man is merely a machine; that is to say, qualities peculiar to humanity, such as thought and morality, have no roots in human nature; and so morality, freedom, dignity and nobility, thinking, thoughtfulness, and rationality — all these are mere illusions. Man is a machine may, however, mean, not man is just a machine, but man is a very special kind of machine which, by its specific virtues, can suffer, can show dignity and nobility, etc.1 Whereas to say that man is merely a machine seems objectionable, to say that man is a machine may be to say the truth — recent developments may show us we know much too little about machines to finally decide that this is or is not the case: we had better speak only tentatively on these matters.2 Now, most people understand the view that man is a machine to mean that he is only a machine and so his suffering, thinking, etc., are all illusions.3 And most people so understand this because of the ancient doctrine which divides the world into reality and appearance,4 truth and illusion, and nothing in between — a view which I reject.5
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© 1977 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands
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Agassi, J. (1977). Man as Machine. In: Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology. The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1095-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1095-5_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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