Abstract
According to Gassendi’s own account he conceived a dislike for Aristotelian philosophy during his student days in the college of Aix-en-Provence. His complaints at that time concerned an alleged ethical inadequacy in Aristotelianism, for the Peripatetic philosophy, in his view, did not measure up to the Stoic philosophical ideal to which Cicero had alluded in his praise of philosophy: “Philosophy can never be praised as she merits; the man who obeys her precepts may live all the days of his life without trouble”.1
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Notes
“Nunquam satis laudari digne poterit philosophia: cui qui pareat, omne tempus aetatis sine molestia possit degere” (Cicero, De senectute (Loeb classical library edition), I.2.); P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99.
Cf. Gassendi’s letter to Henri du Faur de Pibrac, a prominent public figure, later President of the Parlement of Provence, son of Guy du Faur de Pibrac: P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, VI, p.2.
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99.
“Verum mihi animos adiecit, timoremque omnem depulit et Vivis, et mei Charonii lectio, ex qua visus sum non iniuria suspicari sectam illam non esse penitus probandam, quod probaretur quamplurimis. Sed
et vires accrevere ex Ramo praesertim, ac Mirandulo: quorum idcirco mentionem facio, quod ingenuum semper duxerim profiteri per quos profecissem.” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99.)
Cf. B. Rochot: 1955, “La vie, le caractère et la formation intellectuelle”, in B. Rochot et al.:. 1955, Pierre Gassendi 1592–1655, sa vie et son oeuvre (Centre International de Synthèse), Paris, pp.9–54, espc. p. 16
also R. Lenoble: 1971, Mersenne ou la naissance du mécanisme, 2nd Edition, J. Vrin, Paris, p.410.
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, pp.99–106a; VI, p.30.
Idem, III p.106a-b.
Idem, III, pp. 107a–108a.
“Per mathematicas scimus, si quid scimus.” (Idem, III, p. 107a.) This statement was a criticism of the Aristotelians. It is not to be concluded from it that Gassendi was himself a mathematician in any sense, for he was not.
Cf. B. Rochot: 1957, “Gassendi et les mathématiques”, in Revue d’histoire des sciences, 10, pp.69–78. Gassendi was doing no more than repeat what he had read in the writings of Vives, Ramus and Mersenne
cf. P. Dear: 1984, “Marin Mersenne and the probabilistic roots of ‘mitigated scepticism’”, in Journal of the history of philosophy, 22, pp.173–205.
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p. 107b.
“Uno verbo de hac rerum natura nihil perviderunt: quando suas scholas ingressi, aliam naturam ingressi sunt cum hac exteriori minime congruentem.” (Idem, III, p. 108a.)
See H.O. Evennett: 1968, The spirit of the Counter-Reformation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.78–79, 84–86
also Robert Mandrou: 1978, From humanism to science 1480–1700, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 156–159.
See Ignatius of Loyola: 1558–1599, The constitution of the Society of Jesus, IV, Ch.13
Father Aquaviva S.J.: 1599, Ratio studiorum
George E. Ganss S.J. (Ed.): 1970, Saint Ignatius of Loyola. The constitution of the Society of Jesus, St. Louis, pp.215ff.
Ganss claims: “One great merit of the Ratio of 1599 is that it produced a unity of procedure throughout the far-flung hundreds of Jesuit schools in Europe and the Americas. That procedural unity was greater than would be desirable or possible today; but it was a significant advantage and achievement amid the educational disorganisation of the 1500’s and 1600’s.” (Idem, p.216, note 4.)
Ignatius, Constitution, IV, ch. 14.3; Aquaviva, Ratio studiorum, ch. 3 (“De studio philosophiae”).
For example, two text-books issued by faculty members of the Collegio Romano: Benedetto Pereira: 1576, De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus libri quindecim, Rome
and Francisco de Toledo: 1585, Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus in octo libros Aristotelis ‘de Physica…, Cologne; also the text-books of the Jesuits of Coimbra, for example: Conimbricenses: 1602, Problemata quae in… physicis…, Moguntiae, 1601; and Commentariorum… in octo libros physicorum…, Cologne. These text-books were used very widely in Jesuit schools.
Cf. A.C. Crombie: 1977, “Mathematics and Platonism in the sixteenth-century Italian universities and in Jesuit educational policy”, in IIPIΣMATA, Festschrift für Willy Hartner, Wiesbaden, pp.63–94.
Cf. E.A. Fellmann, “Fabri, Honoré”, Dictionary of scientific biography, IV, pp.505–507.
It was true of all sixteenth and early seventeenth-century scholastic texts that I have consulted (see bibliography). Charles B. Schmitt has written as follows: “… even a casual reading of the Aristotelian commentaries of the period [late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries] reveals a peculiar reluctance to quote authors other than the school tradition… the Aristotelian commentary had changed remarkably little over a period of several centuries, considering how much philosophical water had passed under the bridge since the beginning of the humanist criticism of the schools… All in all, the school philosophy was considerably more traditionally oriented — both in form and content — than were the other philosophical movements which emerged in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.” (Charles B. Schmitt: 1964, “Who read Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirándola?”, in Studies in the Renaissance, II, pp. 125–126.)
Paul Dibon, in his interesting work (1954), La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d’or.
Tome I, L’enseignement philosophique dans les universités à l’époque précartésienne (1576–1650), L’Institut Français d’Amsterdam, Amsterdam, has painted a different picture of scholastic teaching as it was conducted in Holland. Dibon has given a number of examples of Peripatetic philosophers teaching in scholastic institutions who were adapting their teaching in order to reflect the new intellectual movements. This was especially true in Leyden, he claimed, in the cases of Daniel Voetius, Cornelius Valerius and Jaccheus. This detail is of particular interest, since Gassendi visited Leyden in 1629 and later sent outlines of his Epicurean project to scholars of the Academy (cf. infra, Chs. 2, 3).
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99, 100.
Gassendi had a theory that the chyle passed through the choledoch duct, and had debated this theory with a certain Professor Merindol of Marseilles. He was forced to abandon it when the De lacteis venis of Gasparo Aselli was published in 1627. Cf. Gassendi’s letter to Peiresc of 16.5.1628 (P. Tamizey de Larroque (Ed.), Lettres de Peiresc, IV, pp. 186–189
also Georges Martin-Charpenel: 1957, “Gassendi physiologiste”, in B. Rochot et al.: 1957, Actes du Congrès du Tricentenaire de Pierre Gassendi (4–5 août, 1955), Digne, pp.207–215).
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p. 102.
Idem, IV, p.76.
Idem, III, p.102. Cf. the letter of Gassendi to Peiresc of 28.2.1629, in which he referred to the dissections of Payan that he had witnessed at an earlier time, in P. Tamizey de Larroque (Eds.), Lettres de Peiresc, IV, pp.203–209
also Martin-Charpenel: (1957), “Gassendi physiologiste”.
“Postquam enim pervidere licuit quantis Naturae Genius ab humano ingenio dissideret intervallis, quid aliud potui, quam existimare effectorum naturalium intimas causas prorsus fugere humanam perspicaciam? Miserescere proinde, ac pudere coepit me levitatis et arrogantiae Dogmaticorum Philosophorum, qui et glorientur se arripuisse, et tarn severe profiteantur naturalium rerum scientiam.” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99.)
“Enitendum duxi, quantum in me esset, retundere huius tantae credulitatis aciem, probaturus num simul quidpiam ex turgida illa Aristoteleorum praesumptione detraherem.” (Idem, III, p. 100.) There seems to be a verbal echo of Vives who complained that the Aristotelian subtleties “break and blunt the spearhead of the intelligence” (“frangunt ingenii aciem ac retundunt”) (J.L. Vives, Opera omnia, 1782, Gregorio Majansio (Ed.): Joannis Ludovici Vivis Valentini opera omnia, 8 vols., B. Monfort, Valencia, VI, p.352).
Supra, p. 15.
Cf. supra, p. 15; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Loeb classical library edition), I.190,200.
“Nullum veriorem hoc sapiente Christianum fore puto.” (J. Vives, Opera omnia, III, p. 17.) Concerning the ethical writings of Vives, cf. Carlos G. Norena: 1970, Juan Luis Vives, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Ch.10.
For an account of the storm and for a spirited defence of Pierre Charron that goes against the standard censorious view, cf. the study of Charron by a latter-day kinsman, Jean Daniel Charron: 1960, The “wisdom” of Pierre Charron. An original and orthodox code of morality, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
P. Charron: 1601, De la sagesse livres trois, S. Millanges, Bordeaux.
See the objections of those whom Charron called “esprits faibles”, and others, as they are listed in 1606, Traicté de sagesse, D. Le Clerc, Paris, pp.224–225, and in the preface to the second and all subsequent editions of the Sagesse. The objections which Charron took most note of were the claim that he was a Pelagian heretic and the objections against his Pyrrhonism on the grounds of its alleged danger for the faith.
P. Charron: 1606, Traicté de sagesse, composé par Pierre Charron, Parisien, D. Le Clerc, Paris.
Idem., ch. 2, par.9; ch. 4, par.2,3; ch. 7,etc.
“Infame escrivain, cynique et brutal s’il en fut jamais” (P.F. Garasse S.J.: 1625, La somme théologique des véritez capitales de la religion chrestienne, S. Chappelet, Paris, p.665). Garasse was himself subsequently condemned by the Sorbonne
cf. Richard H. Popkin: 1968, The history of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, revised edition, Harper and Row, New York, pp.114–118.
Charron replied in Traicté de sagesse, ch. 2, par.9; ch. 4, pars.2,3.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.190, 200.
Idem., 1.8, 10, 196, 205.
Idem, 1.8, 10, 12, 17,28–30.
J. Vives, Opera omnia, VI, pp.23–24
cf. C.G. Norena, Juan Luis Vives, pp.248–249.
“Philosophia tota opinionibus et conjecturis verisimilitudinis est innixa” (J. Vives, Opera omnia, VI, p.417).
P. Charron, Traicté de sagesse, p.224.
“Ces sont choses opposites” (P. Charron, Traicté de sagesse, p.225).
“Pulchre porro me admones authorem hune mecum in solitudinem ducam… Charronio vero quis sanior iudex?” (Letter of 8.4.1621, P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, VI, pp. 1–2.)
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirándola: 1520, Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium, et veritatis Christi anae disciplinae distinctum in libris sex, quorum tres omnem philosophorum sectam universim, reliqui Aristoteleam et Aristotelis armis particulatim impugnant, ubicumque autem Christiana et asseritur, et celebratur disciplina, Mirandola.
“I came to the conclusion that it was much better and much more useful to reduce all the dogmas of the philosophers to uncertainty, than to reconcile them with one another as my uncle wished to do.” “Mihi autem venit in mentem consentaneum magis esse, et utile magis, incerta reddere philosophorum dogmata, quam conciliare, ut patrinus volebat.” (Preface written by Gianfrancesco Pico to his edition of his uncle’s works entitled: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 1572–1573, Opera omnia Joannis Pici, Mirandulae Concordiaeque comitis…, 2 vols., Basileae, II, p.738.)
“Quid restat praeterea ut non ipsa gentium doctrina et vana, et incerta prorsus iudicetur.” (G.F. Pico della Mirandola, Idem, preface.)
Idem, II, pp.812–815; pp.718–719. Ramus also supported this view; cf. Reijer Hooykaas: 1958, Humanisme, science et réforme: Pierre de la Ramée (1515–1572), E.J. Brill, Leyden, pp.9.ff.
This conclusion has been arrived at after a certain amount of discussion among the scholars. Fortunat Strowski argued in his work Montaigne F. Alean, Paris (1906), that the Examen vanitatis had a very considerable influence on later thinkers. The opposite view was taken insofar as it concerned the relationship of Pico’s work with that of Montaigne, in the work of Pierre de Villey: 1908, Les sources de l’évolution des essais de Montaigne, Fondation Thiers, Paris, II, p. 166, pp.324–325. In more recent times both R.H. Popkin, History of scepticism, pp. 19–22
and Charles B. Schmitt: 1964, “Who read Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola?” in Studies in the renaissance, II, pp. 105–132
and Charles B. Schmitt in 1967, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, have been in general agreement that the influence of Pico was not great, but that the Examen vanitatis was of some importance as a source-book for the anti-Aristotelians in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
C.B. Schmitt: 1964, pp.128–129.
Charles B. Schmitt: 1972, Cicero scepticus: a study of the ‘Academica’ in the Renaissance, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, ch. 4.
“Aristotelis philosophiam, orbis terrarum pene totam et solam philosophiam esse” (preface to Bks IX and X of 1556, Animadversionum Aristotelicarum libri XX, A. Wechelum, Paris). For complaints of Ramus against the Aristotelian commentators, see the same preface, also Bk. II, p.67, Bk. III, p.97; cf. also Hooykaas, Humanisme, science et réforme, p. 13.
C.B. Schmitt, Cicero scepticus, p.89.
Cf. C.B. Schmitt, Cicero scepticus, p. 12.
Sextus Empiricus: 1562, Sexti philosophi Pyrrhoniarum hypotypwsewn [sic]… interprete Henrico Stephano, M. Juvenum, Paris
Sextus Empiricus: 1569, Adver sus mathematicos, Gentiano Herveto Aurelio interprete…, M. Juvenum, Paris.
Cf. R.H. Popkin, History of scepticism, pp.68–69.
“Quanto usui autem esse possit Sexti Empirici commentarius ad tuenda Christianae religionis dogmata adversus externos Philosophos, pulchre docet Francisus Picus Mirandulanus in eo libro quo Christianam tueter philosophiam adversus dogmata externorum Philosophorum.” (Preface of Gentian Hervet to his translation of Sextus Empiricus: 1569, Adversus mathematicos, as quoted by C.B. Schmitt (1964), p.114.)
See Charles B. Schmitt: 1967, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and his critique of Aristotle, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, pp. 172–174. Another author who might very possibly have drawn Gassendi’s attention to Pico was Giovanni Battista Bernardi, author of a dictionary of philosophical quotations entitled Seminarium totius philosophiae… (1582–1585)
cf. C.B. Schmitt, Idem, pp.170–171.
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, pp.99–100.
Cf. the account of Pyrrhonic doubt given by Sextus Empiricus: “Chapter XXVI of the expressions “I am non-apprehensive” and “I apprehend not”. Both the expressions “I am non-apprehensive” and “I apprehend not” are indicative of a personal state of mind, in which the sceptic, for the time being, avoids affirming or denying any non-evident matter of enquiry, as is obvious from what we have said above concerning the other expressions.’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.201.) The Pyrrhonisms manner of proceeding has been described as follows: “The Academician takes active part in philosophical discussion, maintaining a definite position, a standpoint; the sceptic in the sense of Sextus [i.e. the Pyrrhonist] has no position… Although he throws arguments into the discussion, he takes no part in it. Although he confronts the dogmatist with counterarguments, he does so without accepting any of them as true or valid.” (Arne Naess: 1968, Scepticism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p.4.) Cf. P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, I, p, 13b.
“Quantis Naturae Genius ab humano ingenio dissideret intervallis” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.99).
“Aristoteles… adolescentes in thesi, non ad hunc morem philosophorum tenuitur disserendi: sed ad copiam rhetorum in utramque partem, ut ornatius et uberius dici posset, exercuit.” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p. 100) Gassendi referred to Cicero, probably De oratore (Loeb classical library edition), I, xi. 49–54, as his authority.
“Tarn indigna opera” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p. 101).
“Sed utcumque se res habeat: seu dogmatice quid defendo, seu sceptico more quid experior: et, seu profero quidpiam verum, seu quidpiam dico probabile…” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p.101.)
Cf. A. Naess, Scepticism, p.2ff.
“Paradoxa mea publice disputata sunt apud celeberrimos illos totius Provinciae consessus…” (P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, I, p.98.)
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.1.
“At vero nostrates philosophi, quorum princeps idem, philosophorum omnium facile sapientissimus, Aristoteles Stagyrites fuit.” (J. Vives, Opera omnia, III, p. 18.)
“Nullum videtur fuisse ingenium Aristotélico praestantius.” (Idem, III, P.25.)
“Nugatoria et praepostera doctrina valde ineptum, nee ulla fere parte Aristoteleum…” (P. Ramus: 1556, Animadversionum Aristotelicarum libri XX…, Bk. 3, p.97.)
“Detrahant a Grammatica omnia definitionum partitionumque lumina: pro exemplis elegantibus misceant abecedaria figmenta.” (Idem, Bk. 2, p.67.)
Idem, preface to Bks. 9 and 10. Cf. R. Hooykaas, Humanisme, science et réforme, p.13ff.
P. Gassendi, Opera omnia, III, p. 101.
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Brundell, B. (1987). Sceptical Anti-Aristotelianism. In: Pierre Gassendi. Synthese Historical Library, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3793-2_2
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