Abstract
In the previous two sections we delineated world and self as the extrinsic and intrinsic modalities of transcending-thinking. In each of these moments we noted the decisive role of “disjunction” and “recoil” whereby the subject is driven to a more comprehensive mode of philosophical integration. These processes have both a positive and a negative aspect. They are positive insofar as the transcending-subject is driven to question the coherence of mere outwardness or mere inwardness as autonomous regions of experience capable of answering the question of Being. But they are also potentially negative if, in either region, the transcending subject grows weary of the task of integration, resigning himself to apathia in the face of an insurmountable dualism, or if one absolutizes either object or subject as the key to Being. In the former case, the subject becomes oblivious to the call of Being, and in the latter case reaps the consequences of reductionism where, as in the case of the logical positivist, metaphysical and religious questions are consigned to mere value and relativity, or, in the case of the subjectivist, when everything becomes a matter of the intensity of emotion and “feeling” and questions of structure and logic are not even entertained. In either case, the dialectical nature of reality is lost, and freedom (which provides the basis for transcending) is nullified.
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The positive and really “eschatological” nature of Jaspers’ position cannot be overemphasized, for it stands directly opposed to the existentialism of nihilistic heroism, particularly Sartre where the pure “transcendental” purification of consciousness is valued only as a self-constituting “emptiness” which in turn provides for a sense of “unimpeded spontaneity.” Cf., Philosophy of Existentialism, ed. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), esp. pp. 31–73; The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams (New York: Noonday, 1957), pp. 103–106. Jaspers, by contrast, stands much closer to the Socratic and indeed the New Testament motif of “dying,” e.g., “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” Way to Wisdom, p. 53.
Cf., also Jaspers’ “Article of Faith” in Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale, 1959), p. xv ff.
“On My Philosophy,” Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Meridian, 1956), p. 133.
Cf., The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), passim.
Chiffren der Transzendenz, p. 44. Jaspers’ notion of the proper role of metaphysics bears a remarkable similarity to the Lutheran understanding of the dens absconditus (albeit less its resolution in the deus revelatus), for it is a metaphysics which “keeps the Godhead flatly concealed. Only indirectly — and always at a distance — does God reveal himself.. Transcendence becomes visible in its traces, not in itself and always ambiguously. It does not become extant in the world. But to Existenz it may mean the perfect peace of Being, a superabundant Being that has nothing indefinite about it anymore.” Phil.., III, P. 60. The theological implications of Jaspers’ “foundering metaphysics” will be further explored in Part III.
Cf., Truth and Symbol, trans. Jean Wilde (New Haven: College and University Press, 1959), pp. 33–35. While much is claimed in the name of experience, Jaspers’ attitude is highly historical as when he says, “It is only within the world that we can live above and beyond the world… There is no way around the world, no way around history, only a way through history.” The Origin and Goal of History, p. 275. It is a similar sense of historicity which leads Karl Rahner to say, “Divine things are no longer considered as the subject of science but as the principle of the subject.” Spirit in the World (New York: Herder, 1968), p. 389.
Phil., III, p. 17.
Ibid., p. 16.
Reason and Existenz, pp. 105–106.
Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder, 1972), pp. 320–329.
The Perennial Scope of Philosophy; p. 77.
Truth and Symbol, p. 75. Cf., also Phil., III, p. 144ff., and Chiffren der Transzendenz, pp. 59–83.
Phil., III, pp. 119, 192–194; Psych. der Welt, p. 52ff.
Ibid., p. 193.
Truth and Symbol, p. 27ff.
Chiffren der Transzendenz, pp. 34–58; Phil., III, p. 114.
Cf., Origin and Goal of History, pp. 262, 272ff. One cannot over-emphasize that for Jaspers the reality question is almost completely equated with experience and not just experience in the naive sense but experience “consciously heightened” through transcending-thinking.
Cf., Phil., III, p. 146, “Worldless love is love of nothing; an unfounded bliss. I really love Transcendence only as my love transfigures the world.”
Ibid., pp. 147–174, Reason and Existenz, pp. 69–74.
Von der Wahrheit, pp. 158ff. Jaspers’ position is not ontological but “periechontological,” i.e., not what but how Being can be for us, as in the case of the Greek verb, to “surround” or “encircle” Being. We will speak more on this in Part III.
Phil., III, pp. 194ff.
Philosophical Fragments, pp. 71–73.
Phil., III, pp. 202–203.
Ibid., p. 205.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., 6.432. Though Wittgenstein does not speak of Chiffren, the movement of the Tractatus towards “Indirect” or poetic discourse as the only possible way of dealing with ethics, aesthetics and religion is in many ways similar to what Jaspers develops as transcending-thinking — even what Jaspers describes as foundering; for example, “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he uses them — as steps — to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.” 6.54.
Reason and Existenz, pp. 105–106.
Phil., III, P. 207ff.; Nietzsche, p. 292f.
Philosophical Faith and Revelation, passim
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Olson, A.M. (1979). Transcending in Speculative Metaphysics. In: Transcendence and Hermeneutics. Studies in Philosophy and Religion, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9270-2_3
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