Abstract
Coal, electricity, natural gas, and oil markets are imperfect spatial markets. In such markets, consumers, haulers, and/or producers possess market power which derives from the insulation that transport cost provides from competition with distant rivals. Policy analysis tools have been recently developed for simulating such markets. In this chapter, models for predicting prices in imperfect spatial markets are summarized and their application to energy problems is critiqued. It is concluded that much research remains to be done, and that regional scientists, geographers, operations researchers, and economists all must contribute.
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Hobbs, B.F. (1985). Modeling Imperfect Spatial Energy Markets. In: Calzonetti, F.J., Solomon, B.D. (eds) Geographical Dimensions of Energy. The GeoJournal Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5416-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5416-8_12
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