Abstract
The problem that Edmund Gettier formulated is, I believe, still unsolved.1 It has been explored and developed to such an extent that it is worthwhile stating just what the problem is. It is, in my opinion, the problem of showing that a falliblistic theory of epistemic justification is possible. For, the problem arises in certain cases in which a person is justified, whether he knows it or not, in believing or accepting some false proposition which transmits justification to some true proposition. Thus, for a Cartesian who held that epistemic justification must proceed from what is certain by certain steps to arrive at what is known, the problem would not arise. For a philosopher who avers, as I do, that epistemic justification is fallible, the problem is to articulate a theory of falliable epistemic justification which allows us to distinguish between those cases in which justification, though fallible, yields knowledge, and those in which some false proposition deprives one of obtaining knowledge from justification. I shall present an analysis of knowledge and theory of justification incorporating a fourth condition to solve the problem Gettier raised.
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References
Gettier, Edmund L., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, 23, 6 (1963), 121–123.
Roth, Michael D., and Leon Galis, eds., Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970
George S., and Swain, Marshall, eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Ithaca: Cornell, 1978, 370–374.
Roderick M., Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1977. 3
Cf. Hilpinen, Risto, ‘Knowledge and Justification,’ Ajatus 33, 1 (1971), 7–39
Klein, Peter D., ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,’ Journal of Philosophy, 68, 16 (1971), 471–482.
Lehrer, Keith and Paxson, Thomas, Jr., ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief,’ Journal of Philosophy, 66, 8 (1969), 225–237.
Harman, Gilbert, Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973
Lehrer, Keith, Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Skyrms, Brian, ‘The Explication of “X knows that p”,’ Journal of Philosophy, 64 12 (1967), 373–389.
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© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company
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Lehrer, K. (1979). The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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